Theories Methods Research - ws2010.Slides.I

Prof.
Paul Hoyningen-Huene Theories and Methods of Research

University of Hannover Winter term 2010-11
Theories and Methods of

Research
Prof. Paul Hoyningen-Huene

Institute of Philosophy
Formalities
• Structure of the course:
– 11 sessions with lectures (20.10.2010 – 12.1.2011)
– 3 sessions with oral presentations of research
projects by M.Sc. 13 students from International
Horticulture (mandatory), 19.1., 26.1. and 2.2.2011
– Presentations: 15 min each: 5 min project, 5 min
connection to lectures, 5 min discussion
• Second year students from Water Resources: Written
presentation of research project (max 1 page) and
connection to lectures (max 1 page), to be handed in
by 2.2.2011, 12 noon
Formalities (2)
• Printout of PowerPoint slides can be downloaded at stud.IP
• Recommended book: Alan F. Chalmers (1999): What is This Thing Called
Science? Third ed. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press.
• List of oral presentations for MSc 13 students will be circulated next week
• Written examination at the end: week following the end of term 7 Feb - 11
Feb 2011 (probably 9 Feb 2011, 10:15)
• Grading: 20% oral/written presentation of research project, 80% written
examination
• My email address: hoyningen@ww.uni-hannover.de
• My official office hours: Tue 16-17, Im Moore 21, back building, 4th floor.
1
Prof. Paul Hoyningen-Huene Theories and Methods of Research
1. Introduction
The fundamental questions of general
philosophy of science:
What is science?
Why is scientific knowledge different from other
forms of knowledge, e.g., more reliable?
What are the characteristic features of scientific
knowledge?
Introduction (2)
The course will present four specific answers to these
questions which have been given during the last one
hundred years:
• Inductivism
• Deductivism
• Paradigm theory
• Systematicity theory
After an attempt to present these answers as persuasively as
possible, criticism of them is raised which forces the
development of new answers.
2. Inductivism
2.1 The basic idea of inductivism
In science and engineering, we find singular statements and
general statements
• Singular statements
• This lake is contaminated by pesticides and heavy metals
• This plant has nine leafs
True singular statements express singular facts
In science and engineering, singular statements often express
observable (and/or measurable) facts
In this case, it is easy to verify (to find out the truth of) the
statement : observe or measure and you will know
2
Inductivism (2)
• There are different kinds of general statements in the sciences
• natural laws like Newton’s law of gravitation:
F = γ m1 m2 / r2 : they are supposed to be certain
• theories: this may mean
• very well established very general statements like
Darwin’s theory of evolution or quantum theory
• General statements about which you are unsure: “it’s just
a theory”; also the term “hypothesis” is used in this sense
Example: “My theory (hypothesis) is that plants of species
X are not seriously affected by a change in the
environmental condition Y”
Inductivism (3)
• (empirical) regularities: a general, regular relation
between different variables
• models: typically a simplified image of a general relation
among different variables (e.g., model organism, model of
an economy, model of a lake)
General statements (laws, theories, general hypotheses,
regularities, models) can not be verified in the same way as
singular statements as they refer to indefinitely many facts
Thus, the “generalization” of singular statements to general
statements is problematic
For example, consider the generalization from the observation of
some finite number of swans that are white to: “All swans are
white”
2.1 The basic idea of inductivism

The problem how to correctly generalize from singular
statements and the justification of this step is called "the
problem of induction".
In dealing with this problem, inductivism states that
scientific knowledge is gained in a two step process:
Step one: Carefully observe singular facts without any
theoretical prejudice ("theory-free facts") and articulate
them in singular observation sentences. These singular
observation statements can deliver an objective, and
therefore also inter-subjective, description of facts.
3
The basic idea of inductivism (2)

Step two: Generalize singular observation statements to
general hypotheses (or "laws", "theories", "models").
This step, the "inductive generalization", is allowed if the
following three conditions are met:
C1: The number of observations must be large.
C2: The observations must be made under very different
conditions.
C3: None of the observation statements must contradict the
general hypotheses.
10

