Valmonte vs.

de Villa [GR 83988, 24 May car subjected to search/check-up without a

1990] court order or search warrant. They further
contend that the said checkpoints give Gen.
En Banc, Padilla (J): 10 concur, 1 on leave
Renato de Villa and the National Capital
Region District Command a blanket
Facts: On 20 January 1987, the National
authority to make searches and/or seizures
Capital Region District Command (NCRDC)
without search warrant or court order in
was activated pursuant to Letter of
violation of the Constitution. In the Supreme
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General
Court's decision dated 29 September 1989,
Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of
Valmonte’s and ULAP’s petition for
conducting security operations within its
prohibition, seeking the declaration of the
area of responsibility and peripheral areas,
checkpoints as unconstitutional and their
for the purpose of establishing an effective
dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed.
territorial defense, maintaining peace and
Valmonte and ULAP filed the motion and
order, and providing an atmosphere
supplemental motion for reconsideration of
conducive to the Constitutional Law II, 2005
said decision.
( 85 )Narratives (Berne Guerrero) social,
economic and political development of the
Issue: Whether checkpoints serve as a
National Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty
blanket authority for government officials for
to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC
warrantless search and seizure and, thus,
installed checkpoints in various parts of
are violative of the Constitution.
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Ricardo C.
Valmonte and the Union of Lawyers and
Held: Nowhere in the Supreme Court's
Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) filed a
decision of 24 May 1990 did the Court
petition for prohibition with preliminary
legalize all checkpoints, i.e. at all times and
injunction and/or temporary restraining
under all circumstances. What the Court
order witht the Supreme Court, seeking the
declared is, that checkpoints are not illegal
declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela,
per se. Thus, under exceptional
Metro Manila or elsewhere, as
circumstances, as where the survival of
unconstitutional and the dismantling
organized government is on the balance, or
and banning of the same or, in the
where the lives and safety of the people are
alternative, to direct the respondents to
in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed
formulate guidelines in the implementation
and installed by the government. Implicit in
of checkpoints, for the protection of the
this proposition is, that when the situation
people. They aver that, because of the
clears and such grave perils are removed,
installation of said checkpoints, the
checkpoints will have absolutely no reason
residents of Valenzuela are worried of being
to remain. Recent and on-going events
harassed and of their safety being placed at
have pointed to the continuing validity and
the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
need for checkpoints manned by either
disposition of the military manning the
military or police forces. Although no one
checkpoints, considering that their cars and
can be compelled, under our libertarian
vehicles are being subjected to regular
system, to share with the present
searches and check-ups, especially at night
government its ideological beliefs and
or at dawn, without the benefit of a search
practices, or commend its political, social
warrant and/or court order. Their alleged
and economic policies or performance; one
fear for their safety increased when, at
must concede to it the basic right to defend
dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a
itself from its enemies and, while in power,
supply officer of the Municipality of
to pursue its program of government
Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down
intended for public welfare; and in the
allegedly in cold blood by the members of
pursuit of those objectives, the government
the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along
has the equal right, under its police power,
McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela,
to select the reasonable means and
for ignoring and/or refusing to submit
methods for best achieving them. The
himself to the checkpoint and for continuing
checkpoint is evidently one of such means it
to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in
has selected. Admittedly, the routine
the air. Valmonte also claims that, on
checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain
several occasions, he had gone thru these
extent, on motorist's right to "free passage
checkpoints where he was stopped and his
without interruption", but it cannot be denied
that, as a rule, it
involves only a brief detention of travellers
during which the vehicle's occupants are
required to answer a brief question or two.
For as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a
body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said
routine checks cannot be regarded as
violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search. These routine
checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are
even less intrusive. Further, vehicles are
generally allowed to pass these checkpoints
after a routine inspection and a few
questions. If vehicles are stopped and
extensively searched, it is because of some
probable cause which justifies a reasonable
belief of the men at the checkpoints that
either the motorist is a law-offender or the
contents of the vehicle are or have been
instruments of some offense. By the same
token, a warrantless search of incoming and
outgoing passengers, at the arrival and
departure areas of an international airport,
is a practice not constitutionally
objectionable because it is founded on
public interest,safety, and necessity. Lastly,
the Court's decision on checkpoints does
not, in any way, validate nor condone
abuses committed by the military manning
the checkpoints. The Court's decision was
concerned with power, i.e. whether the
government employing the military has the
power to install said checkpoints. Once that
power is acknowledged, the Court's inquiry
ceases. True, power implies the possibility
of its abuse. But whether there is abuse in a
particular situation is a different "ball game"
to be resolved in the constitutional arena. In
any situation, where abuse marks the
operation of a checkpoint, the citizen is not
helpless. For the military is not above but
subject to the law. And the courts exist to
see that the law is supreme. Soldiers,
including those who man checkpoints, who
abuse their authority act beyond the scope
of their authority and are, therefore, liable
criminally and civilly for their abusive acts.
Aniag v. Comelec, 237 SCRA 424
Facts: In preparation for the synchronized
national and local elections, the COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 2323, “Gun Ban”,
promulgating rules and regulations on
bearing, carrying and transporting of firearm
or other deadly weapons
on security personnel or bodyguards, on
bearing arms by members
of security agencies or police organizations,
and organization or maintenance of reaction
forces during the election period.
COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327
providing for the summary disqualification of
candidates engaged in gunrunning, using
and transporting of firearms, organizing
special strike forces, and establishing
spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the “Gun
Ban”, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at
Arms of the House of Representatives,
wrote petitioner for the return of the two
firearms issued to him by the House of
Representatives. Petitioner then instructed
his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms
from petitioner’s house and return them to
Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint.
When the car driven by Arellano
approached the checkpoint, the PNP
searched the car and found the firearms.
Arellano was apprehended and detained.
He then explained the order of petitioner.
