New Aspects of Japan's Immigration Policies: Is Population Decline Opening The Doors?

DE GRUYTER
DOI 10.1515/cj-2014-0009 Contemporary Japan 2014; 26(2): 175–196
Open Access
Junichi Akashi
New aspects of Japan’s immigration
policies: is population decline opening
the doors?
Abstract: This paper examines the possible impacts of rapid aging and popula-
tion decline on Japan’s immigration policies. It is commonly understood that
Japanese governments have shown a considerably restrictive attitude toward
the acceptance of foreigners. In fact, immigrants and even foreign workers were
not officially accepted in Japan unless they were highly skilled professionals.
At the same time, recent initiatives such as the Economic Partnership Agree-
ment about foreign health care workers from Indonesia and the Philippines, the
third-country refugee program, and the point system for highly skilled foreign
workers have shown a previously unseen dynamic in the respective policy
fields. Similarly, a larger number of policy recommendations have called for
changes of the current system and the official recognition of immigration. Do
these developments signal a turn in Japanese immigration policies?
This paper gives a comprehensive overview of the current state of Japanese
immigration policies. Considering the background and the consequences of re-
cent policy activities and recommendations, it will be argued that the Japanese
government even now is not intending to open the country to foreigners. This
adhering to past principles is attributable to difficulties in consensus building
and a strong reluctance to make the topic as such a political issue. These prob-
lems can be observed not only on the level of the ministries and government
offices, but also between and within the political parties.
Keywords: immigration policies, foreign workers, population decline
Junichi Akashi: Tsukuba University, e-mail: akashi.junichi.fu@u.tsukuba.ac.jp
1 Introduction
When in 2008 the Japanese population started to shrink, this marked a demo-
graphic turning point in recent Japanese history that has been widely dis-
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176 Junichi Akashi DE GRUYTER
cussed. The society’s rapid aging and the concomitant decline of the working-
age population pose great problems to the social security system, including
medical care and pensions. Worries that the very basis of the Japanese economy
will collapse are getting more pronounced with each year the development
continues. And there is no doubt that it is going to continue for quite some
time.
According to calculations by the National Institute of Population and Social
Security Research, Japan’s present population of approx. 128 million people
will drop below 100 million by 2028 and below 90 million by 2060 (IPSS 2012).
Broadly speaking, the population will shrink about the same extent that it used
to grow since after the Pacific War, but there will be a totally different age
structure. Whereas 50 years ago the share of elderly people (65 years or older)
was around 7 %, it is expected to rise to 40 % within the next 50 years. Like-
wise, only 10 years ago, one older person was supported by 3.56 persons from
the working-age population (15 to 64 years). This ratio will be down to 2.56 in
10 years, and drop to 1.3 in 50 years from now, if developments continue as
predicted (Cabinet Office 2013). No matter what projections are consulted, there
is no doubt that population decline in Japan is unescapable.
While the social implications of this development have come to be analyzed
from various perspectives (e.g., Fujimasa and Furukawa 2000; Matsutani and
Fujimasa 2002; Matsutani 2004; Hiroi 2013), it is certainly no coincidence that
the issue of migration has also become a topic of increased public attention
(Akashi 2009). As the more recent discussions differ from the debates about
foreigners held during the bubble and post-bubble years in the 1980s and
1990s, this calls for a reconsideration of what I will refer to as Japanese “immi-
gration policies.”1
In fact, recent years have seen a couple of noteworthy initiatives in the
respective policy fields: In 2006, new “Guidelines about permanent residence”
(Eijū kyoka ni kan suru gaidorain) were issued; in 2006 and 2007 Economic
Partnership Agreement (EPA) were ratified that provided for the acceptance of
foreign nurses and care workers; in 2010 Japan was the first Asian country to
1 The term “immigration policies” (imin seisaku) as used in this paper refers to policies
designed to regulate the specifics and general orientation regarding the acceptance of foreign-
ers. This includes government decisions about the immigration system and the legal condi-
tions of foreign workers in Japan. Even though the term is not commonly used as a technical
term in Japanese law and administration, it will be shown that in recent years various policies
presupposing a long-term residential system for foreigners have been developed. Moreover,
considering that more than half of Japan’s registered foreign residents hold a permanent or
long-term status, the term “immigration policies” appears feasible to refer to policies in the
respective fields.

DE GRUYTER New aspects of Japan’s immigration policies 177
enact a program for refugees resident in third countries; and in 2012 a point
system for highly skilled foreign workers was introduced. In addition, as will
be shown in Section 4, various policy recommendations have been made that
call for a quicker acceptance of immigrants.
From these developments the following questions arise: Are these political
developments a reflection of the macro changes in the social structure? And if
so, will this bring about a reform of the immigration policies by a self-declared
non-immigrant country that has made much of its ethnic and linguistic homo-
geneity? In other words, will Japan’s immigration policies finally change from
a closed-door to an open-door system? Such change would mean breaking
away from the basic assumption that foreigners in Japan are but temporary
guests. Instead, the legal system would need to be revised in a way that reflects
their acknowledgment as full members of the Japanese society.
In order to answer these questions, this paper explores the most recent
series of political activities and policy recommendations. Section 2 reviews the
previous literature on foreign workers and situates the current approach
against this backdrop. Section 3 takes three recent initiatives directly related to
the issue of immigration and works out their purpose, their systemic properties,
and their effects so far. In addition, the political actors will be located. In a
second step, recent policy recommendations and subsequent discussions re-
garding the acceptance of immigrants will be examined in Section 4.
Data used for this paper include government and other administrative docu-
ments, Diet records, and a larger number of secondary sources. In addition, I took
part in various political discussions and other events related to the topic.
2 Previous research on immigration policies

