Ain Shams University

Faculty of Engineering
Department of Architecture
Postgraduates (Ph.D.) – Spring 2020
Philosophy of Scientific Research
Prof. Yasser Mansour

Assignment 2
Summarize Feyerabend’s book: Against Method.

Student: Abdulrahman Ayman Fahmy

1. Who is Feyerabend?
Born in 1924, Paul Karl Feyerabend was an American, Austrian-born philosopher of science. He worked
as a professor of philosophy for three decades at the University of California, Berkeley. He studied science
at the University of Vienna before moving into philosophy for his doctoral thesis. Feyerabend was mostly
known as a philosopher of science and as critic of Karl Popper’s “critical rationalism” where science had
to have particular rules and methods. He was even a critic of philosophy of science itself. And this led to
some scientists calling him an enemy of science. Feyerabend, who studied various scientific revolutions
from history, observed that scientists were not following any method. Epistemological anarchism was the
theory of knowledge he believed, and he summed up it by his famous quote: “anything goes.”

2. Overview on ‘Against Method’ book:

“The only principle that does not inhibit progress is “anything goes”.
Feyerabend thought that science is business. And that, conducting science with a method that contains firm,
unchanging and binding principles could meet considerable difficulty when confronted with the results of
historical research. He thought that any rule however plausible it could be and however firmly grounded in
epistemology, could be violated at some time. Those violations are not accidental events nor a result of
insufficient knowledge nor inattention which might have been avoided. But they could be seen necessary
for progress.
When looking in the history of science, some developments and theories could not have been done if the
thinkers decided to be bound by methodological rules or not to break them. (The wave theory of light for
example). The growth of knowledge acquires this liberal practice which is necessary and reasonable in his
opinion. In some circumstances it is advisable not only to break fundamental or rational rule, but to adopt
its opposite. So, sometimes it is advisable to defend and introduce ad hoc hypotheses, or hypotheses which
contradict generally accepted experimental results, or self-inconsistent hypotheses, and so on. Arguments
could lose their aspect and become hindrance to progress at sometimes. Thinking of events which cause us
to adopt new standards lets us think that defenders of the status quo would provide counterarguments or
even contrary causes. But if the old forms of argumentation turn out to be weak, would they give up or
resort to stronger and more irrational means? He asks, “what is the use of an argument that leaves people
unmoved?”

3. Students and teachers’ relation:

When a student learns standards from his master, he adheres to it even if he is confused. He will not be able
to realize that what he regards as “voice of reason” is actually a causal after-effect of the training he had
received -“Just like pets obey their owners!”- which is a political maneuver. The reason for this is that the
standards are supposed to have maximal causal efficacy. And this makes it difficult to distinguish between
the logical force and the material effect of the argument.
The growth of our knowledge and the growth of science is affected by interests, propaganda, and
brainwashing techniques. This effect can be seen from analyzing the relation between idea and action. It is
believed that a clear understanding of new ideas precedes their formulation and their institutional
expression. This is where we first have an idea and then we take an action by speaking, building, or
destroying. And this is far from how children behave with words and speaking where children have a playful
activity which is an essential prerequisite of the final act of understanding. In this matter, creation of a thing
and the understanding of a correct idea of a thing are parts of the same indivisible process and if separated,
they bring the process to a stop.
The process should not be guided by a well-defined program but should contain the conditions for realizing
all possible programs. It is rather guided by a vague urge or by passion. This passion rises specific behavior
which creates circumstances and ideas necessary for analyzing and explaining the process to make it
‘rational’. The way Galileo prove Copernican heliocentric theory by building the telescope to observe
himself says he was on the right track. His act led to the theories we defend right now against those who
would accept a view only if it was told in a certain way and who would only trust it if it contained magical
phrases like ‘observational reports’.

4. Anarchism in science:
Feyerabend thought that anarchism helps to achieve progress in any one of the senses one cares to choose.
And that even a law-and-order science will succeed only if anarchistic moves are occasionally allowed to
take place. Thus, the words he used -progress, advance, improvement, etc.- are to be thought of by readers
according to their tradition and understanding.
The idea of a fixed method, or a fixed theory of rationality is thought to be too naïve to man’s view and his
social surroundings. Those who look at history and who would not impoverish it because of their craving
of ‘intellectual security’ in the form of clarity, precision, objectivity, or truth, could understand that the only
principle that can be defended under all circumstances is: “anything goes”. And the rest of the book is to
examine and explain this principle in concrete detail.