Petitioner also explained that Arellano was
only complying with the firearms ban, and
that he was not asecurity officer or a
bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued
Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of
information against petitioner and Arellano
for violation of the Omnibus Election Code,
and for petitioner to show cause why he
should not be disqualified from running for
an elective position. Petitioner then
questions the constitutionality of Resolution
No. 2327. Heargues that “gunrunning, using
or transporting firearms or similar weapons”
and other acts mentioned in the resolution
are not within the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code. Thus, according to
petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is
unconstitutional. The issue on
the disqualificationof petitioner from running
in the elections was rendered moot when he
lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the
elections.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner can be
validly prosecuted for instructing his driver
to return the firearms issued to him on the
basis of the evidence gathered from the
warrant less search of his car
Held: A valid search must be authorized by
a search warrant issued by an appropriate
authority. However, a warrantless search is
not violative of the Constitution for as long
as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and
the inspection of the vehicle is merely
limited to a visual search. In the case at bar,
the guns were not tucked in Arellano’s waist
nor placed within his reach, as they were
neatly packed in gun cases and placed
inside a bag at the back of the car. Given
these circumstances, the PNP could not
have thoroughly searched the car lawfully
as well as the package without violating the
constitutional injunction. Absent any
justifying circumstance specifically pointing
to the culpability of petitioner and
Arellano, the search could not have been
valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained
from the warrantless search cannot be
admitted for any purpose in any proceeding.
It was also shown in the facts that the PNP
had not informed the public of the purpose
of setting up the checkpoint. Petitioner was
also not among those charged by the PNP
with violation of the Omnibus Election Code.
He was not informed by the City Prosecutor
that he was a respondent in the preliminary
investigation. Such constituted a violation of
his right to due process. Hence, it cannot be
contended that petitioner was fully given the
opportunity to meet theaccusation against
him as he was not informed that he was
himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the
warrantless search conducted by the PNP is
declared illegal and the firearms seized
during the search cannot be used as
evidence in any proceeding against the
petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is
unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.
People vs. Escano, Usana and Lopez
[GR 129756-58, 28 January 2000]
First Division, Davide Jr. (CJ): 4 concur
Facts: On 5 April 1995 and during a
COMELEC gun ban, some law enforcers of
the Makati Police, namely, PO3 Eduardo P.
Suba, PO3 Bernabe Nonato, SPO4 Juan de
los Santos, and Inspector Ernesto Guico,
were manning a checkpoint at the corner of
Senator Gil Puyat Ave. and the South Luzon
Expressway (SLEX). They were checking
the cars going to Pasay City, stopping those
they found suspicious, and imposing merely
a running stop on the others. At about past
midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride car with
Plate TBH 493. P03 Suba saw a long
firearm on the lap of the person seated at
the passenger seat, who was later identified
as Virgilio Usana. They asked the driver,
identified as Julian D. Escaño, to open the
door. P03 Suba seized the long firearm, an
M-1 US Carbine, from Usana. When
Escaño, upon order of the police, parked
along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., the other
passengers were searched for more
weapons. Their search yielded a .45 caliber
firearm which they seized from Escaño. The
three passengers were thereafter brought to
the police station Block 5 in the Kia Pride
driven by PO3 Nonato. Upon reaching the
precinct, Nonato turned over the key to the
desk officer. Since SPO4 de los Santos was
suspicious of the vehicle, he requested
Escaño to open the trunk. Escaño readily
agreed and opened the trunk himself using
his key. They noticed a blue bag inside it,
which they asked Escaño to open. The bag
contained a parcel wrapped in tape, which,
upon examination by National Bureau of
Investigation Forensic Chemist Emilia A.
Rosaldos, was found positive for hashish
weighing 3.3143 kilograms. Virgilio T.
Usana and Jerry C. Lopez, together with
Julian D. Escaño, were charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
64, in Criminal Case 95-936 with violation of
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, as
amended. Escaño and Usana were also
charged in Criminal Cases 95-937 and 95-
938 with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition in violation of Presidential
Decree 1866. The cases were consolidated
and jointly tried. In its Decision of 30 May
1997, which was promulgated on 17 June
1997, the trial court convicted Escaño,
Lopez and Usana in Criminal Case 95-936,
Escaño in Criminal Case 95-937, and
Usana in Criminal Case 95-938. Escaño
filed on 19 June 1997 a Notice of Appeal,
but on 16 July 1997, he filed a Manifestation
and Withdrawal of Appeal, which was
granted by the trial court in its Order of 17
July 1997. Usana and Lopez filed a Notice
of Appeal on 30 June 1997, manifesting
therein that they were appealing to the
Supreme Court and to the Court of Appeals.
Considering the penalties imposed, the
decision in Criminal Case 95-936 was
appealed to the Supreme Court, while the
Court of Appeals took cognizance of the
appeal from Criminal Case 95-938. In its
Order of 30 June 1997, the trial court gave
due course to the appeal and ordered the
transmittal of the record in Criminal Case
95-936 to the Supreme Court and the
record of Criminal Case 95-938 to the Court
of Appeals. Accordingly, it is only the appeal
from the judgment in Criminal Case 95-936
that is before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the search conducted on
Escano’s car is illegal, and whether the
evidence acquired therein would be
sufficient to convict Lopez and Usana for
possession of illegal drugs.
Held: The Court has ruled that not all
checkpoints are illegal. Those which are
warranted by the exigencies of public order
and are conducted in a way least intrusive
to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly,
routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain
extent, on motorists' right to "free passage
without interruption," but it cannot be denied
that, as a rule, it involves only a brief
detention of travelers during which the
vehicle's occupants are required to answer
a brief question or two. For as long as the
vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and
the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a
visual search, said routine checks cannot be
regarded as violative of an individual's right
against unreasonable search. In fact,
these routine checks, when conducted in a
fixed area, are even less intrusive. The
checkpoint herein conducted was in
pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the
COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard
put to implement the ban if its deputized
agents were limited to a visual search of
pedestrians. It would also defeat the
purpose for which such ban was instituted.