General statements (theories, etc.) are needed for scientific
explanations, predictions and technical applications
a) Explanations and predictions
Both activities follow the same pattern:
Here is a particular event S0 of type S (description of a situation).
General statement: Whenever an event of type S, then an event
of type K (general hypothesis).
Therefore: K0 (conclusion).
11

Example: Predict how far a mass falls within one second.
Law of free fall: d = ½ g t2; g = 9.8. Situation S0: t0 = 1
Therefore: d0 = 4.9.
The conclusion follows "deductively" (or "by logical deduction")
from the premises
By means of this pattern, a K0 that has not yet happened can be
predicted if S0 and the general hypothesis are known
If K0 has happened, it can be explained by recourse to S0 and the
general hypothesis
12
4

b) Technical application
Technical action is doing one thing in order to realize another
thing
You want to generate an event of type K
General statement: Whenever an event of type S, then an event
of type K (general hypothesis)
Thus: realize S0 and you will get K0
Example: You want to regulate the level L of a lake
Find the general relation among L and the relevant variables:
outflow, inflow, evaporation, etc. (a model of the lake)
Manipulate outflow such that the desired L results
13

Thus according to inductivism, scientific research
consists of an inductive procedure by which scientific
hypotheses are gained, and logical deductions from
these hypotheses by which predictions and
explanations are given.
Scientific knowledge is different from and more
reliable than other forms of knowledge because the
two steps that generate it are much more rigorously
controlled than the steps that lead to other forms of
knowledge.
14
2.2 Historical remark

From about the beginning of modern science in the
17th century and until the 20th century,
inductivism was so wide-spread that the natural
sciences were even called "inductive sciences".
15
5
2.3 Normative versus descriptive

philosophy of science
There seem to be two principal ways of answering the
questions posed in section 1: What is science?
• One can make an empirical investigation into the
peculiarities of science by observing what scientists
really do.
This would be a descriptive procedure.
• One may consider how science should proceed in order
to produce reliable knowledge.
This is a normative procedure.
16
Normative versus descriptive

philosophy of science (2)
In section 2.1, we obviously followed a
normative procedure.
The resulting philosophy of science is therefore
called normative.
17
2.4 Problems of inductivism

There are six main problems that inductivism faces
1. Condition C2, which constrains the possibility of inductive
generalizations, is vague and if taken literally, can never
be fulfilled: it is not clear which conditions have to be
varied and which do not.
If no directives are given, infinitely many conditions can be
varied such that one is never allowed to proceed to the
inductive generalization.
Example: Influence of garlic on the function of compasses –
was a real question in the 16th century!
18
6
Problems of inductivism (2)

2. The observation of facts must be somehow directed: only
relevant facts should be observed.
But the evaluation of facts as relevant presupposes
theoretical elements.
Thus, it is impossible to really gather theory-free facts
that are relevant to the hypothesis in question.
Example: Without the difference between (physical)
solutions and (chemical) compounds, the inductive
generalization to the law of constant proportions is
impossible.
19

3. Even a singular observation statement is not theory-
free.
For instance, a statement like "This is a plant of
species X" uses the concepts of "plant" and
"species".
These concepts are highly theory-laden: for instance,
plants are assumed to be distinct from animals
(among other things), and the concept of species
assumes that biological entities can be ordered into
fairly well-defined classes.
20

4. The justification of the inductive
generalization is probably impossible.
Most attempts to justify it end up in circularities.
Example: Inductive generalizations are justified
because Nature is ordered by regularities
(laws). But how do you know that these
regularities will hold in the future?
21
7

5. According to inductivism, disagreement
between scientists can only be the result of
mistakes; a “rational disagreement” is
impossible
This is highly implausible
22

6. Inductivism is certainly not generally valid.
For instance, it is impossible to gain knowledge
of the structure of DNA (or any other highly
theoretical scientific conception) by inductive
generalization from phenomena.
23