regarding foreign workers
While earlier discussions about the acceptance of foreigners in Japan have been
extensively studied (see Mori 2002; Nakagawa 2003), research exploring the
political background to the topic has been rather scarce.2 What is generally
agreed upon in this research is that Japanese immigration policies have been
extremely restrictive.
2 This can be understood from the fact that the Japanese Association for Migration Policy
Studies (Imin seisaku gakkai, JAMPS) was founded only in 2008. It is certainly no coincidence
that the establishment of JAMPS occurred around the same time as Japan’s population began
to shrink.

If we look at the bare figures only, Japan’s foreign population of about 2

million registered foreign residents makes up less than 2 % of the total popula-
tion. In comparison with other developed countries — which, to be sure, have
developed in different historical contexts — Japan is still seeing itself as an
ethnically and linguistically homogeneous society. This has evoked criticism
that an economic power like Japan should not — and will not be able to —
maintain its traditional closed-door immigration policies.
As I have claimed in an earlier paper (Akashi 2010), this has been the
predominant view in Japanese immigration policy research. At the same time,
the policies themselves have been taken as a given and the processes during
which they developed have been only poorly studied. Instead, the main focus
has been on the social consequences of immigration to Japan. This is not to
say that research on the policies themselves does not exist. Table 1 gives a list
of publications that deal with the topic in the context of foreign workers in
Japan. For reasons of space, it summarizes only those aspects that are relevant
for the present discussion.
Table 1 : Literature analyzing Japanese policies toward foreign workers.
Reference Main focus of analysis Main variables/framework
Kajita (1994) Acceptance of foreign workers National labor market

National identity
European experiences
Koike (1996) Policies regarding foreign workers Policy subsystems
Ministry of Labour Advocacy coalition framework
Bartram (2000, 2005) Policies regarding foreign workers Strong bureaucracy
Kuwahara (2002) Policies regarding foreign workers Policy networks
Trainee system
1989 Revision of Immigration Law
Akashi (2006, 2009, Policies regarding foreign workers Sectionalism
2010) Immigration policies Historical path dependency
Fujii (2007) Policies regarding foreign workers Security issues
Labor–management coopera-
tion
Hamaguchi (2010) Policies regarding foreign workers Sectionalism
Ministry of Labour
Hosono (2011) Policies regarding foreign workers Policy subsystems
EPA Advocacy coalition framework
An (2013) Policies regarding foreign workers Welfare regime
Policy networks

For example, Koike (1996) uses an advocacy coalition framework to examine

the political circumstances that led to the introduction of the trainee system
(ginō jisshū seido) in the first half of the 1990s and the role of the Ministry of
Labour.3 Using a similar theoretical approach, Hosono (2011) analyzes the poli-
cy formation processes behind the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) that
regulates the acceptance of nursing and caregiving professionals from the Phil-
ippines (see next section). Kuwahara (2002) applies policy network theory to
explore the policies designed to regulate the influx of foreign workers in the
second half of the 1980s. An (2013) works out the theoretical implications of
foreign workers with respect to the welfare system. Not subscribing to a specific
theoretical frame, Akashi (2006) conducted interviews with various stakehold-
ers to study the political dynamics that shaped the 1989 revision of the Immi-
gration Control and Refugee Recognition Act and the acceptance of nikkeijin
and foreign trainees.
As can be seen, there is a large variety of theories, research frames, and
variables in recent immigration policy research in Japan. The spectrum reaches
from studies with a strong theoretical focus to more empirical approaches like
that of Hamaguchi (2010). While all these studies are methodologically sound
and contribute to the general theory of political processes, there are various
limitations.
First of all, each of these studies deals with only one single aspect of immi-
gration policies. While this brings to light the stakeholders’ interests for a spe-
cific issue, it does not sufficiently work out the overall characteristics of Japa-
nese immigration policies in a broader sense.
Secondly, and leaving aside some more recent research on the nursing and
caring EPA, most previous studies concentrate on the 1980s and 1990s. As the
next section will show, the rather dramatic developments of the present and
the very recent past, including the shrinking of the Japanese population, have
not yet received sufficient attention. This also applies to studies like Kajita
(1994), Bartram (2000, 2005), and Fujii (2007), which emphasize the historical
factors that shaped Japanese immigration policies.
A third limitation of previous research is the reliance on a specific theoreti-
cal model or concept such as policy network theory, sectionalism, or the advo-
cacy coalition framework. Also, there is a general tendency to focus on the
leading role of the bureaucracy. In other words, it is the ministries and agencies
that are perceived to have the largest impact on immigration policies.
Previous research thus is not necessarily feasible if we are to examine the
impact of Japan’s recent population decline on Japanese immigration policies.
3 Since 2001 the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.