Those who intend to bring a gun during said
period would know that they only need a car
to be able to easily perpetrate their
malicious designs. The facts adduced do
not constitute a ground for a violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused against
illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba
admitted that they were merely stopping
cars they deemed suspicious, such as those
whose windows are heavily tinted just to
see if the passengers thereof were carrying
guns. At best they would merely
direct their flashlights inside the cars they
would stop, without opening the car's doors
or subjecting its passengers to a body
search. There is nothing discriminatory in
this as this is what the situation demands.
Despite the validity of the search, the Court
cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and
Lopez for violation of RA 6425, as
amended. The following facts militate
against a finding of conviction: (1) the car
belonged to Escaño; (2) the trunk of the car
was not opened soon after it was stopped
and after the accused were searched for
firearms; (3) the car was driven by a
policeman from the place where it was
stopped until the police station; (4) the car's
trunk was opened, with the permission of
Escaño, without the presence of Usana and
Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the police
station and until the opening of the car's
trunk, the car was in the possession and
control of the police authorities. No fact was
adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the
hashish found in the trunk of the car. Their
having been with Escaño in the latter's car
before the "finding" of the hashish sometime
after the lapse of an appreciable time and
without their presence left much to be
desired to implicate them to the offense of
selling, distributing, or transporting the
prohibited drug. In fact, there was no
showing that Usana and Lopez knew of the
presence of hashish in the trunk of the car
or that they saw the same before it was
seized.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO, et al. 420
SCRA 280 (2004)
On the night of April 10, 1995, as about
fifteen police officers were manning
a checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City pursuant
to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735,
otherwise known as the COMELEC gun
ban, a motorcycle with three men
on board namely appellant Victor Vinecario
(Vinecario), Arnold Roble (Roble) Gerlyn
Wates (Wates) sped past of the police
officers. When they were ordered to return
to the checkpoint, a police officer asked
what the backpack contains which the
appellants answered that it was only a mat.
The police officers suspected that it was a
bomb and when appellant opened the bag it
turns out that its contents were marijuana.
The three were then brought to the police
station and later to Camp Catitipan and
there they were investigated by police
officials without the assistance of counsel,
following which they were made to sign
some documents which they were not
allowed to read. The Regional Trial Court
rendered them guilty for transporting,
possessing and delivering prohibited drugs
under Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659), and imposing
upon them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search upon the
appellants and the seizure of the alleged
1,700 grams of marijuana violated there
constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure.
HELD:
Although the general rule is that motorists
and their vehicles as well as pedestrians
passing through checkpoints may only be
subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles
may be stopped and extensively searched
when there is probable cause which justifies
a reasonable belief of the men at
the checkpoints that either the motorist is a
law offender or the contents of the vehicle
are or have been instruments of some
offense. Warrantless search of the personal
effects of an accused has been declared by
the Court as valid, because of existence of
probable cause, where the smell of
marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused, or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, and
attempted to flee. In light then of Vinecario
et al.‘s speeding away after noticing
the checkpoint and even after having been
flagged down by police officers, their
suspicious and nervous gestures when
interrogated on the contents of
the backpack which they passed to one
another, and the reply of Vinecario, when
asked why he and his co-appellants sped
away from the checkpoint, that he was a
member of the Philippine Army, apparently
in an attempt to dissuade the policemen
from proceeding with their inspection, there
existed probable cause to justify a
reasonable belief on the part of the law
enforcers that appellants were offenders of
the law or that the contents of
the backpack were instruments of some
offense.
G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL,
et al. vs. FIDEL V. RAMOS.
FACTS:
The Intelligence Operations Unit of the
Capital Command received confidential
information about a member of the NPA
Sparrow Unit being treated for a gunshot
wound at the St. Agnes Hospital, QC. Upon
verification, it was found that the wounded
person, is actually Rolando Dural, a
member of the NPA liquidation squad, who
was positively identified as one who is
responsible for the killing of two (2) soldiers.
Dural was transferred to the Regional
Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for
security reasons.
As a consequence of this positive
identification, Rolando Dural was referred to
the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an
inquest and thereafter filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an
information charging Rolando Dural alias
Ronnie Javelon with the crime of "Double
Murder with Assault Upon Agents of
Persons in Authority."
A petition for habeas corpus was filed with
the Court on behalf of Roberto Umil,
Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva,
which was subsequently approved by the
former. However, Roberto Umil and Renato
Villanueva posted bail before the RTC of
Pasay City where charges for violation of
the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed
against them, and they were accordingly
released. The petition for habeas corpus,
insofar as Umil and Villanueva are
concerned, is now moot and academic and
is accordingly dismissed.
PETITIONER:
Asserts that his detention is unlawful as
their arrests were made without warrant
and, that no preliminary investigation was
first conducted, so that the information filed
against them are null and void. It clearly
appears that he was not arrested while in
the act of shooting the two soldiers nor was
he arrested just after the commission of the
said offense Seemingly, his arrest without
warrant is unjustified.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest, detention, and
denial of petition to habeas corpus of the
petitioner amounts to deprivation of his
constitutional right to liberty, and hence null
and void.
RULING:
NO,
An arrest without a warrant under Section 5
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, is justified
when the person arrested is caught in
flagranti delicto (“in the act of committing an
offense”) or when an offense has just been
committed and the person making the arrest
has personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person arrested has
committed it.
The record of the instant cases would show
that the persons in whose behalf these
petitions for habeas corpus have been filed,
had freshly committed or were actually
committing an offense, when apprehended,
so that their arrests without a warrant were
clearly justified, and that they are, further,
detained by virtue of valid information filed
against them in court.
