Role of Musharaf in management to contain terrorism 2020

Assignment#2:

History
Topic:

Role of President Musharaf in mamagement to cantain

terrorism
Submitted to:

Mam Maria Riaz

Submitted by:

Arooj Chaudhry
Roll no:

4749
Department:

Law
Smester:

2nd(LLB honors)
Government College University Faislabad

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 Role of Musharaf in management to contain terrorism 2020

Q#5 Show how President Musharaf has managed to contain terrorism in

Pakistan?

Role of Musharaf in management to control terrorism

U.S. Secretary of State Collin Powell was greeted in Islamabad yesterday by a Pakistani
leader taking substantive steps to rid his country of homegrown terrorists and foreign
groups such as al Qaeda. Since presenting his new anti-terrorism measures to the public
on Jan. 12, President Pervez Musharraf has begun the difficult task of closing down
radical organizations, arresting their leaders, cutting off their funds and purging the ISI,
or military intelligence, of radical elements. At least at this time he appears to be living
up to his promise to crack down on Islamic radicalism and prevent Pakistani territory
from being used for terrorism of any kind, including attacks in Kashmir.
Nonetheless, the Indian army still stands menacingly on the international border and
along the line of control in disputed Kashmir. But the imminent threat of another Indian-
Pakistani war seems to have passed. Secretary Powell, who travels to New Delhi today,
has praised President Musharraf’s recent efforts and the Bush administration has
indicated a greater willingness to nudge India toward resolving the Kashmir dispute.
Before Washington embarks on this worthy pursuit, however, it should take time to draw
the right lessons from the latest episode of brinkmanship in South Asia so that it may
craft an appropriate long-term policy for the region.
First, the war clouds may have broken, but India is by no means pacified. While
Pakistan’s longstanding support for terrorism in India has contributed to the
Subcontinent’s continuing conflict, India has set the pace of confrontation following the
Dec. 13 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament. If the two Pakistani groups blamed for
the attack, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, continue the use of terrorism—as
they have promised—India may return to a war-like posture in an effort to achieve its
goals.
What are those goals? First, force a Kashmir deal whereby Pakistan publicly forgoes its
claim on the state. This, while the ideal scenario for the Indian leadership, is unlikely to
happen, as President Musharraf’s frequently voiced commitment to Kashmir shows.
Second, India would like to force the Pakistani army to sever its ties with the jihadis,
including purging the ISI of radical elements. This appears to be happening, but India’s
leadership remains skeptical. President Musharraf, after all, is still a general in the
Pakistani military, with strong ties to the ISI.
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India welcomes U.S. influence to help attain these goals and knows the surest way to
maintain the pressure on President Musharraf is to keep the pot boiling slowly and
deliberately. Indian leaders are not in a hurry and know they are setting the pace: The last
time India went to full-scale war with Pakistan in 1971, its military build-up took eight
months.
Failing the above, India may choose a strategy for retaliation against acts of terrorism
similar to Israel. A “hot pursuit” action—hitting terrorist training camps in Pakistani-
controlled territory—might catalyze a small war against Pakistan. But New Delhi appears
to have calculated that with American forces on the ground in the country, Pakistan
would not be able to escalate to nuclear threats. One indication of an impending war
would be if U.S. troops actually pulled out of the region.
But this is by no means a one-way street. It is also in the long-term interest of the U.S.
that India continue to push the Pakistani leadership to eliminate Islamic radicalism in the
country. Since Sept. 11, the U.S. war on terrorism has carried an implicit threat to
Islamabad: If Pakistan does not want to join the international coalition, the coalition
would enlist India. This incentive still holds. Absent a serious threat of war by India,
Pakistan would be unlikely to jail the Kashmir jihadis.
As the next phase of the war on terrorism moves to Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
other countries that have been the real sources of Muslim malcontent, pressure from
countries affected by terrorism is going to be a key factor in maintaining the global
coalition. Therefore, the U.S. and India might not agree on the exact timetable or the
tools, but the U.S. and India share these goals. Thus far, both American and Indian
interests have been met, and short of a real war they are likely to continue to be met.
That said, it is clear that President Musharraf will have to continue to produce results,
including extraditing some of the suspected terrorists demanded by India. The Louis XV
self-justification—aprés moi, le déluge,—has been used by every Pakistani leader, but it
does not apply here. There have not been any serious protests against Pakistani support
for the U.S. war in Afghanistan or even against the arrest of radical activists, including
the leaders of terrorist organizations such as Jaish, Lashkar and the Sipah-e-Sahaba. For
India, the one sure sign of President Musharraf’s break with terrorism would be the
extradition of 20 suspected terrorists to India. Dawood Ibrahim, an Indian mafia don
fingered as the mastermind of the 1993 serial bomb blasts in downtown Mumbai, is a
deserving case for extradition.
Once it is clear that President Musharraf is no longer—tacitly or actively—supporting
terrorism in Kashmir, the Bush administration should pressure India to undertake the real
political reform in Kashmir that can be the only basis for a permanent solution to the

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conflict in the troubled state. Ultimately, Washington will have to climb down from the
universalist perch and define terrorism in a more politically sensitive fashion that allows
for some armed protest against governments. Incumbent governments that seek to destroy
terrorism must distinguish terrorists from political dissidents with whom they can
negotiate. The world should not be a place where all acts of political struggle
automatically become terrorism.
Ultimately, a lasting peace requires public and unambiguous U.S. commitment to the
region and to being a guarantor in a South Asian peace process—just as it has done in the
Middle East for 25 years. There are a number of advantages to launching a public
initiative. First, it will demonstrate U.S. commitment to the region itself. In the past, even
during the present war on terror, U.S. interests in South Asia have been motivated by
larger geopolitical concerns. Once South Asians see that the U.S. has recognized that it
has interests specific to the region, they will be more likely to take the U.S. presence
seriously and as a long-term variable in their relations with each other.
Yet it appears as if the Bush administration, at least for the time being, remains unwilling
to take a lead role in brokering a Kashmiri peace-agreement, something New Delhi has
historically opposed. Before arriving in Islamabad, Secretary Powell told reporters, “This
problem of Kashmir is only going to be solved by direct dialogue between the two sides.”
Perhaps his current trip will convince him that a more prominent U.S. role is needed.

References
www.storyofpakistan.com

https://workmail.com

www.slideshare.com

www.nazriapak.inf.com

www.cssforum.com

www.history.com