5. Pluralism and counterinduction:

To examine the principle in concrete detail means tracing the consequences of ‘counter rules’ which oppose
familiar rules of the scientific enterprise.
Considering the rule that it is ‘experience’, or the ‘facts’, or ‘experimental results’ which measure the
success of theories, that agreement between a theory and the ‘data’ favors the theory. This is the essence of
empiricism. The counter rule corresponding to this theory advises us to elaborate hypotheses that are
inconsistent with well-established theories or well-established facts. It advises us to proceed counter
inductively. The evidence that might refute a theory can be unearthed only with the help of an incompatible
alternative.
Some of the most important properties of a theory are found by contrast, not analysis. So, a scientist who
wishes to maximize empirical content of certain views or understand them must introduce other views or
in other words adopt a pluralistic methodology. The scientist should compare ideas with other ideas rather
than with ‘experience’ and he must try to improve the views that have failed in the competition rather than
discarding them.
Knowledge is not a series of self-consistent theories that converges toward an ideal view nor a gradual
approach to the truth. Knowledge is rather an ever-increasing ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives,
contributing, via a process of competition, to the development of our consciousness. The task of scientists
in this case is not searching for the truth, systematizing observations, praising God, nor improving
predictions. To analyze our most simple and straightforward observations, we need an external standard of
criticism, a set of alternative assumptions, or a dream world. The first step in our criticism of ‘facts’ must
be an attempt to break the circle. This step is again counter inductive.
Feyerabend’s intention was to convince the reader that all methodologies, even the most obvious ones, have
their limits. To him, “an anarchist is like an undercover agent who plays the game of Reason in order to
undercut the authority of Reason (Truth, Honesty, Justice, and so on)”.
6. Objecting the consistency condition:
A demand that new hypotheses must be consistent with well-established theories will be called the
“consistency condition”. Consistency condition eliminates a theory not if it disagrees with the facts, but if
it disagrees with another theory, with a theory whose confirming instances it shares. Age and familiarity of
a theory affect consistency condition, where if a younger theory had been there first, the consistency
condition would have worked in its favor. In this respect the effect of the consistency condition is rather
like the effect of the more traditional methods of transcendental deduction, analysis of essences,
phenomenological analysis, and linguistic analysis.
Feyerabend saw the defenders of consistency condition afraid of time and manpower loss in case new
alternatives opened new arguments which could require recalculation of familiar problems.

7. Separation between science and history:

Counterinduction is the invention of hypotheses which are inconsistent with a point of view that is highly
confirmed. To Feyerabend, refusing counterinduction is like putting the cart before the horse.
He thought that a pluralistic methodology where a theory is compared with other theories rather than with
experiments, data, or facts should replace the interest in maximal empirical content. And one should
improve other views rather than discarding them.
Separation between history of science and science itself and its philosophy dissolves in air because progress
is often achieved by criticizing the past. Abandoning theories before they have an opportunity to show their
virtues is seen in case it contradicts the experiments. Voodoo is an example of knowledge which by
understanding its material basis we could enrich philosophy.
Traditional Chinese medicine was affected by the Western world. However, in 1954 and by political force
it was revived and led to interesting discoveries. Nowadays, science is obtained in Chinese way from a
multiplicity of views rather than from a preferred ideology.
Yet, the entity that gets a modern scientist away from what his scientific conscience tells him to pursue
around the world is the dollar (church, state, political party, money, etc.). The importance of pluralism of
theories for methodology and humanitarian outlook is then seen obvious.

