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II. Lecture Notes: Morality and the Happy Life (Plato’s Republic, Ch.1)

1. Socratic Inquiry
2. The Socratic Method
3. What Is Morality?
4. Function and Morality
5. Morality and Eudaimonia
Here I explain the topics of Socratic inquiry, which all relate to the
fundamental question, “How should one live?” I then explain the Socratic
Method of instruction and argument, and summarize Ch.1 of the Republic. In
the last two sections, the Socratic conceptions of “function”, “morality”, along
with the ancient Greek notion of eudaimonia or happiness, are discussed.

1. Socratic Inquiry

Socrates (470?~399 BCE) never wrote anything himself, and we do not know much

about him except through the dialogues of Plato (427~347 BCE). Here I will present an

overview of the topics on which Socrates cross-examined his interlocutors (i.e., partners in

conversation) in Plato’s dialogues.

Generally speaking, Plato begins his dialogues with Socrates asking a question of the

form: What is _______? This is a request for the definition of _______, where we may fill in the

blank with any general term. But we usually find Socrates searching for the definitions of ethical

terms like ‘virtue’, ‘justice’, ‘morality’, etc., because his chief concern was ethics and the moral

life.

But why does Socrates search for the definitions of ethical terms? Socrates and his

interlocutors are interested in finding out, for any given kind of thing X, what X’s properties or

characteristics are—i.e., whether X is beneficial or harmful, admirable or contemptible,

teachable or unteachable, in our best interest or not in our best interest, and so on. But we cannot

know whether X has any of these characteristics, unless we first know what X is, or in other

words, until we have a precise definition of ‘X’.

For example, we cannot know whether rhetoric is beneficial or harmful unless and until

we know what precisely rhetoric is, just as you cannot know whether a person by the name of

Meno is handsome or ugly until you know who exactly is Meno. You have to first identify
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Meno, in order to tell me whether or not he is handsome. 1 In the same way, we have to first

identify rhetoric, in order to make the judgment that it is good for the soul or not.

So, Socrates begins his inquiry with the question: What is X? And he usually conducts

this inquiry with a person who claims to be an expert in X. Thus, for example, if X is rhetoric,

he goes to a rhetorician, and asks him what rhetoric is. If X is courage, he goes to a military

general, and asks him what courage is. Often, the so-called expert answers the question by

giving examples or particular instances of X—e.g., the military general might describe various

types of courageous behavior, such as remaining at one’s post and fighting the enemy. But this

is not the sort of answer Socrates wants. Socrates wants to know what is common to all the

particular instances or specimens of X, in other words, what the essential nature of X is, or the

precise definition of the term ‘X’. (To use a modern illustration, suppose that a scientist asks

you what water is. You might point to muddy water, rain water, ice water, drinking water, etc.,

and say that these are all water. But the physicist will tell you that that is not the answer he

wants. He wants to know the common feature shared by all these different varieties of water,

and he will tell you that the essential nature of water is characterized by its chemical structure,

H2O.)

Eventually the so-called expert provides a definition of X. Then Socrates employs his

Socratic Method: he cross-examines the expert on his beliefs about X, and it invariably turns out

that the expert’s view of X contains contradictions.

Now, we have seen that in most of Plato’s dialogues Socrates asks a question of the form,

“What is X?” But the more fundamental theme running through all these dialogues is the
1
This is the example that Socrates himself gives to Meno, in a dialogue called the Meno. In that dialogue (71b)
Socrates points out: “…how can I know a property of something when I don’t even know what it is? Do you
suppose that somebody entirely ignorant of who Meno is could say whether he is handsome and rich and wellborn or
the reverse?” Also, cf., Republic (354c): “I mean, if I don’t know what morality actually is, it’s going to be difficult
for me to know whether or not it is good, and whether its possession makes someone happy or not.”
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question “How should I live?” or “What is the best way to live?” or “What is the highest welfare

of the soul?” If we know what X is, we will know whether X is beneficial or in our best interest,

and hence this knowledge will contribute to our knowing how to live well.

