1Concepcion v.

Court of Appeals
GR No. 123450 August 31, 2005

FACTS: Petitioner Gerardo Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte was married in
1989. Almost a year later, Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. In 1991, however, Gerardo filed a petition
to have his marriage to Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that 9 years before he
married Theresa, the latter had married Mario Gopiao.
The RTC ruled that Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo,
thus RTC annulled her marriage to Gerardo for being bigamous, thereby declaring Jose Gerardo to be an
illegitimate child. The CA held that Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child of Mario and Theresa. Not by
Gerardo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child of
Mario and not petitioner Gerardo

HELD: A person's surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on
from parent to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of
the law, not related to him in any way. the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under
attack as it could not be contested collaterally and the law had established his filiation. Hence, the
presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and uncalled for. a record of birth is merely
prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.As prima facie evidence, the statements in the record
of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant evidence

2.Philippine National Bank v. Spouses Reblando, G.R. No. 194014, September 12, 2012
Doctrine:

FACTS:

Reblandos obtained a loan from PNB. To secure the payment of the loan, the Reblandos executed a real
estate mortgage over two parcels of land,A few years later, the parties agreed to up the loan value. At the
foreclosure sale, the PNB, as lone bidder, was awarded the lots.Reblandos filed a complaint before the
RTC, seeking, as their main prayer, the declaration of nullity of the mortgage. The PNB drew the RTC and
subsequently the CA's attention to this aberration, distinctly pointing out that the REM was executed in
January 1992, not February 1992, as stated by both courts.

ISSUE: Whether the mortgage over Lot No. 10 is valid.

RULING: Yes.
A public document enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the
facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution. To overcome this
presumption, there must be clear and convincing evidence. Absent such evidence, the presumption must
be upheld.

3.People v. Urzais y Lanurias, G.R. No. 207662, April 13, 2016

FACTS:

Accused Fabian Urzais is charged with violating the anti-carnapping law of 1972 wherein he allegedly
with 2 other co-accused Alex Bautista and Ricky Bautista, by means of force,violence and intimidation,
stole the Green Isuzu Highlander ofthe victim Mario Magdato. The widow testified as to disappearance
and discovery of the death of her husband. The police officer testified that the arrest of the accused was
conducted due to a checkpoint.The accused in his defense interposed the defense of denial. RTC Found
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on the weight of the testimonies presented by the
prosecution and the disputable presumption

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellant assertion that such presumption does not hold in the case at bar is
correct?

HELD:
The application of disputable presumption found in Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that a
person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of
the whole act, in this case the alleged carnapping and the homicide/murder of its owner, is limited to
cases where such possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered
implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto. In the instant case, accused-appellant
set-up a defense of denial of the charges and adhered to his unrebutted version of the story that the
vehicle had been sold to him by the brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista.

4. Blue Cross Health Care, Inc. v. Olivares, G.R. No. 169737, February 12, 2008
FACTS: Olivares applied for a health care program with Blue Cross a health maintenance firm.
When her application was approved, the health care agreement excluded ailments due to “pre-
existing conditions” from the coverage. After the effectivity of her health insurance, she suffered a
stroke and was admitted at a hospital. When she requested Blue Cross to pay her medical
expenses, the latter refused due to the pending submission of a certificate from her attending
physician, Dr. Edmundo Saniel, that the stroke suffered was not caused by a pre-existing
condition.
ISSUE:
Whether the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced would apply in
the case

No. The burden was on Blue Cross to prove that Olivares’s stroke was excluded from the coverage of
their agreement because it was due to a pre-existing condition. It failed to prove this. Blue Cross never
presented any evidence to prove such. It merely speculated that Dr. Saniel’s report would be adverse to
Olivares, based on her invocation of the doctor-patient privilege. This was a disputable presumption as
described in Sec. 3(e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.

5. Royal Cargo Corp. v. DFS Sports Unlimited, Inc., G.R. No. 158621, December 10, 2008
FACTS:
Royal Cargo is an international freight forwarder while DFS is a concessionaire of the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority engaged in the importation and local sale of duty-free sporting goods. DFS
incurred fees amounting to 248,449.63 which it failed to pay. Royal Cargo filed a collection suit against
DFS. Royal Cargo presented as part of its evidence, 34 carbon copies of invoices to prove respondent's
indebtedness. On the other hand, DFS presented, 28 original copies of the 34 invoices submitted by
Royal Cargo for the purpose of proving payment of the amount sought to be recovered by the latter. The
RTC accorded evidentiary weight to the invoices presented in evidence by DFS.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the invoices presented by respondent DFS are deemed credit instruments, which upon
presentation by the debtor raise the disputable presumption of payment

HELD:
NO. The invoices presented by DFS did not raise the disputable presumption of payment in accordance
to Rule 131, Section 3h. FIRST, an invoice or bill is a commercial document issued by a seller to the
buyer indicating the products, quantities and agreed prices for product or services the seller has provided
the buyer.An invoice is simply a list sent to a purchaser, containing the items, together with the prices and
charges, of merchandise sent or to be sent to him.