8. Disagreement between theories and facts:

No single theory ever agrees with all the known facts in its domain. The value that is obtained differs from
prediction by more than margin of error. And there are two kinds of disagreement between theories and
facts:
1- numerical disagreement
Numerical disagreement abounds in science and create an ocean of anomalies that surrounds every
theory. And there exist numerous discrepancies between observation and theory
2- Qualitative failures
In qualitative failures, a theory is inconsistent not with recondite fact that is known to experts only
but with circumstances that are easily noticed by everyone.
Example: Parmenides theory of the unchanging and homogenous one. In this theory the substance is being.
Parmenides decided that the only change is the journey of the consciousness. This theory led to proposing
the law of conservation, drawing a boundary between reality and appearance.
The common attitude nowadays is to proceed as if the theory has no faults. Occasionally, it is impossible
to survey all the interesting consequences and thus to discover the absurd results of a theory. The reason is
the deficiency in mathematical methods or the ignorance of the defenders. Ad hoc hypotheses are thought
of in this kind. And so, Feyerabend suggests that theories cannot derive from facts.
He also thought that every single theory is in some trouble or other. And that we should revise our
methodology admitting counterinduction in addition to admitting unsupported hypotheses. In this matter,
the right method must not contain any rules that make us choose between theories based on falsification.
Rather it should enable us to choose between theories which are already tested, and which are falsified.
Then, theories and facts would be separated.
Theory may be inconsistent with evidence not because it is incorrect but because the evidence is
contaminated. And it is threatened because the evidence either contains unanalyzed sensations, or because
it is presented in terms of antiquated views, or because it is evaluated with the help of backward auxiliary
subjects. A straightforward judgement of a theory by facts is bound to eliminate ideas because they do not
fit into the framework of some older cosmology. Now, how can we examine something we used all the time
and presuppose in every statement?
The first step of criticism is to create a measure of criticism to compare between the concepts. So, we must
step outside the circle to invent a new conceptual system as a theory that clashes with the most carefully
established observations or to import such a system from outside science (religion, etc.). (Counter
induction).

9. Natural interpretations, the deceiving senses, and observation languages:

The correctness of an observation is not in question but the reality or fallacy. The reason is that senses
deceive us. And phenomenon and statement are one entity. This unity is a result of the process of learning.
Natural interpretation is the mental operations which follow so closely upon the senses. The power of
reasoning could either confirm the reality or reveal the fallacy. This means examining the validity of natural
interpretations which are conceded with the appearances. Also, the force of an argument from observation
derives from the fact that the observation statements involved are firmly connected with appearances. In
the history of thought the senses must be eliminated before any serious examination can begin. However,
they should be accompanied by reasoning.
Producing an observation statement consists of two different psychological events: A clear and
unambiguous sensation. And a clear and unambiguous connection between the sensation and parts of the
language. A comparative analysis of observation language can start when all of them are spoken fluently.
Observation languages are phenomenalistic, objective-idealistic, and theological observation languages.

10. Visiting history – Galileo:

Galileo sought reasons for effects without having considered first causes, and that is why he built a
foundation. He never wanted to retain nor to eliminate the senses. And because the motive for a change
must come from a different source, he turned the experience which partly contradicts the motion of earth
into one that confirms it.
The falling stone’s path from a tower is an example. A stone’s circular path which center is concentric with
earth that would travel around the center forever if there were no friction is another example. Also, the line
drawn on a moving boat.
Galileo praised Copernicus and Aristotle’s counter inductive method. Aristotle thought the Earth was in the
center. Then, Galileo invented the telescope by try and error and not by mathematics. The telescope’s
terrestrial success was assured. Observational experiments could deceive us, the use of telescope in earth
worked well but looking to the sky, it was deceiving, doubling the stars. So, Galileo was thought to be not
a good astronomical observer, or else that the excitement of the discovery in that time had blurred his skill
or critical sense.
The moon’s observations showed that the periphery was smooth, and the center was full of mountains.
Also, the stars were not rendered larger. The reason is that the senses, applied under abnormal conditions,
are liable to give abnormal response.
Galileo was acquainted with contemporary optical theory. His telescope had a phenomena problem. It was
developed by Kepler’s theory of telescopic vision which could separate appearance from reality. Kepler’s
model was the elliptical model.
The geocentric hypothesis and Aristotle’s theory of knowledge and perception are well adopted to each
other. Perception supports the theory of locomotion. In his time, Aristotle was an empiricist, he described
experience as what a normal observer perceives under normal circumstances and describes in an idiom that
fits the facts and can be understood by all. But what was needed to test Copernicus theory was an entirely
new worldview containing a new view of man and of his capacities of knowing. Tests in other cases will
not make sense.

