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    of 211
    ISBN 0-393-03925-0 le ts 1942. Germany controls almost the entire resources of continental Europe and is poised to move into the Middle East, Japan has wiped out the western colonial pres- ence in East Asia in a couple of months and is threatening northern India and Australia. The Soviet Union has lost the heart of its industry, and the United States is not yet armed. Democracy has had its day. The Allied victory in 1945 has since come to seem inevitable. It was not. In Richard Overy’s incisive analysis, we see exactly how the Allies regained military superior- ity and why they were able to do it. Overy offers a brilliant analysis of the decisive campaigns: the war at sea, the crucial battles on the eastern front, the air war, and the vast amphibious assault on Europe. ‘The eastern front was critical. Having lost four mil- lion men and tens of thousands of tanks and air- craft in the first six months of fighting, the Soviet Union was able to relocate its industrial base to the (continued om back lap) Jacket design by Walter Harper Photograph by Yevgeny Chaldey/Vollerernst. Courtesy of Howard Schiekler Fine Art. Inset National Archives. 4-96 (continues from fron flap) east, intensify its industrial production, and defeat the German forces at Stalingrad and Kursk. This was the turning point, the victory of one authoritar~ ian system over another. Overy also explores the deeper factors affecting military success and failure: industrial strength, fighting ability, the quality of leadership, and the moral dimensions of the war. RICHARD OVERY has published extensively on the history of World War Il and the Third Reich. He is professor of modern history at King’s College, London, where he has taught since 1980, His work on World War Il has been praised as “highly effec- tive [in] the ruthless dispelling of myths” (A. J. P. Taylor), “original and important” (New York Review of Books), and “at the cutting edge” (Times Liter- ary Supplement). Printed inthe United States of America ISBN 0-393-03925-0 | | iii] | é 9"780595!'059252' WHY THE ALLIES WON By the same author ‘Wittiam Moss, Viscoust NUFELD THe Aim Wat, 1939-1945 “Twe Nazi Economie Recoveny ‘Gotnina: Di Ikon Man” ‘Au. Our Wonnine Liv (wth Peter Pagnameata) ‘Tw Onsins o rt Secon Wonto Wat Te Roab To War (with Andrew Wheatrot) ‘Wak avo Ecoseont is tH Tito REICH Tae Ivrex Wak CUS, 1919-1939 WHY THE ALLIES WON Richard Overy pmsl y-W- NORTON & COMPANY New York — London v apyigh ©1995 ty Rishrd Overy AI hs send iid inthe Une Sts of Asie Foriarmato tot permsin to erode eens 1W.¥, Norn Cary ne S00 ith Avene New Yor NY 1611, Lubray of Congress Catalogo Paintin Data ‘Wy the ales won! Rca Ove locus iingaphislefernses an inde isi osouanase Wor War 19304988. 2 Seats. Tile ‘nosis ossuuscir |W. Nora Campy eID Fith Avenue New York NY 1110 1W- Noro Compr Li 10Caple Ses, Landon WC1A FPL For Kim, with love Contents Preface ‘Author's Note Unpredictable Victory: Explaining World War I Litle Ships and Lonely Aiceft: The Battle forthe Sas Deep War: Stalingsad and Kursk Te Meas to Vielory: Bombers and Bombing ‘Along 2 Good Road: The Invasion of France [A Genius for Mass-production: Economies at War ‘A War of Engines: Technology and Military Power Impossible Unity Allies and Leaders in War Evil Things, Excellent Things: The Moral Contest Why the Allies Won Epilogue Appendix Notes Selected Reading Ms ah a4 6 a a Illustrations {following page 176) {A 1961 cartoon portrays Hiller devouring one country ater another ‘A US Dauntless dive-bomber during the Battle of Midway. [A sinking Japanese merchant ship sen through the periscope of a US submarine. [An American propaganda poster urges revenge for Peatl Harbor. GGeeman solders cross the Dan ver in July 1982 {AX columm of Sovet 1-34 medium tanks. The Soviet s-76self- propelled gun during the advance ino Prussia in 1945, The Stalingrad “cauldron ablaze at night under air and ailery fe. A German trick protect agains the ferce Rusian climate British propaganda exaggerates the elfectivenes of British boring ‘A bomber’ view of the stack on Hamburg, July 1943 “Anteaicrat gone on the German Kammhulber Line German dead rom a raid on Bevin in December 193. Sailors ofthe Indian navy vist the rss of Hiroshima in 1945 Allied soldiers storm the Normandy beaches. 