Further, dural was arrested for being a
member of the NPA, an outlawed
subversive organization. Subversion being a
continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando
Dural without warrant is justified as it can be
said that he was committing an offense
when arrested. The crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith constitute direct
assaults against the State and are in the
nature of continuing crimes.
The arrest, therefore, need not follow the
usual procedure in the prosecution of
offenses which requires the determination
by a judge of the existence of probable
cause before the issuance of a judicial
warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if
the offense is bailable. Obviously, the
absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing
persons committing overt acts of violence
against government forces, or any other
milder acts but equally in pursuance of the
rebellious movement.
People vs Dela Cruz 571 SCRA 469
Facts:
On November 15, 2002, charges against
accused-appellant were made before the
RTC for Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition and Possession of Dangerous
Drug. The RTC acquitted accused-appellant
of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition but convicted him of possession
of dangerous drugs. On December 7, 2005,
accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal
of the RTC Decision claiming that: (1) the
version of the prosecution should not have
been given full credence; (2) the
prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that he was guilty of
possession of an illegal drug; (3) his arrest
was patently illegal; and (4) the prosecution
failed to establish the chain of custody of
the illegal drug allegedly in his possession.
The CA sustained accused-appellant’s
conviction. It pointed out that
accusedappellant was positively identified
by prosecution witnesses, rendering his
uncorroborated denial and allegation of
frame-up weak. As to accused-appellant’s
alleged illegal arrest, the CA held that he is
deemed to have waived his objection when
he entered his plea, applied for bail, and
actively participated in the trial without
questioning such arrest. Accused-appellant
claims that the presence of all the elements
of the offense of possession of dangerous
drug was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt since both actual
and constructive possessions were not
proved. He asserts that the shabu was not
found in his actual possession, for which
reason the prosecution was required to
establish that he had constructive
possession over the shabu. He maintains
that as he had no control and dominion over
the drug or over the place where it was
found, the prosecution likewise failed to
prove constructive possession.
Issue: Whether or not the court a quo
gravely erred in finding the accused-
appellant guilty of violation of section 11,
Article II, RA 9165 despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove the commission of the
offense charged beyond reasonable doubt?
Ruling: The SC acquitted accused-
appellant of violation of sec. 11(2) of RA
9165. The prosecution in this case clearly
failed to show all the elements of the crime
absent a showing of either actual or
constructive possession by the accused-
appellant.
The elements in illegal possession of
dangerous drug are: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3)
the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug. On the third
element, the court have held that the
possession must be with knowledge of the
accused or that animus possidendi existed
with the possession or control of said
articles.
In the instant case, there is no question that
accused-appellant was not the owner of the
nipa hut that was subject of the buy-bust
operation. He did not have dominion or
control over the nipa hut. Neither was
accused appellant a tenant or occupant of
the nipa hut, a fact not disputed by the
prosecution. The target of the operation was
Boy Bicol. Accusedappellant was merely a
guest of Boy Bicol. Since accused-appellant
was not in possession of the illegal drugs in
Boy Bicol’s nipa hut, his subsequent arrest
was also invalid. The warrantless arrest of
accused-appellant was effected under Sec.
5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to
be valid, two requisites must concur:
 (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer. The
prosecution was not able to adequately
prove that accused-appellant was
committing an offense. Although accused-
appellant merely denied possessing the
firearm, the prosecution’s charge was weak
absent the presentation of the alleged
firearm. His arrest, independent of the buy-
bust operation targeting Boy Bicol, was
therefore not lawful as he was not proved to
be committing any offense.
PEOPLE V. SUCRO 195 SCRA 388
FACTS:
l Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo,
Aklan, was instructed by their Station
Commander to monitor the activities of
appellant Edison Sucro, because of
information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro
was selling marijuana
l As planned Roy Fulgencio monitored the
activities of the accused under the house of
Regalado and near the chapel where the
accused was selling marijuana to a group of
persons around 5 pm.
l Pat reported this to their station commander
and instructed him to continue his
monitoring.
l At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called
up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later
Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was
transacting with appellant.
l At that point, after Macabante bought from the
accused, they pursue Macabante and told
them he bought it from herein accused-
appellant.
l The police team was able to overtake and
arrest appellant at the corner of C. Quimpo
and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19
sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the
cart inside the chapel and another teabag
from Macabante,
l Accused appealed that the marijuana teabags
were seized without serving upon him a
search warrant.
l The accused-appellant contends that his arrest
was illegal, is a violation of his rights
granted under Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution.
l He stresses that there was sufficient time for
the police officers to apply for a search and
arrest warrants considering that Fulgencio
informed his Station Commander of the
activities of the accused two days before
March 21, 1989, the date of his arrest.
ISSUE:
WON the arrest without warrant of the
accused is lawful and consequently
WON the evidence resulting from such
arrest is admissible.
HELD:
YES. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides for the
instances where an arrest without warrant is
considered lawful. The rule states:
Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A
peace officer or private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; (Emphasis
supplied)
An offense is committed in the presence or
within the view of an officer, within the
meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest
without a warrant, when the officer sees the
offense, although at a distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby and proceeds
at once to the scene thereof.
From the records of the case, Fulgencio
saw Sucro three times dealing drugs inside
the chapel where he is 2 meters away
monitoring his nefarious activities then after
the 3rd deal, the police intercepted the buyer
Macabante and when confronted by the
police, Macabante readily admitted that he
bought the marijuana from Sucro.
Therefore, Sucro had just committed an
illegal act of which the police officers had
personal knowledge, being members of the
team which monitored accused-appellants
nefarious activity.
The accused questions the failure of the
police officers to secure a warrant
considering that Fulgencio himself knew of
Sucro's activities even prior to the former's
joining the police force. Fulgencio reported
Sucro's activities only three days before the
incident.