In sum, the Socrates’s method of inquiry may be likened to the art of midwifery. This is

an analogy that Socrates himself makes in the dialogue Theaetetus, and he also suggests it in the

Symposium. Socrates is a midwife, not of the body, but of the soul. A midwife in ancient

Greece was an old woman who was barren and could not bear children of her own, but helped to

deliver the children of other women in labor. In the same way, Socrates says, although he has no

wisdom of his own, he helps others give birth to many admirable truths. This is a painful

process, because one has to first admit that there are flaws and contradictions in one’s view. But

once one realizes one’s own ignorance, one can go on to inquire after the truth.

2. The Socratic Method

The Socratic Method is well exemplified in the dialogue between Socrates and Meletus

(Socrates’s Defense, 24b~27e), where Socrates scrutinizes the official charge leveled against

him, that he is guilty of corrupting the young and believing in false gods. Simply put, it is a

method of showing a person’s view to be wrong by showing that the view contains a

contradiction.

The method involves two component parts, (i) cross-examination and (ii) refutation.

Take any belief or claim, and let us name it P. Socrates begins by cross-examining someone who

believes or claims P, in order to find out what other beliefs or claims the person is committed to,

and also to work out the logical implications and consequences of P together with these other

beliefs or claims. Eventually it turns out that the person ought to believe or claim that not-P.
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But how can anyone believe or claim that both P and not-P? That is a contradiction, which is

necessarily false. It is impossible for a contradiction to be true, and impossible for anyone to

believe a contradiction. Hence something must be wrong with the original belief or claim that P,

or with the other beliefs or claims held by the person.2

3. What is Morality?

In the Republic, Ch.1, we find Socrates and his interlocutors (Cephalus, Polemarchus and

Thrasymachus) inquiring into the nature of morality.

The first interlocutor, Cephalus thinks that morality is “truthfulness and giving back

anything one has borrowed from someone” (p.8, 331c~d). But this definition of ‘morality’ or

‘doing right’ is easily refuted by showing that it would be wrong under certain circumstances to

give back what one has borrowed (e.g., weapons to a lunatic, presumably because the mad guy

would harm himself or others with the weapons). Cephalus drops the debate.

Polemarchus then picks it up and becomes Socrates’s interlocutor.3 He takes up

Simonides’s definition of morality, “it is right to give anyone back what you owe them.” (p.9,

331e) Polemarchus revises the definition, interpreting Simonides as saying that it is right to

benefit one’s friends and harm one’s enemies. This is the opening move to a series of

arguments, as elaborate as a complex game of chess. Polemarchus is clearly outmatched.

Socrates “checks” him several times, and each time the latter is forced to readjust his position.

The decisive move comes when Socrates asks whether a moral person can harm anyone (p.14,

335b). It follows, from Polemarchus’s revised definition of morality, that a moral person can

harm anyone who is an enemy. You can turn to pages 14~15 (335b~e) to see how Socrates gets

2
Please see the handout “Recognizing Arguments”, p.5, for more on the Socratic Method.
3
For more on the arguments between Socrates and Polemarchus, see the handout, “Preparing Outlines for
Arguments in the Republic, Ch.1”.
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Polemarchus to admit that harming any person, friend or enemy, is the job of an immoral person,

rather than the job of a moral person. This contradicts Polemarchus’s revised definition of

morality, namely that part where it states that it is right to harm one’s enemies. Polemarchus

agrees to give up his definition, and collaborate with Socrates in seeking an alternative definition

of morality. This shows the constructive aspect of the Socratic Method, which is called dialectic

(the art of dialogue). The Socratic Method is not merely negative and critical. Socrates and his

interlocutor can engage in a collaborative search for the truth, once the interlocutor admits that

there is something wrong with his own view.