11. Science is complex and needs irrational ways:

There is a tendency in philosophical discussions to approach problems of knowledge as if they were
statements which are compared with each other without regard to their historical strata. The problem is that
this procedure overlooks the complexity and heterogeneity historical process of science which contains
vague and incoherent anticipations of future ideology side by side with highly sophisticated theoretical
systems and ancient and petrified forms of thought.
Some of science elements are available in the form of neatly written statements while others are submerged
and become known only by contrast or by comparison with new and unusual views. A backward movement
is necessary where we return to an early stage where theories were vaguer and had smaller empirical
contents. This backward movement is essential if we want to overtake the status quo because it gives us
freedom and time to develop the main view in detail and for finding the necessary auxiliary sciences.
Feyerabend’s goal was to convince people to move away from well-defined sophisticated and empirically
successful system to: unfinished and absurd hypothesis that is contradicted by one observation after another
if we compare it with what is plainly shown to be the case by our senses. The success of the status quo is
only apparent and is bound to be shown as such in 500 years or more. Irrational means are needed like
propaganda, emotions, ad hoc hypotheses, and append to prejudices of all kind to convince people with
that. This strategy is needed to be used until we have found the auxiliary science, facts, arguments that turn
the faith into sound knowledge. A more reasonable attitude towards the issue between reason and
irrationality needs to be taken.

12. Disagreement with reasoning:

Reason grants that the ideas which we introduce in order to expand and to improve our knowledge may
arise in a very disorderly way and that the origin of a particular point of view may depend on class prejudice,
passion, personal idiosyncrasies, questions of style, and even on error, pure and simple. But it also demands
that in judging such ideas we follow certain well-defined rules: our evaluation of ideas must not be invaded
by irrational means.
Historical examples show that there are situations when our most liberal judgements and our most liberal
rules would have eliminated a point of view which we regard today as essential for science. The ideas
survived and they now are said to agree with reasons. It survived because all the characteristics of the
context of discovery (prejudice, passion, conceit, error, sheer pigheadedness) opposed dictates of reason
and because their irrational elements were permitted to have their way (reason is overruled). And in this
matter, our chances to progress may be obstructed by our desire to be rational.

13. Feyerabend’s progress steps:

Progress steps from Feyerabend’s point of view are as follows:
1- Step back.
2- Bring new data in by ad hoc connections.
3- Reduce the empirical content of science.
The step back will be a step forward when any idea can become plausible and can receive partial support.
Once it has been realized that a close empirical fit is not virtue and that it must be relaxed in time of change,
our knowledge will have some features like: style, elegance of expression, simplicity of presentation,
tension of plot, and narrative and seductiveness of context. These features create and maintain interest in a
theory that has been partly removed from the observational plane and which would be inferior to its rivals
when judged by the customary standards.

14. What limits and affects science progress:

Increasing amounts of theoretical and engineering information are kept secret for military reasons and
thereby cut off from international exchange. Financial arrangements can break a research program and an
entire profession.
The process of knowledge distribution was never the free, objective, and purely intellectual exchange
rationalists make it ought to be.
The decision of experts on Galileo’s proposal at 1616 concerned two points:
1- The scientific content of the doctrine (unscientific is foolish and absurd in philosophy).
2- Its ethical (social) implications. (formally heretical).
However, the judgement of the experts of the church was scientifically correct and had the right social
intention, which was protecting people from the machinations of specialists. It wanted to protect people
from being corrupted by a narrow ideology that might work in restricted domains but was incapable of
sustaining a harmonious life.
In history (as now) knowledge was subdivided into specialties. An expert in one field rarely was an expert
in another distant field. Astronomy, physics, cosmology, theology, mathematics, biology, psychology,
optics all worked together or related in a manner. A river may be subdivided by national boundaries, but
this does not make it a discontinuous entity.