As the acceptance of immigrants is a topic that can be much easier politicized

than the earlier initiatives with regard to foreign workers, such policies cannot
likely be determined by the respective government agencies alone. Being a top-
ic with great future implications for the host society, the choice for or against
immigration is increasingly becoming subject to politicians’ values and assess-
ments. For a better understanding of immigration policies in population-declin-
ing Japan, it is thus essential to not pre-assume a dominating role of the politi-
cal bureaucracy.
The analysis in this paper attempts to take a more comprehensive approach
that includes various policy domains and political actors. This approach will
also enable us to re-evaluate the validity of previous concepts and theories and
hopefully contribute to a better theoretical understanding of Japanese immigra-
tion policies as a whole.
3 Recent policy developments and their

implications
The last couple of years have seen some very dynamic developments in Japa-
nese immigration policy. The main issues have been summarized in Table 2.
To start with, in 2006 the Ministry of Justice issued the Guidelines about
the Permission for Permanent Residence. Two years later, the aforementioned
nursing and caring EPAs with Indonesia and the Philippines (and later Viet-
nam) began, and have since been widely discussed in the relevant literature
(Yamasaki 2006; Asato 2007; Yamamoto 2009). In 2010, Japan joined the UN’s
third-country resettlement initiative and started a pilot program of taking in
refugees. While Japan has regularly been criticized by NGOs and other organi-
zations for its closed-door attitude toward refugees, the cabinet decision to join
the program was hailed by some as a possible turning point in Japanese refugee
policies (e.g., Ishikawa 2011). 2012 then saw the introduction of the Points-
Based System for Highly Skilled Foreign Professionals. Persons accepted to the
system under certain conditions will be able to bring parents or maids, and
may apply for permanent residence after only five years of stay in Japan.4
4 As more recently reported, the government is now even considering the introduction of a
“new permanent residence” (atarashii eijūken) which would require only three years of previ-
ous stay (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 2013).

Table 2: Recent policy developments related to immigration issues.
3/2006 Guidelines about the Permission for Permanent Residence (Eijū kyoka ni kan
suru gaidorain)
10/2007 Mandatory notification of status of foreign workers (Gaikokujin koyō jōkyō to-
dokede no gimuka)
11/2007 Regulation for foreigners to provide biometric identification information on
landing (Partial Amendment of the Immigration and Refugee Recognition Act)
5/2008 Outline of the Plan for 300,000 Exchange Students (Ryūgakusei no 30man
nin keikaku)
7/2008 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) on care and nursing staff exchange
with Indonesia, Philippines, and later Vietnam
12/2008 Pilot program for third-country refugees
1/2009 Office for the Coordination of Policies for Foreign Residents (Teijū gaikokujin
hōsaku suishin shitsu); further developed into Conference for the Promotion
of Policies for Foreign Residents of Japanese Descent (3/2009), Basic Guide-
lines related to Policies for Foreign Residents of Japanese Descent (8/2010),
and Action Plan about Policies for Foreign Residents of Japanese Descent (3/
2011)
3/2009 Notification about the handling of job-hunting activities by exchange stu-
dents after graduation
7/2009 Amendment of the Immigration and Refugee Recognition Act (Shutsunyūkoku
kanri oyobi nanmin nintei hō), including new status of residence system (in
effect since 7/2012), revision of status of residence types, extension of maxi-
mal period of stay from 3 to 5 years, Special Re-entry System, Supervision
Committee for Immigrant Detention Centers, etc.
3/2010 Fourth Immigration Control Master Plan (Dai 4 ji shutsunyūkoku kanri kihon
keikaku)
5/2012 Points-based System for Highly Skilled Foreign Professionals (Gaikokujin
kōdo jinzai pointosei )
5/2012 Review Conference on the realization of a society of coexistence with foreign-
ers (gaikokujin to no kyōsei shakai )
Though different in orientation, the policies described above either facili-

tate residence in Japan or take it as a precondition. But can this be seen as a
turning point in Japanese immigration policies from a closed-door to an open-
door system? As my analysis will show, this question cannot be answered in
the affirmative. To support this claim, we will have a look at the following
aspects for each of these policies: (i) purpose, (ii) system, and (iii) effects.
Starting with the 2006 guidelines about permanent residence, their purpose
was already announced in earlier government initiatives toward regulatory re-
form, but this did not contribute to changing the system in a way as to alleviate
the conditions for permanent residence themselves. Thus in effect, the guide-