6.San Luis v. Rojas, G.R. No. 159127, March 3, 2008

FACTS:
Private respondent is an American Corporation not engage in business in the Philippines sued petitioner
for sum of money only for incidental transaction. Private respondent move to take deposition of its
witnesses because all in the United States and difficult to come to the Philippines to take the witness
stand. Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground that the court will fail to see the demeanor of the
witness because such statements are only based on depositions. RTC granted the motion of the
petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court allows a non-resident foreign corporation the privilege of
having all its witnesses, all of whom are foreigners, to testify through deposition upon written
interrogatories taken outside the Philippines to prove an oral contract?

RULING:

YES. It has been repeatedly held that deposition discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal
treatment and should not be unduly restricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not
privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law. Otherwise, the advantage
of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would be
defeated. In fact, we 9nd nothing in the rules on deposition that limits their use in case of oral contract as
alleged by the petitioner.

7.Santamaria v. Cleary, G.R. Nos. 197122 &197161, June 15, 2016

FACTS:
an American citizen with office address in California, filed a Complaint for specific performance and
damages against Miranila Land Development Corporation (MLD). The Complaint involved shares of stock
of MLD for which Cleary paid US$191,250.00. Cleary sued in accordance with the Stock Purchase and
Put Agreement he entered into with Miranila. He expressed his intent in availing himself of the modes of
discovery under the rules of court. Cleary moved for court authorization to take deposition. He prayed that
his deposition be taken before the Consulate-General of the Philippines in Los Angeles and be used as
his direct testimony.

ISSUE: Whether or not the examination of witness in open court should be observed
RULING:
No. The deposition serves the double function of a method of discovery — with use on trial not
necessarily contemplated — and a method of presenting testimony. The taking of depositions has been
allowed as a departure from open-court testimony. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence, however, do
not restrict a deposition to the sole function of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain
conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken even after trial has commenced and may be
used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand

8. Lee v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 177861, July 13, 2010

FACTS: Spouses (Lee) and (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They
had 11 children. In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to
serve as housemaid. The Lee-Keh children led with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lee's presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC
granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and violated
the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lee's stepmother. RTC quashed the subpoena
ISSUE: May Tiu be compelled to testify in the correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee
to show that she is not Keh's daughter?

RULING: YES

The SC held that Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might subject her to badgering by
adverse counsel. The trial court's duty is to protect every witness against oppressive behavior of an
examiner and this is especially true where the witness is of advanced age. Likewise, the high court held
that the filial privilege that Tiu invoked will not apply to the case as the rule applies only to "direct"
ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no
common ancestry by her stepmother.

9. People v. Ortillas y Gamlanga, G.R. No. 137666, May 20, 2004

FACTS:
An information for murder was filed against Marlon Ortillas. The only hearing that took place after the
testimony of Russel was with the NBI medico-legal officer that testified for the prosecution. All in all, the
hearing was postponed 13 times until the prosecution finally rested its case. Russel was never presented
for cross-examination. On the basis of the testimonies of Russel and Dr. Garcia the judge rendered a
decision rendering Ortillas y Gamlanga GUILTY of the charge against him. Hence a petition for review on
certiorari was filed.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in denying the request of Atty. Carandang-Pantua to cross-examine the
witness presented by the prosecution during the hearing

RULING:

Yes. Judge Alumbres’ refusal to give opportunity for Atty. Teresita Carandang-Pantua of the PAO, the
new counsel for appellant, to cross-examine prosecution witness Russel on the ground that prosecution
had already rested its case, is patently a grave abuse of discretion on his part. The accused has the
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witness against him. Records disclose that there
was never a valid waiver on the part of appellant or his counsel to cross-examine the prosecution witness
Russel.

10. People v. Estibal y Calungsag, G.R. No. 208749, November 26, 2014
According to the information, Anecito Estibal y Calungsag was accused of rape by his daughter. The
accused-appellant pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. At the trial, four witnesses came forward to testify
for the prosecution. Relying on the investigating officer’s testimony of what AAA narrated to her, the RTC
considered the spontaneity of the declarations made by AAA as confirmed by PO3 Cobardo as part of the
res gestae, and convicted the accused-appellant. Moreover, there is nothing on record that would compel
the court to believe that said prosecution witness has improper motive to falsely testify against the
accused-appellant. Accordingly, it upheld the presumption of regularity in the performance of her duties.

ISSUE:
Whether the testimonies made by the witnesses reiterating what AAA allegedly told are hearsay.