Then Thrasymachus comes raging into the scene. The definition Thrasymachus proposes

is: morality is the advantage of the stronger party (p.18, 338c). To refute Thrasymachus’s view,

Socrates has to engage in eristic (the art of dispute; Eris was the goddess of war), which is

necessary when one’s interlocutor is contentious and uncooperative.

The full extent of Thrasymachus’s view on morality emerges gradually in the course of

several arguments, and here I will state the implications of his view that Socrates himself finds

most troubling.

That morality is the advantage of the stronger party is only one side of the coin. The

other side is that “immorality is profitable and advantageous to oneself” (p.27, 344c). Morality

is something imposed on the weaker party by the stronger party, for the advantage of the strong.

So, what morality dictates as good for the weak is actually to the benefit of the strong, not of the

weak, and serves the happiness of the strong, rather than of the weak (p.26, 343c). Hence the

clever realize that morality is a scam in which the moral people are the unwitting victims. They

see that it pays to be immoral, and to reap advantage from the moral person’s servitude to

morality. The most perfect form of immorality is dictatorship, where one robs the entire state
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from the people, and is praised and declared a happy man by his fellow citizens. Immorality has

a bad name only because people are afraid to be the victims of immoral acts, but for those who

can successfully perpetrate immoral deeds, it is a blessing (p.27, 344c).

Now, Socrates does profess ignorance, but this does not mean that Socrates does not have

his own view about morality. He believes that immorality is not profitable and advantageous to

oneself, nor is it more profitable and advantageous than morality, “not even if it is given free rein

and never prevented from getting its own way; and even if I grant you your immoral person,

Thrasymachus, with the power to do wrong either by stealth or by brute force, for my part I’m

still not convinced that it is more profitable than morality.” (p.28, 345a)

Thus Thrasymachus’s claim that immorality is better than morality is much more

important to Socrates than the other claim that morality is to the advantage of the stronger party

(p.32, 347e). So, in a sense, immorality is good and morality is bad. Thrasymachus, in short, is

turning convention upside down, which is why Socrates comments that it is difficult to respond

to Thrasymachus’s idea (p.33, 348e).

What you have to specifically address, in your first paper, is the argument between

Thrasymachus and Socrates from 348d~350c (pp.33~36), on Thrasymachus’s idea that immoral

people are clever and good, and moral people are not. Socrates refutes Thrasymachus on this

point, and you have to explain how. Socrates believes that he has successfully established,

through this argument, that “morality was a good state and is knowledge, and that immorality

was a bad state and was ignorance” (p.36, 350d). This, of course, is the same as saying that the

moral person is good and clever, whereas the immoral person is bad and stupid.

Next, Socrates refutes Thrasymachus’s contention that immorality is effective

(pp.36~39), and that immorality is conducive to a happy and fulfilled life (pp.40~42). Socrates’s
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belief that morality is not only conducive to a good life, but itself constitutes happiness and

fulfillment in human life, is his key thesis in the Republic. But in order to prove this thesis, he

has to first define what “morality” is, because “if I don’t know what morality actually is, it’s

going to be difficult for me to know whether or not it is good, and whether its possession makes

someone unhappy or happy” (p.43, 354c). This he does in the rest of the Republic, with Glaucon

and Adeimantus (brothers of Plato) as his interlocutors and fellow-seekers after the truth.4

4. Function and Morality

In order to properly appreciate some of the moves made in Socrates’s arguments, we

need to establish the following definitions, mostly gleaned from pp.40~43 of the Republic. First,

here is the definition of ‘function’:

(a) the function of X =df. the kind of activity which only X can do, or which X is best at doing.

For example, the biological function of the eye is to see, and seeing is an activity that only eyes

can perform, or that eyes can perform better than any other bodily organ. Here the contrast-class

(what X in general is compared to) is other kinds of things Y, Z, etc., such as noses, ears, etc.

