Corruption in Collin County in A TX 5th COA in Dallas

5th COA
05-20-00098-CV
Request Oral Argument
Gallagher
v
Collin County, AG and State of Texas
Brief
Introduction: Commanding Precedent

A key component of this case is the FBI Investigation into Collin County District Attorney’s Of-
fice and Greg Abbott, which according to the Judge Wooten false criminal case record, ended Au-
gust 28th, 2010. This investigation was ended when they lied to the FBI and said they had legiti-
mate charges to bring against Judge Wooten. But the 2018 Wooten case record shows that that is
a lie and that now they are doing the same thing to me that they did to her. I am still awaiting a
FOIA of the 2010 FBI records. Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018)
Rights are Rights no matter how Hostile the county becomes when they are asserted
“Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, at 372 U. S. 237. Conceding this was so, the "compelling
answer . . . is that constitutional rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to their assertion
or exercise." Watson v. Memphis, 373 U. S. 526, 373 U. S. 535.”-Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965)
“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition…such devices should be necessary to control the
abuses of government.“ -Federalist #10
"the great and essential rights of the people are secured against legislative as well as against executive
ambition. They are secured not by laws paramount to prerogative, but by constitutions paramount to
laws. This security of the freedom of the press requires that it should be exempt not only from previous
restraint by the Executive, in Great Britain, but from legislative restraint also." -Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931)
Freedom of Speech and Right to Criticize Public Officials

“Because he relies on the standard discussed in Kramer v. Price,[5] which deals with the interplay of
the vagueness doctrine and the First Amendment guarantees, and on Article I, Section 8 of the Texas
Constitution,[6] we construe Appellant's vagueness argument as including a complaint that the statute
offends the First Amendment protection of free speech. The State argues that the First Amendment is
not implicated in this case because harassment is not protected speech contemplated by the First
Amendment. The problem with the State's argument is that it is the challenged statute itself that defines
harassment. Unless the harassment statute is sufficiently clear to withstand constitutional scrutiny, no
unlawful harassment exists that would be excluded from First Amendment protection“ -Karenev v.
State, 258 S.W.3d 210 (Tex. App. 2008)
As can be seen in the "Direct Examination" and General Filings in this case, Bob Davis seems to think
that this case will be lost by myself:
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1. Because he doesn't like my Religion
2. Because Statute of limitations is up in his mind
3. Because of Sovereign Immunity
This brief shows the fanciful nature of those thoughts. Firstly, because Statute of Limitations don't actu-
ally even start until the last date of injury, so the Statute of Limitations has yet to start running, let alone
being up. Sovereign Immunity is waived by the State in Religious suits, and the fact that he openly
doesn't like my Religion simply shows that the Government is hostile towards my Religion and is not
in his favor at all. This is a Rights case before it is a Vexatious Litigant Case, one issue is more impor-
tant and is the foundation of the other. Rights come first, it is your Bill. Glenn Hegar, Comptroller of
Public Accountsv.Texas BLC, Inc., 01-18-00554-CV (Tex. App 2020)
The underlying Sanctions and Orders in this case are all Void. This is due to the Illegal involvement of
the Whelesses and the Nowaks, 2 married Couples of Judges, Illegally involving themselves in this
case and on top of that the Sanctions were both Illegally implemented, that is regardless of the corrup-
tion of the Whelesses and the Nowaks, and are based on Perjury, effecting Court cases, which makes it
Aggravated Perjury by Bob Davis in Cynthia Whelesses court 3 years before she recused herself.
In the Interest of K.A.R. No. 14-03-00970-CV Court of Appeals of Texas,Houston (14th Dist.
2005); Jackson v. Ellis No. 07-13-00184-CV (Tex. App. Jun. 4, 2015); Gilbert v. Tx. Mut. Insu. Co.
No. 03-05-00787-CV (Tex. App. Dec. 19, 2008); Ex Parte Price 7 41 S. W.2d 366 (1987)
Vacating after Recusal

“We vacate the Nevada Supreme Court’s judgment because it applied the wrong legal standard. Under
our precedents, the Due Process Clause may sometimes demand recusal even when a judge “ ‘ha[s] no
actual bias.’ ” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U. S. 813, 825 (1986) . Recusal is required when, ob-
jectively speaking, “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision maker is too high
to be constitutionally tolerable.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35, 47 (1975) ; see Williams v. Pennsyl-
vania, 579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 6) (“The Court asks not whether a judge harbors an ac-
tual, subjective bias, but instead whether, as an objective matter, the average judge in his position is
likely to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional potential for bias” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Our decision in Bracy is not to the contrary: Although we explained that the peti-
tioner there had pointed to facts suggesting actual, subjective bias, we did not hold that a litigant must
show as a matter of course that a judge was “actually biased in [the litigant’s] case,” 132 Nev., at ___,
368 P. 3d, at 744—much less that he must do so when, as here, he does not allege a theory of “camou-
flaging bias.” The Nevada Supreme Court did not ask the question our precedents require: whether,
considering all the circumstances alleged, the risk of bias was too high to be constitutionally tolerable.
As a result, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, and we vacate the judgment below and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsis-
tent with this opinion.”-Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. ___ (2017)
Illegal Sanctions, Abuse of Contempt Laws

“MR. GALLAGHER: The testimony drives the Court to find as a fact that the unlawful and illegal
sanctions were imposed. Such sanctions were being carried out. Humble Oil Refining Company versus
Eighth Regional, WLB56 Northern District Of Texas 1944. The Power for contempt should only be ex-
ercised with caution Ex Parte Arnold 503 S.W.2d 534 Texas Criminal Appeals 1974. To be forcibly --
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enforceable by coercive contempt, the order must be clear and unambiguous. Ex Parte Chambers, 898
S.W.2d 257 260 1995. And I would argue that the order was ambiguous and it wasn't clear because he
brought up. It's something that he himself claims that it's about smoking marijuana in jail, and we
have not discussed that once here because it was not ever something that I brought up.“ -(RR), Lebo,
Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County
District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p50 l10-24
In summary this filing is a Constitutional Challenge to the Texas Controlled Substances Act as well as
Rule 11 the Bill of Review Law and the Vexatious Litigant Law as well as a Writ of Innocence
Collin County Bill of Review Case # 416-00070-2020
In Re: Gallagher, WR-90,174-01 (Tx. Crim. App. 2019)
Constitutionally and otherwise Void Orders

“Christian relies on Omura v. State,730 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, pet. ref'd). The effect
of the trial court's failure, argues Christian, is: (1) a void original judgment granting probation; (2) in-
sufficient evidence to support the original judgment granting probation; (3) a void judgment revoking
probation; and (4) an application of the Act violative of article five, sections one and seven of the Texas
Constitution. Additionally, Christian argues that the provisions of the Act that allow the court to adopt,
by inaction, the magistrate's actions render the Act facially unconstitutional. See TEX.GOV'
Generally, an appeal from an order revoking probation is limited to the propriety of the revocation or-
der and does not include review of the original conviction. See Whetstone v. State, 786 S.W.2d 361, 363
(Tex. Crim.App.1990). However, the original conviction may be collaterally attacked if fundamental er-
ror occurred in the original conviction that rendered the proceeding absolutely void. See Trcka, 744
S.W.2d at 680. Christian has the burden of showing that the underlying conviction is void. See Cun-
ningham v. State,815 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, no pet.). The State argues that even if
the trial court failed to timely review the magistrate's actions, this error would render the judgment
voidable, not void. See Armstrong v. State, 805 S.W.2d 791, 793 n. 3 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). We agree.“
-Christian v. State, 865 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App. 1993)
"This is a "Greylord" case, and the use, or nonuse, of that designation has caused the defendant to
raise related issues concerning pretrial publicity, jury voir dire, and the resulting impact on the presen-
tation of defendant's defense. On December 19, 1985, the defendant John Reynolds, former judge of
the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, was charged in a thirty-six count indictment with racketeer-
ing (18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)), racketeering conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)), mail fraud (18 U.S.C. §
1341), and making false statements on his federal income tax returns (26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)). On May 7,
1986, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts.
Among other cases, the government cites Irvin, Garza, Blanton and Dellinger, as does the defendant,
but the government points out that in Blanton, in an en banc opinion, 719 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099, 104 S. Ct. 1592, 80 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1984), the court set aside the panel
opinion on which the defendant relies and upheld the voir dire examination. Blanton was the former
state governor of Tennessee and his indictment for corruption generated massive publicity."-United
States of America, v. John F. Reynolds, 821 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1987)
This is a Challenge under Texas Code Title 5 Chapter 110 (Texas RFRA), Texas Constitution Article 1,
Sec 6 (Right to Worship according to consience), Sec 19 (Deprivation of Rights under Color of Law),
3
Sec 27 (Right to Petetion for Redress and Remonstrance), Sec 29 (Inviolate by Written Law), and U.S.
Constitution Article I, Sec 9, Clause 3 (No Laws of Attainder), 1st Amendmemt (Religion, Speech, Re-
dress of Grievances), 5th Amendment (Due Process), 14th Amendment (Due Process, Equal Protection)
to Texas Law Chapter 11 (Vexatious Litigant Law) as applied.
And Criminal Accusations against Bob Davis, Cynthia Wheless, Christin Nowak, Ken Paxton and Greg
Abott under Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Sec 41 (Negligence), 18 U.S. Code Sec 242 (Deprivation of
Rights Under Color of Law), RICO 18 U.S. Code Sec 1962 (Public Corruption), Tex. Pen. Code Sec
37.03 (Aggravated Perjury), False/Ommitted Statements on Public Financial forms Tex. Pen. Code
Chapter 37 (Perjury and Other Falsification).
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The Laws of the State of Texas do not allow the State to Sanction and or Declare someone a Vexatious
Litigant because of their Religious Beliefs, or because of their Pursuit to have Religious Rights Recog-
nized in the Courts. But that is what has happened here. “Because this dispute presents us with a con-
stitutional issue, we review the trial court's decision de novo. See, e.g., Perry v. Del Rio, 67 S.W.3d 85,
91 (Tex. 2001). Thus, we owe no deference to the trial court's decision and may proceed to resolve the
issues presented as a matter of law. Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex.1998).” -Strayhorn
v. Ethical Society of Austin 110 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. App. 2003)
“We review constitutional challenges to a statute de novo. VanDyke v. State, 538 S.W.3d 561, 570 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2017); see also Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 2 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (facial challenges
to statutes reviewed de novo). When, as here, a litigant claims that a statute is facially unconstitutional,
we consider the statute as it is written, rather than any particular application of it. Peraza v. State, 467
S.W.3d 508, 514–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). A claim of facial unconstitutionality asserts that the
statute is unconstitutional in all possible circumstances. Salinas v. State, 464 S.W.3d 363, 367 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2015).“ -Leland Kremplewski v. State, 01-19-00033-CR (Tex. App.)
"To properly raise a constitutional challenge to a statute, the party attacking the statute must show
three things: "`(1) [T]he statute or the particular part or parts of the statute which the party would
challenge must be stated or pointed out with fair precision; (2) the provision of the Constitution which
it is claimed has been violated must be clearly designated; and (3) it must be shown wherein the
statute, or *141 some designated part of it, violates such constitutional provision."." -DeKalb County
v. Post Properties, 245 Ga. 214, 218, 263 S.E.2d 905 (1980) (quoting Richmond Concrete Products
Co. v. Ward, 212 Ga. 773, 774, 95 S.E.2d 677 (1956)). Accord Cooper v. State,277 Ga. 282, 284, 587
S.E.2d 605 (2003); Wallin v. State, 248 Ga. 29, 30, 279 S.E.2d 687 (1981).
"Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of law, which we review for correctness." Provo
City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, ¶ 5, 86 P.3d 735. "When addressing such a challenge, this court
presumes that the statute is valid, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality."
State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ¶ 6, 980 P.2d 191.
see also Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1238
(2010) (“[A] ‘facial challenge’ is nothing more nor less than a claim that Congress (or a state legisla-
ture) has violated the Constitution.”). State v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 372
(Alaska 2009). State v. Planned Parenthood (Planned Parenthood 2007), 171 P.3d 577, 581 (Alaska
2007). See State, Dept. of Revenue v. Andrade, 23 P.3d 58, 71 (Alaska 2001). See Estate of Kim ex rel.
Alexander v. Coxe, 295 P.3d 380, 386-88 (Alaska 2013). See Planned Parenthood 2016, 375 P.3d at
1135-36.
GOVERNMENT CODE
TITLE 4. EXECUTIVE BRANCH
SUBTITLE A. EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
CHAPTER 402. ATTORNEY GENERAL
SUBCHAPTER A. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 402.010. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STATUTES.
(a) In an action in which a party to the litigation files a petition, motion, or other pleading challenging
the constitutionality of a statute of this state, the party shall file the form required by Subsection (a-1).
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The court shall, if the attorney general is not a party to or counsel involved in the litigation, serve no-
tice of the constitutional challenge and a copy of the petition, motion, or other pleading that raises the
challenge on the attorney general either by certified or registered mail or electronically to an e-mail
address designated by the attorney general for the purposes of this section.
(a-1) The Office of Court Administration of the Texas Judicial System shall adopt the form that a party
challenging the constitutionality of a statute of this state must file with the court in which the action is
pending indicating which pleading should be served on the attorney general in accordance with this
section.
(b) A court may not enter a final judgment holding a statute of this state unconstitutional before the
45th day after the date notice required by Subsection (a) is served on the attorney general.
(c) A party's failure to file as required by Subsection (a) or a court's failure to serve notice as required
by Subsection (a) does not deprive the court of jurisdiction or forfeit an otherwise timely filed claim or
defense based on the challenge to the constitutionality of a statute of this state.
(d) This section or the state's intervention in litigation in response to notice under this section does not
constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity.
Arrett v. Bower, 237 Ariz. 74, 79 ¶ 15, 345 P.3d 129, 134 (App. 2015) (permitting the secretary of state
to intervene to defend the constitutionality of a statute); Grammatico v. Indus. Comm'n, 208 Ariz. 10,
12 ¶ 5 n.3, 90 P.3d 211, 213 n.3 (App. 2004) (providing the attorney general an opportunity to address
constitutional challenge to a statute), aff’d 211 Ariz. 67, 117 P.3d 786 (2005). Compare, e.g., Kepple v.
Fairman Drilling Co., 615 A.2d 1298, 1303 n.3 (Pa. 1992) (noting that notice to attorney general is not
required when contending statute is unconstitutional as applied), with Lazo v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of
Bernalillo Cnty., 690 P.2d 1029, 1031–32 (N.M. 1984) (taking the opposite view). See Fielden, 280 Ga.
at 444-445, 629 S.E.2d 252; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-112, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 33 L.
Ed. 2d 222 (1972) (school anti-noise ordinance not unconstitutionally vague, as ordinance, as a whole,
clearly prohibits noisy or diversionary activity that disrupts normal school activity)
TEXAS CODE
ARTICLE 1, BILL OF RIGHTS
Sec. 6. FREEDOM OF WORSHIP.
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of
their own consciences. No man shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or
to maintain any ministry against his consent. No human authority ought, in any case whatever, to con-
trol or interfere with the rights of conscience in matters of religion, and no preference shall ever be
given by law to any religious society or mode of worship. But it shall be the duty of the Legislature to
pass such laws as may be necessary to protect equally every religious denomination in the peaceable
enjoyment of its own mode of public worship.
Sec. 19. DEPRIVATION OF LIFE, LIBERTY, PROPERTY, ETC. BY DUE COURSE OF LAW.
No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in
any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.
Sec. 27. RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY; PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES.
The citizens shall have the right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble together for their common good;
and apply to those invested with the powers of government for redress of grievances or other purposes,
by petition, address or remonstrance.
Sec. 29. BILL OF RIGHTS EXCEPTED FROM POWERS OF GOVERNMENT AND INVIOLATE.
To guard against transgressions of the high powers herein delegated, we declare
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that everything in this "Bill of Rights" is excepted out of the general powers of government, and
shall forever remain inviolate, and all laws contrary thereto, or to the following provisions, shall
be void
see Christian v. State, 865 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App. 1993); Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. ___ (2017) This
is a Rights case before it is a Vexatious Litigant Case, one issue is more important and is the foundation
of the other. Rights come first, it is your Bill. Glenn Hegar, Comptroller of Public Accountsv.Texas
BLC, Inc., 01-18-00554-CV (Tex. App 2020)
"It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular exceptions to
the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration;
and it might follow by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to
be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were consequently insecure. This
is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard against the admission of a bill of rights
into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against."
-James Madison, when Introducing the Bill of Rights
The 9th Amendment

"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."
There is a place where Human Understanding and Reality separate. Not that Reality needs to be supple-
memted from that point, it is still real, Humans just don't understand it. And now adays people are so
connected and surrounded by new things, and inventions, and google, etc, it is hard to accept that Real-
ity is itself beyond our comprehension in many ways.
Just for examples of Human Understanding falling short. First, if you were writing a Book about
America as a Historian, you could write about Americans in the 1900s and 2000s believe in Ghosts.
Not because they read about them, but because they have experiences.
That brings us to the Human Brain, Ghosts must be Psychological, right? Well we don't understand
Brains either, because we can only Xray for Molecules that are Radio-active Isotopes which are not
representative of their Parent/Source Molecule, ex: Iodo-Melatonin is not Melatonin in the Body or
Brain, it is a new substance. And Brain scans measure responses of the Brain and Activity, not the Driv-
ing force. We still don't understand the mind beyond the Frontal Lobe and Synapses, Memory is
only just beginning to be understood.
The Big Bang Theory, it is constantly in opposition to Jahovah with Adam and Eve, but even Big Bang
apologists have to admit that we are likely not the only Universe, and that it is not impossible that our
Universe was not just a Big Bang but the end of another Universe, populated, collapsing on itself to
produce a centerpoint from which we all are moving away from. If I say there is a force connecting you
and I, to the Earth, to the Sun, the Moon and all the Planets, it sounds New Age. But if I say "Gravity"
it's like, "Yeah, that thing that connects everything together".
"ib. §. 27. that 'los obrages los aniquilan por la inhumanidad con que se les trata.' that in other situa-
tions also he meets death with more deliberation, and endures tortures with a firmness unknown almost
to religious enthusiasm with us"
- Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, speaking about Native Americans
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Statement of Facts
A Major point to remember here is that the Name Change case, the Final hearing with Ashley
Wysocki, came before the Vexatious Litigant motion was even Docketed. This Vexatious Litigant
motion came after they thought they had defeated my Name change.
(CR), Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-
00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p170-205 (Original Mo-
tion for Dismissal, Memorandum of Law filed in the Collin County Criminal case in 2015) This
document contains a good explination of the series of events underlying this case, it was used to
create the 2017 filing. So this documemt is a fundamental document to this case. It has my
Original Ministry Certificate from 2009, from before I Established my own Religious Organiza-
tion, the Shaivite Temple FEIN#37-1949939, as well as an explaination of the 04/20/2010 Raid
at 609 Riviera dr.
“THE COURT: Please stop talking over me. We don't want to have an issue where you leave and you
later come back and assert that you were not able to represent yourself effectively today because you
were under the influence of marijuana.
MR. GALLAGHER: No, I would not do that. It's the flesh of my Lord.“ -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v.
Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court,
Judge Andrea Thompson), p36 l4-10
00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p207-232 (Open Records
release from Police regarding 04/20/2010 raid at 609 Rivera dr.
Police misconduct refers to inappropriate conduct and/or illegal actions taken by police officers in con-
nection with their official duties. Types of misconduct include: coerced false confession, intimidation,
false arrest, false imprisonment, falsification of evidence, spoliation of evidence, police perjury, wit-
ness tampering, police brutality, police corruption, racial profiling, unwarranted surveillance, unwar-
ranted searches, and unwarranted seizure of property. Bribing or lobbying legislators to pass or main-
tain laws that give police excessive power or status. Similarly, bribing or lobbying city council mem-
bers to pass or maintain municipal laws that make victimless acts ticket-able (e.g. bicycling on the side-
walk), so as to get more money Selective enforcement ("throwing the book at" people who one dis-
likes; this is often related to racial discrimination). Sexual misconduct. [1]Off-duty misconduct
[ 2]Killing of dogs unjustly [3]Noble cause corruption, where the officer believes the good outcomes
justify bad behavior [4]Using badge or other ID to gain entry into concerts, to get discounts, etc.Influ-
ence of drugs or alcohol while on duty. Violations by officers of police procedural policies.
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"Mr Davis: And for the State is Amy Hilton and she had to go to Harris County, but she did authorize
us to represent to the Court that the state -- and actually I show on the docket that he's also sued the
Texas Attorney General
The Court: Yes, also -- but Amy Hilton is also representing the Attorney General
Mr. Davis: Correct" -(RR) DuBois, Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas
Attorney General, D-1-GN-19-004716 (Travis County District Court, Judge Maya Guerra Gamble), p5
l15-19; l24-25; p6 l1 This can be found in the Supplement to Objection to Vexatious Litigant motion by
county (CR5), Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-
00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p243-265
The Collin County Records department became involved after my 40 days in Collin County Jail, which
resulted in a Dismissal of the Case in 2015. I requested records of my Correspondences with the Pro-
grams Director. At some point after a year or more of being told by Records Staff that they didn't have
it, Jail Leutenants and finally an IT person in the jail, I did receive records, but became Homeless soon
after and lost them. When I requested them again Bob Davis took over, which was my first ever email
contact with him. He contacted the TX AG about my Open Records request. The records department is-
sue, to get Evidence to file this case, is where the Bob Davis issue started.
Bob Davis is the most Culpable, and clearly implicated in the Civil Conspiracy against Rights. This is
similar to if this were Officers of the County and one Officer was paid by the County, and became over-
engaged in a Civil Suit to the point of Corruption. He lists his fees for "Enforcing Sanctions" at
$26,000. I am not sure who in the County charged him with the task of doing this, but he is a Private at-
torney with a Private Law Firm off LBJ and 75 right down the road (Dallas, Richardson?), I believe I
read that he has been a Prosecutor in Dallas, and he was appointed to my case by someone in Collin
County. He clearly seems to be stalking me across Texas, probably speaking to Judges and Clerks, and
other Court Employees, a cross Texas and likely in Colorado. He seems to be the most overtly active
participant. It is also likely that Bob Davis involved himself in my ND TX cases, possibly from the be-
ginning, but a Key change in my ND TX cases, (after a case against the DEA was filed in March 2017
but left open until over 1 year later, after the Nov 2017 Sanctions Agreement between Bob Davis and
Cynthia Wheless). In late 2018 early 2019, a Case was ignored by the ND TX for over a year again
(CITE CASE is still open with no IFP service for over 2 years now) then when I filed about new things
my cases were no longer randomly assigned, but all assigned to Judge Godbey, a Felony Drug Judge,
and all dismissed. It is likely that this is when Bob Davis became heavily involved. He may also be in-
volved in influencing various Federal Court and Federal Agency decisions, under the guise of "Sanc-
tions Enforcement". Sanctions do not make me an Enemy of the State, and these Sanctions aren't even
valid in the first place. Collin County could technically use the part of Rule 11 that says "cases 2 years
without service" but they are not, because it is Bob Davis' job to make sure no one gets served in my
cases. It's not as if I am Vexatiously filing cases just to say I filed them, Bob Davis is going around
making that happen, and asking me to pay for it. NOTE: I began this brief in April and shared it pub-
licly and with the County and Bob, he then exposed himself by filing in a Federal Court case not re-
garding the County Gallagher v. Dhillon 3:2018cv02801 (ND TX 2020) around May 26th, 2020 show-
10
ing that he is in fact operating outside the pervue of the Sanctions which only mention actions against
the County and he is no longer “Enforcing Sanctions” (and that is being generous assuming the Sanc-
tions weren’t based on Perjury committed by Bob, which they are) and is likely the person responsible
behind each and every one of the State and Federal Dismissals and Sanctions orders. United States of
America, v. John F. Reynolds, 821 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1987); Hobson v. Wilson, 556 F. Supp. 1157
(D.D.C. 1982); Strayhorn v. Ethical Society, 110 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. App. 2003); Wooten v. Collin
County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018); City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143
(Tex.1995)
“MR. DAVIS: Based on that and my hourly rate, there was the total amount of $26,220. Based on my
experience and review of these records and the work that was performed, this was certainly a reason-
able and necessary amount for the preparation and defense and enforcement of the sanctions' action.
Additionally, I anticipate that there will be another 20 hours dealing with Mr. Gallagher, attempted ap-
peals and further actions if his past history is any indication.“ -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin
County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge
Andrea Thompson), p46 l5-14
Cynthia Wheless is also clearly Culpable in Civil Conspiracy. In the Original Sanctions order she calls
my claims against Ken Paxton "Gossip" and Evidence of Bad Faith, yet if you Google "Paxton Whe-
less" they are clearly biased towards Ken Paxton, who now has a Triple Felony case in which he signed
a Confession Statement, and wrote the Law he broke. This is fact, not Gossip. His case has been open 5
years now. But Ken Paxton became involved in 2016 or 2017 in this instant case before it was ever as-
signed to Cynthia Wheless in my 2017 Original filing. Cynthia Wheless' husband created the Drug
Court in Collin County, which she never disclosed to me. I have since then retrieved copies of both her
Husband and her Financial Records. And the only big difference between my Indigency Form I filed, is
they have a house on it. I am Homeless, I am pretty sure Cynthia Wheless could File a lawsuit, send
you her Financial Record and move forward without payment of Court costs. Once assigned to my case
Cynthia took from March 2017 to November 2017 to have a hearing. March I was living at Dallas Life
and by May I had a FAFSA and was out of State going to school for around 8 months. I did not know
about Efiling at this time. In Nov 2017 I was unable to appear, she proceeded to move forward with
Sanctions on a non-Present party on a nearly 1 year old case. Sanctions Bob Davis has requested
$26,000 for enforcing with no record of it being Enforced apart from 1 Federal Case in the ED TX
2019 where Magistrate Christine Nowak wrote an R&R citing Bob's lie that I requested Marijuana in
jail, the case was dismissed within 1 week of Ray Wheless retiring and Tom Nowak, Christine Nowak's
husband was appointed to replace him on the 366th bench, Sept 2019. Upon my own discovery of this
through personal research, she was recused. Both Bob Davis and Cynthia Wheless are Phi Delta Phi but
failed to disclose this as a conflict to show they could work together fairly. Judge Wheless has right-
fully recused herself though and does deserve to be recognized for that action, but may currently be
fighting against me with Bob still and if that is the case she needs to be recognized for that as well.
Christian v. State, 865 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App. 1993); Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. ___ (2017); United
States of America, v. John F. Reynolds, 821 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1987); Hobson v. Wilson, 556 F.
Supp. 1157 (D.D.C. 1982); Strayhorn v. Ethical Society, 110 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. App. 2003); Wooten
v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018); City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d
143 (Tex.1995)
11
Christine Nowak enforced State Sanctions in Federal court on a case naming Ray Wheless as a Defen-
dant, by repeating Bob Davis' lie that I had requested Marijuana in jail, with no hearing, as the Sanc-
tions stated I could not file a Claim about Smoking Marijuana inside the Collin County Jail. The only
way to Enforce the Sanctions was to pretend I was again filing about Marijuana in jail, which I never
filed about in the first place. Her Husband, Tom Nowak, was then appointed to replace Ray Wheless 1
week apart from the case against Ray Wheless being dismissed. She has yet to recuse herself as Cyn-
thia Wheless has. And both need to Vacate their Orders. Christian v. State, 865 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.
App. 1993); Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. ___ (2017); United States of America, v. John F. Reynolds,
821 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1987); Hobson v. Wilson, 556 F. Supp. 1157 (D.D.C. 1982); Strayhorn v.
Ethical Society, 110 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. App. 2003); Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM
(NDTX 2018); City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143 (Tex.1995)
Ashley Wysocki is involved in that it seems as if Bob Davis had a massive influence on my Name
Change case, which I assume is part of the $26,000 and why the name change was denied. He seems to
have "Enforced Sanctions" by communicating with her office.
Andrea Thompson replaced Cynthia Wheless and seemed to think that all of these are issues for appeal,
but also seems to have been Influenced by Bob Davis after Cynthia Wheless was recused. She is also a
Collin County Judge, associated with Ashley Wysocki through the O'Neil Wysocki Lawfirm. Andrea
Thompson did not hold me in Contempt, and she Enforced the Sanctions to award Bob David $26,000
for what is now a Grand Total of 4/5 hearings I have ever been to in the US, the first one being the
2017 Sanctions hearing I was not present for, 2nd the Associate Judge Name change hearing, then
Austin in the Original filing of this case, 2nd Name change hearing, then Jan 23rd, 2020. She also
wrote new Sanctions, but did not hold me in Contempt. All of this 17 days after Bob Davis sent some-
one to my Name change hearing to tell Ashley Wysocki that they were soon filing a Motion to Declare
me a Vexatious Litigant.
Ken Paxton is involved in at least Negligence, but likely active Participation in the Conspiracy. Various
documents have been filed by the AG who was at first a Subject in the 2017 case, but is listed as a De-
fendant in the 2019 filing because of his ongoing activity. And not only has he been involved in this
case, but for almost a year now I have been awaiting a response from the Secretary of State regarding
an AP-20x filing. The SoS originally accepted an AP-20x application, basically saying that because I
am Homeless my Orginization not a "Church" perse as in a Building. So I filed an AP-20x for Organi-
zations under 501(c)(3) or Charities, Lodges, etc. I filed this around July 2019 and filed suit in Dallas
County about the "Church" definition issue. They refused to respond referring me to Keeney at the
AG's office. The Dallas Court then ruled that Tax Cases must be brought in Austin, despite the Reli-
gious nature, and I failed to appeal thinking I would need to file in Austin and I was living at the Salva-
tion Army. This was in November 2019, and the AG and SoS still refuse to grant Tax Exempt Status. I
also filed a sister case to the Instant case, against the AG and DPS in the Dallas District Court. United
States of America, v. John F. Reynolds, 821 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1987); Hobson v. Wilson, 556 F.
Supp. 1157 (D.D.C. 1982); Strayhorn v. Ethical Society, 110 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. App. 2003); Wooten
v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018); City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d
143 (Tex.1995)
Kerrie Walker is also involved. Her role may have ended after her Corruption in my Criminal Court
case, but she may have seen my suit as a threat to her Reputation as by 2017 she had let her Bar Li-
cense Expire. I did not discover her Scandal until 2015 or 2016, and it is included in the 2017 case. She
12
was the prosecutor on a DUI case for a Wealthy individual who had a former FBI agent as a Defense
Attorney, she was an Assistant DA. She wanted a good word with the FBI, as she had formerly been a
Plano PD officer and was a prosecutor in the richest County in Texas so she helped the Defendant Win.
She was forced to resign and became a Public Defender, my Public Defender. Then in 2017 I filed this
Lawsuit in Collin county which includes her conduct in my Case. It is possible that she then bacame in-
volved again as she is basically a Co-Defendant in this case, Acting as a Public Defender in the Employ
of Collin County. And Collin County is basically representing her and the Judges in this case, as well as
the Jail and Police.
Greg Abbott is involved on at least a Negligence level, but may be in on the Agreememt. He facilitated
the Payment between the Whelesses and the Nowaks, on behalf of Bob Davis, who now wants $26,000
for making that happen. Saying he is responsible. But Greg Abbott could also be a full participant,
given his history with the Collin County District Attorney's office (CCDAO). United States of Amer-
ica, v. John F. Reynolds, 821 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1987); Hobson v. Wilson, 556 F. Supp. 1157
(D.D.C. 1982); Strayhorn v. Ethical Society, 110 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. App. 2003); Wooten v. Collin
County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018); City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143
(Tex.1995)
Andrew Hatch is the Collin County Officer who took my Criminal Complaint against Bob Davis in Feb
2020, he was able to within a day or 2 gain access to my Collin County Jail Greivence system Records.
I assume this easy access to something that took them 2 years to retrieve for me, is because they very
probably contacted Bob Davis who would have happily "Enforced Sanctions" against me by getting
Andrew Hatch to disregard the Class 3 Felony of Aggrevated Perjury. Andrew Hatch closed it out stat-
ing that Bob Davis' lie about me requesting Marijuana in jail was an "Opinion", not a lie, because I
mentioned my Religion in the Records. Not requested anything, but because I mentioned my Religion.
I am currently trying to get a copy of the record, but I don't have a $5 Bill to send them.
“Q. Do you know the concept of "governmental sovereign immunity" that the County has?
A. No, not under Rule -- Title 5, Chapter 110 you guys have waived your sovereign immunity The State
has waived sovereign immunity for both municipalities and the State under Title 5, Chapter 110.
Q. So your allegations about --
A. Any judicial order, action, decision, ordinance, rule, law, anything is subject to that.
Q. So you dispute and you don't think that the County would have immunity for any claims about --
A. No.
Q. Let me finish my question, please, sir.
A. Sorry.
Q. -- about removing, as you allege, documents in a court file?
A. What do you mean "removing documents"?
Q. Okay. You have made an assertion that there was a felony. I did --
A. Yes.
Q. -- not see anything in any official record in Collin County that you've ever been charged with a
felony.“ -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-
2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p23 l20-25; p24 l1-16
13
Collin County's motion to declare me a Vexatious Litigant was filed 01/08/20 and Notice of Hear-
ing was 01/09/20. The hearing was 01/23/2020. It was scheduled 30 minutes before a Sanctions
hearing that was already scheduled, and was initiated 2 day AFTER the 01/06/20 Name Change
hearing where they actually expected to lose, changing the styling of this case to El Sasha v.
Collin County. 2 days after that they filed the Vexatious Litigant Motion. The Sanctions hearing
was for me to be in Jail for 6 months and until I dismissed cases against them, plus $500 per day.
The Scope was changed to $26,000 in attorney's fees at the Hearing, no Notice, and I told the
Judge on the record I was not ready to move forward, but she then moved forward anyway.
The Name Change case is also a great example of an actual "adverse ruling. The Tex. Civ. Prac.
Rem. Code Chapter 22, Subchapter B, Sec. 11.054, (1), (A) says "finally determined adversely to
the Plaintiff". Simple Dismissal and request for a better complaint is not a "Final Determina-
tion" nor is it "Adverse". The Name Change was "DENIED" not dismissed, Denied is Adverse.
This is clear, because (1), (C) says "Frivolous or Groundless", which my cases are not and have
not been labeled.
“THE COURT: Mr. Davis, Mr. Gallagher has asked for an attorney to be appointed because you're
asking for criminal Contempt. Are you amending the motion?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, Your Honor. The County will stipulate on the record that it is not seeking any criminal
contempt against Ryan Gallagher.
MR. GALLAGHER: No, not --
MR. DAVIS: We're not seeking --
MR. GALLAGHER: No.
MR. DAVIS: We're not seeking any incarceration. The only relief that we're seeking at this point is the
imposition of monetary fines against Mr. Gallagher, which is a civil remedy. And based on that stipula-
tion, we believe that he is not entitled to a court-appointed attorney at this point because he does not
face the potential of incarceration or any loss of liberty.“-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County,
State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea
Thompson), p37 l8-25
MR. GALLAGHER: So when I walked in this room today, that is not what I was under the understand-
ing of. He filed previously for six months in jail until I dismiss all cases against the County and $500
per day.
14
THE COURT: So Mr. Davis is saying he's going to drop the --
MR. GALLAGHER: I understand that. I'm just saying what it was earlier.
THE COURT: -- request for you to go to jail. Please listen to what I'm telling you.
MR. GALLAGHER: All right.
THE COURT: Are you telling me you want him to try to put you in jail --
MR. GALLAGHER: Yes.-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney Gen-
eral, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p38 l1-14
MR. GALLAGHER: No, I've already – like, I've actually filed things on this case in case you guys try to
put me in jail to help other people with their cases in jail. Because that's what I do when I go to Collin
County jail, help other people with their cases, get them released, and you kick me out of jail.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Davis, the Court is going to accept your amendment.-(RR), Lebo, Gal-
lagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County Dis-
trict Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p38 l17-22
Statement of the Case

