Gandionco vs. Peñaranda (G.R. No.
L- hearing on the motion was opposed by
72984; November 27, 1987)
Facts: Private respondent, Teresita
Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein
petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal
separation on the ground of concubinage as
a civil case and criminal case. She likewise
filed an application for the provisional
remedy of support pendent elite which was
approved and ordered by the respondent
judge. Petitioner contends that the civil
action for legal separation is inextricably tied
with the criminal action thus, all proceedings
related to legal separation will have to be
suspended and await the conviction or
acquittal of the criminal case.
Issue: Whether or not the civil action for
legal separation shall be suspended on the
case of concubinage.
Ruling: Petition is dismissed. A civil action for
legal separation based on concubinage may
proceed ahead of or simultaneously with a
criminal action for concubinage for the
action for legal separation is not to recover
civil liability arising from the offense.
Civil action is not one “to enforce the civil
liability arising from the offense” even if
both the civil and criminal actions arise from
or are related to the same offense. Support
pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of
in an action for legal separation and granted
at the discretion of the judge.
Sabalones vs. CA (G.R. No.106169;
February 14, 1994)
Facts: Sam Sabalones (diplomatic service)
left to his wife the administration of some of
their conjugal properties for 15 years. After
retirement, Sabalones cohabited with his 2 nd
wife and 3 kids. He filed for a judicial
authorization to sell a building and lot in
Greenhills, San Juan. His wife opposed and
filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She
asked the court to grant the legal separation
and order the liquidation of their conjugal
properties, with forfeiture of her husband’s
share because of adultery. RTC granted
wife’s petition. CA granted issuance of writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin Sabalones
from interfering with the administration of
their properties. Petitioner assailed CA’s
decision.
Issue: Whether or not a preliminary
injunction can be issued by the Court.
Held: Under Art 124, the law grants joint
administration over conjugal properties.
However, Art 61 states that after a petition
for legal separation has been filed, the trial
court shall, in the absence of a written
agreement, appoint either one of the spouse
or a 3rd person to act as an administrator.
Such designation is explicit in the decision of
the trial court denying petitioner any share
in the conjugal properties.
OMOSA-RAMOS vs. VAMENTAGR No. L-
34132, July 29, 1972
Facts: Petitioner Lucy Somosa- Ramos, filed
an action for legal separation based on the
ground of concubinage on the part of
respondent Clemen Ramos. She also sought
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction for the return to her of
her paraphernal and exclusive property. The
anonymous writers, which were not
respondent Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not Article 103 of the Civil
Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for
legal separation before the lapse of six
months from the filing of the petition, would
likewise preclude the court from acting on a
motion for preliminary mandatory injunction
applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a
suit.
HELD: NO. There would appear to be then a
recognition that the question of
management of their respective property
need not be left unresolved even during
such six-month period. An administrator
may even be appointed for the management
of the property of the conjugal partnership.
The absolute limitation from which the court
suffers under the preceding article is thereby
eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be
heard. There is justification then for the
petitioner's insistence that her motion for
preliminary mandatory injunction should not
be ignored by the lower court. There is all
the more reason for this response from
respondent Judge, considering that the
husband whom she accused of concubinage
and an attempt against her life would in the
meanwhile continue in the management of
what she claimed to be her paraphernal
property, an assertion that was not
specifically denied by him.
Ong Eng Kiam vs Lucita Ong
Facts: William Ong and Lucita Ong were
married on July 13, 1975. Union wasblessed
with 3 children. On March 21, 1996, Lucita
filed a complaint for legal separation under
Art 55 (1) of FC on grounds of physical
violence, threats, intimidation and grossly
abusive conduct of petitioner. RTC granted
prayer for legal separation. CA upheld RTC’s
decision when herein petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration (MR).
Issues: Whether or not CA erred in
upholding the RTC’s decision granting legal
separation to Lucita when she herself has
given ground for legal separation when
abandoned her family.
Held: No. It is true that a decree of legal
separation should not be granted when both
parties have given ground for legal
separation (Art 56 (4) FC). However, the
abandonment referred to in the Familu Code
is abandonment without justifiable cause for
more than one year. Also, it was established
that Lucita left William due to his abusive
conduct which does not constitute the
abandonment contemplated in the said
provision.
Bugayong vs Ginez
Facts: Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in
the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez
on August 1949 at Pangasinan while on
furlough leave. The couple came to an
agreement that Ginez would stay with his
sisters who later moved in Manila. On or
about July 1951, Leonila left the dwelling of
the sisters-in-law and informed her husband
by letter that she had gone to Pangasinan to
reside with her mother and later on moved
to Dagupan to study in a local college.
Petitioner then began receiving letters from
Valeriana Polangco, and some from
produced at the hearing, informing him of
alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. In August
1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and
looked for his wife. They proceeded to the
house of Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff where
they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as husband
and wife. The next day, they slept together
in their own house. He then filed a complaint
for legal separation.
Issue: Whether there was condonation
between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve
as a ground for dismissal of the action.
Held: Condonation is the forgiveness of a
marital offense constituting a ground for
legal separation. A single voluntary act of
marital intercourse between the parties
ordinarily is sufficient to constitute
condonation and where the parties live in
the same house, it is presumed that they live
on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code
states that the legal separation may be
claimed only by the innocent spouse,
provided there has been no condonation of
or consent to the adultery or concubinage.
Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio (43 SCRA 177)
Facts: Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for
legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on
August 1953. They were married and lived
together as husband and wife continuously
without any children until 1943 when her
husband abandoned her. Petitioner then
discovered that her husband cohabited with
a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or
about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a
decree of legal separation (deprive Eufemio
of his share of the conjugal partnership
profits). Eufemio counterclaimed for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and
subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Before a
decision can be made on the case, petitioner
died in a vehicular accident on May 1969.
Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for
legal separation on June 1969 on the
grounds that the said petition was filed
beyond the one-year period provided in
Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the
death of Carmen abated the action for legal
separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to
substitute the deceased Carmen by her
father, Macario Lapuz.
Issue: Whether the death of the plaintiff,
before final decree in an action for legal
separation, abate the action and will it also
apply if the action involved property rights.
Held: An action for legal separation is abated
by the death of the plaintiff, even if property
rights are involved. These rights are mere
effects of decree of separation, their source
being the decree itself; without the decree
such rights do not come into existence, so
that before the finality of a decree, these
claims are merely rights in expectation. If
death supervenes during the pendency of
the action, no decree can be forthcoming,
death producing a more radical and
definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn.

Siochi vs Gozon
Facts: Elvira (Wife of Gozon) filed for a legal
separation (property regime: conjugal
partnership of gains). Lis pendens over the
title of the lot in Malabon. Pending the legal
separation case, Alfredo entered into an
agreement with Mario. RTC granted legal
separation (his net profits went to their
daughter, Winifred). Alfred issued a Deed of
Donation over said property to Winifred.
Winifred issued SPA for her father to sell the
lot to Inter-Dimensional Realty. Mario filed
petition to annul donation to Winifred, annul
sale to IDR and remove lis pendens.
CA annulled donation and sale but declared
the agreement between Mario and Alfredo
as invalid (no consent from Elvira and
Alfredo’s share forfeited in favor of
Winifred).
Issue: Whether or not donation to Winifred
was valid
Held: No. Elvira’s consent was absent.
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA
MAQUILAN (G.R. No. 155409; June 8,
2007)
Facts: Herein petitioner and herein private
respondent are spouses. Petitioner
discovered that private respondent was
having illicit sexual affair with her paramour,
which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a
case of adultery against private respondent
and the latter's paramour. Consequently,
both accused were convicted of the crime
charged. Thereafter, private respondent,
through counsel, filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains and Damages imputing
psychological incapacity on the part of the
petitioner. During the pre-trial of the said
case, petitioner and private respondent
entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for
the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This
motion was denied. Petitioner then filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
the Court of Appeals on the ground that the
conviction of the respondent of the crime of
adultery disqualify her from sharing in the
conjugal property. The Petition was
dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not the conviction of the
respondent of the crime of adultery a
disqualification for her to share in the
conjugal property.
Held: No. The conviction of adultery does
not carry the accessory of civil interdiction.
Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code
provides for the consequences of civil
interdiction (rights of parental authority, or
guardianship, either as to the person or
property of any ward, of marital authority, of
the right to manage and of the right to
dispose of his property). Under RPC Art 333,
penalty for adultery (suspension from public
office, from the right to follow a profession
or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage) It
is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by
the CA, that the crime of adultery does not
carry the accessory penalty of civil
interdiction which deprives the person of the
rights to manage her property and to
dispose of such property inter vivos.
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda (35 Phil 252)
Facts: Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner,
and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were
married on January 7, 1915. They stayed
together for a month before petitioner
returned to her parent’s home. Goitia filed a
complaint against respondent for support
outside the conjugal home. It was alleged
that respondent demanded her to perform
unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital
organs. Since Goitia kept on refusing,
respondent maltreated her by word and
deed. The trial court ruled that Goitia could
not compel her husband to support her
except in the conjugal home unless it is by
virtue of a judicial decree granting her
separation or divorce from respondent.
Goitia filed motion for review.
Issue: Whether or not Goitia can compel her
husband to support her outside the conjugal
home.
Held: The law will not permit the husband to
evade or terminate his obligation to support
his wife if the wife is driven away from the
conjugal home because of his wrongful acts.
In the case at bar, the wife was forced to
leave the conjugal abode because of the
lewd designs and physical assault of the
husband, she can therefore claim support
from the husband for separate maintenance
even outside the conjugal home.
ARROYO v VASQUEZ (1921)
FACTS: Plaintiff Mariano and defendant
Dolores were married and lived together
with a few short intervals of separation. On
July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores went away
from their common home and decided to
live separately from plaintiff. She claimed
that she was compelled to leave on the basis
of cruel treatment on the part of her
husband. She in turn prayed for a decree of
separation, a liquidation of their conjugal
partnership, and an allowance for counsel
fees and permanent separate maintenance.
Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of
conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory
injunction requiring the defendant to return
to the conjugal home and live with him as his
wife.
ISSUES:
1. WON defendant had sufficient cause for
leaving the conjugal home
2. WON plaintiff may be granted the
restitution of conjugal rights or absolute
order or permanent mandatory injunction
HELD:
1. Cruelty done by plaintiff to defendant was
greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted
with a disposition of jealousy towards her
husband in an aggravated degree. No
sufficient cause was present.
Courts should move with caution in
enforcing the duty to provide for the
separate maintenance of the wife since this
recognizes the de facto separation of the
two parties. Continued cohabitation of the
pair must be seen as impossible, and
separation must be necessary, stemming
from the fault of the husband. She is under
obligation to return to the domicile.
“When people understand that they must
live together…they learn to soften by mutual
accommodation that yoke which they know
they cannot shake off; they become good
husbands and wives…necessity is a powerful
master in teaching the duties which it
imposes…” (Evans v. Evans)
2. On granting the restitution of conjugal
rights. It is not within the province of the
courts to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to,
the other. In the case of property rights,
such an action may be maintained. Said
order, at best, would have no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live together.
Other countries, such as England and
Scotland have done this with much criticism.
Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration
that the defendant absented herself without
sufficient cause and it is her duty to return.
She is also not entitled to support.
Ilusorio vs. Bildner (GR No. 139789;
May 12, 2000)
FACTS: In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival
from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5
months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia
and Lin, alleged that during this time their
mother overdose Potenciano which caused
the latter’s health to deteriorate. In
February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC
petition for guardianship over the person
and property of Potenciano due to the
latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor
eyesight and impaired judgment. In May
1998, after attending a corporate meeting in
Baguio, Potenciano did not return to
Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium in Makati. In March 1999,
petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas
corpus to have the custody of his husband
alleging that the respondents refused her
demands to see and visit her husband and
prohibited Potenciano from returning to
Antipolo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of
habeas corpus should be issued.
HELD: Evidence showed that there was no
actual and effective detention or deprivation
of Potenciano’s liberty that would justify
issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter
was 86 years of age and under medication
does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. He still has the capacity to
discern his actions. With his full mental
capacity having the right of choice, he may
not be the subject of visitation rights against
his free choice. Otherwise, he will be
deprived of his right to privacy.