Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 168852           September 30, 2008

SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents.*

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Resolution1 dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case
No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC Resolution2 dated July 11, 2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion
for Reconsideration.

The factual background of the case:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married. 3 Out of
this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle 4 and Kristen Denise.5 On January 12, 2005,
barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Protective Order (TPO)6 against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L.
Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were
causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)
(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,8 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004."

On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice9 granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.

On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of
Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,10 contending that the RTC
lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by
R.A. No. 9262.

On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition 11 to respondents' Motion to Dismiss
arguing that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at
promoting the protection and safety of victims of violence.

On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution12 dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground
that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A.
No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."13

On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration 14 contending that the doctrine
of necessary implication should be applied in the broader interests of substantial justice and due process.

On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for Reconsideration 15 arguing
that petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the
relationship between the offender and the alleged victim was an essential condition for the application of
R.A. No. 9262.

On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution16 denying petitioner's

Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents under the coverage
of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law.

Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF

SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER,
IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004".17

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of
R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
and, accordingly, the provision on "conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to
R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by
giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home;
and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents should be
included as indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.

On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3
thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a former
marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a
factual determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot
be characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since their presence in the case is not only
unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3
of R.A. No. 9262.

The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as "any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of
such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage,
former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the RPC.

Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus:

SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other
applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)

Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis
supplied)

Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to
crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a
particular matter.

Thus, in People v. Moreno,18 the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary penalty under
Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the "Revised Motor
Vehicle Law," noting that the special law did not contain any provision that the defendant could be
sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

In People v. Li Wai Cheung,19 the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service of sentences
provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of
R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," considering the lack of similar
rules under the special law.

In People v. Chowdury,20 the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the
words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," because said words were not defined therein, although the
special law referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal
recruitment.

In Yu v. People,21 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article
39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law," noting
the absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.

Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,22 the Court applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under
Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein.

With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied
suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be
supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily
applicable, may be applied suppletorily.

Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in
concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the
precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators
are principals.23

It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence
against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another, thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and
their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxx

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another,

that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child.
This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
 (2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child
against her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets
of the woman or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence
against the woman or her child may include

individuals other than the offending husband, thus:

SEC. 8. Protection Orders. – x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include
any, some or all of the following reliefs:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through
another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; 1avvphi1.net

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:

SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of
victims of violence against women and their children. (Emphasis supplied)

It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law 24 and that this intent must be effectuated by the
courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for
liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent,
meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children.

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no
application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an "ancillary rule of statutory
construction." It is not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a
means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to
defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature. 25

The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance of circumstances
evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to cause verbal, psychological and
economic abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in
a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in the present petition since this Court is not a
trier of facts.26 It is thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this controversy is
centered only on the determination of whether respondents may be included in a petition under R.A. No.
9262. The presence or absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.

Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No.
9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents may be considered indispensable or
necessary parties. To do so would be an exercise in superfluity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July
11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are
hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition against
respondents is concerned.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* The present petition impleaded the Court of Appeals as respondent. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, the name of the Court of Appeals is deleted from the title.

1
 Penned by Judge Romeo F. Zamora, records, p. 209.

2
 Id. at 501.
3
 Records, p. 21.

4
 Id. at 22.

5
 Id. at 23.

6
 Id. at 1.

7
 SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct
which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which
the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting
the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against
the woman or her child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed
with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or child's movement or
conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial

support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's
children insufficient financial support;

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;

(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation,

business or activity, or controlling the victim's own money or properties, or solely
controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties;

xxxx

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or

through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but
not be limited to, the following acts:

xxxx

(5) Engaging in any form of harassmentww or violence;

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or
her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of
financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's
child/children.
8
 Entitled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN
PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES".

9
 Records, p. 26.

10
 Records, p. 36.

11
 Id. at 147.

12
 Id. at 209.

13
 Latin maxim meaning "The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." (San Miguel
Corporation Employees Union-Phil. Transport and General Workers Org. v. San Miguel
Packaging Products Employees Union-Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipino, G.R. No.
171153, September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 125, 152).

14
 Records, p. 316.

15
 Id. at 376.

16
 Id. at 510 .

17
 Rollo, p. 8.

18
 60 Phil. 712 (1934).

19
 G.R. Nos. 90440-42, October 13, 1992, 214 SCRA 504.

20
 G.R. Nos. 129577-80, February 15, 2000, 325 SCRA 572.

21
 G.R. No. 134172, September 20, 2004, 438 SCRA 431.

22
 G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 673.

23
 Ladonga v. People,  supra note 22; People v. Felipe, G.R. No. 142505, December 11, 2003,
418 SCRA 146, 176; People v. Julianda, Jr., G.R. No. 128886, November 23, 2001, 370 SCRA
448, 469; People v. Quinicio, G.R. No. 142430, September 13, 2001, 365 SCRA 252, 266.

24
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 160528, October 9,
2006, 504 SCRA 90, 101; Eugenio v. Drilon, 322 Phil. 112 (1996); Philippine National Bank v.
Office of the President, 322 Phil. 6, 14 (1996); Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50, 57 (1950);
Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141, 145-146 (1931).

25
 Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. 132527, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA
47, 78; Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., G.R. No. 96859, October 15, 1991, 202 SCRA 779, 792; Primero
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 48468-69, November 22, 1989, 179 SCRA 542, 548-549.