MR. DAVIS: So the four cases would be Gallagher versus Paxton, et al, Cause No. 418-CV-575 in the
Eastern District of Texas. The second would be Ryan Gallagher versus City of Austin, Collin County, et
al, which is the instant case. The third one is Reverend Sasha Gallagher versus Collin County, Cause
No. DC-19-17502 in the 193rd District Court of Dallas County. And then Ryan Gallagher versus
Collin County, Cause No. 416-00070-2020, which is this case, which is the previously filed case in
Travis County.-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-
00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p40 l10-19
0058313010
April 20, 2010 I was arrested at 609 Riviera dr. Mckinney, TX in Collin County, on my own property,
in Violation of my U.S. CONST 1st Amendment Religious Rights, U.S. 4th Amendment Property
Rights and Search and Seizure Rights. I was charged with a Class B Misdemeanor, Possession of Mari-
juana for 1g, or less, of Marijuana they found. They claimed to have found 14g but when the 14g came
back from the Lab in Garland it did not contain THC, as I had extracted it out to make Charas, which is
the Sankrit word for Hashish or Hash, called "Concentrate" in the Medical Marijuana, not Religious,
Industry.
This case dragged on for 5 years. First, I requested my Court Appointed attorney begin a Reigious De-
fense. He said he would do no such thing, so I requested that he remove himself from my Case. He then
proceeded to write a nasty letter about me to the Judge. I was then appointed an Attorney named Kerrie
Walker, a former Plano PD Officer and then recently resigned Assistant DA for Collin County after a
Scandal involving fixing a case as well as general bias against indigent defendants and towards wealthy
defendants. I did not know she had recently resigned. She forced me to waive my trial, accept a Guilty
Plea, and probation.
15
I then moved to Denton, TX, for a few months before Fleeing to California, Colorado, Mexico, New
Mexico, Florida and Colorado again as a Refugee, with the Goal of eventually learning enough about
the Law to form my own Religious Defense. I remained in Colorado after the 2nd time back there until
2015. During this time I was unable to Rent apartments or pass a background check but I thought it was
because of this misdemeanor.
In Sept 2015 I returned to Texas, having written a "Memorandum of Law". My Dad lives in McKinney,
and I had hardly spoken to him since 9th Grade, but had spoken to him and met with him at least once
in Colorado, as he has a Vacation House/Rental Property in Brekenridge. I asked if I could stay with
them in McKinney before I turned myself in, and came in on a Monday I think, then by Friday his Wife
attacked me while we were all drinking after she played a DVR recording of "Last Comic Standing" or
something and tried to start an argument with me about 9/11, asking me if I thought it was a good thing
and what I thought about the Holocaust, telling me for the first time in my life she lived in New York (I
thought she was from Kansas), and then when I said that at some point, by her logic, if I don't under-
stand 9/11, neither do Millions of kids in Highschool, Middleschool, and Elememtary, and we eventu-
ally then must enter a "post-post 9/11 world" and she attacked me. Then she called the Police so I
called them also to tell them I was the one attacked and that I had a Warrant. So I was arrested the Fri-
day before the Monday I intended to turn myself in, and talked to my Dad for 4 days after not speaking
to him hardly at all.
Ken Paxton was booked into this same jail 1 week before me. I was in jail for 40 days, Sept-Aug 2015,
on a charge which if I plead guilty to, I would be released after 15 Days, Class B Misdemeanor. But it
took 40 days because I fought the charge, I actually intended to be there for 6 months when I initially
returned to Texas. While in Jail I filed Habeas Corpus for various Individuals and helped them build
cases with Case Law to give to their court appointed attorneys and I got people's attorneys to come see
them under the Texas Fair Defense Act, and even got people's lawyers to Bail them out. But, while I
was there the Programs Director told me that the Non-Denominational Christian Service was the Hindu
Service, I accepted that but then the Pastor told me I could not be there if I was not Christian. They
then banned Religious Texts from Trustee jobs saying "books need to be approved by the Programs Di-
rector", but allowed Christian's to have their Bibles. The Programs Director told me I could bring mine,
and when they saw me carrying it in the hallway on the camera, they called me on the speaker and fired
me and took me out of the Trustee pod.
In August I had my hearing, where my Motion to Dismiss was denied. My attorney, the 3rd in this case,
tried to get me to go on the stand to say I smoked Marijuana on probation. I refused. And the next day
the case was dismissed and I was released because the Probation Officer could not be found, meaning
any claim that I violated Probation was Hearsay.
I then worked for 2 years to get Greivence system records from the Jail.
I have repeatedly filed into the case requesting the disposition be corrected, they refuse.
417-01458-2017
In March 2017, I was Training at a Company in Allen, TX, and on my 3rd day I was brought into the
Office and told I had a Felony. I disagreed and they handed my a copy of a Background Check that said
16
I had a Felony for Tampering with Evidence from 4/20/2010, and instead of "Guilty" or "Dismissed" it
said "Released from Jail". I went to the Collin County website and there it was. I then called the
County for 4 days being given different numbers and going to voicemail. I spoke to Deborah Ramirez,
who told me "I don't know how you found that" and suddenly it was gone. It was no longer accessible
and it no longer showed up on background Checks.
I then sued the County in March 2017 for leaving the case open, and affecting my life for 7 years with-
out ever informing me that it was there, ever. It was dismissed at Examining Trial. I also included in the
suit everything involving the Misdemeanor and the 40 days in Jail. Cynthia Wheless was appointed to
the Case. Bob Davis began to threaten me with Sanctions if I did not dismiss the case, expecting me to
fold. I didn't fold. At this time I was living at Dallas Life, not wanting to risk being falsely accused by
my Stepmom of new assaults if I went to stay with my Dad, and he has to live with her so he has to
stick by her, which is fine. But I could not appear in the Collin County Court, and never appeared at the
Court previously in this case, and Sanctions were granted against me simply because I had not ap-
peared. I believe this was November 2017. The Sanctions provided a windfall to the Defendant, barring
me from filing with the Collin County Clerk, and were issued in Violation of the Court's inherent right
to Sanction "those appearing before it".
I then filed in Federal Court in 2019. Against Collin County, Ken Paxton, the Criminal Court Judge, as
well as Ray Wheless because I simply Googled "Wheless" and did not know my Judge was Cynthia
Wheless, his Wife. The Federal Case was filed in the Eastern District of Texas and was taken up by a
Magistrate named Christine Nowak.
We have -- I've never lost any of these cases. These cases are yet to be tried, all right. And then on top
of that, he has to prove that I'm unlikely to win this one. And I have evidence showing the arrest record
from 2010, because this case goes back to 2010. I sued the County because in 2010 they broke into my
property with no warrant and arrested me for one gram of marijuana and then came and gave me a
felony saying that I tampered with evidence, which was dismissed upon examining trial. I was never in-
formed of this charge.-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General,
416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p16 l7-20
"Mr. Gallagher: I never requested to be able to use Marijuana in jail. It's about my Religious Text
which was denied to me when I was doing work in the jail as a Trutee. And the Christians were allowed
to bring their Bibles, but they stopped letting me bring my Religious Text to my job. It had nothing to
do with Marijuana in jail. The possession of Marijuana stems from the criminal charge that he was
talking about that got dismissed whenever I came to Texas, State of Texas, and I filed a Religious De-
fense, they dismissed the case and forced me out of jail because I was helping people with their cases
as a Jailhouse Lawyer. And they like made me leave and then they -- that case was dismissed claiming
that I finished probation when, as he said, I went to the State of Colorado and left, I never finished pro-
bation. And so that case needs to be redisposed because it says I completed probation, that is what the
case states if you go look at it." -(RR) DuBois, Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of
Texas, Texas Attorney General, D-1-GN-19-004716 (Travis County District Court, Judge Maya Guerra
Gamble), p17 l9-25; p18 l1-4 This can be found in the Supplement to Objection to Vexatious Litigant
17
motion by county (CR5), Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney
General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p243-265
I was never convicted. I never went to court. I was never even told about the fact that I had a felony on
my record until 2017. I went and got a job and they did a background check and they told me that I had
a felony on my record and I couldn't work the job. And then I called Collin County, asked them about it
for four days, kept calling people until I talked to somebody named Deborah Martinez (phonetic) who
then said I don't know how you found that and removed the felony from my record.-(RR), Lebo, Gal-
D-1-GN-19-004716
I filed this case in Austin, regarding the events explained, as well as events in Austin that better show
the broadness of the State of Texas' actions outside of Collin County, but I will stick to Collin County.
With new facts, including Bob Davis' actions, the McKinney PD Open Records Documentation from
2010, and various other new Evidences. Collin County and the State Motioned for Transfer, I objected
given my Family ties to the City and County Government, and Ken Paxton. The case was transferred.
416-01458-2017
Bob Davis had apparently been filing in Collin County attempting to hold me in Comtempt for my Fed-
eral Court filing. And Bob Davis' appeared at my name Change hearing in Dallas in December 2019 to
serve me, and argue that I don't live in Texas (I do). The hearing was set for Jan 23rd, 2020.
Later in December 2019 I discovered that Ray Wheless resigned, and Greg Abbott appointed Christine
Nowak's husband, Tom Nowak, to replace him. Just a week apart from when Christine Nowak Dis-
missed my Wheless Case. I filed a Judicial Misconduct and Human Rights complaint and sent an Email
to alert Cynthia Wheless that I knew about this Illegal "Payment" for dismissing my Federal Case, told
her that Judges should not be sleeping with people who benefit from their Rulings and Cynthia Wheless
recused herself.
The Contempt hearing was still set though, so Bob Davis became frantic. He sent someone else to the
next name change hearing, Jan 6th, 2020, to tell the Judge that they needed to declare me a Vexatious
Litigant.
416-00049-2020 (Transferred from Austin)
I believe it was a few days later, maybe Jan 8-15th sometime, Bob Davis filed a Motion to declare me a
Vexatious Litigant. I had maybe 8 days notice, and it was set for 30 minutes prior to the Contempt hear-
ing. This was done as a Defense Mechanism to protect the now invalid Sanctions order from Cynthia
Wheless. The hearing was heald Jan 23rd, 2020, Appealed the same day, and here we are now.
18
Sanctions are not -- this isn't against a person. They're meant to stop a behavior, which that judge that
filed that sanctions, the sanctions against me that he's talking about, then recused herself because of
her involvement in this case. Her and her husband are involved in this case. The federal case that he's
talking about I filed that he wants to put sanctions on me for and put me in contempt for, in that case
the federal judge that took that case then -- then her husband replaced the other judge's wife, Ms. Whe-
less. Her husband left the bench and was replaced by Ms. Nowak's husband who was a DA with the
Collin County Office, right. So she recused herself. And now you are the judge of this case because she
is too involved in this case to where if she made a decision against me, it would literally be in her fa-
vor, right. So she had to remove herself and now you are deciding this case. And he's telling you that
the judge that made that order should be listened to at all. Like, when they recused themselves saying
they're too close to this case, like this case is -- it's -- she's gone now. She -- her decision -- she's dis-
qualified herself from this case. And we need to overturn what she -- what she had said. I motion the
Court to vacate her decision and vacate the motion to contempt-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin
Issues Presented
Constitution Article I, Sec 9, Clause 3 (No Laws of Attainder), 1st Amendment (Religion, Speech, Re-
Additionally, when this Court has appellate jurisdiction over any issue, it acquires "ex-
tended jurisdiction" over all other questions of law properly preserved and presented. Edge-
wood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 749 n. 39 (Tex.1995); City of Corpus
Christi v. Pub. Util. Comm'n,572 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Tex. 1978). Accordingly, we have direct-
appeal jurisdiction to consider all the legal errors alleged in the various parties' appeals.
See Edgewood, 917 S.W.2d at 749 n. 39; City of Corpus Christi,572 S.W.2d at 294. Perry v.
Del Rio, 67 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. 2001)
19
2005); Jackson v. Ellis No. 07-13-00184-CV (Tex. App. Jun. 4, 2015); Gilbert v. Tx. Mut.
Insu. Co. No. 03-05-00787-CV (Tex. App. Dec. 19, 2008); Ex Parte Price 7 41 S. W.2d 366
(1987)
Right to criticize Government, firstly I spread no “Gossip” only public information, and it was all true
information about not Private Citizens, but my own Government.
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)
fice and Greg Abbott, which according to the Judge Wooten criminal case record, ended August
28th, 2010. This investigation was ended when they lied to the FBI and said they had legitimate
charges to bring against Judge Wooten. But the 2018 Wooten case record shows that that is a lie
and that now they are doing the same thing to me that they did to her. I am still awaiting a FOIA
of the 2010 FBI records. Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018)
“… with respect to the bribery charges at the heart of this case, this case is most unusual because the
State’s evidence is not merely insufficient - if affirmatively negates an essential element of the bribery
charges and proves appellant not guilty.” Id. at page 1, Dissenting Opinion (Tex.App. -Dallas 2014)”
-Stacy Cary v. State, 05-12- 01421-CR, 2014 WL 4261233 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2015)
Appeals reversed the convictions of David Cary and rendered acquittals on all counts, finding that
there "was insufficient evidence to support his convictions" on all counts (emphasis added).
See David Cary v. State, 460 S.W.3d 731 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2015)
In David Cary’s case, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the 5th District Dallas Court of Appeals
opinion and affirmed the acquittal on all counts.
See David Cary v. State, PD-0445-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)
In Stacy Cary’s case, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the opinion of the 5th District Dallas
Court of Appeals and rendered acquittals on all counts as well.
See Stacy Cary v. State, PD-1341-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)
The entire foundation of the defenses case rests on Aggravated Perjury committed by Bob Davis,
the current proceedings and Dismissed State and Federal cases are the Aggravating Factor. The
initial act of Perjury was during an illegal Sanctions hearing in a court I never appeared in; Bob
Davis lied to the Court and said that I am a Prisoner requesting Marijuana, as if I was not there
because I was a criminal and in Jail and wanted Marijuana while I was there. Further, the Judge
who issued those illegal Sanctions has recused herself after being exposed for being an opera-
tional member of the Defense, her orders must be reconsidered and vacated. Christian v. State,
865 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App. 1993); Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. ___ (2017)
20
This is a Civil Conspiracy and Public Corruption Case, and both Collin County and the State Texas
are not claiming it is not happening, and they can not make that claim because it is clear. Bob is
not even arguing that he did not commit Aggravated Perjury. What they are claiming is that it is
covered by Sovereign Immunity, which while the Civil Conspiracy against rights itself is a Con-
stitutional Issue to be resolved before even considering the State's defense, there is the 2nd Is-
sue of determining if Sovereign Immunity covers the overt and covert actions taken to remove a
Religious element from your community, and even a neighboring community, with the false as-
sumption that I, the Religious element, am a singular independent problem, and not the tip of an
iceburg within the community. Further, Ken Paxton already has 3 Felony Charges and is clearly
fighting to remain free after committing criminal acts. It is well known as "Team Paxton" in the
media, this is not a secret. My father and Stepmom, as well as both Wheless Judges and others,
are members of Team Paxton and have openly endorsed him and are involved in both the Collin
County Republican Party and Mckinney Municipal Government. See, -United States of Amer-
ica, v. John F. Reynolds, 821 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1987); Hobson v. Wilson, 556 F. Supp. 1157
(D.D.C. 1982); Strayhorn v. Ethical Society, 110 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. App. 2003); City of
Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143 (Tex.1995)
MR. GALLAGHER: The testimony drives the Court to find as a fact that the unlawful and illegal sanc-
tions were imposed. Such sanctions were being carried out. Humble Oil Refining Company versus
have not discussed that once here because it was not ever something that I brought up. -(RR), Lebo,
This is a Rights case before it is a Vexatious Litigant Case, one issue is more important and is the foun-
dation of the other. Rights come first, it is your Bill. Glenn Hegar, Comptroller of Public Accountsv.-
Texas BLC, Inc., 01-18-00554-CV (Tex. App 2020)
21
A. Rule 270 Reopening and Merging Cases
(1) Statute of Limitations
in his favor at all.
"Courts have clearly recognized that such acts overcome the statute of limitations defense raised in Appellee’s
motion. Specifically, the statute of limitations starts at the time of the violation. In cases where the violation has
been ongoing as a series of injuries, the series must be treated as a whole and the statute of limitations com-
mences at the last violation. Texas courts first recognized the tolling concept of continuing tort in trespass to
land and nuisance cases. Creswell Ranch & Cattle Co. v. Scoggins, 39 S.W. 612 (Tex.Civ.App.1897, no writ)."
-Sharleen Wilson Allen v. Bryon Wilson, 06-15-00060-CV (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)
(2) Motion to Merge
The entire foundation of the defenses case rests on Aggravated Perjury committed by Bob Davis, the
current proceedings and Dismissed State and Federal cases are the Aggravating Factor. The initial act
of Perjury was during an illegal Sanctions hearing in a court I never appeared in; Bob Davis lied to the
Court and said that I am a Prisoner requesting Marijuana, as if I was not there because I was a criminal
and in Jail and wanted Marijuana while I was there. Further, the Judge who issued those illegal Sanc-
tions has recused herself after being exposed for being an operational member of the Defense, her or-
ders must be reconsidered and vacated.
(January 23, 2020; 9:23 a.m.)

THE COURT: 416-01458-2017, Ryan Gallagher versus Collin County; 416-00049-2020, Ryan Gallagher versus
City of Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas AG.-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas,
Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p5 l2-5
THE COURT: Okay. Why don't -- in that case we're going to take up 416-00049-2020. That's Mr.
Davis' motion on behalf of Collin County to declare you vexatious.
MR. GALLAGHER: And a motion to merge the two cases, the 01458 and 00049.
THE COURT: There is no basis to merge them.
MR. GALLAGHER: They're both the same case.
THE COURT: They are not the same case and there's no legal basis to merge them.
22
MR. GALLAGHER: Okay. But they are the same cases, the same Defendant, it's the same --
THE COURT: Okay. I disagree and I'm denying the motion.
THE COURT: So they're going to stay separate cases and we're going to take that one up first and then we can
deal with the contempt case and your request for an attorney after that.-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County,
State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thomp-
son), p5 l18-25; p6 l1-10
MR. GALLAGHER: No, not this subject matter. The fact that I smoked marijuana -- wanted to smoke
marijuana in jail was the subject that they said I couldn't file about.
THE COURT: The Court finds that they're all substantially similar, re-litigating the same issues and
the same claims by the Plaintiff.-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attor-
ney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p19 l5-12
MR. GALLAGHER: No, no, I'm talking about what happened in this case.
THE COURT: And like I said, this case has already been litigated and decided. You refiled again on
the same case.-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. DAVIS:
Q. All right. Mr. Gallagher, I believe you've testified that your claim against Collin County arises from
an alleged arrest in 2010, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Which would be far more than two years prior to filing the lawsuit, correct?
A. Well, it didn't end until 2017, as I just stated in the previous...
Q. When was the last time you were incarcerated in the Collin County jail?
A. 2015. 2016.
Q. And you would agree --
A. 2016.
Q. You would agree with me, sir, that that is well past two years prior to filing the most recent lawsuit?
A. Yes, this is -- as you say even, this is a continuum and this is something that happened and I didn't
know about until 2017 and filed the case in 2017, the same year that I found out about the felony that
was still on my record, which is connected to the exact same day back in 2010, which then goes for-
ward with all the other things that I didn't know was there though, the whole time.
Q. You understand in this motion the County has alleged that you will not prevail because of the limita-
tions; do you understand that, sir?
A. No, because that's false.
Q. Do you know what "statute of limitations" is?
A. Yes, I know what statute of limitations is.
Q. Do you know what the statute of limitations is in Texas for a tort?
A. Yes, it's two years unless you can prove that it's still happening.
Q. And all of the things that you've alleged occurred in 2010 and 2015, correct?
A. No, 2017.
Q. What happened in 2017?
A. I had a felony removed from my record that I never even knew was there from 2010.
Q. And that is an action that you included in your prior lawsuit filed in the 417th?
23
A. 2017.
Q. And you've already sued the County over that, haven't you?
A. That's what this is about today. We're here talking about the 01458 and 00079 -- or 49.
Q. My question, sir, is this allegation about the felony, which I dispute, but your belief that you had a
felony, all of those issues were previously raised in your earlier lawsuit against Collin County in the
417th District Court in --
A. It was not raised because they said it was about smoking marijuana in jail, so that is what that case
was about is what you guys say. That's what you're -- you guys claim that the case was about smoking
marijuana in jail. So, no, that is what was raised and not the issue that I'm talking about. And you guys
said I couldn't bring that up again, which is not the issue that we're talking about right now. -(RR),
Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin
County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p21-23
Q. Do you understand the concept is called "res judicata," that you can't --
A. Yeah, I know about res judicata. But that means something has been finished. It means that it has
reached a resolution, res judicata, final resolution in a judicial action, right, which has not happened.
The judge then recused herself, which opened it up to this. This case is not even open. I don't know (in-
audible) the Rule 270 motion to reopen the case that we're talking about right now, because it's not
closed. We're sitting here talking about it, but it's happening now. This is not a closed case. Like, we're
here doing this now. -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General,
416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p23 l7-19
Q. The state court case, Ryan Gallagher versus Collin County, that was previously --
A. In the 417th District.
Q. -- dismissed on --
A. The judge recused herself on that case because she was involved in it.-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin
County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea
Thompson), p31 l1-6
MR. DAVIS: So the four cases would be Gallagher versus Paxton, et al, Cause No. 418-CV-575 in the
Eastern District of Texas. The second would be Ryan Gallagher versus City of Austin, Collin County, et
al, which is the instant case. The third one is Reverend Sasha Gallagher versus Collin County, Cause
No. DC-19-17502 in the 193rd District Court of Dallas County. And then Ryan Gallagher versus
Collin County, Cause No. 416-00070-2020, which is this case, which is the previously filed case in
Travis County.-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-
THE COURT: -- that the case is substantially related to the litigation in the previous case. So do you
have anything else to add about – -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attor-
MR. GALLAGHER: No. The cases that I'm filing are not regarding smoking marijuana in jail, which is
what they claimed that I was filing about when they told me not to file about it again. I'm okay with not
ever filing that because I never did and I never will. I never made that claim so that's what they're
about and that's not what we're talking about. So the sanctions are unenforceable because the sections
are not about real things, all right. They're not about a fact in reality. -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin
24
Ample time to prepare and respond to the allegations, In Re: Oliver (phonetic).-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher
v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District
Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p53 l22-24
We've had a hearing this morning. I'm going to order additional sanctions against Mr. Gallagher for
failure to comply with the order of November 14, 2017, in the amount of $26,220. -(RR), Lebo, Gal-
Tex. R. Civ. P. 270

When it clearly appears to be necessary to the due administration of justice, the court may permit additional evi-
dence to be offered at any time; provided that in a jury case no evidence on a controversial matter shall be re-
ceived after the verdict of the jury.
"Mr. Gallagher: And this is also part of a continuum of things with the state of Texas…"-(RR) DuBois,
Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, D-1-GN-19-004716
(Travis County District Court, Judge Maya Guerra Gamble), p10 l7-18 This can be found in the Sup-
plement to Objection to Vexatious Litigant motion by county (CR5), Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin
Andrea Thompson), p243-265
"Mr. Davis: When Mr. Gallagher says this is a continuum, that would be an understatement to say the
least. You are the 32nd court which has dealt with Mr. Gallagher's beliefs that smoking Marijuana is a
core tenant of his religious beliefs. His claim against Collin County arises from a 2010 plea to Mari-
juana possession, he claimed he was a Religious refugee and did not report for probation, he ab-
sconded to Colorado for 5 years. When he came back to Texas in 2015, he was arrested and placed in
the Collin County jail. He requested for religious reasons to be provided Marijuana. That was denied
Mr. Gallagher: That's wrong
Mr. Davis: When he was released he filed suit in the district court in Collin County, claiming violations
of religious rights for not being provided Marijuana in jail. That was dismissed. The District Court
Judge in Collin County said, do not bring these claims against Collin County anymore, and issued the
sanctions order" -(RR) DuBois, Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas At-
torney General, D-1-GN-19-004716 (Travis County District Court, Judge Maya Guerra Gamble), p14
l5-25 This can be found in the Supplement to Objection to Vexatious Litigant motion by county (CR5),
Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-2020
(Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p243-265
25
MR. GALLAGHER: No, no, I'm just asking you if you understand that he's saying this is about my reli-
gion?
THE COURT: I've read all the pleadings in the case.
MR. GALLAGHER: Okay. And I'm saying Title 5, Chapter 110, the Texas -- court orders, Texas law, he
cannot go against religion. He's saying this is about my religion. It's not about something else and the
religion is on top of that. That is what this is about. And you guys are sitting here talking about, did you
smoke marijuana yesterday? Yes, that is part of my religion, and I've said that over and over. And
you're acting like that's a point against me when that is what this is about. -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v.
Appellees introduced evidence of various arrests to which appellant had been subjected in Houston
County since 1940, and offered evidence, which was rejected, of arrests of appellant in neighboring
counties. There were no pleadings in the case by which such evidence was admissible. Character may
not be shown by specific instances of misconduct. Besides, evidence of character is not admissible in
civil cases unless it relates to an element of damage involved in the nature of the cause of action. Ry-
burn v. Moore, 72 Tex. 87, 10 S.W. 393, 394; Texas Midland R. R. Co. v. Dean, 98 Tex.517, 85 S.W.
1135, 1138, 70 L.R.A. 943. The jury can be prevented from allowing damages which are not involved in
the case by instructions as to what elements can be taken into consideration. The possibility that appel-
lant may have conceived an animus against peace officers because he may have been legally arrested
on previous occasions is remote, and is not to be proved by enumerating instances of previous arrests.
Such evidence is not admissible because under the law a cause must be tried on its merits, and not on
the merits of the parties. A very bad man may have a very good case, and vice versa. It is no doubt pos-
sible that upon the retrial, the case may take a turn where the evidence referred to may become admis-
sible by way of impeachment, or upon some other ground. -Robinson v. Lovell, 238 S.W.2d 294 (Tex.
App. 1951)
Whether or not harm probably resulted to the party complaining is a question of law to be passed upon by the
trial court in the first instance and to be reviewed upon appeal. See Barrington v. Dun-
can, 140 Tex. 510, 169S.W.
It was the position of appellees that the Sheriff was sufficiently excused from literally obeying the war-
rant of arrest because the evidence raised the issue of whether the arrest was made on Sunday, during
a time when offices of magistrates are not open, and if he was further excused from literal obedience
because appellant was drunk, and the law does not contemplate that a prisoner will be haled before a
magistrate in an intoxicated condition. Beeland v. State, 149 Tex. Crim.272, 193 S.W.2d 687; Fouraker
v. Kidd Springs Boating and Fishing Club, Tex. Civ.App., 65 S.W.2d 796; Pratt v.
Brown, 80Tex. 608, 16 S.W.
Robinson v. Lovell, 238 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. App. 1951)
26
The question of whether evidence should be admitted or excluded during trial is generally within the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court. Fandey v. Lee, 880 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Tex.App.El Paso 1994, writ denied); Ethicon,
Inc. v. Martinez, 835 S.W.2d 826, 831 (Tex.App.Austin 1992, writ denied). Thus, we review the complained of
evidentiary rulings in this case under the abuse of discretion standard. Fandey, 880 S.W.2d at 168; Ethicon, Inc.,
835 S.W.2d at 831. The test for abuse of discretion is not whether, in our opinion, the facts present an appropri-
ate case for the trial court's actions. Fandey, 880 S.W.2d at 168. Rather, it is a question of whether the trial court
acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701
S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S. Ct. 2279, 90 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1986). In other
words, we must determine whether the court's rulings were arbitrary or unreasonable. Downer, 701 S.W.2d at
242. The mere fact that a trial court may decide a matter within its discretionary authority in a different manner
than an appellate judge in a similar circumstance does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has oc-
curred. Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 242. Nor does a mere error of judgment amount to an abuse of discretion. Loftin
v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex.1989).
The issue before us is governed by TEX.R.CIV.P. 270, which provides as follows:

When it clearly appears to be necessary to the due administration of justice, the court may
permit additional evidence to be offered at any time; provided that in a jury case no evi-
dence on a controversial matter shall be received after the verdict of the jury.
After having rested his case, the right of a party to reopen it and introduce additional evidence is a
question addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Binford v. Snyder, 144 Tex. 134, 189
S.W.2d 471, 476 (1945); Turner v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 733 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tex.App.Houston [1st
Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Word of Faith World Outreach v. Oechsner, 669 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex.
App.Dallas 1984, no writ). The trial judge should liberally exercise his discretion to permit both sides
to fully develop their case. Lifestyle Mobile Homes v. Ricks, 653 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Tex.App.Beaumont
1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Zodiac Corp. v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 566 S.W.2d 341, 346-47 (Tex.
Civ.App.Tyler 1978, no writ). The trial court's decision should only be overturned for clear abuse.
Matador Pipelines, Inc. v. Thomas, 650 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex.App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). *250 "A trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to reopen a case after evidence
is closed, particularly where the party seeking to reopen has not shown diligence in attempting to pro-
duce the evidence in a timely fashion." McNamara v. Fulks, 855 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex.App.El Paso
1993, no writ); see Guerrero v. Standard Alloys Mfg. Co., 598 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex.Civ.App.Beau-
mont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Smart v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex.R.R., 560 S.W.2d 216, 217 (Tex.Civ. App.Tyler
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(asserting that "there must be a showing of diligence upon the part of the moving
party" in requesting court to allow a party to reopen his case after resting). -Apresa v. Montfort Ins.
Co., 932 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App. 1996)
Due notice was given all parties of the time of the reopening of the case, and no complaint is made ex-
cept that the appellants and their attorney would have had to make a trip of over 200 miles to be
present at such hearing, and no prejudice has been shown.
27
The only evidence taken on the reopening of the case was to the effect that Hunter Strain, one of the de-
fendants, had resided continuously in Tom Green County for the past three or four years, and appel-
lant's witness, Lassiter, testified substantially to the same effect at the first hearing.
Rule 270, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; 3-B Tex.Jur. 411 (Appeal and Error) Sec. 924.
The trial court overruled appellant's plea without making findings of fact or conclusions of law which
is proper.
Rule 385(e), T.R.C.P.
The inquiry here is whether there is any ground upon which the order can be sustained, since if there is
any evidence upon which the judgment can be upheld it is our duty to do so, and every issue raised by
the testimony will be resolved in favor of the judgment.
Gaford v. Arnold, Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 225; 3-B Tex.Jur. 278 (Appeal and Error, Sec. 873). -John
F. Buckner & Sons v. Allen, 272 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. App. 1954)
Saunders contends in her first issue that the court abused its discretion by denying her motion to re-
open the evidence.
Appellees alleged in their no-evidence summary judgment motion that Saunders had failed to respond
to their discovery and thus could produce no evidence to support any of her claims. Because Saun-
ders’s attorney had withdrawn, Appellees served the summary judgment motion on Saunders herself.
In the motion to reopen, Saunders produced evidence that she had in fact responded to the discovery in
a timely manner. At the same time, Saunders filed a response to the summary judgment motion accom-
panied by evidence to support each element of her claims.
The motion to reopen was premised on Rule of Civil Procedure 270[4] which provides, “When it
clearly appears to be necessary to the due administration of justice, the court may permit additional
evidence to be offered at any time; provided that in a jury case no evidence on a controversial matter
shall be received after the verdict of the jury.”
In determining whether to permit additional evidence under Rule 270, a court should consider: (1) the
movant’s diligence in obtaining the additional evidence; (2) the decisiveness of this evidence; (3)
whether the reception of the evidence could cause any undue delay; and (4) whether the granting of the
motion could cause any injustice. Naguib v. Naguib, 137 S.W.3d 367, 373 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet.
denied); Lopez v. Lopez, 55 S.W.3d 194, 201 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). “The trial
court should exercise its discretion liberally ‘in the interest of permitting both sides to fully develop the
case in the interest of justice.’” Lopez, 55 S.W.3d at 201 (quoting Word of Faith World Outreach Ctr.
Church, Inc. v. Oechsner, 669 S.W.2d 364, 367 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, no writ)); In re T.V., 27 S.W.3d
622, 624 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, no pet.).
28
Ordinarily it lies within the trial court’s discretion to grant or refuse permission to a party to reopen a
case for the reception of additional testimony. But there are occasions when it is the duty of the court to
grant such a request, especially when the proffered testimony is decisive, its reception will not cause
any undue delay, or do an injustice.
Word of Faith, 669 S.W.2d at 367 (emphasis added) (quoting Hill v. Melton, 311 S.W.2d 496, 500 (Tex.
Civ. App.—Dallas 1958, writ dism’d w.o.j.)); accord Naguib, 137 S.W.3d at 373; In re Est. of Johnson,
886 S.W.2d 869, 873 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1994, no writ).
Saunders presented uncontroverted evidence that she had difficulty finding a new attorney when her
first one withdrew. Her new attorney was unable to obtain her file until six days before the summary
judgment hearing. From the record, we thus conclude that there is nothing to show that Saunders failed
to diligently pursue the evidence in question. Rather, the delay in responding to the summary judgment
motion, which Appellees served on Saunders herself, was due to the difficulties she had in hiring an-
other attorney. -Iketha Saunders, Individually and A/N/F of Rob Saunders, Robert Saunders, III
and Robnashea Saunders v. Lakisha Lee and Shawna D. Dodd, 10-04-00211-CV (Tex. App. 2005)
B. Jurisdiction
This is a Civil Conspiracy and Public Corruption Case, and both Collin County and the State of Texas
are not claiming it is not happening, and they can not make that claim because it is clear. Bob is not
even arguing that he did not commit Aggravated Perjury. What they are claiming is that it is covered by
Sovereign Immunity, which while the Civil Conspiracy against rights itself is a Constitutional Issue to
be resolved before even considering the State's defense, there is the 2nd Issue of determining if Sover-
eign Immunity covers the overt and covert actions taken to remove a Religious element from your com-
munity, and even a neighboring community, with the false assumption that I, the Religious element, am
a singular independent problem, and not the tip of an iceburg within the community. Further, Ken Pax-
ton already has 3 Felony Charges and is clearly fighting to remain free after committing criminal acts.
It is well known as "Team Paxton" in the media, this is not a secret. My father and Stepmom, as well as
29
both Wheless Judges and others, are members of Team Paxton and have openly endorsed him and are
involved in both the Collin County Republican Party and Mckinney Municipal Government. See,
-United States of America, v. John F. Reynolds, 821 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1987); Hobson v. Wilson,
556 F. Supp. 1157 (D.D.C. 1982); Strayhorn v. Ethical Society, 110 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. App. 2003);
City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143 (Tex.1995)
Void Orders Christian v. State, 865 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App. 1993); Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. ___
(2017). This is a Rights case before it is a Vexatious Litigant Case, one issue is more important and is
the foundation of the other. Rights come first, it is your Bill. Glenn Hegar, Comptroller of Public Ac-
countsv.Texas BLC, Inc., 01-18-00554-CV (Tex. App 2020)
In Texas there is a word for what is being done by the County, Civil Conspiracy. And as Civil
Conspiracy is a factor in this case, it must first be considered by the court before any other issues.
The Civil Conspiracy Laws in Texas exist solely in case Law, and are for any Conspiracy against
Rights whatsoever, even Conspiracy against someone's inheritance. But the Federal Law better
Illuminates Civil Conspiracy, which exists in Federal Statute, and is Conspiracy against Rights
based on Religion, Race, Ethnicity, Nationality, etc. So this case meets both State and Federal
Standards of Civil Conspiracy.
As a general proposition, before a court may address the merits of any case, the court must have juris-
diction over the party or the property subject to the suit, jurisdiction over the subject matter, jurisdic-
tion to enter the particular judgment, and capacity to act as a court. See Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex.1973). Subject matter jurisdiction requires that the party bring-
ing the suit have standing, that there be a live controversy between the parties, and that the case be jus-
ticiable. See Texas Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443-46 (Tex.1993). If
the district court lacks jurisdiction, in any of these senses, then its decision would not bind the parties.
See Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 495 S.W.2d at 881 (noting that collateral attacks on a judgment are al-
lowed when the district court lacked jurisdiction). And, a decision that does not bind the parties is, by
definition, an advisory opinion prohibited by Texas law. See Texas Ass'n of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 444
(citing Article II, Section 1, of the Texas Constitution as prohibiting advisory opinions). See Eichel-
berger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Tex.1979) (noting that doctrine of inherent power is
derived, in part, from the separation of powers dictated by Article II, Section 1 of the Texas Constitu-
tion) See generallyJIM R. CARRIGAN, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS 2 (1973) (defining in-
herent powers as those "reasonably required to enable a court to perform efficiently its judicial func-
tions, to protect its dignity, independence and integrity, and to make its lawful actions effective"). The
Court's inherent powers, such as the power to regulate the practice of law, are not jurisdictional pow-
ers.-The State Bar of Texas v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. 1994)
Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife
v. Miranda,133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.2004); Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74
S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex.2002); Dallas County v. Wadley, 168 S.W.3d 373, 376 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet.
denied). Accordingly, an appellate court reviews a challenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdic-
tion de novo. Thompson v. City of Dallas,167 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. filed) (quot-
ing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228); Benefit Realty Corp. v. City of Carrollton, 141 S.W.3d *809 346, 348
(Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied). In performing this review, an appellate court does not look to the
merits of the case, but considers only the pleadings and evidence relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry.
30
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227; County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex.2002). -Willms v.
Americas Tire Co., Inc., 190 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. App. 2006)
(1) Texas Jurisdiction
This is a Rights case before it is a Vexatious Litigant Case, one issue is more important and is the foun-
dation of the other. Rights come first, it is your Bill.
Ordinarily, to assert a challenge that a taxing statute is unlawful, the taxpayer is required to pay the
tax under protest and seek a refund. See TEX. TAX CODE § 112.051(a) (“If a person who is required
to pay a tax or fee imposed by this title or collected by the comptroller under any law, including a local
tax collected by the comptroller, contends that the tax or fee is unlawful or that the public official
charged with the duty of collecting the tax or fee may not legally demand or collect the tax or fee, the
person shall pay the amount claimed by the state, and if the person intends to bring suit under this sub-
chapter, the person must submit with the payment a protest.”). However, the Administrative Procedure
Act authorizes the filing of a declaratory judgment action to challenge “the validity or applicability of
a rule,” when “it is alleged that the rule or its threatened application interferes with or impairs, or
threatens to interfere with or impair, a legal right or privilege of the plaintiff.” TEX. GOV’T CODE §
2001.038(a). A party can also challenge the constitutionality of a statute or rule under the Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act. See Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 76 (Tex.
2015). -Glenn Hegar, Comptroller of Public Accounts v. Texas BLC, Inc., 01-18-00554-CV (Tex.
App 2020)
Water & Power Resources Board, Department of Forests and Waters v. Green Springs Company,
Inc.,394 Pa. 1, 6, 145 A.2d 178, 181 (1958) ("[T]he fact that [a] statute has remained on the statute
books unassailed for many years does not in itself justify a court in reaching an interpretation favorable
to its validity for `old age cannot give it life.'"); Page v. Carr, 232 Pa. 371, 377, 81 A. 430, 432 (1911)
("If a statute is plainly in conflict with the organic law, mere lapse of time cannot cure the defect.") In
short, "this [C]ourt must perform its duty, in spite of the delay." Wilson,328 Pa. at 242, 195 A. at 100.
"Litigant statute provides in Sec. 11.054(1) as follows:
A court may find a plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant if the Defendant shows that there is not a reasonable
probability that the Plaintiff will prevail in the litigation against the defendant and that:
(1) The Plaintiff, in a seven- year period immediately preceding the date that the defendant makes
the motion under Section 11.051, has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained at least five litiga-
tions as a Pro Se Litigant other than in a Small Claims Court that have been:
(A) Finally Determined adversely to the Plaintiff;
(B) Permitted to remain pending for at least 2 years without having been brought to trial or
hearing; or
(C) Determimed by a Trial or Appellate Court to be frivolous or groundless under State or Fed-
eral laws or rules of Procedure
It is difficult to determine with accuracy due to the amorphous nature of Gallagher's claims and his
shifting list of targeted defendants, but it appears that Ryan Gallagher has filed countless litigations in-
volving the alleged issues involving his beliefs about smoking Marijuana and his Religious Right to do
so."-Clerk's Record, Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney Gen-
eral, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p12; p14
31
"...on March 20, 2017, Gallagher started making allegations against Collin County regarding his con-
torted Beliefs about the unfettered use of Marijuana under the guise of Religious practices. He origi-
nally filed his lawsuit in County Court at Law No. 5, but it was transferred to the 417th district court.
See, cause No. 005-00650-2017 and 416-01458-2017. Such lawsuit was dismissed and Gallagher
Sanctioned. Despite the clear ORDER OF SANCTIONS AGAINST RYAN GALLAGHER entered No-
vember 14th, 2017, prohibiting any further litigation against Collin County without permission from
the Court, Gallagher scurried to Federal Court...
…
Gallagher's most recent blatant disregard of State and Federal Prohibitions was to scurry to Travis to
continue with his frivolous litigation blitzkrieg. His plot did not work and such case is now before this
court. This instant lawsuit makes nearly verbatim the complaints plaintiff made in his other lawsuits
against Collin County.
…
And just this week, Gallagher filed in this very court what he called an 'Original Petition fo Bill of Re-
view' seeking to tardily challenge the Sanctions imposed against him years ago -- and which he never
appealed. See, Gallagher v. Collin County, case No. 416-00070-2020"-(CR), Gallagher v. City of
Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County Dis-
trict Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p15; p16; p17
Alternatively, the officers ask us to recognize an implied private right of action for damages for the vio-
lation of their constitutional rights. The officers claimed that their rights under the Texas Constitution
were violated by the City and its officers because they were retaliated against for exercising their free
speech rights under Article 1, section 8 of the Texas Constitution and for exercising their right to as-
semble under Article 1, section 27 of the Texas Constitution.[4] They ask us to find a state analog to
the federal Bivens-type cause of action. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971).[5]
In Bivens, the United States Supreme Court recognized an implied private cause of action against a
federal agent acting under color of authority who violates an individual's Fourth Amendment rights
under the United States Constitution. 403 U.S. at 389, 91 S.Ct. at 2001. This remedy has also been
*147 applied to the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component, Davis v. Passman,442 U.S. 228,
248, 99 S. Ct. 2264, 2278, 60 L. Ed. 2d 846 (1979), and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24-25, 100 S. Ct. 1468, 1474-75, 64 L.
Ed. 2d 15 (1980). The United States Supreme Court has come to refer generically to causes of action
for damages for the violation of constitutional rights as Bivens-type causes of action. See Bush v. Lu-
cas, 462 U.S. 367, 377, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 2411, 76 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1983) (referring to Bivens, Davis,
Carlson, and other cases seeking damages for violation of constitutional right as "Bivens-type actions
based directly on the Constitution."). The Court in Bush held a Bivens-type action would not lie where
32
a federal statutory scheme provided a remedy for the violation of a particular constitutional right, in
that case, the First Amendment right to free speech. Id. at 390, 103 S. Ct. at 2417.
The Bivens implied cause of action against federal officers complements the statutory § 1983 cause of
action which lies against state or other non-federal government officials. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The
deterrent effect provided by Bivens-type actions works similarly to that provided by § 1983. See Carl-
son, 446 U.S. at 19-22, 100 S. Ct. at 1472-73; Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91, 98 S. Ct.
1991, 1995, 56 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1978). Section 1983 provides that one who under the color of any state
law deprives another of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution shall be liable in an action
at law or equity. Id.[6] Our analysis focuses on two questions. First, we must determine whether there
is an implied private right of action for damages against governmental entities for violations of the
Texas Constitution. Second, we must decide whether we may look to the Constitution to define the ele-
ment of duty for a Texas common law cause of action.
Because Texas has no provision comparable to § 1983, the first question must be answered by deter-
mining whether a private right of action for damages can be implied under the Texas Constitution. We
hold there is no implied private right of action for damages arising under the free speech and free as-
sembly sections of the Texas Constitution.
Initially, the officers argue that other jurisdictions have recognized state causes of action based on
Bivens. Several states faced with the issue before us have found an implied cause of action while others
have rejected such an action. There is little uniformity in how other jurisdictions have addressed the is-
sue. Several jurisdictions have followed the approach used by the United States Supreme Court in the
Bivens line of cases, and have based their decisions on the presence or absence of alternative remedial
schemes. See, e.g., Dick Fischer Dev. No. 2, Inc. v. Dep't of Admin.,838 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1992) (ex-
pressing reluctance to extend Bivens to the realm of state constitutional violations except in cases of
flagrant constitutional violations where little or no alternative remedies are available); Gay Law Stu-
dents Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 595 P.2d 592 (1979) (finding
an implied cause of action appropriate because of absence of other remedies); Kelley Property Dev. v.
Town of Lebanon,226 Conn. 314, 627 A.2d 909 (1993) (holding that because of statutory remedial
scheme, court would not imply a cause of action arising directly under the state constitution);
Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines & Risk Management Servs., Inc.,408 So. 2d 711
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982),
Other jurisdictions have based their determination on the ground of sovereign immunity. See, e.g.,
Figueroa v. Hawaii,61 Haw. 369, 604 P.2d 1198 (1979) (noting that Tort Liability Act does not make
state liable in money damages for violation of state constitution); Smith v. Dept. of Public Health,428
Mich. 540, 410 N.W.2d 749 (1987) (holding that where it is alleged that state has violated rights con-
ferred by constitution, governmental immunity is not available in state court action, but declining to in-
fer a right to sue the state for damages on the basis of a violation of the Michigan constitution), aff'd,
491 U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2D 45 (1989); City of Mound Bayou v. Roy Collins Const. Co.,
457 So. 2d 337 (Miss.1984) (holding that state liability only accrues as expressly authorized by law);
Rockhouse, 503 A.2d at 1385 (noting the sovereign immunity scheme cuts against the creation of a
state cause of action); Livingood v. Meece, 477 N.W.2d 183 (N.D.1991) (holding that state sovereign
immunity bars state constitutional claims).
33
Similarly, other courts have based their determination on either the text of the state constitutions or the
relationship between those constitutions and other bodies of state laws. See, e.g., HFH, Ltd. v. Superior
Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 542 P.2d 237 (1975) (noting that the remedy for improper
legislative acts is undoing the wrongful act and not in money damages), cert. denied,425 U.S. 904, 96
S. Ct. 1495, 47 L. Ed. 2D 754 (1976); Widgeon, 479 A.2d at 921 (holding that where an individual is
deprived of liberty or property interests in violation of article of the state Declaration of Rights, he may
enforce those rights by a common law action for damages); Anderson v. Dep't of Revenue, 313 Or. 1,
828 P.2d 1001 (1992) (noting that taxpayer claims against state for damages based only on state con-
stitutional violations do not state cognizable claims for relief).
As we consider the reasoning underpinning these decisions, we recognize them as persuasive authority,
but we also recognize that we are not controlled by any one approach used by other states interpreting
specific provisions of their constitutions. Because our Bill of Rights is "based on a myriad of
sources,"[7] ultimately we must interpret our particular Texas Constitution. To interpret our Constitu-
tion, we give effect to its plain language. Dawkins v. Meyer,825 S.W.2d 444, 448 (Tex.1992). We pre-
sume the language of the Constitution was carefully selected, and we interpret words as they are gener-
ally understood. Leander Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cedar Park Water Supply Corp.,479 S.W.2d 908
(Tex.1972). Thus, we turn our attention to our Constitution.
As we begin, we note that we have been presented no authority, and our research has revealed no au-
thority, that would indicate that at the time the Constitution was written, it was intended to provide an
implied private right of action for damages for the violation of constitutional rights. See Jones v. Ross,
141 Tex. 415, 173 S.W.2d 1022, 1024 (1943) (constitutional provisions must be construed in light of
conditions existing at the time of adoption). Accordingly, we find no historical basis to create the rem-
edy sought.
Additionally, the text of the Texas Bill of Rights cuts against an implied private right of action for the
damages sought because it explicitly announces the consequences of unconstitutional laws. The guar-
antees found in the Bill of Rights are excepted from the general powers of government; the State has no
power to commit acts contrary to the guarantees found in the Bill of Rights. Tex. Const. art. 1, § 29.
Section 29 has been interpreted as follows: any provision of the Bill of Rights is self-executing to the
extent *149 that anything done in violation of it is void. Hemphill v. Watson,60 Tex. 679, 681 (1884).
When a law conflicts with rights guaranteed by Article 1, the Constitution declares that such acts are
void because the Bill of Rights is a limit on State power. Id. The framers of the Texas Constitution artic-
ulated what they intended to be the means of remedying a constitutional violation. The framers in-
tended that a law contrary to a constitutional provision is void. There is a difference between voiding a
law and seeking damages as a remedy for an act. A law that is declared void has no legal effect. See
Cain v. Fry, 86 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1935, no writ). Such a declaration is different
from seeking compensation for damages, or compensation in money for a loss or injury. Thus, suits for
equitable remedies for violation of constitutional rights are not prohibited. Section 29 does not support
the officers' claim that a private right of action for damages is implied under the Texas Constitution.
The officers rely on Article 1, section 17 as evidence that this Court has approved actions for damages
arising under the Constitution before. Their reliance on that section is misplaced. Section 17 provides
that no person's property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed or applied to public use without ade-
quate compensation. Tex. Const. art. 1, § 17. The converse of the provision is that if property is taken,
the owner is entitled to adequate payment. Section 17 provides a textual entitlement to compensation in
34
its limited context. The officers focus on language from Steele v. City of Houston,603 S.W.2d 786, 791
(Tex.1980), where we stated: "The Constitution itself is the authorization for compensation for the de-
struction of property and is a waiver of governmental immunity for the taking, damaging or destruction
of property for public use." However, this language cannot be interpreted beyond its context. The text
of section 17 waives immunity only when one seeks adequate compensation for property lost to the
State. We are not persuaded that a right to damages for injuries to constitutional interests can be im-
plied solely from a limited explicit entitlement for compensation for the loss of property.
The court of appeals below rejected the City's reliance on Bagg v. Univ. of Texas Medical Branch,726
S.W.2d 582 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.), a case in which the court of ap-
peals affirmed the dismissal of a constitutional tort for damages. The court of appeals below distin-
guished Bagg, stating that Baggturned on the issue of immunity and not on a holding that there is no
state constitutional tort. 873 S.W.2d at 440. However, the plaintiff in Baggpursued causes of action for
violations of both his federal and state constitutional rights. With respect to his claims under the state
constitution, the Bagg court did recognize that although Texas has a strong bill of rights, "no Texas
statute or case ... provides a citizen the kind of redress afforded by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or by Bivens....
There is no state `constitutional tort.'" Bagg, 726 S.W.2d at 584 n. 1. Therefore, because the state
claims were rejected, the immunity discussion was necessary only to dispose of the federal causes of
action.
The court of appeals was also persuaded by Jones v. Memorial Hospital Sys.,746 S.W.2d 891 (Tex.App.
—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ). In Jones, the court of appeals held that Article 1, section 8 of the
Texas Constitution provides an independent legal basis for a cause of action. However, Jones is not in-
consistent with our holding today to the extent Jones is understood as approving suits for injunctive re-
lief. Jones is not to be read as implying from the Constitution a cause of action for damages for the vio-
lation of free speech rights.
The officers fail to satisfy their burden to relate to this Court any textual basis for their argument that
the Constitution affords more than equitable relief for a violation of its provisions. Our review of the
language of the Constitution leads us to conclude that there is no basis from the text of the Constitution
to assume a party is given more than equitable protection. Accordingly we hold that there is no implied
private right of action for damages under the Texas Constitution when an individual alleges the viola-
tion of speech and assembly rights.
Alternatively, we also ask whether we may look to the Constitution to define the element of duty for a
Texas common law cause of action. We answer this in the negative as well. Other jurisdictions split on
whether a common law cause of action is implied to remedy the violation of constitutional rights. At
common law, the violation of a right such as those protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution was viewed as a trespass, giving rise to an action for damages for trespass. For ex-
ample, the United States Supreme Court in Bivens referred to the principle that the essence of liberty
consists in the right of individuals to claim protection of the laws when injured, 403 U.S. at 397, 91
S.Ct. at 2005 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)), and thus held that
a cause of action existed to remedy a violation of the Fourth Amendment by the federal government.
Yet, even given the imperative from Marbury v. Madison, the same Court refused to imply a cause of
action for the violation of an employee's First Amendment rights in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389,
103 S. Ct. 2404, 2417, 76 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1983). There, the Court recognized that Congress had crafted
35
a remedy for the misconduct alleged, and deferred to Congress to decide whether to create a cause of
action. Congressional action, in effect, precluded a finding of a common law remedy.
States have turned to the common law to allow an action for trespass when individual rights analogous
to those protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated. See Wid-
geon, 479 A.2d at 927 (following Bivens). North Carolina recognized that the common law can provide
a remedy for the violation of free speech, but also noted that the trial judge must craft the appropriate
remedy, and that remedy may include injunctive relief, such as reinstatement, and backpay. Corum, 413
S.E.2d at 290-91. Ohio, on the other hand, did not establish a common law cause of action for the vio-
lation of free speech because the legislature was viewed to be the more appropriate body to provide
those remedies. Provens, 594 N.E.2d at 962. Our State does not recognize a common law cause of ac-
tion for damages to enforce constitutional rights.
Historically Texas common law has not provided a cause of action for damages for the violation of
constitutional rights. The only Texas case we can find that can be read to allow an award of damages
for the violation of constitutionally protected rights is Gold v. Campbell,54 Tex. Civ. App. 269, 117 S.W.
463 (El Paso 1909, no writ). There, the court of appeals recognized that a victim of false imprisonment
could pursue a tort cause of action against an officer. However, the cause of action alleged in Gold was
the traditional common law tort of false imprisonment, not a tort for the violation of constitutional
rights. Gold did not create a new cause of action; rather, it recognized that an officer who acts outside
the scope of his authority is amenable to suit under a traditional common law cause of action. We dis-
approve of any interpretation of Gold that concludes it authorized a constitutional tort cause of action.
-City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143 (Tex.1995)
(2) Federal Question Jurisdiction
I'm currently in a federal process with the DEA right now where we are going through a religious ex-
emption process, which we started in 2006 because they lost a federal case by the -- Gonzalez versus O
Centro, it's a church where they use ayahausca and they had 300 gallons. They were arrested and they
went all the way up to the federal court. The DEA lost this case and was supposed to create a process
where they could exempt people from -- for religious use for controlled substances.
That process I started in 2017, November 2017, and we have still been going through it. -(RR), Lebo,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973) (A Texas statute making it a crime to procure or to attempt to pro-
cure an abortion except on medical advice to save the life of the mother infringes upon a woman’s right
of privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U. S. ___, No. 15–274, slip op. (2016) (A Texas law, which requires that (1)
36
physicians performing or inducing an abortion have admitting privileges at a local hospital and (2)
abortion facilities meet the minimum standards for ambulatory surgical centers under Texas law, im-
poses a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion, imposing an undue burden on a liberty in-
terest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); In Re State of Texas, 15-0139
(Tex. 2016) (Judge Willet on gay marriage); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U. S. 517 (1946) (The Texas Penal
Code makes it an offense for any “peddler or hawker of goods or merchandise” willfully to refuse to
leave premises after having been notified to do so by the owner or possessor thereof. A state, consis-
tently with the freedom of religion and the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
cannot impose criminal punishment upon a person engaged in religious activities and distributing reli-
gious literature in a village owned by the United States under a congressional program designed to pro-
vide housing for workers engaged in national defense activities, where the village is freely accessible
and open to the public); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945) (A Texas statute required union orga-
nizers, before soliciting members, to obtain an organizer’s card from the Secretary of State. As applied
in this case, the statute violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it imposes a prior re-
straint on free speech and free assembly. The First Amendment’s safeguards apply to business and eco-
nomic activity, and restrictions of these activities can be justified only by clear and present danger to
the public welfare); Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas School Dist., 361 U. S. 376 (1960) (Texas statutes
discriminated against the United States in violation of Article VI, clause 2, by levying a tax on federally
owned land and improvements used and occupied by a private concern that was more burdensome than
the tax imposed on similarly situated lessees of property owned by Texas and its subdivisions); Stan-
ford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476 (1965) (A statute providing for the suppression of the Communist Party
and authorizing the issuance of search warrants for subversive books and other materials is constitu-
tionally defective because it does not require a description with particularity of the things to be seized);
Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123 (1880) (A Texas statute, insofar as it levied an occupational tax only
upon the sale of outofstate beer and wine, violated Congress’s power to regulate foreign and interstate
commerce); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460 (1882) (A Texas tax collected on pri-
vate telegraph messages sent out of the state imposed an invalid burden on foreign and interstate com-
merce, and, insofar as it was imposed on official messages sent by federal officers, it constituted an un-
constitutional burden on a federal instrumentality); Houston & Texas Central R. R. v. Mayes, 201 U. S.
321 (1906) (A Texas statute exacting of an interstate railroad an absolute requirement that it furnish a
certain number of cars on a given day to transport merchandise to another state imposed an invalid, un-
reasonable burden on interstate commerce); Smith v. Texas, 233 U. S. 630 (1914) (Texas act of 1914
stipulating that only those who have previously served two years as freight train conductors or brake-
men shall be eligible to serve as railroad train conductors was arbitrary and effected a denial of the
equal protection of the laws); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U. S. 389 (1924) (An insurance policy
originally issued to insurer in Tennessee and converted by him in Texas from term insurance to 20 year
payment life was deemed to be a mere continuation of the original policy, and upon suit on the policy
in Texas, a Texas law imposing a penalty and allowing an attorney’s fee could not constitutionally be
applied against the insurer for the reason that Texas could not regulate contracts consummated outside
its limits in conformity with the laws of the place where the contract was made without violating Full
Faith and Credit Clause); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307 (1925) (A Washington law that prohibited
motor vehicle common carriers for hire from using its highways without obtaining a certificate of con-
venience could not validly be exacted of an interstate motor carrier; the law was not a regulation de-
signed to promote public safety but a prohibition of competition and, accordingly, burdened interstate
commerce) Bush Co. v. Maloy, 267 U. S. 317 (1925) (voiding like application of a similar Maryland
law) Allen v. Galveston Truck Line Corp., 289 U. S. 708 (1933) (voiding like application of a Texas
law); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927) (Texas White Primary Law that barred Negroes from
37
participation in Democratic party primary elections denied them the equal protection of the laws);
Graysburg Oil Co. v. Texas, 278 U. S. 582 (1929) (voiding application of Texas gasoline tax statute to
gasoline sold to the United States); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397 (1930) (A Texas law that for-
bade insurance stipulations limiting the time for suit on a claim to less than two years could not be ap-
plied, consistently with due process, to permit recovery contrary to the terms of a fire insurance policy
executed in Mexico by a Mexican insurer and covered in part by reinsurance effected in Mexico and
New York by New York insurers licensed to do business in Texas who defended against a Texas
claimant to whom the policy was assigned while he was a resident of Mexico and where he resided
when the loss was sustained); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73 (1932) (Texas White Primary Law that
empowered the state executive committee of a political party to prescribe the qualifications of members
of the party and thereby to exclude Negroes from voting in primaries conducted by the party amounted
to state action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950) )Texas constitutional and statutory provisions restricting admission to the
University of Texas Law School to white students violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because Negro students denied admission are afforded educational facilities inferior to
those available at the University); United States v. Texas, 339 U. S. 707 (1950) (Notwithstanding provi-
sions in Texas laws under which Texas extended its boundary to a line in the Gulf of Mexico 24 marine
miles beyond the three-mile limit and asserted ownership of the bed within that area and to the outer
edge of the continental shelf, the United States is entitled to a decree sustaining its paramount rights to
dominion of natural resources in the area, beyond the low-water mark on the coast of Texas and outside
inland waters. Any claim that Texas may have asserted over the marginal belt when it existed as an in-
dependent Republic was relinquished upon its admission into the Union on an equal footing with the
other states); Carr v. City of Altus, 385 U. S. 35 (1966) (A district court decision holding unconstitu-
tional under the Commerce Clause a Texas statute forbidding anyone to withdraw water from any un-
derground sources in state without authorization of legislature is affirmed); Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395
(1971) (A Texas statute (and ordinance of City of Houston) that provide for imprisonment of persons
unable to pay a fine for period calculated at $5 a day violate the Equal Protection Clause); Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972) (Texas’ filing fee system, which imposes on candidates the costs of the
primary election operation and affords no alternative opportunity for candidates unable to pay the fees
to obtain access to the ballot, violates the Equal Protection Clause); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535
(1973) (A Texas law denying right of enforced paternal support to illegitimate children while granting it
to legitimate children violates the Equal Protection Clause); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973)
(The establishment of multimember legislative districts in certain Texas urban areas in the context of
pervasive electoral discrimination against blacks and Mexican-Americans denied equal protection of
laws); Texas v. Pruett, 414 U. S. 802 (1973) (A federal court decision that a Texas statutory system that
denies good time credit to convicted felons in jail pending appeal but allows good time credit to incar-
cerated nonappealing felons unconstitutionally burdens the right of appeal is summarily affirmed);
Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U. S. 308 (1980) (A Texas public nuisance statute authorizing
state judges, on the basis of a showing that a theater exhibited obscene films in the past, to enjoin its fu-
ture exhibition of films not yet found to be obscene is an invalid prior restraint in violation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U. S. 216 (1984) (A Texas requirement that a no-
tary public be a United States citizen furthers no compelling state interest and denies equal protection
of the laws to resident aliens); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U. S. 1 (1989) (A Texas sales tax ex-
emption for publications published or distributed by a religious faith and consisting of teachings of that
faith or writings sacred to that faith violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003) (A Texas statute making it a crime for two people of the same
sex to engage in sodomy violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The right to
38
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of two adults, “with full and mutual con-
sent from each other, [to] engag[e] in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.”)
28 U.S. Code§ 1337.Commerce and antitrust regulations; amount in controversy, costs

(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising un-
der any Act of Congress regulating commerce
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (affirming that Congress may regulate personal Marijuana use as
Interstate Trade); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 US ___(2014) (ACA held to be in Violation of Reli-
gious Right to believe Fetuses have Souls); Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 US ___(2015) (A case using the Co-
caine Tax Law/Harrison Tax Act where the CSA is not definitive, showing the CSA is a generational
member of a family of Laws, and not some alien lifeform immune to Fundamental Law); Linder v.
United States, 268 US 5 (1925) (Harrison Narcotics case Stating "direct control of Medical practice in
the States is beyond the power of the Federal Government"); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114
(1889) (Attainder case, and first case to mandate State Licensed Medical Doctors, and State Medical
Boards).
"Congress may regulate it in its entirety. That a particular instance of carjacking may have a de min-
imis effect on interstate commerce is of no consequence" -Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (cit-
ing Maryland v. Wirtz,392 U.S. 183, 197 n. 27, 88 S. Ct. 2017, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1020 (1968)). See also
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995); United States v. Mor-
rison,529 U.S. 598, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 146 L. Ed. 2d 658 (2000); and Jones v. United States, 529 U.S.
848, 120 S. Ct. 1904, 146 L. Ed. 2d 902 (2000); United States v. Rivera-Figueroa,149 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st
Cir.1998); United States v. Cobb,144 F.3d 319, 321 (4th Cir.1998); United States v. Romero, 122 F.3d
1334, 1339 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. McHenry, 97 F.3d 125, 126-27 (6th Cir.1996); United
States v. Coleman, 78 F.3d 154, 157-60 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hutchinson, 75 F.3d 626, 627
(11th Cir.1996); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 576-83 (3d Cir.1995); United States v.
Robinson,62 F.3d 234, 236 (8th Cir.1995); United States v. Oliver,60 F.3d 547, 549-50 (9th Cir. 1995).
(3) Ultra Vires & Anti-Trust Law
Constitutional Challenges to Government actions are not new, otherwise there would be no purpose in
having a Constitution. Ultra Vires is Latin, meaning "beyond the powers." Christian v. State, 865
S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App. 1993); Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. ___ (2017) This is a Rights case before it is a
Vexatious Litigant Case, one issue is more important and is the foundation of the other. Rights come
first, it is your Bill. Glenn Hegar, Comptroller of Public Accountsv.Texas BLC, Inc., 01-18-00554-
CV (Tex. App 2020)
"No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the Sovereignty from which its authority is
derived" -Hilton v. Guyot, 159 US 113 (1895); Marbury v. Madison, 5 US 137 (1803)
"In looking at the facts pled in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we find that defendant state *74
agency's employees were clearly engaged in ultra vires activity and were not, therefore, involved "in
the exercise or discharge of a governmental function". Thus, the granting of summary judgment was in
error." -McCann v. Michigan, 247 N.W.2d 521 (Mich. 1976)
"The trial judge discharged the accused on the ground that the ordinance was ultra vires" -City of
Shreveport v.Taylor, 151 So. 638 (La. 1933)
39
A great example of Ultra Vires acts are those where Governments create Monopolies, or Trusts. Though
Ultra Vires relates to Rule 5.1 historically, but is now primarily cited in Private Corporate Contract
Law, Ultra Vires and Rule 5.1 directly connect when the Government engages in an Ultra Vires contract
forming a Monopoly. Tunica Web Advertising v. Tunica Casino Operators, 496 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2007)
(Section 1 of the Sherman Act)
A Monopoly is not a Monopoly if they happen naturally, with no Government Contract.
"In commenting upon the statute, 21 Jac. I. c. 3, at the commencement of chapter 85 of the third insti-
tute, entitled "Against Monopolists, Propounders, and Projectors," Lord Coke, in language often
quoted, said:
"It appeareth by the preamble of this act (as a judgment in Parliament) that all grants of monopolies
are against the ancient and fundamental laws of this kingdome. And therefore it is necessary to define
what a monopoly is… A monopoly is an institution, or allowance by the King by his grant, commission,
or otherwise to any person or persons, bodies politique, or corporate, of or for the sole buying, selling,
making, working, or using of anything, whereby any person or persons, bodies politique, or corporate,
are sought to be restrained of any freedome or liberty that they had before or hindred in their lawfull
trade." -United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895)
Trust Defined:
"1. Engaged in Conspiracy
2. That restrained trade;
3. In a particular market" -Spectator's Comm. Network, Inc. v. Colonial Country Club, et al., 253
F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2001)
"Disadvantaged competitors by directly denying… relationships the competitor needs in the competi-
tive struggle" -NW Wholesale Stationers v. Pac. Stationary, 472 US 284 (1985)
"...it is not surprising that profit margins declined somewhat after 1994 when Noramco joined
Mallinckrodt in the market, transforming it from a monopoly to a duopoly — but this does not mean the
minimal competition between two market participants was adequate…" -Noramco DE Inc v. DEA,
No. 02-1211 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Referring to a Cocaine Trust formed by the DEA); John Doe inc,v.
DEA, 484 F.3d 561 (DC Cir 2007); Norman Bridge Drug Company v. DEA, et al., 529 F.2d 822 (5th
Cir 1976).
"Competition is a rough, often inelegant process by which winners and losers -- whether products,
firms, or technologies -- are chosen by decisions made in the marketplace. In that process, economic
actors are constantly challenged to improve on price, cost, and technology -- or exit. The end result is
economic efficiency and increased technological innovation." -MEMORANDUM OF THE AN-
TITRUST DIVISION OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AS AMICUS
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE APPLICATION OF JOHNSON MATTHEY, INC. Docket #99-
27 (Discussing the Normaco case)
Title 5 Chpt 110 – Grievance system, no 30 days and can not be barred from filing court cases because
the Government doesn’t like your religion
40
tional member of the Defense, her orders must be reconsidered and vacated.
41
42
43
44
Whether the UPL Committee's records requested by Nolo Press are confidential is a judicial issue.
Nolo Press argues that this Court's 1986 Order contravenes the Public Information Act,[58] various
state constitutional provisions, and the common law. Recently in Commission for Lawyer Discipline v.
Benton,[59] we considered a constitutional challenge to Rule 3.06(d) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules
of Professional Conduct, a rule promulgated by this Court. The district court rejected the challenge,
but the court of appeals sustained it, holding the rule unconstitutional. Nolo Press's challenge to this
Court's 1986 Order is no less justiciable than the challenge in Benton to this Court's rule, and the ap-
propriate initial forum for this challenge is the district court.-In Re Nolo Press/Folk Law, Inc., 991
S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1999)
Sanctions can’t be an outcome when you don’t appear, etc

Vexatious Litigant motion has to prove case will not be won cite case law and transcript Vexatious Lit-
igant case law
Collin County paying for the case to be transferred to Collin County from Austin
C. Negligence/Noble Cause Corruption