As the records reveal, Fulgencio and Sucro
had known each other since their childhood
years and that after Fulgencio joined the
police force, he told the accused-appellant
not to sell drugs in their locality. Hence, it is
possible that because of this friendship,
Fulgencio hesitated to report his childhood
friend and merely advised him not to
engage in such activity. However, because
of reliable information was given by some
informants that selling was going on every
day, he was constrained to report the matter
to the Station Commander.
On the other hand, the failure of the police
officers to secure a warrant stems from the
fact that their knowledge acquired from the
surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the
requirements for the issuance of a search
warrant. What is paramount is that probable
cause existed.
The general rule is that searches and
seizures must be supported by a valid
warrant is not an absolute rule... Among the
exceptions granted by law is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12,
Rule 126 of the RCP which provides that a
person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of
an offense, without a search warrant.
Since the arrest was considered valid, the
evidence presented is admissible in
evidence.
Hence, this Court is convinced that
appellant Edison Sucro had indeed
committed the offense charged. The trial
court's decision must be upheld.
PEOPLE VS MENGOTE Y TEJAS
People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio
Mengote y. TejasG.R. No. 8759, June 22,
1992
Facts:
            a telephone call was by Western
Police district that here were three
suspicious-looking persons at the corner of
Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in
Tondo Manila. A surveillanve team of
plainclothesmen was dispatch to the place.
They saw two men “looking from side to
side” one of whom is holding his abdomen.
They approached these persons and
identified themselves as policemen,
whereupon the two tried to run away but
were unable to escape because the other
lawmen had surrounded them. The
suspects were then searched. One of them,
who turned out to be the accused was found
with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson
revolver with six live bullets in the chamber.
His companion had a fan knife. The
weapons were taken from them.
Issue:
            Whether or not the accused
constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure is violated
Ruling:
            The Supreme court held that par(a)
section 5 Rule 113 of rules of court requires
that a person be arrested 1 After he has
committed or while he is actually committing
or is at least attempting to commit an
offense 2 In the presence of the arresting
officer.
            These requirements have not been
established in the case at bar at bar. At the
time of the arrest in question, the accused
was merely “looking from side to side” and
“holding his abdomen”. There was
apparently no offense that has just been
committed or was being actually committed
or at least being attempted by Mengote in
their presence.
            Par. B. is no less applicable
because it’s no less stringent requirements
have not been satisfied. The prosecution
has not shown that at the time of arrest an
offense had in fact just been committed and
that the arresting officer had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote
had committed it. All they had was hearsay
information from the telephone caller, and
about a crime that had yet to be committed.
– ACQUITTED
People v. Luisito Go 406 Phil. 804
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 22, 1992, at around 10:00
o'clock in the evening, SPO1 Mauro
Piamonte and SPO3 Candido Liquido,
members of the Intelligence and Follow-up
Unit of the Calamba Police, went to the
police outpost at Crossing, Calamba,
Laguna, to follow up an intelligence report
that methamphetamine hydrochloride, or
shabu, a regulated drug, was being supplied
there. Police civilian agent Ronnie
Panuringan arrived and reported to them
that he saw accused-appellant Luisito Go,
also known as "King Louie", enter the
Flamingo Disco House with two women.
Panuringan said that he spotted a gun
tucked in accused-appellant's waist.
Together, the three policemen proceeded to
the Flamingo, which was located about a
hundred meters away from the outpost.
When they arrived at the Flamingo, the
police officers informed the owner that they
were conducting an "Operation Bakal,"
whereby they search for illegally possessed
firearms. The owner allowed them in and
told a waiter to accompany them. They went
up to the second floor of the disco. The
waiter turned on the lights, and the police
officers saw accused-appellant and his lady
companions seated at a table. They
identified themselves and asked accused-
appellant to stand up. When the latter did
so, the policemen saw the gun tucked in his
waist. SPO1 Piamonte asked for the license
of the gun, but accused-appellant was
unable to produce any. Instead, accused-
appellant brought out the driver's license of
a certain Tan Antonio Lerios. SPO1
Piamonte confiscated the gun, which was
later identified as a 9mm Walther P88,
Serial Number 006784, with a magazine
containing ten (10) rounds of live
ammunition. Accused-appellant was invited
to the police precinct for questioning.
On the way out of the disco, accused-
appellant asked permission to bring his car,
which was parked outside. The police
officers accompanied accused-appellant to
his car, a Honda Civic with license plate
number TCM-789. Through the windshield,
SPO3 Liquido noticed a Philippine National
Police identification card hanging from the
rearview mirror. He asked accused-
appellant if he was a member of the PNP,
and he said no. The police officers asked
accused-appellant for his driver's license
and the registration papers of the vehicle,
but he was unable to produce them. When
accused-appellant opened the door, SPO3
Liquido took the ID card and found that the
same belonged to SPO4 Zenaida
Bagadiong. The police officers saw pieces
of glass tooters and tin foils on the backseat
and floor of the car. They asked accused-
appellant why he had these items, but he
did not say anything. Instead, accused-
appellant suggested that they talk the
matter over, and intimated that he had
money. SPO3 Liquido replied that they
should talk at the police headquarters.
Accused-appellant took out an attaché case
from the car and opened it. There were two
black clutch bags inside. Accused-appellant
opened the first bag, which contained shiny
white substance wrapped in cellophane.
The second bag contained P120,000.00 in
cash.
The police officers brought accused-
appellant to the police station. When they
arrived at the precinct, they turned over the
attaché case together with the two black
clutch bags to the investigator. The
investigator found eight cellophane bags
containing granules suspected to be shabu
in one of the clutch bags. When the attaché
case was opened, the police officers found
that it also contained three glass tooters, tin
foils, an improvised burner, magazines and
newspapers.[1]
Consequently, two Informations were filed
against accused-appellant before the
Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna,
Branch 34. The first Information, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 3308-92-C,
charged accused-appellant with violation of
Article III of R.A. 6452 (Dangerous Drugs
Act), committed as follows:
That on or about October 22, 1992 at Brgy.
