Lado, Erxha Vinzinna V.

2019-0725
Property Digest   June 6,
2020

Natividad C. Cruz and Benjamin Dela Cruz, Petitioners, v. Pandacan Hiker's Club,

Inc., Represented By Its President, Priscilailao, Respondent.

G.R. No. 188213, January 11, 2016

Facts:
Petitioner Natividad Cruz, a barangay Captain of a Barangay in the City of Manila. She
allegedly confronted persons playing basketball with the following statements:

Bakit nakabukas ang (basketball) court? Wala kayong karapatang

maglaro sa court na 'to, barangay namin ito! xxx xxx xxx Wala kayong
magagawa. Ako ang chairman dito. Mga walanghiya kayo, patay gutom!
Hindi ako natatakot! Kaya kong panagutan lahat!

Then, she allegedly gave an order to the other petitioner, Barangay Tanod Benjamin
dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), to destroy the basketball ring by cutting it up with a hacksaw
which Dela Cruz promptly complied with, thus, rendering the said basketball court
unusable.

Petitioners maintain that they acted merely with the intention to regain free passage of
people and vehicles over the street and restore the peace, health and sanitation of
those affected by the basketball court. Cruz, in particular, asserts that she merely
abated a public nuisance which she claimed was within her power as barangay chief
executive to perform and was part of her duty to maintain peace and order.

Issues:
1. How may a private individual abate a public nuisance?

2. Assuming that the basketball ring was a nuisance per se, but without posing any
immediate harm or threat that required instantaneous action, may the petitioners
summarily destroy the basketball ring?

Ruling:
1. Art. 704. Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious
to him by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same,
without committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury. But it is
necessary:

a) That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the property to
abate the nuisance;

b) That such demand has been rejected;

c) That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed
with the assistance of the local police; and

d) That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand pesos.

2. No.
Under Article 700 of the Civil Code, the abatement, including one without judicial
proceedings, of a public nuisance is the responsibility of the district health officer. Under
Article 702 of the Code, the district health officer is also the official who shall determine
whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the best remedy against a
public nuisance. The two articles do not mention that the chief executive of the local
government, like the Punong Barangay, is authorized as the official who can determine
the propriety of a summary abatement.

Heirs Of Roger Jarque, Petitioners, V. Marcial Jarque, Lelia Jarque-Lagsit, And

Teresita Jarque-Bailon, Respondents.

G.R. No. 196733, November 21, 2018

Facts:
The subject lot was declared under the name of Laureano Jarque, who was married to
Servanda. Petitioners claim that Roger inherited the subject lot from their grandfather
Laureano upon his death in 1946. Roger mortgaged the lot twice, and on the second
one, Lupo, his brother, was the one who redeemed the property. Roger tried to redeem
the property back from Lupo and his family thrice, but every time he would do so, Lupo
and his family would request to the property remain with them as they need it as a
source of income. On the other hand, Roger would also accede to their requests.

When Roger’s sons would finally take the property back for good, they were surprised to
find out that respondents were already claiming ownership over the subject property.

Respondents’ claim on the other hand, that their grandmother mortgaged

the lot. When the period to repurchase the same was about to expire, she requested her
granddaughter to redeem the property. Thereafter, she took possession of the lot and
then, transferred all her rights over the property to Lelia.

Issue:
Who has the better right over the subject property?

Ruling:
The petitioners has the better right over the property.

Laureano died in 1946, prior to the effectivity of the Civil Code on August 30, 1950. At
the time of his death, the governing law as to the property relations between husband
and wife and the successional rights among the decedent’s heirs is the Old Civil Code.

Under the Old Civil Code, the default property regime of the husband and wife is the
conjugal partnership of gains. This includes: (1) property acquired for a valuable
consideration during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the
acquisition is made for the partnership or for one of the spouses only; (2) property
obtained by the industry, wages or work of the spouses or of either of them; and (3) the
fruits, income, or interest collected or accrued during the marriage, derived from the
partnership property, or from that which belongs separately to either of the spouses.
Unless proved otherwise, properties acquired during the marriage are considered
partnership property.
Upon the death of either spouse, the conjugal partnership is dissolved. The surviving
spouse is entitled to his or her ½ share in the partnership, while the remaining half
belongs to the estate of the deceased which will be inherited by his forced heirs.

Laureano and Servanda, having lived together as husband and wife, are presumed to
have been lawfully married. When Laureano died and the partnership was dissolved,
Servanda acquired her ½ share in the conjugal partnership, while the other half
devolved to the estate of Laureano. In turn, their four children (including Roger)
succeeded to the 2/3 of the estate of Laureano as his forced heirs. On the other hand,
Servanda’s successional rights over the estate of Laureano was limited to the usufruct
of the legitimate children’s share.

The record shows that the parties admitted the property’s conjugal nature for being
“originally owned by the late spouses [Laureano] Jarque and [Servanda] Hagos.” No

evidence was submitted to show that it was either the exclusive property of Laureano or
the paraphernal property of Servanda. Hence, it belongs to the conjugal partnership, to
be divided equally between them or their estate upon the dissolution of marriage.
However, it was not shown that a partition was effected between Servanda or the heirs
of the estate of Laureano. With this missing piece of information, it was error for the CA
to conclude that Servanda had the authority to execute the Deed of Sale with Right of
Repurchase over the property.

The absence of a partition between the estates of Servanda and Laureano resulted in a
co-ownership between Servanda and her children over the properties. This co-
ownership remained and continued even when the Civil Code, took effect on August 30,
1950. Thus, the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership now governs their rights.