26
 Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. v. Philippine National Construction Company, G.R.
No. 169596, March 28, 2007, 519 SCRA 432, 441; Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 85.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182835               April 20, 2010

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a former
boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it.

The Indictment

The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an information that reads:

That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless conduct, sent through the Short Messaging Service (SMS)
using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend,
whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked body of another woman making it
to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture
thereby causing substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said
Irish Sagud.1

The Facts and the Case

The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan
were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became
"on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had
taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.

Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with
him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and
told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish changed her
cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages.
Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-
8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.

In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a
picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure (Exhibit
A).2 The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers
that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they
were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).3

After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it
would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread
the picture he sent through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text
messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa
lahat ng chatter."4

Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under police
supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture
and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada,
Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he walked towards Irish but the
waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony
Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the police
station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"

Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an expert in
information technology and computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for one to lift
the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on the body of another woman in another
picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by computer to make it appear that the face and
the body belonged to just one person.

Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct irregularities: the face was
not proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was fake
and the face on it had been copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales explained
how this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to a cellphone like the Sony Ericsson
P900 seized from Rustan.

For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in Tarlac in October 2003
and their relation lasted until December of that year. He claimed that after their relation ended, Irish
wanted reconciliation. They met in December 2004 but, after he told her that his girlfriend at that
time (later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out on him.

Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at Lorentess Resort
as she needed his help in selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police officers
approached him, seized his cellphone and the contents of his pockets, and brought him to the police
station.

Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her identify a
prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender’s number and,
pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages
from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he said, why the
obscene messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it
was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. He presented six pictures of a
woman whom he identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).5

Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures. Michelle
claims that she received the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that contained them
because she was jealous and angry. She did not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the woman
in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as in Exhibit A. Further, the
face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she was the woman
in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the picture was fully dressed.

After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous
manner. The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her experience, prompting the court to
comment: "Her tears were tangible expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she
suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her testimony is
evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of human nature and
experience."6 Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty of the
violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.

On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA),7 the latter rendered a decision dated January 31,
2008,8 affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.

The Issues Presented

The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message
the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological
distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.

The subordinate issues are:

1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is
defined in R.A. 9262;

2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this
case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;

3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation of
his constitutional rights; and

4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in
the case.

The Court’s Rulings

Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a person
against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

xxxx
 Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these include
any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a
woman. Thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that

alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child.
This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

xxxx

5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against
women through harassment are:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of

harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused Rustan had a
"dating relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation
where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of
the relationship. Thus:

(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the
course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in
a business or social context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)

Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the offended
woman have or had sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a sexual act. He cites
Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal
meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make love; to make love to" as in "He
romanced her."

But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies
a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it
used the noun "romance" to describe a couple’s relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9

R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating
relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f) defines
"sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing
of a common child." The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even
without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved.

Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the "on-and-off" variety
(away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over time and on a continuing
basis." But the two of them were romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October to
December of 2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship of mutual trust and love.

An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking
place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during
periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that at times, when
she could not reply to Rustan’s messages, he would get angry at her. That was all. Indeed, she
characterized their three-month romantic relation as continuous. 10

Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered a form
of harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a very dangerous
precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes
violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence,
would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence
that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.

Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her
getting one could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or
psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that
she was already desensitized by them.

But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was not
impressed with their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-7). It
is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on them.

Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent, except
Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know that Exhibits 2
to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said that she did not
have time to delete them.11 And, if she thought that she had deleted all the pictures from the memory
card, then she had no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card. There would have been
nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained in the card, there was no reason for
her to keep it for several years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see anything
connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving credence to her testimony. 1avvphi1

Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustan’s low
regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of today’s youth. What is obscene and injurious to an
offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here,
the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head and face, was
clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish,
who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a
picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat
to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.

Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him without
any warrant, the evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is that
the prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police
officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need such items to prove
its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900
cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial conference.

Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish’s testimony that she received
the obscene picture and malicious text messages that the sender’s cellphone numbers belonged to
Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that the cellphone
numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to summon him to come to
Lorentess Resort and he did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present the
confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages.

Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish. 13 His defense was that
he himself received those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing Irish and he
merely forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the cellphone
number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to authenticate the same. The RTC
did not give credence to such version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was most unlikely for
Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the sender.

Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an
electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as
provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for
the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the
admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be
deemed to have already waived such ground for objection. 14

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings. 15

In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
 ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, per
raffle dated September 14, 2009.

1
 Docketed as Criminal Case 3493.

2
 Records, p. 69.

3
 Id. at 70.

4
 Exhibit D and sub-markings, id. at 72-76.

5
 Id. at 156-159.

6
 Rollo, p. 38.

7
 Docketed as CA-G.R. CR 30567.

8
 Penned by then Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of this Court),
and concurred in by Associate Justices Arcangelita Romilla-Lontok and Romeo F. Barza.

9
 Webster’s New World College Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 1164.

10
 TSN, April 11, 2006, pp. 22-24.

11
 TSN, July 19, 2006, pp. 10-12.

12
 TSN, April 11, 2006, p. 28.
13
 TSN, June 27, 2006, pp. 23-24.

14
 People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 180501, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 616, 625-626.

15
 A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, Rule 1, Section 2.