IMPOSITION OF FINES
Art. 66. Imposition of fines. — In imposing fines
the courts may fix any amount within the limits
established by law; in fixing the amount in each
case attention shall be given, not only to the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but
more particularly to the wealth or means of the
culprit.
Fine is a pecuniary penalty imposed by court in
case of judgment of conviction.
Factors to consider in imposing fines
1. Aggravating and mitigating circumstance
2. Wealth and means of the offender
Scale of Penalty in case of Fine
Article 26 of the Revised Penal determines
whether a fine is afflictive, correctional, or light
penalty.
SCALE OF PENALTY AMOUNT OF FINE
Afflictive Penalty Exceeds P6,000.00
Correctional Penalty From P200.00 to
P6,000.00
Light Penalty Less than P200.00
Art. 73. Presumption in regard to the imposition
of accessory penalties. — Whenever the courts
shall impose a penalty which, by provision of
law, carries with it other penalties, according to
the provisions of Articles 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44 of
this Code, it must be understood that the
accessory penalties are also imposed upon the
convict.
S. PENALTIES S. IMPRISONMENT
deemed imposed must be expressly
stated in the decision
EXECUTION AND SERVICE OF PENALTIES
Art. 78. When and how a penalty is to be
executed. — No penalty shall be executed except
by virtue of a final judgment. A penalty shall not
be executed in any other form than that
prescribed by law, nor with any other
circumstances or incidents than those expressly
authorized thereby. In addition to the provisions
of the law, the special regulations prescribed for
the government of the institutions in which the
penalties are to be suffered shall be observed
with regard to the character of the work to be
performed, the time of its performance, and
other incidents connected therewith, the
relations of the convicts among themselves and
other persons, the relief which they may receive,
and their diet. The regulations shall make
provision for the separation of the sexes in
different institutions, or at least into different
departments and also for the correction and
reform of the convicts.
DESTIERRO
Art. 87. Destierro. — Any person sentenced to
destierro shall not be permitted to enter the
place or places designated in the sentence, nor
within the radius therein specified, which shall
be not more than 250 and not less than 25
kilometers from the place designated.
Destierro is considered as a principal
correctional and divisible penalty. Therefore,
jurisdiction over crimes punishable with
destierro lies with the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Destierro shall be imposed in the following
cases; 1. Death or serious physical injuries is
caused or are inflicted under exceptional
circumstance;
2. Person fails to give bond for good behavior in
grave and light threats;
3. Concubine’s penalty for the crime of
concubinage;
4. When after reducing the penalty by one or
more degree, destierro is the proper penalty
Execution of Destierro
1. Convict shall not be permitted to enter the
place designated in the sentence nor within the
radius specified, which shall not be more than
250 and not less than 25 km from the place
designated;
2. If the convict enters the prohibited area, he
commits evasion of sentence
ISLAW CASES
People v. Lanuza
The penalty prescribed by law for the
crime of frustrated homicide is one degree lower
than that prescribed by law for the crime of
homicide. Under ISLAW, the maximum of the
sentence shall be that which could be properly
imposed in view of the attending circumstances,
and the minimum shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code.
Considering that the penalty prescribed
by law for the crime of homicide is reclusion
temporal, the penalty for the crime of frustrated
homicide would be prision mayor. Applying
ISLAW, there being the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender and no aggravating
circumstance, the maximum of the sentence
should be within the range of prision mayor in
its minimum term which has a duration of six (6)
years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, and that,
on the other hand, the minimum should be
within the range of prision correccional which
has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day
to six (6) years. Thus, the imposition of
imprisonment from four (4) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years of
prision mayor, as maximum, is in order.
Talampas v. People
The penalty for homicide under Article
246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
temporal. Under Section 1 of ISLAW, the court, in
imposing a prison sentence for an offense
punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, is mandated to prescribe an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal
Code, and the minimum term shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
offense. With the absence of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty
is reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14
years, eight months, and one day to 17 years and
four months. This is pursuant to Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code. It is such period that the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence
should be reckoned from. Hence, limiting the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence at
only 14 years and eight months contravened the
express provision of the ISLAW, for such penalty
was within the minimum period of reclusion
temporal. Accordingly, the Court must add one
day to the maximum term fixed by the lower
courts.