15. Contemporary empiricism and criticism on Feyerabend’s argument’s historical

background:
Contemporary empiricism has some features:
1- Distinctions between a context of discovery and context of justification, norms and facts,
observational terms, and theoretical terms.
 2- Popper’s critical rationalism.
3- The problem of incommensurability which leads to the problem of rationality and order vs.
anarchism.
Feyerabend thought that discovery may be irrational and need not follow any recognized method. He
pursued his opinion through historical examples. Critics thought that Justification or criticism starts only
after the discovery has been made and it proceed in an orderly way. He then answers that there is a very
noticeable difference between the rules of testing as reconstructed by philosophers of science and the
procedures which scientists use in actual research. A most superficial examinations shows that a determined
application of the methods of criticism and proof which are said to belong to the context of justification
would wipe out science as we know it and would never have permitted it to arise. Consequently, the fact
that science exists proves that these methods were overruled. They were overruled by procedures which
belong to the context of discovery. And process can be made only if the distinction between the ought and
the is, is regarded as a temporary device rather than as a fundamental boundary line.
The distinction between observational terms and theoretical terms is admitted being not as sharp as it was
thought to be. Learning involves both observation and theory. And observation (experience) comes along
with theoretical assumptions. No one comes before the other.

16. Popperian method and rules (critical empiricism):

There are some rules of critical rationalists (Popperians):
1- develop your ideas so that they can be criticized.
2- attack them relentlessly.
3- Do not try to protect them.
4- Exhibit their weak spots.
5- Eliminate them as soon as such weak spots have become manifest.
A science that accepts the rules of critical empiricism will develop as follows:
1- We start with a problem (theoretical result and not a result of curiosity which is a conflict between
observation and expectation).
2- The elements of the problem are not simply given.
3- One tries to solve the problem by invention a relevant falsifiable but not yet falsified theory.
4- Next comes the criticism of the theory.
5- Successful criticism removes the theory and creates a new problem.
6- To solve the new problem, we need a new theory that reproduces the successful consequences of
the older, denies its mistakes and makes additional predictions not made before.
7- More and more facts are discovered.
Feyerabend thought that every step that protects a view from criticism, that makes it safe or well-founded
is a step away from rationality. Also, the actual development of institutions, ideas, practices should start
often from extraneous activities – which is called naïve falsification by Lakatos call – rather than problems,
or else, science as we know it would be wiped out.

17. Feyerabend’s method for developing a theory:

Trying to develop a new theory, we must:
1- Take a step back from the evidence and reconsider the problem of observation.
2- Extending the theory to other domains.
 3- The slowly emerging conceptual apparatus of the theory soon start defining its own problems.
Where scientists pay attention to preceding theories, they try to accommodate their factual core in the
manner with the help of ad hoc hypotheses and approximations, redefinition of terms.
The principles of critical rationalism and logical empiricism give on inadequate account of the past
development of science as a whole and are liable to hinder it in the future. Science is sloppier, and more
irrational than its methodological image. And deviations and errors are preconditions of progress. He states
that, “Without chaos, there is no knowledge. Without a frequent dismissal of reason, there is no progress.”

18. Visiting history – the Greek archaic period:

The archaic world is less compact than our world. Archaic man lacks physical unity and mental unity. And
events are not shaped by the individual. Knowledge is not obtained by trying to grasp an essence behind
the reports of the senses, but by:
1- Putting the observer in the right position relative to the objects.
2- Adding up the elements which are noted under their circumstances.
Knowledge is a result of a complex survey carried out from a suitable vantage point. And there is no uniform
conception of knowledge. In the archaic world there are a lot of words that express knowledge like:
expertise in a certain knowledge – having seen – listening/understanding, etc.
Modes of representation in the early archaic period in Greece give a faithful account of what are thought to
be fundamental features of the world of archaic man, what could be felt and what could be seen. They are
reflections of incompetence and special artistic interests. Their world was an open world and its elements
coalesce to form assemblages. The relation of a single element to the assemblage to which it belongs is like
the relation of a part to an aggregate of parts rather than the relation of a part to an overpowering whole.
The aggregate called man is visited and inhabited by mental events. Such events may reside in him or enter
from the outside. The archaic cosmology contains things, events, their parts. It does not contain appearances
and knowledge of an object is complete by enumeration of its parts.
A new cosmology that arises in the 7th to 5th centuries BC distinguishes between much-knowing, and true
knowledge. And it warns against trusting custom born of manifold experience. In one version which played
a large role in the development of Western civilization and which underlies such problems as the problem
of the existence of theoretical entities and the problem of alienation the new events form what one might
call a True World, while the events of everyday life are now appearances that are but its dim and misleading
reflection.
The True World is simple and coherent, and it can be described in a uniform way. So can every act by
which its elements are comprehended. From now on there is only one important type of information, and
that is: knowledge. The simplicity of the true world has consequences like chaos of appearances. And the
freeing from firm, rules, well-determined is the same step back that is needed for change. It discards
rationality standards and observations. In this sense, we have a point of view, its elements are built up in
accordance with certain principles of construction. There are things that cannot be discovered without
violating the principles.