lines did not have an influence on the number of permanent residence permis-
sions.5
The purpose of the nursing and caring EPA was mainly foreign-policy
based. Domestically, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) has
continued to take a negative view on the employment of foreign nurses and
care workers and has refused to acknowledge their recruitment as a solution
to labor shortages in the health sector. Suggestions by private organizations
were reacted to in a similarly negative way. If foreign workers were to be accept-
ed at all, so the Ministry’s stance, this should be done under very strict condi-
tions only.
One organization that is frequently mentioned as a stern opponent of any
alleviation of the conditions for immigration is the Japanese Nursing Associa-
tion (Nihon kango kyōkai) and its political arm, the Japan Nursing Federation
(Nihon kango renmei). It is well known that these two organizations have strong
links to the Nursing Division of the MHLW’s Health Policy Bureau (Kōsei rōdō-
shō iseikyoku kangoka). This mechanism helps to strengthen the network be-
tween public and private organs in Japan’s nursing care business.
In addition, the influence of politicians who take the above organizations
as their power bases must not be ignored. Thus trained nurse and former Minis-
ter of Justice Chieko Nohno stipulated that all foreigners who want to work in
the domestic nursing care business must have just the same skills and qualifi-
cations as their Japanese colleagues, which also includes passing the national
nursing exam.6 Two current politicians representing the interests of the nursing
business are the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) representatives Toshiko Abe,
former deputy director of the Japanese Nursing Association, and Emiko Taka-
gai, who is the present executive director of the organization. The frequently
quoted iron triangle that links politicians, the state bureaucracy, and the busi-
ness sector is very alive here.
Two peculiarities about the system are the upper limit of possible appli-
cants and the requirement to pass the national nursing exam within the given
time frame. As a result, in the past five years less than 2,000 foreign nursing
care professionals have applied for the two programs, of which so far less than
300 eventually passed the test.
5 While it is true that the number of permissions in 2006 for the first time exceeded 50,000
and in the following year even 60,000, the number subsequently dropped back to the level
of 2000. These figures coincide with the overall decrease of foreigners after the “Lehman
Shock” in 2008 and the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 (numbers from http://
www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyukan_nyukan42.html; accessed 28 March 2014).
6 Statement made at the Upper House Special Committee for Administrative Reform (Sangiin
gyōsei kaikaku ni kan suru tokubetsu iinkai), 23 May 2006.

The purpose of the third-country refugee program is somewhat obscure.

Briefly before the Japanese government in 2007 started discussing the frame-
work, the High Commissioner of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), António
Guterres, visited Japan and talked with his predecessor, Sadako Ogata.7 It may
well be possible that the main intention to join the program was to sweep away
criticism about Japan being a closed country for refugees.
However that may be, the project faced only minor political opposition
and was supported by all parliamentary factions, which shows there was some
substantial political backup. From the point of view of the system, however, it
must be kept in mind that this is merely a pilot program that provides for an
annual maximum of 30 persons. In fact, in 2012 not a single refugee came to
Japan under the program, and the total of accepted persons so far is still below
70. This shows that, similar to the EPA scheme, the effect of the respective
policies is minimal.
As for the 2012 point system for highly skilled foreign professionals, prepa-
rations had already been started ten years earlier. A Cabinet meeting in June
2002 adopted structural reform principles that explicitly included the promo-
tion of a “brain gain” (zunō ryūnyū) and an enhanced employment of “highly
skilled overseas human resources” (kaigai no kōdo jinzai). This has been sup-
ported by the business sector from the start, without any sizable opposition
from labor circles.
Yet there are also critical views on the laxer conditions for permanent resi-
dence, the possibility to invite family members, and an expansion of the system
in general (see Gotō 2013; MOFA 2011). And even though the 2010 Fourth Immigra-
tion Control Master Plan by the Ministry of Justice mentions the purpose to “ac-
tively promote immigration policies” (MOJ 2010: 2), the hurdles for an applicant
to be admitted are actually quite high. One consequence is that the effective num-
ber of people who came to Japan under the program so far has remained below
2,000 in total, which was the target number set by the government for the first
year only. Like with the EPA scheme and the third-country refugee program, the
point system thus remains faced with a number of institutional constraints.
In sum, the systemic properties of the recent policy measures suggest that it
is still a long way to an open-door policy. Also, the discussions accompanying the
introduction of these measures have centered on the however slight opening of
the door itself, but have not seriously considered the integration of foreigners as
full members of the Japanese society. In effect, immigration so far has failed to
have any sizable impact on the labor market or the population development.
7 According to UNHCR press release from 27 November 2007, see http://www.unhcr.or.jp/

news/press/pr071127.html (accessed 28 March 2014).

Ironically, this has invited a series of fragmentary revisions and amend-

ments of the policies. In the case of the EPA scheme, for instance, the maximum
period of stay has been extended and some modifications have been made to
make the nursing exam questions more easily understandable for non-Japanese
test takers. Kanji have been supplemented by Furigana, the names of diseases
are now given in both Japanese and English, and easier Japanese expressions
are used. In addition, the test taking time has been extended (MHLW 2012).
Likewise, the third-country refugee program was extended for two more years
and various steps were taken to broaden the pool of possible candidates (Cabi-
net Secretariat 2012a). Comparable initiatives had to be implemented with re-
gard to the low number of successful applicants of the point system for skilled
foreign workers (see MOJ 2013a, 2013b).
All in all, then, we can summarize as follows: As the recent plans and
programs do acknowledge permanent residence under specified conditions,
they may well be called a breakthrough in Japan’s hitherto closed-door policies.
On the other hand, it cannot be said that there is any evidence for a real turning
point in these developments.8
4 Recent policy suggestions and the

government’s (non-)reaction
The previous section has discussed the major developments in Japanese immi-
gration policies. As could be seen, it is a fact that a number of systemic changes
have been implemented in the last couple of years. It is difficult, however, to
perceive of these changes as a real reform of Japanese immigration policies
that would entail the acceptance of foreigners as full members of the society.
This can be confirmed when looking at the series of recent policy recom-
mendations about immigration and how they failed to be included in actual
policy making. Table 3 summarizes the major proposals and requests regarding
structural changes of the Japanese immigration system and the acceptance of
foreign workers.
8 Incidentally, the same can be said of the new registration system provided by the 2009
Amendment of the Immigration and Refugee Recognition Act. Though under the new system
foreign residents are included in the communities’ basic resident register (jūmin kihon daichō),
the ultimate purpose of this policy is to build up a database on foreign nationals in Japan
(see also Akashi 2012, 2013).