The Court finds to be unnecessary the
increment of one day as part of the minimum
term of the indeterminate sentence. It may be
true that the increment did not constitute an
error, because the minimum term thus fixed was
entirely within the parameters of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Yet, the addition of
one day to the 10 years as the minimum term of
the indeterminate sentence of Talampas may
occasion a degree of inconvenience when it will
be time for the penal administrators concerned
to consider and determine whether Talampas is
already qualified to enjoy the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Hence, in order to
simplify the computation of the minimum
penalty of the indeterminate sentence, the Court
deletes the one-day increment from the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence.
People v. Temporada
 The formula proposed in the Dissenting
Opinion of Mr. Justice Ruben T. Reyes, i.e., the
maximum term shall first be computed by
applying the incremental penalty rule, and
thereafter the minimum term shall be
determined by descending one degree down the
scale of penalties from the maximum term, is a
novel but erroneous interpretation of the ISL in
relation to Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC.
Under this interpretation, it is not clear how the
maximum and minimum terms shall be
computed. Moreover, the legal justification
therefor is not clear because the meaning of the
terms “penalty,” “prescribed penalty,” “penalty
actually imposed,” “minimum term,” “maximum
term,” “penalty next lower in degree,” and “one
degree down the scale of penalties” are not
properly set out and are, at times, used
interchangeably, loosely and erroneously.
The basis for fixing the minimum term is the
prescribed penalty, and not the imposable
penalty.
If we use the formula as proposed by the
dissent, i.e., to compute the minimum term based
on the maximum term after the attending or
modifying circumstances are considered, the
basis for computing the minimum term, under
this interpretation, is the imposable penalty as
hereinabove defined. This interpretation is at
odds with Section 1 of the ISL which clearly
states that the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence shall be “within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense.” Consequently, the basis for fixing the
minimum term is the prescribed penalty, and not
the imposable penalty.
The plain terms of the ISL show that the
legislature did not intend to limit “attending
circumstances” as referring to Articles 13 and 14
of the RPC. If the legislature intended that the
“attending circumstances” under the ISL be
limited to Articles 13 and 14, then it could have
simply so stated. The wording of the law clearly
permits other modifying circumstances outside
of Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC to be treated as
“attending circumstances” for purposes of the
application of the ISL, such as quasi-recidivism
under Article 160 of the RPC. Under this
provision, “any person who shall commit a felony
after having been convicted by final judgment,
before beginning to serve such sentence, or
while serving the same, shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed by
law for the new felony.” This circumstance has
been interpreted by the Court as a special
aggravating circumstance where the penalty
actually imposed is taken from the prescribed
penalty in its maximum period without regard to
any generic mitigating circumstances. Since
quasi-recidivism is considered as merely a
special aggravating circumstance, the penalty
next lower in degree is computed based on the
prescribed penalty without first considering said
special aggravating circumstance as exemplified
in People v. Manalo, 148 SCRA 98 (1987) and
People v. Balictar, 91 SCRA 500 (1979).
It is one thing to say that, generally, the
penalty from which the minimum term is taken
is only one degree away from the penalty from
which the maximum term is taken, and
completely another thing to claim that the
penalty from which the minimum term is taken
should only be one degree away from the
penalty from which the maximum term is taken.
The one-degree difference is merely the result
of a general observation from the application of
generic mitigating and ordinary aggravating
circumstances in the RPC in relation to the ISL.
Nowhere does the ISL refer to the one-degree
difference as an essential requisite of an
“attending circumstance.” If the application of
the incremental penalty rule deviates from the
one-degree difference, this only means that the
law itself has provided for an exception thereto.