19. Disagreement with logicians of science:

While examining key ideas, a researcher must have firm control over his urge for instant clarity and
perfection of logic. Logicians are liable to object. They point out that an examination of meanings and of
the relation between terms is the task of logic, not of anthropology. And 'Logic' may mean the study of, or
results of the study of, the structures inherent in a certain type of discourse. And it may mean a logical
system or set of systems.
Logicians of science demand that the main terms of the discussion be clarified, they are both unwilling and
unable to carry out an informal discussion. And to clarify the terms of a discussion means to fill them with
existing notions from the entirely different domain of logic and common sense, preferably observational
ideas, until they sound common themselves, and to take care that the process of filling obeys the accepted
laws of logic.
Feyerabend thinks that arguments, theories, terms, points of view and debates can therefore be clarified in
at least two different ways:
1- Treating the new as a special case of things already understood.
2- Incorporation into a language of the future, which means that one must learn to argue with
unexplained terms and to use sentences for which no clear rules of usage are yet available.
He also believes that science is full of lacunae and contradictions. That ignorance, pigheadedness, reliance
on prejudice, lying, far from impeding the forward march of knowledge may actually aid it and that the
traditional virtues of precision, consistency, 'honesty', respect for facts, and maximum knowledge may bring
it to a standstill. In his opinion, logical principles not only play a much smaller role in the moves that
advance science, but also, the attempt to enforce them would seriously impede science.

20. Observers’ questions vs. participants’ questions:

Feyerabend thought that science and rationalism are not measures of excellence. Rather, they are traditions
whose historical grounding is not known. Reason does not sacrosanct and modern science arose from global
objections against earlier views and rationalism itself. Also, the ideas that there are general rules and
standards for conducting our affairs arose from global objections to common sense. He thinks that science
come from having a practice, having certain influences upon it, emerging from another practice or tradition,
and then observing a change.
Considering any interaction of traditions, we may ask two kinds of questions:
1- Observer questions
The observer asks what happens and what is going to happen. An observer wants to describe a life
he does not lead

2- Participant questions.
The participant asks what shall I do? Shall I support the interaction? Shall I oppose it? Or shall I
simply forget about it? A participant wants to arrange his own life. Participants can be opportunists
and act in a straightforward and practical way. A participant with a pragmatic philosophy views
practices and traditions as a traveler views a foreign country.
Stating demand and describing a practice may be two different things and that logical connection cannot be
established between them. And the relation between reason and practice has three views:
1- Reason guides practice (idealistic version).
An idealist does not only want to act rationally, he also wants his rational actions to have results.
And he wants the results to occur in the real world he inhabits. According to idealism it is rational
to kill the enemies of the faith, to avoid ad hoc hypotheses, to despise the desires of the body, to
remove inconsistencies, to support progressive research programs and so on. Rationality justice,
 the Divine Law are universal, independent of mood, context, historical circumstances and give rise
to equally universal rules and standards.
2- Reason receives its content and authority from practice (naturalism version).
Basing standards on a practice and leaving it may forever perpetuate the shortcomings of this
practice because reason and practice are not two different entities but parts of a single dialectical
process. Reason without guidance of a practice will lead us astray while practice is vastly improved
by the addition of reason. Therefore, reason and practice are two different types of practice, the
difference being that the one clearly exhibits some simple and easily producible formal aspects
while the other drowns the formal aspects under a great variety of accidental properties. According
to naturalism, rules and standards are obtained by an analysis of traditions. Philosophers of science
will of course opt for science as their basic tradition. But science is not one tradition, it is many,
and so it gives rise to many incompatible standards. Thus, the problem the development of one
tradition under the impact of others.
3- Naïve Anarchism version.
Neither science nor rationality are universal. The limitation of all rules and standards is recognized
by naive anarchism. A naive anarchist says that both absolute rules and context-dependent rules
have their limits and infers, and that all rules and standards are worthless and should be given up.
Feyerabend argued that all rules have their limits and that there is no comprehensive 'rationality',
he did not argue that we should proceed without rules and standards. This position adopts some
elements of naturalism, but it rejects the naturalist philosophy. Rationality is a tradition:
Traditions are neither good nor bad, they simply are. And rationality is not an arbiter of traditions; it is itself
a tradition or an aspect of a tradition. It is therefore neither good nor bad, it simply is. A tradition assumes
desirable or undesirable properties only when compared with some tradition and the subjectivity is noticed
as soon as participants realize that different traditions give rise to different judgements.
For example, Protagorean relativism is reasonable because it pays attention to the pluralism of traditions
and values. And it is civilized for it does not assume that one's own village and the strange customs it
contains are the navel of the world. Every tradition has special ways of gaining followers. And argument is
propaganda for one observer, and the essence of human discourse for another.
There are therefore at least two different ways of deciding an issue:
1- A guided exchange
In this case some or all participants adopt a well-specified tradition and accept only those responses
that correspond to its standards. Here, education is separated from decisive debates, it occurs at an
early stage and guarantees that the grown-ups will behave properly. A rational debate is a special
case of a guided exchange. A rational exchange promises respect only within the framework of a
rational debate.
2- An open exchange
An open exchange is guided by a pragmatic philosophy. The tradition adopted by the parties is
unspecified in the beginning and develops as the exchange proceeds. The participants get immersed
into each other's ways of thinking, feeling, perceiving to such an extent that their ideas, perceptions,
worldviews may be entirely changed. An open exchange respects the partner whether he is an
individual or an entire culture, there is no logic though new forms of logic may emerge in its course.