Note that difficulties 2 and 3 are not deadly to inductivism.
They show, however, that a build-up of scientific knowledge
from a theory-free basis is an illusion.
Thus, inductivism looses much of its attractiveness because
theoretical elements enter already at the level of
observation.
The position dealt with next, deductivism, tries to draw
consequences by allowing theoretical elements to enter
science at all levels, and by avoiding the inductive
generalization because it seems unjustifiable.
24
8
Literature
Chalmers, A.F. (1999): What is This Thing Called Science?
Third Edition. Indianapolis: Hackett (especially chapters 1
- 4)
Losee, John (1993): A Historical Introduction to the
Philosophy of Science. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University
Press (an overview over the historical development of
philosophy of science).
Salmon, M. H./J. Earman/C. Glymour/J.G. Lennox/P.
Machamer/J.E. McGuire/J.D. Norton/W.C. Salmon/K.F.
Schaffner (1992): Introduction to the Philosophy of
Science. Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall (a book on an
advanced level).
25
3. Deductivism
3.1 The basic idea of deductivism
Deductivism is an attempt to develop a position that avoids
the difficulties that beset inductivism.
It is accepted that theoretical elements enter science at all
stages and that inductive generalizations lack proper
justification.
The basic idea of deductivism is that theories are not built
bottom-up from theory-free data, but that they are
deductively tested against data.
Inductivism and deductivism share the view of scientific
explanation, prediction and technical application
26
3.2 The demarcation criterion

In order to establish that deductive testing procedures
are applicable, scientific hypotheses, theories, etc.
must fulfill a specific condition.
This condition demarcates scientific hypotheses from
others, like metaphysical, religious or pseudo-
scientific ones.
In the given context, to be a "scientific hypothesis"
does not imply that the hypothesis has been
accepted or confirmed by science; it only means that
it can be admitted to scientific testing procedures.
27
9
The demarcation criterion (2)

Demarcation criterion:
A hypothesis is scientific if and only if it is empirically
falsifiable, i.e., that there are empirical circumstances
imaginable such that the hypothesis is refuted.
Thus, a scientific hypothesis is in principle empirically
testable.
An example of a hypothesis that is not falsifiable is "The
universe is governed by love and hate.“
Whatever happens empirically, it can be subsumed under
this hypothesis. Thus, this hypothesis cannot be
empirically refuted; and therefore, it is not a scientific
hypothesis.
28

In other words: scientific hypotheses must be
empirically risky:
There is always danger that by means of
empirical evidence they are shown to be false
29

For inductivism, the process of producing a hypothesis is a rule-
governed process.
By contrast, for deductivism the production of hypotheses is not
constrained as long as the resulting hypotheses are
empirically falsifiable.
Example: Kekulé’s idea of the ring structure of the benzene
molecule, published in 1865
As legend has it, Kekulé came up with the idea of this structure
in a dream of snakes. Each of the snakes bit into the tail of
another snake. As a result, the snakes depicted a cyclic
structure.
Whether the hypotheses are (temporarily) accepted in science,
however, will be determined by the testing procedures.
30
10
3.3 Deductive hypothesis testing

The main tool for the empirical test of scientific hypotheses is logical
deduction.
From a general hypothesis, specific sentences are deduced that can be
compared with empirical data.
Example: Ohm's Law: R = U/I.
For a specific piece of matter, by simple mathematical manipulation,
the following equation can be deduced:
U1/I1 = U2/I2.
This equation can be compared with the results of measurements.
If the measurement differs significantly from the deduced values, the
hypothesis failed the test and it is falsified; otherwise it survived the
test.
Hypotheses are kept in science as long as they have not been falsified.
31
Deductive hypothesis testing (2)