Verily, the one-degree difference is a mere
consequence of the generic mitigating and
ordinary aggravating circumstances created by
the legislature. The difficulty of the dissent with
the deviation from its so-called one-degree
difference rule seems to lie with the inability to
view these “attending circumstances” as mere
artifacts or creations of the legislature. It does
not make sense to argue that the legislature
cannot formulate “attending circumstances” that
operate differently than these generic mitigating
and ordinary aggravating circumstances, and
that, expectedly, leads to a different result from
the one-degree difference—for it would be to say
that the creator can only create one specie of
creatures. Further, it should be reasonably
assumed that the legislature was aware of these
special circumstances, like the incremental
penalty rule or privileged mitigating
circumstances, at the time it enacted the ISL as
well as the consequent effects of such special
circumstances on the application of said law.
Thus, for as long as the incremental penalty rule
is consistent with the letter and spirit of
“attending circumstances” under the ISL, there is
no obstacle to its treatment as such.
Frontreras v. People (2015)
A reduction in the imposable penalty by
one degree is thus in order pursuant to Article
64(5) of the RPC which states that when there
are two or more mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstances are present, the court
shall impose the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem
applicable, according to the number and nature
of such circumstances. As such, the penalty next
lower in degree which is prisió n mayor in its
medium period should be imposed.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum term shall be taken from the
penalty next lower or anywhere within the full
range of prisió n correccional or six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years, while the
indeterminate maximum penalty shall be fixed
anywhere within the range of prisió n mayor in
its medium period or eight (8) years and one (1)
day to ten (10) years. The penalty imposed by
the CA should thus be modified to conform to the
foregoing findings.
PROBATION CASES
Pablo v. Castillo
Probation; In the matter of interpretation of laws
on probation, the Court has pronounced that the
policy of liberality of probation statutes cannot
prevail against the categorical provisions of the
law.
It is a basic rule of statutory construction
that if a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without any interpretation. Not only
that; in the matter of interpretation of laws on
probation, the Court has pronounced that “the
policy of liberality of probation statutes cannot
prevail against the categorical provisions of the
law.”
Section 9 paragraph (c) is in clear and
plain language, to the effect that a person who
was previously convicted by final judgment of an
offense punishable by imprisonment of not less
than one month and one day and/or a fine of not
less than two hundred pesos, is disqualified from
applying for probation. This provision of law is
definitive and unqualified. There is nothing in
Section 9, paragraph (c) which qualifies
“previous conviction” as referring to a conviction
for a crime which is entirely different from that
for which the offender is applying for probation
or a crime which arose out of a single act or
transaction as petitioner would have the court to
understand.
In Rura vs. Lopena the Court declared that
“previous” refers to conviction, and not to
commission of a crime.
In the case of Rura vs. Lopena relied upon
by petitioner, the Court declared that “previous”
refers to conviction, and not to commission of a
crime. At the time Rura was convicted of the
crime for which he was applying for probation,
he had no prior conviction. In the present case of
petitioner, when she applied for probation in
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00197-D and 94-00198-
D, she had a previous conviction in Criminal Case
No. 94-00199-D, which thereby disqualified her
from the benefits of probation.
Probation law is not a penal statute; and
therefore, the principle of liberal interpretation
is inapplicable. And when the meaning is clearly
discernible from the language of the statute,
there is no room for construction or
interpretation.
COMMUNITY SERVICE ACT
AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COURT TO REQUIRE
COMMUNITY SERVICE IN LIEU OF
IMPRISONMENT FOR THE PENALTIES OF
ARRESTO MENOR AND ARRESTO MAYOR,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CHAPTER 5,
TITLE 3, BOOK I OF ACT NO. 3815, AS
AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS “THE
REVISED PENAL CODE”  1. Uplift and redeem valuable human material;
The new measure is supposed to help decongest
jails and promote restorative justice.
Community service: "any actual physical
activity which inculcates civic consciousness, and
is intended towards the improvement of a public
work or promotion of a public service."
Community service should be rendered by the
defendant in the place where the crime was
committed. When the court decides on the terms
of the community service, it should consider the
gravity of the offense and the circumstances of
the case.
The court has to specify the number of hours and
the period within which the community service
shall be completed.