Just like Austin Case, Judge's are Represented by the County so the County may be subject to suit for
their actions. This section is Evidence of and case law regarding Negligence and corruption.
45
-United States of America, v. John F. Reynolds, 821 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1987); Hobson v. Wilson, 556
F. Supp. 1157 (D.D.C. 1982); Strayhorn v. Ethical Society, 110 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. App. 2003); City of
MR. DAVIS:Additionally, Mr. Gallagher repeatedly re-litigates matters. His initial case was in the
417th. He essentially -- and I'm paraphrasing -- sued Collin County or sued the Sheriff because Mr.
Gallagher felt that he should be allowed to smoke marijuana while --
MR. GALLAGHER:That's a lie.
MR. DAVIS:-- in jail.
MR. GALLAGHER:That is a complete lie.
THE COURT: Sir, again --
MR. GALLAGHER: He's lying about me right now.
THE COURT: If you have a legal objection, I'm happy --
MR. GALLAGHER: I object, that's a lie.
THE COURT: -- to -- okay.
MR. GALLAGHER: It was about my religious –
THE COURT: Do you have a legal objection?
MR. GALLAGHER: Yes.
THE COURT: What is your legal objection?
MR. GALLAGHER: I object to -- he's sitting here lying and lying to the Court.
THE COURT: With no legal --
MR. GALLAGHER: Are we under oath, or no?
THE COURT: -- objection, it's overruled.
MR. GALLAGHER: Okay. All right.
THE COURT: You may continue, Mr. Davis
MR. DAVIS: In his first lawsuit against Collin County in the 417th he made -- whatever his claims are,
they were dismissed. He was sanctioned and he was told, ordered, in fact, in an order granting sanc-
tions not to file any additional litigation against Collin County --
MR. GALLAGHER: Regarding that though.
MR. DAVIS:-- until he had obtained permission from the judge. subsequently sued Collin County in
federal court. He didn't do that.
MR. GALLAGHER: Can I object? I filed no case about smoking marijuana in jail.
MR. GALLAGHER: Yes. I've never filed a case about smoking marijuana in jail. -(RR), Lebo, Gal-
trict Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p9 l10-25; p10 l1-25
THE COURT: Okay. Sir, before we begin I need to ask if you swear or affirm that you're going to tell
the truth in these proceedings?
MR. GALLAGHER: Yes. Did he do the same?
THE COURT: He doesn't have to. He's an officer of the court. He's already done that pursuant to his
bar license, okay.
MR. GALLAGHER: Ok so he is under penalty of perjury right now?
46
THE COURT: Yes, he is. -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney Gen-
MR. GALLAGHER: No, I've already – like, I've actually filed things on this case in case you guys try to
put me in jail to help other people with their cases in jail. Because that's what I do when I go to Collin
County jail, help other people with their cases, get them released, and you kick me out of jail.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Davis, the Court is going to accept your amendment.-(RR), Lebo, Gal-
Point of error two contends the trial court erred in awarding damages to Sterk based upon his arrest
because sovereign immunity bars recovery for false arrest or false imprisonment. The point is without
merit because the fact that an action for an intentional tort is barred does not prevent an injured party
from pursuing a claim for simple negligence arising out of the same facts. Texas Department of Mental
Health and Mental Retardation v. Petty, 817 S.W.2d707, 712 (Tex.App.—Austin *262 1991, writ
granted). Point of error two is overruled.
First, the County contends section 101.055(3) of the Tort Claims Act excludes liability for "the method
of providing police or fire protection". We do not construe this clause to exclude from the Act liability
for activity by the government in its policing capacity. Rather, it excludes from liability the formulation
of policy, not its negligent implementation. State v. Terrell,588 S.W.2d 784, 788 (Tex.1979); City of
Waco v. Hester, 805 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Tex.App.—Waco 1990, writ requested).
The County argues that the only damages recovered were for mental anguish, which damages are not
recoverable in the absence of a finding that the tortfeasor acted knowingly and with conscious indiffer-
ence. Such a finding may be implied from the court's finding of damages for mental anguish. Tex.R.-
Civ.P. 299. Point of error three is overruled.
Point of error one contends the trial court erred in finding that the capias is "tangible personal prop-
erty" the misuse of which is actionable under the Tort Claims Act. Salcedo v. El Paso Hospital District,
659S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex. 1983), held that the tangible personal property need not proximately cause the
injury; its use may be incidental to the negligence. Salcedo warns us that we must construe the Act lib-
erally in favor of allowing persons to state a cause of action against the sovereign.
The San Antonio court thus distinguished court orders from situations such as that in Salcedo, where
the act of negligence, misinterpreting an electrocardiogram graph, was within the Tort Claims Act be-
cause the written record documented a tangible situation. See Montoya v. John Peter Smith Hospital,
760 S.W.2d 361(Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1988, writ denied)[1]. The Austin court has held that a list of
registered family homes for child care is not tangible personal property. Eakle v. Texas Department of
Human Services, 815 S.W.2d869 (Tex.App.—Austin 1991, writ requested). The Waco court has held
that a permit issued by the Highway Department is a piece of paper evidencing permission and in no
way constituted a use of tangible personal property. Wilkins v. State, 716S.W.2d 96 (Tex.App.—Waco
1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).Jefferson County v. Sterk, 830 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. App. 1992)
-Jefferson County v. Sterk, 830 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. App. 1992)
While recognizing that "no Texas cases have specifically held that a member of such an association
may be liable for the tortious act of another member," the court relied on Cox v. Thee Evergreen
47
Church, 836 S.W.2d 167(Tex.1992), and several court of appeals cases interpreting Cox, as
"suggest[ing] that such liability may in fact be imposed." 883S.W.2d at 288. Actually, Cox held only
that a member of an unincorporated association could sue the association. Cox, 836 S.W.2d at 173.
Cox may in fact reasonably be read as precluding group liability for one member's conduct. In abro-
gating the common law rule that a member cannot sue the group because the group's negligence is im-
puted to the member, the Court necessarily concluded that membership no longer automatically carries
with it legal responsibility for the group's actions.
As the United States Supreme Court recognized in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,
931-32, 102 S. Ct.3409, 3435-36, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1215 (1982), where it refused to allow the national or-
ganization to be liable for the actions of some members of a local chapter unless it had authorized or
ratified the unlawful conduct, "[t]he rights of political association are fragile enough without ... the
additional threat of destruction by lawsuit." Nor did the Court allow individual members to be held li-
able for mere membership in the local chapter absent proof of "a specific intent to further an unlawful
aim embraced by the group." Id. at 925, 102 S. Ct. at 3432. The Court reasoned that this would amount
to a constitutionally impermissible "guilt by association." Id.
Subsection (a) of Restatement (Second) section 876 requires at least a tacit agreement to participate in
some tortious act, done in furtherance of a common goal or plan, and which causes injury. Halberstam
v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C.Cir.1982); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 512 F. Supp. 1031, 1035
(D.Mass.1981); PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 46, at 323 & n. 8-11. This has *644 common ele-
ments with common law civil conspiracy, long a recognized tort in this state. See Schlumberger Well
Surveying Corp. v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corp., 435 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Tex.1968); Massey v. Armco Steel
Co., 652S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex.1983) ("The essential elements [of civil conspiracy] are: (1) two or more
persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action;
(4) one or more unlawful, overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result."). We, however, have re-
cently held that merely proving a joint "intent to engage in the conduct that resulted in the injury" is
not sufficient to establish a cause of action for civil conspiracy. Triplex Communications, Inc. v. Ri-
ley, 900 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tex.1995). Instead, "civil conspiracy requires specific intent" to agree "to ac-
complish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means." Id. Because neg-
ligence by definition is not an intentional wrong, one cannot agree or conspire to be negligent. There-
fore in Triplex, we held that a finding that the parties "intended to accomplish an unlawful or negligent
purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful or negligent means" would not support liabil-
ity. Id. at 720. Consistent with our decisions in Triplex, 900 S.W.2d at 719, and Firestone Steel Prods.
Co. v. Barajas, 927S.W.2d 608, 617 (Tex.1996), if we were to adopt § 876(a) we would require allega-
tions of specific intent, or perhaps at least gross negligence, to state a cause of action.
Juhl v. Airington, 936 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1997)
The Tummels’ sole argument on appeal is that a civil-conspiracy claim does not require the existence of
an underlying tort but can be premised on any “illegal act”—including the defendants’ alleged crimes.
For support, the Tummels point to the Texas Supreme Court’s statement that it “ha[s] repeatedly called
civil conspiracy a ‘derivative tort,’ meaning it depends on some underlying tort or other illegal act,”
Agar, 580 S.W.3d at 140-41 (emphasis added) (citing Chu v. Hong, 249 S.W.3d 441, 444 (Tex. 2008)).
Though elsewhere in Agar the Texas Supreme Court repeatedly refers exclusively to “underlying torts,”
the Tummels argue that that language “is merely short-hand for unlawful or wrongful conduct or ac-
tion.”
Lydia Tummel v. Robert Milane, 19-40148 (5th Cir. 2019)
48
Judge Brister found that many of the alleged conspirators had never met each other, much less partici-
pated in regular meetings or communications in furtherance of a conspiracy. Appellant cites cases stat-
ing the undisputed proposition that an agreement may be informal and tacit and that a civil conspiracy
can be established by circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Hol-
loway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 581-82 (Tex.1963); Bourland v. State, 528 S.W.2d 350, 354-55 (Tex.Civ.App.-
Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Additionally, conspiracy is not an independent, actionable claim. As the Texas Supreme Court has ob-
served:
Civil conspiracy, generally defined as a combination of two or more persons to accomplish an unlawful
purpose, or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means, might be called a derivative tort....
That is, a defendant's liability for conspiracy depends on participation in some underlying tort for
which the plaintiff seeks to hold at least one of the named defendants liable.
Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 681 (Tex.1996). Therefore, even if he had been able to show some
sort of tacit agreement between the defendants, appellant's inability to articulate even one actionable
underlying tort claim is fatal to his conspiracy allegations. See, e.g., Hoggett v.
Brown, 971 S.W.2d 472, 493 (Tex. *767 App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) (concluding there
was no actionable conspiracy claim once the court had determined the defendants did not owe a fidu-
ciary duty to the plaintiff because "a defendant's liability for conspiracy depends on participation in
some underlying tort for which the plaintiff seeks to hold at least one of named defendants liable").
We earlier expressly determined, however, that Metzger lacked standing because he failed to show in
the "record that he was injured in his business or property by any predicate act of racketeering activ-
ity." Metzger, 892 S.W.2d at 47. It was this failure to establish any underlying, predicate racketeering
activity that was fatal to the issue of standing.
In considering whether a claim is groundless within the meaning of Rule 13, we do examine inadmissi-
ble evidence. See, e.g., Donwerth v. Preston II Chrysler-Dodge, Inc.,775 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tex.1989).
(1) whether the $100,000 sanction imposed is directly related to the offensive conduct and (2) whether
the amount is excessive. TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex.1991).
Appellant argues that Judge Brister's Sanction Order fails for lack of specificity. A Rule 13 sanction or-
der must state with particularity "good cause for finding that [appellant's] pleadings were groundless
and not brought in good faith or groundless and brought for purposes of harassment," or else there is
abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Smith, 857 S.W.2d 612, 617 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no
writ).
Appellant's argument appears to be that if any finding of the trial court was in error, the entire order is
void. "[A] trial court's failure to make particular findings in a rule 13 order may constitute harmless
error when the trial court's findings *770 of fact and conclusions of law supply the particulars of good
cause required by rule 13." Gorman v. Gorman, 966 S.W.2d 858, 867-68 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1998, pet. denied)
49
Bradt v. Sebek, 14 S.W.3d 756 (Tex. App. 2000)
Because civil conspiracy is a derivative tort that "depends on participation in some underlying tort,"
we conclude that the applicable statute of limitations must coincide with that of the "underlying tort for
which the plaintiff seeks to hold at least one of the named defendants liable." SeeTilton v. Mar-
shall , 925 S.W.2d 672, 681 (Tex. 1996) (describing the nature of a civil conspiracy claim). And be-
cause at least one of the underlying torts asserted as the basis for the conspiracy claims here may not
be barred by its applicable statute of limitations, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment in part and
affirm it in part.
In this summary-judgment appeal we must determine what statute of limitations applies to a claim of
civil conspiracy. Following its own precedent, the court of appeals applied the two-year statute gener-
ally applicable to torts, including trespass, and affirmed the trial court's summary judgment conclud-
ing that the civil conspiracy claims were indeed barred by limitations. 565 S.W.3d 12, 18 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2016) (mem. op.) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003 and cases
applying it to civil conspiracy). We do not agree that section 16.003 universally applies to such claims.
In a concurrence to the denial of rehearing en banc, Chief Justice Frost explained that the courts of
appeals have uniformly applied section 16.003's two-year statute of limitations to civil conspiracy
claims, even though the logic for that rule might reasonably be questioned. 529 S.W.3d 559, 563–
64 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017) (Frost, C.J., concurring in order denying rehearing en
banc). Having never passed on the question, we granted Agar's petition to consider the relevant statute
of limitations for a claim of civil conspiracy.
In civil conspiracy, the plaintiff seeks to hold the defendant liable for an injury caused by a third party
who has acted in combination with the defendant for a common purpose. Chu v. Hong , 249 S.W.3d
441, 444–45 (Tex. 2008) ; Carroll v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc. , 592 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex. 1979). Agar
therefore submits that the applicable statute of limitations for a civil conspiracy claim should be that of
the underlying tort because that limitations period more accurately reflects civil conspiracy's status as
a vicarious liability theory that hinges on an underlying tort.
We have said a proven civil conspiracy means "each of [the] defendants in error is responsible for all
acts done by any of the conspirators in furtherance of the unlawful combination." State v. Standard Oil
Co. , 130 Tex. 313, 107 S.W.2d 550, 559 (1937). This is a statement of vicarious liability. See Car-
roll , 592 S.W.2d at 925–26 (citing Standard Oilwhile describing civil conspiracy as a theory of vicari-
ous liability). We have repeatedly called civil conspiracy a "derivative tort," meaning it depends on
some underlying tort or other illegal act. Chu , 249 S.W.3d at 444 ; Tilton , 925 S.W.2d at 681. Our use
of the word "derivative" in this context means a civil conspiracy claim is connected to the underlying
tort and survives or fails alongside it. NME Hosps., Inc. v. Rennels , 994 S.W.2d 142, 148 (Tex. 1999).
This is because "[i]t is not the agreement itself, but an injury to the plaintiff resulting from [another]
act done pursuant to the common purpose that gives rise to the cause of action." Carroll , 592 S.W.2d
at 925. Civil conspiracy depends entirely on the injury caused by the underlying tort; the injury is the
damage from the underlying wrong, not the conspiracy itself. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp. v.
Nortex Oil & Gas Corp. , 435 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Tex. 1968). These cases clearly describe civil conspir-
acy as a theory of vicarious liability and establish that in Texas, civil conspiracy requires some under-
lying wrong.
50
Electro argues that Carroll stands for the opposite because it says civil conspiracy is "distinguished
from the concept of vicarious liability for concerted action...." See Carroll , 592 S.W.2d at 925-26. This
misses that concerted action is a separate theory of vicarious liability distinct from civil conspir-
acy. See Juhl v. Airington , 936 S.W.2d 640, 643-44(Tex. 1996) (treating civil conspiracy and concerted
action as similar but distinct theories). Carroll simply recognized that distinction.
In other cases, we have described civil conspiracy as a "recognized tort" or a "cause of action." See,
e.g. , Juhl v. Airington , 936 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1996) ; Massey v. Armco Steel Co. , 652 S.W.2d 932,
934 (Tex. 1983). A cause of action is simply "a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a
remedy." Cause of Action , BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Likewise, in modern usage a
tort is simply a "civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which a remedy may be ob-
tained." Tort , BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). When used as a theory of vicarious lia-
bility, civil conspiracy is part of the factual situation that permits a remedy against co-conspirators.
Without it, there would be no grounds for recovery against co-conspirators who did not commit the un-
derlying unlawful act. So it is not inconsistent to say civil conspiracy is a vicarious liability theory
while also recognizing that it is a kind of cause of action. Indeed, it is not uncommon for courts to
characterize vicarious liability itself as a cause of action when sorting through plaintiffs' various
claims. E.g. , Sky View at Las Palmas, LLC v. Mendez , 555 S.W.3d 101, 105 n.2 (Tex. 2018) (including
vicarious liability in a list of the plaintiff's causes of action alongside malpractice, negligence, and
breach of contract); N.P. v. Methodist Hosp. , 190 S.W.3d 217, 225 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2006, pet. denied) ("[Plaintiff] nonetheless has a viable cause of action for vicarious liability under
principles of respondeat superior."). None would take this usage to mean vicarious liability is an inde-
pendent cause of action. See Crooks v. Moses , 138 S.W.3d 629, 637 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.)
(explaining that vicarious liability is not an independent cause of action). Likewise, characterizing
civil conspiracy as a cause of action does not mean it is an independent tort.
The statute of limitations begins to run when a claim accrues. Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc. , 800
S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex. 1990). A cause of action accrues when facts come into existence that permit a
plaintiff to recover. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Rincones , 520 S.W.3d 572, 593 (Tex. 2017). Generally, this is
when a wrongful act causes an injury. Murray , 800 S.W.2d at 828.
Texas appellate courts on balance appear to agree with Arizona, treating each underlying tort of the
conspiracy as having its own limitations which runs from the time the act is committed. See, e.g. , Ha-
rang v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. , 400 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1966, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) ; Cathey v. First City Bank of Aransas Pass , 758 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
1988, writ denied). The application of this rule, however, is not always clear or consistent. See,
e.g. , Jeanes v. Hamby , 685 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that
limitations in a civil conspiracy claim for fraud ran from the conspiracy's last overt act rather than
with the underlying fraud claim's accrual). We agree with the rule as stated in Tovrea and Harang : the
claim accrues when each underlying tort of the conspiracy damages the plaintiff, and limitations run
separately for each such tortious act. See Tovrea , 412 P.2d at 63 ; Harang , 400 S.W.2d at 813. Under-
standing that civil conspiracy is a theory of derivative liability, it follows that a civil conspiracy claim
should share both accrual and the limitations period of the underlying wrong. This also accords with
the general rule that a cause of action accrues when a wrongful act causes an injury. See Murray , 800
S.W.2d at 828.
-Agar Corp., Inc. v. Electro Circuits Int'l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136 (Tex. 2019)
51
A civil conspiracy has been defined as "a combination by two or more persons to accomplish an un-
lawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means." Great National Life Ins. Co. v.
Chapa,377 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex.1964). But in civil conspiracy, unlike criminal conspiracy, the mere
fact that the existence of a conspiracy is proved is not, in and of itself, a recoverable harm. Starling v.
Hill, 121S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex.Civ.App.— Waco 1938, no writ). The Texas Supreme Court has stated
that "the gist of a civil conspiracy is the damage resulting from commission of a wrong which injures
another, and not the conspiracy itself." Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp. v. Nortex Oil and Gas
Corp.,435 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Tex.1968) (emphasis added). It follows from this statement that in order to
recover a judgment for civil conspiracy there must be a finding of damages resulting from that conspir-
acy.
-Belz v. Belz, 667 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. App. 1984)
Causation is an essential element for each of Koenig's personal injury claims. See Union Pump Co. v.
Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex.1995) (strict liability); Hyundai Motor Co. v. Rodriguez, 995
S.W.2d *554 661, 667 (Tex.1999) (breach of warranty); General Motors Corp. v.
Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tex.1993) (negligence); Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Engi-
neers & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex.1998) (fraud and fraudulent concealment); Harco
Energy, Inc. v. Re-Entry People, Inc., 23 S.W.3d 389, 396 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 2000, no pet.) (misrep-
resentation).
Under Texas law, these causes of action are derivative claims, requiring proof that Abbott caused in-
jury to Mr. Koenig. See Upjohn Co. v. Freeman, 885 S.W.2d 538, 549 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1994, writ
denied) (loss of consortium); Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d672, 680-81 (Tex. 1996) (civil conspiracy).
-Koenig v. Purdue Pharma Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d 551 (N.D. Tex. 2006)
It is generally well established that a violation of substantive due process occurs only when the govern-
ment deprives someone of a protected liberty or property interest. Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248,
1257 (5th Cir.1988). "Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an inde-
pendent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits." Hill v. City of Seven Points, 31 Fed.Appx. 835 (5th Cir.2002).
The Supreme Court construed the first part of section 1985(3) in Griffin v.
Breckenridge,403 U.S. 88, 91
To state a claim pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must claim a violation of a right secured by the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States and demonstrate that the deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law. Randolph v. Cervantes, 130 F.3d 727, 730 (5th Cir.1997). In order to
hold the private Defendants liable on Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim, they must have engaged in a con-
spiracy with state actors to violate their constitutional rights. Tebo v. Tebo, 550 F.3d 492, 496 (5th
Cir.2008) (citing Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d1338, 1343 (5th Cir.1994)). To make such a claim action-
able, the private and the public actors must have entered into an agreement to commit an illegal act,
and a plaintiff's constitutional rights must have been violated. Id. A plaintiff must "allege specific facts
to show an agreement." Priester v. Lowndes County, 354 F.3d 414, 421 (5th Cir.2004); Lynch v. Can-
natella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1369 (5th Cir.1987) ("Plaintiffs who assert conspiracy claims under civil rights
statutes must plead the operative facts upon which their claim is based.").
52
As noted by Defendant WOHA, a takings claim would not be ripe because Plaintiffs have failed to pur-
sue "just compensation" via state-court procedures. John Corp. v. City of Houston, 214 F.3d 573 (5th
Cir.2000);[7]see also Rosedale *756 Missionary Baptist Church v. City of New Or-
leans, 641 F.3d 86(5th Cir.2011) (noting that Williamson County's ripeness requirements are no longer
considered to be unwaivable jurisdictional requirements, but are merely prudential, though the issue
may be raised by the district court sua sponte).
Lee v. WHISPERING OAKS HOME OWNERS'ASS'N, 797 F. Supp. 2d 740 (W.D. Tex. 2011)
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3. The purpose of COINTELPRO — Black Nationalist, according to an earlier mem-
orandum, was inter alia to "[p]revent the coalition of militant black nationalist groups;" the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, then headed by the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was one of four
"primary targets" listed in the same memorandum.[6] The memorandum that had initiated COINTEL-
PRO-Black Nationalist advised the agents to whom it was addressed, "You are urged to take an enthu-
siastic and imaginative approach to this new counterintelligence endeavor and the Bureau will be
pleased to entertain any suggestions or techniques you may recommend." See Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. In
addition to testimony there were in evidence some FBI documents indicating that COINTELPRO inter-
fered tangibly with the protest activities of the kind carried on by plaintiffs. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Exhibit
13 (WFO reporting that FBI distribution of fictitious addresses for housing of demonstrators at 1968
Chicago demonstrations caused "numerous demonstrators" to make "useless trips to locate nonexistent
addresses."); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 69 ("security squad Buagents" supervised by defendant Jones instituted
"an intensive interview program in the New Left community ..." which "produced tangible results in the
disruption of the day to day activities in the New Left communes...."). At trial, plaintiffs asserted, and
the jury evidently was persuaded, that plaintiffs were victims of three conspiracies, actionable under 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3), to violate their civil rights. One such conspiracy, the jury found, included the five
FBI defendants; another encompassed certain of the MPD defendants; and a third involved both FBI
and MPD defendants. The jury also found that many of the defendants, acting outside the scope of any
conspiracy, injured various plaintiffs in the exercise of their First-Amendment rights.
The First-Amendment rights plaintiffs alleged had been violated included the opportunity to assemble
for *1166 political protest, to associate with others in order to engage in political expression, and to
speak on public issues, free of unreasonable government interference. Plaintiffs offered evidence of
broad undertakings by defendants to disrupt their activities and of specific instances in which FBI and
MPD action allegedly impeded those activities. Defendants also assert now, as they did at trial, that
there was no evidence of "class-based discriminatory animus" to justify an instruction on liability un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 96-104, 91 S. Ct. 1790, 1795-99, 29 L.
Ed. 2d338 (1971), established the basic elements of conspiracies actionable under section 1985(3).
The proof of a conspiracy to violate civil rights is often circumstantial, and determination of the ulti-
mate factual questions of intent is peculiarly within the province of the jury. Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 175-88, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1617-19, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970) (Black, J., concurring in
the judgment). The District of Columbia defendants appear, however, to argue that it was error to in-
struct the jury on section 1985(3) because the alleged conspiracy was not based on racial animus. See
generally Griffin v. Breckenridge, supra,403 U.S. at 102 n. 9, 91 S. Ct. at 1798 n. 9. Passing for the
moment the question whether there was sufficient evidence for the verdicts that the jury returned, it is
long past dispute that section 1985(3) does not require that the targets of the conspiracy be members of
a particular racial group. That principle has been clear at least since Glasson v. City of
Louisville, 518 F.2d 899(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930, 96 S. Ct.280, 46 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1975).
53
The cases now make it plain that it is the agreement vel nonamong the alleged conspirators to single a
particular group or class for discriminatory interference with constitutional rights that should itself de-
fine the class for purposes of section 1985(3). If a conspiracy actionable under section 1985(3) does
exist, it will have defined for itself the group or class of persons it intends to victimize. See Scott v.
Moore, 640 F.2d 708, 718-19 (5th Cir.1981); cf. Kimble v. McDuffy, 648 F.2d 340, 346-47 (5th
Cir.1981) (en banc); see also Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriff's Posse Comitatus, 641F.2d 711, 719 n. 15
(9th Cir.1981) (collecting cases). See generally Hampton v. Hanrahan,600 F.2d 600, 624 (7th
Cir.1979), cert. denied on these grounds, rev'd in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754, 100 S.
Ct. 1987, 64 L. Ed. 2d 670 (1980). In this case plaintiffs offered, as proof of conspiratorial consensus
defining the target classes, FBI memoranda launching COINTELPRO and directing agents' attention
to "New Left" and "Black Nationalist" political associations, as well as testimony of participants in the
FBI program.[12] Plaintiffs also examined *1168the MPD defendants on the criteria explicitly used by
the Intelligence Division to identify targets for the Division's activities, and they closely questioned the
MPD defendants on the implications of those criteria. There was substantial evidence from which the
jury could have found that the alleged conspiracies targeted plaintiffs as opponents of the Viet Nam
War or proponents of racial justice. Accordingly, the Court could not have kept plaintiffs' claims of
conspiracy from the jury. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress, supra; Hampton v. Hanrahan, supra.
-Hobson v. Wilson, 556 F. Supp. 1157 (D.D.C. 1982)
D. Bill of Review
Cite Bill of Review Case # 416-00070-2020

In Re: Gallagher, WR-90,174-01 (Tx. Crim. App.)
(2017) This is a Rights case before it is a Vexatious Litigant Case, one issue is more important and is
54
I petition for a Bill of Review in the 417/16th Court. A Case in which Illegal Sanctions were granted to
the Defendant providing a Windfall in the Case, and in which all my Motions were denied, including
motions requesting transfer to Federal Court under Federal Question Jurisdiction. And now the defen-
dant is asking that I be held in Contempt of a court which decided a case in which it had no jurisdiction.
The court also has a conflict of interest, both in deciding a case which involved the county that it repre-
sents and for myself because my father does business with the republican party of Collin county and is
named publicly as an affiliate of them.
See Prestige Land Iran v. Hilti, 3:15-CV-3734-L (N.D. Tex. Jun. 14, 2018)
I ask that the court set aside judgment so that we may decide the matters in the original case in a court
of appropriate jurisdiction. The defendant only filed sanctions as a strategy to scare me into dismissing
the case and then the court moved forward in a case it had no jurisdiction in sanctions that are un-
founded which is clear when you read the reason for the sanctions as they are listed as
1. filing a case against public officials which is my right

Gallagher v. Collin County, 417-01548-2017 (417th District 2017)
Gallagher v. Collin County, et al, 05-20-00098-CV (Tx. App. 2020)
2. filing a case involving the religious use of marijuana which is my right, as the criminal case that was
dismissed involves the same
State of Texas v. Gallagher, Collin County Criminal Court, 0058313010 (2010-2015)
3. the sanctions request goes on to erroneously claim that the religious violations in the jail are related
to marijuana use which they are not I was denied access to my religious text which was mailed to me
by family and I was told by a preacher in the jail that I could not attend church service because I was
not Christian none of which involve the use of religious marijuana in jail and none of that is sanction-
able but sanctions were granted simply because I am homeless and indigent and could not appear
55
In the original case I filed against the county I outlined that the country had illegally entered our
property and had arrested me both actions in violation of my 4th amendment constitutional rights
against search and seizure and the criminal charges were later dismissed, and I have since retrieved
the police report proving that the arrest was completely illegal. Further the complaint listed a number
of religious rights violations under the 1st amendment during the time I was kept in Collin county jail
for 40 days before the case was dismissed
A bill of review is an equitable proceeding brought by a party seeking to set aside a prior judgment that
is no longer subject to challenge by a motion for new trial or appeal. Caldwell v. Barnes, 975 S.W.2d
535, 537 (Tex.1998). To set aside a judgment by bill of review, the petitioner must ordinarily plead and
prove (1) a meritorious defense to the cause of action alleged to support the judgment, (2) that he was
prevented from making by the fraud, accident or wrongful act of his opponent, (3) unmixed with any
fault or negligence of his own. Id. If the petitioner was not served, constitutional due process relieves
him of showing a meritorious defense, he is not required to show that the other party's fraud, accident
or wrongful act prevented him from presenting such a defense, and his own want of fault or negligence
is established. Id. The grounds upon which a bill of review can be obtained are narrow because the
procedure conflicts with the fundamental policy that judgments must become final at some point.
Transworld Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Briscoe, 722 S.W.2d 407, 407 (Tex.1987) (citing Alexander v. Hagedorn,
148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 996, 998 (1950)).
sanctions order" -(RR) DuBois, Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attor-
ney General, D-1-GN-19-004716 (Travis County District Court, Judge Maya Guerra Gamble), p14 l5-
25 This can be found in the Supplement to Objection to Vexatious Litigant motion by county (CR5),
56
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. DAVIS:
A. Yes.
A. 2015. 2016.
A. 2016.
A. No, 2017.
A. 2017.
57
And then they came out and said you can't sue the Police Department. That's all it said. It didn't say
that my religion is invalid. It didn't say that I -- like, I'm not allowed to practice my religion. It didn't
say that my religion is a problem. It didn't say anything like that. It didn't say -- no case has ever said
my religion is a problem. I've never gone to court and had a judge decide things about my religion,
ever. Like, that has never happened. And you sit here and claim, like, these cases are all sitting here
saying, like, oh, no, we've heard this, we've heard this before, we've heard this before. No, these cases
were all dismissed before we heard anything, ever. These cases were dismissed before we even got any-
body served. And it was a Rule 8 violations and stuff. -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of
Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thomp-
son), p32 l6-20
Although it is an equitable proceeding, the fact that an injustice has occurred is not sufficient to justify
relief by bill of review. Wembley Inv. Co. v. Herrera, 11 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex.1999) (per curiam). Be-
fore filing a bill of review, a person must exercise due diligence to avail himself of all adequate legal
remedies against a former judgment. Caldwell, 975 S.W.2d at 537. If legal remedies were available but
ignored, relief by equitable bill of review is unavailable. Wembley, 11 S.W.3d at 927. This applies even
if the failure results from the negligence or mistake of a party's attorney. Gracey v. West,422 S.W.2d
913, 916 (Tex.1968); Thompson v. Henderson,45 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied).
-Nguyen v. Intertex, Inc., 93 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. App. 2002)
“"It is . . . axiomatic that the inferior federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They are 'empow-
ered to hear only those cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article III of
the Constitution,' and which have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant authorized by Con-
gress." Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994)). "Congress has provided for removal
of cases from state court to federal court when the plaintiff's complaint alleges a claim arising under
federal law." Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 472 (1998) “Where, as here, only
state-law claims are asserted in a complaint, a claim "aris[es] under" federal law if it "necessarily
raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain
without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities."
Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005); Gunn v.
Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013) "The test ordinarily applied for determining whether a claim
arises under federal law is whether a federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff's well-
pleaded complaint." -Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1251 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. de-
nied, 133 S. Ct. 101 (2012)” -Morgan v.PNC Bank, 14-00181-KD-B (S.D. Ala. May. 14, 2014)
“"A bill of review is an independent equitable action brought by a party to a former action seeking to
set aside a judgment, which is no longer appealable or subject to motion for new trial." Baker v.
Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex.1979). According to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, "[o]n ex-
piration of the time within which the trial court has plenary power, a judgment cannot be set aside by
58
the trial court except by a bill of review for sufficient cause, filed within the time allowed by law."
Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(f) (emphasis added). The rules themselves do not define "sufficient cause" but the
Texas Supreme Court, in a series of well-known cases, has set out the requirements that must be met in
order to obtain relief by bill of review. As the following review of these cases will show, the require-
ments for obtaining a bill of review differ depending on the particular fact situation.” -McDaniel v.
Hale, 893 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App. 1995)
“The trial court found that Hagedorn "had a complete and absolute defense" to the Alexanders' suit in
that he did not own the mule and was not responsible for it being on the highway when the Alexanders'
car was forced off the road; that the court would not have entered judgment for the Alexanders on De-
cember 8, 1947, if he "had not understood from the testimony given and the statements made to
the Court at that time that defendant William Hagedorn admitted that the mule which was on the high-
way and which was alleged to have caused the accident *998 * * * was his mule and was a mule
for the custody of which he was responsible"; that when Hagedorn came to the courtroom on Septem-
ber 1, 1947, he came to inform the court that he did not own, and was not responsible for, the
mule at the time of the accident; and that the mule belonged to, and was under the control of, Hage-
dorn's son, Robert, at the time of the accident, which fact was known to the Alexanders when they filed
suit "and at all time thereafter."” -Alexander v. Hagedorn, 226 S.W.2d 996 (Tex. 1950)
“The trial court here found that Hanks was not negligent in failing to file an answer because of his
having misplaced the citation, and that the default judgment was not caused by his negligence. It will
be here assumed that, viewing the matter under bill of review standards, there is no evidence to support
these findings, and that Hanks was negligent as a matter of law. This negligence, however, was in
failing to file an answer in time, not in his failure to timely file a motion for new trial.
Under the law, Hanks had two rights or remedies: (1) to file an answer to prevent a default judgment,
and (2) to file a motion for new trial within ten days after the judgment was taken. Rule 329b (1),
Tex.Rules Civ.Proc. Since there was a reliance on the erroneous official information given by the clerk,
it was unnecessary for Hanks to show, as was required under other circumstances in Hagedorn, that he
was prevented from filing his motion for new trial because of some accident, fraud, or wrongful act of
the opposing party.” -Hanks v. Rosser 378 S.W.2d 31 (1964)
In this Case I was unable to appear because I am Homeless and Indigent, Collin County does not have
public Transportation, and I was unable to appear. During this time Uber and Lyft did not even exist
yet, or were not something I had ever used in my life at least, as I did not begin to use them until 2018
so did not know that I could get to Collin County Court, and was indigent anyway so could not appear.
When the Court reviews the Original case they will see that not only did I request the Case be removed
to Federal Court for Federal Question Jurisdiction, but that I am Indigent and Homeless. In this Case
the County refused to Acknowledge that they have no Jurisdiction in a Case regarding themselves, and
in which I was requesting 1st Amendment and Title 42 Section 1983 Relief, this Case was full of Fed-
eral Question Jurisdiction.