21. Traditions and free societies:

A society is considered free if all traditions are given positions of power like equal rights and equal access
to education. Choosing a tradition as a basis of a free society seems an arbitrary act when some traditions
have advantage only from the point of view of other traditions. So, a free society must not be based on any
creed like rationalism or humanitarian considerations. When people engage in an open exchange and
introduce protective alluded to structures, a free society will emerge rather than being imposed. In this
sense, rationalism is not necessary in the basic structure of a free society which insists on the separation of
science and society.

22. Summing up and answering questions about science:

Chapter 19 answers the following questions: what is science? How do scientists proceed, how do their
standards differ from the standards of the enterprises, etc.
Feyerabend’s answers what science is as follows: there is no single word that corresponds to the word
science because the wide divergence of historical periods, schools, individuals leads to difficulty in
identifying principles of method or fact that could be comprehensive. “Is it not really strange”, asks
Einstein, “that human beings are normally deaf to the strongest argument while they are always inclined
to overestimate measuring accuracies?”
Scientists do not always proceed in a methodical way, try to avoid accidents nor focus on observation and
experiment. Some of them propose theories which have little or no connection with reality. So, it could be
said that the rules of method are not obeyed at all by scientists in many cases and that scientific knowledge
is not peculiarly positive nor free from differences of opinion. Also, methods which are not used as a matter
of habit without thinking about the reasons of using them are often tied metaphysical beliefs. But different
worldviews require different procedures. So, a single coherent worldview which underlies all of science
could be a metaphysical hypothesis anticipating unity or a pedagogical fake. From a variety of scientific
viewpoints, there are different maps of reality.
While metaphysicians and educators want the world to be tidy, and the same everywhere, the world tends
to strenuously resist unification. Science is said to be complex but rational. Now if the word rational
describes a general feature found in every single scientific action, then Feyerabend rejects that science is
rational. But if it means a collecting bag for a variety of procedures then he would agree. That is because
the first meaning excludes arts and large sections of the sciences. Science is delimited by lists.
Popularity is a measure of greatness. If there is familiarity with some results and belief that they are
important then science becomes popular. The public may think that the achievements they read about and
the threats they perceive come from a single source and are produced by a uniform procedure.
Science sometimes work and sometimes does not. Sometimes science could change a disaster into triumph
if not tied to a particular method or worldview. And an approach does not guarantee success just because it
is thought to be scientific according to some clearly formulated criterion. And so, each case should be
judged separately. Especially in today’s world where there are competitions to win the Nobel Prize, uneven
distribution of funds, national rivalries, fear of accusations. All these issues restrict dreamers and
philosopher among them from achieving a ‘free intellectual adventure’.