If defendants violate the terms of the community
service, they will have to serve the full
imprisonment term of the penalty, in jail or in
their home.
The chance to be penalized with community
service instead of prison time will only come
once, says the law. If the individual is again
convicted of a crime for which the punishment is
imprisonment, they will have to go to jail.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (R.A. 4103)
 modifies the imposition of penalty
 applied both to the Revised Penal Code
and Special Penal Laws
 provides for a minimum and max term,
such that the moment the offender serves
the minimum of the sentence, he shall be
eligible for parole. If granted, he will serve
the remainder of the sentence out of
prison, but subject to the supervision of
the parole officer
OBJECTIVES
2. Avoid unnecessary and excessive deprivation
of liberty;
These objectives are achieved when the moment
the offender becomes eligible to apply for parole
and he may be able to serve sentence out of jail.
PAROLE
Parole is the conditional release of the offender
form the correctional institution after serving
minimum sentence after showing that he has
reformed. Note it does not extinguish criminal
and civil liability.
Requisites for parole:
1. He must be placed in prison jail to serve an
indeterminate sentence penalty which exceeds 1
year;
2. Served minimum term of sentence;
3. Board of pardons and parole found that his
released is for greater interest of society
DISQUALIFICATIONS UNDER THE
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
The general rule is that everyone is entitled to
the Indeterminate Sentence law.
However, this act shall not apply to the following
persons;
1. Convicted crime punished by death or life
imprisonment; (Reclusion perpetua ias held by
the Supreme Court in People v. Enriquez G.R.
No.158797, July 29, 2005)
2. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or
proposal to commit treason, misprision of
treason;
3. Those convicted of rebellion, sedition, or
espionage;
4. Those convicted piracy;
5. Those who are habitual delinquents; (In
People v. Jaranilla, G.R. No. 28547, Feb. 22, 1974,
the Supreme Court ruled that Recidivist are
entitled to an indeterminate sentence law)
6. Those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence; (In People v.
Perez, 44 OG 3884, a minor who escaped from
confinement in the reformatory is entitled to the
benefits of the law because confinement is not
considered imprisonment).
7. Those who having been granted conditional
pardon by the President shall have violated the
terms thereof;
8. Those whose maximum period of
imprisonment does not exceed one year;
Reclusion perpetua cannot Avail Indeterminate
Sentence Law In the concurring opinion of
Justice Tinga in the case of (People v.
Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271, August 31, 2006)
Parole is extended only to those convicted of
divisible penalties.
Under Section 5 of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, it is after 'any prisoner shall have served
the minimum penalty imposed on him, that the
Board of Indeterminate Sentence may consider
whether such prisoner may be granted parole.
There being no 'minimum penalty imposable on
those convicted to reclusion perpetua, it follows
that persons sentenced by final judgment to
reclusion perpetua could not have availed of
parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Q: is the indeterminate sentence law applicable
if the penalty imposed is destierro?
A: NO. Destierro does not involve imprisonment.
Effect of disqualification
If the offender is disqualified for the application
of the indeterminate sentence law, he shall be
given a straight penalty. The offender must serve
the entire term of his sentence and he is not
eligible for parole.
Example; A final judgment was rendered
against X. He was granted conditional pardon
by the Chief Executive. He violated the terms
and conditions of the said pardon. He was
charged with evasion of service of sentence.
He was found guilty by the court.
Q: Can the court impose upon him an
indeterminate sentence? A: NO. X is among those
disqualified under the law. By violating the
condition of his pardon he cannot avail of an
indeterminate sentence law.
Example; X has been convicted of final
judgment of serious physical injuries,
thereafter he committed homicide and the
judge found him guilty of homicide.
Q: Can the judge impose upon him an
indeterminate sentence?
A: YES. X is a recidivist. Under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, only habitual delinquents are
disqualified from availing indeterminate
sentence. A recidivist is qualified under the law
from availing the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Example; X is a minor who was charged and
convicted for kidnapping with ransom, the
penalty of which is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since minority is a privilege mitigating
circumstance, we will lower the imposable
penalty by one degree.