Table 3: Main policy suggestions about immigration (2007–2013).
# Date Organization/Title Relevant contents
1 3/2007 Japanese Business Federation: – introduce test to assess balance of

“Secondary suggestions for the labor supply and demand
acceptance of foreigners” – consider restricted number of foreign
(Keidanren 2007) workers to secure human resources
2 6/2008 LDP, Division of National Strategy: – 1 0 million immigrants (ca. 10 % of
“Opening the country to human the total population)
resources! Proposal for a Japa- – large-scale structural reforms of the
nese-style immigration policy” legal system
(LDP 2008a)
3 7/2008 LDP, Division of National Strategy: – short-term admittance of foreign work-
“Recommendations for the estab- ers without restrictions on occupa-
lishment of a system for short- tion/business type
term foreign workers” (LDP 2008b) – determine upper limit for each year
– maximum period of stay 3 years
4 7/2008 Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and – make up for the shrinking working-
Industry: “Opinion on the accep- age population by increasing immigra-
tance of foreign workers and the tion
revision of the trainee and techni- – desirable to grant permanent resi-
cal intern program” (TCCI 2008) dence under given conditions
5 9/2008 Japan Economic Research Insti- – softening of employment permits and
tute: “Issues and directions about better development of foreign capaci-
the acceptance of foreign work- ties
ers” (Nikkeichō 2008) – revision of current status of residence
categories and introduction of a “spe-
cially skilled person” (tokutei ginō
jinzai) category
6 10/2008 Japan Business Federation: “Out- – increase acceptance of skilled foreign
line of an economic system feasi- workers in specific fields to sustain
ble to deal with population de- the economic system
cline” (Keidanren 2008)
7 6/2009/ Japan Immigration Policy Institute: – necessary transformation of Japan
9/2009 “The concept of Japanese-style im- into an immigration country through
migration policy” (JIPI 2009) bringing in foreign nationals in a
large number
– educational measures to avoid fric-
tions with host society
8 5/2010 Council on Population Education: – introduction of Japanese-style immi-
“Seven proposals for Japan to re- gration policies and quick opening of
establish its place as a respected the country to human resources (jin-
member of the international com- zai kaikaku)
munity” (Jinkō mondai kyōgikai – permanent residence
2010) – education and training in Japan, incl.
Japanese language

Table 3: (continued)
# Date Organization/Title Relevant contents
9 11/2010 Japan Forum on International Rela- – cautious consideration of unskilled

tions: “Prospects and challenges foreign workers
for the acceptance of foreign – identify sectors suffering from labor
migrants to Japan” (JFIR 2010) shortage and accelerate human re-
source development
10 3/2011 Sasakawa Peace Foundation: – introduce employment permit system
“Responding to new demographic and labor market tests
trends” (Sasakawa Peace Founda- – consider acceptance of more immi-
tion 2011) grants in the health sector and for
household tasks
11 5/2013 Kansai Association of Corporate – revision of immigration law to deal
Executives: “Revitalizing Japan with labor shortages in farming, for-
through the promotion of perma- estry, and fishery
nent foreign residents” (Kansai – public supports targeted at settled
Keizai Doyukai 2013) migrants
– foundation of a “foreigners’ office”
(gaikokujinchō)
– raise budget for relevant projects
As previously described, the recent emergence of these discussions must be

seen in the context of growing anxieties about population decline, which has
been given much public attention particularly since 2008, the year the Japanese
population factually started to shrink. Even before that there had been reasons
to worry though. There was the labor shortage during the bubble years in the
late 1980s, and the economic recession of the 1990s, which also saw the peak
and subsequent decline of the working-age population. Less than ten years on,
the decline of the total population and the pessimistic prospects this will entail
for the Japanese economy started to become the main issue. The series of policy
suggestions by business leaders and think tanks throughout the last couple of
years must be seen in direct relationship to these demographic facts. They ques-
tion not only the existing immigration system but, on a deeper level, the accep-
tance of foreigners in Japanese society as such.
However, as remarked in the previous section, Japanese governments and
their bureaucracies have been rather unresponsive to such public interjections.
One likely reason for this, as frequently mentioned in the literature, is the diffi-
culty of consensus building. Research on present and past immigration pol-
icies — the integration of nikkeijin from South America, the foreign trainee pro-
gram around the 1990s, as well as more recent initiatives like the care worker
EPA scheme — has identified a lack of consensus between the political actors