I, Crossing, Municipality of Calamba,
province of Laguna, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being
authorized/permitted by law, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, control and custody
750 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride known as "SHABU", a
regulated drug, in violation of the above-
stated law.[2]
The other Information, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 3309-92-C, charged accused-
appellant with violation of P.D. 1866,
committed as follows:
That on or about October 22, 1992, at
Flamingo Beerhouse, Crossing, Municipality
of Calamba, Province of Laguna and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused above-named not being licensed or
authorized by law, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
his possession, custody and control one (1)
caliber .9mm marked "WALTHER" with
serial number 006784 with one (1)
magazine loaded with ten (10) live
ammunitions of same caliber, in violation of
the aforementioned law.[3]
After a joint trial, the lower court rendered
judgment convicting accused-appellant in
the two criminal cases, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused in Criminal
Case No. 3308-92-C, to be GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of having in his
possession of 750.39 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a attempting to commit an offense; or when
regulated drug. He is hereby sentenced to a
penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine
of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00)
PESOS; and in Criminal Case No. 3309-92-
C, the accused is also found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearm, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua.
Considering that the accused appears to be
detained at the Makati Police Station, jailer,
Makati Police Station is hereby ordered to
commit the accused to the New Bilibid
Prison, Bureau of Correction, Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila. The bond posted by the
accused in Criminal Cases No. 3308-92-C &
3309-92-C, are hereby ordered cancelled.[4]
Accused-appellant appealed his conviction
in Criminal Case No. 3309-92-C directly to
this Court, considering that the penalty
imposed was reclusion perpetua, which
appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 116001.
On the other hand, accused-appellant
brought his appeal of the judgment in
Criminal Case No. 3308-92-C before the
Court of Appeals.[5] In an Amended Decision
dated February 21, 1996, the Court of
Appeals affirmed accused-appellant's
conviction but modified the penalty imposed
by the trial court by sentencing him, in
addition to imprisonment of six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, to pay
a fine of six thousand pesos (P6,000.00),
citing Section 8 of R.A. 6425, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.[6] Hence, this petition for review,
docketed as G.R. No. 123943.
The two cases were consolidated.[7]
Accused-appellant assails the validity of his
arrest and his subsequent convictions for
the two crimes. Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals found that the arrest and
subsequent seizure were legal. A review of
the records at bar shows no reason to
depart therefrom.
The constitutional proscription, that no
person shall be arrested without any
warrant of arrest having been issued prior
thereto,[8] is not a hard-and-fast rule. The
Rules of Court and jurisprudence recognize
exceptional cases where an arrest may be
effected without a warrant.[9] Among these
are when, in the presence of a peace
officer, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is
an offense has in fact just been committed,
and the arresting officer has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it.
In the cases at bar, the police saw the gun
tucked in appellant's waist when he stood
up. The gun was plainly visible. No search
was conducted as none was necessary.
Accused-appellant could not show any
license for the firearm, whether at the time
of his arrest or thereafter. Thus, he was in
effect committing a crime in the presence of
the police officers. No warrant of arrest was
necessary in such a situation, it being one
of the recognized exceptions under the
Rules.
As a consequence of appellant's valid
warrantless arrest, he may be lawfully
searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search
warrant, as provided in Rule 126, Section
12. This is a valid search incidental to the
lawful arrest.[10] The subsequent discovery in
his car of drug paraphernalia and the
crystalline substance, which was later
identified as shabu, though in a distant
place from where the illegal possession of
firearm was committed, cannot be said to
have been made during an illegal search.
As such, the seized items do not fall within
the exclusionary clause, which states that
any evidence obtained in violation of the
right against warrantless arrest cannot be
used for any purposes in any proceeding.
[11]
 Hence, not being fruits of the poisonous
tree, so to speak, the objects found at the
scene of the crime, such as the firearm, the
shabu and the drug paraphernalia, can be
used as evidence against appellant.
Besides, it has been held that drugs
discovered as a result of a consented
search is admissible in evidence. [12]
Under P.D. 1866, the essence of the crime
is the accused's lack of license or permit to
carry or possess firearm, ammunition, or
explosive. Possession by itself is not
prohibited by law.[13] In prosecutions for
illegal possession of firearm, the element of
absence of license to possess the firearm
may be established through the testimony of
or a certification from a representative of the
Firearms and Explosives Bureau[14]of the
Philippine National Police (FEB-PNP),
attesting that a person is not a licensee of
any firearm.[15] In this case, a representative
of the FEB-PNP testified that accused-
appellant was not a holder of any gun
license.[16] Moreover, a certification[17]to that
effect was presented to corroborate his
testimony. These pieces of evidence suffice
to establish the second element of the
offense of possession of unlicensed
firearms.[18] However, in a vain attempt to
exculpate himself, accused-appellant
presented for the first time an alleged
firearm license, which was described as
"Annex 2" of his petition. Accused-
appellant's counsel admitted that said
document was not presented below "for
some reason."[19] Whatever those reasons
are, he did not specify. The document,
however, is dubious. It is too late in the day
for accused-appellant to proffer this very
vital piece of evidence which might
exculpate him. First, the reception of
evidence is best addressed to the trial court
because it entails questions of fact. It should
be emphasized that this Court is not a trier
of facts.[20] Second, the document marked
as "Annex 2" of the petition in G.R. No.
123943 is not the license referred to, but an
order of the trial court resetting the date of
arraignment.[21] Third, there is attached to
the petition a firearm license[22] which is a
mere photocopy and, as such, cannot be
appreciated by this Court. Indeed,
considering that this was the one piece of
evidence which could spell accused-
appellant's acquittal of the unlicensed
firearm charge, and assuming that, as
shown in the face of the license, it was
issued on October 7, 1992, there should be
no reason for its non-production during the
trial. Fourth, and most importantly, the
genuineness of the purported license
becomes all the more suspect in view of the
Certification issued by the FEO-PNP that
accused-appellant was not a licensed
firearm holder.