6 June 144 ‘A roup of Brisshartlerymen face the German front at Caen. An artificial port, or Mulberry. off the Normandy coast June 1944 ‘View ofan American shipyard, mas producing Liberty ships Stel furnaces at Magnitoporsk inthe Urals. ‘The assembly ne at Willow Run, Michigan German soldiers. hoses and wagons onthe Soviet font, summer 1942 Japanese soldiers train in archery as preparation for modern combat [A rnuclear bomb ofthe type used agaist Nagasaki, nicknamed Fat Man ‘The thee Allied leaders a the fst summit aks in Teheran Briish and American military chiefs atthe Quebec conference, October tog, Pope Pius XI broadcast o Washington in the winter of 1939, German officers execute Soviet peasants on the eastern fron Allied propaganda presents the Japanese as primitive caial infers {A Soviet cartoon encourages the reader to see the enemy i animal terms [A Soviet poster identifies the Great Patriotic War with past Russian ‘A German propaganda poster plays on popular fers of Bolshevism. tate in the wa. Acknowledgments ‘The author and publishers are grater the following for permision to reproduce ilusteations: Library of Congress, Washington DC~ 17.18.19, 230; UilsteinBilderdienst 5 Imperial War Museum, Landon 2, 3.4.6.9. 8.9, 11, 13,13, 14 15, 16.22, 33, 24,25, 30,31 Every effort has been made t0 obtain the necessary permissions to reproice the remaining images (taken from the authors personal ole tion of World War Il pictures, posters and cartoons); however should there tbe any omisions inthis respect we apologise and shall be pleased o make ‘the appropriate acknowledgment in any ture edition Maps Axis expansion in Europe 1938-42 Japanese expansion 1931-42 Bate of the Corl Se, $-7 May 1942 Battle of Midway, 4-5 June 1942 “Merchant ships sunk from 1 August rog2 10 21 May 1943, “Merchant ships sunk from 23 May 19430 31 December t9g3 “The Fasten Front 1ogin2 Battle of Stalingrad, September 1942 January 1043 Battle of Kursk, July-August 1943 Battle for Normandy, 6 June to 24 July 1944 Breakout and pursuit in France, July-August 1944 6 6 35 9 9 6s 8 3 163 m Preface WEN PEOPLE WEARD thatthe te of my’ next Book was tobe Why the Alles Won’, itoften provoked the retort Didthey? There are many ‘ways of winning. With the pasage of time it has become possible to argue {hat none of the thee major Allies ~ Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union = won & peat deal. Britain lst her empire and her leading ‘world fle: the United States found that they had traded one European ‘enemy for another. an evil empire more dangerous and unfathomable than Hitlers; a for the Soviet Union, the cot of sustaining the superpower status won in 945 eventually produced acrisisin Soviet society which ed to Aascollase in 199. The tree Axistates Germany, aly and Japan—have ‘made no attempt to become big military powers agai, but they have all, ‘become economic sees stories instead. Germany and Japan are the supe powers ofthe world market, and thei itzens a good deal ricer than the British, whose war elfor almost bankrupted what had been one of the ‘wealthiest economies in the world in 1939. When people ask “Did they?” these ae the things they have in mind “The Allies unguestionaby won the military contest in v9, anditis with, ‘ctoy in this natrower ens that this book is concerned. have no tied 10 provide a general history ofthe war there ate plenty of those already. The focus of the book isto explain the outcome, rather than to describe its ‘course, Ihave restricted the narrative to those parts of the confit I regard as decisive rst the areas of combat, then the athe elements of the wat Production, technology, politics, and morale. AS a result, many familiar specs ofthe story ate deat with only brely. The eastern front has been ven a prominence it surely deserves, but the battles in the Pacific and the ar between lapan and China here ust take aback at, Its fashionable to See the sxe of intelligence aa critcl difference between the two sides but ‘am not sufciently persuaded of histo give the subject chapter af its on, ‘Where inteligence clearly had special significance, tsstory as en woven, tothe narrative. Alf this has been done inorder to answer very diteetly the question ‘why the Allies won’. “There are conventional answers to this question. There is a commonly held assumption that the Ais states were beaten ty sheer weight of material, strength, which ought inevitably t0 prevail in an age of industrialised ‘arate. To tis might be added arclated assumption, tht Germany. Japan nd tly made fundamental mistakes nthe wa, not he last of which Was biting off more than they could chew in Fightin Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union together. Neither of these assumptions is very satisfactory. and it would be wrong fo pretend that what follows is notin ‘some sense respoaseto them. The more Ihave workedonthe history of the Second World War, the more I have become convinced that the outcome tad not just a material explanation but aso important moral and poitial causes, am also sceptical of the view that the Axis powers los he war ‘through ther own efforts rather than those of the Ales, Mistakes were ‘obviously made on both sides, but the outcome onthe battlefeldultimately depended on a very great improvement in the military effectiveness of Allied frees. The Allies di not have vietory handed to them on plates ‘they had to ight frit "This might seem an obvious pinto those wbo lived through the war bu ‘vis one that i seldom made with much force. I