Texas Criminal Appeals Case #
59
“As described more fully above, all of the Defendants, while acting individually, herein. jointly and in
conspiracy, as well as under color of law and within the scope of their employment, deprived Plaintiff
of her constitutional rights. Indeed, a judicial finding has been made that the arrest and prosecution of
Plaintiff violated her right to due process. Exhibit A, Order, attached hereto and incorporated herein by
reference … Defendants’ misconduct directly resulted in the unjust arrest and criminal prosecution of
Plaintiff, in violation of her rights under the United States Constitution … The misconduct described in
this Count was undertaken by employees and agents of the Collin County, including but not limited to
Defendants, pursuant to the policy and practices of Collin County to pursue wrongful arrests and con-
victions through profoundly flawed investigations and false allegations. In this way, Collin County vio-
lated Plaintiff’s rights by maintaining policies and practices that were the moving force driving the
foregoing constitutional violations. These widespread practices, so well settled as to constitute de facto
policy of Collin County, were able to exist and thrive because the policymaker(s) with authority over
the same exhibited deliberate indifference to the problem, thereby effectively ratifying it. The wide-
spread practices described in the preceding paragraphs were allowed to flourish because Collin
County failed to implement sufficient training and/or any legitimate mechanism for oversight or pun-
ishment. As a result of the Defendants’ unconstitutional conduct, Plaintiff sustained, and continues to
sustain, injuries including emotional pain and suffering… Defendants John Roach, Sr., Christopher
Defendant Milner, Gregory Abbott, and herein. Defendant White (hereinafter the “Individual Defen-
dants”) reached an agreement amongst themselves to wrongfully arrest and prosecute Plaintiff for
false and legally untenable claims of Bribery, Conspiracy to Commit Engaging in Organized Criminal
Activity, Money Laundering, and Tampering with a Governmental Record, and to thereby deprive
Plaintiff of her constitutional rights, all as described in the various paragraphs of this Complaint.”
-Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018)
“That hostility surfaced at the Commission’s formal, public hearings, as shown by the record. On May
30, 2014, the seven-member Commission convened publicly to consider Phillips’ case. At several
points during its meeting, commissioners endorsed the view that religious beliefs cannot legitimately be
carried into the public sphere or commercial domain, implying that religious beliefs and persons are
less than fully welcome in Colorado’s business community. One commissioner suggested that Phillips
can believe “what he wants to believe,” but cannot act on his religious beliefs “if he decides to do
60
business in the state.” Tr. 23. A few moments later, the commissioner restated the same position: “[I]f a
businessman wants to do business in the state and he’s got an issue with the—the law’s impacting his
personal belief system, he needs to look at being able to compromise.” Id., at 30. Standing alone, these
statements are susceptible of different interpretations. On the one hand, they might mean simply that a
business cannot refuse to provide services based on sexual orientation, regardless of the proprietor’s
personal views. On the other hand, they might be seen as inappropriate and dismissive comments
showing lack of due consideration for Phillips’ free exercise rights and the dilemma he faced. In view
of the comments that followed, the latter seems the more likely.” -Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Col-
orado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S. ___ (2018)
“Other statements by members of the city council were in a similar vein. For example, Councilman
Martinez, after noting his belief that Santeria was outlawed in Cuba, questioned: "[I]f we could not
practice this [religion] in our homeland [Cuba], why bring it to this country?" Councilman Cardoso
said that Santeria devotees at the Church "are in violation of everything this country stands for." Coun-
cilman Mejides indicated that he was "totally against the sacrificing of animals" and distinguished
kosher slaughter because it had a "real purpose." The "Bible says we are allowed to
sacrifice an animal for consumption," he continued, "but for any other purposes, I don't believe that
the Bible allows that." The president of the city council, Councilman Echevarria, asked: "What can we
do to prevent the Church from opening?".” -Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993)
The petitioner relies on three Supreme Court cases in support of his argument that the "defense of rea-
sonable reliance upon authority, more recently termed `entrapment by estoppel,' is mandated by the
Due Process Clause" U.S. v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chem. Co., 411 U.S. 655, 93 S. Ct. 1804, 36 L.
Ed. 2d 567 (1973), Cox v. State of La., 379 U.S. 559, 85 S. Ct. 476, 13 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1965), and Raley
v. State of Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 79 S. Ct. 1257, 3 L. Ed. 2D 1344 (1959). -Luna v. COM. OF MASSA-
CHUSETTS, 224 F. Supp. 2d 302 (D. Mass. 2002)
C. Conflict of Interest
Collin County has a long documented history of corruption.
Johnson, Dietrick Lewis Sr., WR-83,532-01 (Tex. App. 2015)
61
-United States of America, v. John F. Reynolds, 821 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1987); Hobson v. Wilson,
556 F. Supp. 1157 (D.D.C. 1982); Strayhorn v. Ethical Society, 110 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. App. 2003);
City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143 (Tex.1995)
I personally had never thought of Collin County as a particularly corrupt place, until my experience
with Kerrie Walker. In 2010 I wanted to explain my Religion in Court, to explain how the Collin
County Police and Narcotics Sergeant came to my house with no warrant, broke in after looking
through the front door window and seeing me walk upstairs, then arresting me for having Religious
Materials. My first attorney wouldn't let me use a Religious Defense and I still didn't assume it was cor-
rupt, so I asked him to remove himself from my case and he wrote a nasty letter to the Judge. Then,
Kerrie Walker was my Public Defender, and because of her actions on my case I fled the state to go
learn about my Rights. I still didn't necessarily assume corruption.
After I left, there was a Scandal with a City Manager firing the Police Cheif on YouTube and inventing
high paying jobs for his friends
Jason Gray
62
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/community-news/mckinney/headlines/20140225-embattled-mckin-
ney-city-manager-jason-gray-resigns1.ece
Jason Cooley
Ty Lake
Joe Williams
Todd Philips
Cheree Bontrager
Geralyn Kever
Then, upon my return in 2015 and reading my 2010 Court documents, I started Googling Kerrie Walker
and learned about her Resignation from the CCDAO, and then by that time she had also let her Bar Li-
cense expire, meaning she was no longer an Attorney.
This was a very small instance of Corruption involving 2 people. You could even say in a sense that
Kerrie is herself a Victim of the Corruption of Collin County and she was just "doing what everyone
was doing".
Kerrie Walker
Curtis Howard (former FBI Agent)
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/watchdog/2009/11/02/hot-links-why-was-collin-dwi-case-aborted/
I then began to look a little deeper, it was 2015/16. So I starting Googling and found that Rick Perry
was under pressure for abuse of office. And he may not have explicitly abused his office there, but the
instance shows the attitude of Texas Politicians.
http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/docs/PE/htm/PE.39.htm
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rick_Perry_veto_controversy
Rick Perry
Kirk Watson
Mary Ann Wiley
David L Botsford
Then I discovered the Judges of Collin County. Collin County Judges have a sweet tooth for corrupt Ju-
dicial activity. The Roaches have illegally used the Clerks for Political Campaigning (Cynthia Wheless
has the Clerks listed as her Campaign Treasurers, and it is probably just normal in Collin County)
which was a big scandal because it is illegal. Judge Sandoval is a gem, with a non-FDA Approved Ad-
diction Miracle Cure with a 70% success rate (including the people it killed).
John Roach
http://www.dallasobserver.com/news/in-the-collin-county-courthouse-due-process-has-a-funny-way-of-
expressing-itself-payback-personal-vendettas-and-overzealous-prosecutions-6420961
http://www.petition2congress.com/17145/impeach-judge-john-roach
Judge Sandoval
http://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-magazine/2009/december/the-worst-judge-in-dallas-county
Judge Roach Jr.
63
Patricia Wysong Crigger
Hannah Kunkle
Rebecca Littrell
Sherry Bell
Then, Ken Paxton was booked in the Collin County Jail literally 1 week before I intended to turn my-
self in for my Religious case. So I started looking into Ken Paxton. My Stepmom knew him, and was
going to his Political events, and his arrest became a big deal across Texas.
http://trailblazersblog.dallasnews.com/2015/09/ken-paxton-hires-terri-moore-dan-cogdell-to-lead-de-
fense-team.html/
When I looked into him, I found just a wealth of corruption. Ken Paxton is the Low Hanging Fruit in
this Investigation. He is almost like a figurehead, with so many actions, payments, signatures, arrests,
etc, imenating from him that he literally argues when Investigated "I can't keep track of all my invest-
ments" and they stop investigating him for writing Laws that benefit his companies. He doesn't even
personally have knowledge of many of the corrupt actions being taken in his name.
Ken Paxton
Eldorado-Collin L.P.
Cornerstone Development
Chicago Title Insurance Co.
Collin County Appraisal District
Unity Resources LLC
WatchGuard Video
Enforcement Video LP
Greg Willis
Don Day
Byron Cook
Anthony Holm
Dan Cogdell
Terri Moore
Ted Cruz
http://www.texastribune.org/2015/12/25/year-texas-politics/
Dan Patrick
Howard Hamilton
Judge Willis
Servergy Inc.
William Mapp
Joel Hochberg
Dwayne Henderson
David Dewhurst
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Dewhurst
MR. DAVIS: -- nine letters beginning in February 20th, 2018, and ending on May 16th of 2019 asking
Mr. Gallagher to please just go away, leave Collin County alone.
64
MR. GALLAGHER: This is my home.-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas
Attorney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p41 l9-13
"Mr: Davis: But, to cut to the chase on this, we are asking that the case be transferred to Collin
County. The State and the Attorney General's Office agreed…"-(RR) DuBois, Gallagher v. City of
Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, D-1-GN-19-004716 (Travis County
District Court, Judge Maya Guerra Gamble), p15 l24-25; p16- l1 This can be found in the Supplement
to Objection to Vexatious Litigant motion by county (CR5), Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County,
State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea
Thompson), p243-265
"Mr. Gallagher: … my Stepmom is a campaign contributor and a sponsor and listed for the Ken Pax-
ton campaign… My stepmom is part of the Ken Paxton campaign and everything. My Dad and my
Stepmom are both listed as Collin County Republican sponsors, and my dad does a bunch of printing
work for the Collin County Republican Party. So these are the people that are all very closely tied to
my family."-(RR) DuBois, Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney
General, D-1-GN-19-004716 (Travis County District Court, Judge Maya Guerra Gamble), p17 l1-8
This can be found in the Supplement to Objection to Vexatious Litigant motion by county (CR5), Gal-
lagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-2020
"Mr. Gallagher: So, I mean, to change it to Collin County would just be a complete conflict of interest
and like not -- and like it would be they're the defendant, I don't see how they could be the Judge, Jury,
Executioner, and Defendant
The Court: Ok, so your opposition is that you think there is a Conflict of Interest?
Mr. Gallagher: Not just a Conflict of Interest but like my family is -- that it's like they're asking Dad to
like and his friends to do the -- like, I mean, that's not okay." -(RR) DuBois, Gallagher v. City of
District Court, Judge Maya Guerra Gamble), p5 l15-19 This can be found in the Supplement to Objec-
tion to Vexatious Litigant motion by county (CR5), Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of
son), p243-265
This Case filed in the Texas Courts, and involving the Texas Attorney General is more of a Personal
case than it seems to be on its Face.
My Father is Robert Scott Gallagher, who is associated with PrintingYourNameOnIt

(PYNOI) and Executive Press, as Co-Owner of these Companies (PYNOI being merged into Executive
Press) as well as a Former Member of the YMCA Board after our years in Indian Guides and Tae Kwon
Do with the Valazquezes, and also in a friendly relationship with the
recent Former Mayor and other Parents of kids from my School. I went to School with Chelsea Lough-
miller, and she used to come over to our house, this is the Daughter of the Former Mayor. My Dad is
also friends with other Kid’s Parents from my Childhood, such as a Lawyer named
Mr. Futia who was the Father of Alex Futia, who I did not know well but was in Classes with in Ele-
mentary School. I did not really speak to my Father from about 6th Grade to the age of about 18, except
for Occasionally. And only slightly more Frequently since then, I do meet with him
when I am in the Area now.
65
My Stepmom, Wendy Gallagher, was even given the role of Operating the McKinney Visitors Center,
which is Basically the Collin County Visitor Center, and my Parents have been to Ken Paxton Cam-
paign events, as he was previously the DA in our Town.
So as the Plaintiff, I am much more Closely tied to the Texas Attorney General than your average Plain-
tiff, and anyone associated with me or the Attorney General, or Collin County, and who would Benefit
from this Case, should recuse themselves.
And it may be best for these Cases to be tried in more Neutral Counties, who are not directly effected
by the Relationships in this Case.
Cynthia Wheless Recusal because of Human Rights complaint cite # Gallagher v. Collin County, 417-
01548-2017 (417th District 2017) and City CJC Misconduct Case # Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-
cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018) Christine Nowak Federal Case # cite lines from the Nowak R&R with
Dates that it was written and ordered by the Judge later Greg Abbott then appoints Nowak’s husband
within 1 month of Nowak R&R to replace Cynthia Wheless husband, Suzanne Wooten same Judge An-
drea Thompson Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018) who said this case
would be an appeals case and that is why the record needed to be clear, point out Greg Abbott Wheless
connection in
“At the time of the CCDAO’s and the OAG’s investigation and prosecution of Judge Wooten, Gregory
Abbott was the Attorney General of Texas… Defendant Abbott, the OAG, allowed his office and
staff, including Defendant White, to assist the CCDAO in the investigation into Judge Wooten… Fur-
ther, Defendant White informed the FBI that CCDAO thought that once Greg Willis was elected Collin
County District Attorney, the “Wooten investigation would be discontinued if not transferred to the
AG’s office”. It will become clear that the CCDAO wanted to maintain control over the malicious in-
vestigation and prosecution of Judge Wooten under the guise of the OAG leading the charge… D.J.
stated that the two cases against Judge Greg Willis and Judge Wooten were completely different from
all the other cases heard by the grand jury. The presentation of evidence for the two cases was strange.
The prosecutors, Davis and Defendant Milner, often set the stage for a witness by telling the grand jury
what the witnesses would testify about. The prosecutors often made comments to both D.J. individually
and to the grand jury as a whole, which led D.J. to believe both cases may have had underlying per-
sonal issues … D.J. and other grand jury members started articulating to Davis and Defendant Milner
their concerns as to the DA’s Office having conflicts of interest with these cases. D.J. told the prosecu-
tors that the investigation seemed more like a political witch-hunt. D.J. asked Davis if his boss (CCDA
John Roach) knew what the prosecutors were doing. Davis responded that of course Roach knew, that
was why they were presenting the cases, and that Roach did not like this person (Judge Greg Willis).
After that comment, Davis tried to backtrack and told D.J. to forget that D.J. heard that comment …
On June 24, 2010, the Collin County grand jury (CCGJ) voted eight to three in favor of a 90-day ex-
tension to their six-month term. The CCGJ wanted to hear additional findings in the Judge Wooten in-
vestigation. Collin County District Judge Ray Wheless was presiding over the grand jury at that time.
Judge Wheless denied the grand jury the 90-day extension because he felt the Attorney General (OAG)
prosecutor was working on behalf of the CCDAO and not the OAG.
” -Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018).
Ashley Wysocki in the Dallas Court In Re: Gallagher, 05-20-00128-CV (Tx. App. 2020) married to
O’Neil Wysocki Law Firm who helped to elect Andrea Thompson and in the Name change case In Re:
66
Gallagher, 05-20-00128-CV (Tx. App. 2020) the Representative who appeared, on no legal grounds,
stated as their Primary argument that they did not want to “Start over with the Vexatious litigant
process”, a case taken by Andrea Thompson later that month, see Gallagher v. Collin County, et al,
05-20-00098-CV (Tx. App. 2020); Gallagher v. Collin County, 417-01548-2017 (417th District
2017); Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018), which was added as a late tac-
tic when Bob Davis realized his Motion for Contempt including an indefinite jail sentence and $500 per
day fee would not be upheld after Cynthia Wheless recused herself, see Gallagher v. Collin County,
417-01548-2017 (417th District 2017) Phi Delta Phi. This is why Andrea Thompson says it is an issue
for appeal, she does not want to rock the boat because they do not want to ”Start over” see Gallagher
v. Collin County, et al, 05-20-00098-CV (Tx. App. 2020)
”A pattern of abuse of power and malicious prosecution for political gain plagues the CCDAO. In the
time surrounding the gross misuse of the law against Judge Wooten, there has accumulated multiple ex-
amples of similar abusive conduct, including the following:
• Collin County District Judge Greg Willis was investigated by Defendant Milner and Assistant Attor-
ney General David Glickler while Greg Willis was a candidate for the Collin County District Attorney
position that would be vacated by Roach. Judge Greg Willis’ case was not indicted by the grand jury
convened by Defendant Milner.
• Denton County Sheriff Weldon Lucas was indicted by Defendant Milner a day after the election. The
indictment against Sheriff Lucas was thrown out by a judge just over one week later.
• Dallas County Sheriff Jim Bowles was indicted by Defendant Milner for allegedly funneling more
than $100,000 in political contributions into his personal accounts. The indictment was thrown out by
a judge. The provision of the Texas Election Code used by Defendant Milner does not even specify
criminal penalties for the alleged violations.
• Dallas County Jail Commissary Vendor Jack Madera was indicted by Defendant Milner only to have
the indictment dropped.
• J.V. 3 is a defense attorney who was indicted by Defendant Milner for tampering with a government
record. The indictment was later thrown out. Upon information and belief Defendant Milner specifi-
cally target J.V. because of a personal vendetta.
• D.W. 4 is a defense attorney who was indicted by Defendant Milner for tampering with a government
record. The indictment was later thrown out.” -Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM
(NDTX 2018)
Filing Ethics Complaint notarize at Wells Fargo Financial reports and missing information
What they fail to realize is that when this is properly adjudicated (which is what they are requesting be
delayed by the court when they request that proper decisions be withheld because they do not want to
start over) is that they will have to stop. They are in violation of Rights Title 5 Chpt 110 – Grievance
system, no 30 days they do not need to start over they need to stop.
Cite transcript in Collin County where Bob Davis says he knows this is about religion
cite appearance of misconduct throughout
67
Summary of the Argument
in his favor at all.
Argument
A Major point to remember here is that the Name Change case, the Final hearing with
Ashley Wysocki, came before the Vexatious Litigant motion was even Docketed. This Vex-
atious Litigant motion came after they thought they had defeated my Name change.
Collin County's motion to declare me a Vexatious Litigant was filed 01/08/20 and Notice of
Hearing was 01/09/20. The hearing was 01/23/2020. It was scheduled 30 minutes before a
Sanctions hearing that was already scheduled, and was initiated 2 day AFTER the
01/06/20 Name Change hearing where they actually expected to lose, changing the styling
of this case to El Sasha v. Collin County. 2 days after that they filed the Vexatious Litigant
Motion. The Sanctions hearing was for me to be in Jail for 6 months and until I dismissed
cases against them, plus $500 per day. The Scope was changed to $26,000 in attorney's fees
at the Hearing, no Notice, and I told the Judge on the record I was not ready to move for-
ward, but she then moved forward anyway.
68
-United States of America, v. John F. Reynolds, 821 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1987); Hobson v. Wilson, 556
F. Supp. 1157 (D.D.C. 1982); Strayhorn v. Ethical Society, 110 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. App. 2003); City of
the foundation of the other. Rights come first, it is your Bill. -Glenn Hegar, Comptroller of Public
Accountsv.Texas BLC, Inc., 01-18-00554-CV (Tex. App 2020)
Aggravated Perjury by Bob Davis in Cynthia Whelesses court 3 years before she recused herself. -In
the Interest of K.A.R. No. 14-03-00970-CV Court of Appeals of Texas,Houston (14th Dist. 2005);
Jackson v. Ellis No. 07-13-00184-CV (Tex. App. Jun. 4, 2015); Gilbert v. Tx. Mut. Insu. Co. No.
03-05-00787-CV (Tex. App. Dec. 19, 2008); Ex Parte Price 7 41 S. W.2d 366 (1987)
69
sanctions order" -(RR) DuBois, Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas At-
l5-25 This can be found in the Supplement to Objection to Vexatious Litigant motion by county (CR5),
"Mr. Gallagher: So, I mean, to change it to Collin County would just be a complete conflict of interest
and like not -- and like it would be they're the defendant, I don't see how they could be the Judge, Jury,
Executioner, and Defendant
The Court: Ok, so your opposition is that you think there is a Conflict of Interest?
Mr. Gallagher: Not just a Conflict of Interest but like my family is -- that it's like they're asking Dad to
like and his friends to do the -- like, I mean, that's not okay." -(RR) DuBois, Gallagher v. City of
District Court, Judge Maya Guerra Gamble), p5 l15-19 This can be found in the Supplement to Objec-
tion to Vexatious Litigant motion by county (CR5), Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of
son), p243-265
THE COURT: Okay. And you're representing yourself?

MR. GALLAGHER: Yes, until today because I'm requesting a court-appointed attorney.-(RR), Lebo,
70
Additionally, they can be vexatious for repeatedly re-litigating matters that have already been conclu-
sively established against them.-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney
General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p7 l16-18
MR. DAVIS: In this situation I don't think there's any dispute that within the operative seven-year pe-
riod Mr. Gallagher has filed far more than the requisite five. that are identified where Mr. Gallagher is
the pro se Plaintiff. As noted in the appendix, there are 34 litigations And he has lost -- I know in one of
his replies Mr. Gallagher points out that they -- some of them were dismissed without prejudice, some
were dis --
MR. GALLAGHER: (Inaudible).
MR. DAVIS: -- dismissed for other reasons. That is irrelevant to the vexatious statute. It does not have
to be a dismissal with prejudice. It doesn't have to be a dismissal on the merits.
MR. GALLAGHER: It's adverse.
MR. DAVIS: Adverse means they lost.
MR. GALLAGHER: No, I didn't lose -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas At-
torney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p8 l9-25
First off, I'm going to start with what he said, actually. I'll start with what he said. He said that -- that I
have 34 cases that I filed. It's more like 21, maybe. And the rest are appeals, right. He's listing appeals
as their own cases as if I had filed those separately as their own cases, right. -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v.
MR. GALLAGHER: Yeah. And he's saying that the -- the -- that the fact that these are without prejudice
doesn't apply to the Texas vexatious litigant law, when this is the Texas vexatious litigant law that he's
trying to apply these Colorado state cases to, these Colorado cases to. all right, the things that he's
talking about. This has nothing to do with this state,
Second off, they are all -- almost all decided without prejudice with nobody even being served in the
case. There are Rule 8 Forms, rules of violations, which is overruled by Federal Rule of 83(a)(2) --
-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-2020
(Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p13 l7-17
MR. GALLAGHER: No, but he's not proving that any case has been decided against me. A dismissed
case is not an adverse decision. That's not an adverse opinion against me. That's like sanctions -- it's
like saying sanctions are adverse, like sanctions are not meant to be an opinion against me.
THE COURT: All right. Do you have anything else?-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of
son), p17 l17-24
71
And then it has on that my background checks, which state that I had a -- if you can see this here (indi-
cating), there are two charges at first on there. And then it says I have a felony and then it gets removed
so that I just have the misdemeanor. Here's the dismissed on the examining trial --
Q. Have you been smoking pot today?
A. No. Examining trial, not enough --
Q. Are you sure?
A. -- probable cause --
THE COURT: Sir.
Q. (BY MR. DAVIS) If you'd step back, you smell like marijuana to me.
A. -- tamper and fabricating with evidence --
THE COURT: Mr. Gallagher.
A. -- not enough probable cause, dismissed.
THE COURT: Mr. Gallagher, have you used marijuana today?
MR. GALLAGHER: No.
MR. DAVIS: Yesterday?
MR. GALLAGHER: Yes, as part of my religion. -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of
son), p25 l2-22
MR. GALLAGHER: No, I'm completely clear on everything that's happening. I'm trying to show you I
do have a felony. He doesn't think it ever happened when I'm sitting here showing you evidence that
there's a felony on my record. -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney
72
son), p32 l6-20
MR. GALLAGHER: So when I walked in this room today, that is not what I was under the understand-
ing of. He filed previously for six months in jail until I dismiss all cases against the County and $500
per day.
THE COURT: So Mr. Davis is saying he's going to drop the --
MR. GALLAGHER: I understand that. I'm just saying what it was earlier.
THE COURT: -- request for you to go to jail. Please listen to what I'm telling you.
THE COURT: Are you telling me you want him to try to put you in jail --
MR. GALLAGHER: Yes.-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney Gen-
MR. DAVIS: Okay. Exhibit...

THE COURT: 14, I think is what we're up to; is that right?
THE REPORTER: Yes, ma'am.
MR. GALLAGHER: Do you understand --You've spent $26,000 at $150 an hour thinking about me.-
(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-2020
Body
What these cases are about is a Religious Mystery School. You may know about Bone Meal, and Blood
Meal being used to grow plants. There is Feathermeal, as well as Crabmeal. Nature moves in Cycles.
The Ogdoad can be found as a theme throughout most modern religions and some ancient Religions.
An example of this is ancient Egypt. In the picture below you can see that the Sun has been placed in a
boat, this is known as the Solar boat and it is thought to be part of the force that moves the Sun and the
Moon across the sky. But if you look in the Solar boat you will see more Gods than just the Sun and
moon, this is because the Egyptians noticed the Planets in the sky and called them Gods, just like the
Sun is a God. This religion can be found in Ancient Egypt, Ancient Sumeria, Ancient Greece, Ancient
Rome and Modern India/Hinduism. Hinduism is the only major ancient world Religion that survived
after Abraham, Jesus and Mohammed.
In Ancient Egypt they were very good at keeping records, and not just in hieroglyphs but in other
ways. For example the Egyptians had a 365 day Calendar, they did this by creating a wall to work as a
false horizon. Then they would mark the wall every day when the Sun came up, and throughout the
year the Sun moves across the Horizon, and at the end of 365 days it ends up back in the same spot and
they have 365 marks on the wall. They just didn't have leap year. This is also where the Constellations
come from. Aquarius and Taurus and Pisces and Libra and Leo and Scorpio, etc. Aren't random, those
are the starts the Sun passes through, and those give us the names of our months. Then there was Horus
who represented the Horizon, but he was the planet Mars. They figured out the Cycle of Mars just like
73
the Sun, and they also had the Moon's Cycles (And Moon Cycles give the lengths of our Months) and
the Cycles of various planets. Even the Jewish Nomads knew about some of the Planets, they called
Mars 'The Blushing One'.
And in Christianity the 7 known planets of the time can be found in the Ancient Greek Christian Gnos-
tic idea of The 7 Heavens which represented the Bodies in the Heavens the Heavenly Bodies or Planets.
Some people like to say "The Planets were named after the Gods, the Gods weren't named after the
planets" but that would only be true if Greece and Rome discovered the planets independently, but
Greece found them first and gave them to Rome. And Egypt and Sumeria actually found them first. The
7 Heavenly bodies can still be found in our days of the week "Sun day" for the Sun, "Mon Day" for the
Moon, etc. And the spoked wheel spread with this knowledge, an the spokes and their function are
themselves a symbol of these cycles. A lot of people see statues of Zeus now a days and think that An-
cient people thought Zeus threw lightning bolts at them, but before people knew about Gravity and the
Atmosphere, they thought the Planets controlled the weather and it was specifically thought that Jupiter
(Zeus) controlled the Lightning. Many plants used to be thought to have a cycle based on the Planets
and not the sun, and in the modern 'Old Farmer's Almanac' every year they publish the planetary crop
planting cycle. And the history of Machines and Gears actually comes from the measuring of the sky on
boats, and people making mechanical navigation devices. So Machines come from this also.
"All perceptible matter comes from a primary substance, or tenuity beyond conception, filling all space,
the Akasha (आककश) or luminferous ether, which is acted upon by the life giving Prana (पपरकण) or creative
force, calling into existence, in never-ending cycles all things and phenomena." -Nikola Tesla
Stone Age Religion seems to have been about Language, Nature, Creation, Burial Rites (Indus Valley,
Egypt before King Scorpion, Adam & Eve). This moved into Bronze Age Religion, which was about
forming States (Vedic Era, Greece, Rome, Abraham, etc), but retained the Ancient Natural Sciences
(Homer's Iliad). This then moved into the Iron Age Religions, with Prophets (Jesus, Mohammed, etc),
but even this retained pieces of the Ancient Mysteries (Wine and Bread are Blood and Bread). Then the
Empires took over those Religions, (Byzantine, Catholic & Moorish) the Dark Ages. Then Enlighten-
ment and America, separation of Church and State (Magna Carta, Martin Luther and Protestants, the
Pilgrims), but Colonialism. The Spiritualist and Theosophy Movement, (Houdini, Crowley, Alice Bai-
ley & Madame Blavatski). The Charismatic Movement, then the Atomic Era was here. Nuclear
Weapons and LSD reminded America of the Stone Age and Bronze Age Rites (the Atomic Age). The
Native American Religion, the Ayahuasca Religions. Eastern Art hit America, as the World followed
America out of the British Empire. We had done it in 1776, and throughout the 1900s others did the
same. Then the discovery of DNA and Neurons (the Neural Age).
This is not something new, we are just in a new place. You are not smarter than an Ancient Egyptian,
your Brain is not larger, you just have more books, a smart phone, internet & discoveries since then.
When many people hear the Word "Ancient" they may think Old, Dead, Static. But Ancient can mean
Dormant, Immanent, and Naturally Occurring.
There are 2 theories of Human History, and we all have seen evidence of both, but most people proba-
bly never noticed the 2 and that modern Academia has pushed us towards the one with less Evidence.
The 2 Theories are Isolationism and Diffusionism.
74
Isolationism: Based almost solely on the idea that you need a ship with a Hull to cross large bodies of
water, therefor Humans were largely Isolated from each other, even across Seas and very large Lakes. It
is supported by hardly any Evidence, apart from a Theory called "Land Bridges", suggesting People,
Animals and Plants crossed Hemispheres and Oceans to get to Australia, then the Americas as Native
Americans. These Land Bridges themselves are a Theory.
Diffusionism: The idea that Humans have been crossing Oceans, Following Stars, even just being
Swept away by currents, and not only doing things like Establishing Native American (Pre-Columbian)
Society, but actually causing a continuum, where regularly new people would come and in doing so,
would inspire others to go spread Human Advancements to others. Constantly. This is proven by Axes,
Tattoos, Reed Boat Designs, Thor Hyerdhal's cross ocean experiments (Ra II), Dogs, various Plants,
various discoveries connecting Egypt to Australia, Native American stories of following the Sun every-
day in the Ocean for 40 days to get to America, etc.
A similar Theory that we all know about we can compare it to is the "Out of Africa" Theory, which ex-
ists because 99.9% of Ancient Homosapien Bones are African, while other Humanoid Ape species lived
in Europe, Asia and Australia. Then we, Homosapiens, killed all the others, absorbing a small amount
of Neanderthal DNA through Sex and Birth, and Papau New Guinea still has 4-6% Denisovan DNA, a
3rd Humanoid Species. The "Out of Africa" theory is further proven by Mitochondrial Eve, which is 1
single Ancient Homosapien Woman that is present in all Human DNA and is the Mother of our
Species.
A. History
75
76
77
78
00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p207-232 (Open Records
release from Police regarding 04/20/2010 raid at 609 Rivera dr.
April 20, 2010, within the same time frame Judge Wooten was being viciously attacked by Collin
County, the Police raided my home. When they came to my home they knocked on the front door and I
was asleep on a couch watching TV in the backyard by the pool. My friend woke me up, and told me
there was Police at the door. I went inside and went upstairs, at which time they entered the backyard
stating in their report that they had seen me walking up stairs. They then arrested my friend in the back-
yard, I came down the stairs and was arrested on the stairs. They then took us to the backyard where we
had books about religious sacraments which they directly asked us about and we had a number of other
sacred herbs which we talked to the about
We were then taken to jail, and were bailed out. My first attorney would not allow me to present a Reli-
gious defense, I asked him to remove himself from my case and he wrote a nasty letter to the Judge and
he was replaced by Kerrie Walker, former Plano PD and corrupt DA who resigned. She forced me to
plea guilty.
7 years later I discover they tried to charge me with a Felony, Dismissed it, but never changed the
record to reflect it was dismissed.
This is in regards to Criminal Case# 0058313010 in the Collin County County Criminal Court and
Civil Case# 417-01458-2017 in the Collin County District Civil Court. First, in 0058313010 I was ar-
rested in my Home, with no Warrant in violation of my 4th Amendment Rights, and in Violation of my
1st Amendment Religious Rights, as well as against my Texas Constitutional Rights of Religion and
Search. And a Motion to Dismiss was filed to this effect, but even though the Case was dismissed the
Judge refused to Acknowledge the Motion to Dismiss and its contents. But this is what the Motion to
Dismiss was about. Then the Case was dismissed, and instead of Redisposing the Case, the Judge left it
on my Record as if I had finished Probation, which I did not, I was not even in the State for Probation.
Then I sued because I was fired from a Job for a Felony they had put on my Record, and instead of
“Guilty” or “Not Guilty” or “Dismissed” it said “Released from Jail” and it affecting my ability to rent
and work for 7 years. I did get the County to delete that Case (not a Judge, some other City Employee,
her name was Deborah Ramirez or something, I can find it if I need to) so that case is no longer on my
Record. The Lawsuit also involved Religious Violations in the County Jail, such as the Pastor there
telling me I had to be Christian and Couldn’t be Hindu and kicking me out of Church on Sunday for
knowing too much about where everything is in the Bible and not being Christian.
Then I asked the Judge in Case# 0058313010 to redispose the Case, but he refused. I filed a Civil Case,
Case# 417-01458-2017 and they filed a hearing for when I was in Colorado, and did not read anything
79
I filed in response to the Defendants, and gave me Sanctions
because the County Requested Sanctions and I was not at the Hearing. Not based on Evidence, not
based on anything other than the Fact that I was not there. So they gave me Sanctions, and Dismissed
the Case, and that was my first Court Case ever. I am Pro Se, I am not an Attorney, and they forced me
to learn about the Courts and the Federal Courts, and since Austin Texas removed a Case on Mine to
Federal Court in 2015, I have learned a lot more. But when I was doing this County Case I was not fa-
miliar with Federal filing deadlines, and Notices, and everything.
Request part 1:
So I request that the Court Correct the Lower Courts Legal Errors, in
a Writ of Mandamus or Writ of Error:
1. I request the Low Court be ordered to Redispose my Criminal Case to reflect the Dismissal
2. I request that the Sanctions be lifted, after a hearing to determine that they are Void
3. I request that my Civil Case be reopened and actually tried, not brushed under a rug
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. DAVIS:
A. Yes.
A. 2015. 2016.
A. 2016.
A. No, 2017.
A. 2017.
80
Q. Are you sure?
THE COURT: Sir.
MR. GALLAGHER: No.
son), p25 l2-22
MR. GALLAGHER: No, I'm completely clear on everything that's happening. I'm trying to show you I
do have a felony. He doesn't think it ever happened when I'm sitting here showing you evidence that
there's a felony on my record. -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney
son), p32 l6-20
81
Guilty Plea
In 2010, Kerrie Walker forced me to accept a guilty plea after another attorney would not let me present
a Religious defense and Kerrie did the same. I was 18, and had been arrested from the age of 14 for my
Religion, I did not know how to articulate a Religious defense myself and she forced me to sign papers
for probation and plea guilty. I then fled the State and was gone studying my Rights for 5 years, came
back in 2015 and the case was dismissed but the court refused to change the disposition. The disposi-
tion says I was given probation, the Docket says Probation Revoked and Case Dismissed. Void Orders
Christian v. State, 865 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App. 1993); Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. ___ (2017)
Further, while this was all happening, the County had secretly put a Felony on my record, none of my
attorneys told me about it, even the 3rd one in 2015, and it was dismissed on examining trial, but said
"Released from Jail".
(CR), Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-
2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p207-232 (Open Records release from
Police regarding 04/20/2010 raid at 609 Rivera dr.
Kerrie Walker ineffective assistance of counsel and corruption

Fingerprint Background from In Re: Gallagher, 05-20-00128-CV (Tx. App. 2020)
And you understand that, like, they've, like, admitted -- and also, we need to get the records from the
jail, the grievance system records in which – because he's stating that I claim -- that I was trying to
smoke marijuana in jail. I would like him to prove that, could prove that I've ever said that I was trying
to smoke marijuana in jail. Do you want to prove that or no?
So then the -- he clearly says it's about my religion
Defendant' s main argument in support of his claim that there is a fair and just reason to allow him to
withdraw his guilty plea ls that he did not knowingly or voluntarily enter a guilty plea. Defendant
bases this argument on the fact that prior counsel did not explain to him that his plea in federal court
could be used against him in a parallel case in state court 1n Collin County Texas." For a plea to be
knowing and voluntary, ‘the defendant must be advised of a'nd understand the consequences of the
[guilty] plea. United States v. Gaitan,954 F.2d 1005, 1011 (5th Cir. _1992)(quoting United States v.
Pearson,910 F.2d 221223 (5th Cir. 1990 )) -Johnson, Dietrick Lewis Sr., WR-83,532-01 (Tex. App.
2015)
“The CCDAO had ulterior malicious political motivations for prosecuting Judge Wooten. The CCDAO
wanted Judge Wooten off the bench because the CCDAO disagreed with Judge Wooten’s rulings in
criminal cases. This motivation is evident from a myriad of evidence including, a CCDAO internal
email and the redaction of incriminating statements before dissemination of that email as a response to
a public information request, the pressuring of witnesses, destruction of evidence, and the clear misuse
and abuse of the grand jury process. Additionally, it was widely known in the legal community that the
CCDAO had a Special Crimes Division headed by Defendant Milner who used heavy-handed tactics
and strategies to investigate, intimidate and often indict those who were his enemies. As detailed below,
numerous lawyers, elected officials and courthouse staffers were target by CCDAO during the two
82
terms former District Attorney Roach ran the CCDAO and employed Defendant Milner. The OAG
knowingly aided the CCDAO in accomplishing their goals by way of prosecuting Judge Wooten when it
was clear a crime had not occurred… As a result of this baseless investigation, prosecution, and con-
viction, Judge Wooten was forced out of her position as judge of the 380 th Judicial District Court, ex-
actly as the CCDAO and OAG planned.” -Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX
2018)
Grievance system and Attorney General Opinion about FOIA and Discovery
Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018) Bob Davis lying about requesting Mar-
ijuana in jail and then disputing the existence of the felony on my record which effected my ability to
rent apartments or get jobs for 7 years and was dismissed in examining trial with me never even being
made aware of it and never being convicted or tried for it cite 2 Collin County transcripts from Jan 23rd
and Austin Transcript and EDTX R&R Nowack Police Report # for Aggravated Perjury cite cases
where people have been convicted of it
Cynthia Wheless Sanction calling things rumors and bad faith with no evidence of bad faith whatsoever
and Contempt motion not upheld by Andrea Thompson
“Although the trial court was acting within its discretion in proceeding to trial in the absence of Ken-
neth and Clarke and in granting Lisa all of the relief sought in her counter-petition, the mere failure of
Kenneth and Clarke to appear for trial should not expose them to sanctions. A defendant who fails to
appear for trial may be subject to a judgment following trial in his absence, but the worst-case sce-
nario for such a defendant should be an adverse judgment for all relief sought in the plaintiff's plead-
ings. See Sharpe v. Kilcoyne, 962 S.W.2d 697, 698-702 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.)
(affirming sanctions against defendant that were limited to a post-answer default judgment as to liabil-
ity and damages after defendant moved from Texas to Canada, refused to accept correspondence
from court and counsel regarding the lawsuit, and failed to appear at two deposition settings, a sanc-
tions hearing, and a trial setting).” -In the Interest of K.A.R. 14-03-00970-CV (Tx Crt Apps Hous-
ton)
“Gilbert Maxwell appeals that order, complaining in four issues that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in assessing sanctions pursuant to its "inherent power over attorneys appearing before it" and be-
cause the new order is not supported by the evidence. We affirm.” -Gilbertv.Tx. Mut. Insu. Co. 03-05-
00787-CV (Tex. App. Dec. 19, 2008)
“...violation of a vague and uncertain court order cannot be punished by contempt.” -Ex Parte Price
741 S.W.2d 366 (1987)
Filed in 2017 and 2020 merge case Austin, Collin County, Bill of Review
United States v. Morgan,230 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir.2000) (recognizing that a claim that a statute is
facially unconstitutional is a jurisdictional claim not waived by a guilty plea); United States v. Bell, 70
F.3d 495, 496-97 (7th Cir.1995) (challenge to constitutionality of statute of conviction is, in certain cir-
cumstances, jurisdictional claim not waived by guilty plea)."); Bell, 70 F.3d at 496-97 (addressing de-
fendant's challenge to the constitutionality of the underlying statute after recognizing the principle that
such a challenge "is a jurisdictional claim which is not waived by the guilty plea"); United States v.
Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir.1989) (stating that although the dividing line between constitu-
83
tional claims that are waived by a guilty plea and those that survive the plea is not "crystal-clear,"
"[c]laims that `the applicable statute is unconstitutional or that the indictment fails to state an offense'
are jurisdictional claims not waived by the guilty plea" (quoting Broncheau, 597 F.2d at 1262 n. 1)),
amended by907 F.2d 115 (9th Cir.1990); States v. Barboa,777 F.2d 1420, 1423 n. 3 (10th Cir.1985) ("A
plea of guilty ... does not bar a claim that the defendant may not constitutionally be convicted in the
first instance.... If [the defendant] ple[aded] guilty to something which was not a crime, he is not now
precluded from raising this jurisdictional defect, which goes `to the very power of the State to bring the
defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him.'" (quoting Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30,
94 S. Ct. 2098)); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 978 n. 8 (5th Cir.1975) (recognizing "that after
entering ... a plea of guilty, a defendant may only appeal jurisdictional defects in the proceeding below,
such as ... the unconstitutionality of the statute underlying the indictment"); Mercado v. Rockefeller,502
F.2d 666, 672 (2d Cir.1974) ("[I]t is clear that [a] guilty plea waives only nonjurisdictional defects and
does not waive the right to contest the constitutionality of the statute that is the basis for a conviction."
(second alteration in original) (quotations and citation omitted))
B. Judge Cynthia Wheless (Illegal Sanctions, Void Orders, Re-

cusal)
84
ders must be reconsidered and vacated. Void Orders Christian v. State, 865 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App.
1993); Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. ___ (2017)
MR. GALLAGHER: I mean, I object on the grounds that the judge has recused herself. She is disquali-
fied.
THE COURT: Do you have a legal objection to the exhibits being admitted?
MR. GALLAGHER: Yeah, this is all -- this is all the past. This is all stuff that doesn't -- that he did with
a judge that has declared herself disqualified now. -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of
son), p42 l12-20
Gilbert Maxwell appeals that order, complaining in four issues that the trial court abused its discretion
in assessing sanctions pursuant to its "inherent power over attorneys appearing before it" and because
the new order is not supported by the evidence. We affirm. -Gilbert v. Tx. Mut. Insu. Co. No. 03-05-
00787-CV (Tex. App. Dec. 19, 2008)
CJC NO. 20-0485 CJC NO. 20-0053

I filed the Civil Action in the Collin county District Court in 2017, and then could not appear, and was
Sanctioned on the Grounds that I requested $2,000,000 and used News Paper Articles as part of my
Prima Facie Evidence, and because my Religion involves Marijuana use (the Flesh of the Lord God
Shiva). The Collin County Lawyer Bob Davis Continuously states that I requested to use Marijuana in
jail, but I requested that I be allowed to take my Religious Text (the Rig Veda) to Trustee Jobs the same
as the Christians. He has stated this in more than one Court and it is a Blatant lie.
But that is not the issue at hand. That Case, the Civil Case in which Sanctions were Granted and I was
ordered to no longer file Claims for Religious Violations in Jail by Collin County, was by Judge Cyn-
thia Wheless. Her Husband is the Founder of the Drug Court in Collin County, and as being such has a
bias and is unable to see Marijuana as a Religious Sacrament (Sacred Food), rather than a "Drug"
which we are not using it as. She may be able to put the Fact that ruling for me in her Case could de-
stroy her Husbands Legacy out of her mind and rule fairly in my Case, but she did not disclose this in-
85
formation, and accepted a Contempt Hearing Motion recently still with no mention of this, and I am
just learning all of this about the Whelesses and the Nowaks in September.
“The court agrees with the reasoning in Bollinger. Any amount above the rate at which Defendant’s
counsel charged for legal services in this matter would result in a windfall for Defendant.” PRESTIGE
LAND IRAN CO. v. HILTI, INC, 3:15-cv-03734 (NDTX 2018)
“The testimony drives the court to find as a fact, that unlawful and illegal sanctions were imposed.
Such sanctions were being carried out.” Humble Oil Refining Co. v. Eighth Regional W.L.B. 56 F.
Supp. 950 (N.D. Tex. 1944)
When she made her error I filed in the Federal Court, not understanding appeals processes at the time. I
also did not realize that Cynthia Wheless was the Judge, as I was unable to appear, and upon searching
the last name Wheless in Collin County found Ray Wheless, and filed the Federal Action against him,
and Collin County, and Ken Paxton. The Judge that took the Case was Christine Nowak. On September
10th, 2019, just about 2 months from this instant filing you are reading, she dismissed the Case against
Ken Paxton and Ray Wheless.
That same Month, Ray Wheless Retired as Collin County Judge, and appointed Christine Nowak's Hus-
band, Tom Nowak, to replace him in the 366th Court. So the Federal Magistrate who decided that the
District Court Judge's ruling was not Erroneous, without mentioning that her Husband was replacing
him (I mistakenly thought it was Ray Whelesses order) dismissed the Case and within the same exact
month, her Husband replaced the Defendant on the Bench. Who appoints Judges at this time? Greg Ab-
bott.
”42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, to vindicate her right to be free from wrongful arrest and prosecution, and
files this, her Original Complaint, complaining of and about John Roach, Sr., Christopher Milner,
Collin County, Texas, Gregory Abbott, and Harry White (hereinafter collectively referred to as “De-
fendants”)” -Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018)
So at this point this is a case that was decided by the Wife (Chrinstine Nowak) of the Judge (Tom
Nowak) who replaced her Husband (Ray Wheless) who founded the Collin County Drug Court, under
the supervision of a corrupt Governor. And all of this happened within a 1 month period, and with the
Vexatious Litigant Motion a 4 month period, as if the Dismissal was a payment for the Husband to be
placed on the Bench. These People have no business deciding any of my Cases at this point, and should
probably be disbarred. This is completely and absolutely unethical.
TITLE 5. OPEN GOVERNMENT; ETHICS

SUBTITLE B. ETHICS
CHAPTER 572. PERSONAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE, STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, AND
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Sec. 572.001. POLICY; LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
(a) It is the policy of this state that a state
officer or state employee may not have a direct or indirect interest, including financial and other
86
interests, or engage in a business transaction or professional activity, or incur any obligation of
any nature that is in substantial conflict with the proper discharge of the officer's or employee's
duties in the public interest.
(b) To implement this policy and to strengthen the faith and confidence of the people of this
state in state government, this chapter provides standards of conduct and disclosure
THE COURT: Okay. And you're representing yourself?

MR. GALLAGHER: Yes, until today because I'm requesting a court-appointed attorney.-(RR), Lebo,
In her first two issues, Lugo contends Judge Khoury erred in denying her motion to recuse because the
evidence established as a matter of law that the trial judge was biased. Lugo argues that the trial
judge's bias, and Judge Khoury's failure to recuse him, violated her constitutional right to due process.
We review an order denying a motion to recuse for an abuse of discretion. See Sommers v.
Concepcion,20 S.W.3d 27, 41 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). We examine the total-
ity of the circumstances and will not reverse an assigned judge's ruling if it is within the zone of rea-
sonable disagreement. See In re C.J.O.,325 S.W.3d 261, 267 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2010, pet. denied). The
movant bears the burden of proving that recusal is warranted, and this burden is met only through ing
of bias or partiality to such an extent that the movant was deprived of a fair trial. Id. Judicial rulings
alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a motion to recuse based on bias or partiality. See
Liteky v *254 U.S., 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 127 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1994). Furthermore, opin-
ions formed by the judge based on facts introduced or events occurring in the course of proceedings do
not constitute a valid basis for a recusal motion unless "they display a deep-seated favoritism or antag-
onism that would make a fair judgment impossible." Id. A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom admin-
istration, even if stern or short-tempered, are immune. Id. at 556, 114 S. Ct. 1147.
For a judge to be disqualified based on an interest in the proceedings, that interest must generally be
either a direct pecuniary interest or a property interest in the subject matter of the litigation. See Bank
of Texas, N.A., Trustee v. Mexia,135 S.W.3d 356, 361 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied). The subject
matter of the litigation in this case was the care and custody of the minor, H.M.S. The trial judge had
neither a pecuniary nor a property interest in that matter. A party cannot cause a judge to have an "in-
terest in the proceedings" merely by threatening to call him as a witness. To allow a trial judge to be
disqualified because he sought affirmative relief against being called as a witness would allow a party
an easy means of forcing a recusal. See Sommers, 20 S.W.3d at 42.
Collin County asserts, however, that Judge Khoury had the authority to award sanctions in its favor
under the court's inherent power to discipline an attorney's behavior. See In re Bennett, 960 S.W.2d 35,
40 (Tex.1997). This inherent power to sanction exists to enable courts to perform their judicial func-
tions effectively and to protect their dignity, independence, and integrity. See Eichelberger v. Eichel-
berger,582 S.W.2d 395, 399 (Tex.1979). The power may be exercised to the extent *257 necessary to
deter, alleviate, and counteract bad faith abuse of the judicial process, such as any significant interfer-
ence with the traditional core functions of the court. See Lawrence v. Kohl, 853 S.W.2d 697, 700
(Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). Lugo does not assert the trial court erred in awarding
sanctions to Collin County because there was no evidence that her conduct or the conduct of her coun-
sel interfered with the core functions of the court.
87
Lugo additionally argues that she was not given proper notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard
on the sanctions issue. As a general rule, a party made the subject of a sanctions motion must receive
written notice of the allegations and a reasonable opportunity to respond. See Low v. Henry, 221
S.W.3d 609, 618 (Tex.2007). A party may waive proper notice, however, by failing to object in the trial
court. See id. In this case, Sampley provided notice to Lugo that he was seeking sanctions in his re-
sponse to the motion to recuse. Later, at the hearing on the motion to recuse, Collin County orally
moved for sanctions and requested attorney's fees. Both Sampley and Collin County put on evidence of
the amount of attorney's fees they were seeking, and Judge Khoury announced in open court that he
was granting the sanctions requested. Although counsel representing Lugo was present at the proceed-
ings, he raised no objection to the request, the evidence, or the award on the ground of lack of notice.
We conclude, therefore, that this argument has been waived. TEX. R.APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). 5g -In Re
Hms, 349 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. App. 2011)
We must decide if Judge Specia was authorized to act as he did considering the Family Code provision
that fixes "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" in the court that renders the "final order" in a suit affect-
ing the parent-child relationship. See TEX. FAM.. CODE ANN. § 155.001(a)(Vernon 1996). The di-
vorce decree signed by Judge Gabriel qualifies as a "final order." See, e.g. Ex parte Sustrik, 721
S.W.2d 592, 593 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
A person seeking mandamus relief generally must establish that the trial judge committed a clear
abuse of discretion that cannot be adequately remedied by appeal. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d
833, 839-40 (Tex.1992). Alternatively, the supreme court has held that void orders can be challenged
by mandamus, regardless of whether an adequate appellate remedy is available. See Dikeman v.
Snell,490 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex.1973). An order is void only if the court rendering it had no jurisdiction
of the parties, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the judgment, or no capacity
to act as a court. See Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex.1990). When a court's action is
merely contrary to a statute or rule, the action is erroneous or voidable, rather than void. See id.; ac-
cord Glunz v. Hernandez, 908 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied).
Judges may exchange districts, or hold courts for each other when they may deem it expedient...." TEX.
CONST. art. V, § 11. Further, the Government Code expressly grants the district courts in Bexar
County concurrent jurisdiction. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 24.139(c) (Vernon 1988). *441It also
sets forth liberal provisions for exchanging benches and transferring cases. The rules of civil proce-
dure implement these constitutional and statutory provisions. SeeTEX.R. CIV. P. 330(e)-(h) (setting
forth rules for transferring cases and exchanging benches). These provisions also form the basis of the
Bexar County local rules that provide for a centralized, rotating docket system for non-jury civil mat-
ters. See Local Rules 3.1-3.10. -In Re Garza, 981 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. App. 1998)
Vexatious Litigant Designation and Rule 11

88
not been labeled. Void Orders Christian v. State, 865 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App. 1993); Rippo v.
Baker, 580 U.S. ___ (2017) This is a Rights case before it is a Vexatious Litigant Case, one issue is
more important and is the foundation of the other. Rights come first, it is your Bill. Glenn Hegar,
Comptroller of Public Accountsv.Texas BLC, Inc., 01-18-00554-CV (Tex. App 2020)
(1) Rule 11
Right to criticize Government, firstly I spread no “Gossip” only public information, and it was all true
information about not Private Citizens, but my own Government.
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)
I have now provided evidence of a false felony left on my record from 2010-2017 that I was never
informed of, and a dismissed misdemeanor case. Both are at the center of this lawsuit, as the Felony
is a false charge that went undismissed, and the misdemeanor is the case where my Religious Rights
were violated upon arrest and during the time I was in jail. That is the time Collin County claims I
requested Marijuana in jail, which is a false claim. Collin County is simply attacking my Religion.
89
In the County's motion to declare e a vexatious litigant they clearly are just attacking my religion they
do not agree with my religion and they hope so silence me and make an example of me for practicing it
and for attempting to request my religious rights be honored in the State of Texas. The county has
claimed that there are over 30 cases that have been decided adversely to myself but that is simply not
true and either the Defendant is lying or is unaware of the meaning of the phrase without prejudice and
attached to this document are a series of cases that the county claimed has been decided against me
when in fact they were dismissed without prejudice
Although the trial court was acting within its discretion in proceeding to trial in the absence of
Kenneth and Clarke and in granting Lisa all of the relief sought in her counter-petition, the mere
failure of Kenneth and Clarke to appear for trial should not expose them to sanctions. A defendant
who fails to appear for trial may be subject to a judgment following trial in his absence, but the worst-
case scenario for such a defendant should be an adverse judgment for all relief sought in the plaintiff's
pleadings. See Sharpe v. Kilcoyne, 962 S. W.2d 697, 698-702 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.)
(affirming sanctions against defendant that were limited to a post-answer default judgment as to
liability and damages after defendant moved from Texas to Canada, refused to accept correspondence
from court and counsel regarding the lawsuit, and failed to appear at two deposition settings, a
sanctions hearing, and a trial setting).
2005)
Appellant Reidie Jackson , a prison inmate appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, sued appellees,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice employees David Ellis and Andrew Gratz, individually.
Jackson's pleadings alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights and asserted claims under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986. On the defendants' motion, the trial court found Jackson to be a
vexatious litigant, ordered him to deposit security of $150, and entered a pre-filing order. When
Jackson did not post security within the period required, the court dismissed his suit. This appeal
followed. We find Ellis and Gratz failed to prove Jackson is a vexatious litigant, and will reverse the
judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.
Jackson v. Ellis No. 07-13-00184-CV (Tex. App. Jun. 4, 2015)
Gilbert Maxwell appeals that order, complaining in four issues that the trial court abused its discretion
in assessing sanctions pursuant to its "inherent power over attorneys appearing before it" and because
the new order is not supported by the evidence. We affirm.
Gilbert v. Tx. Mut. Insu. Co. No. 03-05-00787-CV (Tex. App. Dec. 19, 2008)
Appellant, Allen Glenn Thomas, is currently incarcerated at the Robertson Unit of the Institutional
Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,located in Jones County, Texas. Appearing pro
se, he challenges the trial court's orders finding him to be a vexatious litigant and dismissing his
claims as frivolous. We reverse the order declaring him to be a vexatious litigant, and we affirm the
dismissal of his claims
Allen Glenn Thomas v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division, 11-12-00121-
CV (Tex. App. 2014)
This original habeas corpus proceeding arises out of a judgment holding John Wiley Price in violation
of a permanent injunction orally rendered on May 2, 1986. The permanent injunction, however, was
not reduced to writing and signed until May 9, 1986, a~er the allegedly contemptuous conduct
90
occurred on May 3, 1986 and after a motion for contempt was filed on May 6, 1986. We hold that the
judgment of contempt is void insofar as it is based upon the May 2, 1986 oral order purporting to
render a permanent injunction, and order relator Price discharged. In view of this holding, it is
unnecessary to address the remainder of Price's statutory and constitutional arguments.
Ex Parte Price 7 41 S. W.2d 366 (1987)
(I) Plaintiff was provided with proper and timely notice of the hearing on the
COLLIN COUNTY'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS;
(2) Plaintiff has targeted the govermnental entity [Collin County] which
incarcerated him in the Collin County Detention Center as a result of the
criminal charges brought against him;
(3) Plaintiffs has used this litigation as a forum to espouse his beliefs about the
use of marijuana or controlled substances while incarcerated in the Collin
County jail, under the guise of religious practices;
( 4) Plaintiff has also used this litigation is a way to disparage and impugn former
County elected officials and employees by regurgitating gossip which is
irrelevant to any of his asserted - - yet groundless - - claims;
(5) The allegations contained in PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT [filed March 27, 2017],
misrepresent facts; are groundless and were made in bad faith; are groundless
and were made for the improper purpose of delay; lack evidentiary support;
were made for the improper purpose to harass Collin County, cause
unnecessary delay, and needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and are not
warranted by the existing law or nonfrivolous argument for the extension or
modification or reversal of current law, or establishment of new law. These
groundless allegations made in bad faith and lacking evidentiary support,
constituting harassment, resulting in unnecessary delay, and not warranted by
the existing law or nonfrivolous argument for the extension or modification or
reversal of current law include, but are not limited to, the following:
 "The Plaintiff is a Hindu Shaivite Priest (Certificate of Ministry can be

provided), a religion which includes the ceremonial use of Marijuana,
called Bhang within the faith, e.g. Holi. The ceremonial use ofBhang is
occasional for regular adherents to the faith, and is a regular, if not daily,
ceremony for Priests of the faith; e.g. Sadhus (Priests). The Plaintiff is
also a member of the Church of Neuroscience. The Church of
Neuroscience includes in its doctrine as the cornerstone of the Church,
the use of molecular sacraments, the Rites ofBeneficence of the Church
were included in this filing." PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT, page 2;
 "The DEA and DOJ have admitted that the DEA is operating
Monopolies (Documents attached) and claims to work towards fixing it
( since 2006), and in 2016 they finally admitted to a Marijuana Monopoly with the University of Mis-
sissippi (Document Attached), and
opened up registration for companies to do Marijuana research."
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT, page 2;
91
•"It should be clear from the coercion, and disregard for llights, and
differential treatment of wealthy and non-wealthy individuals, as well
as Christian and non-Christian individuals, that this county is corrupt."
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT, page 4;
"Ken Paxton and the Collin County DA, the Roach family clerk scandal,
etc. Ken Paxton was in fact booked into the same jail mentioned in this
lawsuit, and was treated much differently than the Plaintiff, and Paxton
was there for 3 Felonies he had signed a paper admitting to, and which
were laws that he wrote." PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT, page 4;
• "I would argue, under Rule 5.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
that the Controlled Substances Act, being Unconstitutional, is not law
and should therefor be overturned by this court." PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT, page 4;
• "I would also argue that to not do so would be a violation of the Oath of
any Judge involved." PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT, page 4;
• "The Plaintiff claims that the Texas Controlled Substances Act and the
Federal Controlled Substances Act are both Unconstitutional causing
damage to the Plaintiff in the form of arrest, jailing, seizure (violation
of Constitutional llights) and the acts are Dangerous on their face
(Possibly Unconstitutional on their face), as well as perpetuate
Monopolies, and the plaintiff challenges them under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 5.1." PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT, page 7; and
•"Release any persons who are currently illegally jailed, and award the
plaintiff$2,000,000 for all physical and emotional distress and damages
and for violation of llights under section 1983, including punitive
damages for violation of rights and for the Defendants t, allowing
Govermnent enforced Monopolies to damage his ability to practice his
Religion." PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT, page 7;
(6) Other examples of pleadings filed by Plaintiff which are groundless and were
made for the improper purpose of delay; lack evidentiary support; were made
for the improper purpose to harass, cause unnecessary delay, and needlessly
increase the cost of litigation; and are not warranted by the existing law or
nonfrivolous argument for the extension or modification or reversal of current
law, or establishment of new law include, but are not limited to, the following:
* SACRED Food/SACRAMENT AL SUBSTANCES BRIEF, filed March 21, 201 7;
• ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM, filed March 23, 2017;
• ANTINOMY BRIEF, filed March 27, 2017;
• RELIGION IN AMERICA BRIEF, filed March 28, 2017;
92
• RESPONSE TO DEFENSES, filed April 18, 2017; and
* RESPONSE To THREAT OF SANCTIONS, filed April 19, 2017.
(7) The bad faith motive of and harassment by Plaintiff is evidenced by the efforts
of Counsel Davis to obtain voluntary dismissal and avoidance of unnecessary
costs and attorney's fees. The Court finds that on April 17, 2017, Counsel
Davis sent Plaintiff a letter requesting dismissal, but Plaintiff refused and
continued with his lawsuit as reflected in his response email of April 19, 201 7,
and his RESPONSE TO 1l!REATOF SANCTIONS filed April 19,2017, evidencing
the Plaintiff's bad faith motive;
(8) The bad faith motive of and harassment by Plaintiff is evidenced by the fact
that the Plaintiff, the party initiating this litigation, did not attend the status
review conference conducted on July 14, 2017
(9) The cumulative effect of the filing of the instant litigation and submitting
voluminous exhibits and briefs infringed upon and impacted this Court's
ability to perform its core judicial functions effectively and protect this Court's
dignity, independence, and integrity. Thus, Ryan Gallagher's actions are
further sanctionable under this Court's inherent powers to deter, alleviate, and
counteract bad faith abuse of the judicial process which significantly interfered
with the traditional core functions of this Court.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that

Plaintiff RY AN GALLAGHER be and hereby is SANCTIONED and ORDERED
as follows:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ryan Gallagher and all his agents,

attorneys, employees, officers and elected or appointed representatives and all other
persons, firms, organizations, or corporations in privily therewith be and hereby are
prohibited from filing or initiating any more lawsuits, pleadings or other instruments
of any kind or nature [in either State or Federal Court] concerning the claim( s) which
have previously been made in the instant case against: (1) Collin County (2) any
officers, agents, servants or employees of Collin County, (3) the undersigned
Counsel Robert J. Davis and his Firm MATIHEWS, SHIELS, KNOTT, EDEN, DAVIS &
BEANLAND, L.L.P., and any officers, agents, servants or employees of said Firm.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ryan Gallagher and all his agents,
attorneys, employees, officers and elected or appointed representatives and all other
persons, firms, organizations, or corporations in privily therewith be and hereby are
prohibited from filing or initiating any more lawsuits, pleadings or other instruments
of any kind or nature [in either State or Federal Court] against: (I) Collin County (2) any officers,
agents, servants or employees of Collin County, (3) the undersigned
Counsel Robert J. Davis and his Firm MATTHEWS, SHIELS, KNOTT, EDEN, DAVIS &
BEANLAND,L.L.P., and any officers, agents, servants or employees of said Firm, until
such document, pleading or other instrument has first been reviewed by this Court for
a determination that the claims or matters set forth a legitimate request for relief and
approved by this Court for filing, service, or other appropriate handling;
93
ITISFURTHERORDEREDTHATthefailureofRyanGallaghertopaythe
attorney's fees, costs, and sanctions listed this ORDER OF SANCTIONS, as well as
comply with the other terms of this ORDER OF SANCTIONS shall result in such
additional and further sanctions or actions which the Court deems just and fair under
the evidence, after notice and hearing." -(CR), Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of
son), p237-242
MR. GALLAGHER: No, no, I'm talking about what happened in this case.
THE COURT: And like I said, this case has already been litigated and decided. You refiled again on
the same case.-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-
Q. You also filed in the District of New York?

A. Yes.
Q. That was dismissed?
A. No, it was transferred.-Reporter's Record, Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas
Attorney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p30 l4-7
THE COURT: Mr. Davis, Mr. Gallagher has asked for an attorney to be appointed because you're ask-
ing for criminal Contempt. Are you amending the motion?
MR. DAVIS: Yes, Your Honor. The County will stipulate on the record that it is not seeking any criminal
contempt against Ryan Gallagher.
MR. GALLAGHER: No, not --
MR. DAVIS: We're not seeking --
MR. GALLAGHER: No.
MR. DAVIS: We're not seeking any incarceration. The only relief that we're seeking at this point is the
imposition of monetary fines against Mr. Gallagher, which is a civil remedy. And based on that stipula-
tion, we believe that he is not entitled to a court-appointed attorney at this point because he does not
face the potential of incarceration or any loss of liberty.-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State
94
of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea
MR. DAVIS: The relief that we're seeking is that Mr. Gallagher be ordered to reimburse the County for
the attorney's fees and costs it has incurred in, basically, trying to get him to comply with the prior No-
vember 14th of 2017 sanction order. Essentially what that sanction order reads is that Mr. Gallagher
cannot sue Collin County again without obtaining permission from the --
MR. GALLAGHER: For smoking weed in jail. That's what I can't sue for. -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v.
MR. GALLAGHER: So we're not doing it. He's requesting over $500, which triggers in the law the
same thing as the criminal contempt, so I am entitled to an attorney. This is a motion for a court-ap-
pointed attorney and for the judge to recuse herself due to interest of the case when she failed to dis-
close this was previously filed with the other judge and then covertly went forward signing erroneous
and fraudulent, slanderous documents regarding myself.-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State
THE COURT: -- that the case is substantially related to the litigation in the previous case. So do you
have anything else to add about – -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attor-
MR. GALLAGHER: No. The cases that I'm filing are not regarding smoking marijuana in jail, which is
what they claimed that I was filing about when they told me not to file about it again. I'm okay with not
ever filing that because I never did and I never will. I never made that claim so that's what they're
about and that's not what we're talking about. So the sanctions are unenforceable because the sections
are not about real things, all right. They're not about a fact in reality. -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin
Ample time to prepare and respond to the allegations, In Re: Oliver (phonetic).-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher
v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District
Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p53 l22-24
We've had a hearing this morning. I'm going to order additional sanctions against Mr. Gallagher for
failure to comply with the order of November 14, 2017, in the amount of $26,220. -(RR), Lebo, Gal-
The vagueness of the phrase "up to task" was addressed, on facts similar to those presently before the
Court, in First Bank of Marietta v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company,307 F.3d 501 (6th
Cir.2002). In First Bank of Marietta, the district court ruled that Rule 11 was unavailable to sanction
certain conduct that had been raised because the movant who filed the motion for sanctions failed to
comply with Rule 11's safe harbor filing requirements. Id. at 510. Nevertheless, the district court in-
cluded that conduct, along with other conduct that would not have been subject to Rule 11, in a single
order for sanctions based on the court's inherent powers in Chambers. Id. at 509-11;. The Sixth Circuit
95
first pointed out that the failure to comply with Rule 11 was not fatal because the conduct under Rule
11 was "intertwined" with conduct which was not subject to Rule and that, pursuant to Chambers, the
district court was correct in considering the entirety of the conduct under inherent powers. Id. at 513.
The Sixth Circuit also pointed to language in Chambers which implies that, if conduct is "intertwined,"
it is not necessary for the court to first apply the Rules or statutes before relying upon its inherent pow-
ers because such a rule "`would serve only to foster extensive and needless satellite litigation, which is
contrary to the aim of the Rules themselves.'" Id. at 516 (quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50-51, 111 S.
Ct. 2123). The Sixth Circuit continued: "Where; as here, the offending party's conduct extends through
the proceedings, Rule 11 remedies would not address the injury that the district court sought to remedy
that included withholding evidence, the consequences of the withholding, violating discovery orders
and extending the proceedings." Id. at 517. Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded that since the district
court had the authority to rely upon its inherent powers due to the "Intertwined" and pervasive nature
of the sanctionable conduct, any failures of Rule 11 were irrelevant. Id. at 518. -In Re Cochener, 360
B.R. 542 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007)
(2) Vexatious Litigant Designation
not been labeled. Void Orders Christian v. State, 865 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App. 1993); Rippo v. Baker,
580 U.S. ___ (2017) This is a Rights case before it is a Vexatious Litigant Case, one issue is more im-
portant and is the foundation of the other. Rights come first, it is your Bill. Glenn Hegar, Comptroller
of Public Accountsv.Texas BLC, Inc., 01-18-00554-CV (Tex. App 2020)
Additionally, they can be vexatious for repeatedly re-litigating matters that have already been conclu-
sively established against them.-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney
MR. DAVIS: In this situation I don't think there's any dispute that within the operative seven-year pe-
riod Mr. Gallagher has filed far more than the requisite five. that are identified where Mr. Gallagher is
the pro se Plaintiff. As noted in the appendix, there are 34 litigations And he has lost -- I know in one of
his replies Mr. Gallagher points out that they -- some of them were dismissed without prejudice, some
were dis --
MR. GALLAGHER: (Inaudible).
MR. DAVIS: -- dismissed for other reasons. That is irrelevant to the vexatious statute. It does not have
to be a dismissal with prejudice. It doesn't have to be a dismissal on the merits.
MR. GALLAGHER: It's adverse.
MR. DAVIS: Adverse means they lost.
MR. GALLAGHER: No, I didn't lose -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas At-
torney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p8 l9-25
96
First off, I'm going to start with what he said, actually. I'll start with what he said. He said that -- that I
have 34 cases that I filed. It's more like 21, maybe. And the rest are appeals, right. He's listing appeals
as their own cases as if I had filed those separately as their own cases, right. -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v.
MR. GALLAGHER: Yeah. And he's saying that the -- the -- that the fact that these are without prejudice
doesn't apply to the Texas vexatious litigant law, when this is the Texas vexatious litigant law that he's
trying to apply these Colorado state cases to, these Colorado cases to. all right, the things that he's
talking about. This has nothing to do with this state,
Second off, they are all -- almost all decided without prejudice with nobody even being served in the
case. There are Rule 8 Forms, rules of violations, which is overruled by Federal Rule of 83(a)(2) --
But they keep saying that, oh, well, you haven't filed our forms, you haven't filed our forms. And then
they dismiss without prejudice saying this case can't be re-brought and you just need to refile this case,
you just need to file again in this case with the form. This is -- it's not a case that's decided against me.
Sanctions are not -- this isn't against a person. They're meant to stop a behavior, which that judge that
filed that sanctions, the sanctions against me that he's talking about, then recused herself because of
her involvement in this case. Her and her husband are involved in this case. The federal case that he's
talking about I filed that he wants to put sanctions on me for and put me in contempt for, in that case
the federal judge that took that case then -- then her husband replaced the other judge's wife, Ms. Whe-
less. Her husband left the bench and was replaced by Ms. Nowak's husband who was a DA with the
Collin County Office, right. So she recused herself. And now you are the judge of this case because she
is too involved in this case to where if she made a decision against me, it would literally be in her fa-
vor, right. So she had to remove herself and now you are deciding this case. And he's telling you that
the judge that made that order should be listened to at all. Like, when they recused themselves saying
they're too close to this case, like this case is -- it's -- she's gone now. She -- her decision -- she's dis-
qualified herself from this case. And we need to overturn what she -- what she had said. I motion the
Court to vacate her decision and vacate the motion to contempt-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin
MR. GALLAGHER: No, but he's not proving that any case has been decided against me. A dismissed
case is not an adverse decision. That's not an adverse opinion against me. That's like sanctions -- it's
like saying sanctions are adverse, like sanctions are not meant to be an opinion against me.
THE COURT: All right. Do you have anything else?-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of
son), p17 l17-24
Q. Okay. And you do not dispute that in the Eastern District of Texas, you filed at least one case that
was dismissed on September 10th?
97
A. Yes. It's the same day that the husband of Judge Nowak replaced Judge Wheless on the bench Ray
Wheless was replaced by Tom Nowak. In the same week that that case was decided when -- Christine
Nowak is the judge on that case, and Christine Wheless is the judge that recused herself on this case. -
Q. And Your case in this instant lawsuit, the City of Austin has already been dismissed, haven't they,
sir?
A. No. That one is also on appeal. That one is on appeal with the regional district -- with the regional
appeals court in Austin. And that case also -- the one that you're -- the federal case in Austin that was
decided against the City, it was not decided against the City, it was decided against the Police Depart-
ment. It was decided that the City and the Police Department are one entity.-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v.
MR. GALLAGHER: They've been decided before anybody was ever served in the case. It cannot be
something that's adverse unless there's another party.
MR. DAVIS: I have nothing further of this witness, Your Honor. -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin
Andrea Thompson)
2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p19-168 (Shows that most cases were
dismissed without prejudice, and almost all dismissed without service, very few dismissed as Frivolous)
Appellant Reidie Jackson, a prison inmate appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, sued appellees,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice employees David Ellis and Andrew Gratz, individually. Jack-
son's pleadings alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights and asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. §§
1983, 1985(3), and 1986. On the defendants' motion, the trial court found Jackson to be a vexatious lit-
igant, ordered him to deposit security of $150, and entered a pre-filing order. When Jackson did not
post security within the period required, the court dismissed his suit. This appeal followed. We find El-
lis and Gratz failed to prove Jackson is a vexatious litigant, and will reverse the judgment of the trial
court and remand the case for further proceedings. -Jackson v. Ellis, No. 07-13-00184-CV (Tex. App.
Jun. 4, 2015)
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 11.101(a).