and pronounced sectionalism between the government agencies (Akashi 2006,

2010; Vogt 2007). Even if opposition doesn’t necessarily show at the surface, it
can be assumed that consensus building between the political actors will be
further complicated when it comes to the procurement of foreign labor.
One indication for such lack of consent can be found in the differing views
expressed in the policy recommendations themselves. Thus the examples in
Table 3 are far from uniform in their orientation and at times show quite funda-
mental differences. For instance, while suggestions such as #2, #7, and #8 advo-
cate permanent residence as a solution to the demographic problems, #1, #3,
#5, #6, and #9 recommend only temporary acceptance of foreign workers.
These gaps can be found even within the parties. One of the recommenda-
tions that advocate permanent residence is the 2008 “Opening the country to
human resources!” plan (#2). It was developed by the LPD’s Division of Nation-
al Strategy, represented by the party’s heavyweight, former secretary general
and cabinet secretary Hidenao Nakagawa (Akashi and Ogawa 2008; Sakanaka
2011; Roberts 2012). Also from the LDP, and almost around the same time, came
the “Recommendations for the introduction of a system for short-term foreign
workers” (#3), which, as can already be understood from the title, takes an
entirely different view on the issue.
Of the two reports, the former was given higher media attention, though
the most likely reason for this is that this rather bold scheme was presented by
a representative of the ruling party’s main faction, rather than the fact that it
was considered particularly realistic. In retrospect, neither the former nor the
latter plan seems to have had any noticeable impact on actual policy making
so far.
As can be seen in Table 3, the “Opening the country to human resources!”
(#2) plan proposes a total number of no less than 10 million immigrants in
Japan by 2050. This figure was clearly inspired by suggestions from the Japan
Immigration Policy Institute (JIPI), which was founded by Hidenori Sakanaka,
a former bureaucrat of the Ministry of Justice (see #7). Having attended various
meetings of the aforementioned LDP Division of National Strategy at which
Sakanaka was present, too, my general impression was that even within this
group little consensus building seemed to be undertaken. Opinions consider-
ably differed about the number of 10 million immigrants (for details, see Akashi
and Ogawa 2008), and there was even reluctance to use the term imin [immi-
grants/immigration] itself, though Sakanaka’s original plan finally came to be
accepted.
Noteworthy is that the awareness to avoid the term imin did not seem to
change much when the LDP after three years was re-elected into government
in December 2012. Their former Alliance of Diet Members to Promote the Ex-

change of Foreign Human Resources (Gaikoku jinzai kōryū giin renmei) was
subsequently renamed into Alliance of Diet Members for International Human
Resources (Kokusai jinzai giin renmei). The newly appointed representative of
the group is Yuriko Koike, former head of the LDP’s public relations section.
She was reported saying that while seeing the necessity of admitting foreign
workers, she would prefer the term “international human resources” (kokusai
jinzai) over “foreign human resources” (gaikoku jinzai). She also mentioned that
the term imin was prone to provoke fierce opposition (Arima 2013).
While usage of the term imin has increased in debates of the Diet, the
current government is clearly not in favor of immigration. A reform of immigra-
tion policies is not a major issue in Abenomics, the current prime minister’s
program of pro-growth economic policies. Although the Abe administration,
anticipating a labor shortage in the construction industry for the 2020 Tokyo
Olympics and other key sectors, recently announced to consider the expansion
of the current temporary migrant workers scheme, their main answers to the
country’s shrinking working-age population are the promotion of female work-
force participation, increasing birthrates, greater labor market flexibility, and
the employment of senior citizens, among others. And even though it is expect-
ed that a facilitation of the procedures for short-stay business meetings will be
raised as a topic in the current TPP negotiations, it is highly unlikely that
immigration or the issue of the so-called “unskilled workers” (tanjun rōdōsha)
will be dealt with. To be sure, some progress has been made in specific fields,
such as the IT sector, where a mutual acknowledgment of qualifications with
other countries has been promoted. However, even here the national exams
remain a major obstacle in many professions. In other words, both with respect
to Abenomics and the TPP negotiations, there is no indication of a reform of
the system toward an open-door policy.
On 23 May 2013, MP Katsuhiko Eguchi of Your Party mentioned the term
“immigration policies” (imin seisaku) during a meeting of the House of Council-
ors’ Committee on the topic of regional reorganization. Anticipating opposition
due to anxieties about regional autonomy with regard to immigration, he asked
Prime Minster Abe for a clarification on this point. While this constituted one
of very rare occasions for an incumbent Japanese prime minister to talk about
immigration policies at all, Abe’s reply was rather non-committal in stating that
this was an issue that related to the very “foundation of the state” (kokka no
konkan) and that the government would “take a proactive role in deciding”
(shutaiteki ni kimete iku) on this issue.
A few days in advance of this event, the topic had already been dealt with
at the Lower House Judicial Affairs Committee. On 10 May 2013, Tsuyoshi Shii-
na, also member of Your Party at the time, made an inquiry about the afore-