owe @ debt to all those veterans ofthe confict I have talked with and listened to over the Years ‘The testimony has prompted me to think more critically about Allied success. Ihave accumulated many other debs along the way too numerous to mention. I woud like to give particular thanks to Ken Follett who has ‘ead more of the manuscript than anyone ele; alo to Andrew Heritage for help with the maps: and to Geoffrey Roberts, Peter Gattll and Mark Hatrson for help on aspect ofthe Soviet wareffor. Lalo ove a reat desl tomy publisher, Neil Belton, and tomy editor Liz Smith both of whom have helped enormously to make this & much better product than I could have ‘made it. My agent. Gill Coleridge, has been more patent than I deserve Filly @ word of thanks to my family who have been a great support throughout. My wife Kim, our daughter Alexandra, my children Emma, Becky and Jonathan, have had to endute month of paitul wing, and iy initatingly preoccupied air. | hope they fee hat the end-product has justified their endurance and my distraction. Richard Overy ‘March 1995 Author's Note ovcmowr re rexr the terms “Allies and “Axis’ have been used. “These terms need toe qualified. The Allis” coves a set of shifting colitions: Brits, France and Poland from 19390 1940, Britain and the Soviet Union in 194, and Brita, the Soviet Union, the United Statesanda host of othersmalle stats from 1042: from 19g, with the fll ofthe French Vichy regime, France again became one of the major allie powers. Both the terms Britain” and France” have to be understood also to cover their respective empites. Inthe British case this included the Dominion states (Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa al of which made very substantial contributions tothe Allied war effort, Nether the Allied nor ‘Axis powers were united as whole ina formal military or politealaliance ‘Only Britain and the Soviet Union had a firm alliance, sealed in 1942. The [Axis states were united only by informal agreements. aly Broke with the [Axis in 1943, though Haians continued to Rght for both sides. have Petsited in using the conventional shorthand fully aware ofits lack of historical precision, The alternatives ae simply too cumbersome to sustain readabiliy, but the defects ofthe existing terms must be borne in mind “Measurements provide difficulties 00. Ihave i general kept imperat veghts and distances, ic. pounds, tons and miles. But incase where the metic sytem is commonly used (for example in expressing certain gun Calibres and wavelength) Ihave kept the metric measurement. The us of ‘onsneeds tobe clarified. Thave used the word interchangeably forimperia, “American and metric tons. In geetal tons applied to Soviet or German production are metric tonnes 2.20§ pounds instead ofthe imperial 2.230 Pounds. In Americathe tons generally 2.000 pounds. Measures of Japanese land American oil production have generally been quoted in barels spproximately 75 bares equal 1 ton of oll. Again. it proved t00 turmbersome fo make all hese differences explicit thoughout the text 1 UNPREDICTABLE VICTORY Explaining World War II Wien stie nin Wot War hha raptor ‘question that we assume it has an obvious answer. Indeed the ‘question itefishardly ever asked. Allie victory staken for granted. Was their ease not manifestly just? Despite all the dangers, was the progress of ‘heir vast forces nat irresistible? Explanations of Allied success contain a strong element of determinism. We now know the story so well that we do rot consider the uncomfortable prospect that other outcomes might have ben possible. To ask why the Allies Won isto presuppose that they might have lost of for understandable easons, that they would have accepted an ‘outcome short of total itor. These werein fat strong possibilities. There ‘vas nothing preordained about lied succes “This is a ifclt view to cept. The log petiod of peace and prosperity forthe west that setin wih the Allies triumph in 1945 could be said 0 show that Progress was once again in the saddle of history from which the momentary aberration of world War had unseated her. It has alvays been tempting, psychologically comforting, to sce vitor i 1945 8 a natural or inevitable outcome, the asertion of right over might, of moral order over nihisechaes. For western liberals victory wasa necessary outcome, avery Public demonstration that in the scales of historical justice democracy counted for more than dictatorship, liberty for more than servitude. To hammer the point home. enemy leaders were put onal at Nuremberg and Tokyo for all the world to see what happened to regimes that thrived on (Of course noone pretends that the rumph of reedom over despotism i ‘an entirely sufcent explanation. The western powers defeated the Axis cnly in aliance with the Soviet dictatorship, which before 1941 they had shunned and viifed with only a litle less vehemence than they reserved for Nazi Germany. The Soviet Union