Second, definitions of what count as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in terms of performing a function:

(b1) a good X =df. an X that is good at (= comparatively skilled in) its function.
(b2) a bad X =df. an X that is bad at (= comparatively unskilled in) its function.

For example, you have good eyes if they have 20/20 vision, as compared to my eyes which have

poor vision. Here the contrast-class (what a particular member of X is compared to) is other

members that belong to the same class X, and perform the same function. Thus we say that you

have good eyes as compared to other eyes (not as compared to noses or ears), with respect to the

function that eyes are meant to perform. Likewise, we say Socrates is a good person as

4
“The Ring of Gyges”, which you’ve read, is in fact the second chapter of the Republic.
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compared to Stalin or Saddam Hussein (not as compared to horses and dogs), with respect to the

function that humans are supposed to perform.

Third, I stipulate the following definition of the Greek word technē, which can be

translated as “art”, “craft” or “expertise”.

(c) the art of performing a function =df. know-how in X’s skilled performance of its function.

Let us now consider this question: what is the function of a human being? If you reflect

carefully upon this question, it will strike you as very strange. Sure, tools like hammers and

calculators have their own mechanical functions, the tasks that we design them to do. Also, body

organs like hands and eyes have their respective biological functions, the purposes that they have

acquired through a long process of evolution. Moreover, human beings in the capacity of

parents, postal workers, and artists have their respective social functions, the jobs or

responsibilities or roles that we freely choose or are assigned to us. But it doesn’t make much

sense to speak of the function of a human being simply by virtue of being a human being, right?

What the ancient Greeks mean by the function of a human being is the function of a human being

as opposed to other biological species like trees or dogs or horses. The function of an oak tree is

to flourish as an oak. The function of a horse is to live well as a horse. Similarly, the function of

a human being is to flourish or live well as a human being. A good human is someone who lives

well.

Now, here’s another question worth puzzling over: what is the art of living well (as a

human being)? According to Socrates, the art of living well as a human is morality. Hence, a

moral person is someone who is good at living well, and an immoral person is someone who is

bad at living well. But, of course, this is a vacuous and meaningless claim, unless we know what

living well amounts to, and also what morality consists in.
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Socrates does provide such an account in the Republic, but unfortunately we have not

read those parts. I can provide such an account in very general terms, but we need to return to

our definition of ‘function’. Take the function of an eye, which depends on the nature or the

structure of the eye. The internal structure of the eye is disposed in such a way that it enables us

to see. Similarly, human nature has an internal structure, disposed in such a way that it enables

us to live well. This internal structure, according to Socrates, has three parts: reason, will, and

the passions. It is only when there is a harmony of these parts, where the will follows reason and

the passions accord with reason, that we are able to live well. Morality is therefore the art of

fine-tuning the internal structure of the human soul.

Moreover, society also has a structure, which consists of various positions occupied by

human beings and the relations obtaining between them. Thus, according to Socrates, morality is

also the art of striking a harmonious balance in the organization of these positions and in human

relationships.

5. Morality and Eudaimonia

All ancient Greek philosophers agreed that eudaimonia is the ultimate end or final good

that we all seek.  We always choose it for its own sake, and anything else we choose, we choose

for the sake of eudaimonia.  Eudaimonia is also a comprehensive good. Whatever we may

want out of life is included in eudaimonia, and it excludes nothing we find worth desiring. Thus

eudaimonia was thought to meet the two conditions of finality (being a final good) and self-

sufficiency (being a comprehensive good).

In translation, eudaimonia is usually rendered as “happiness” or “flourishing”.

Eudaimonia is also equated with “living well”. Eudaimonia does not mean a momentary state of
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bliss; rather, it is a process that can only be achieved in a complete lifetime.  It is a deep sense of

happiness or fulfillment that extends over a person’s whole life.  (Thus there is an ancient Greek

saying attributed to Solon, “Call no man happy before his death”.) And eudaimonia does not

refer to a subjective feeling of happiness; there is an objective basis for making the judgment as

to whether a person is truly happy or not.