mentioned LDP recommendations for large-scale immigration that had been

issued by its Division of National Strategy (#2) and demanded clarification by
the government. Minister of Justice Sadakazu Tanigaki replied by pointing out
that there was not the necessary consensus on the part of the society and also
raised the issue of public safety in this context. Therefore, the government
would continue its cautious approach to the topic.
Indeed, the lack of consensus by the population and the issue of public
safety appear to be two of the main bricks in the logic of the government’s
playing-it-safe approach. With regard to the former, public opinion polls by the
government itself address this topic merely by asking about foreign workers
(gaikokujin rōdōsha). According to the most recent survey from 2004, 26 % com-
pletely reject unskilled foreign workers, while 39 % accept their admission on
condition that labor shortages could not be made up for even with women
and elderly citizens being recruited, and 17 % accept their admission without
conditions (Cabinet Office 2004). These figures suggest that more than half of
the population considers foreign workers to be at least an option. The govern-
ment does not normally refer to these data.9
Data about crimes by foreigners are annually published by the National
Police Agency.10 According to these statistics, the number of cases involving
foreigners peaked in 2005, while the number of arrested persons was highest
in 2004. Both numbers dropped subsequently, which is also reflected in opinion
polls about public safety. Whereas in 2006, 55 % of the respondents saw foreign
crime as the main reason for the worsening of public safety, less than 30 %
expressed this view in 2012 (Cabinet Office 2006, 2012).
As can be seen, both the argument about missing public consent and the
concern about public safety lack clear empirical evidence. Nevertheless they
continue to be given as the two main reasons for the government’s reservations
about immigration. Japanese governments have done their best to strengthen
the overall impression that the Japanese population has a “reclusive” (heisa-
teki) view on foreigners and, at the same time, not make the topic of immigra-
tion as such a political issue.
And this trend is observable not only for the long post-war rule of the LDP.
For example, in the early 2000s, a group of young Diet members consisting of
Motohisa Furukawa, Takeaki Matsumoto, and Goshi Hosono of the Democratic
Party of Japan (DPJ), officially advocated a future number of 10 million immi-
9 Possible differences in public opinion with regard to different groups or specifications of

foreigners such as migrants (imin), refugees (nanmin), foreign workers (gaikokujin rōdōsha),
etc., remain a topic for future research.
10 See http://www.npa.go.jp/toukei/index.htm#kokusaihanzai (accessed 28 March 2014).

grants. But although all three of them were to hold important positions during
the subsequent three years of DPJ rule — Furukawa became Minister of State
for Special Missions, Matsumoto Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Hosono DPJ
Secretary General, among others — no concrete policy making on the topic of
migration was ever undertaken. This shows that even politicians who express
a positive stance toward immigration policy reform revoke their former state-
ments once they hold a position in state affairs.
To give another example, under DPJ rule in 2012, the Cabinet Secretariat set
up a Review Conference on the Implementation of Coexistence with Foreigners
(Gaikokujin to no kyōsei jitsugen kentō kaigi).11 It was led by Masaharu Naka-
gawa, then Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, and
a well-known proponent of an open-door immigration policy. But even though
one major aim of the conference was to stimulate discussion about immigration
in a broader sense, it merely resulted in a confirmation of previously declared
intentions to improve the conditions for foreigners already resident in Japan
(Cabinet Secretariat 2012b). Nakagawa’s more progressive view on the issue was
clearly not reflected here. When I had the chance to bring up this point during
a lecture I gave to DPJ Diet members in February 2012, I was told that a certain
segment of the public expressed strong opposition toward Nakagawa’s previous
statements on the issue. Within the DPJ, too, there are many skeptics, rendering
consensus building a very difficult endeavor.
The critical position of the DPJ can also be understood from a discussion
at the House of Councilors’ Committee on Judicial Affairs on 22 March 2012.
Here, LDP Diet member Kazuya Maruyama stated the necessity to accept foreign
immigrants in order to deal with Japan’s demographic ailments. He then con-
fronted Toshio Ogawa, who was the DPJ’s Minister of Justice at the time, with
this question, about which he said he had so far received no clear answer from
the minister. Ogawa’s reply was a mere replication of common positions, hold-
ing that countermeasures to the falling birthrate should be given priority and
that consensus by the people was important.
Even though LDP’s Maruyama expressed such a positive stance toward the
topic, many of his own party members take an entirely different view on the
issue. This can be seen from a discussion at the House of Representatives’
Committee on the Cabinet that took place on 7 March 2012. During the discus-
sion LDP Diet member Seiko Noda confronted aforementioned Nakagawa as
incumbent Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology with
his previous statements about a desirable increase of immigration to Japan. She
11 See http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/kyousei (accessed 28 March 2014).