bore the bruat of the German ‘onslaught and broke the back of German power. For years the western version ofthe war played down this uncomfortable fact while exaggerating the successes of democratic war-mahing, Yet ifthe moral image ofthe wat js muddied, the material explanation for victory seems unambiguous ‘Alliance between the British Empire, the Soviet Union and the United States created overwhelming superiority in manpower and resources. If there Is any consensus about why the Allies won, it rests onthe unssal able evidence that one side vastly outnumbered and outproduced the other “Thetis danger hereof determinism of afferent sort. Asone historian ‘ofthe confict recently put it, the Allies "were certain to defeat Germany ‘once German and Japanese aggression brought them together in December toat.! By 1043 the material gulf was huge. That year the Axis produced 43.000 aircraft; the Allies produced 11,000, The temptation has always been to assume that the figures speak for themselves. The balance of populations and raw materials greatly favoured the Allies: hence whatever the Axis powers did they would alvays come up against the strategic dead fend of material inferionty. This is at best an unsophisticated argument. Tt begs endless questions about the comparative quality of weapons, orthe gop between potential and real resources or about how well weapons were used nce the forces actually got them. Tt also ignores the very considerable teffors made by bot sides to deny resources tothe other, for example the Submarine offensive against British rade, or the Anglo-American bombing fof German industty. There was a wid gap between potential and actual ‘output on both ies. The statistics do nt simply speak for themselves: they require interpreters. ‘We ean sce at once that there ate no simple answers to the question we started with, Much of what we believe about the wa silsion. Take, for ‘example, the view that the war represented the triumph of democracy over tyranny. In realty democracy was narrowly confined in 1939 ~to Bia, France, the United States and handful of smalle European and British Commonwealth states ~ and was even more restrited once the confit got under way. Far ftom being a war fought by a democratic world to bring ftrantdisttors to hee, the wat was about the very survival of democracy in its besieged heartland. Vietory in 1945 made democracy more secure in ‘westen Europe, America and the Britsh Dominions but outside these {egions ths form of government has had at best a chequered career in the half-century since the defeat ofthe Axis anything the war made the world safe for communism, which was as cemattledas democracy inthe 1930s and closet eclipse by 1942. One of the most sigifiant consequences ofthe war was the spread of communism in Europe and Asia and its consoldation inthe Soviet Union. This outcome EXPLAINING WORLD WAR 3 sefected the significant ole played by Soviet frees in defeating Germany ‘There is now widespread recognition thatthe dete theatre of operations Tay onthe eastern tron, Without Soviet resistance it is dificult see how the democratic world would have defeated the new German empire, except by sting ight and waiting unt atomie weapons had been developed. The reat paradox ofthe Second World Wars that democracy wassaved by the txerions of communism. “This unpalatable faci usually explained in terms ofthe common cause against Hier, which helped to bridge the ideological gulf between capitalist democracy and communist authoritarianism. The pooling of resources and military effort was clearly a beter way to secure survival than {ping it alone. But het, 100, 4 word of caution is needed. Collaboration etween the three Allie tates could not be taken for granted. Until r9gt the Soviet Union was regarded by the west sa virtual aly of Nezi Germany following the signature ofthe German-Soviet Pact in August 1939, which ‘ensured the steady supply of resources and food for Germany from Soviet production, When the Soviet Union was attacked by Germany in June 1961, there was residue of profound distrust between the Soviet leadership and the west which had tobe dispelled before any alance could be built. There ‘was still powertul anticommunist sentiment in Britain and the United States. “How can anyone swallow the idea that Russia is batling for ‘democratic principles?” asked Senator Taft in Congress “In the name of Democracy ate we to make an alliance with the mos ruthless diettor inthe word? “The alliance was forge in the end from the bare metal of national sl interest It survived along a8 each side needed the other to help achieve victory, and no longer. We are much better off, wrote Roosevel's Assistant Secretary of State, Adolph Berl, in his diay, “if we teat the Russian situation for what iti, namely. a temporary confluence of Interest.” Throughout the war each side woried tat the oer might reach a separate agreement withthe common enemy, and