The purpose of the statute is to make it possible for courts to control their
dockets rather than permitting courts to be burdened with repeated filings of
frivolous and malicious litigation by litigants without hope of success while, at the same time, provid-
ing protections for litigants’ constitutional rights to open courts when they have genuine claims that
can survive the scrutiny of the administrative judge and the posting of security to protect defendants. In
re Potts, 357 S.W.3d 766, 768 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, orig. proceeding). In that regard,
section 11.102 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, entitled “Permission by Local Adminis-
trative Judge,” provides:
(a) A local administrative judge may grant permission to a person
found to be a vexatious litigant under Section 11.101 to file a
litigation only if it appears to the judge that the litigation:
98
(1) has merit; and
(2) has not been filed for the purposes of harassment or delay.
a show
(b) The local administrative judge may condition permission on the
furnishing of security for the benefit of the defendant as provided in
Subchapter B [Sections 11.051-.057].
(c) A decision of a local administrative judge denying a litigant
permission to file a litigation under Subsection (a), or conditioning
permission to file a litigation on the furnishing of security under
Subsection (b), is not grounds for appeal, except that the litigant
apply for a writ of mandamus with the court of appeals not later than
the 30th day after the date of the decision. The denial of a writ of
mandamus by the court of appeals is not grounds for appeal to the
supreme court or court of criminal appeals.-in Re Patricia Potts and A.M.W.(A Child), 14-13-
00562-CV (Tex. App. 2013)
Appellant, Ralph O. Douglas, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his case for failure to post
bond as a vexatious litigant. Douglas also appeals the court's designation of him as a vexatious litigant
which order merged into the final judgment. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 11.054 (Vernon
2002). We determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting appellee, American Title
Company's (“ATC”), motion to declare Douglas a vexatious litigant and, thus, whether the trial court
erred in dismissing Douglas's suit for failure to post a vexatious-litigant bond. We reverse the judg-
ment of the trial court and remand the cause. -DOUGLAS v. AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY 01-
04-00669-CV Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist. 2006)
On appeal, Appellant challenges both the order that found him to be a vexatious litigant and the order
that dismissed his claims. Appellant’s brief contains the following seven issues:
1. Chapter 11 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code is unconstitutional
as applied to Appellant, as it violates his rights to access to the courts,
due process, and equal protection under the Texas and United States
Constitutions. The motion to declare Appellant a vexatious litigant filed on behalf of Teeters and
Owens by the attorney general is the only pleading filed by any of the defendants prior to the entry of
final judgment.
2. The trial’s court order that required Appellant to pay $7,500 in security
was an arbitrary condition that prevented him access to the courts.
3. The trial court erred when it dismissed Appellant’s claims as frivolous.
4. There was a reasonable probability that Appellant’s retaliation claim
would have been successful on the merits.
5. There was a reasonable probability that Appellant’s due process claim
would have been successful on the merits.
6. There was a reasonable probability that Appellant’s malicious
prosecution claim would have been successful on the merits.
7. Sovereign immunity was not a bar to Appellant’s claims. -Allen Glenn Thomas v. Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division, 11-12-00121-CV (Tex. App. 2014)
Compare Boyd v. Bulala,672 F. Supp. 915, 922 (W.D. Va.1987) ($1,000,000 damage cap violated right
of jury trial under seventh amendment to the U.S. Constitution) (prior opinion in same case held that
99
$750,000 cap violated right of jury trial under Virginia Constitution as well, 647 F.Supp. At 789). The
reasoning from the Smith opinion is entirely consistent with our "open courts" analysis in LeCroy v.
Hanlon,713 S.W.2d 335 (Tex.1986). LeCroy
While state constitutions cannot subtract from rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution,
state constitutions can and often do provide additional rights for their citizens. The federal constitution
sets the floor for individual rights; state constitutions establish the ceiling. Recently, state courts have
not hesitated to look to their own constitutions to protect individual rights. This court has been in the
mainstream of that movement. Like the citizens of other states, Texans have adopted state constitutions
to restrict governmental power and guarantee individual rights. The powers restricted and the individ-
ual rights guaranteed in the present constitution reflect Texas' values, customs, and traditions. Our
constitution has independent vitality, and this court has the power and duty to protect the additional
state guaranteed rights of all Texans. By enforcing our constitution, we provide Texans with their full
individual rights and strengthen federalism. LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 338-39 (citations and footnote
omitted).
Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution provides:
No citizen of this state shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any
manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19. Article I, Section 19 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution impose similar restrictions on the legislature. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19; Lively v. Missouri
K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas, 102 Tex. 545, 120 S.W. 852 (1909); Mellinger v. City of Houston, 3 S.W. 249
(Tex.1887); Massachusetts Indem. & Life v. Tex. State Bd. of Ins.,685 S.W.2d 104 (Tex.App.- Austin
1985, no writ). The standard of review for constitutional challenges on substantive due process
grounds for both the state and federal due process clauses is as follows:
If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are nei-
ther arbitrary nor *696discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 537, 54 S. Ct. 505, 516, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1933).
The other due process guarantee in the Texas Constitution is the open courts provision, which provides
as follows:
All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or repu-
tation, shall have remedy by due course of law.
TEX. CONST., art. I, § 13. Similar guarantees are found in the constitutions of thirty-seven other
states. 1 G. Braden, The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 51
(1977). Article I, Section 13 provides two separate and distinct guarantees: (1) all courts shall be
open, and (2) every person shall have remedy for injury by due course of law. The former category
guarantees a right of "access," while the latter category guarantees a right of "redress." No opinion of
this court has discussed the independent guarantee of redress; rather, the focus of our analysis has
been upon those legislative enactments which impose impossible or unreasonable conditions on a liti-
gant's right of access to the courts. It is of course obvious that an entire abrogation of access results in
an entire denial of redress. Thus, to that extent, the right of access and redress are inextricably inter-
100
twined. However, this case presents a slightly different question because section 11.02 of Article 4590i
leaves the right of access wholly intact; only the right of redress is partially restricted.
Thus, this case presents two important questions of first impression. Does a legislative enactment
which partially restricts the right of redress trigger the protections of Article I, Section 13? If so, what
is the appropriate standard of review to be applied? I have found no case which interprets the open
courts provision as independently protecting a litigant's right of redress. I am mindful, however, of the
text of our Constitutional provision: "every person ... shall have remedy by due course of law." TEX.
CONST. art. 1, § 13. I agree with the majority that the protections of Article I, Section 13 do extend to
legislative enactments which allow free access but restrict redress. I further agree that the appropriate
standard of review is whether the legislative purpose for the statute outweighs the partial diminution of
a litigant's constitutionally-guaranteed right of redress. I vigorously disagree, however, with the major-
ity's implication that the appropriate standard of review includes the existence of a reasonable substi-
tute (individual quid pro quo) as a constitutional prerequisite to statutory validity. -Lucas v. United
States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988)
C. Greg Abbott and Ken Paxton: Conflict of Interest

"Mr Davis: And for the State is Amy Hilton and she had to go to Harris County, but she did authorize
us to represent to the Court that the state -- and actually I show on the docket that he's also sued the
Texas Attorney General
The Court: Yes, also -- but Amy Hilton is also representing the Attorney General
Mr. Davis: Correct" -(RR) DuBois, Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas At-
l15-19; l24-25; p6 l1 This can be found in the Supplement to Objection to Vexatious Litigant motion by
county (CR5), Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-
00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p243-265
Collin County
Defendant' s main argument in support of his claim that there is a fair and just reason to allow him to
withdraw his guilty plea ls that he did not knowingly or voluntarily enter a guilty plea. Defendant
bases this argument on the fact that prior counsel did not explain to him that his plea in federal court
could be used against him in a parallel case in state court 1n Collin County Texas." For a plea to be
knowing and voluntary, ‘the defendant must be advised of a'nd understand the consequences of the
[guilty] plea. United States v. Gaitan,954 F.2d 1005, 1011 (5th Cir. _1992)(quoting United States v.
Pearson,910 F.2d 221223 (5th Cir. 1990 )) -Johnson, Dietrick Lewis Sr., WR-83,532-01 (Tex. App.
2015)
101
“Law enforcement did not initiate this investigation, nor did law enforcement aid in this investigation.
This investigation originated and was subsequently conducted by the CCDAO and, later, by the Office
of the Attorney General (OAG) acting in conjunction with the CCDAO. The investigation lasted over
two years before Judge Wooten was initially indicted on October 14, 2010. Another nine months went
by before the final indictment against Judge Wooten was filed on July 14, 2011.” -Wooten v. Collin
County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018)
“1. Plaintiff, Suzanne H. Wooten, was wrongfully arrested, charged, and convicted of multiple con-
trived counts of Bribery, Conspiracy to Commit Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity, Money
Laundering, and Tampering with a Governmental Record, based on false and legally untenable allega-
tions.
2. Defendants John Roach, Sr., Christopher Milner, Collin County, Texas, Gregory Abbott, and Harry
White conspired to wrongfully obtain an indictment and prosecute Plaintiff by
inventing and perverting law, misleading judges and juries, and taking apart Plaintiff’s life and career
one piece at a time.
3. Beyond the fact Plaintiff did not engage in the conduct alleged by Defendants,
Defendants knew full well the law did not proscribe any of the alleged conduct. In an attempt to en-
sure that Plaintiff was convicted despite her innocence, and knowing she committed no criminal act,
Defendants intentionally misrepresented the law and facts and secured a wrongful
conviction of Plaintiff.
...
5. Ultimately, the criminal case against Plaintiff fell apart when her alleged co-conspirators were held
by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to be actually innocent and that there was no evidence of any
wrongdoing. On May 24, 2017, after spending five and a half years under community supervision,
Plaintiff was exonerated by Writ of Actual Innocence. Unfortunately, the damage had already been
done. As noted in the Order granting the Writ of Actual Innocence, Plaintiff’s civil rights have been vi-
olated. Plaintiff now sues to recover for the harm done to her by the corrupt government agents who
targeted her unjustly.
…
The CCDAO used at least five grand juries to investigate this criminal case against Judge Wooten.
More specifically, the grand juries of the Fall of 2008, Spring of 2009, Fall of 2009, Spring of 2010,
and Fall of 2010. Four of the five grand juries were used to subpoena bank records, phone records,
credit card documents, personal records, emails, and various campaign-related vendor information.
Three of the five grand juries was used to subpoena witnesses.
…
Prior to Defendant Milner being employed at the CCDAO, grand jury investigations were initiated by
law enforcement organizations. There were no independent investigations initiated and conducted by
the CCDAO. However, when Defendant Milner started his employment with the CCDAO, the Special
Crimes Unit was formed, and grand jury cases began to be initiated from within the Special Crimes
Unit.
…
Defendant Milner explained to Judge Rusch that he wanted to leave the CCDAO with a bang. Judge
Rusch had mentioned to Judge Wooten that Defendant Milner was looking to prosecute Dallas District
Attorney Craig Watkins on a constable investigation. Further, Judge Rusch told Judge Wooten not to
worry about Judge Sandoval, but to worry about the “army” coming after her.
…
102
Defendant Milner told Schulte that Judge Wooten had one week to resign, or she was going to be fac-
ing indictment and would lose her house, law license, her family, her reputation, and that he would put
her in prison for a long time. When Schulte inquired about the basis for Judge Wooten resigning, De-
fendant Milner replied that “she knows what she did” and that the “Judge” (Defendant Roach insisted
that he be called Judge Roach) would look favorably upon her if she resigned.
…
On August 28, 2010, the FBI investigation into the CCDAO ended after Defendant White told FBI in-
vestigators that the CCDAO had a legitimate investigation against Judge Wooten and that the OAG ex-
pected to receive a grand jury indictment in the near future.
…
The constitutional injuries complained-of herein were proximately caused by a herein. pattern and
practice of misconduct which occurred with the knowledge and consent of those of Defendants who
acted in a supervisory capacity, such that these Defendants personally knew about, facilitated, ap-
proved, and condoned this pattern and practice of misconduct, or else affirmatively turned a blind eye
thereto without taking any steps to stop it. In this way, these Defendants are personally responsible for
the complained-of injuries because they knowingly, willfully, or at least recklessly caused the alleged
deprivation of Plaintiff’s civil rights by their actions or by their deliberately indifferent failure to act.
…
Statements the Individual Defendants made regarding Plaintiff’s alleged culpability were made with
the knowledge that said statements were false. The Individual Defendants withheld the facts of their
manipulation from Plaintiff.” -Wooten v. Collin County, 4:18-cv-00380-ALM (NDTX 2018)
Separation of Powers
The Commissioners Court did not comply and the Judges issued show cause orders. The Commission-
ers Court then filed for mandamus relief with the Dallas Court of Appeals which found that: (1) the or-
ders actually direct action and, therefore, were essentially writs of mandamus orders made without no-
tice and hearing to the Commissioners Court; (2) the Judges contravened TEX.R.CIV.P. 694 because a
mandamus cannot issue ex parte; (3) the Commissioners Court was entitled to notice and a hearing on
the October orders; and (4) it appeared at oral argument that the Judges would not vacate the orders
on motion as required by TEX.R.CIV.P. 694. Accordingly, the court of appeals ordered the Judges to
vacate their October orders. 747 S.W.2d 842, 847 (1988).
The courts of Texas derive their judicial power directly from the constitution. Tex. Const. art. V, § 1.
This inherent power of the courts to preserve their efficient functioning thus derives from the very cre-
ation of the judiciary as a separate branch of government. Indeed, the Texas Constitution not only
mandates that the courts shall exercise the judicial power of the state but also expressly mandates a
separation of governmental powers into three distinct branches.[2] Tex. Const. art. II, § 1. The purpose
behind the separation of governmental powers was to avoid the concentration of political power in the
hands of a few—i.e. to avoid tyranny. See 1 Braden, The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Anno-
tated and Comparative Analysis 89 (1977), citing The Federalist No. 47 (J. Madison).
Indeed, in 1965, a statement of principles asserting the need for financial independence of the courts
was adopted by the Conference of Chief Justices, by the National Conference of Court Administrators,
and by most of the countries of North and South America at the First Judicial Conference of the Ameri-
cas. Statement of Principles: The Need for Independence in Judicial Administration, 50 Judicature 129
103
(1966); Judicial Independence is Keynote of Judicial Conference of the Americas, 49 J.Am.Jud. Soc'y
44 (1965).
Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 755 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. 1988)
Legislative immunity derives largely from the Speech and Debate Clauses of the Texas and federal con-
stitutions, which, in turn, embody fundamental separation-of-powers tenets. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 6;
Tex. Const. art. III, § 21; United States v. Johnson, 383U.S. 169, 178-82, 86 S. Ct. 749, 15 L. Ed. 2d681
(1966); Clear Lake City Water Auth. v. Salazar, 781 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tex.App.-Houston [14TH Dist.]
1989, orig. proceeding). The legislative immunity doctrine recognizes *860 that it is "`not consonant
with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators.'" Bogan, 523 U.S.
at 55, 118 S. Ct. 966 (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377, 71 S. Ct. 783); see also Clear Lake City Water
Auth., 781 S.W.2d at 350. Because the immunity doctrine serves important public purposes, courts have
affirmed that the doctrine generally shields legislative actors not only from liability, but also from be-
ing required to testify about their legislative activities. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606,
615-16, 92 S. Ct.2614, 33 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1972) (holding that senator could not be made to answer
questions about events that occurred in senate subcommittee meeting); Dombrowski v. East-
land, 387 U.S. 82, 85, 87 S. Ct. 1425, 18L. Ed. 2d 577 (1967) (noting that legislators "should be pro-
tected not only from the consequences of litigation's results but also from the burden of defending them-
selves"); Schlitz v. Virginia, 854 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir.1988) (holding that legislator could not be re-
quired to testify about matters of legislative conduct); Miller v. Transamerican Press,
Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that former congressman could not be required to tes-
tify about his legislative activities); Clear Lake City Water Auth., 781 S.W.2d at 349-50 (holding that
members of water authority could not be questioned about legislative activities).
Courts have extended the legislative immunity doctrine beyond federal and state legislators to other in-
dividuals performing legitimate legislative functions. See, e.g., Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55, 118 S.
Ct. 966 (applying legislative immunity doctrine to mayor and city council vice-president); Supreme
Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, 446 U.S. 719, 734, 100 S. Ct. 1967, 64 L. Ed.
2d 641 (1980) (applying legislative immunity doctrine to state supreme court and its chief justice for
their action in promulgating code of professional responsibility); Clear Lake City Water Auth.,781
S.W.2d at 349-50 (applying legislative immunity doctrine to local water authority). Whether the func-
tion the actor performs is legislative depends upon the nature of the act. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54, 118 S.
Ct. 966; Bowles v. Clipp, 920 S.W.2d 752, 758 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1996, writ denied). An action is leg-
islative in nature when it reflects a discretionary, policymaking decision of general application, rather
than an individualized decision based upon particular facts. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55-56, 118S.
Ct. 966; Bryan v. City of Madison, 213 F.3d267, 273-74 (5th Cir.2000); Cutting v.
Muzzey,724 F.2d 259, 261 (1st Cir.1984); Bowles, 920 S.W.2d at 758.
In Re Perry, 60 S.W.3d 857 (Tex. 2001)
In Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State, 802 S.W.2d237 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), this Court provided a test for
determining when the separation of powers is violated.
We have held repeatedly that the separation of powers provision may be violated in either of two ways.
First, it is violated when one branch of government assumes, or is delegated, to whatever degree, a
power that is more `properly attached' to another branch. The provision is also violated when one
branch unduly interferes with another branch so that the other branch cannot effectively exercise its
constitutionally assigned powers.
104
Id. at 239 (emphasis in original; internal citations omitted). Thus, if TCEQ has been delegated a power
that is more properly attached to the legislature, then appellee is correct, and the statute that he was
charged with violating is unconstitutional.
The Texas Constitution vests law-making power in the legislature. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 1. Boykin v.
State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Copeland v. State, 92Tex. Crim. 554, 244 S.W. 818,
819 (Tex.Crim.App.1922). See also Russell v. Farquhar, 55 Tex. 355, 359 (1881). Only the legislature
can exercise that power, subject to restrictions imposed by the constitution. TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1.
These restrictions must be express or clearly implied. Jones v. State, 803 S.W.2d 712, 716
(Tex.Crim.App.1991) (citing Gov't Servs. Ins. Underwriters v. Jones, 368 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Tex.1963)).
The legislature also declares the public policy of the state and may depart *306 from established public
policy, reshape it, or reform it. State v. Dallas, 319 S.W.2d 767, 774 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1958) (cit-
ing McCain v. Yost, 155 Tex. 174, 284 S.W.
Under Boykin, statutes are read according to the plain meaning of their literal text as long as it is clear
and unambiguous. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). However, if the plain
language leads to an absurd result or is ambiguous, "then and only then, out of absolute necessity, is it
constitutionally permissible for a court to consider, in arriving at a sensible interpretation, such extra-
textual factors as executive or administrative interpretations of the statute or legislative his-
tory." Id. Section 311.011 of the Code Construction Act[7] states that "[w]ords and phrases shall be
read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage" and that
"[w]ords and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative def-
inition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly." These provisions apply to statutes and rules
"adopted under a code." Section 311.002.
State v. Rhine, 297 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)
D. Bob Davis: Aggravated Perjury & Fraud on the Court

ders must be reconsidered and vacated. Void Orders Christian v. State, 865 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App.
1993); Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. ___ (2017)
MR. DAVIS:Additionally, Mr. Gallagher repeatedly re-litigates matters. His initial case was in the
417th. He essentially -- and I'm paraphrasing -- sued Collin County or sued the Sheriff because Mr.
Gallagher felt that he should be allowed to smoke marijuana while --
MR. GALLAGHER:That's a lie.
MR. DAVIS:-- in jail.
MR. GALLAGHER:That is a complete lie.
105
THE COURT: Sir, again --
MR. GALLAGHER: He's lying about me right now.
THE COURT: If you have a legal objection, I'm happy --
MR. GALLAGHER: I object, that's a lie.
THE COURT: -- to -- okay.
MR. GALLAGHER: It was about my religious –
MR. GALLAGHER: Yes.
THE COURT: What is your legal objection?
MR. GALLAGHER: I object to -- he's sitting here lying and lying to the Court.
THE COURT: With no legal --
MR. GALLAGHER: Are we under oath, or no?
THE COURT: -- objection, it's overruled.
MR. GALLAGHER: Okay. All right.
THE COURT: You may continue, Mr. Davis
MR. DAVIS: In his first lawsuit against Collin County in the 417th he made -- whatever his claims are,
they were dismissed. He was sanctioned and he was told, ordered, in fact, in an order granting sanc-
tions not to file any additional litigation against Collin County --
MR. GALLAGHER: Regarding that though.
MR. DAVIS:-- until he had obtained permission from the judge. subsequently sued Collin County in
federal court. He didn't do that.
MR. GALLAGHER: Can I object? I filed no case about smoking marijuana in jail.
MR. GALLAGHER: Yes. I've never filed a case about smoking marijuana in jail. -(RR), Lebo, Gal-
trict Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p9 l10-25; p10 l1-25
Q. Are you sure?
THE COURT: Sir.
MR. GALLAGHER: No.
son), p25 l2-22
106
MR. DAVIS: The relief that we're seeking is that Mr. Gallagher be ordered to reimburse the County for
the attorney's fees and costs it has incurred in, basically, trying to get him to comply with the prior No-
vember 14th of 2017 sanction order. Essentially what that sanction order reads is that Mr. Gallagher
cannot sue Collin County again without obtaining permission from the --
MR. GALLAGHER: For smoking weed in jail. That's what I can't sue for. -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v.
MR. DAVIS: Okay. Exhibit...

THE COURT: 14, I think is what we're up to; is that right?
THE REPORTER: Yes, ma'am.
MR. GALLAGHER: Do you understand --You've spent $26,000 at $150 an hour thinking about me.-
MR. DAVIS: Based on that and my hourly rate, there was the total amount of $26,220. Based on my ex-
perience and review of these records and the work that was performed, this was certainly a reasonable
and necessary amount for the preparation and defense and enforcement of the sanctions' action. Addi-
tionally, I anticipate that there will be another 20 hours dealing with Mr. Gallagher, attempted appeals
and further actions if his past history is any indication.-(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State
(1) Fraud on the Court
In Miller v. Miller, 956 P.2d 887, 905 (Okla.1998), the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that the former
wife's misrepresentations during the divorce decree were intrinsic fraud, as perjury is the prototypical
example of intrinsic fraud. -Parker v. Parker, 916 So. 2d 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
107
Where fraud on the court deprives the defendant of due process, that is, due notice and opportunity to
defend, and hence of jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, the court, upon sufficient findings, will
set aside the decree. McLean v. McLean, 233 N.C. 139, 63 S.E.2d 138. -Carpenter v. Carpenter, 93
S.E.2d 617 (N.C. 1956)
Some examples of fraud on the court include:

• Fraud in service of court summons (such as withholding a court summons from a party)
• Corruption or influence of a court member or oflicial
• Judicial fraud
• Intentionally failing to inform the parties of necessary appointments or requirements, in efforts to ob-
struct the judicial process
• “Unconscionable” schemes to deceive or make misrepresentations through court system
Fraud on the court only involves court officials or officers of the court, such as judges or court- ap-
pointed attorneys. The fraud must be directed at the judicial machinery” itself. Fraud on the court is
one of the most serious violations that can occur in a court of law. If fraud on the court occurs, the ef-
fect is that the entire case is voided or cancelled. Any ruling or judgment that the court has issued will
be void. The case will usually need to be retried with different court officials, often in an entirely differ-
ent venue. For official(s) who acted in fraud upon the court, they may very well be required to step
down from their position & may even be subjected to criminal consequences like a fine or jail time. It
could result in other serious consequences, such as an attorney(s) being disbarred, or a judge being re-
moved from service. If a court official is found to be biased or prejudiced even before fraud occurs,
they are required to excuse themselves from the case, & different official must be appointed. In some
jurisdictions. a trial tainted by fraud on the court will be vacated or set aside for a certain time period
(such as two years), to be “reopened” at a later date. Fraud on the court can be devastating, espe-
cially for a party that may be waiting to receive relief from the court.
Fraud on the court should embrace only that species of fraud which does or attempts to. subvert the in-
tegrity of the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court ) (citation omitted); Kerwit
Med. Prods., Inc. v. N. & H. Instruments, Inc., 616 F.2d 833, 837 (11th Cir. ‘s-i 1980). Fraud on the
court must involve an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the
court in its decision Davenport RecyclingAssocs. r. CLR.. 220 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000) (al-
leged fraud on tax court). â€wlt has been found only in those instances where the fraud vitiates the
court’s ability to reach an impartial disposition of the case before it, there was fraud: there was fraud
on the court; and there was a conspiracy t defraud. This fraud was intentional. The fraud was perpe-
trated by officers of the court. Herring, 424 P.3d at 386. A judge is an officer of the court, as are all
members of the Bar. A federal judge is a federal judicial officer, paid by the federal government to act
impartially and lawftilly. Ajudge is not the court. People ; Zajk. 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d
626(1980). Chief Justice John Marshall acknowledged that a court may grant relief from judgment
where a new matter “clearly proves it to be against conscience to execute a judgment, and of which the
injured party could not have availed himself before judgment. Marhie Ins. (‘o. ofAlexandria v. Hodg-
son, 11 U.s. (7 Cranch) 332, 336 (1813). lie further emphasized that an Article Ill court can grant relief
where “equity of the applicant [is] free from doubt,” and where ajudgment “would be against con-
science/or /1w peiwon 11110 has obtained i/to avail himself” Id. at 337 (emphasis supplied). Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) and 60(d) as well as independent actions in equity may all be used to
seek to vacate orders and judgments due to fraud upon the courts.One of the essential elements of an
108
independent action in equity is a showing of the absence of any adequate remedy at law. Bankers Mort-
gage (‘a. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 79 (5th Cir. 1970). The Supreme Court has further noted that
an independent action in equity should be available only to prevent a grave miscarriage ofjustice.
United States v. Beggedj’, 524 U.S. 38,47(1998). The absence of any adequate remedy at law. In re
Macline Israel, Inc.. 48 F. App’x 859, 863 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Nat’l Stir. Co. ofN.Y. v. State
Bank of Humboldt, 120 F. 593. 599 (8th Cir. 1903)). “[A]n independent equitable action for relief from
judgment may only be employed to prevent manifest injustice.” Id. at 863. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v.
Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), and United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38 (1998), this
Court’s leading recent discussions of fraud upon the court. -Darlene C. Amrhein v.Attorney Lennie
F. Bollinger, and Worminton & Bollinger Law Firm, 05-18-00567-CV (Tex. App.)
In 2010, Plaintiff was charged in Collin County with a violation of Texas Penal Code
§ 481.121(b)(l), possession of marijuana, in a quantity ofless than two ounces after a search of
his residence revealed the presence of marijuana. 1 State of Texas v. Ryan Gallagher, Cause
No. 0058313010. Plaintiff pleaded guilty to the criminal charges, and was placed on deferred
adjudication, sentenced to one year of probation, thirty hours of community service, and directed
to attend the Drug Offenders Program. Plaintiff failed to report for probation, and instead fled
Texas for Colorado, among other states, until he returned to Texas, where he served time at the
Collin County jail (Dkt. #39 at pp. 2-3). Throughout his incarceration, Plaintiff avers that his
religious rights were violated because he was not permitted to smoke marijuana and was told he
could not be Hindu (Dkt. #39 at p. 3). Plaintiff was released from custody in 2015. Plaintiff
contends he was unable to obtain employment or rent property following his release due to being
"labeled a 'Criminal."' In addition, when trying to apply for a job in 2017, Plaintiff alleges his
record erroneously or falsely showed a felony (not misdemeanor) conviction (Dkt. #39 at p. 3).
Plaintiff sued Collin County in state court on March 20, 2017, raising his alleged right to
smoke marijuana as part of his religion (the "2017 State Court Lawsuit"). Ryan Gallagher v.
Collin County, Cause No. 005-00650-2017. On March 27, 2017, the 2017 State Court Lawsuit
was transferred to Judge Cynthia Wheless, Cause No. 417-01458-2017. 2 On November 14, 2017,
the state court dismissed the 2017 State Court Lawsuit (Dkts. #51-4, #51-5)
In the instant suit, which also seeks to litigate Plaintiff’s religious beliefs related to
marijuana, Plaintiff does not delineate specific claims against each of Defendants, but instead, lists
his various grievances with how his state criminal proceedings and the 2017 State Court Lawsuit
were handled. Relevant to Plaintiff’s Objection (hereinafter defined), as relief, Plaintiff requests
to “[o]verturn these Sanctions simply on Free Speech and Redress of Grievance Grounds, if not
on Texas Statutory Grounds, provide Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief, and Investigation, and
Punitive, Real and other Damages as requested in the Original Lawsuit against the County 417-
01458-2017, in the amount of $10,000,000.00” (Dkt. #39 at p. 4). Plaintiff does not clarify what
specific declaratory or injunctive relief he seeks.-Clerk's Record, Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin
Andrea Thompson), p267
Plaintiff argues that “[t]his Magistrate failed to recognize the key issue in the case, the fact
that [Plaintiff] was given a false felony for 7 years. A false felony, which affected my ability to
get jobs and rent. This Magistrate has ignored the main issue in the case” (Dkt. #83). Plaintiff is
109
mistaken; the Report expressly enumerated and considered Plaintiff’s argument:
Plaintiff also contends that as a result of his criminal proceedings, he could not
receive employment or rent property due to being “labeled a ‘Criminal;’” Plaintiff
specifically recounts trying to apply for a job in 2017, but having his record
erroneously show a felony conviction, which he attributes to “Judge Rippel
[leaving] it open as ‘Released from Jail’ rather than ‘Dismissed’”
(Dkt. #80 at p. 3). The Report found that such allegation did not alter the conclusion that Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendants were barred by sovereign immunity, judicial immunity, prosecutorial
immunity and/or did not establish Monell liability (see Dkt. #80). Neither Plaintiff’s Objection,
nor the record, demonstrate that such findings by the Magistrate Judge are incorrect. The
Magistrate Judge did not ignore the “main issue.” Plaintiff’s objection is overruled.-(CR), Gallagher v.
City of Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County
District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p270
Plaintiff also argues that "[he] also asked for declaratory relief. [The Magistrate Judge]
claims judges are immune, but they are not immune from declaratory relief' (Dkt. #85). As an
initial matter, the Court finds that although Plaintiff lists "Declaratory Relief' as a request from
the Court, nowhere in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint does he provide any specific details about
this request, namely what he requests the Court to declare (Dkt. #39 at p. 4).
Even so,"although judicial immunity does not bar [certain] claims for injunctive or declaratory relief
in civil rights actions, [herein] Plaintiff cannot obtain any requested declaratory or injunctive relief
because federal courts have no authority to direct state courts or their judicial officers in the
performance of their duties." See Bailey v. Willis, 417CV00276ALMCAN, 2018 WL 3321461, at
*11 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 4: 17-CV-276, 2018 WL
2126476 (E.D. Tex. May 8, 2018) (Mazzant, J.) (quoting Hunter v. Price, No. A-15-CV-405-LY,
2015 WL 2454118, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 21, 2015) (quoting LaBranche v. Becnel, 559 F. App'x
290, 290-91 (5th Cir. 2014))). Plaintiffs objection is overruled.-(CR), Gallagher v. City of Austin,
Judge Andrea Thompson), p271
It is, therefore, ORDERED that each of Defendants Collin County and Judge Rippel’s
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Dkt. #51), Judge Wheless’s Motion to
Dismiss (Dkt. #58), and Attorney General Paxton’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #59) are GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Judges Wheless and Rippel and AG Paxton in their
official capacities are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims
against Defendants Judges Wheless and Rippel and AG Paxton in their individual capacities are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.-Clerk's Record, Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of
son), p273
This action is DISMISSED without prejudice… DISMISSED without prejudice… this case is DIS-
MISSED without prejudice… this civil action are DISMISSED without prejudice… this civil action are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.… ORDERED that the action is dismissed without prejudice
pursuant to Rule 41 (b)… DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to Rule 41 (b)… Affirmed.…
ORDERED that the Complaint and the action are dismissed without prejudice for failure to cure the
deficiencies and failure to prosecute. … ORDERED that the Complaint and the action are dismissed
110
without prejudice for failure to cure the deficiencies and failure to prosecute.… are dismissed without
prejudice pursuant to Rule 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Mr. Gallagher has
failed to file a pleading that complies with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.… dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure because Mr. Gallagher has failed to file a pleading that complies with the pleading require-
ments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. …ORDERED that this action is dismissed without prej-
udice for failure to comply with a Court Order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 (b )… …ORDERED that
the action is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure because Plaintiff failed to cure the deficiencies as directed. …ORDERED that the Complaint and
this action are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41 (b) … ORDERED that the action is dis-
missed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41 (b) … ORDERED that the pursuant to Rule 41 (b)…
-Clerk's Record, Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General,
416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p277 278 279 280 281 284
292 297 300 303 310 316 319 322 329 332 343
Pro Se Plaintiff Ryan Gallagher has filed what he labels his "Objection To Vexatious Litigant Motion
By the county Memorandum of Law, written in 2015 Collin County Criminal case #0058312010" [filed
January 14, 2020], and "Supplement To Objection To Vexatious Litigant motion by county" [Filed Jan-
uary 15, 2020]. These "responses" completely fail to rebuke that Gallagher is the worst kind of Vexa-
tious Litigant. Gallagher does not dispute, because he cannot, that he has filed Thirty Four (34) pro se
litigations in the relevant time period and he repeatedly relitigates the same issues against the same
parties.-Clerk's Record, Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney
General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p344
Gallagher's tired mantra that "Collin County is simply attacking my Religion" is simply incorrect. His
responses fail to adequately address the legal and factual grounds compelling that his reign of litiga-
tion terror be halted. -Clerk's Record, Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas
Attorney General, 416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p345
2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p351-378 show the Federal religious
exemption process which I a currently in the middle of
(2) Plaintiff was timely and properly notified of the hearing on COLLIN COUNTY'S
MOTION FOR ORDER DETERMINING RYAN GALLAGHER A VEXATIOUS
LITIGANT and he personally appeared at such hearing;
(3) On January 23, 2020, the Court conducted a hearing, in accordance with TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 11.053, to determine whether Plaintiff Ryan
Gallagher meets the criteria to be found a vexatious litigant under TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE §11.lOl(a), and if so, whether a Prefiling Order should
be issued against him. The Court took judicial notice of and entered into
evidence the documents attached as Exhibits No. 1-44 to the APPENDIX To
COLLIN COUNTY'S MOTION FOR ORDER DETERMINING RYAN GALLAGHER A
VEXA nous LITIGANT. The Court also took judicial notice of all cases filed by
and/or against Ryan Gallagher in Collin County as contained on Collin
County's judicial record management system ODYSSEY.
(6) The Court also considered argument of Collin County and Ryan Gallagher as
111
set forth in their respective briefing, which included: (a) COLLIN COUNTY'S
MOTION FOR ORDER DETERMINING RYAN GALLAGHER A VEXATIOUS
LITIGANT, (b) the APPENDIX To COLLIN COUNTY'S MOTION FOR ORDER
DETERMINING RYAN GALLAGHER A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT, (c) Gallagher's
"OBJECTION To VEXATIOUS LITIGANT MOTION BY THE COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OF LAW, WRITTEN IN 2015 COLLIN COUNTY CRIMINAL CASE
#0058312010", (d) Gallagher's "SUPPLEMENT To OBJECTION To VEXATIOUS
LITIGANT MOTION BY COUNTY"' ( e) COLLIN COUNTY'S REPL y To RESPONSES
To MOTION FOR ORDER DETERMINING RYAN GALLAGHER A VEXATIOUS
LITIGANT, and (f) Gallagher's SUPPLEMENT To BRIEF. The Court also
considered the sworn testimony of Ryan Gallagher.
(7) The Court finds there is not a reasonable probability that Plaintiff Ryan
Gallagher will prevail in the instant litigation. Plaintiffs claims against the
City of Austin have already been dismissed. 1 Plaintiffs claims against Collin
County are barred by variety of reasons, including but not limited to
limitations, res judicata, and immunities. Similarly, Plaintiffs claims against
the State of Texas and Texas Attorney General are barred by immunities.
(8) COLLIN COUNTY'S MOTION FOR ORDER DETERMINING RYAN GALLAGHER A
VEXATIOUS LITIGANT was filed on January 8, 2020, and thus, the operative
Seven (7) year time period for any pro se litigations "commenced, prosecuted, or maintained” by Ryan
Gallagher is found to be a time period beginning on
January 8, 2013. Litigation filed before then yet still prosecuted or maintained
[i.e., on appeal] afterwards counts for the Court’s quantifying the number of
pro se litigations during the operative time period;
(9)
The Court finds that Ryan Gallagher has commenced, prosecuted or maintained
Thirty Four (34) pro se litigations in the relevant time period of January 8,
2013, to January 8, 2020, and which have been determined adversely to him.
Attached to the A PPENDIX T O C OLLIN C OUNTY ’ S M OTION F OR O RDER
D ETERMINING R YAN G ALLAGHER A V EXATIOUS L ITIGANT as Exhibit No. 1-44,
and also contained on the Collin County’s judicial record management system
ODYSSEY, are the corresponding docketsheets and other information for each
such litigation which Ryan Gallagher has commenced, prosecuted or
maintained since January 8, 2013, and that have been determined adversely to
him, which this Court takes judicial notice of for all purposes and has entered
into evidence in this case;
(10) The Court further finds that Ryan Gallagher, after litigation has been finally
determined against him, repeatedly relitigates or attempts to relitigate, pro se,
either (1) the validity of the determination against the same defendants as to
whom the litigation was finally determined; (2) or the cause of action, claim,
controversy, or any of the issues of fact or law determined or concluded by the
final determination against the same defendants as to whom the litigation was
finally determined. It appears to the Court that Ryan Gallagher has filed four
subsequent litigations just against Collin County involving the same alleged
issues, bringing suits in state court and federal court. The documents attached
to the A PPENDIX T O C OLLIN C OUNTY ’ S M OTION F OR O RDER D ETERMINING
R YAN G ALLAGHER A V EXATIOUS L ITIGANT as Exhibits No. 1 and 43, and also
112
contained on the Collin County’s judicial record management system
ODYSSEY, evidence that after litigation has been finally determined against
him, Ryan Gallagher repeatedly relitigates or attempts to relitigate, pro se,
either (1) the validity of the determination against the same defendants as to
whom the litigation was finally determined; (2) or the cause of action, claim,
controversy, or any of the issues of fact or law determined or concluded by the
final determination against the same defendants as to whom the litigation was
finally determined.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a PRE-FILING ORDER be and hereby
is issued against RYAN ALEXANDER GALLAGHER, and/or aka “El Sasha”
and/or aka “Rev. Ryan Gallagher” and/or aka “Rev. Ryan Sasha-Shai Van
Kush” and/or any other name or designation which he may go by, and he is hereby
prohibited from filing, pro se, any new litigation of any kind or nature in any state or
federal court located in the State of Texas until and unless written permission has first
been granted by the appropriate local Administrative Judge, strictly in accordance
with and as expressly authorized by T EX . C IV . P RAC . & R EM . C ODE §11.102.
-(CR), Gallagher v. City of Austin, Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General, 416-00049-
2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p381-384
(2)Texas Penal Code § 37.03. Aggravated Perjury
THE COURT: Okay. Sir, before we begin I need to ask if you swear or affirm that you're going to tell
the truth in these proceedings?
MR. GALLAGHER: Yes. Did he do the same?
THE COURT: He doesn't have to. He's an officer of the court. He's already done that pursuant to his
bar license, okay.
MR. GALLAGHER: Ok so he is under penalty of perjury right now?
THE COURT: Yes, he is. -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney Gen-
Here is a fairly detailed list of the Records (Collin County Jail Grievance System) that I am talking
about, which Bob Davis continues to lie about. I wrote this out with Pen and Paper in the jail then
transferred it to an email when I won the case and was released, so I had it available. I would like him
to prove that I have ever once requested to use Marijuana during the time of my Incarceration:
Request # 37595, I asked to be allowed to attend Religious Services, and they said I could go to the
Christian ones (even though I am not Christian) and I was ok with that.
Request # 42101, I was told by the Christian Priest that I was not allowed to attend Bible study because
I was not Christian, and I spoke with the Programs director, Jamie Taylor, in person and she apologized
and said that I could go to the Christian services.
Request # 42121, I point out that the Supreme Court has said that a Jail may have to incur expenses to
accommodate Religion, as I was told I couldn't go to Christian services, and that they didn't have Hindu
Religious texts, etc.
113
Request # 43154, I respond to the Program Director's Apology, as it came after the original request was
sent
Request # 44481, I tell them how they can get other Hindus printed versions of the Rig Veda, so that
they never have to tell anyone "We don't have your text" ever again (advice I am sure they ignored)
Request # 44803, I make the Staff aware that I will be spreading my faith, and having my own Reli-
gious services, and bringing my Holy Book with my everywhere, no different than the Christians.
Request # 46056, I am told I can no longer bring my Religious Text with me places, and am told I can
only bring books approved by the Programs Director
Request # 46146, I am kicked out of the Inmate Worker Program because of my Religion, even after
getting approval from the Program's director in person to bring my Religious text, and Christians were
never not allowed during this whole time.
There are various problems with the Positions put forward by the County, first of all they claim that the
Lawsuit surrounding this was regarding Religious Marijuana in Jail, when in Reality it is about Viola-
tions in jail of not being allowed to bring Religious Texts to Trustee Jobs, and being told by one of the
Preachers that in order to attend the Christian Church Services I had to be Christian, simply because I
knew more about the Bible than the other inmates there who were Christian and he did not like it. So I
would like Bob Davis to provide to the Court the Evidence that Marijuana was ever Requested. The Or-
der of Sanctions is Erroneous in that is says that I can not file the same Claims in State or Federal Court
against the County, yet never actually states a set of Claims that I have made. So the Sanctions to not
actually fully exist, as they do not have a mooring in Reality.
Under Texas law, punishment of six months incarceration or less and a fine of $500 or less is consid-
ered a petty offense, insufficient to trigger the right to trial by jury. Werblud, 536 S.W.2d at 546. Pun-
ishment exceeding six months’ incarceration entitles the contem- nor to a jury, and the judge must ad-
vise the contemnor of the right to jury. Griffin, 682 S.W.2d at 262.4. At what point in the contempt pro-
ceeding the case is determined to be serious or petty is subject to conflicting authority. a. The court in
Ex parte York, 899 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Tex. App.—Waco 1995, no writ) held that “if confinement may ex-
ceed six months,” then the contempt offense is serious and constitutional safeguards (i.e., the right to
a jury) should be given. b. However, the court in In re Brown, 114 S.W.3d 7, 11 (Tex. App.— Amarillo
2003, no writ) (citing Werblud, 536 S.W.2d at 546), held that the actual punishment imposed deter-
mines whether the character of the contempt is serious or petty.
“The power to punish for contempt should only be exercised with caution.” Ex parte Arnold, 503
S.W.2d 529, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)
To be enforceable by coercive contempt the order must be clear and unambiguous. Ex parte Chambers,
898 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. 1995)
To be held accountable for contempt of court, the order, whether written or oral, the judgment sought to
be enforced must be clear, specific, and unambiguous. Ex parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Tex. 1967);
Ex parte Hodges, 625 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. 1981); Ex parte Blasingame, 748S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex.
1988)
114
“Due process of law . . . in the prosecution of contempt, except of that committed in open court, re-
quires that the accused should be advised of the charges and have a reasonable opportunity to meet
them by way of defense or explanation . . .this includes the assistance of counsel, if requested, and the
right to call witnesses to give testimony . . .” Cooke, 45 Sup. Ct. at 395.
Ample time to prepare and respond to the allegation , In re Oliver, 68 Sup. Ct. 499, 507 (1948), Ex
parte Martin, 656 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)
The right to a jury trial if the potential punishment exceeds 6 months in jail, Muniz v. Hoffman, 422
U.S. 454, 95 S. Ct. 2178, 2190 (1975), Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 546 (Tex. 1976)
The court in Ex parte York, 899 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Tex. App.—Waco 1995, no writ) held that “if confine-
ment may exceed six months,” then the contempt offense is serious and constitutional safeguards (i.e.,
the right to a jury) should be given.
The Court Ordered a fee of over $4,900 for the Attorney Costs in the Collin County Lawsuit, yet Bob
Davis states in the request for Sanctions that he is attempting to basically nip this in the bud before it
gets expensive. I would like him to prove that he has done over $4,900 worth of Work for the County,
as of the time of the Sanctions being granted in 2017, and is not simply pulling that number out of his
ass like everything else he says. Attorney’s fees range anywhere from $100-$250 per Hour, and an At-
torney generally spends 8-10 Hours or so on a Case that has actually hearings and a Trails and every-
thing, so there is no reason that his attorneys fees should have ever been set at $4,900+ for a Case
which he claims he nipped in the bud.
E. Constitutional Challenge to a Statute & Mandamus