Thus, the answer of deductivism to the fundamental questions
of general philosophy of science (see sect. 1) is:
Science is the continual invention of falsifiable hypotheses and
their critical empirical test.
Science does not try to confirm hypotheses, but to disconfirm (or
falsify) them.
The spirit of science is thus fundamentally critical.
Science tries to be as unbiased and dogma-free as possible by
testing all proposals as severely as possible.
This is well-expressed in the title of Karl Popper's 1963 book:
Conjectures and Refutations.
32
3.4 Consequence: fallibilism

In spite of all of the critical tests of a given hypothesis, it
never becomes absolutely certain, even if it has passed
all of the tests without being falsified.
That a new test will be devised which falsifies the
hypothesis is never excluded.
As a consequence, scientific knowledge never becomes
infallible, i.e. absolutely certain.
It is bound to be fallible.
This insight rejects the pre-dominant (Western) ideal of
science from antiquity up until very recently, according to
which scientific knowledge should be infallible.
33
11
Consequence: fallibilism (2)

According to deductivism, scientific knowledge
consists of hypotheses that are accepted until
they are falsified.
Therefore, science is an intrinsically dynamic
enterprise as hypotheses have to be
continually tested.
To stop testing hypotheses is to stop doing
science.
34

Deductivism was developed in the 20th century,
mainly in the work of Karl Popper (1902-
1994).
Many scientists, including social scientists,
adhere to this position.
Deductivism is also called "falsificationism",
"critical rationalism", and the "hypothetico-
deductive account of science".
35
3.6 Problems of deductivism

Deductivism is attractive because it seems successfully to
exploit the "asymmetry between verification and
falsification of general hypotheses“:
The verification of a general empirical hypothesis, i.e. a
definitive proof of its truth, is impossible because for
general statements one would have to make infinitely
many tests (the problem of induction, see section 2.1).
The definitive falsification of a general empirical hypothesis,
however, seems possible because a single fact that
contradicts the hypothesis suffices.
36
12
Problems of deductivism (2)

On closer inspection, however, the situation is more
complicated.
The falsification of a hypothesis by, say, some
measurement, assumes that the measurement is
reproducible.
But this assumption makes use of an inductive
generalization, namely, that the same measurement
performed tomorrow will yield the same result.
Thus, a definitive falsification is also not possible.
37

2. The rule that science should never stop its attempts
to critically test hypotheses leads to unintended and
unpleasant results.
Suppose you have a hypothesis that states a specific
functional dependence of a variable y on a variable x:
y = f(x).
Real life examples:
• Boyle’s gas law pV = k, or p = k/V
• Ohm’s law: I = V/R
The test of the hypothesis y = f(x) does not only include
that y does indeed co-vary with the variable x in the
way the function f states.
38

It must also include the test of the assumption that y
depends on the variable x only, and not on additional
variables u, v, w, etc., too.
However, the list of potentially influential variables is
indefinite (it includes the haircut of the
experimenter, the position of Venus, etc.).
Thus, a systematic test of the potential dependence of
y on u, v, w, etc. cannot be carried out; testing
cannot even approximately be complete.
39
13

In more general terms, the problem consists in this.
Any account of the development of science must
contain the following three elements:
a principle for the generation of hypotheses;
a principle for the elimination of hypotheses;
a principle for the (perhaps only temporary)
acceptance of hypotheses that allows for
(temporarily) halting tests and accepting a
hypothesis in order to be justified to apply it.
40

The fundamental problem of deductivism
consists in its lack of a principle for the
(perhaps only temporary) acceptance of
hypotheses.
Deductivism cannot stop testing hypotheses,
thus never allowing the move forward to
applications.
The paradigm theory to be discussed next will
provide an answer to this problem.
41
Literature
Chalmers, A.F. (1999): What is This Thing Called
Science? Third Edition. Indianapolis: Hackett
(chapters 5 - 7)
Popper, Karl R. (1968): The Logic of Scientific
Discovery. Second Edition. London: Hutchinson
(especially chapters 1 and 2)
42
14
Paradigm theory
4.1 The basic idea of paradigm theory
Paradigm theory begins with a comparison of the
normative positions (inductivism, deductivism) with
the history of science which results in a strong
discrepancy:
In many cases scientists do not behave in the way the
normative positions posit.
Thus we have a discrepancy between norms (how
science should be done) and facts (how science is
actually done).
43
4.1 The basic idea of paradigm theory