the naked pursuit of national interest edt endless squabbles between the thee partners. Inthe ‘ed they fought separate wars, the Soviet Union oa the eastern font, the United Sats inthe Pacife Britain and America inthe Mediterranean and western Europe. ‘The coalition certainly did produce a great weight of resources inthe Alles’ favour as ong a8 they fought together. But there are illusions to spel agnin. God does ot alvays march wih he big battalions. In World ‘War | Britain, France and Russia mustered 520 divisions inthe middle of 1917. but eould not prevail over 230 German divisions and So Austin. But Jn March 1918, with Russia out of the war, 365 German and Austrian ‘ Uvraeoicrante wcrony visions could not defeat the 281 ofthe Alles. Instead the German powers tadmited defeat sx months later with the balance of divisions 325 apiece-* ‘Ofcourse in World War I here were other factors at play the Ales had ‘more tanks and itera andin 191 8there came alow of vigorous American armies across the Alani; German and Austrian forces were hampered by cullapsing home economies and declining enthusiasm for war; and Soon. “The basi gute ae presented here only toillostrate the dubious value of ‘relying on plain numbers to explain the outcome of wars. ‘Such simple analysis particularly inappropriate inthe case ofthe Second ‘World War, when the material balance changed sharply severaltimes during the course of the conflict. Upto 1o42 the balance favoured the aggressor and ‘ight well have allowed them to win before American economic power ‘ould be placed inthe sales, German vietories brought the vast spoils of Continental Europe and of western Rusia, turing the German empire in two yeas info an economic superpower, capable of turning out twice the ‘quantity of see that Britain andthe Soviet Union topether could muster. Japan's seizure ofthe rch resources of northern China and of south-east ‘Asia vastly improved her strategic position by 1942, while denying vital ‘supplies of tin, rubber, ol and Bauxite tothe Allies. Even when America entered the wart took time before her enoemous capacity could produce signicant quantities of weapons, or, for that matter, the trained forces to tse them, If the eventual outcome ofthe war owed something 0 the great Allied preponderance ia material produced by American indus strength, we sill have to explain why the Axis tates filed to use their ‘economic advantages when they ad them. ‘What gradually swung te balance of resources back nthe Allies" favour were tho factors the sheer speed and scale of American rearmament which ‘varied anything thatthe Germans and Japanese, or even the British, had thought possible; and the swift revival of the Soviet economy after the mauling received in 194, when it sustained losses so Severe that most, Pundits assumed the worst. Without the extraordinary exodus of Soviet, ‘machinery and labour rom the war zonesof the western Soviet Union tthe harsh plains of Siberi, Stalin's armies would have been like the Tsar's in 1916, the soldiers in the second rank picking up the guns nd boots of thet ead vanguard es they scurried intobate. Apanst every expectation Soviet, Soxiety worked feverishly 1 turn out the tanks and srcraft ther soldiers needed. With only a quarter ofthe steel avaliable to Germany. Soviet, Industry turned out move tanks, guns and planes throughout the War than her enemy. “Ths surprising outcome aso tells ws something about the organisational ties of the Axis powers The huge disparity in weapons was due not EXPLAINING WORLD WAR I s ‘only to American rearmament and Soviet revival, but also tothe inability of their enemies to make the most of the resources they hid. Some ofthis ‘efciency could be put down tothe circumstances of war. Japan never got what she wanted fom the oilvch southern islands because American submarines lay across her supply lines, reaping a destructive harvest from Japan's poorly defended merchant shipping. Germany extracted far less than Hitler wanted from the captured areas of the Soviet Union because Soviet forces torched anything they could not carry away before the Germans arrived. The ran of bombs on German alan and Japanese cies slowly eroded once Nourishing industries. By 1944 bombing reduced German output of arraftby 31 percent, and of tanks by 35percent.