Q: is X qualified under for indeterminate
sentence?
A: YES. In applying the indeterminate sentence
law, we should consider the imposable penalty
rather than the penalty prescribed by law. In this
case, since the penalty of reclusion perpetua was
lowered to reclusion temporal, then X is qualified
for indeterminate sentence.
Computation for Indeterminate Sentence Law
In order to arrive at an indeterminate sentence
in the violation of the RPC, the following rules
must be considered;
1. Get first the maximum term of sentence with
all the attendant circumstance in accordance
with Article 64 of the RPC;
2. Lower it the one degree. Do NOT consider
anymore the attendant circumstance. The
minimum term of sentence depends upon the
sound discretion of the court.
VIOLATION OF SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
If the offense is punished by special laws, the
court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by
said law and the minimum shall not be less than
the minimum term prescribed by the same.
Example; X committed was charged and
convicted of the anti-carnapping law. Section
14 of R.A. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping law)
provides a penalty for 17 years and 4 months
to 30 years if a person committed carnapping
by means of violence against or intimidation
of any person, or force upon things.
Q: Under the indeterminate sentence law, what is
the duration of the penalty for the violation of
the anti-carnapping law?
A: Under the indeterminate sentence law, if a
special law is violated, the courts may sentence
the accused to an indeterminate sentence
provided that it shall not be less than the
minimum or more than the maximum according
to the sound discretion of the judge. Thus,
anywhere from 17 years and 4 months to 30
years may be imposed upon X.
Argoncillo v. CA, G.R. No. 118816, July 10, 1998
The crime committed is illegal fishing with the
use of explosives. The penalty prescribed by law
is 20 years to life imprisonment. The judge
imposed him the penalty of straight 30 years.
Q: Is the judge correct?
A: NO. The Indeterminate sentence law states
that a violation of special penal law and the said
special penal law does not use the enumeration
of penalties in the RPC, the maximum term of the
sentence shall not exceed the maximum penalty
prescribed by law and the minimum term of
sentence shall not be less than the minimum
penalty prescribed by law. In this case, since the
penalty prescribed by law is 20 years to life
imprisonment, it means that the penalty to be
imposed upon the convict must be an
indeterminate sentence. SC said the penalty must
be 20 years (minimum term) to 25 years
(maximum term)
Article 64 and Indeterminate Sentence law
The indeterminate sentence law did not repeal
Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code. On the
contrary, they are related.
Example; A abducted B with lewd design. His
intention was rape. But before A raped B, A
was arrested. A was charged with the crime of
forcible abduction punishable by reclusion
temporal.
Q: What is the penalty imposed if there is no
mitigating or aggravating circumstance?
A: The maximum term will be reclusion temporal
in medium period since there are no mitigating
or aggravating circumstance. The minimum term
is 1 degree lower in any of its periods according
to the sound discretion of the court. Thus, the
imposable penalty is prision mayor in any of its
period to reclusion temporal.
Q: What if there is only one ordinary mitigating
circumstance is present?
A: Maximum term will be reclusion temporal in
minimum period and the minimum term is
Prision mayor in any of its period according to
the sound discretion of the court.
Q: What if there is only one aggravating
circumstance is present?
A: The maximum term will be reclusion temporal
in its maximum period and the minimum term is
Prision mayor in any of its period according to
the sound discretion of the court.
Q: What if both aggravating and mitigating
circumstance are present?
A: The maximum term shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period because under
article 64 you should offset the circumstances.
The minimum term will be one degree lower
than reclusion temporal which is Prision mayor
in any of its period according to the sound
discretion of the court.
Q: What if there are 2 aggravating circumstance
and 1 ordinary mitigating circumstance present?
A: The maximum term shall be reclusion
temporal in its maximum period applying the
last aggravating circumstance after offsetting the
aggravating circumstance and mitigating
circumstance. The minimum term is Prision
mayor in any of its period according to the sound
discretion of the court.
