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factor §.ni‘l1ien¢i;::g_-their reactions? weuld be not éo much the \_-_

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take inizoeooount not only the nature and scope of the US

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operefioions north of the 17th parallel, but also any significant

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E3 movemeni-Ior'=ne$1r degloymont of US forces in SVN, and US operations

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ML.’ also e<msj.der what‘ the US seié about its oojeotives, 'm>.*c woulrl ~

»-cc‘ be‘ litfle inclined to take these statements at face value. '
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we view of the US ection.‘ Hanoi almost

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to‘ inefmde destruotion of the regime. US operations of appreciable

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scoye in the northern DMZ, end particularly an extension

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of such “opera/'aions fizrther irito North Vietnamese territory, would.

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judgment woula be
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important; aspect of the situation would. be the reaction
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of publie opinion in the United States and the non-Communisfi world

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“gemrslly. l-Small-scale operations confined to the northern DMZ

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_wou3.r1 ‘arouse somezconcern axed criticism. But if US ground forcea

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enough to be 8.pp1_‘e<>i8.'bl8, there would be outburst; of dieapproval

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anti. alarm "in most of the non-Communist world. Most of the
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oetermine
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tamzicsl moves to cope with the new tactical situation, but also
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longer-term jareperetions to deal with possible future Us actions.

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Hanoi would have to consider not only new deployments of its ow-12

the time had. come to request more extensive E

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help from other Gozmunist countries, including the introdsction

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combat‘ forces into -North Vietnam in some numbers.

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At the same time, the progress of the war to
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be-at oonrse was to make some move toward peace; On the whole, I
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however,‘ we think more likely that Hanoi would refuse to

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1:1 enter neg<>‘cia.tions under these oircums‘oa.noes~ and would continue

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indiceteo. ipcreased. concern over the possibilxty that the US

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actions into North Vietnam. In_Sep‘oember,
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zone. ,A Q‘ If,‘ as" these siseternente suggest, the North Vi-etzzamese

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2:: lergge» forces in this general area, and they would try to inflict .

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deter any further: operations} As long as the operations were
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fairly emelloscale end remained within the DMZ, Hanoi woulo.
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pressures on the DMZ increased military ‘action in -Laos. The

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the panhandle or nothern provinces would deter the

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amplified. Hanoi would urge Moscow and Peking to lend their i

voices to such a campaign. If US operations were extenoed

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fqrthen notth in the panhandle, Hanoi would probably request

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extended fwther into North Vietnam, ‘Peking would become ,

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the Hanoi regime. ‘China would want to

to the existence oi‘

further US actions while still. avoiding a. direct confron-

detour

It woulc1pro‘oa.bly calculate that the

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'batiLon with the US.
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means toward'these ends would. ‘oe to give firm indications that
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it was pzfepared at some point to fig‘n.t._

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course. Accordingly, we think that the

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by Hanoi, send ground combat forces
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nzgnw mmlikely
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to-move 'f.‘a.r enough south to engage US forces as long
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would probably
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'lei'gér Chinese involvement in North Vie‘hna.m

e.t7bended;by other} mi2.i"be.z'y nxovements

within China. ~-
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priacautionazfy from‘ ?ek5.ng's‘ point of view.
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could never be
tensioné would greé.t3jf§{ncrease', and the US
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cejrtaih that Chinese military moves did

not have more ominous
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than 'mero deterrence.
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The Soviet Position

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be long a.s_ the US actions remained .€‘eirly limited in, -

ewe, we wink Soviet reactions would be confined to material

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increased
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of weapons which could strengthen

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The Soviets might believe

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providing "volunteers“ to men some of these weapons would.

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have some deterrent value on the US. The Soviets woulo also try
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check further US action by warnings and perhepe

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a. <3.err.onetra.‘oi§:e
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'poli.ticel-'pr_otes*o e.go.insi:_'bhe US_ (e.g., terminating eertein

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__.______;
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fairly large scale, the Soviets woulo anticipate

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