*Toall these external circamstances were added homegrown fale. Italian wat production was riddled with corruption and administrative incompetence: Japan's economic effort wa stiled by tensions between he soldiers and er businessmen, and a debilitating rivalry between the nay and the army’ German industry and technology were the victims of ceaseless rivalry between the Naz straps nd a military establishment whose technological fastidiousness made mass-production almost impossible. If these internal weaknesses had been resolved, the Axis by 1942 might well have proved the irresistible force. Even when the balancesheet of resources is broken down, the erude ‘qwanttes tell ws nothing bout the quality of weapons produced from them, Infact there existed wide diferences in levels of technical achievement between the two sides, The large forces ofthe Red Atmyin i941 were aless formidable asset than they looked on pape because they lagged inthe main behind German standards. Bu in 1942 the famous T-3 tank began to pour in large numbers ftom Soviet factories, and the quay of Soviet Bghter ircrat improved sufficiently to make combat les one-rided. There were siznicant gape on the German side 100. The new generation of aircraft esigned to replace the ageing models developed in the mid-t930 filed 9 ‘materialise inthe fst years of war fora whole host of reason, and the Luftwaffe was stuck forthe dutation ofthe confit fying the modes with, hich it started the war. The balance of ar technology, in which Germany enjoyed an enviable lead 1939, swung the Ales wa largely for weasons of Germany's own making. Esen more striking was the reality of Germany's famous mobil forces. Though her sient could produce rocketsand ets by "heendo the war, Germany fled obi the simpler tracks and jeepsneeded 'o keep her armies om the move, By 1944 American and British forces were {ally motorised, but the German army was sill sing one and a quater milion horses, When Hitler's massive invasion free slood posed on the Soviet From in June 19g it deployed 3,399 tanks and 650.000 horses.” 6 LUNPaEDICTABLe vicronY “The materia balance also els shite about how the weapons were used ‘once the fores got them. This was nota question of economic power or {echnical ingenuity, bu of Fighting skills. During the war there were plenty of instances of pooly-armed troops ighting superbly: asuper-abundance of ‘weapons and equipment was no guarantee that forces could use them effectively. Fighting power was determined not jst by weapons, but by tuaiing, organisation, morale and military clan. Both German and Japanese forces showed this as they were pushed back in 1944 and 1048: ‘ehting against very large odds, witha deteriorating supply of weapons, they ‘maintained their combat skills and resolute willingness to ght almost the end, Hite was convinced thoughout the war thatthe German soldier was a superior fighter, both more competent and more spiritually fortified than his opponent, and that this could in some sense compensate decisively forthe greater numbers ofthe enemy. In Japanese society the military were supposed tobe imbued with bushido, spiritualshield that gave eachsoldier ‘the strength to fight tothe limits ofendurance andset sare, even against overwhelming materials. The emphasis placed on sheer fighting skilsin Germany and Japan brought them remarkable victories between 1939 and tg it aso forced thei enemies to think more about the quality of thet ‘own forces, rather than ther evident quantity “The balance of fighting power, like that of resources, didnot remain constant during the war. AS might be expected, after th ial shock of ‘eleat the Allies looked hard tthe way thee forces were rained, deployed tnd ed, Lestons were quickly learned from Anie sucess, The Ales were forced by the nature of ther enemy to stretch theirstratepicimaginatons embrace ways of warfare that were more ingenious and effective. By Contrast the arly victories lent certain complacency to Axis strategy and ‘operations there were few fundamental changes made othe military secipe ‘that had worked so well the fist time around. The gap in fighting power ‘between the two sides narrowed remarkably quickly. There ae eshoes here ‘ofthe Napoleonic wars, In both cases the aggresor intially demonsirtes superior fting kills and leadership, against forces that were divided and ‘operationally ineffectual. In both cass the gulf between the two sides narrowed over time asthe lessons of early defeats were evalated andthe ‘weaker forces were expanded and reformed. By the end of the war Allied forces performed much more elfestively than they had done fist, Axis forces om the other hand, lke the armies of Napoleon stagnated ~ both were remarkably skilled in retreat, Dut twas retreat none the es, ‘Clealy then the possession of biger battalions ging ina just eavseis fot sufficient explanation of victory. We need to be much more precise about the reasons fr Allied vietory to ind an explanation thats istorclly EXPLAINING WORLD WAR t 7 convincing ll the moreso give the nature of the crisis that generated the ‘wari the fst plac. Inthe 1930s the work order had been subjected t0 Seismic shifts, rocked by forces which western liberal statesmen could scarcely understand. Democracy wasin treat everywhere, eebly keeping at bay the tie of volent imperialism, racial confit and popular dictator led nationalism, When war broke out there were widespread fears in the west that the march of Hitlr’s brutal armies signalled the end of liberal

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