Q: What if there are two mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance
present? A: The maximum term shall be prision
mayor in its medium period. Since there are two
ordinary mitigating circumstances, we lower the
imposable penalty by one degree. The minimum
term is prision correccional in any of its periods
according to the sound discretion of the court.
Q: What if there are three mitigating
circumstance with no aggravating circumstance
present?
A: The maximum term shall be prision mayor in
its minimum period. The two ordinary mitigating
circumstances shall operate to lower the
imposable penalty by one degree, the remaining
ordinary mitigating circumstance shall operate
to make the penalty in its minimum period. The
minimum term is prision correccional in any of
its periods according to the sound discretion of
the court.
Q: What if there are four mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance?
A: The maximum term shall still be prision
mayor in its minimum period. In case of ordinary
mitigating circumstance, you can only lower the
penalty by one degree. You cannot lower the
penalty by two degrees. The two ordinary
mitigating circumstances shall operate to make
the penalty in its minimum period. The minimum
term is prision correccional in any of its periods
according to the sound discretion of the court.
* In order that the penalty will be lowered by
one degree, it is necessary that there is NO
aggravating circumstance.
 Even if there are many mitigating circumstances,
for as long as there is one aggravating
circumstance, you cannot lower the penalty by
degrees. Only by periods.
Example; A was charged with the information
of rape with mitigating circumstance of
passion and obfuscation, against B.
thereafter, A voluntarily surrendered. A
convicted of rape and was punished with the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Q: since there are two mitigating circumstance,
should the judge lower his penalty by one
degree? A: NO. Reclusion perpetua is an
indivisible penalty. Under Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code, if the penalty prescribe by
law is a single invisible penalty you shall impose
it as it is regardless of any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance.
Q: What is the penalty of A if, in a addition to the
2 mitigating circumstances above mentioned, A
is a minor at the time of the offense?
A: privilege mitigating circumstance must first be
applied prior to the ordinary mitigating
circumstance. Since minority is a privilege
mitigating circumstance which lowers the
penalty by one degree, the maximum term is
prision mayor in its medium period and the
minimum term prision correccional in any of its
range according to the sound discretion of the
court.
*Only circumstance that can defeat an
indivisible penalty is a privilege mitigating
circumstance.
Example; X was charged with the crime of
frustrated homicide. X voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities. In the trial,
the mitigating circumstance of immediate
vindication to a grave offense was in
attendant.
Q: What should be the penalty imposed to X?
A: Since the penalty for frustrated homicide is
prision mayor and there are two other ordinary
mitigating circumstance present, the maxium
term of sentence is Prision correccional in its
medium period while the mimimum term of
sentence. Arresto mayor within the range or.
Q: What is the penalty if, in addition to the facts
above mentioned, X is minor committing without
discernment? A: Since the penalty already
imposed upon X is prision correccional, we lower
it by one degree more because minority is a
privilege mitigating circumstance. Thus,
according to Article 64, the maximum term is
Arresto mayor in its medium period.
Indeterminate sentence law is not applicable if
the penalty imposed upon the offender does not
exceed one year. In this instance we cannot give
him an indeterminate sentence because the
duration of arresto mayor is 1 month to 6
months.
If the maximum term of sentence does not
exceed one year, a straight penalty shall be
imposed upon him.
PROBATION LAW (P.D. 968 as Amended by R.A.
10707)
Probation is a disposition by which a convict
after conviction and sentence is released subject
to the conditions imposed by the court under the
supervision of a probation officer.
Objectives
1. To promote the correction and rehabilitation
of the offender because he is placed under a
personalized treatment;
2. To provide an opportunity for the reformation
of penitent offender;
3. To prevent further commission of crimes
because the offender is placed under an
individualized treatment;
4. To decongest cases;
5. To save the Government from spending much-
needed funds when the offender will be placed
behind bars
The first three objectives are based on P.D. 968.
The last two purposes are jurisprudential.
Probation as a Privilege
Probation is not a right but a privilege. Thus,
even if a convict is not among those disqualified
of probation, the judge can still deny the
application. This denial is not appealable. The
grant or denial of application is dependent solely
on the sound discretion of the judge.