There are two main possibilities to explain this discrepancy:
• either the norms are wrong (for instance: unrealistic) or
• the actual practice of science is bad (for instance: dogmatic).
From the discrepancy alone, one cannot judge whether the
norms should be given up or if the practice of science should
be changed.
Before deciding this question, paradigm theory aims at a
description of the general characteristics of the sciences,
especially of their development over time.
44
4.2 The developmental model of

science
Paradigm theory describes the general
characteristics of the development of the
basic disciplines of the natural sciences (as
opposed to the applied ones) by a phase
model (or "developmental model").
In such a model, different phases of a science's
development are distinguished and their
temporal order is described.
In each phase, science is practiced in a specific
form.
45
15
The developmental model (2)

The phase model is a cyclical model (more precisely, a
spiral model) of scientific development. Its structure
is as follows:
P -------> N "P" stands for "pre-normal science"

"N" stands for "normal science"
R "R" stands for "revolutionary science"

46

P N The arrows in the model should be
understood as follows.
From P, a first phase of normal science N1 is
reached.
R N1 leads to a first phase of revolutionary
science R1.
From R1, a new phase of normal science N2
is reached, which in turn leads to a new
phase R2, etc.
In the following, the different phases and
the transitions between them will be
explained.
47

Pre-normal science is a scientific practice which is not very
structured and in which various schools compete.
They have different fundamental viewpoints about the subject
matter.
There are even disagreements about what does, and what does
not, belong to the field.
Example: Research on electricity in the first half of the 18th century:
different schools:
• Electrostatic attraction and frictional generation of electricity
fundamental, electrostatic repulsion secondary
• Attraction and repulsion equally fundamental
• Conduction fundamental: result of an electric fluid
48
16

The transition to normal science is called the maturation of the field.
It happens when one of the schools produces an extraordinarily
convincing solution to some of the fundamental problems of the field
such that the members of the other schools join this school.
This solution must be such that the fundamentals of the field now seem
to be clear, and that further research can build upon them.
The decision for the theory associated with the outstanding solution is
based on a set of scientific values which include scope, accuracy,
predictive power, consistency, and fruitfulness.
Example: Bohr’s atomic model:
• describes distribution of positive and negative charges
• explains discrete emission spectra
• “explains” stability of atoms
49

Normal science is a scientific practice that is characterized by a
consensus of its practitioners about the fundamentals of the
field.
More specifically, it can be described as follows:
1. The consensus about fundamentals of the field provides
scientists with a framework of re-search which they accept.
2. The basis of the consensus are paradigmatic solutions to
concrete scientific problems, the so-called paradigms.
3. The research activity is implicitly governed by the paradigms.
They function as exemplars of successful research.
50

4. Research has analogies to puzzle-solving (in chess puzzles, or crossword
puzzles, or Sudoku puzzles)
- There are an (implicit) set of rules which constrain the solution process and
the criteria for the identification of completed solutions.
- There is an expectation of the existence of a solution. If one fails to achieve
a problem solution, either the problem was badly selected or one failed to
solve a solvable problem.
- The research activity does not aim at innovation of the guiding framework,
i.e., it takes the paradigmatic solutions for granted.
- Contrary to inductivism and deductivism, the research activity cannot be
seen as testing or confirming the guiding rules of science -- if anything is
tested, it is the scientist! Rather, it is the production of new knowledge on
the basis of already existing knowledge.
- The motivation for the activity is less the desire to posses the solution, but
rather the exposition of one's ability to creatively solve problems.
51
17

5. There is a quasi-dogmatic element: the
framework is not called into question.
This is called "quasi-dogmatic" because
- this sort of dogmatism does not hold forever
(see transition to revolutionary science), and
- it is not negatively evaluated.
52