Anent the certification issued by the FEO-
PNP to the effect that Luisito Go y Ko was
not a licensed gun holder, accused-
appellant claims that he was not the person
alluded to therein because the correct
spelling of his middle name is not "Ko" but
"Co." Whatever the correct spelling of his
name is, the fact remains that he had no
license on the day the gun was found in his
possession. All that he could present then
was a photocopy of his application for gun
license,[23] which is not the equivalent of a
license. Appellant testified that he presented
a firearm license to the police, [24] but he
could not produce that alleged license in
court. If appellant was indeed a licensed
gun holder and if that license existed on
October 22, 1992, he could have easily
presented it to the police when he was
asked for his papers inside the disco, or if
the alleged license was in his car, he could
have easily shown it to them when they
went to his car. Otherwise, he could have
easily asked his lawyer or relative to bring
the license to the police precinct when he
was being investigated. Despite several
opportunities to produce a license, he failed
to do so. In fact, during trial, he never
presented any such license. And on appeal,
he could only submit for the first time and
for unknown reasons an alleged photocopy
of a purported license. The only plausible
conclusion that can be drawn is that there
was no such license in the first place.
Hence, his guilt of illegal possession of
firearm was duly established.
Accused-appellant's guilt for illegal
possession of shabu has likewise been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. The white
crystalline substance found in his
possession, upon laboratory examination,
were positively identified as
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu,
a regulated drug.[25]
The bulk of accused-appellant's defense
revolves around the factual findings of the
trial court. It should be recalled that factual
findings of the trial court, if supported by
evidence on record, and particularly when
affirmed by the appellate court, are binding
on this Court.[26] As discussed above, the
records substantiate the trial court's and the
appellate court's findings as to accused-
appellant's culpability. There is no reason to
depart from these findings as no significant
facts and circumstances were shown to
have been overlooked or disregarded
which, if considered, would have altered the
outcome of the case.[27] Moreover, questions
as to credibility of witness are matters best
left to the appreciation of the trial court
because of its unique opportunity of having
observed that elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the witness' deportment on the
stand while testifying, which opportunity is
denied to the reviewing tribunal.[28]
In the case at bar, the trial court found:
The narration of the incident by the police is
far more worthy of belief coming as it does
from law enforcers who are presumed to
have regularly performed their duties and
were not demonstrated to have been unduly
biased against the accused.[29]
Similarly, the Court of Appeals held that:
(T)he findings of fact of the trial court are
generally respected by the appellate court,
unless they are found to be clearly biased or
arbitrary. We do not find any in these cases.
[30]
The crime of illegal possession of firearm,
committed in 1992, regardless of whether
the firearm is low powered or high powered,
was punished with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death, as provided in P.D. 1866.
However, under R.A. No. 8294, which took
effect on July 6, 1997,[31] the penalty was
lowered to prision correcional in its
maximum period and a fine of P30,000.00, if
the firearm[32] is classified as low powered.
In this case, the unlicensed firearm found in
appellant's possession was a 9mm Walther
pistol, which under the amendatory law, is
considered as low powered. Inasmuch as
the new law imposes a reduced penalty and
is, thus, more favorable to accused-
appellant, the same may be given
retroactive effect.[33] Therefore, accused-
appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
maximum, and a fine of P30,000.00.
On the other hand, the crime of illegal
possession of regulated drug, under the law
in force at the time of the commission of the
offense in this case, was punished by
imprisonment of from six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine
ranging from P6,000.00 to P12,000.00,
[34]
 regardless of the amount of drugs
involved. Hence, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six
(6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
twelve (12) years, as maximum, and to pay
a fine of P12,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court
finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of
firearm is AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATION that he is sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as maximum, and a fine of
P30,000.00. The decision of the trial court
finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of
750.39 grams of shabu and drug
paraphernalia, is likewise AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that he is sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve (12)
years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
P12,000.00. The shabu and subject drug
paraphernalia seized from appellant shall be
destroyed as provided by law.
SO ORDERED.
 Larranaga vs CA G.R. No. 130644 March
13, 1998
Facts: Petitioner Larranaga was charged
with two counts of kidnapping and serious
illegaldetention before the RTC of Cebu
City. He was arrested and was detained
withoutthe filing of the necessary
Information and warrant of arrest. The
petitioner allegedthat he must be released
and be subject to a preliminary
investigation. Howeverpending the
resolution of the Court for the petition for
certiorari, prohibitionand mandamus with
writs of preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction filedby the petitioner,
RTC judge issued a warrant of arrest
directed to the petitioner.
Issue:
1.Whether petitioner is entitled to a regular
preliminary investigation.2.Whether
petitioner should be released from detention
pending the investigation.
Held:
1.Yes. Our ruling is not altered by the fact
that petitioner has been arraigned
onOctober 14, 1997. The rule is that the
right to preliminary investigation iswaived
when the accused fails to invoke it before or
at the time of entering aplea at arraignment.
Petitioner, in this case, has been actively
andconsistently demanding a regular
preliminary investigation even before hewas
charged in court. Also, petitioner refused to
enter a plea during thearraignment because
there was a pending case in this Court
regarding hisright to avail of a regular
preliminary investigation. Clearly, the acts
of petitioner and his counsel
inconsistent with a waiver.
Preliminaryinvestigation is part
procedural due process. It cannot be waived
unlessthe waiver appears to be clear and
informed.2.No. The filing of charges and the
issuance of the warrant of arrest against
aperson invalidly detained will cure the
defect of that detention or at leastdeny him
the right to be released because of such
defect.The originalwarrantless arrest of the
petitioner was doubtless illegal.
Nevertheless, theRegional Trial Court
lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person
of thepetitioner by virtue of the warrant of
arrest it issued on August 26, 1993against
him and the other accused in connection
with the rape-slay cases. Itwas belated, to
be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
GEORGE BONGALON vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013
FACTS:
The petitioner, George Bongalon, was
charged of child abuse, an act in violation of
Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610. He
allegedly struck Jayson, a minor, with his
hand and slapped him on the face after the
latter threw stones at George's daughter.