DISQUALIFICATIONS
The following are disqualified to avail probation;
1. Those whose maximum term of imprisonment
is more than 6 years;
2. Those who have been convicted of subversion
and crimes against national security;
3. Those who have previously been convicted by
final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of more than six (6) months and
one (1) day and/or a fine of more than one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00);
4. Those who have already availed the benefit of
probation;
5. Those who have perfected an appeal from
judgment of conviction;
6. Those convicted of an election offense under
the Omnibus Election Code;
7. Those convicted of drug trafficking or drug
pushing;
8. Those who filed a malicious report that a
person is committing a violation of Anti-money
laundering law and was convicted because of
such malicious filing
Example; X was charged and convicted for
alarms and scandals. He was sentenced to 30
days of arresto menor.
Q: Can X avail probation?
A: If the felony was committed prior to the
amendment of the probation law, X cannot avail
probation. Under P.D. 968, a person who is
convicted of a crime involving public disorder
cannot avail probation. The felony of Alarm and
Scandal is a crime against public disorder. Thus X
cannot avail probation. However, if the crime
was convicted after the amendment, X may avail
probation. Under R.A. 1070, crimes against
public disorder is removed from the
disqualifications. Thus, X may avail probations
Q: May probation be availed even if the penalty
imposed upon the offender is only a fine?
A: YES. Under Section 4 of P.D. 968 as Amended
by R.A. 10707, Probation may be granted
whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only.
APPEAL AND PROBATION
Generally, under P.D 968, appeal and probation
are mutually exclusive remedies. This is because
the reason behind appeal and the reason behind
probation are diametrically opposed.
If a person appeals, it means that he is
questioning the decision of the court. He is
insisting on his innocence. On the other hand, if a
personapplies for probation, it means that he is
accepting the judgment of the court. He,
however, does not want to serve his sentence
behind bars.
Exceptions;
1. However, Section 4 of R.A. 10707 which
amended the probation law, states that when a
judgment of conviction imposing a non-
probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed,
and such judgment is modified through the
imposition of a probationable penalty, the
defendant shall be allowed to apply for
probation based on the modified decision before
such decision becomes final. The application for
probation based on the modified decision shall
be filed in the trial court where the judgment of
conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty
was rendered, or in the trial court where such
case has since been re-raffled.
This notwithstanding, the accused shall lose the
benefit of probation should he seek a review of
the modified decision which already imposes a
probationable penalty.
2. Section 42 of the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
act provides that the court may, after it shall
have convicted and sentenced a child in conflict
with the law, and upon application at any time,
place the child on probation in lieu of service of
his/her sentence taking into account the best
interest of the child. For this purpose, Section 4
of Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known
as the "Probation Law of 1976", is hereby
amended accordingly.
Colinares v. People (G.R. No. 182748,
December 13, 2011)
Colinares hit Rufino twice in the head with a
stone. Thereafter, Colinares was charged and
convicted for frustrated homicide in the regional
trial court. He was sentenced to 2 years and 4
months of prision correcional to 6 years and 1
day of prision mayor. Colinares appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the purpose of modifying his
conviction from frustrated homicide to
attempted homicide thereby lowering the
penalty so that he can avail probation. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Thus, Colinares elevated the case to the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court held that Colinares is
only liable for attempted homicide because the
prosecution failed to prove that the wound of
Rufino is fatal. Thus the penalty imposed on him
should be lowered to imprisonment of four
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two
years and four months of prision correccional, as
maximum.
Q: Can Colinares avail probation after the
perfection of appeal to modify his conviction? A:
YES. Colinares did not appeal from a judgment
that would have allowed him to apply for
probation. He did not have a choice between
appeal and probation. He was not in a position to
say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply
for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial
court imposed on him denied him that choice.
Besides, in appealing his case, Colinares raised
the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed
on him. He claimed that the evidence at best
warranted his conviction only for attempted, not
frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a
probationable penalty. In a way, therefore,
Colinares sought from the beginning to bring
down the penalty to the level where the law
would allow him to apply for probation.