The transition to revolutionary science happens when significant anomalies
turn up which hinder the practice of normal science.
Significant anomalies are anomalies that shed doubt on the prevailing
framework of research.
In normal science, there are always anomalies, i.e., problems that should be
solvable but aren't at the moment
Example: For Darwin’s theory in his time: sex ratio of 1:1 not explainable
Because there are always many possible causes for these anomalies, usually
the guiding framework is not called into question.
But significant anomalies do just that.
Whether an anomaly is a mere anomaly or an significant one is a question of
judgment on which scientists may disagree.
Factors influencing this judgment include a clustering of anomalies or the
persistence of anomalies in spite of prolonged efforts of the best
scientists.
53

Revolutionary science aims at establishing a new framework for research
which makes normal science possible again.
That is, it aims at new paradigmatic solutions.
In the new framework, some of the significant anomalies must be solvable,
and the main achievements of the old framework must be preserved, or
must at least be reproducible.
Competing theories are evaluated according the scientific values mentioned
above (transition to normal science).
Revolutionary science differs from pre-normal science in that there is a
consensus about the significant anomalies which must be solved, and
there is the need to preserve or reproduce the results of an earlier
accepted theory.
However, there are also similarities to pre-normal science which include a
lack of general consensus and the existence of competing schools.
54
18

The transition to a new phase of normal science is called a
scientific revolution.
It happens in analogy to the transition from pre-normal to
normal science due to an extraordinary achievement
Typically, the old phase of normal science is incommensurable
with the new phase of normal science (or the old and the new
guiding theory).
This means that they lack a common measure in three senses:
- they use different sets of concepts, and some of the new
concepts cannot be expressed in terms of the old concepts
and vice versa
Example: wave function in quantum mechanics; concept of
ether in field theory
55

- slightly different sets of data are seen as relevant.
This is because the choice of data and the methods of
their measurement may be influenced by the theories
which make use of them
Example: unaccounted rest of 42”/century of the total
Mercury perihelion precession of 570”/century
- somewhat different scientific values may play a role in
the evaluation of competing theories because these
values may depend on the theories in question
Example: deterministic theories are highly valued in
classical physics whereas probabilistic theories are
accepted in quantum physics
56

It is important to note that incommensurability does
not make theory comparison impossible, but it
makes it more difficult than commonly assumed.
This latter fact helps explain why theory choice in
science is sometimes a lengthy process.
Incommensurability does not only apply to the
relationship between normal science traditions of
fundamental science, but also to the relationships
between the schools of pre-normal science and, in
somewhat modified form, to the relationships
between different cultures.
57
19
4.3 The argument against

normative philosophies of science
The most important tension between the normative
philosophies of science (inductivism and deductivism) and
the descriptive paradigm theory concerns normal science.
From the point of view of the normative philosophies,
normal science is a bad practice of science because of its
quasi-dogmatic element.
The question arises whether the normative philosophies are
right, in which case most of modern science is indeed bad
science, or whether the normative philosophies are wrong
in this respect, in which case normal science is a good
scientific practice (of course, both could be wrong).
58
Against normative philosophies (2)

Paradigm theory defends the practice of normal
science
• by showing that this practice serves vital functions
for the goal of science (knowledge production), and
thus
• that normal science is a reasonable scientific
practice, and consequently,
• that the normative philosophies of science are wrong
in this respect.
The argument runs as follows.
59

The quasi-dogmatic element of normal science provides the
principle which was missing, especially in deductivism: a
principle for the (perhaps only temporary) acceptance of
hypotheses that allows for (temporarily) halting tests.
In this way, emerging difficulties with a theory are not
immediately taken as indicators of its failure in principle, but
as exposing the incapability of the respective scientist.
In this way, the real potential of a theory can be probed.
It has often happened in the history of science that problems
could eventually be solved in the existing research framework.
60
20

