LIM TAN HU v RAMOLETE
contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented
FACTS: Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim
Po Chuan, who was a partner and practically the owner who has controlling interest
of Glory Commercial Company and a Chinese Citizen until his death. Defendant
Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua were partners in name but they
were mere employees of Po Chuan and were naturalized Filipino Citizens. Tan Put
filed complaint against spouses-petitoner Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay including their
son Tech Chuan and the other spouses-petitoner Ng Sua and Co Oyo including also
their son Eng Chong Leonardo, that through fraud and machination took actual and
active management of the partnership and that she alleged entitlement to share
not only in the capital and profits of the partnership but also in the other assets,
both real and personal, acquired by the partnership with funds of the latter during
its lifetime."
According to the petitioners, Ang Siok Tin is the legitimate wife, still living, and with
whom Tee Hoon had four legitimate children, a twin born in 1942, and two others
born in 1949 and 1965, all presently residing in Hong Kong. Tee Hoon died in 1966
and as a result of which the partnership was dissolved and what corresponded to
him were all given to his legitimate wife and children.
Tan Put prior of her alleged marriage with Tee Hoon on 1949, was engaged in the
drugstore business; that not long after her marriage, upon the suggestion of the
latter sold her drugstore for P125,000.00 which amount she gave to her husband as
investment in Glory Commercial Co. sometime in 1950; that after the investment of
the above-stated amount in the partnership its business flourished and it embarked
in the import business and also engaged in the wholesale and retail trade of cement
and GI sheets and under huge profits.
Defendants interpose that Tan Put knew and was are that she was merely the
common-law wife of Tee Hoon. Tan Put and Tee Hoon were childless but the
former had a foster child, Antonio Nunez.
ISSUE: Whether Tan Put, as she alleged being married with Tee Hoon, can claim
from the company of the latter’s share.
HELD: Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, “the declaration of the contracting parties
that they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument"
signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the
marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic
copy of the marriage contract”. While a marriage may also be proved by other
competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily
explained. Surely, the certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a
marriage is not admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the
to the court. In the case at bar, the purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose
M. Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore,
competent evidence, there being absolutely no showing as to unavailability of the
marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of the signature of said
certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not being
authorized by law, since it is not part of the functions of his office. Besides,
inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay.
An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and signed by Tan Put that she received
P40,000 for her subsistence when they terminated their relationship of common-
law marriage and promised not to interfere with each other’s affairs since they are
incompatible and not in the position to keep living together permanently. Hence,
this document not only proves that her relation was that of a common-law wife but
had also settled property interests in the payment of P40,000.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted. All proceedings held in
respondent court in its Civil Case No. 12328 subsequent to the order of dismissal of
October 21, 1974 are hereby annulled and set aside, particularly the ex-parte
proceedings against petitioners and the decision on December 20, 1974.
Respondent court is hereby ordered to enter an order extending the effects of its
order of dismissal of the action dated October 21, 1974 to herein petitioners
Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy Ochay, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo. And
respondent court is hereby permanently enjoined from taking any further action in
said civil case gave and except as herein indicated. Costs against private
respondent.
VDA. DE CHUA v CA
Facts: From 1970 up to 1981, Roberto Chua lived out of wedlock with private
respondent Florita A. Vallejo and they begot two sons. On 28 May 1992, Roberto
Chua died intestate in Davao City.
On 2 July 1992, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition
for the guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of the two
minors.
Petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the surviving spouse
of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue.
Petitioner alleged that at the time of the decedent’s death, Davao City was his
residence, hence, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is the proper forum. In
support of her allegation, petitioner presented the following documents: (1)
photocopy of the marriage contract; (2) Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the
name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City;
(3) Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that
he was married and was born in Cotabato City; (4) Income Tax Returns for 1990 and
1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married;
and, (5) Passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence
was Davao City.
Vallejo contends that movant/oppositor Antonietta Chua is not the surviving spouse
of the late Roberto L. Chua but a pretender to the estate of the latter since the
deceased never contracted marriage with any woman until he died.
The trial court ruled that petitioner has no personality to file the motion not having
proven his status as a wife of the decedent. The Order was appealed to the CA, but
it decided in favor of herein respondents.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was able to prove her marriage to Roberto L. Chua
Held: No. The best proof of marriage between a man and wife is a marriage
contract which petitioner failed to produce. The lower court correctly disregarded
the Photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a
violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of
evidence. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other
similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the private
respondent has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned
that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to
have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage.