HELD:
Yes. The court ruled that AAA’s statements to the barangay tanod and the police do not qualify as part of
res gestae in view of the missing element of spontaneity and lapse of an appreciable time between the
rape and declaration which afforeded her sufficient opportunity for reflection. AAA admitted that she first
revealed her ordeal of sexual abuse to her cousin. AAA had clearly ceased to act unthinkingly under the
immediate influence of her shocking rape by her father.

11. Zaldivar v. People, G.R. No. 197056 (Resolution), March 2, 2016

FACTS:Zaldivar and Jeanette Artajo were charged with Estafa pursuant to a complaint filed by
respondent Mamerto Dumasis before the RTC, which was initially raffled to Branch 33. Pre-trial
conference was held. During the trial of the case, the prosecution presented Alma Dumasis and Delia
Surmieda as witnesses, and both identified their respective affidavits, which constituted their direct
testimonies. The RTC denied the admission of the prosecution’s exhibits and nullified and set aside the
previous proceedings conducted and set the case anew for pre-trial conference. He later on filed a Motion
to Reconsider but it was also denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion committed by Judge Catilo in nullifying the
proceedings and setting the case anew for pre-trial.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The trial court should have done to correct any "perceived"
procedural lapses committed during the presentation of the prosecution's evidence was to recall the
prosecution's witnesses and have them identify the exhibits mentioned in their respective affidavits. The
trial court may even grant the parties the opportunity to adduce additional evidence bearing upon the
main issue in question, for strict observance of the order of trial or trial procedure under the rules depends
upon the circumstance obtaining in each case at the discretion of the trial judge.

12. Dulla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123164, February 18, 2000
Doctrine: A 3 year old victim may be asked leading questions; it falls under Rule 132 SEC. 10 of the
ROC
FACTS: Petitioner Nicanor Dulla was charged for the crime of rape. During the trial, the victim, Andrea
Ortega, who was only three years old at the time of the incident, testified that on February 2, 1993, her
uncle, herein petitioner, touched her vagina while doing a pumping motion with his penis exposed to her.
Petitioner denied the accusation. Petitioner questions that Andrea is not capable of understanding the
questions propounded to her. Moreover, she did not take an oath and the fact that she was asked purely
leading questions shows that she was only coached by her guardian.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 3 year old victim may be asked leading questions

RULING: YES. With respect to the fact that leading questions were propounded to Andrea during her
direct examination, suffice it to say that under the Rules of Court, such questions are allowed considering
the age (three years and 10 months) of the witness at the time she testified in court. Rule 132, SEC. 10
provides: "Leading and misleading questions. — A question which suggests to the witness the answer
which the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except: . . . (c) When there is
difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender
years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute;

13. Civil Service Commission v. Belagan, G.R. No. 132164, October 19, 2004
Magdalena charged respondent with sexual indignities and harassment, while Ligaya accused him of
sexual harassment and various malfeasances.Magdalena on her part alleges that she filed for an
application for a permit to operate a preschool, one of the requisites of which is the inspection of school
premises. Respondent volunteered himself to do the inspection. During the time of inspection, several
sexual advances were made on her. Ligaya Annawi likewise alleges that the respondent made sexual
advances on her.
ISSUE: W/N complaining witness, Magdalena Gapuz, is credible?
RULING: YES. In the present administrative case for sexual harassment, respondent did not offer
evidence that has a bearing on Magdalena's chastity
When the credibility of a witness is sought to be impeached by proof of his reputation, it is necessary that
the reputation shown should be that which existed before the occurrence of the circumstances out of
which the litigation arose, or at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the
commencement of the suit. This is because a person of derogatory character or reputation can still
change or reform himself.

14. DST Movers Corp. v. People's General Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 198627, January 13, 2016

FACTS:

This case is about a vehicular accident that involves three vehicles.PGIC then demanded reimbursement
from DST Movers. The demands not having been satisfied, PGIC filed a Complaint for Sum of Money
before MTC. The MTC, RTC, and CA all ruled in favor of PGIC. Hence, the present petition by DST
Movers alleging that the reliance of the courts below in the said Traffic Accident Investigation report was
misplaced as it was improperly identified and uncorroborated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of Traffic Accident Investigation Report in evidence was proper
under Section 44 of Rule 130?