The RTC found George guilty as charged.
This was affirmed by the CA, but the said
court modified the penalty.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the SC
via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
ROC.
ISSUE:
1.            Whether a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 is the proper remedy.
2.            Whether the petitioner is guilty of
child abuse, under RA 7610.
are RULING:
of
1.            No. The SC held that the petitioner
adopted the wrong remedy in assailing the
CA’s affirmance of his conviction. His proper
recourse from the affirmance of his
conviction was an appeal taken in due
course. Hence, he should have filed a
petition for review on certiorari. Instead, he
wrongly brought a petition for certiorari.
The special civil action for certiorari is
intended for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Its principal office is only to keep the inferior
court within the parameters of its jurisdiction
or to prevent it from committing such a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. As observed in
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, et al. "the special civil action for
certiorari is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction and not
errors of judgment. The raison d’etre for the
rule is when a court exercises its
jurisdiction, an error committed while so
engaged does not deprived it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error
is committed. If it did, every error committed
by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction
and every erroneous judgment would be a
void judgment. In such a scenario, the
administration of justice would not survive.
Hence, where the issue or question involved
affects the wisdom or legal soundness of
the decision–not the jurisdiction of the court
to render said decision–the same is beyond
the province of a special civil action for
certiorari. The proper recourse of the
aggrieved party from a decision of the Court
of Appeals is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
It is of no consequence that the petitioner
alleges grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the CA in his petition. The allegation
of grave abuse of discretion no more
warrants the granting of due course to the
petition as one for certiorari if appeal was
available as a proper and adequate remedy.
At any rate, a reading of his presentation of
the issues in his petition indicates that he
thereby imputes to the CA errors of
judgment, not errors of jurisdiction. He
mentions instances attendant during the
commission of the crime that he claims
were really constitutive of justifying and
mitigating circumstances; and specifies
reasons why he believes Republic Act No.
7610 favors his innocence rather than his
guilt for the crime charged. The errors he
thereby underscores in the petition
concerned only the CA’s appreciation and
assessment of the evidence on record,
which really are errors of judgment, not of
jurisdiction.
2.            No. The SC held that petitioner is
not guilty of child abuse, but rather of the
crime of slight physical injury only.
Despite the procedural transgression, the
court continued to rule on the substantive
issue. According to the SC, the records did
not establish beyond reasonable doubt that
the laying of hands by George on Jayson
had been intended to debase the "intrinsic
worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human
being, or that he had thereby intended to
humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records
showed the laying of hands on Jayson to
have been done at the spur of the moment
and in anger, indicative of his being then
overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the
personal safety of his own minor daughters
who had just suffered harm at the hands of
Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his
self-control, he lacked that specific intent to
debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human
being that was so essential in the crime of
child abuse. Considering that Jayson’s
physical injury required five to seven days of
medical attention, the petitioner was liable
for slight physical injuries under Article 266
(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
G.R. Nos. 141943-45 November 13 ,2002]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
appellee,
vs.
DIOSDADO RECEPCION Y PALASO
(deceased), FELIPE DELA CRUZ Y
REYES,
AUDIE DONA Y BINAN, ALFREDO
BARACAS Y CONCEPCION, EDUARDO
PALACPAC Y ROSALES,
BERNARDO RANARA Y MORATALLA (at
large),
JOEMARI DELOS REYES Y
CONCEPCION,
DOMINADOR RECEPCION Y PALASO
and ROBERT ALFONSO Y MARTIZANO,
appellants
FACTS:
· on July 28, 1999, eight persons allegedly
conspired to kill and actually killed 5
customers of Sabungan Fastfood
& Videoke
· A waitress in said bar testified as to the
incident and identified the accused as the
persons responsible
· Another witness who worked as a waitress
in a restaurant across the scene of the
crime testified and identified
the same offenders
· After the shooting, the accused boarded a
jeepney owned by Ruben Labjata and made
him drive to Tarlac
where they freed the driver and boarded a
tricycle driven by Conrado Marquez
® Both drivers positively identified the
perpetrators
· Around lunchtime on 29 July 1999, after
the police invited the jeepney driver and the
tricycle driver for
questioning, the area was cordoned off
· the group, along with FO1 Felipe dela
Cruz, surrendered after several calls by the
police
· Taken into custody were Felipe dela Cruz,
Joemari delos Reyes, Audie Dona, Alfredo
Baracas, Eduardo Palacpac,
Bernardo Ranara, Robert Alfonso, and
Dominador Recepcion; Diosdado
Recepcion, then a special agent of the
Narcotics Command, was intercepted at the
national highway of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija,
on board a tricycle
· At the police station, Labjata identified his
passengers, namely, Audie Dona, Alfredo
Baracas, Diosdado
Recepcion, Bernardo Ranara, Eduardo
Palacpac, Dominador Recepcion, Joemari
delos Reyes and Robert
Alfonso.
· The accused were charged with multiple
murder, violation of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1866, and robbery
in band in three separate accusatory
Informations
· The indictees, when arraigned, pled "not
guilty" to all the charges and interposed alibi
as a defense
· the court a quo found the several accused
guilty of multiple murder but acquitted them
in the charge of illegal
possession of firearm and robbery in band
because of insufficiency of evidence
ISSUE: whether or not the arrest made
without a warrant was valid
HELD: YES
· The arrest of appellants has been made in
"hot pursuit," an exception from the rule that
warrantless arrests are
illegal.
· In any event, appellants can no longer
assail the illegality of their arrest since such
a claim has not been
brought up before or during the arraignment
® The failure to timely move for the quashal
of the Information on this basis operates as
a waiver of the

right to question the supposed irregularity of

the arrest.