REPUBLIC V CA AND CASTRO
FACTS: On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married
in a civil ceremony without the knowledge of Castro’s parents. Defendant Cardenas
personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the
celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license. In
fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was
issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro
Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife until when
Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together.
However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple
parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by
Castro’s brother, with the consent of Cardenas and was brought to US. Desiring to
follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving
for the States. She filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking
a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. As ground
therefor that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the
solemnization of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register
of Pasig, Metro Manila that their marriage license cannot be located and does not
appear in the records. Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of
Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a license. Neither did she sign
any application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on
June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to
respondent appellate court. The CA reversed the decision of the trial court and
declared the marriage null and void. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by
the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private
respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
HELD: Yes. The documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage
license. The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the
Civil Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently proves
that the office did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the
fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a
ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her case.
Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he
chose to ignore.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law
governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no
marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil
registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a
license would render the marriage void ab initio.
As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with
the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter
all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the
date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. The certification
of “due search and inability to find” issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all
data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any
circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, a certificate of “due search and inability to find” sufficiently proved that his
office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
GARCIA v RECIO
FACTS: Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as
husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992,
respondent became an Australian citizen and was married again to petitioner Grace
Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application
for a marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
on the ground of bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at
the time he married her. On his Answer, Rederick contended that his first marriage
was validly dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry Grace.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for
the declaration of nullity was pending , respondent was able to secure a divorce
decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the “marriage had
irretrievably broken down.”
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace Recio
dissolved on the ground that the Australian divorce had ended the marriage of the
couple thus there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was
proven.
2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner.
HELD:
1st issue: The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce
decree of respondent’s marriage to Samson is insufficient. Before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Furthermore, the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears
to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is
not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
2nd issue: Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorrecce obtained by respondent
may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to
remarry according to his national law. Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling
of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto
restored respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this
matter.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of
receiving evidence. The Court mentioned that they cannot grant petitioner’s prayer
to declare her marriage to respondent null and void because of the question on
latter’s legal capacity to marry.
PILAPIL V IBAY-SOMERA
FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent,
Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages
and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who
was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony
eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against
petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The
petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the
petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City
Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with
William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in
1983”.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of
adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was
already issued.
HELD: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and
concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended
spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is
the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and
rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no
legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
VAN DORN V ROMILLO
Facts: Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States, were married on 1972 at
Hongkong. On 1982, they got divorced in Nevada, United States; and the petitioner
remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, asking that the
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila,
and be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgement in the divorce proceeding before Nevada Court where respondent
acknowledged that they had no community property. The lower court denied the
motion to dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the
Philippines, that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. Respondent avers
that Divorce Decree abroad cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the
Philippines.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each of them.
(2) Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on conjugal properties.
Held: As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. As
he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by
his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property. Only Philippine Nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorce the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. Alicia Reyes under our National law is still considered married to
private respondent. However, petitioner should not be obliged to live together
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.
REPUBLIC vs. ORBECINDO
FACTS: Cipriano Orbecindo and Lady Myros Villanueva got married in May 24, 1981.
Both are Filipino citizens. They cohabited and had two children. Villanueva went to
the U.S. in 1986 with one son.
Villanueva became a naturalized American citizen and sometime in the year 2000,
Orbecindo learned that his wife obtained a divorce decree and remarried.
Orbecindo then filed a petition for authority to remarry. The court granted the
petition since there was no opposition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code
HELD: Petition for authority to remarry constituted a petition for the declaratory
relief. The following are the requisites:
1. Justiciable controversy
2. Controversy must be between persons whose interest are adverse
3. That the party seeking relief has a legal interest
4. The issue is ripe for judicial determination
ARTICLE 26 Paragraph 2 of the Family Code should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried can also be allowed to remarry.
However, the present petition of Orbecindo has no sufficient evidence submitted
and on record and are only based on bare allegations that his wife was a naturalized
American citizen, had obtained divorce decree and had remarried an American.
Such declaration could only be made properly upon submission of evidence in his
favor.
QUITA V CA
FACTS: Fe Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines
on May 18, 1941 and were not blessed with children. Their relationship soured and
eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in U.S.A and in July 1954, she obtained a final
judgment of divorce. Three weeks after, she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the
same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she
married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died and left no will. In August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed
a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust
Company. Respondent BlandinaDandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of
Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all
surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and
prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved
in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was
later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors submitted
certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of
divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the
sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
Petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the
distribution of his estate. At a scheduled hearing, the trial court required the
submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten days from
receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the
declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed
period lapsed without the required documents being submitted.
ISSUE: Who between petitioner and private respondent may validly claim as the
spouse of the decedent
RULING: The right of petitioner to inherit as Arturo’s spouse must still be
determined by the trial court. The trial court failed to conduct a hearing to establish
her citizenship when she obtained the divorce abroad. The purpose of a hearing is
to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and
testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or
opposing the evidence.
On the other hand, private respondent’s claim to heirship was already resolved by
the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior
marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous
marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil
Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this
status presupposes a legitimate relationship.
The case was remanded to the trial court.
LLORENTE v CA
In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in the U.S. Navy. In 1937, he
and Paula Llorente got married in Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo became an
American citizen.
In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. He discovered that
Paula was already living illicitly with Ceferino Llorente (brother of Lorenzo). Ceferino
and Paula even had a son.
Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to give her monetary
support. Eventually, Lorenzo and Paula agreed in writing Lorenzo shall not
criminally charge Paula if the latter agrees to waive all monetary support from
Lorenzo. Later, Lorenzo returned to the United States.
In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula in California. Paula was
represented by an American counsel. The divorce was granted and in 1952, the
divorce became final.
Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno. They
had three children.
In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where he left all his estate to
Alicia and their children (nothing for Paula). In 1983, he went to court for the will’s
probate and to have Alicia as the administratrix of his property. In 1985, before the
probate proceeding can be terminated, Lorenzo died. Later, Paula filed a petition
for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate.
The trial court ruled that Lorenzo’s marriage with Alicia is void because the divorce
he obtained abroad is void. The trial court ratiocinated that Lorenzo is a Filipino
hence divorce is not applicable to him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
ISSUES: Whether or not Lorenzo’s divorce abroad should be recognized.
HELD: Yes. It is undisputed by Paula Llorente that Lorenzo became an American
citizen in 1943. Hence, when he obtained the divorce decree in 1952, he is already
an American citizen. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides:
Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino, Philipine laws relating to family rights,
duties, or status are no longer applicable to him. Therefore, the divorce decree he
obtained abroad must be respected. The rule is: aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.
However, this case was still remanded to the lower court so as for the latter to
determine the effects of the divorce as to the successional rights of Lorenzo and his
heirs.
Anent the issue on Lorenzo’s last will and testament, it must be respected. He is an
alien and is not covered by our laws on succession. However, since the will was
submitted to our courts for probate, then the case was remanded to the lower
court where the foreign law must be alleged in order to prove the validity of the
will.
BAYOT VS CA G.R. NO. 155635
FACTS: On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were
married in Muntinlupa. They had a child name Alix, born in November 27, 1982 in
California.
In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic,
which was docketed as Civil Decree No. 362/96 ordering the dissolution of the
marriage. The same court also issued Civil Decree No. 406/97 settling the couple's
conjugal property in Muntinlupa in March 4, 1997.
She then filed a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of
Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094. She
sought dissolution of the conjugal partnerships of gains with application for support
pendente lite for her and Alix. She also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a
permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of P 220,000.00.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause
of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.
RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss. CA dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094 and set
aside RTC's incidental orders. According to the CA, RTC ought to have granted
Vicente's motion to dismiss, since the marriage between the spouses is already
dissolved when the divorce decree was granted since Rebecca was an American
citizen when she applied for the decree.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican
Republic is valid.
HELD: Yes. Civil Decrees No. 362/96 and 406/97 are valid.
Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen
and remains to be one, being born to American parents in Guam, an American
territory which follows the principle of jus soli granting American citizenship to
those who are born there. She was, and still may be, a holder of American passport.
She had consistently professed, asserted and represented herself as an American
citizen, as shown in her marriage certificate, in Alix's birth certificate, when she
secured divorce in Dominican Republic.
Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United
States of America, a country which allows divorce.
The Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued by the Dominican Republic court properly
adjudicated the ex-couple's property relations.
The Court said, in order that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, the divorce
decree must be proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien
spouse.
The fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce
and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign
court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
Thus the foreign decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are
valid, and consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force
of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by the DOJ Secretary of the October 6, 1995 Bureau
Order of Recognition will not, stand alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign
divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in 1996. In determining whether
or not a divorce is secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's
policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties
at the time a valid divorce is obtained.
CORPUZ V STO. TOMAS
FACTS: Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized Canadian,
married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. He soon left to Canada after their wedding
due to work commitments. He returned to Philippines on April 2005 only to find out
Daisylyn has an affair with another man. Gerbert returned to Canada to file a
divorce that took effect on January 2006.
Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry her in the
Philippines. He went to Pasig City Registrar's Office to register his Canadian divorce
decree but was denied considering that his marriage with Daisylyn still subsists
under Philippine law, that the foregin divorce must be recognized judicially by the
Philippine court.
Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition of
foreign divorce but was subsequently denied since he is not the proper party and
according to Article 26 of the Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz' petition of
recognition of the foreign divorce decree
HELD: The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right as it is only in favor
of Filipino spouses. The legislative intent of Article 26 is for the benefit of the
clarification of the marital status of the Filipino spouse.
However, aliens are not strip to petition to the RTC for his foreign divorce decree as
it is a conclusive presumption of evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce
decree with confirmity to the alien's national law.
The Pasig City Registrar's Office acted out of line when it registered the foreign
divorce decree without judicial order recognition. Therefore, the registration is still
deemed to be void.
NINAL v BAYADOG
Facts: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She
was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On
February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident
After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or
invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of
action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for annulment
of marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for at
least five years exempts them from obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of
the Family Code of the Philippines.
(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for
the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal,
with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father
Pepito G. Niñal is already dead
HELD:
(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and
wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other
words, the five-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of the marriage. The five-year period should be the years
immediately before the day the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the five years, and continuity—that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year
cohabitation period is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law
would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouse.
(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death
of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage
had been perfectly valid.
MANZANO V SANCHEZ
FACTS: Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano
having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan.
They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another
marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract
clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated” thus, respondent
Judge ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that
when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had
been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their
joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or
communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels.
ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties
who both have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been
cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code.
HELD: Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal
impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting
marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both “separated” is
an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like
separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years
does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge
Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage.
COSCA v PALAYPAYON
FACTS: The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1),
Edmundo B. Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora
(Process Server). Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge,
and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTC-Tinambac,
Camarines Sur.
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the
requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get
married just by paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano &
Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer;
Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy
Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the
following couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition,
Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license
to be submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after the
marriage ceremony.
Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article
34 of the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement.
According to him, he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the
couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar but
the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently
formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage
contract, a copy of which was then filed with the civil registrar. The other five
marriages were not illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their
marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included. It was
alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant
Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay &
Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize
them in the absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of Bocaya &
Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of
the parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the
marriage contract.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.
HELD: Bocaya & Besmonte’s marriage was solemnized without a marriage license
along with the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola
including the photographs taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who
solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by judge to
return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage
license. They already started living together as husband and wife even without the
formal requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge explained that it was a
simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. However, considering that
there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the
marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it
was simulated.
On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage
between Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so
the marriage license was dispensed with considering that the contracting parties
executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife
for almost 6 years already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that
Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living
together for 6 years already before they got married as what is stated in the joint
affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when they started living
together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his
duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have
executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement.
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that “in the absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an
irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but
the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and
administratively liable.
MARITATEGUI V CA
FACTS: Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3
marriages during his lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still
a bachelor. He had 4 children with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in
1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7
children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all
surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto. On the
other hand, Lupo’s second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter
named Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco
and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his
parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses
deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be
such.
Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the
Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary registration proceedings and a
decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the third
marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father
and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a
marriage license.
other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of
nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham
and his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they
executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
HELD: CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for
five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage.
Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months
before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law
and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn
affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have
qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license,
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath”. Hence,
Jose and Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for
nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not
prescribe and may be raised any time.

HELD: Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s
marriage, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the
mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage,
provided all requisites for its validity are present.

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place

between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting
themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed
and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

REPUBLIC V DAYOT

FACTS: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24,
1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had
lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a
certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against
Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the