Q: When and where do you apply for probation?
A: A grant of probation is applied before the Trial
Court which heard the case within the period of
perfecting an appeal or within 15 days from
promulgation of judgment.
CONDITIONS IMPOSED UPON OFFENDER
UNDER PROBATION
1. Mandatory/ Ordinary;
 a. Appear before the probationary
officer within 72 hours from the
receipt of the order;
b. Report once a month
2. Discretionary/ Special;
a. Discretionary or special conditions
are dependent upon the sound
discretion of the court. Usually
involves engaging in a vocation,
not drinking alcohol, not going to
house of ill-reputes.
b. The only limitation on the
discretionary conditions is that
they must not be so restrictive to
the rights of the accused such that
they will no longer be in
consonance with his freedom.
c. Example; In the case of Baclayon v.
Mutia (G.R. No. L-59298, April 30,
1984) the trial court prohibited
the offender, who is a teacher by
profession, to teach as a condition
during the period of probation.
This is a restrictive condition. It
deprives the offender his means of
livelihood.
PERIOD OF PROBATION:
SENTENCE PERIOD OF PROBATION
Imprisonment of Will not exceed 2 years
not more than 1
year
All other cases of Will not exceed 6 years
imprisonment
Fine subsidiary Not less than nor be more
imprisonment in than 2x than the total
case of number of days of
insolvency subsidiary imprisonment,
taking into account the
highest minimum wage
rate at the time of the
rendition of the judgment.
EFFECT OF PROBATION
Probation will suspend the execution of the
sentence. However, it will not extinguish civil
liability.
Under Section 16 of P.D. 968 as amended by R.A.
10707, the final discharge of the probationer
shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost
or suspended as a result of his conviction and to
totally extinguish his criminal liability as to the
offense for which probation was granted.
Moreno v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 168550, August
10, 2006)
Moreno ran for the public office of punong
barangay. However, a petition for
disqualification was filed against him because he
was convicted by final judgment of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1)
Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months.
Moreno argues that the disqualification under
the Local Government Code is for those hohave
served sentence for more than 1 year. Since
Moreno applied and was granted of probation, he
did not serve his sentence because probation
suspends the service of the offender.
Q: Can a person who was convicted by final
judgment but was granted probation run for
public office?
A: YES. The phrase service of sentence,
understood in its general and common sense,
means the confinement of a convicted person in
a penal facility for the period adjudged by the
court. During the period of probation, the
probationer does not serve the penalty imposed
upon him by the court but is merely required to
comply with all the conditions prescribed in the
probation order. Furthermore, he accessory
penalties of suspension from public office, from
the right to follow a profession or calling, and
that of perpetual special disqualification from
the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period imposed
upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the will then issue a final discharge of probation.
grant of probation. Only then will probation be terminated.

Example; Lindsay Lohan, after conviction,

applied for probation and was granted the
same. Thereafter, she filed an appeal
questioning the civil indemnity imposed
upon her. The judge denied the appeal on the
ground that Lindsay already applied for
probation. Therefore, the appeal cannot be
granted.

Q: Is the judge correct?

A: NO. The only effect of probation is to suspend

the execution of the sentence. It has nothing to
do with the civil aspect of the case. Insofar as the
civil aspect is concerned, the convict can still
appeal it.

Example; D, under the probation for two

years, was imposed the condition that he
could not change his residence. For two
years, he complied with this condition. After
the lapse of two years, D now changed his
residence. The probation officer learned
about this and filed for a Motion to Revoke
the probation. D contended that the period of
probation (2 years) has already been
completed, so he is already allowed to change
residence. The trial court granted the
revocation.

Q: Is the trial court correct?

A: YES. The expiration of the period of probation

does not ipso facto mean the termination of
probation. Probation is only terminated upon the
issuance of the court of a final discharge of
probation. This happens when after the lapse of
the period of probation, the probation officer will
file a Motion before the court with a
recommendation stating that the convict has
complied with the conditions imposed and
therefore, he should be discharged. The court