We may also think of eudaimonia in terms of human flourishing. Eudaimonia is the

sense of fulfillment that comes with the full development and exercise of human capacities. 

There may be some people who are perfectly content to lie in front of the TV the whole day—we

call them “couch potatoes”.  We cannot say of such people that they are flourishing, because they

are not potatoes, after all, but human beings.  The Greeks would say that human flourishing

involves the exercise of our power of reasoning, which sets us apart from vegetables and other

animals.  It also involves social interaction, which means that family life, friendship and political

association with fellow citizens are part and parcel of human flourishing.

The Greek philosophers, however, disagreed on the precise relation between happiness

(eudaimonia) and moral virtue (the cardinal virtues being wisdom, courage, temperance and

justice).  We may map out the possible positions in the following manner:

(1) The morally virtuous life is neither necessary nor sufficient for the happy life. The

Greek philosopher who possibly held this view is Epicurus, who was a hedonist, but not in the

usual sense. He did not advocate reckless pursuit of corporeal pleasures. The Epicurean position

is this: the best life is the life with the least amount of pain.  It follows from this position that if

the virtues were less conducive to life without pain than wealth and fame, then one should adopt

wealth and fame rather than the virtues.

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(2) The morally virtuous life is necessary but not sufficient for the happy life. According

to some interpretations, Aristotle might have held this view. Aristotle may be seen as claiming

that being virtuous is part of the good life, but also that we need external goods—such as wealth,

friends, political influence, personal beauty, intelligence, good fortune, long life, peaceful death,

etc.—in order to live a completely happy life. These external goods are material conditions

external to ourselves, or goods which depend on circumstances beyond our control; whereas the

virtues are inner goods which we can possess by improving our own character.  One implication

of this view is that our happiness can be influenced by accidents of fortune and vagaries of fate.

(I must note, however, certain passages in Aristotle’s ethical works suggest that this is not a

plausible interpretation of Aristotle.)

(3) The morally virtuous life is sufficient but not necessary for the happy life. To my

knowledge no ancient Greek philosopher held this view. But in my opinion it is (at least at first

sight) a plausible position. For someone like Socrates the morally virtuous life is sufficient for

happiness, but for many people, it seems, happiness can be attained in other ways, e.g., by

immoral means, through aesthetic pursuit, through political career or family life, through

recreational activities, etc.

(4) The morally virtuous life is both necessary and sufficient for the happy life. Socrates,

Plato, the Stoics, and (according to some interpretations) Aristotle held this position, though in

somewhat different ways. You will find Socrates's statement of this view in the conclusion of

his debate with Thrasymachus (pp.40~42, 352d~354a).  On p.42 (354a), Socrates says, “a moral

person is happy, whereas an immoral person is unhappy”. 

Socrates holds that when one is virtuous one cannot be harmed by a bad person or

perturbed by external vicissitudes.  The moral virtues are self-sufficient, in the sense that all one
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needs for happiness is provided by one’s own virtuous character.  This position entails some

strange claims that Socrates makes in the Republic and other dialogues: for instance, that one can

be happy while being tortured on the rack (so long as one is moral), that it is better to suffer

wrong than to do wrong (since to do wrong is to harm oneself in the sense of making oneself

immoral), and that it is better to be punished for doing wrong than to go unpunished (given that

punishment is moral improvement).

Indeed, Socrates himself exemplifies the moral person who remains unperturbed in the

face of misfortune and unjust punishment. He was sentenced to die under false charges by his

own city, Athens, which he cared about all his life. And yet, those who were present at his

deathbed report that “The master seemed quite happy... both in his manner and in what he said;

he met his death so fearlessly and nobly” (Phaedo, 58e). The Stoics admired Socrates for his

megalopsychia (“greatness of mind”), which Aristotle defines as “refusal to put up with insult”,

and also as “imperviousness to fortune”, the mark of a character that is much too great to be

affected by external circumstances.