expressed great astonishment about the minister’s point of view on the topic
and called for a clear statement that “the Japanese come first” (mazu saisho ni
Nihonjin ariki) (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 2012). Obviously, this is in great contrast
to fellow LDP member Maruyama’s position, showing that opinions strongly
differ within the LDP, too. By the way, the above mentioned Review Conference
on the Implementation of Coexistence with Foreigners of the Cabinet Secretariat
was suspended when the LDP retook government.
In summary, we can say that even though the DPJ came to power around
the same time that Japan’s population started to shrink, immigration failed to
become a major political issue under their rule, and nothing much has changed
since the LDP took over in 2012. Both in government and in opposition the two
parties have done little consensus building and have continued to show a very
cautious attitude on the topic. Particularly when in government, strong efforts
tend to be undertaken to keep immigration a political non-issue.
Among the many likely reasons for the government’s reluctance to deal
with the topic is that a substantial increase in immigration would also bring
up the issue of the immigrants’ most frequent countries of origin. For example,
when the previously mentioned LDP Division of National Strategy in 2008 pre-
sented their plan about 10 million immigrants, right-wing groups organized
protest rallies with banners reading “Save Japan from the China-people inva-
sion” (Shinajin no jinkō shinryaku kara Nihon o mamore). Moreover, LDP’s Hide-
nori Sakanaka himself, who as previously mentioned was largely in charge of
promoting the plan, more recently suggested that care would have to be taken
in finding the right balance with regard to the ethnic makeup of immigrants
(Sakanaka 2013). It can be assumed that the trouble-ridden relationship with
China and Korea will remain a major obstacle in future discussions on immigra-
tion (see also Akashi 2010).
Leaving aside the discussions in mostly anonymous Internet forums, open
opposition against immigration at present is restricted to a handful of conserva-
tive intellectuals and revisionist political groups. Nevertheless, it rarely hap-
pens that politicians, let alone those with official functions, mention the prob-
lems of ethnicity and their possible implications for foreign relations that may
result from larger-scale immigration. Particularly government officials have
gone out of their way to not discuss these issues in public. These attitudes will
most likely help retain the political silence that has been a main characteristic
of Japanese immigration policies past and present.

5 Conclusion
This paper has started with the question of whether the recent phenomenon of
population decline has brought about a turning point in Japanese immigration
policies. In fact, recent years have seen lively political activities on the topic,
as also testified to by a larger number of policy recommendations. This being
said, however, a closer analysis of the background and the effects of these
developments reveals that Japan has not substantially deviated from its tradi-
tional closed-door policies. The issue of immigration as such has not been
spelled out as a prior political topic, and so far no thorough discussion has
taken place. One reason for this is lacking consensus building on the part of
the main political actors.
The negative stance toward immigration on the part of the government has
traditionally been explained by sectionalism and opposition of the government
bureaucracies. How then are we to interpret the recent situation, with its nu-
merous policy plans and recommendations that bring in the issue of immigra-
tion as one way to deal with the country’s demographic predicaments?
The analysis has shown that differing interests between and even within
the parties have impeded a consolidation of opinions. Particularly the govern-
ment has been most eager to avoid making immigration a political issue. Rather
than fundamental reform, the status quo has been left largely unchanged, some
small-scale revisions notwithstanding. Difficulties in consensus building, both
in the bureaucracy and the political parties, are one of the main reasons for
this.
As could be seen in Section 3, recent initiatives like the EPA scheme, the
third-country refugee program, and the point system for highly skilled foreign
workers, all have suffered from rather strict requirements with regard to their
upper limits and other specifications. As a result, they have had relatively mi-
nor effects in reality, and subsequent improvements have been mostly cosmetic.
A systematic approach with clear goals and principles is not identifiable.
Even faced with the prospects of large-scale population aging and decrease,
Japanese governments have continued to adhere to past principles and
shunned away from initiating any serious debate on the topic. What we do
see is a number of time-lagged, incremental reactions that may well result in
peripheral, local changes of the legal system, but they are not likely to bring
about any fundamental changes to the basically negative stance on immigra-
tion as a whole. Of course it should not be ruled out of hand that the recent
flood of political activities and recommendations in fact indicates an upcoming
turning point. Even if this were the case, however, we will need to closely
examine the political reactions to the growing socioeconomic pressures of Ja-

pan’s demographic developments and what real impacts they will have on fu-
ture immigration policy making.
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New Aspects of Japan's Immigration Policies: Is Population Decline Opening The Doors?

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DE GRUYTER

DOI 10.1515/cj-2014-0009 Contemporary Japan 2014; 26(2): 175–196

Junichi Akashi: Tsukuba University, e-mail: akashi.junichi.fu@u.tsukuba.ac.jp

© 2014, Walter de Gruyter GmbH.

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2 Previous research on immigration policies

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If we look at the bare figures only, Japan’s foreign population of about 2

Table 1 : Literature analyzing Japanese policies toward foreign workers.

Reference Main focus of analysis Main variables/framework

Kajita (1994) Acceptance of foreign workers National labor market

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For example, Koike (1996) uses an advocacy coalition framework to examine

3 Since 2001 the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.

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As the acceptance of immigrants is a topic that can be much easier politicized

3 Recent policy developments and their

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Table 2: Recent policy developments related to immigration issues.

Though different in orientation, the policies described above either facili-

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The purpose of the third-country refugee program is somewhat obscure.

7 According to UNHCR press release from 27 November 2007, see http://www.unhcr.or.jp/

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Ironically, this has invited a series of fragmentary revisions and amend-

4 Recent policy suggestions and the

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Table 3: Main policy suggestions about immigration (2007–2013).

# Date Organization/Title Relevant contents

1 3/2007 Japanese Business Federation: – introduce test to assess balance of

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# Date Organization/Title Relevant contents

9 11/2010 Japan Forum on International Rela- – cautious consideration of unskilled

As previously described, the recent emergence of these discussions must be

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and pronounced sectionalism between the government agencies (Akashi 2006,

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mentioned LDP recommendations for large-scale immigration that had been

9 Possible differences in public opinion with regard to different groups or specifications of

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11 See http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/kyousei (accessed 28 March 2014).

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