Q. Do you know the concept of "governmental sovereign immunity" that the County has?
A. No, not under Rule -- Title 5, Chapter 110 you guys have waived your sovereign immunity The State
has waived sovereign immunity for both municipalities and the State under Title 5, Chapter 110.
Q. So your allegations about --
A. Any judicial order, action, decision, ordinance, rule, law, anything is subject to that.
Q. So you dispute and you don't think that the County would have immunity for any claims about --
A. No.
Q. Let me finish my question, please, sir.
A. Sorry.
Q. -- about removing, as you allege, documents in a court file?
A. What do you mean "removing documents"?
Q. Okay. You have made an assertion that there was a felony. I did --
A. Yes.
Q. -- not see anything in any official record in Collin County that you've ever been charged with a
felony.-Reporter's Record, Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of Texas, Texas Attorney General,
416-00049-2020 (Collin County District Court, Judge Andrea Thompson), p23 l20-25; p24 l1-16
115
MR. GALLAGHER: No, no, I'm just asking you if you understand that he's saying this is about my reli-
gion?
THE COURT: I've read all the pleadings in the case.
MR. GALLAGHER:
Okay. And I'm saying Title 5, Chapter 110, the Texas -- court orders, Texas law, he cannot go against
religion. He's saying this is about my religion. It's not about something else and the religion is on top of
that. That is what this is about. And you guys are sitting here talking about, did you smoke marijuana
yesterday? Yes, that is part of my religion, and I've said that over and over. And you're acting like that's
a point against me when that is what this is about. -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin County, State of
son), p35 l9-22
THE COURT: Please stop talking over me. We don't want to have an issue where you leave and you
later come back and assert that you were not able to represent yourself effectively today because you
were under the influence of marijuana.
MR. GALLAGHER: No, I would not do that. It's the flesh of my Lord. -(RR), Lebo, Gallagher v. Collin
116
Affidavit of Harm and Hardship
117
Correspondence from DPS regarding Compassionate Use Program (CPU)
118
HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE
TITLE 6. FOOD, DRUGS, ALCOHOL, AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
SUBTITLE C. SUBSTANCE ABUSE REGULATION AND CRIMES
CHAPTER 481. TEXAS CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT
Sec. 481.002. DEFINITIONS.
In this chapter:
(5)"Controlled substance" means a substance,including a drug, an adulterant, and a dilutant, listed in
Schedules I through V or Penalty Group 1, 1-A, 2, 2-A, 3, or 4. Theterm includes the aggregate weight
of any mixture, solution, or other substance containing a controlled substance. The term doesnot in-
clude hemp, as defined by Section121.001, Agriculture Code,or the tetrahydrocannabinols in hemp.
(6)"Controlled substance analogue" means:(A)a substance with a chemical structure substantially sim-
ilar to the chemical structure of a controlled substance in Schedule I or II or Penalty Group 1, 1-A, 2,
or 2-A; or(B)a substance specifically designed to produce an effect substantially similar to, or greater
than, the effect of a controlled substance in Schedule I or II or Penalty Group 1, 1-A, 2,or 2-A.
(17)"Drug paraphernalia" means equipment, a product,or material that is used or intended for use in
planting,propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing,compounding, converting, pro-
ducing, processing, preparing,testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing,or con-
cealing a controlled substance in violation of this chapteror in injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or other-
wise introducing into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this chapter. The term in-
cludes:(A)a kit used or intended for use in planting,propagating, cultivating, growing, or harvesting a
species of plant that is a controlled substance or from which a controlled substance may be derived;
(B)a material, compound, mixture, preparation,or kit used or intended for use in manufacturing, com-
pounding, converting, producing, processing, or preparing a controlled substance;(C)an isomerization
device used or intended foruse in increasing the potency of a species of plant that is a controlled sub-
stance;(D)testing equipment used or intended for use in identifying or in analyzing the strength, effec-
tiveness, or purity of a controlled substance;(E)a scale or balance used or intended for use in weighing
or measuring a controlled substance;
(G)a separation gin or sifter used or intended for use in removing twigs and seeds from or in otherwise
cleaning or refining marihuana;
(L)an object used or intended for use iningesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing marihuana, co-
caine,hashish, or hashish oil into the human body, including:(i)a metal, wooden, acrylic, glass,
stone,plastic, or ceramic pipe with or without a screen, permanent screen, hashish head, or punctured
metal bowl;(ii)a water pipe;(iii)a carburetion tube or device;(iv)a smoking or carburetion mask;(v)a
chamber pipe;(vi)a carburetor pipe;(vii)an electric pipe;(viii)an air-driven pipe;(ix)a chillum;(x)a
bong; or(xi)an ice pipe or chiller.
(26)"Marihuana" means the plant Cannabis sativa L.,whether growing or not, the seeds of that plant,
and every compound,manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of that plant or its seeds.
The term does not include:(A)the resin extracted from a part of the plant or a compound, manufacture,
salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the resin;
(27)"Medical purpose" means the use of a controlled substance for relieving or curing a mental or
physical disease or infirmity.
119
(34)"Pharmacist" means a person licensed by the Texas State Board of Pharmacy to practice phar-
macy and who acts as an agent for a pharmacy.
(52) "Department" means the Department of Public Safety.
(53) "Chemical laboratory apparatus" means any item of equipment designed, made, or adapted to
manufacture a controlled substance or a controlled substance analogue, including:
(A) a condenser;
(B) a distilling apparatus;
(C) a vacuum drier;
(D) a three-neck or distilling flask;
(E) a tableting machine;
(F) an encapsulating machine;
(G) a filter, Buchner, or separatory funnel;
(H) an Erlenmeyer, two-neck, or single-neck flask;
(I) a round-bottom, Florence, thermometer, or filtering flask;
(J) a Soxhlet extractor;
(K) a transformer;
(L) a flask heater;
(M) a heating mantel; or
(N) an adaptor tube.
Sec. 481.062. EXEMPTIONS.

(a) The following persons may possess a controlled substance under this chapter without registering
with the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration:
(1) an agent or employee of a manufacturer, distributor, analyzer, or dispenser of the controlled sub-
stance who is registered with the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration and acting in the usual
course of business or employment;
(2) a common or contract carrier, a warehouseman, or an employee of a carrier or warehouseman
whose possession of the controlled substance is in the usual course of business or employment;
(3) an ultimate user or a person in possession of the controlled substance under a lawful order of a
practitioner or in lawful possession of the controlled substance if it is listed in Schedule V;
(4) an officer or employee of this state, another state, a political subdivision of this state or another
state, or the United States who is lawfully engaged in the enforcement of a law relating to a controlled
substance or drug or to a customs law and authorized to possess the controlled substance in the dis-
charge of the person's official duties;
(5) if the substance is tetrahydrocannabinol or one of its derivatives:
(A) a Department of State Health Services official, a medical school researcher, or a research program
participant possessing the substance as authorized under Subchapter G; or
(B) a practitioner or an ultimate user possessing the substance as a participant in a federally ap-
proved therapeutic research program that the commissioner has reviewed and found, in writing, to
contain a medically responsible research protocol; or
(6) a dispensing organization licensed under Chapter 487 that possesses low-THC cannabis.
Sec. 481.0621. EXCEPTIONS.
120
(a) This subchapter does not apply to an educational or research program of a school district or a
public or private institution of higher education. This subchapter does not apply to a manufacturer,
wholesaler, retailer, or other person who sells, transfers, or furnishes materials covered by this sub-
chapter to those educational or research programs.
(b) The department and the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board shall adopt a memorandum
of understanding that establishes the responsibilities of the board, the department, and the public or
private institutions of higher education in implementing and maintaining a program for reporting in-
formation concerning controlled substances, controlled substance analogues, chemical precursors, and
chemical laboratory apparatus used in educational or research activities of institutions of higher edu-
cation.
(c) The department and the Texas Education Agency shall adopt a memorandum of understanding that
establishes the responsibilities of the agency, the department, and school districts in implementing and
maintaining a program for reporting information concerning controlled substances, controlled sub-
stance analogues, chemical precursors, and chemical laboratory apparatus used in educational or re-
search activities of those schools and school districts.
Sec. 481.065. AUTHORIZATION FOR CERTAIN ACTIVITIES.

(a) The director may authorize the possession, distribution, planting, and cultivation of controlled sub-
stances by a person engaged in research, training animals to detect controlled substances, or designing
or calibrating devices to detect controlled substances. A person who obtains an authorization under
this subsection does not commit an offense involving the possession or distribution of controlled sub-
stances to the extent that the possession or distribution is authorized.
(b) A person may conduct research with or analyze substances listed in Schedule I in this state only if
the person is a practitioner registered under federal law to conduct research with or analyze those sub-
stances and the person provides the director with evidence of federal registration.
Sec. 481.067. RECORDS.

(a) A person who is registered with the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration to manufacture, dis-
tribute, analyze, or dispense a controlled substance shall keep records and maintain inventories in
compliance with record keeping and inventory requirements of federal law and with additional rules
the board or director adopts.
(b) The pharmacist-in-charge of a pharmacy shall maintain the records and inventories required by
this section.
(c) A record required by this section must be made at the time of the transaction that is the basis of the
record. A record or inventory required by this section must be kept or maintained for at least two years
after the date the record or inventory is made.
Sec. 481.071. MEDICAL PURPOSE REQUIRED BEFORE PRESCRIBING, DISPENSING,

DELIVERING, OR ADMINISTERING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
(a) A practitioner defined by Section 481.002(39)(A) may not prescribe, dispense, deliver, or adminis-
ter a controlled substance or cause a controlled substance to be administered under the practitioner's
direction and supervision except for a valid medical purpose and in the course of medical practice.
(b) An anabolic steroid or human growth hormone listed in Schedule III may only be:
(1) dispensed, prescribed, delivered, or administered by a practitioner, as defined by Section
481.002(39)(A), for a valid medical purpose and in the course of professional practice; or
121
(2) dispensed or delivered by a pharmacist according to a prescription issued by a practitioner, as de-
fined by Section 481.002(39)(A) or (C), for a valid medical purpose and in the course of professional
practice.
(c) For the purposes of Subsection (b), bodybuilding, muscle enhancement, or increasing muscle bulk
or strength through the use of an anabolic steroid or human growth hormone listed in Schedule III by a
person who is in good health is not a valid medical purpose.
Sec. 481.111. EXEMPTIONS.

(a) The provisions of this chapter relating to the possession and distribution of peyote do not apply to
the use of peyote by a member of the Native American Church in bona fide religious ceremonies of the
church or to a person who supplies the substance to the church. An exemption granted to a member of
the Native American Church under this section does not apply to a member with less than 25 percent
Indian blood.
(b) The provisions of this chapter relating to the possession of denatured sodium pentobarbital do not
apply to possession by personnel of a humane society or an animal control agency for the purpose of
destroying injured, sick, homeless, or unwanted animals if the humane society or animal control
agency is registered with the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration. The provisions of this chapter
relating to the distribution of denatured sodium pentobarbital do not apply to a person registered as re-
quired by Subchapter C, who is distributing the substance for that purpose to a humane society or an
animal control agency registered with the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration.
(c) A person does not violate Section 481.113, 481.116, 481.1161, 481.121, or 481.125 if the person
possesses or delivers tetrahydrocannabinols or their derivatives, or drug paraphernalia to be used to
introduce tetrahydrocannabinols or their derivatives into the human body, for use in a federally ap-
proved therapeutic research program.
(d) The provisions of this chapter relating to the possession and distribution of anabolic steroids do
not apply to the use of anabolic steroids that are administered to livestock or poultry.
(e) Sections 481.120, 481.121, 481.122, and 481.125 do not apply to a person who engages in the ac-
quisition, possession, production, cultivation, delivery, or disposal of a raw material used in or by-
product created by the production or cultivation of low-THC cannabis if the person:
(1) for an offense involving possession only of marihuana or drug paraphernalia, is a patient for
whom low-THC cannabis is prescribed under Chapter 169, Occupations Code, or the patient's legal
guardian, and the person possesses low-THC cannabis obtained under a valid prescription from a dis-
pensing organization; or
(2) is a director, manager, or employee of a dispensing organization and the person, solely in perform-
ing the person's regular duties at the organization, acquires, possesses, produces, cultivates, dispenses,
or disposes of:
(A) in reasonable quantities, any low-THC cannabis or raw materials used in or by-products created
by the production or cultivation of low-THC cannabis; or
(B) any drug paraphernalia used in the acquisition, possession, production, cultivation, delivery, or
disposal of low-THC cannabis.
(f) For purposes of Subsection (e):
(1) "Dispensing organization" has the meaning assigned by Section 487.001.
(2) "Low-THC cannabis" has the meaning assigned by Section 169.001, Occupations Code.
Sec. 481.121. OFFENSE: POSSESSION OF MARIHUANA.

(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, a person commits an offense if the person knowingly or inten-
tionally possesses a usable quantity of marihuana.
122
(b) An offense under Subsection (a) is:
(1) a Class B misdemeanor if the amount of marihuana possessed is two ounces or less;
(2) a Class A misdemeanor if the amount of marihuana possessed is four ounces or less but more than
two ounces;
(3) a state jail felony if the amount of marihuana possessed is five pounds or less but more than four
ounces;
(4) a felony of the third degree if the amount of marihuana possessed is 50 pounds or less but more
than 5 pounds;
(5) a felony of the second degree if the amount of marihuana possessed is 2,000 pounds or less but
more than 50 pounds; and
(6) punishable by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life or for a term of
not more than 99 years or less than 5 years, and a fine not to exceed $50,000, if the amount of mari-
huana possessed is more than 2,000 pounds.
HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE

TITLE 6. FOOD, DRUGS, ALCOHOL, AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
SUBTITLE C. SUBSTANCE ABUSE REGULATION AND CRIMES
CHAPTER 487. TEXAS COMPASSIONATE-USE ACT
Sec. 487.053. LICENSING OF DISPENSING ORGANIZATIONS AND REGISTRATION OF

CERTAIN ASSOCIATED INDIVIDUALS.
(a) The department shall:
(1) issue or renew a license to operate as a dispensing organization to each applicant who satisfies the
requirements established under this chapter; and
(2) register directors, managers, and employees of each dispensing organization.
(b) Subject to Section 411.503, Government Code, the department shall enforce compliance of li-
censees and registrants and shall adopt procedures for suspending or revoking a license or registration
issued under this chapter and for renewing a license or registration issued under this chapter.
SUBCHAPTER C. LICENSE TO OPERATE AS DISPENSING ORGANIZATION
Sec. 487.101. LICENSE REQUIRED.

A license issued by the department under this chapter is required to operate a dispensing organization.
Sec. 487.102. ELIGIBILITY FOR LICENSE.

An applicant for a license to operate as a dispensing organization is eligible for the license if:
(1) as determined by the department, the applicant possesses:
(A) the technical and technological ability to cultivate and produce low-THC cannabis;
(B) the ability to secure:
(i) the resources and personnel necessary to operate as a dispensing organization; and
123
(ii) premises reasonably located to allow patients listed on the compassionate-use registry access to
the organization through existing infrastructure;
(C) the ability to maintain accountability for the raw materials, the finished product, and any by-prod-
ucts used or produced in the cultivation or production of low-THC cannabis to prevent unlawful access
to or unlawful diversion or possession of those materials, products, or by-products; and
(D) the financial ability to maintain operations for not less than two years from the date of applica-
tion;
(2) each director, manager, or employee of the applicant is registered under Subchapter D; and
(3) the applicant satisfies any additional criteria determined by the director to be necessary to safely
implement this chapter.
Sec. 487.103. APPLICATION.

(a) A person may apply for an initial or renewal license to operate as a dispensing organization by
submitting a form prescribed by the department along with the application fee in an amount set by the
director.
(b) The application must include the name and address of the applicant, the name and address of each
of the applicant's directors, managers, and employees, and any other information considered necessary
by the department to determine the applicant's eligibility for the license.
Sec. 487.104. ISSUANCE, RENEWAL, OR DENIAL OF LICENSE.

(a) The department shall issue or renew a license to operate as a dispensing organization only if:
(1) the department determines the applicant meets the eligibility requirements described by Section
487.102; and
(2) issuance or renewal of the license is necessary to ensure reasonable statewide access to, and the
availability of, low-THC cannabis for patients registered in the compassionate-use registry and for
whom low-THC cannabis is prescribed under Chapter 169, Occupations Code.
(b) If the department denies the issuance or renewal of a license under Subsection (a), the applicant is
entitled to a hearing. Chapter 2001, Government Code, applies to a proceeding under this section.
(c) A license issued or renewed under this section expires as determined by the department in accor-
dance with Section 411.511, Government Code.
SUBCHAPTER E. DUTIES OF COUNTIES AND MUNICIPALITIES
Sec. 487.201. COUNTIES AND MUNICIPALITIES MAY NOT PROHIBIT LOW-THC

CANNABIS.
A municipality, county, or other political subdivision may not enact, adopt, or enforce a rule, ordi-
nance, order, resolution, or other regulation that prohibits the cultivation, production, dispensing, or
possession of low-THC cannabis, as authorized by this chapter.
"Mandamus is only available where no other adequate remedy at law is available." Vance v. Routt,571
S.W.2d 903, 907 (Tex. Cr.App.1978). It is also well settled that mandamus will not issue to compel a
particular result *594 in what is manifestly a discretionary decision, Garcia v. Dial, supra; see, e.g.,
Williams v. Placke,587 S.W.2d 166 (Tex.Cr. App.1979); and Ordunez v. Bean,579 S.W.2d 911
(Tex.Cr.App.1979), though mandamus may be appropriate to impel the consideration of a motion, the
issuance of a ruling, an entry of a judgment or other act, the doing of which is not discretionary. Id.
The affirmative duty upon an attorney to advise the court of any conflict, actual or potential, extant in
124
his representation of a defendant has been performed by Petitioner. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435
U.S. 475, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 55 L. Ed. 2D 426 (1978); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457,
86 L. Ed. 680 (1942); Pete v. State,533 S.W.2d 808 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); see also State Bar of Texas
Rules and Code of Professional Responsibility (hereinafter C.P.R.) DR 5-105. And though it appears no
duty devolves on the trial court to sua sponte inquire, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S. Ct. 1708,
64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980), the authorities agree that great deference should be accorded the representa-
tions of an attorney that he feels a division of loyalty. -White v. Reiter, 640 S.W.2d 586
(Tex.Crim.App.1982)
TITLE 5. GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY

CHAPTER 110. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Sec. 110.001.
(1)DEFINITIONS.
(a) In this chapter:
"Free exercise of religion" means an act or refusal to act that is substantially motivated by sincere reli-
gious belief. In determining whether an act or refusal to act is substantially motivated by sincere reli-
gious belief under this chapter, it is not necessary to determine that the act or refusal to act is moti-
vated by a central part or central requirement of the person's sincere religious belief.
Attainder and Exemption
The Volstead Act Prohibited the use and Sale of Alcohol in the United States under the 18th Amend-
ment, and in it there was a Medical and Religious Exemption: "Liquor for nonbeverage purposes and
wine for sacramental purposes may be manufactured, purchased, sold, bartered, transported, im-
ported, exported, delivered furnished and possessed..." -41 Stat. 305 (Pub. Law 66-66)
"8th day of March, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-one. Every such person shall make and file
with the two members of the State Board of Health in the congressional district in which he resides, or
if he resides out of the State in the district nearest his residence, an affidavit of the number of years he
has continuously practiced in this State; and, if the number of years therein stated be ten or more, the
said Board, or said two members thereof, shall, unless they ascertain such affidavit to be false, give
him a certificate to that fact, and authorizing him to practice medicine in all its departments in this
State." -Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889)
"The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures
of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws. The constitutional inhibition of legislation
on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to
adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be re-
stricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion."
-Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
“waive the requirement for registration of certain manufacturers, distributors, or dispensers if he finds
it consistent with the public health and safety.” 21 U. S. C. §822(d). The fact that the Act itself contem-
125
plates that exempting certain people from its requirements would be “consistent with the public health
and safety” indicates that congressional findings with respect to Schedule I substances should not
carry the determinative weight, for RFRA purposes, that the Government would ascribe to them."
-Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006); Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (affirming that Congress may regulate personal Marijuana use as Interstate
Trade); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 US ___(2014) (ACA held to be in Violation of Religious Right to
believe Fetuses have Souls); Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 US ___(2015) (A case using the Cocaine Tax
Law/Harrison Tax Act where the CSA is not definitive, showing the CSA is a generational member of a
family of Laws, and not some alien lifeform immune to Fundamental Law); Linder v. United States,
268 US 5 (1925) (Harrison Narcotics case Stating "direct control of Medical practice in the States is be-
yond the power of the Federal Government"); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) (Attainder
case, and first case to mandate State Licensed Medical Doctors, and State Medical Boards).
XI.Request/Conclusion
126
not been labeled.
Mandamus
Bill of Review
Title 5 Chpt 110 Relief, not “start over”, stop.
Demand Jury Trial
Records from Childhood Arrests and Probation so that any Conflicts may be revealed in these Cases as
well as Discovery for the Criminal Case in County and Redispose County Criminal Case to reflect real-
ity
In Re: Gallagher, 05-20-00128-CV (Tx. App. 2020)
Rule 270 motion to merge all cases into and reopen Case from 2017 Cynthia Wheless recused Gal-
lagher v. Collin County, 417-01548-2017 (417th District 2017)
Aggrevated Perjury Bob Davis
Subpoena Andrew Hatch
Motion to retrieve copy of Police report for Agg Perjury from Collin County Police
S/_Ryan_Gallagher___
Rev. Ryan “Sasha” Gallagher
Mahatmajapa@gmail.com
8150 N Stemmons fwy
Dallas, TX 75427
127

Corruption in Collin County in A TX 5th COA in Dallas

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Corruption in Collin County in A TX 5th COA in Dallas

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5th COA

Introduction: Commanding Precedent

Freedom of Speech and Right to Criticize Public Officials

2. Because Statute of limitations is up in his mind

3. Because of Sovereign Immunity

Vacating after Recusal

Illegal Sanctions, Abuse of Contempt Laws

Constitutionally and otherwise Void Orders

The 9th Amendment

Statement of the Case

416-00049-2020 (Transferred from Austin)

1. Because he doesn't like my Religion

2. Because Statute of limitations is up in his mind

3. Because of Sovereign Immunity

(2) Motion to Merge

(January 23, 2020; 9:23 a.m.)

Tex. R. Civ. P. 270

The issue before us is governed by TEX.R.CIV.P. 270, which provides as follows:

(1) Texas Jurisdiction

"Litigant statute provides in Sec. 11.054(1) as follows:

(2) Federal Question Jurisdiction

28 U.S. Code§ 1337.Commerce and antitrust regulations; amount in controversy, costs

(3) Ultra Vires & Anti-Trust Law

A Monopoly is not a Monopoly if they happen naturally, with no Government Contract.

Sanctions can’t be an outcome when you don’t appear, etc

C. Negligence/Noble Cause Corruption

Cite Bill of Review Case # 416-00070-2020

1. filing a case against public officials which is my right

State of Texas v. Gallagher, Collin County Criminal Court, 0058313010 (2010-2015)

Collin County has a long documented history of corruption.

Johnson, Dietrick Lewis Sr., WR-83,532-01 (Tex. App. 2015)

My Father is Robert Scott Gallagher, who is associated with PrintingYourNameOnIt

cite appearance of misconduct throughout

1. Because he doesn't like my Religion

2. Because Statute of limitations is up in his mind

3. Because of Sovereign Immunity

THE COURT: Okay. And you're representing yourself?

MR. DAVIS: Okay. Exhibit...

The 2 Theories are Isolationism and Diffusionism.

State of Texas v. Gallagher, Collin County Criminal Court, 0058313010 (2010-2015)

Kerrie Walker ineffective assistance of counsel and corruption

B. Judge Cynthia Wheless (Illegal Sanctions, Void Orders, Re-

CJC NO. 20-0485 CJC NO. 20-0053

TITLE 5. OPEN GOVERNMENT; ETHICS

THE COURT: Okay. And you're representing yourself?

Vexatious Litigant Designation and Rule 11

 "The Plaintiff is a Hindu Shaivite Priest (Certificate of Ministry can be

* SACRED Food/SACRAMENT AL SUBSTANCES BRIEF, filed March 21, 201 7;

• ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM, filed March 23, 2017;

• ANTINOMY BRIEF, filed March 27, 2017;

• RELIGION IN AMERICA BRIEF, filed March 28, 2017;

* RESPONSE To THREAT OF SANCTIONS, filed April 19, 2017.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ryan Gallagher and all his agents,

Q. You also filed in the District of New York?

(2) Vexatious Litigant Designation

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 11.101(a).

Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution provides:

C. Greg Abbott and Ken Paxton: Conflict of Interest

D. Bob Davis: Aggravated Perjury & Fraud on the Court

MR. DAVIS: Okay. Exhibit...

(1) Fraud on the Court

Some examples of fraud on the court include: