9/11 AND THE IRAQ WAR

1. Why did the US take action in Iraq?

2. Does this maneuver indicate that the US is in decline?
3. Was 9/11 an exceptional act, or part of a pattern?
4. Was the impulse for war a popular one (i.e. driven by public opinion) or was it a
channel of action selected by government and business elites and the Washington
community?

CASE SUMMARY BASED ON:

Rosati & Scott ch.2
Mazarr: ‘Iraq War and Agenda Setting’
Jervis: ‘The Remaking of a Unipolar World’
Hopkins: ‘Capitalism, Nationalism and the New American Empire’
Mastanduno: the US Political System and Intl Leadership

Agenda-setting approach (Iraq an elite decision):

THEORY (KINGDON, 1984; MAZARR):

 “Policy communities” = such groups are belief and idea driven rather than interest
driven, and share causal beliefs
 Policy Entrepreneurs: “willing to invest resources, time, and money in hope of future
return”
o Lay the groundwork for the ultimate acceptance of their idea
o Later became key government officials – Wolfowitz; Cheney; etc.  these
men were committed to the “radical, prodemocracy reorientation of the
Middle East” (Mazarr)
o Institutionalized their influence and insinuated their views into policy as they
moved into powerful government positions in the Bush administration
 Groupthink: there exists a desire for concurrence, and hence policy communities
tend to develop a common causal story, which explains how the group comes to
experience harm, who is to blame, and who must take responsibility
o Rational decision making gives way to distorted decisions, as the group is
highly cohesive, insulated, and informal in its analysis, i.e. in the Bush
administration
o Causal stories in Bush administration RE. Instability and risk in the Middle
East
 Focusing Event/Policy Window: an event that is significant enough to both call for
and justify a response
o “Alternatives are advocated for a long time before a short-run opportunity
presents itself on an agenda”
o A focusing event joins three streams of policy: problem recognition,
development of policy options, and political opportunity
 IRAQ: policy options had already been developed by individuals that,
at the time of 9/11, held key govt. posts – 9/11 provided the casus
belli.
o There are no new policy ideas; existing ones merely cluster around policy
windows.

Spread of ‘American Values’ (Morality) + Opportunism – Combination of crisis catalyst and

underlying long-term objectives deeply rooted in the American cultural psyche
  American missionary zeal (JERVIS)
o A product of Bush himself  “this is what I was put on this earth for” born
again Christian, looking for missions, sees himself and his country in a
struggle of good against evil
o Also embedded in US political culture
 Reformist characteristics exemplified by bold initiatives (unifying
Europe, modernizing the 3rd World) and dialectic rhetoric (good/evil,
right/wrong)  C.f. Reagan’s label of the USSR as an evil empire,
and Bush’s “axis of evil” for Iran, Iraq and Nth Korea

Reasons for population support (HOPKINS):

 Hopkins suggests that there is a divide within American government and society that
exists between xenophobic groups that seek isolation, and groups that support
globalizing forces
o Within administration, these groups are called ‘”lions and foxes” (PARETO)
 Lions: conservatives, stand for tradition and support the use of force
to maintain order
 Foxes: innovators, business-minded, persuasion and guile
o Foxes had no interest in occupying Iraq, but they were co-opted by the lions
in the administration, who succeeded in the aftermath of 9/11 in
transforming domestic patriotism to aggressive nationalism
 The response to 9/11 was advocated by a “small group of neocons and nationalist
activists,” who “sounded an alarm that rang throughout American society”
o Appealed to the population to “rally round the flag,” to engage in a
“crusade” against terrorism
o Globalization had created a rapid increase in inequality between the top 1%
and bottom 90% of income earners
 As lions were more nationalist and insular in their approach to FP,
this process was mainly advocated by foxes
o “Swirling uncertainties contributed to the rise of evangelical faiths… [which]
promoted an assertive form of Christianity that fitted into secular patriotism
and provided validation for it”
 Conservative values, stiffened by evangelical teaching, provided
unambiguous and reassuring answers
 PARETO: emphasizes the power of sentiment rather than reason in influencing
behavior
 The success of new American capitalism rested on promoting fox-like qualities of
innovation, guile and persuasion that were needed to manage business relationships
across countries
o Economic advantage pointed towards globalization, but fear of foreign
invaders, stirred up in the aftermath of 9/11, called for the rebuilding of
fortress America

Insecurity approach – i.e. reassertion (possibly in decline)

 ROSATI & SCOTT: as the world became more pluralistic and interdependent from the
1960s through to the 1980s, the US’s economic and military ability to influence the
world declined relative to its post WWII apex
o Economic role:
 Went from a creditor to a debtor nation in 1971 – since then annual
trade deficits have been the norm (US DEPT OF COMMERCE)
  Percentage of total world economic production produced within the
US declined from 50% to 24% b/w 1950 and 1976 (KRASNER, 1982)
 Petroleum-based economy  grown increasingly dependent on
foreign oil post 1950s, THUS VULNERABILITY
 1920s – 90% world oil production in the US (HALBERSTAM,
1986); 1950s “oil production in the US had slowed while
overall global demand had increased”
 In the 21st century, 70% of oil is imported (US CENSUS
BUREAU DATA)
o Military role: post-Vietnam – reduced ability to use force successfully
 Diminishment of the US’s power of persuasion  less certainty of
multilateral support; less certainty of victory – the US increasingly
has to prove its strength
o Imperial overstretch theories: widening gap between the ends and means of
a great power  i.e. America’s current involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan
 Responses: “balancing” and “delegitimization” attempts by other
countries, in order to resist US actions and challenge US hegemony
 JERVIS: common sense and most academic thinking argue that a hegemon’s primary
objective should be to maintain the prevailing international system. The irony is that
Washington seeks to change the rules of the order.
o The US behaves more like a revolutionary state than committed to
preserving the existing arrangements
o Terrorism seems so threatening because US hegemony and dramatic decline
in international was that may be a product of it mean that many of the
threats that had been so prominent previously have today disappeared
 Hence, psychologically, if not logically, small threats appear in the
same class with fundamental challenges such as the Cold War
 Although the current world system is unipolar, the situation
represents that of the CW
 The fact that the US is a hegemon feeds it revolutionary zeal
 Having established order within its large sphere, the hegemon will
find itself threatened by whatever is out of its reach  hegemony
thus ironically magnifies the sense of threat. The very fact that the
US has interests throughout the world leads to fears that undesired
changes in one area could undermine its interests elsewhere
 Rejection of INTL law as it limits the changes that are likely to
accompany shifting power relations, which goes against
revolutionary interests

Economic/Imperial – i.e. consolidation (not in decline) – MASTANDUNO

 In absolute terms, the US remains a dominant power
o Economy largest in terms of GNP
o With the collapse of the USSR, the US is unambiguously the world’s leading
military power and is increasingly dominant in the production and export of
sophisticated weaponry
o Despite its relative decline, the US still retains sufficient power to seriously
contemplate an international leadership role