However, if people work on a significant anomaly
within the old framework, they may get a deeper
understanding of where exactly the failure of the old
theory lies, and this may prove extremely important
for the invention of alternatives.
Without this principle for the acceptance of theories,
scientist would tend to jump from one theory to the
next without ever knowing their real strengths and
weaknesses.
Thus, the quasi-dogmatic element of normal science
serves the aim of science and it is reasonable.
61

Paradigm theory was first articulated by Thomas
S. Kuhn (1922-1996) in his 1962 bestseller The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
There was a wide-spread discussion of paradigm
theory in many fields which involved many
misunderstandings.
62
4.5 Problems of paradigm theory

The phase model of paradigm theory essentially makes a
statistical statement of the form:
"Typically (or: In most cases), science develops in such a
way . . ."
In the systematic social sciences such as psychology or
sociology, such statistical statements have to be validated
by statistical methods applied to historical evidence.
However, paradigm theory has not done that.
Thus, the validity of paradigm theory’s general statements
about the development of scientific disciplines is
uncertain.
63
21
Problems of paradigm theory (2)

There are serious doubts that the phase model applies
throughout.
Example: Development of General Relativity Theory
(GRT) from 1915 onwards
There was very little normal science after 1919 (when
the solar eclipse confirmed GRT’s prediction about
the bending of light due to the Sun)
However, in the 1950s people started inventing
alternatives to GRT although there were no
significant anomalies!
64
Problems of paradigm theory (3)

In answering this line of criticism, one might simply
accept it with the remark that the difficulty
mentioned is typical for many general statements
about historical processes.
Very often, limited access to historical data prohibits
the use of proper statistical tools.
The systematic social sciences are in a much better
position in this respect because they can often
produce the sort of data that are necessary for
proper statistical analysis.
65
Literature
Chalmers, A.F. (1999): What is This Thing Called Science?
Third Edition. Indianapolis: Hackett, chapter 8.
Hoyningen-Huene, Paul (1993): Reconstructing Scientific
Revolutions. Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, Thomas S. (1970): The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions. 2nd ed. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Preston, John, 2008: Kuhn's "The structure of scientific
revolutions": a reader's guide. London; New York:
Continuum Logo.
66
22

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Prof.

Paul Hoyningen-Huene Theories and Methods of Research

Theories and Methods of

Prof. Paul Hoyningen-Huene

2.1 The basic idea of inductivism

The basic idea of inductivism (2)

The basic idea of inductivism (3)

The basic idea of inductivism (4)

The basic idea of inductivism (5)

The basic idea of inductivism (6)

2.2 Historical remark

2.3 Normative versus descriptive

Normative versus descriptive

2.4 Problems of inductivism

Problems of inductivism (2)

Problems of inductivism (3)

Problems of inductivism (4)

Problems of inductivism (5)

Problems of inductivism (6)

Problems of inductivism (7)

3.2 The demarcation criterion

The demarcation criterion (2)

The demarcation criterion (3)

The demarcation criterion (4)

3.3 Deductive hypothesis testing

Deductive hypothesis testing (2)

3.4 Consequence: fallibilism

Consequence: fallibilism (2)

3.5 Historical remark

3.6 Problems of deductivism

Problems of deductivism (2)

Problems of deductivism (3)

Problems of deductivism (4)

Problems of deductivism (5)

Problems of deductivism (6)

4.1 The basic idea of paradigm theory

4.2 The developmental model of

The developmental model (2)

P -------> N "P" stands for "pre-normal science"

R "R" stands for "revolutionary science"

The developmental model (3)

The developmental model (4)

The developmental model (5)

The developmental model (6)

The developmental model (7)

The developmental model (8)

The developmental model (9)

The developmental model (10)

The developmental model (11)

The developmental model (12)

The developmental model (13)

4.3 The argument against

Against normative philosophies (2)

Against normative philosophies (3)

Against normative philosophies (4)

4.4 Historical remark

4.5 Problems of paradigm theory

Problems of paradigm theory (2)

Problems of paradigm theory (3)

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