HELD:
NO.Precisely as an exception to the Hearsay Rule, Rule 130, Section 44 does away with the need for
presenting as witness the public officer or person performing a duty specially enjoined by law who made
the entry. The following are the requisites of which: (a) that the entry was made by a public o􏰀cer or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so;(b)that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, (c)that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts
by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

15. Manila Electric Co. v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 127598 (Resolution), February 22, 2000

FACTS:
A separate intervention was made by the supervisor’s union (FLAMES 2) of petitioner corporations
alleging that it has bona fide legal interest in the outcome of the case.Herein respondent Union argued
that the award should retroact to such time granted by the Secretary. On the other hand, petitioner
warned that if the wage increase of P2,200.00 per month as ordered by the Secretary is allowed it would
simply pass the cost covering such increase to the consumers through an increase in the rate of
electricity. In the absence of a CBA, the Secretary’s determination of the date of retroactivity as part of his
discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall control

ISSUE: Was the All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to support its position
regarding the wage issue an accurate basis and conclusive determinant of the rate of wage
increase?

HELD:
NO. Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides that: "Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence
of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register,
periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant
matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is
generally used and relied upon by them therein."

16. Ilao-Quianay, et al., v. Mapile, G.R. No. 154087, October 25, 2005
FACTS:
Subject of this case is a parcel of land in the name of the deceased Simplicio Ilao (Ilao). His heirs found
out that the title of the subject property had an annotation of adverse claim filed by a certain Juanito Ibarra
(Ibarra). Respondent Mapile filed a motion to exclude the property from the inventory on the ground that
the same no longer formed part of Ilao's estate having been disposed of during the latter's lifetime in favor
of Ibarra. Petitioners assail as hearsay the factual findings of the trial court on the circumstances
surrounding the sale of the property to Ibarra which were based only on respondent's narration, without
Ibarra actually testifying thereon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony qualifies as an exception to the hearsay rule

HELD:
None of the circumstances for the admission of the testimony given at a former proceeding obtains in this
case. Not only were petitioners not parties to the former proceeding and hence without opportunity to
cross-examine the notary public, there was also no proof that the notary public was already deceased or
unable to testify. Hence, the testimony should not have been accorded any probative weight.

17. Marcos v. Heirs of Late Dr. Andres Navarro, Jr., G.R. No. 198240, July 3, 2013
FACTS:
Spouses Navarro died in 1958 and 1993, respectively, they left lots in Masbate.Petitioner and her sister
Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming exclusive ownership of the subject lot. Respondents
based their claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property. Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the
sisters requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary
Grace Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.’s signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of
Andres, Sr. were not written by one and the same person.
ISSUE: Whether or not PO2 Alvarez is disqualified from being a witness in the case.

RULING: No, a witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided
in the Rules of Court. There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default from
taking the witness stand for non-disqualified parties. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since she
possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules. There is no provision of the Rules
disqualifying parties declared in default from taking the witness stand for non-disqualified parties. The law
does not provide default as an exception.

18. Dela Llana v. Biong, G.R. No. 182356, December 4, 2013

FACTS:

On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla. A dump
truck containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the car’s rear end, violently pushing the car forward,
puncturing Llana. CA held that Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a reasonable connection between the
vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence through an identified and
authenticated a medical certificate dated November 20, 2000 issued by Dr. Milla.

ISSUE:

W/N Dra. dela Llana’s opinion that Joel’s negligence caused her whiplash injury has probative value

HELD:

Dra. dela Llana’s medical opinion cannot be given probative value for the reason that she was not
presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she was not competent to testify on the nature,
and the cause and effects of whiplash injury. Furthermore, we emphasize that Dra. dela Llana, during
trial, nonetheless did not provide a medical explanation on the nature as well as the cause and effects of
whiplash injury in her testimony.

19. People v. Lee, G.R. No. 139070, May 29, 2002

Herminia Marquez was sitting in her house one evening, to her complete surprise, she saw a hand
holding a gun coming out of the open window behind Joseph. Herminia stood up but could not move as
accused-appellant fired a second shot at Joseph and three (3) shots more. The accused was charged
with murder committed with treachery and evident premeditation. The accused testified that the victim
was a drug addict and thief, and present a letter from the mother to Mayor Malonzo surrendering her son
because he was a drug addict and thief.

ISSUE:
Whether Proof of Victim’s Bad Moral Character is irrelevant?

RULING:

Yes. Proof of the Bad Moral Character of the victim is irrelevant to establish the probability or
improbability of his killing since the accused did not allege that the victim was the aggressor or that the
killing was made in self-defense. Also, proof of the victim’s Bad Moral Character is not necessary in cases
of murder committed with treachery and evident premeditation.

20. Spouses Trinidad v. Imson, G.R. No. 197728, September 16, 2015
Trinidad filed an ejectment suit against respondent. Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a
condominium unit. Imson countered that although she entered into a contract of lease with the original
Indian owners, she decided to purchase the unit. The RTC reversed the MeTC and held that the subject
Deed is superior to the evidence presented by respondent, which merely consisted of bills of payments of
association dues, utility bills, real estate tax on the common areas and building insurance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conclusive presumption that “The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his
landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them” apply?

HELD:
No. A tenant is estopped from denying the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the
landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to
the commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply.