[1] G.R. No. 128314      May 29, 2002 quo.
28314      May 29, 2002 quo. We agree with the appellate court’s observation that since the death certificates
RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner,  vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V.
JAO, respondents.
Special Proceedings; Estate Proceedings; Residence; The estate of an inhabitant of
the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration granted in the proper
court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.—
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had—in
Pampanga, where the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City,
where they actually stayed before their demise? Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court states: Where estate of deceased persons be settled.—If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (underscoring ours) Clearly, the estate
of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration granted
in the proper court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of
his death.
Same; Same; Same; Factors Considered in Determination of Residence.—Petitioner
Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al., where we held
that the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had his
permanent residence or domicile at the time of death. In determining residence at the
time of death, the following factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had:
(a) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at the place
chosen; and (c) intention to stay therein permanently. While it appears that the
decedents in this case chose to be physically present in Quezon City for medical
convenience, petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon City as their
permanent residence.
Same; Same; Same; Death Certificates; Recitals in death certificates as to the
residence of the decedent at the time of death are admissible in evidence and
presumed to be correct.— The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible
in evidence, were thus properly considered and presumed to be correct by the court a
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
were accomplished even before petitioner and respondent quarreled over their
inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the time of their
parents’ death.
Same; Same; Same; The Rules of Court refers to residence at the time of death, not
the permanent residence or domicile.—The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs
of the decedents’ residence at the time of death, over the numerous documentary
evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented by petitioner
pertained not to residence at the time of death, as required by the Rules of Court, but
to permanent residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals, we held: x x
x x x x x x x the term “resides” connotes ex vi termini“actual residence” as
distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” This term “resides,” like the terms
“residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of
venue statutes and rules—Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature—residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word “domicile” still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
“residence” and “domicile” but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms
are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term “inhabitant.” In other
words, “resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.
It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense,
the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary.
Same; Same; Same; It does not necessarily follow that the records of a person’s
properties are kept in the place where he permanently resides, and neither can it be
presumed that a person’s properties can be found mostly in the place where he
establishes his domicile.—It does not necessarily follow that the records of a
person’s properties are kept in the place where he permanently resides. Neither can it
be presumed that a person’s properties can be found mostly in the place where he
establishes his domicile. It may be that he has his domicile in a place different from
that where he keeps his records, or where he maintains extensive personal and
business interests. No generalizations can thus be formulated on the matter, as the
question of where to keep records or retain properties is entirely dependent upon an
individual’s choice and peculiarities.
Page 1 of 74
Same; Same; Same; Venue; Words and Phrases; Venue for ordinary civil actions
and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning—as thus defined,
“residence,” in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s
actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.—At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he
differentiates between venue in ordinary civil actions and venue in special
proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of Appealsand Bejer v. Court of Appeals, we
ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one
and the same meaning. As thus defined, “residence,” in the context of venue
provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. All told, the lower court
and the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue for the settlement of the
decedents’ intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon City court
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag
and Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The
decedents left real estate, cash, shares of stock and other personal
properties.
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99,
over the estate of his parents, docketed as Special Proceedings No. Q-91-
8507.1Pending the appointment of a regular administrator, Perico moved that
he be appointed as special administrator. He alleged that his brother,
Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the assets of the estate. More particularly,
Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real properties without rendering any
accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their deceased parents
and disposing of the cash and valuables therein.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper
venue.2 He argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City
either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. The decedent’s
actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother used
to run and operate a bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated due to
old age, they stayed in Rodolfo’s residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street,
Quezon City, solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment and
hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence previously
executed by the decedents, consisting of income tax returns, voter’s
affidavits, statements of assets and liabilities, real estate tax payments, motor
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
vehicle registration and passports, all indicating that their permanent
residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga.1âwphi1.nêt
In his opposition,3 Perico countered that their deceased parents actually
resided in Rodolfo’s house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a
matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their death certificates that their
last residence before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon
City.4 Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing on the death
certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the said
document.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the
decedents’ residence on the death certificates in good faith and through
honest mistake. He gave his residence only as reference, considering that
their parents were treated in their late years at the Medical City General
Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in his house was merely
transitory, in the same way that they were taken at different times for the
same purpose to Perico’s residence at Legaspi Towers in Roxas Boulevard.
The death certificates could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive evidence
of the decedents’ residence in light of the other documents showing
otherwise.5
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the
position.6 Both failed to comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the
petition be archived.7
Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived. 8 After
the parties submitted the names of their respective nominees, the trial court
designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as special administrator of the estate
of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea Jao.9
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was
denied, to wit:
A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in
1988 and 1989, respectively, confirm the fact that Quezon City was the last
place of residence of the decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing on
the death certificate of Andrea V. Jao were supplied by movant, Rodolfo V.
Jao, whose signature appears in said document. Movant, therefore, cannot
disown his own representation by taking an inconsistent position other than
his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.
Page 2 of 74
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for
lack of merit movant’s motion to dismiss.
SO ORDERED.10
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35908. On December 11, 1996, the Court of
Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the court
a quo having been shown, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
The questioned order of the respondent Judge is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
Rodolfo’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in
the assailed resolution dated February 17, 1997. 12 Hence, this petition for
review, anchored on the following grounds:
I
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN
A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY
CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY
RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO,
100 PHILS. 593, WHICH CLEARLY INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY
RESIDENCE IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL
PRESENCE IN A PLACE AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE
OF DECEDENT’S RESIDENCE RATHER THAN THE INTENTION OF THE
DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN
ANOTHER PLACE.
IV
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE
RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE
PURPOSE OF SERVING SUMMONS TO A DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL
ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73
FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING VENUE IN THE SETTLEMENT
OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED.
V
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE
ENTRY OF PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE
RESPECTIVE DEATH CERTIFICATES OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER
THAN THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CLEAR
INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT
RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF
ESTOPPEL AS AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE
PERSUASIVE THAN THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS
THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES
CITY.
VII
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE
PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF
SP. PROCEEDING NO. Q-91-8507.13
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be
had --- in Pampanga, where the decedents had their permanent residence, or
in Quezon City, where they actually stayed before their demise?
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. – If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court
Page 3 of 74
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (underscoring ours)
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters
of administration granted in the proper court located in the province where
the decedent resides at the time of his death.
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et
al.,14 where we held that the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the
place where the decedent had his permanent residence or domicile at the
time of death. In determining residence at the time of death, the following
factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to
choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen;
and (c) intention to stay therein permanently.15 While it appears that the
decedents in this case chose to be physically present in Quezon City for
medical convenience, petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon City
as their permanent residence.
The contention lacks merit.
The facts in Eusebio  were different from those in the case at bar. The
decedent therein, Andres Eusebio, passed away while in the process of
transferring his personal belongings to a house in Quezon City. He was then
suffering from a heart ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to purchase
a Quezon City residence, which was nearer to his doctor. While he was able
to acquire a house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even before he could move
therein. In said case, we ruled that Eusebio retained his domicile --- and
hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be said that
Eusebio changed his residence because, strictly speaking, his physical
presence in Quezon City was just temporary.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have
transferred to petitioner’s Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to
sufficiently refute respondent’s assertion that their elderly parents stayed in
his house for some three to four years before they died in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decedents’ respective death certificates state that they were
both residents of Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
petitioner himself who filled up his late mother’s death certificate. To our
mind, this unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized
his deceased mother’s residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner
failed to contest the entry in Ignacio’s death certificate, accomplished a year
earlier by respondent.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were
thus properly considered and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We
agree with the appellate court’s observation that since the death certificates
were accomplished even before petitioner and respondent quarreled over
their inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the
time of their parents’ death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents’ residence at
the time of death,  over the numerous documentary evidence presented by
petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented by petitioner pertained not
toresidence at the time of death, as required by the Rules of Court, but
to permanent residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of
Appeals,16 we held:
xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides", like the
terms "residing" and "residence", is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In
the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is
the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it
is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile"
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous,
and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In
this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary. 17
Page 4 of 74
Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the decedents WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the
have been living with petitioner at the time of their deaths and for some time decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED.
prior thereto. We find this conclusion to be substantiated by the evidence on
record. A close perusal of the challenged decision shows that, contrary to SO ORDERED.
petitioner’s assertion, the court below considered not only the decedents’
physical presence in Quezon City, but also other factors indicating that the
decedents’ stay therein was more than temporary. In the absence of any
substantial showing that the lower courts’ factual findings stemmed from an
erroneous apprehension of the evidence presented, the same must be held
to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.

Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule

4, Section 2,18 on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies
specifically to settlement proceedings. He argues that while venue in the
former understandably refers to actual physical residence for the purpose of
serving summons, it is the permanent residence of the decedent which is
significant in Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that venue for the
settlement of estates can only refer to permanent residence or domicile
because it is the place where the records of the properties are kept and
where most of the decedents’ properties are located.

Petitioner’s argument fails to persuade.

It does not necessarily follow that the records of a person’s properties are
kept in the place where he permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed
that a person’s properties can be found mostly in the place where he
establishes his domicile. It may be that he has his domicile in a place
different from that where he keeps his records, or where he maintains
extensive personal and business interests. No generalizations can thus be
formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep records or retain
properties is entirely dependent upon an individual’s choice and peculiarities.

At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates

between venue in ordinary civil actions and venue in special proceedings.
In Raymond v. Court of Appeals19 and Bejer v. Court of Appeals,20 we ruled
that venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one
and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence", in the context of venue
provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of
abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 21 All told,
the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue for the
settlement of the decedents’ intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon
City court.

Assignment No. 1 – Succession Page 5 of 74

[2] G.R. No. L-33006 December 8, 1982
NICANOR NACAR, petitioner, 
vs. CLAUDIO A. NISTAL as Municipal Judge of Esperanza, Agusan del
Sur, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Agusan del Sur, ILDEFONSO JAPITANA
and ANTONIO DOLORICON, respondents.
Action; Where a complaint for sum of money does not state a cause of action against
the defendant, but against defendant’s deceased stepfather, the complaint should be
dismissed even if there is a third-party intervention.—Indeed, although respondent
Japitana may have a legal right to recover an indebtedness due him, petitioner
Nicanor Nacar has no correlative legal duty to pay the debt for the simple reason that
there is nothing in the complaint to show that he incurred the debt or had anything to
do with the creation of the liability. As far as the debt is concerned, there is no
allegation or showing that the petitioner had acted in violation of Mr. Japitana’s
rights with consequential injury or damage to the latter as would create a cause of
action against the former.
Same; Same.—As a rule the sufficiency of the complaint, when challenged in a
motion to dismiss, must be determined exclusively on the basis of the facts alleged
therein, x x x Hence, it was error for the respondent court not to dismiss the case
simply because respondent Doloricon filed the complaint for intervention alleging
that he owned the carabaos.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Nicanor Nacar filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with
preliminary injunction to annul an order of the respondent judge of the
municipal court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur directing the attachment of
seven (7) carabaos, to effect the return of four (4) carabaos seized under the
questioned order, and to stop the respondent judge from further proceeding
in Civil Case No. 65.
Respondent Ildefonso Japitana filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 65 and
entitled it "Claim Against the Estate of the Late Isabelo Nacar With
Preliminary Attachment:" On the basis of this complaint, including an
allegation "that defendant are (sic) about to remove and dispose the above-
named property (seven carabaos) with intent to defraud plaintiff herein", and
considering that Mr. Japitana had given security according to the Rules of
Court, Judge Nistal issued the order commanding the provincial sheriff to
attach the seven (7) heads of cattle in the possession of petitioner Nicanor
Nacar. Actually only four (4) carabaos were attached because three (3)
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
carabaos had earlier been slaughtered during the rites preceding the burial of
the late Isabelo Nacar.
Nicanor Nacar filed a motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of preliminary
attachment, and to order the return of the carabaos. Private respondent
Japitana filed an opposition to this motion while intervenor Antonio Doloricon
filed a complaint in intervention asserting that he was the owner of the
attached carabaos and that the certificates of ownership of large cattle were
in his name.
The respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss prompting Mr. Nacar to
come to the Supreme Court.
In a resolution dated January 12, 1971, this Court, upon the posting of a
bond in the amount of P1,000.00, directed the issuance of a preliminary
mandatory injunction. The respondents were enjoined from further enforcing
the writ of attachment and to return the seized carabaos. The judge was
restrained from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 65.
We find the petition meritorious.
The pertinent portions of the complaint filed by Mr. Japitana with the
municipal court read as follows:
ILDEFONSO JAPITANA Civil Case No. 65 Plaintiff,
FOR:
— Versus —
CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE NICANOR NACAR THE LATE ISABELO
NACAR WITH Defendant. PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT x
---------------------------------x
COMPLAINT
COMES NOW the undersigned plaintiff and before this Honorable Court,
respectfully avers:
xxx xxx xxx
That at various dates since the year 1968, the defendant have (sic) incurred
indebtedness to the plaintiff in the total sum of TWO THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED NINETY ONE (P2,791.00) PESOS, which said amount had long
Page 6 of 74
been overdue for payment, and which the defendant up to this date have
(sic) not been able to pay, despite repeated demands from the plaintiff;
That the defendant Isabelo Nacar died last April, 1970 leaving among other
things personal property consisting seven (7) heads of carabaos now in the
possession of the defendant Nicanor Nacar;
That plaintiff herein file a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar to
recover the aforementioned sum of P2,791.99;
That defendant are (sic) about to remove and dispose the above mentioned
property with intent to defraud plaintiff herein;
That plaintiff is willing to put up a bond for the issuance of a preliminary
attachment in an amount to be fixed by the Court, not exceeding the sum of
P 2,791.00 which is the plaintiff's claim herein;
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that pending the hearing of this case,
a writ of preliminary attachment be issued against the properties of the
defendant to serve as security for the payment or satisfaction of any
judgment that may be recovered herein; and that after due hearing on the
principal against the defendant for the sum of P 2,791,00 with legal interest
from September 15, 1970 plus costs of this suit. (Annex "A", p. 7 rollo).
In his motion to dismiss, the petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction
and absence of a cause of action. Mr. Nacar averred that the indebtedness
mentioned in the complaint was alleged to have been incurred by the late
Isabelo Nacar and not by Nicanor Nacar. There was, therefore, no cause of
action against him. The petitioner also stated that a municipal court has no
jurisdiction to entertain an action involving a claim filed against the estate of a
deceased person.
The same grounds have been raised in this petition. Mr. Nacar contends:
xxx xxx xxx
9. That the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction.The municipal courts
or inferior courts have NO jurisdiction to settle the estate of deceased
persons. The proper remedy is for the creditor to file the proper proceedings
in the court of first instance and file the corresponding claim. But assuming
without admitting that the respondent judge had jurisdiction, it is very patent
that he committed a very grave abuse of discretion and totally disregarded
the provisions of the Rules of Court and decisions of this honorable Court
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
when he issued an ex-parte  writ of preliminary attachment, when there is no
showing that the plaintiff therein has a sufficient cause of action, that there is
no other security for the claim sought to be enforced by the plaintiff; or that
the amount claimed in the action is as much as the sum for which the order is
prayed for above all legal counterclaims; There was no bond to answer for
whatever damages that herein petitioner may suffer; (Rollo, pp. 3- 4).
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent judge tried to avoid the consequences of the issues raised in
the motion to dismiss by stating that although the title of the complaint styled
it a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar, the allegations showed
that the nature of the action was really for the recovery of an indebtedness in
the amount of P2,791.99.
The rule cited by the judge is correctly stated but it is hardly relevant to the
contents of the complaint filed by Mr. Japitana.
It is patent from the portions of the complaint earlier cited that the allegations
are not only vague and ambiguous but downright misleading. The second
paragraph of the body of the complaint states that the defendant (herein
petitioner Nicanor Nacar) at various dates since the year 1968 incurred debts
to the plaintiff in the sum of P2,791.00. And yet, in the subsequent
paragraphs, one clearly gathers that the debts were actually incurred by the
late Isabelo Nacar, who died several months before the filing of the
complaint. The complaint which the respondent judge reads as one for the
collection of a sum of money and all the paragraphs of which are incidentally
unnumbered, expressly states as a material averment:
xxx xxx xxx
That plaintiff herein file (sic) a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo
Nacar to recover the aforementioned sum of P2,791.00;
xxx xxx xxx
Under the circumstances of this case, respondent Japitana has no cause of
action against petitioner Nacar. Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust
Company  (58 SCRA 559) gives the elements of a valid cause of action:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal
right of the other. Its essential elements are, namely: (1) the existence of a
legal right in the plaintiff, (2) a correlative legal duty in the defendant, and (3)
Page 7 of 74
an act or omission of the defendant in violation of plaintiff's right with
consequential injury or damage to the plaintiff for which he may maintain an
action for the recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. ( Ma-ao Sugar
Central Co., Inc. vs. Barrios, et al., 79 Phil. 666, 667; Ramitere et al. vs.
Montinola Vda. de Yulo, et al., L-19751, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 251,
255). On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides
that the complaint must state the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's
cause of action. Hence, where the complaint states ultimate facts that
constitute the three essential elements of a cause of action, the complaint
states a cause of action; (Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs.
Garcia, 88 Phil. 215, 218) otherwise, the complaint must succumb to a
motion to dismiss on that ground.
Indeed, although respondent Japitana may have a legal right to recover an
indebtedness due him, petitioner Nicanor Nacar has no correlative legal duty
to pay the debt for the simple reason that there is nothing in the complaint to
show that he incurred the debt or had anything to do with the creation of the
liability. As far as the debt is concerned, there is no allegation or showing that
the petitioner had acted in violation of Mr. Japitana's rights with
consequential injury or damage to the latter as would create a cause of
action against the former.
It is also patent from the complaint that respondent Japitana filed the case
against petitioner Nacar to recover seven (7) heads of carabaos allegedly
belonging to Isabelo Nacar which Japitana wanted to recover from the
possession of the petitioner to answer for the outstanding debt of the late
Isabelo Nacar. This matter, however, is only ancillary to the main action. The
ancillary matter does not cure a fatal defect in the complaint for the main
action is for the recovery of an outstanding debt of the late lsabelo Nacar due
respondent Japitana, a cause of action about which petitioner Nacar has
nothing to do.
In fact the fatal defect in the complaint was noticed by the respondent court
when it advised respondent Japitana to amend his complaint to conform with
his evidence and from the court's admission that it was inclined to dismiss
the case were it not for the complaint in intervention of respondent Doloricon.
Respondent Doloricon filed his complaint for intervention on the ground that
the four carabaos, subject of the writ of attachment, were actually his
carabaos. Thus, the respondent court in its Order denying the petitioner's
motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of preliminary attachment and in order the
return of the carabaos said:
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
... Antonio Doloricon manifested before this Court that he is filing a third-party
complaint alleging that he is the true and lawful owner of the carabaos in
questions.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court for the interest of both
parties will not for the meantime dismiss this case. Antonio Doloricon is
hereby given 10 days from receipt hereof within which to file his third-party
complaint. The plaintiff who in his opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss
pray (sic) for the custody of the carabaos. This Court further requires plaintiff
to put up the additional bond of P I,000.00 after which the latter may be
entitled of (sic) the custody of the carabaos subject of litigation pending final
termination of this case. (Rollo, pp. 18-19)
The respondent court's reason for not dismissing the case is contrary to
applicable precedents on the matter. We ruled in Mathay v. Consolidated
Bank and Trust Company, supra:
Section I, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, providing in part that:
Within the time for pleading a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the
following grounds; ...
(g) That the complaint states no cause of action. ...
explicitly requires that the sufficiency of the complaint must be tested
exclusively on the basis of the complaint itself and no other should be
considered when the ground for motion to dismiss is that the complaint states
no cause of action. Pursuant thereto this Court has ruled that:
As a rule the sufficiency of the complaint, when challenged in a motion to
dismiss, must be determined exclusively on the basis of the facts alleged
therein' (Uy Chao vs. De La Rama Steamship Co., Inc., L-14495, September
29, 1962, 6 SCRA 69, 72. See also De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino et al., 95
Phil. 365, 371; Dalandan, et at. vs. Julio, et al., L- 19101, February 29, 1964,
10 SCRA 400; Ramitere et al. vs. Montinola Vda. de Yulo, et al., L-19751,
February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 250, 254; Acuna vs. Batac Producers
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., et al., L-20338, June 30, 1967, 20
SCRA 526, 531)
Hence, it was error for the respondent court not to dismiss the case simply
because respondent Doloricon filed the complaint for intervention alleging
that he owned the carabaos.
Page 8 of 74
Moreover, even assuming that respondent Japitana had a legal right to the
carabaos which were in the possession of petitioner Nacar, the proper
procedure would not be to file an action for the recovery of the outstanding
debts of the late Isabelo Nacar against his stepfather, the petitioner Nacar as
defendant. As we said in Maspil v. Romero  (61 SCRA 197):

Appropriate actions for the enforcement or defense of rights must be taken in

accordance with procedural rules and cannot be left to the whims or caprices
of litigants. It cannot even be left to the untrammeled discretion of the courts
of justice without sacrificing uniformity and equality in the application and
effectivity thereof.

Considering the foregoing, the respondent court's denial of the motion to

dismiss the complaint and its issuance of a writ of attachment based on the
allegations of the complaint are improper. With this conclusion, we find no
need to discuss the other issue on whether or not the procedural rules on the
issuance of a writ of attachment were followed by the respondent court in
issuing the subject writ of attachment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The preliminary mandatory

injunction issued on January 13, 1971 is made permanent and the cash bond
filed by the petitioner in connection therewith is ordered returned to him.

SO ORDERED.

Assignment No. 1 – Succession Page 9 of 74

[3] G.R. No. L-4275             March 23, 1909
PAULA CONDE, plaintiff-appellee,  vs. ROMAN ABAYA, defendant-
appellant.
1.1.ESTATES; ACTIONS AGAINST EXECUTORS OR ADMINISTRATORS.—
While an estate is in the course of settlement in a special proceeding, no ordinary
action can be maintained by a person claiming to be an heir, against the executor or
administrator, for the purpose of having his rights in the estate determined. (Pimentel
vs.Palanca, 5 Phil. Rep., 436.)
1.2.DISTINCTION BETWEEN RIGHTS OF ACTION BY LEGITIMATE AND
BY NATURAL CHILDREN TO COMPEL RECOGNITION.—As a general rule,
the right of action of a child to enforce recognition of its legitimacy lasts during the
lifetime of such child, but the right of a natural child to compel acknowledgment of
its status continues only during the life of the alleged parents. The right of action for
a declaration of legitimacy is transmitted to the heirs of the child only when -the
latter dies during minority or while insane, or in case the action has already been
instituted. Action by a natural child can only be brought against the heirs of the
parents in the event of the death of the parents during the minority of the child, or
upon the discovery of a document, after the death of the parents, expressly
acknowledging such child. This right of action which the law concedes to thisnatural
child is not transmitted to his ascendants or descendants. (Arts. 118 and 137, Civil
Code.)
ARELLANO, C.J.:
From the hearing of the appeal interposed by Roman Abaya in the special
proceedings brought in the Court of First Instance of La Laguna for the
settlement of the intestate estate and the distribution of the property of
Casiano Abaya it appears:
I. As antecedents: that Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo
Abaya and Sabrina Labadia, died on the 6th of April, 1899; that Paula Conde,
as the mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom the
states she had by Casiano Abaya, on the 6th of November, 1905, moved the
settlement of the said intestate succession; that an administrator having been
appointed for the said estate on the 25th of November, 1905, Roman Abaya,
a son of the said Romualdo Abaya and Sabrina Labadia, the parents of the
late Casiano Abaya, came forward and opposed said appointment and
claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of the deceased; that this
was granted by the court below on the 9th of January, 1906; that on the 17th
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
of November, 1906, Roman Abaya moved that, after due process of law, the
court declare him to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya, to the exclusion of all
other persons, especially of Paula Conde, and to be therefore entitled to take
possession of all the property of said estate, and that it be adjudicated to him;
and that on November 22, 1906, the court ordered the publication of notices
for the declaration of heirs and distribution of the property of the estate.
II. That on the 28th of November, 1906, Paula Conde, in replying to the
foregoing motion of Roman Abaya, filed a petition wherein she stated that
she acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya, but that she
considered that her right was superior to his and moved for a hearing of the
matter, and, in consequence of the evidence that she intended to present she
prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to the property left by
Casiano Abaya, and that the same be adjudicated to her together with the
corresponding products thereof.
III. That the trial was held, both parties presenting documentary and oral
evidence, and the court below entered the following judgment:
That the administrator of the estate of Casiano Abaya should recognize
Teopista and Jose Conde as being natural children of Casiano Abaya; that
the petitioner Paula Conde should succeed to the hereditary rights of her
children with respect to the inheritance of their deceased natural father
Casiano Abaya; and therefore, it is hereby declared that she is the only heir
to the property of the said intestate estate, to the exclusion of the
administrator, Roman Abaya.
IV. That Roman Abaya excepted to the foregoing judgment, appealed to this
court, and presented the following statement of errors:
1. The fact that the court below found that an ordinary action for the
acknowledgment of natural children under articles 135 and 137 of the Civil
Code, might be brought in special probate proceedings.
2. The finding that after the death of a person claimed to be an
unacknowledged natural child, the mother of such presumed natural child, as
heir to the latter, may bring an action to enforce the acknowledgment of her
deceased child in accordance with articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code.
3. The finding in the judgment that the alleged continuos possession of the
deceased children of Paula Conde of the status of natural children of the late
Casiano Abaya, has been fully proven in these proceedings; and
Page 10 of 74
4. On the hypothesis that it was proper to adjudicate the property of this
intestate estate to Paula Conde, as improperly found by the court below, the
court erred in not having declared that said property should be reserved in
favor of relatives of Casiano Abaya to the third degree, and in not having
previously demanded securities from Paula Conde to guarantee the
transmission of the property to those who might fall within the reservation.
As to the first error assigned, the question is set up as to whether in special
proceedings for the administration and distribution of an intestate estate, an
action might be brought to enforce the acknowledgment of the natural child of
the person from whom the inheritance is derived, that is to say, whether one
might appear as heir on the ground that he is a recognized natural child of
the deceased, not having been so recognized by the deceased either
voluntarily or compulsorily by reason of a preexisting judicial decision, but
asking at the same time that, in the special proceeding itself, he be
recognized by the presumed legitimate heirs of the deceased who claim to be
entitled to the succession opened in the special proceeding.
According to section 782 of the Code of Civil Procedure —
If there shall be a controversy before the Court of First Instance as to who the
lawful heirs of the deceased person are, or as to the distributive share to
which each person is entitled under the law, the testimony as to such
controversy shall be taken in writing by the judge, under oath, and signed by
the witness. Any party in interest whose distributive share is affected by the
determination of such controversy, may appeal from the judgment of the
Court of First Instance determining such controversy to the Supreme Court,
within the time and in the manner provided in the last preceding section.
This court has decided the present question in the manner shown in the case
of Juana Pimentel vs. Engracio Palanca (5 Phil. Rep., 436.)
The main question with regard to the second error assigned, is whether or
not the mother of a natural child now deceased, but who survived the person
who, it is claimed, was his natural father, also deceased, may bring an action
for the acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such child in order
to appear in his behalf to receive the inheritance from the person who is
supposed to be his natural father.
In order to decide in the affirmative the court below has assigned the
following as the only foundation:
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
In resolving a similar question Manresa says: "An acknowledgment can only
be demanded by the natural child and his descendants whom it shall benefit,
and should they be minors or otherwise incapacitated, such person as legally
represents them; the mother may ask it in behalf of her child so long as he is
under her authority." On this point no positive declaration has been made,
undoubtedly because it was not considered necessary. A private action is in
question and the general rule must be followed. Elsewhere the same author
adds: "It may so happen that the child dies before four years have expired
after attaining majority, or that the document supporting his petition for
acknowledgment is discovered after his death, such death perhaps occurring
after his parents had died, as is supposed by article 137, or during their
lifetime. In any case such right of action shall pertain to the descendants of
the child whom the acknowledgment may interest." (See Commentaries to
arts. 135 and 137, Civil Code, Vol. I.)
The above doctrine, advanced by one of the most eminent commentators of
the Civil Code, lacks legal and doctrinal foundation. The power to transmit
the right of such action by the natural child to his descendants can not be
sustained under the law, and still less to his mother.
It is without any support in law because the rule laid down in the code is most
positive, limiting in form, when establishing the exception for the exercise of
such right of action after the death of the presumed parents, as is shown
hereafter. It is not supported by any doctrine, because up to the present time
no argument has been presented, upon which even an approximate
conclusion could be based.
Although the Civil Code considerably improved the condition of recognized
natural children, granting them rights and actions that they did not possess
under the former laws, they were not, however, placed upon the same place
as legitimate ones. The difference that separates these two classes of
children is still great, as proven by so many articles dealing with the rights of
the family and the succession in relation to the members thereof. It may be
laid down as legal maxim, that whatever the code does not grant to the
legitimate children, or in connection with their rights, must still less be
understood as granted to recognized natural children or in connection with
their rights. There is not a single exception in its provisions.
If legitimacy is the attribute that constitutes the basis of the absolute family
rights of the child, the acknowledgment of the natural child is, among
illegitimate ones, that which unites him to the family of the father or the
mother who recognized him, and affords him a participation in the rights of
Page 11 of 74
the family, relatively advantageous according to whether they are alone or
whether they concur with other individuals of the family of his purely natural
father or mother.
Thus, in order to consider the spirit of the Civil Code, nothing is more logical
than to establish a comparison between an action to claim the legitimacy,
and one to enforce acknowledgment.
ART. 118. The action to claim its legitimacy may be brought by the child at
any time of its lifetime and shall be transmitted to its heirs, should it die
during minority or in a state of insanity. In such cases the heirs shall be
allowed a period of five years in which to institute the action.
The action already instituted by the child is transmitted by its death to the
heirs, if it has not lapsed before then.
ART. 137. The actions for the acknowledgment of natural children can be
instituted only during the life of the presumed parents, except in the following
cases:
1. If the father or mother died during the maturity of the child, in which
case the latter may institute the action before the expiration of the first four
years of its maturity.
2. If, after the death of the father or mother, some instrument, before
unknown, should be discovered in which the child is expressly
acknowledged.
In this case the action must be instituted with the six months following the
discovery of such instrument.
On this supposition the first difference that results between one action and
the other consists in that the right of action for legitimacy lasts during the
whole lifetime of the child, that is, it can always be brought against the
presumed parents or their heirs by the child itself, while the right of action for
the acknowledgment of a natural child does not last his whole lifetime, and,
as a general rule, it can not be instituted against the heirs of the presumed
parents, inasmuch as it can be exercised only during the life of the presumed
parents.
With regard to the question at issue, that is, the transmission to the heirs of
the presumed parents of the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, or to
recognize the natural filiation, there exists the most radical difference in that
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
the former continues during the life of the child who claims to be legitimate,
and he may demand it either directly and primarily from the said presumed
parents, or indirectly and secondarily from the heirs of the latter; while the
second does not endure for life; as a general rule, it only lasts during the life
of the presumed parents. Hence the other difference, derived as a
consequence, that an action for legitimacy is always brought against the
heirs of the presumed parents in case of the death of the latter, while the
action for acknowledgment is not brought against the heirs of such parents,
with the exception of the two cases prescribed by article 137 transcribed
above.
So much for the passive transmission of the obligation to admit the legitimate
filiation, or to acknowledge the natural filiation.
As to the transmission to the heirs of the child of the latter's action to claim
his legitimacy, or to obtain the acknowledgment of his natural filiation, it is
seen that the code grants it in the first case, but not in the second. It contains
provisions for the transmission of the right of action which, for the purpose
claiming his legitimacy inheres in the child, but it does not say a word with
regard to the transmission of the right to obtain the acknowledgment of the
natural filiation.
Therefore, the respective corollary of each of the two above-cited articles is:
(1) That the right of action which devolves upon the child to claim his
legitimacy under article 118, may be transmitted to his heirs in certain cases
designated in the said article; (2) That the right of action for the
acknowledgment of natural children to which article 137 refers, can never be
transmitted, for the reason that the code makes no mention of it in any case,
not even as an exception.
It is most illogical and contrary to every rule of correct interpretation, that the
right of action to secure acknowledgment by the natural child should be
presumed to be transmitted, independently, as a rule, to his heirs, while the
right of action to claim legitimacy from his predecessor is not expressly,
independently, or, as a general rule, conceded to the heirs of the legitimate
child, but only relatively and as an exception. Consequently, the pretension
that the right of action on the part of the child to obtain the acknowledgment
of his natural filiation is transmitted to his descendants is altogether
unfounded. No legal provision exists to sustain such pretension, nor can an
argument of presumption be based on the lesser claim when there is no
basis for the greater one, and when it is only given as an exception in well-
defined cases. It is placing the heirs of the natural child on a better footing
Page 12 of 74
than the heirs of the legitimate one, when, as a matter of fact, the position of
a natural child is no better than, no even equal to, that of a legitimate child.
From the express and precise precepts of the code the following conclusions
are derived:
The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts
during his whole life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural
child lasts only during the life of his presumed parents.
Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his legitimacy
lasts during his whole life, he may exercise it either against the presumed
parents, or their heirs; while the right of action to secure the acknowledgment
of a natural child, since it does not last during his whole life, but depends on
that of the presumed parents, as a general rule can only be exercised against
the latter.
Usually the right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a
personal character and pertains exclusively to him, only the child may
exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As an exception, and in three cases
only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit, if he died during his
minority, or while insane, or after action had been already instituted.
An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be
exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the
event of the death of the latter during the minority of the child, and second,
upon the discovery of some instrument of express acknowledgment of the
child, executed by the father or mother, the existence of which was unknown
during the life of the latter.
But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be
exercised by him. It can not be transmitted to his descendants, or his
ascendants.
In support of the foregoing the following authorities may be cited:
Sanchez Roman, in his Treatise of Civil Law, propounds the question as to
whether said action should be considered transmissive to the heirs or
descendants of the natural child, whether he had or had not exercised it up to
the time of his death, and decides it as follows:
There is an entire absence of legal provisions, and at most, it might be
deemed admissible as a solution, that the right of action to claim the
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
acknowledgment of a natural child is transmitted by the analogy to his heirs
on the same conditions and terms that it is transmitted to the descendants of
a legitimate child, to claim his legitimacy, under article 118, but nothing more;
because on this point nothing warrants placing the heirs of a natural child on
a better footing than those of the legitimate child, and even to compare
them would not fail to be a strained and questionable matter, and one of
great difficulty for decision by the courts, for the simple reason that for the
heirs of the legitimate child, the said article 118 exists, while for those of the
natural child, as we have said, there is no provision in the code authorizing
the same, although on the other hand there is none that prohibits it. (Vol. V.)
Diaz Guijarro and Martinez Ruiz in their work on "The Civil Code as
construed by the supreme court of Spain," commenting upon article 137, say:
Article 118, taking into account the privileges due to the legitimacy of
children, grants them the right to claim said legitimacy during their lifetime,
and even authorizes the transmission of said right for the space of five years
to the heirs thereof, if the child die during his minority or in a state of insanity.
But as article 137 is based on the consideration that in the case of a natural
child, ties are less strong and sacred in the eyes of the law, it does not fix
such a long and indefinite period for the exercise of the action; it limits it to
the life of the parents, excepting in the two cases mentioned in said article;
and it does not allow, as does article 118, the action to pass on to the heirs,
inasmuch as, although it does not prohibit it, and for that reason it might be
deemed on general principles of law to consent to it, such a supposition is
inadmissible for the reason that a comparison of both articles shows that the
silence of the law in the latter case is not, nor it can be, an omission, but a
deliberate intent to establish a wide difference between the advantages
granted to a legitimate child and to a natural one.
(Ibid., Vol. II, 171.)
Navarro Amandi (Cuestionario del Código Civil) raises the question: "Can the
heirs of a natural child claim the acknowledgment in those cases wherein the
father or mother are under obligation to acknowledge"? And says:
Opinions are widely divergent. The court of Rennes held (on April 13, 1844)
that the right of investigation forms a part of the estate of the child, and along
with his patrimony is transmitted to his heirs. The affirmation is altogether too
categorical to be admissible. If it were correct the same thing would happen
as when the legitimacy of a child is claimed, and as already seen, the right of
action to demand the legitimacy is not transmitted to the heirs in every case
Page 13 of 74
and as an absolute right, but under certain limitations and circumstances.
Now, were we to admit the doctrine of the court of Rennes, the result would
be that the claim for natural filiation would be more favored than one for
legitimate filiation. This would be absurd, because it can not be conceived
that the legislator should have granted a right of action to the heirs of the
natural child, which is only granted under great limitations and in very few
cases to those of a legitimate one. Some persons insist that the same rules
that govern legitimate filiation apply by analogy to natural child are entitled to
claim it in the cases prescribed by the article 118. The majority, however, are
inclined to consider the right to claim acknowledgment as a personal right,
and consequently, not transmissive to the heirs. Really there are no legal
grounds to warrant the transmission. (Vol. 2, 229.)
In a decision like the present one it is impossible to bring forward the
argument of analogy for the purpose of considering that the heirs of the
natural child are entitled to the right of action which article 118 concedes to
the heirs of the legitimate child. The existence of a provision for the one case
and the absence thereof for the other is a conclusive argument that inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius, and it can not be understood that the provision of
law should be the same when the same reason does not hold in the one case
as in the other.
The theory of law of transmission is also entirely inapplicable in this case.
This theory, which in the Roman Law expressed the general rule than an heir
who did not accept an inheritance during his lifetime was incapacitated from
transmitting it to his own heirs, included at the same time the idea that if the
inheritance was not transmitted because the heir did not possess it, there
were, however, certain things which the heir held and could transmit. Such
was the law and the right to accept the inheritance, for the existing reason
that all rights, both real and personal, shall pass to the heir; quia haeres
representat defunctum in omnibus et per omnia. According to the article 659
of the Civil Code, "the inheritance includes all the property, rights, and
obligations of a person, which are not extinguished by his death." If the
mother is the heir of her natural child, and the latter, among other rights
during his lifetime was entitled to exercise an action of his acknowledgment
against his father, during the life of the latter, if after his death in some of the
excepting cases of article 137, such right, which is a portion of his
inheritance, is transmitted to his mother as being his heir, and it was so
understood by the court of Rennes when it considered the right in question,
not as a personal and exclusive right of the child which is extinguished by his
death, but a any other right which might be transmitted after his death. This
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
right of supposed transmission is even less tenable than that sought to be
sustained by the argument of analogy.
The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his legitimacy is in all
respects superior to that of the child who claims acknowledgment as a
natural child. And it is evident that the right of action to claim his legitimacy is
not one of those rights which the legitimate child may transmit by inheritance
to his heirs; it forms no part of the component rights of his inheritance. If it
were so, there would have been no necessity to establish its transmissibility
to heirs as an exception in the terms and conditions of article 118 of the
code. So that, in order that it may constitute a portion of the child's
inheritance, it is necessary that the conditions and the terms contained in
article 118 shall be present, since without them, the right that the child held
during his lifetime, being personal and exclusive in principle, and therefore,
as a general rule not susceptible of transmission, would and should have
been extinguished by his death. Therefore, where no express provision like
that of article 118 exists, the right of action for the acknowledgment of a
natural child is, in principle and without exception, extinguished by his death,
and can not be transmitted as a portion of the inheritance of the deceased
child.
On the other hand, if said right of action formed a part of the child's
inheritance, it would be necessary to establish the doctrine that the right to
claim such an acknowledgment from the presumed natural father and from
his heirs is an absolute right of the heirs of the child, not limited by certain
circumstances as in the case of the heirs of a natural child with a legitimate
one to place the heirs of a natural child and his inheritance on a better footing
than those of a legitimate child would not only be unreasonable, but, as
stated in one of the above citations, most absurd and illegal in the present
state of the law and in accordance with the general principles thereof.
For all of the foregoing reasons we hereby reverse the judgment appealed
from in all its parts, without any special ruling as to the costs of this instance.
[4] G.R. No. 56700 March 28, 1983
WARLITO MABALOT and ARACELI MABALOT, petitioners, 
vs. THE HON. JUDGE TOMAS P. MADELA, JR., in his capacity as Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Manila and PEDRO V.
MALIT, respondents.
Page 14 of 74
Ejectment; It is ironic that ejectment cases that are supposed to be summarily
terminated take long to terminate. It is time a procedure is devised to remedy the
situation.—Petitioners’ submissions are typical examples of the arguments advanced
by defendants in ejectment cases in their attempt to prolong their occupancy of
premises over which they ceased to have valid ground to possess, by keeping alive
the litigation involving their ejectment therefrom. The records of our courts will
reveal that a considerable percentage of the cases pending in them are actions for
forcible entry and detainer. Ordained by law to be commenced in the courts at the
municipal or city level, they pass thru all the other grades of courts in the judicial
system up to the Highest Court of the land. It is ironic that a forcible entry or detainer
case which is intended to be disposed of in summary fashion has oftentimes proved
to be the most cumbersome and difficult to terminate. It has become a truism that, if
a landlord would like to eject a tenant in the shortest possible time, the worst thing
that he could do is to file an ejectment case. It is, indeed, about time that this
situation be remedied if only to contribute to the solution of the worsening problem
of court congestion, by refusing to edify these cases by giving them a full-blown
treatment in all the courts in the judicial structure, and thereby save the courts the
expenditure of precious time and energy which could otherwise be devoted to more
significant and vital litigations.
Same; The one-year period to file an action for forcible entry and detainer is
reckoned from the time the possession of defendant becomes unlawful, not at the
moment of occupancy.—The time limitation of one year within which to file an
action for forcible entry and detainer is reckoned not from the moment of occupancy
by the defendant, but from the time that his possession becomes unlawful. The
occupancy of the apartment by Araceli Mabalot in 1966 was not unlawful because
she was then a member of the household of Armando Galvez who was the lessee of
the premises in question. The possession of the petitioners became unlawful only
after Armando Galvez died, which was on August 23, 1977. Such death of Armando
Galvez terminated the lease in his favor. Petitioners do not have any colorable right
to occupy the apartment thereafter. The filing of the case on January 8, 1978 was
well within one year period from August 23, 1977.
Same; Succession; Jurisdiction; The fact that the issue raised in the ejectment case is
solely a legal one—whether a person can continue a lease by inheritance—does not
make it one incapable of pecuniary estimation and bring the case under the CFI’s
jurisdiction.—There is less merit in the contention that the action filed by the private
respondent is one in which the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation
just because it involves the legal question as to the right of the petitioners to continue
the lease by reason of inheritance. Such legal issue is purely incidental to the
question of whether they are entitled to possess the apartment in question. The action
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
is for the recovery of the possession of real property brought within one year from
the time the possession of the defendant became unlawful, technically known as an
action for unlawful detainer. Although it is a real action which should ordinarily fall
under the jurisdiction of the court of first instance (now the regional trial court), the
law vests the exclusive original jurisdiction over it in the courts at the municipal or
city level as an exception to the general rule on jurisdiction over real actions,
presumably in view of the summary nature of the proceedings contemplated to be
taken therein. This kind of action is different and distinct from the class of actions
where the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action
does not become one where the subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation by the
mere fact that an issue of law is raised therein. Such a view would result in
converting virtually all civil actions into that category, and in depriving the
municipal and city trial courts of jurisdiction over all civil cases where a party raises
a question of law.
VASQUEZ, J.:
This is an unlawful detainer case originally commenced in the City of Manila
by private respondent to eject the petitioners from an apartment located at
No. 2262 Coral Street, San Andres, Manila. The decision of said court, which
was in favor of the petitioners, was appealed by the private respondent to the
Court of First Instance of Manila where it was assigned to the branch
presided over by respondent Judge Tomas P. Madela, Jr. A decision
rendered on January 6, 1981 by Judge Madela reversed the decision of the
City Court and ordered the petitioners to vacate the premises in question.
The petitioners took a direct appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila on the legal question raised by them with respect to the
alleged lack of jurisdiction of the City Court of Manila and the Court of First
Instance of Manila to take cognizance of the basic action.
The facts of this case, as synthesized in the decision of Judge Madela and
which are impliedly admitted by the petitioners in taking this direct appeal to
this Court on a pure question of law, are as follows:
From the records and evidence of the case, plaintiff appellant as owner of an
apartment No. 2262 located at Coral Street, San Andres, Manila leased it to
Atty. Armando Galvez on a monthly basis of P200.00 a month since 1967.
Staying with him in said apartment is defendant Araceli Mabalot and a maid
the former claiming to be a ward of Atty. Galvez since she was 10 years old
when her mother died and her father could not support her (t.s.n. pp. 3-4,
Dec. 6, 1979). In 1970 Araceli Mabalot married defendant Warlito Mabalot
Page 15 of 74
and continued to stay with Atty. Galvez until his death on August 23, 1977.
After the death of Atty. Armando Galvez, the arrearages for the monthly
rentals of July and August were paid by Atty. Fernando Galvez, a brother of
the late Atty. Armando Galvez and for the month of September 1977, Atty.
Fernando Galvez issued a check (pay to cash) which he gave to the
defendants-appellees to pay the plaintiff-appellant. However, the
corresponding receipts were issued by plaintiff in the name of Atty. Fernando
Galvez.
As early as September 1, 1977, in his letter to Atty. Fernando Galvez, the
plaintiff-appellant intimated that with the death of his brother, Araceli Mabalot
and husband cannot take over the apartment as the contract of lease
between him and Atty. Armando Galvez is a personal one and could not be
transmitted to them (Exh. "A"). On September 5, 1977, plaintiff wrote the
defendants that they could not take over the apartment as it could not be the
subject of inheritance and gave them three (3) months to vacate the same
(Exhibit "B"). However, defendants refused to receive said letter, as plaintiff
with the help of patrolman Tomas Soriaga served it the following morning
with the policeman as a witness (Exh. "B-1").
Araceli Mabalot admitted that the late Armando Galvez has his own family, a
wife and children namely, Cynthia, Rosalinda, Danilo, Jocelyn and Olivia who
were mentioned in his application for insurance as his legitimate children with
Araceli mentioned as a niece (t.s.n. p. 16, Oct. 25, 1977). The succeeding
payments of the rentals were paid by defendants- appellees' counsel, Atty.
Efren Santos.
The question to be resolved is, whether or not the defendants, Warlito and
Araceli Mabalot have the right to continue as tenants of the plaintiff from the
death of Atty. Armando Galvez. (Annex "A", Petitioners' Brief, p. 72, Rello.)
As may be noted from the definition of the issue by Judge Madela, the
question which was raised and argued by the parties in the lower courts was
the right of the petitioners to succeed to the lease over the subject apartment
previously existing between Armando Galvez and the private respondent.
Apparently convinced of the correctness of the holding of Judge Madela that
they may not continue said lease inasmuch as the petitioners are not heirs of
Armando Galvez (Art. 1311, Civil Code), nor was such lease assigned by
Armando Galvez to the petitioners with the consent of private respondent
(Art. 1649, Ibid), the petitioners now rely on the alleged legal infirmity of the
proceedings had in the lower courts by attacking their jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case.
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
It is the petitioners' main contention that the City Court lacked jurisdiction to
entertain the action filed by the private respondent inasmuch as it is not an
action for unlawful detainer, but one the subject matter of which is incapable
of pecuniary estimation falling within the original jurisdiction of the court of
first instance pursuant to Section 44(a) of the former Judiciary Act.
Petitioners argue that an action for unlawful detainer must be filed within one
year after the unlawful deprivation of the possession of the subject property
by the defendant. They contend that this requirement does not exist in this
case inasmuch as petitioner Araceli Mabalot was admittedly staying in the
apartment together with Armando Galvez since 1966, and the action to eject
her was filed only on January 8, 1978. They further point out that in
paragraph 7 of the complaint, the private respondent had expressly alleged
that he denied the request of the petitioners to continue the lease of Armando
Galvez on the ground "that a lease contract is personal in nature and cannot
be the subject of inheritance." By this allegation, so the petitioners contend,
the basic issue becomes a determination of whether or not a lease contract
may be the subject of inheritance, thereby making the action as one of the
subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation.
Petitioners' submissions are typical examples of the arguments advanced by
defendants in ejectment cases in their attempt to prolong their occupancy of
premises over which they ceased to have valid ground to possess, by
keeping alive the litigation involving their ejectment therefrom. The records of
our courts will reveal that a considerable percentage of the cases pending in
them are actions for forcible entry and detainer. Ordained by law to be
commenced in the courts at the municipal or city level, they pass thru all the
other grades of courts in the judicial system up to the Highest Court of the
land. It is ironic that a forcible entry or detainer case which is intended to be
disposed of in summary fashion has oftentimes proved to be the most
cumbersome and difficult to terminate. It has become a truism that, if a
landlord would like to eject a tenant in the shortest possible time, the worst
thing that he could do is to file an ejectment case. It is, indeed, about time
that this situation be remedied if only to contribute to the solution of the
worsening problem of court congestion, by refusing to edify these cases by
giving them a full-blown treatment in all the courts in the judicial structure,
and thereby save the courts the expenditure of precious time and energy
which could otherwise be devoted to more significant and vital litigations.
The time limitation of one year within which to file an action for forcible entry
and detainer is reckoned not from the moment of occupancy by the
defendant, but from the time that his possession becomes unlawful. The
Page 16 of 74
occupancy of the apartment by Araceli Mabalot in 1966 was not unlawful
because she was then a member of the household of Armando Galvez who
was the lessee of the premises in question. The possession of the petitioners
became unlawful only after Armando Galvez died, which was on August 23,
1977. Such death of Armando Galvez terminated the lease in his favor.
Petitioners do not have any colorable right to occupy the apartment
thereafter. The filing of the case on January 8, 1978 was well within one year
period from August 23, 1977.

There is less merit in the contention that the action filed by the private
respondent is one in which the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary
estimation just because it involves the legal question as to the right of the
petitioners to continue the lease by reason of inheritance. Such legal issue is
purely incidental to the question of whether they are entitled to possess the
apartment in question. The action is for the recovery of the possession of real
property brought within one year from the time the possession of the
defendant became unlawful, technically known as an action for unlawful
detainer. Although it is a real action which should ordinarily fall under the
jurisdiction of the court of first instance (now the regional trial court), the law
vests the exclusive original jurisdiction over it in the courts at the municipal or
city level as an exception to the general rule on jurisdiction over real actions,
presumably in view of the summary nature of the proceedings contemplated
to be taken therein. This kind of action is different and distinct from the class
of actions where the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. An action does not become one where the subject is incapable of
pecuniary estimation by the mere fact that an issue of law is raised therein.
Such a view would result in converting virtually all civil actions into that
category, and in depriving the municipal and city trial courts of jurisdiction
over all civil cases where a party raises a question of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. With costs against the

petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Assignment No. 1 – Succession Page 17 of 74

[5] G.R. No. L-14128             August 21, 1962
LEON C. VIARDO, plaintiff-appellant,  CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 3484 OF THE LAND RECORDS OF NUEVA
vs. PILAR BELMONTE, PATRICIA DRIZ, JOAQUINA DRIZ, ISIDORO
MERCADO,  TRINIDAD ISIDRO, ZACARIAS BELMONTE, TERESITA
FLORES,  PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC. and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,defendants-appellees.
Sales; Validity of sale of definite portions of undivided property; Effect of notice of
lis pendens.—As the notice of lis pendens was limited to the one-half interest
acquired by appellant from the owner and the other one-half undivided interest of the
latter was not in litigation, the owner thereof had a right to sell it. The fact that the
deeds of sale executed by the owner with respect to the latter one-half undivided
interest appeared to convey definite or segregated parts of the owner's remaining
interest in the parcel of land, did not result in the nullity of the deeds. The sales were
valid, subject only to the condition that the interests acquired by the vendees were
limited to the parts which might be assigned to them in the division upon the
termination of the coownership.
PADILLA, J.:
In civil case No. 7611 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, entitled
Leon C. Viardo vs. Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte, a writ of execution
was issued and levy was made "upon all the rights, interest and participation
which the spouses Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte have or might have" in
a parcel of land covered by original certificate of title No. 3484 of the
Registrar of Deeds in and for the province of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit A, p.3).
This certificate of title covers a parcel of land (Lot No. 1, Psu-14371) in the
barrios of Nieves and Santo Rosario, municipality of Zaragoza, province of
Nueva Ecija, containing an area of 1,192,775 square meters, more or less.
The land is registered in the names of "Leonor Belmonte, Felisa Belmonte,
Pilar Belmonte and Ines de Guzman, subject . . . to the condition that ¼
share [that] belongs to Ines de Guzman is usufructuary "correspondiendo la
nuda propiedad a sus tres hijas arriba citadas en participaciones iguales
quienes se consolidara el dominio despues del fallecimiento de su madre' "
(Exhibit A, p. 2).
On 25 February 1941, by virtue of the writ of execution above mentioned, the
provincial sheriff of Nueva Ecija sold at public auction one-half (½) of the
following property:
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
TAX DECLARATION NO. 11313 OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF ZARAGOZA,
PROVINCE OF NUEVA ECIJA AND COVERED BY ORIGINAL
ECIJA.
A parcel of land, situated in the sitio of Valdez, barrio Sto. Rosario,
municipality of Zaragoza, Province of Nueva Ecija. Bounded on the North by
property of Felisa Belmonte; on the East by Sapang Dalagot; on the
Southeast by Ines de Guzman; on the South by the property of Felisa
Belmonte; and on then West by the property of Cirilo Acosta; containing an
area of THIRTY (30) HECTARES, more or less. Declared under tax No.
11313 in the name of Pilar Belmonte with an assessed value of P8,400.00.
The highest bidder at the auction sale was the judgment creditor, Leon C.
Viardo, who paid P2,125.64 for the interest sold and P83.15 for the land tax
corresponding to such interest (Exhibit B). When the judgment debtors failed
to redeem the property within the statutory period of one year from the date
of sale (21 February 1941), the provincial sheriff of Nueva Ecija executed on
12 May 1943 a Final Bill of Sale of the property described in Exhibit B in favor
of Leon C. Viardo (Exhibit C). On 3 May 1943 a co-owner's copy of the
certificate of title was issued to Leon C. Viardo (Exhibit A, p. 3).
On 28 December 1945 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Land
Registration Case No. 918, G.L.R.O. Record No. 17910, acting upon a
verified petition of Leon C. Viardo, ordered the Registrar of Deeds in and for
Nueva Ecija —
to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 3484 and to issue another in lieu
thereof in the name of and in the proportion as follows: LEONOR
BELMONTE ¼ share; FELISA BELMONTE, ¼ share; PILAR BELMONTE,
¹/8 share; LEON C. VIARDO, ¹/8 share; and INES DE GUZMAN, ¼ share,
upon the payment of the corresponding fees (Exhibit D).
However, it appears from Original Certificate of Title No. 3484 (Exhibit A) that
the above-mentioned order was not carried out and that said original
certificate of title was not cancelled.
On 27 May 1946 Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte filed in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija a complaint against Leon C. Viardo (civil case No.
161) praying that judgment be rendered against the defendant:
Page 18 of 74
(a) Ordering the defendant to reconvey the property in question in favor of
plaintiffs herein upon payment by the latter of the lawful redemption price in
accordance with law, or the sum of P2,125.64 with interest at the rate of one
per centum (1%) per month for twelve (12) months from February 27, 1941 to
February 27, 1942. (Exhibit E.)
On 4 June 1946 Patricia Blando, attorney for the plaintiffs Bartolome Driz and
Pilar Belmonte, requested the Registrar of Deeds in and for Nueva Ecija for
— Jose E. Castañeda, Manila) Date of the Inst. — March 8, 1958: Date of the
the annotation of a Notice of LIS PENDENS on the back of ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 3484 of the Office of the Register of Deeds for
the Province of Nueva Ecija, affecting the undivided one-half (½) portion of
the property of the plaintiffs in the above-entitled cause, situated in the Sitio
of Valdez, Barrio of Sto. Rosario, Municipality of Zaragoza, which is involved
in the said controversy against the defendant LEON C. VIARDO, and which
is more particularly described under paragraph (4) of the plaintiffs' complaint
a copy of which is hereby presented, hereunto attached. (Exhibit F.)
On 6 June 1946 the Registrar of Deeds made the following annotation on the
back of original certificate of title No. 3484:
Entry No. 3347/0-3484: Kind — Lis Pendens — Executed in favor of
Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte; Conditions — Al the rights, interests, and
participation of Leon C. Viardo in this title is the subject of a complaint filed in
Civil Case No. 16 of the C.F.I. of N.E. now pending for action. Date of the
instrument — June 4, 1946; Date of the inscription — June 6, 1946 at 3:18
(?) p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. Cuizon, Acting Register of Deeds. (Exhibit A, p. 3.)
While the above-mentioned case was pending in the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija, Pilar Belmonte, one of the plaintiffs, entered into the following
contracts involving her interest or rights over the parcel of land covered by
original certificate of title No. 3484:
(1) Entry No. 10984: Kind — Sale; Executed in favor of — Isidro M. Mercado
& Trinidad Isidro; Conditions--Pilar Belmonte sold a portion of Seven and
One-Half (7-½) hectares of the property described in this title for the sum of
P5,500.00 (D-126: P-90: B-11: S-1948, Herminio E. Algas, N. E.) Date of the
Inst. — June 28, 1948 at 1:30 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(2) Entry No. 10985/0-3484: Kind — Sale with right of repurchase: Executed
in favor of — Federico Aquino; Conditions — Pilar Belmonte sold with a right
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
of repurchase seven and one-half (7-½) hectares of her share, interest and
participation in this title for the sum of P3,600.00 (D-127: P-90: B-11: S-48. H.
Algas, N. E.) Date of the Inst. — June 28, 1948; Date of the Inscription —
June 28, 1948 at 1:30 p.m. (Sgd.) F. C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(3) Entry No. 15110/0-3484: Kind — Resale: Executed in favor of — Pilar
Belmonte; Conditions — Federico Aquino resold his share in this title
consisting of 7-½ Has. for the sum of P3,600.00 (D-63: P-15: B-6: S-1949,
Inscription — April 8, 1949 at 11:30 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of
Deeds.
(4) Entry No. 15111/0-3484: Kind — Sale; Executed in favor of — Dominador
Asuncion and Tomasita Dansil: Pilar Belmonte sold a portion of seven (7)
Has. of her share and participation in this title for the sum of P7,000.00. (D-
64: P-15: B-6: S-1949, J. E. Castañeda, Manila) Date of the Inst. — March 9,
1949; Date of the Inscription — April 8, 1949 at 11:30 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C.
CUIZON, Register of Deeds. (Exhibit A, p. 4)
On 11 April 1950 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija rendered
judgment in civil case No. 161, as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court absolves the defendant from the
complaint of the plaintiffs, in the same manner that plaintiffs are absolved
from the counter complaint of the defendant. Defendant is the legal owner of
the land in question and the right of redemption of the plaintiff of said land
had already elapsed. With costs to the plaintiff. (Exhibit G.)
Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing his counter-claim, the defendant
Leon C. Viardo appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the appeal was
pending, the following transactions involving the interest or rights of Pilar
Belmonte over the parcel of land covered by original certificate of title No.
3484 took place:
(1) Entry No. 7967/NT-15162: Kind — Partition: Executed in favor of —
Felisa Belmonte, et al.; Conditions — By virtue of a deed of partition, the
share of the deceased Ines de Guzman and Isidro Belmonte has been
adjudicated in favor of the heirs of said deceased. (D-891: P-77: B-V: S-
1948, Manuel E. Castañeda, Manila) Date of the Inst. — March 31, 1948:
Date of the Inscription — Feb. 18, 1954 at 10:18 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON,
Register of Deeds.
Page 19 of 74
(2) Entry No. 7968/NT-15162: Kind — Agreement: Executed in favor of —
Felisa Belmonte, et al; Conditions — By virtue of an agreement of the parties
concerned in the partition, Lots Nos. 1-D and 1-J, with an area of 300,000 sq.
m. and 80,000 sq.m., more or less, respectively in the subdivision plan Psd-
36340, a portion of lot 1 described on plan Psu-14371, of this title, have been
adjudicated in favor of Felisa Belmonte and Lot 1-G with an area of 75,000
sq.m., more or less, of the same subdivision, has been adjudicated in favor of
Isidoro Mercado, See TCT No. 15162 and 15163, Vol. No. 76. (D-211: P-44:
B-IV: S-1952, P. Bautista, Cab. City) Date of the Inst. — Jan. 22, 1952: Date
of the Inscription — Feb. 18, 1954 at 10:18 a.m.(Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON,
Register of Deeds.
(3) Entry No. 9715/NT-15746: Kind — Sale; Executed in favor of — Sp.
Zacarias Belmonte and Teresita Flores; Conditions — Dominador Asuncion
and Tomasita Dansil sold all their rights and interest in this title consisting of
seven hectares for the sum of P6,000.00. (D-177: P-37: B-IV: S-1952; R. S.
Pengson, N.E.) Date of the Inst. — Feb. 4, 1952; Date of Inscription — May
13, 1954 at 10:08 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(4) Entry No. 12168/NT-15162: Kind — Project of Partition — Executed in
favor of Pilar Belmonte; Conditions — By virtue of a project of partition re-
estate of the late Ines de Guzman, a portion of 13.2775 hectares of the land
described in this title has been adjudicated in favor of Pilar Belmonte. (D-891:
P-77: B-V: S-1948, Manuel E. Castañeda, Manila) Date of the Inst. — March
31, 1948: Date of the Inscription — Aug. 23, 1954 at 2:00 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C.
CUIZON, Register of Deeds.1äwphï1.ñët
(5) Entry No. 12169/NT-16440: Kind — Sale; Executed in favor of — Joaquin
Driz: Conditions — Pilar Belmonte sold Lot 1-B of the subdivision plan of this
title Psd-36340 a portion taken from her undivided 13.2775 hectares with an
area of 52,775 sq.m., more or less, for the sum of P800.00. See TCT NT-
16440, Vol. No. 83. (D-160: P-33: B-I: S-1954, Adolfo San Juan, Cab. City)
Date of the Inst. — Aug. 23, 1954; Date of the Inscription — Aug. 23, 1954 at
2:00 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(6) Entry No. 12370/NT-16488: Kind — Sale; Executed in favor of — Patricia
Driz: Conditions — Pilar Belmonte sold Lot 1-A of the subdivision plan Psd-
36340 being a portion of Lot 1 described in plan Psu-14371, G.L.R.O. Cad.
Record No. 17910, of this title for the sum of P1,000.00 with an area of
80,000 sq.m., with respect to her share of 13.2775 hectares. See TCT No.
NT-16488, Vol. 83. (D-440: P-90: B-V: S-1954, H. V. Garcia, Cab. City) Date
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
of the Inst. — Aug. 31, 1954: Date of the Inscription — Sept. 2, 1954 at 8:00
p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(7) Entry No. 12512/NT-16546: Kind — Sale; Executed in favor of — Patricia
Driz: Conditions — Pilar Belmonte sold Lots Nos. 1-H and 1-I of the
subdivision plan Psd-30340 of the property described in this title for the sum
of P850.00. See TCT No. NT-16524, Vol. 83. (D-167: P-35: B-I: S-1954,
Adolfo San Juan, Cab. City) Date of the Inst. — Sept. 9, 1954; Date of the
Inscription — Sept. 9, 1954 at 11:50 a.m. (Sgd.) F. C. CUIZON, Register of
Deeds.
(8) Entry No. 12569/NT-16546: Kind — Sale; Executed favor of — Patricia
Driz; Conditions — Pilar Belmonte sold Lot I-E of the subdivision plan Psd-
30340 of the property described in this title, with an area of 79,848 sq.m.,
more or less the subdivision plan of this title, was sold for the sum of
P2,000.00. See TCT No. NT-16546, Vol. 83. (D-172: P-36: BS-1954, Adolfo
San Juan, Cab. City) Date of the Inst. — Sept. 11, 1954; Date of the
Inscription — Sept. 13, 1954 at 8:20 am. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of
Deeds. (Exhibit A, pp. 4-5.)
On 22 September 1954, a few days after the last transactions mentioned
above, the Court of Appeals passed a resolution granting the prayer of
defendant-appellant Leon C. Viardo that the children and only heirs, namely,
Artemio, Patricia, Mario, Domingo, Joaquina and Catalina, surnamed Driz,
who were all of age, be substituted for the deceased appellee Bartolome Driz
(the husband of Pilar Belmonte). (Exhibit H-1).
On 25 September 1954 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment awarding
damages prayed for in the counterclaim of Leon V. Viardo. The judgment
made the following findings and conclusions:
. . . The area of the contested property is 15 hectares. By computation, this is
capable of producing 750 cavans of palay a year. On the basis of 70-30,
defendant is entitled to 225 cavans of palay a year. Therefore, plaintiffs are
under obligation to deliver to defendant this quantity of palay every
agricultural year from the filing of defendant's answer on August 5, 1946, up
to the time he vacates said land, or pay the equivalent value thereof at
P12.00 a cavan.
Having been declared owner of the land in dispute, defendant is entitled to its
possession. Inasmuch as the court below did not order plaintiffs to restore
Page 20 of 74
the possession of the land in question, we hereby order them to vacate the
same and restore possession thereof to defendant. (Exhibit H.)
This judgment of the Court of Appeals became final and executory and the
records were remanded to the lower court. On 16 December 1954 the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija issued a writ of execution (Exhibit W). The
return made by Chief of Police of the Municipality of Zaragoza on 14
February 1955 states that Leon C. Viardo had been placed in possession of
the parcel of land referred to in the writ and that levy was made on a total of
86 cavans and 74 kilos of palay, and that the same were deposited in a
warehouse (Exhibit X).
On or about 4 January 1955 Isidoro M. Mercado filed a third party claim with
the Provincial Sheriff of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit Y). The affidavit attached to the
claim states that Isidoro M. Mercado and his wife purchased from Pilar
Belmonte on 28 June 1948 seven and one-half hectares of her undivided
share in the land described in original certificate of title No. 3484, that on the
same day the deed of sale was registered, that a transfer certificate of title
was issued in their names, and that since 1948 up to the time of the levy on
execution he had been in actual possession of the parcel of land, paying the
corresponding taxes thereon and had exclusively benefited from the harvests
therein, (Exhibit Y-1). The sheriff was requested not to continue with the levy
on the harvest in the parcel of land they were claiming.
On 2 February 1955 Isidoro M. Mercado filed in the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija a complaint docketed as civil case No. 1718, against Leon C.
Viardo and the Provincial Sheriff. The complaint alleged that improper levy
had been made on the harvest in plaintiff's parcel of land and prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to return the palay levied
upon, together with damages. On 26 February 1955 the defendants
answered that plaintiffs' purchase of the parcel of land in question from Pilar
Belmonte was subject to whatever judgment the courts might render in civil
case No. 161 between Pilar Belmonte and Leon C. Viardo. On 17 October
1955 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija entered an order suspending
the trial of the case, in view of the information by counsel for the defendant
that his client Leon C. Viardo would file a complaint against all persons
claiming ownership of or interest in the parcel of land covered by original
certificate of title No. 3484 (Record on Appeal, pp. 2-11).
On 5 December 1955 civil case No. 2004 was filed by Leon V. Viardo against
Pilar Belmonte, Patricia Driz, Joaquina Driz, Isidoro Mercado, Trinidad Isidro,
Zacarias Belmonte, Teresita Flores, Philippine American General Insurance
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
Co., Inc. and the Philippine National Bank, as parties claiming some right,
participation, share or interest in the parcel of land covered by original
certificate of title No. 3484 or by trader certificates of title derived therefrom.
The defendants filed their answers. After trial, 1 on 24 August 1956 the trial
court rendered judgment in civil cases Nos. 1718 and 2004, the dispositive
part of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, in Civil Case 2004,
Leon C. Viardo, Isidoro M. Mercado, Zacarias Belmonte and Patricia Driz are
hereby declared CO-OWNERS PRO-INDIVISO of lots 1-A PSD-16864,
which is the ¼ share of Pilar Belmonte in Lot 1, PSU 14371, OCT No. 3484
in the following proportions: ONE-HALF for LEON C. VIARDO; 7½ hectares
for Isidoro M. Mercado; 7 hectares for Zacarias Belmonte, and the remainder
for Patricia Driz, it being understood that whatever is adjudicated to Patricia
Driz in the partition shall be subject to the mortgage in favor of the Philippine
National Bank; the deeds of sale executed by Pilar Belmonte in favor of
Patricia Driz, Exhibits R and S are declared NULL AND VOID; the deeds of
partition Exhibits L and N, are set aside, and the certificates of title issued in
favor of Zacarias Belmonte, Isidoro M. Mercado and Patricia Driz, Exhibits P,
Q, R-1 and S-1 are ordered cancelled. And in civil case 1718 Isidoro M.
Mercado is hereby declared to be entitled to the products which had been
levied upon by the Provincial Sheriff. No damages are awarded. The parties
in civil case 2004 shall come to an amicable settlement with respect to the
partition. Upon their failure to arrive at an amicable settlement, commissioner
shall be appointed by this Court in accordance with a law to make the
partition.
With costs against the defendants in both cases.
Only Leon C. Viardo, plaintiff in civil case No. 2004 and defendant in civil
case No. 1718, appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 21 May 1958 the latter
certified and forwarded the appeals to this Court because the facts are not in
dispute and "the questions raised by appellant in his brief are purely legal in
nature."
In his first assignment of error the appellant contends that the trial court
"erred in not annulling the sale executed by Pilar Belmonte to Isidoro M.
Mercado, marked as Exhibit I, and to Dominador Asuncion and Teresita
Bansil (Exhibit J) and the sale by Dominador Asuncion to Zacarias Belmonte
and Teresita Flores in a Deed of Sale marked Exhibit M." In support thereof
he argues that the three sales took place and were registered after he had
become the absolute owner of an undivided one-half interest in the parcel of
Page 21 of 74
land owned by Pilar Belmonte and after notice of lis pendens had been
recorded on the title of Pilar Belmonte.
The argument is without merit. It is true that the appellant became the
absolute owner of an undivided one-half interest in the undivided one-fourth
interest owned by Pilar Belmonte in the parcel of land described in original
certificate of title No. 3484; that before Pilar Belmonte sold parts of her
undivided share in the parcel of land to Isidoro M. Mercado and Dominador
Asuncion and the last in turn sold his part to Zacarias Belmonte, there was
notice of lis pendens recorded on the certificate of title; and that this notice is
binding upon all who should acquire an interest in the property subsequent to
the record of the lis pendens. The notice of lis pendens (Exhibit A), however,
was limited to one-half interest acquired by Leon C. Viardo from Pilar
Belmonte. The other one-half undivided interest of the latter was not in
litigation and therefore the trial court correctly held that Pilar Belmonte, as the
owner of this undivided one-half interest, had a right to sell it and could
convey absolute title thereto or to parts thereof. Of course, the deeds of sale
executed by Pilar Belmonte appears to convey definite or segregated parts of
her remaining interest in the parcel of land described in original certificate of
title No. 3484, which she could not do, because this one-fourth in interest had
not yet been subdivided to show the interest acquired by Leon C. Viardo,
amounting to one-half of the said one-fourth interest. This defect, however,
does not result in the nullity of the deeds of sale she had executed relating to
her remaining interest of one-eighth. The sales were valid, subject only to the
condition that the interests acquired by the vendees were limited to the parts
which might be assigned to them in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership (Article 493, Civil Code).
In the second assignment of error the appellant contends that the trial court
"erred in not annulling the sales executed by Pilar Belmonte in favor of her
daughters Joaquina and Patricia Driz of lots 1-B and 1-A, Exhibits U and V of
Plan PSD 36340."
Lots 1-B and 1-A of Plan PSD-36340 are taken, not from the original one-
fourth interest of Pilar Belmonte in the parcel of land covered by original
certificate of title No. 3484, which interest was levied upon and thereafter
acquired by Leon C. Viardo to the extent of one-half, but from another one-
fourth interest in the same parcel of land, which belonged originally to Ines de
Guzman, the mother of Pilar Belmonte. This one-fourth interest subsequently
devolved upon Pilar Belmonte and her two sisters. The three sisters
partitioned this one-fourth interest among themselves and lots 1-A and 1-B
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
were assigned to Pilar Belmonte who, in turn, sold them to her daughters.
These sales, the appellant contends, are fictitious and in fraud of his rights as
creditor.
The only evidence adduced by the appellant in support of this contention is
that the sales were made by the mother to her daughters. This is not enough
evidence to hold the sale fictitious and fraudulent. There is no evidence
whatsoever that Pilar Belmonte, at the time she sold the lots, had outstanding
debts or was in an otherwise embarrasing financial position. Even the credit
of Leon C. Viardo, the appellant, was established only after the sales were
executed, when the Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the trial court
in civil case No. 161 by awarding damages to him. There is no merit,
therefore, in the second assignment of error.
In the third assignment of error the appellant contends that the trial court
"erred in declaring that the "product raised in the portion under the
occupancy of Isidoro Mercado, therefore, pertains to him and was not subject
to the levy or execution in favor of Leon C. Viardo in Civil Case No. 161." In
support of this assignment the appellant again harps on the fact that the time
Isidoro Mercado acquired an interest in the property, there was notice of lis
pendens, and therefore Isidoro Mercado "is not a purchaser in good faith."
This contention has been overruled in the first assignment of error when the
notice of lis pendens (Exhibits A and F) was held to refer not to the remaining
one-eighth interest of Pilar Belmonte in the parcel of land described in
original certificate of title No. 3484, but to the one-eighth interest which Leon
C. Viardo had acquired from Pilar Belmonte, and which the latter was trying
to recover from him in civil case No. 161. It was Pilar Belmonte who caused
the notice of lis pendens to be recorded to subject "all the rights, interests
and participation of Leon C. Viardo in this Title" to the result of the litigation in
the aforesaid civil case No. 161. Pilar Belmonte did not thereby subject her
remaining one-eighth interest to the result of civil case No. 161 which she
had filed against Leon C. Viardo. If the latter wanted to subject the remaining
one-eighth interest of Pilar Belmonte to the outcome of his counterclaim in
civil case No. 161, he should have asked for it.
The view held by this Court in passing upon the third assignment of error
renders it unnecessary for the Court to discuss the respective rights and
liabilities of co-owners when one co-owner, without the knowledge and/or
consent of the other co-owners, plants or builds on the property owned in
common.
Page 22 of 74
The appellant further contends that the trial court erred "in concluding that
the heirs of Bartolome Driz could not be held personally liable for the
judgment rendered against the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 161 and therefore
Lots 1-A and 1-B cannot be subject to the payment of the judgment in favor
of Leon C. Viardo."
The only ground of appellant for this contention is that the present owners of
these lots are the children of the spouses Pilar Belmonte and Bartolome Driz,
the plaintiffs in civil case No. 161, and that, upon the death of Bartolome Driz
during the pendency of the appeal in civil case No. 161, these children were
substituted as parties. This assignment of error is without merit. The
substitution of parties was made obviously because the children of Bartolome
Driz are his legal heirs and therefore could properly represent and protect
whatever interest he had in the case on appeal. But such a substitution did
not and cannot have the effect of making these substituted parties personally
liable for whatever judgment might be rendered on the appeal against their
deceased father. Article 774 of the Civil Code provides:
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by
operation of law. (Emphasis supplied.)
The trial court, therefore, correctly ruled that the remedy of Leon C. Viardo,
the creditor, was to proceed against the estate of Bartolome Driz.
Moreover, it appears from the evidence that Bartolome Driz was only a
formal party to civil case No. 161, the real party in interest being his wife Pilar
Belmonte. The subject matter in litigation was Pilar Belmonte's interest in the
parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 3484, which appears
to be paraphernal property.
The appellant's fifth and last assignment of error is that "the trial court erred
in not awarding damages to the plaintiff Leon C. Viardo in Civil Case No.
2004." Obviously the appellant refers to the prayer in his complaint that
P5,000 be awarded to him against Pilar Belmonte for attorney's fees. He
maintains that appellee Pilar Belmonte had disposed of all her property with
the intent of avoiding payment of her liability or debt to him.
A review of the record lends credence to the appellant's claim. Appellee Pilar
Belmonte had one-fourth interest in a parcel of land containing an area of
119.2775 hectares. On 12 May 1943 Leon C. Viardo acquired one-half
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
interest of Pilar Belmonte's one-fourth interest. In a partition, where the
appellant did not participate but which he does not impugn, Pilar Belmonte's
original one-fourth interest was segregated and delimited. She was assigned
in that partition and subdivision, Lot 1-A of Plan PSD-16864, containing an
area of 30 hectares (Exhibit K). Upon the death of her mother, she acquired
another 13.2775 hectares. These 13.2775 hectares she sold to her two
daughters and the validity of the sales has been upheld by this Court. With
the original 30 hectares, however, Pilar Belmonte did not act in good faith
when she sold more than 15 hectares to her daughter Patricia Driz. Knowing
that one-half of said 30 hectares or a total of 15 hectares belonged to the
appellant Leon C. Viardo, she nevertheless proceeded to enter into the
following transactions: (1) sale of seven and one-half hectares to Isidoro
Mercado, dated 28 June 1948, Exhibit A; (2) sale of seven hectares to
Dominador Asuncion, who later sold the same parcel or interest to Zacarias
Belmonte, dated 9 March 1949, Exhibit A; (3) subdivision and partition of her
lot 1-A, PSD-16864, into lots 1-E, 1-F, 1-G, 1-H and 1-I, without the
knowledge of her co-owner Leon C. Viardo, Plan PSD-36340, Exhibit O; (4)
sale in favor of her daughter Patricia Driz of lots 1-H and 1-I, Plan PSD-
36340, containing an area of 20,000 and 55,152 sq. meters, respectively,
dated 9 September 1954, Exhibits R and A; and (5) sale in favor of her
daughter Patricia Driz of lot 1-E; Plan PSD-36340, containing an area of
79,848 sq. meters, dated 11 September 1954, Exhibits S and A.
It will thus be seen that on 9 March 1949, after Pilar Belmonte had sold
seven hectares to Dominador Asuncion, she had only one-half hectare left to
dispose of, since out of her original thirty hectares (Lot 1-A, PSD-16864) the
appellant Leon C. Viardo had acquired one-half or fifteen hectares, Isidoro
Mercado, seven and one-half hectares, and Dominador Asuncion, seven
hectares.
Fully aware that one-half hectare remained her only property, Pilar Belmonte
nevertheless proceeded to sell to her daughter Patricia Driz three lots
containing a combined area of more than fifteen hectares. It is obvious,
therefore, that the sales to Patricia Driz cannot be sustained, regardless of
whether Pilar Belmonte was aware or suspected that she would be held
liable for damages to Leon C. Viardo in civil case No. 161, as in fact she was
held liable by the Court of Appeals about two weeks after she had executed
the sales in favor of her daughter. The sales above referred to stand on a
different footing from the sales made in favor of Isidoro Mercado and
Dominador Asuncion, because in the latter sales Pilar Belmonte still had
something to sell, namely, her remaining fifteen hectares. But after she had
Page 23 of 74
disposed of fourteen and one-half hectares to Mercado and Asuncion she
had only one-half hectare left and therefore could not sell another fifteen
hectares.

The trial court, however, did not completely annul the sales made by Pilar
Belmonte in favor of her daughter. It merely reduced the sale of fifteen
hectares to a sale of one-half hectare, obviously in the belief that the sales
should be sustained to the extent of Pilar Belmonte's remaining interest. The
record shows that both Pilar Belmonte and her daughter Patricia Driz knew
that one-half hectare only remained as the former's property, but they
nevertheless proceeded to sell and purchase more than fifteen hectares.
When it is considered further that the final judgment in civil case No. 161
awarded damages to Leon C. Viardo amounting to 225 cavans of palay from
1946 (Exhibit H) and that when this judgment was executed in 1954 no
property of Pilar Belmonte could be found to satisfy the damages (p. 11,
t.s.n.), it is evident that Pilar Belmonte and her daughter Patricia Driz had
conspired to dispose of all the property of Pilar Belmonte in order to frustrate
any award of damages the Court of Appeals might make in favor of Leon C.
Viardo and that this conspiracy must have taken place at the latest on 9
September 1954 when Pilar Belmonte proceeded to sell to her daughter
Patricia Driz parcels of land which no longer belonged to her.

The judgment appealed from is modified by holding and declaring that (1)
Leon C. Viardo, Isidoro M. Mercado, Zacarias Belmonte and Pilar Belmonte
(not Patricia Driz) are the co-owners pro-indiviso of lot 1-A, Plan PSD-16864,
which is the one-fourth share of Pilar Belmonte in lot 1, PSD-14371, original
certificate of title No. 3484, in the following proportion: one-half or fifteen
hectares owned by Leon C. Viardo, seven and one-half hectares by Isidoro
M. Mercado, seven hectares by Zacarias Belmonte, and one-half hectares by
Pilar Belmonte, subject to the rights of Leon C. Viardo to the balance of his
judgment credit against Pilar Belmonte; and (2) Leon C. Viardo is awarded
damages of P1,000 against Pilar Belmonte. In all other respects, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellees Pilar
Belmonte and Patricia Driz.

Assignment No. 1 – Succession Page 24 of 74

[6] G.R. No. L-33187 March 31, 1980
CORNELIO PAMPLONA alias GEMINIANO PAMPLONA and APOLONIA
ONTE, petitioners,  vs. VIVENCIO MORETO, VICTOR MORETO, ELIGIO
MORETO, MARCELO MORETO, PAULINA MORETO, ROSARIO
MORETO, MARTA MORETO, SEVERINA MENDOZA, PABLO MENDOZA,
LAZARO MENDOZA, VICTORIA TUIZA, JOSEFINA MORETO, LEANDRO
MORETO and LORENZO MENDOZA, respondents.
Property; Sale; Equity; Laches; Estoppel; The petitioners are estopped from
assailing the reality of the sale of conjugal estate made by their widowed father
where for years they and the vendees have been neighbors each believing that the
area occupied by the private respondents-vendees was the one so sold and
petitioners had not questioned the sale made by their father of the area in question.
—Again, there is no dispute that the houses of the spouses Cornelio Pamplona and
Apolonia Ante as well as that of their son Rafael Pamplona, including the concrete
piggery coral adjacent thereto, stood on the land from 1952 up to the filing of the
complaint by the private respondents on July 25, 1961, or a period of over nine (9)
years. And during said period, the private respondents who are the heirs of Monica
Maniega as well as of Flaviano Moreto who also died intestate on August 12, 1956,
lived as neighbors to the petitioners-vendees, yet lifted no finger to question the
occupation, possession and ownership of the land purchased by the Pamplonas, so
that We are persuaded and convinced to rule that private respondents are in estoppel
by laches to claim half of the property in dispute as null and void. Estoppel by laches
is a rule of equity which bars a claimant from presenting his claim when, by reason
of abandonment and negligence, he allowed a long time to elapse without presenting
the same. (International Banking Corporation vs. Yared, 59 Phil. 92).
Same; Same; A co-owner has the right to sell his portion of the co-owned property.
The sale of a particular lot thus co-owned by one co-owner where within his right
pro-indiviso is valid in it’s en-tirety.—We reject respondent Court’s ruling that the
sale was valid as to one half and invalid as to the other half for the very simple
reason that Flaviano Moreto, the vendor, had the legal right to more than 781 sq.
meters of the communal estate, a title which he could dispose, alienate in favor of the
vendees-petitioners. The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-
owner as vendor pointed out its location and even indicated the boundaries over
which the fences were to be erected without objection, protest or complaint by the
other co-owners, on the contrary they acquiesced and tolerated such alienation,
occupation and possession, We rule that a factual partition or termination of the co-
ownership, although partial, was created, and barred not only the vendor, Flaviano
Moreto, but also his heirs, the private respondents herein from asserting as against
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
the vendees-petitioners any right or title in derogation of the deed of sale executed by
said vendor Flaviano Moreto.
Same; Same; Succession; Heirs are obliged to deliver land sold by their parents to
the vendee thereof.—Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which
private respondents received from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-
interest included all the property rights and obligations which were not extinguished
by their parents’ death. And under Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New Civil Code, the
contract of sale executed by the deceased Flaviano Moreto took effect between the
parties, their assigns and heirs, who are the private respondents herein. Accordingly,
to the private respondents is transmitted the obligation to deliver in full ownership
the whole area of 781 sq. meters to the petitioners (which was the original obligation
of their predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and not only onehalf thereof. Private
respondents must comply with said obligation. The records reveal that the area of
781 sq. meters sold to and occupied by petitioners for more than 9 years already as of
the filing of the complaint in 1961 had been re-surveyed by private land surveyor
Daniel Aranas. Petitioners are entitled to a segregation of the area from Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-9843 covering Lot 1496 and they are also entitled to the
issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in their name based on the relocation
survey.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari  by way of appeal from the decision of the Court
of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. No. 35962-R, entitled "Vivencio Moreto, et al.,
Plaintiff-Appellees vs. Cornelio Pamplona, et al., Defendants-Appellants,"
affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I at
Biñan.
The facts, as stated in the decision appealed from, show that:
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During their
marriage, they acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the
Calamba Friar Land Estate, situated in Calamba, Laguna, containing 781-
544 and 1,021 square meters respectively and covered by certificates of title
issued in the name of "Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega."
The spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega begot during their
marriage six (6) children, namely, Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and
Leandro, all surnamed Moreto.
Page 25 of 74
Ursulo Moreto died intestate on May 24, 1959 leaving as his heirs herein
plaintiffs Vivencio, Marcelo, Rosario, Victor, Paulina, Marta and Eligio, all
surnamed Moreto.
Marta Moreto died also intestate on April 30, 1938 leaving as her heir plaintiff
Victoria Tuiza.
La Paz Moreto died intestate on July 17, 1954 leaving the following heirs,
namely, herein plaintiffs Pablo, Severina, Lazaro, and Lorenzo, all surnamed
Mendoza.
Alipio Moreto died intestate on June 30, 1943 leaving as his heir herein
plaintiff Josefina Moreto.
Pablo Moreto died intestate on April 25, 1942 leaving no issue and as his
heirs his brother plaintiff Leandro Moreto and the other plaintiffs herein.
On May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega died intestate in Calamba, Laguna.
On July 30, 1952, or more than six (6) years after the death of his wife
Monica Maniega, Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of the heirs of his said
deceased wife Monica, and before any liquidation of the conjugal partnership
of Monica and Flaviano could be effected, executed in favor of Geminiano
Pamplona, married to defendant Apolonia Onte, the deed of absolute sale
(Exh. "1") covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00. The deed of sale (Exh. "1")
contained a description of lot No. 1495 as having an area of 781 square
meters and covered by transfer certificate of title No. 14570 issued in the
name of Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega, although the lot was
acquired during their marriage. As a result of the sale, the said certificate of
title was cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title No. T-5671 was
issued in the name of Geminiano Pamplona married to Apolonia Onte (Exh.
"A").
After the execution of the above-mentioned deed of sale (Exh. "1"), the
spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte constructed their house on
the eastern part of lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the time of the sale,
pointed to it as the land which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona. Shortly
thereafter, Rafael Pamplona, son of the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and
Apolonia Onte, also built his house within lot 1496 about one meter from its
boundary with the adjoining lot. The vendor Flaviano Moreto and the vendee
Geminiano Pamplona thought all the time that the portion of 781 square
meters which was the subject matter of their sale transaction was No. 1495
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
and so lot No. 1495 appears to be the subject matter in the deed of sale
(Exh. "1") although the fact is that the said portion sold thought of by the
parties to be lot No. 1495 is a part of lot No. 1496.
From 1956 to 1960, the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonio Onte
enlarged their house and they even constructed a piggery corral at the back
of their said house about one and one-half meters from the eastern boundary
of lot 1496.
On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the plaintiffs
demanded on the defendants to vacate the premises where they had their
house and piggery on the ground that Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the
lot which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona as the same belongs to the
conjugal partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife and the latter was
already dead when the sale was executed without the consent of the plaintiffs
who are the heirs of Monica. The spouses Geminiano Pamplona and
Apolonia Onte refused to vacate the premises occupied by them and hence,
this suit was instituted by the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for the
declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale of July 30, 1952 above-
mentioned as regards one-half of the property subject matter of said deed; to
declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the other half of said lot; to
allow the plaintiffs to redeem the one-half portion thereof sold to the
defendants. "After payment of the other half of the purchase price"; to order
the defendants to vacate the portions occupied by them; to order the
defendants to pay actual and moral damages and attorney's fees to the
plaintiffs; to order the defendants to pay plaintiffs P120.00 a year from August
1958 until they have vacated the premises occupied by them for the use and
occupancy of the same.
The defendants claim that the sale made by Flaviano Moreto in their favor is
valid as the lot sold is registered in the name of Flaviano Moreto and they are
purchasers believing in good faith that the vendor was the sole owner of the
lot sold.
After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by agreement of the
parties, it was found out that there was mutual error between Flaviano
Moreto and the defendants in the execution of the deed of sale because
while the said deed recited that the lot sold is lot No. 1495, the real intention
of the parties is that it was a portion consisting of 781 square meters of lot
No. 1496 which was the subject matter of their sale transaction.
Page 26 of 74
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive part thereof
being as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs declaring the
deed of absolute sale dated July 30, 1952 pertaining to the eastern portion of
Lot 1496 covering an area of 781 square meters null and void as regards the
390.5 square meters of which plaintiffs are hereby declared the rightful
owners and entitled to its possession.
The sale is ordered valid with respect to the eastern one-half (1/2) of 1781
square meters of Lot 1496 measuring 390.5 square meters of which
defendants are declared lawful owners and entitled to its possession.
After proper survey segregating the eastern one-half portion with an area of
390.5 square meters of Lot 1496, the defendants shall be entitled to a
certificate of title covering said portion and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
9843 of the office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna shall be cancelled
accordingly and new titles issued to the plaintiffs and to the defendants
covering their respective portions.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 of the office of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna covering Lot No. 1495 and registered in the name of Cornelio
Pamplona, married to Apolonia Onte, is by virtue of this decision ordered
cancelled. The defendants are ordered to surrender to the office of the
Register of Deeds of Laguna the owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 5671 within thirty (30) days after this decision shall have become
final for cancellation in accordance with this decision.
Let copy of this decision be furnished the Register of Deeds for the province
of Laguna for his information and guidance.
With costs against the defendants. 2
The defendants-appellants, not being satisfied with said judgment, appealed
to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment, hence they now come
to this Court.
The fundamental and crucial issue in the case at bar is whether under the
facts and circumstances duly established by the evidence, petitioners are
entitled to the full ownership of the property in litigation, or only one-half of
the same.
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
There is no question that when the petitioners purchased the property on July
30, 1952 from Flaviano Moreto for the price of P900.00, his wife Monica
Maniega had already been dead six years before, Monica having died on
May 6, 1946. Hence, the conjugal partnership of the spouses Flaviano
Moreto and Monica Maniega had already been dissolved. (Article 175, (1)
New Civil Code; Article 1417, Old Civil Code). The records show that the
conjugal estate had not been inventoried, liquidated, settled and divided by
the heirs thereto in accordance with law. The necessary proceedings for the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership were not instituted by the heirs either in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse pursuant to Act
3176 amending Section 685 of Act 190. Neither was there an extra-judicial
partition between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse
nor was an ordinary action for partition brought for the purpose. Accordingly,
the estate became the property of a community between the surviving
husband, Flaviano Moreto, and his children with the deceased Monica
Maniega in the concept of a co-ownership.
The community property of the marriage, at the dissolution of this bond by
the death of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to the legal partnership
and becomes the property of a community, by operation of law, between the
surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse, or the exclusive
property of the widower or the widow, it he or she be the heir of the deceased
spouse. Every co-owner shall have full ownership of his part and in the fruits
and benefits derived therefrom, and he therefore may alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, unless
personal rights are in question. (Marigsa vs. Macabuntoc, 17 Phil. 107)
In Borja vs. Addision, 44 Phil. 895, 906, the Supreme Court said that "(t)here
is no reason in law why the heirs of the deceased wife may not form a
partnership with the surviving husband for the management and control of
the community property of the marriage and conceivably such a partnership,
or rather community of property, between the heirs and the surviving
husband might be formed without a written agreement." In Prades vs.
Tecson, 49 Phil. 230, the Supreme Court held that "(a)lthough, when the wife
dies, the surviving husband, as administrator of the community property, has
authority to sell the property withut the concurrence of the children of the
marriage, nevertheless this power can be waived in favor of the children, with
the result of bringing about a conventional ownership in common between
the father and children as to such property; and any one purchasing with
knowledge of the changed status of the property will acquire only the
Page 27 of 74
undivided interest of those members of the family who join in the act of
conveyance.
It is also not disputed that immediately after the execution of the sale in 1952,
the vendees constructed their house on the eastern part of Lot 1496 which
the vendor pointed out to them as the area sold, and two weeks thereafter,
Rafael who is a son of the vendees, also built his house within Lot 1496.
Subsequently, a cemented piggery coral was constructed by the vendees at
the back of their house about one and one-half meters from the eastern
boundary of Lot 1496. Both vendor and vendees believed all the time that the
area of 781 sq. meters subject of the sale was Lot No. 1495 which according
to its title (T.C.T. No. 14570) contains an area of 781 sq. meters so that the
deed of sale between the parties Identified and described the land sold as
Lot 1495. But actually, as verified later by a surveyor upon agreement of the
parties during the proceedings of the case below, the area sold was within
Lot 1496.
Again, there is no dispute that the houses of the spouses Cornelio Pamplona
and Apolonia Onte as well as that of their son Rafael Pamplona, including the
concrete piggery coral adjacent thereto, stood on the land from 1952 up to
the filing of the complaint by the private respondents on July 25, 1961, or a
period of over nine (9) years. And during said period, the private respondents
who are the heirs of Monica Maniega as well as of Flaviano Moreto who also
died intestate on August 12, 1956, lived as neighbors to the petitioner-
vendees, yet lifted no finger to question the occupation, possession and
ownership of the land purchased by the Pamplonas, so that We are
persuaded and convinced to rule that private respondents are in estoppel by
laches to claim half of the property, in dispute as null and void. Estoppel by
laches is a rule of equity which bars a claimant from presenting his claim
when, by reason of abandonment and negligence, he allowed a long time to
elapse without presenting the same. (International Banking Corporation vs.
Yared, 59 Phil. 92)
We have ruled that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal partnership
was already dissolved six years before and therefore, the estate became a
co-ownership between Flaviano Moreto, the surviving husband, and the heirs
of his deceased wife, Monica Maniega. Article 493 of the New Civil Code is
applicable and it provides a follows:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
when personal rights are involve. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
We agree with the petitioner that there was a partial partition of the co-
ownership when at the time of the sale Flaviano Moreto pointed out the area
and location of the 781 sq. meters sold by him to the petitioners-vendees on
which the latter built their house and also that whereon Rafael, the son of
petitioners likewise erected his house and an adjacent coral for piggery.
Petitioners point to the fact that spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica
Maniega owned three parcels of land denominated as Lot 1495 having an
area of 781 sq. meters, Lot 1496 with an area of 1,021 sq. meters, and Lot
4545 with an area of 544 sq. meters. The three lots have a total area of 2,346
sq. meters. These three parcels of lots are contiguous with one another as
each is bounded on one side by the other, thus: Lot 4545 is bounded on the
northeast by Lot 1495 and on the southeast by Lot 1496. Lot 1495 is
bounded on the west by Lot 4545. Lot 1496 is bounded on the west by Lot
4545. It is therefore, clear that the three lots constitute one big land. They are
not separate properties located in different places but they abut each other.
This is not disputed by private respondents. Hence, at the time of the sale,
the co-ownership constituted or covered these three lots adjacent to each
other. And since Flaviano Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the
entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters as his share, he had a perfect legal and
lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the Pamplona
spouses. Indeed, there was still a remainder of some 392 sq. meters
belonging to him at the time of the sale.
We reject respondent Court's ruling that the sale was valid as to one-half and
invalid as to the other half for the very simple reason that Flaviano Moreto,
the vendor, had the legal right to more than 781 sq. meters of the communal
estate, a title which he could dispose, alienate in favor of the vendees-
petitioners. The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-
owner as vendor pointed out its location and even indicated the boundaries
over which the fences were to be erectd without objection, protest or
complaint by the other co-owners, on the contrary they acquiesced and
tolerated such alienation, occupation and possession, We rule that a factual
partition or termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was created,
and barred not only the vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the
private respondents herein from asserting as against the vendees-petitioners
Page 28 of 74
any right or title in derogation of the deed of sale executed by said vendor
Flaiano Moreto.
Equity commands that the private respondents, the successors of both the
deceased spouses, Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega be not allowed to
impugn the sale executed by Flaviano Moreto who indisputably received the
consideration of P900.00 and which he, including his children, benefitted
from the same. Moreover, as the heirs of both Monica Maniega and Flaviano
Moreto, private respondents are duty-bound to comply with the provisions of
Articles 1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which is the obligation of the vendor of
the property of delivering and transfering the ownership of the whole property
sold, which is transmitted on his death to his heirs, the herein private
respondents. The articles cited provide, thus:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from
is hereby AFFIRMED with modification in the sense that the sale made and
executed by Flaviano Moreto in favor of the petitioners-vendees is hereby
declared legal and valid in its entirely.
Petitioners are hereby declared owners in full ownership of the 781 sq.
meters at the eastern portion of Lot 1496 now occupied by said petitioners
and whereon their houses and piggery coral stand.
The Register of Deeds of Laguna is hereby ordered to segregate the area of
781 sq. meters from Certificate of Title No. 9843 and to issue a new Transfer
Certificate of Title to the petitioners covering the segregated area of 781 sq.
meters.

Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates No costs.
himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and
SO ORDERED.
the other part to pay therefore a price certain in money or its equivalent.

A contract of sale may be absolute or conditionial.

Art. 1495. The vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver, as
well as warrant the thing which is the object of the sale.

Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents
received from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest
included all the property rights and obligations which were not extinguished
by their parents' death. And under Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New Civil Code,
the contract of sale executed by the deceased Flaviano Moreto took effect
between the parties, their assigns and heirs, who are the private respondents
herein. Accordingly, to the private respondents is transmitted the obligation to
deliver in full ownership the whole area of 781 sq. meters to the petitioners
(which was the original obligation of their predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and
not only one-half thereof. Private respondents must comply with said
obligation.

The records reveal that the area of 781 sq. meters sold to and occupied by
petitioners for more than 9 years already as of the filing of the complaint in
1961 had been re-surveyed by private land surveyor Daniel Aranas.
Petitioners are entitled to a segregation of the area from Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-9843 covering Lot 1496 and they are also entitled to the
issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in their name based on the
relocation survey.

Assignment No. 1 – Succession Page 29 of 74

[7] [G.R. No. 94918. September 2, 1992.]
DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ-ANDRES, MARCELO I.
SUAREZ, JR., EVELYN SUAREZ-DE LEON and REGINIO I.
SUAREZ, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, VALENTE
RAYMUNDO, VIOLETA RAYMUNDO, MA. CONCEPCION VITO and
VIRGINIA BANTA, Respondents.
Civil Law; Succession; Auction sale of decedent’s property to satisfy judgment debt
of surviving spouse; Right of heirs to institute action for annulment of sale.—To start
with, only one-half of the 5 parcels of land should have been the subject of the
auction sale. x x x The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned
property is different from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-
owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own right as
children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way
from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.
DECISION
NOCON, J.:
The ultimate issue before Us is whether or not private respondents can
validly acquire all the five (5) parcels of land co-owned by petitioners and
registered in the name of petitioner’s deceased father. Marcelo Suarez,
whose estate has not been partitioned or liquidated, after the said properties
were levied and publicly sold en masse to private respondents to satisfy the
personal judgment debt of Teofista Suarez, the surviving spouse of Marcelo
Suarez, mother of herein petitioners.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Herein petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and
since then his estate consisting of several valuable parcels of land in Pasig,
Metro Manila has lot been liquidated or partitioned. In 1977, petitioners’
widowed mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the consolidated cases
for rescission of contract and for damages, and were ordered by Branch 1 of
the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Branch 151, RTC of Pasig) to
pay, jointly and severally, herein respondents the aggregate principal amount
of about P70,000 as damages.
The judgment against petitioner’s mother and Rizal Realty Corporation
having become final and executory, five (5) valuable parcel of land in Pasig,
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
Metro Manila, (worth to be millions then) were levied and sold on execution
on June 24, 1983 in favor of the private respondents as the highest bidder for
the amount of P94,170.000. Private respondents were then issued a
certificate of sale which was subsequently registered or August 1, 1983.
On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners
filed a reinvindicatory action 2 against private respondents and the Provincial
Sheriff of Rizal, thereafter docketed as Civil Case No. 51203, for the
annulment of the auction sale and the recovery of the ownership of the levied
pieces of property. Therein, they alleged, among others, that being strangers
to the case decided against their mother, they cannot be held liable therefor
and that the five (5) parcels of land, of which they are co-owners, can neither
be levied nor sold on execution.
On July 31, 1984, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued to private respondents
a final deed of sale 3 over the properties.
On October 22, 1984, Teofista Suarez joined by herein petitioners filed with
Branch 151 a Motion for Reconsideration 4 of the Order dated October 10,
1984, claiming that the parcels of land are co-owned by them and further
informing the Court the filing and pendency of an action to annul the auction
sale (Civil Case No. 51203), which motion however, was denied.
On February 25, 1985, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued enjoining
private respondents from transferring to third parties the levied parcels of
land based on the finding that the auctioned lands are co-owned by
petitioners.
On March 1, 1985, private respondent Valente Raymundo filed in Civil Case
No. 51203 a Motion to Dismiss for failure on the part of the petitioners to
prosecute, however, such motion was later denied by Branch 155, Regional
Trial Court, Pasig.
On December 1985, Raymundo filed in Civil Case No. 51203 an Ex-Parte
Motion to Dismiss complaint for failure to prosecute. This was granted by
Branch 155 through an Order dated May 29, 1986, notwithstanding
petitioner’s pending motion for the issuance of alias summons to be served
upon the other defendants in the said case. A motion for reconsideration was
filed but was later denied.
Page 30 of 74
On October 10, 1984, RTC Branch 151 issued in Civil Case Nos. 21736- "The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
21739 an Order directing Teofista Suarez and all persons claiming right of the decedent." Article 888 further provides
under her to vacate the lots subject of the judicial sale; to desist from
removing or alienating improvements thereon; and to surrender to private "The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half
respondents the owner’s duplicate copy of the torrens title and other pertinent of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.
documents.
The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of
illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."
Teofista Suarez then filed with the then Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari to annul the Orders of Branch 151 dated October 10, 1984 and
Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides:
October 14, 1986 issued in Civil Case Nos. 21736-21739.
"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving
On December 4, 1986 petitioners filed with Branch 155 a Motion for
spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the
reconsideration of the Order 5 dated September 24, 1986. In an Order dated
legitimate children or descendants."
June 10, 1987, 6 Branch 155 lifted its previous order of dismissal and
directed the issuance of alias summons. Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the
legitime of each child.
Respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the
orders dated February 25, 1985, 7 May 19, 1989 8 and February 26, 1990 9 The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is
issued in Civil Case No. 51203 and further ordering respondent Judge to different from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-
dismiss Civil Case No. 51203. The appellate court rendered its decision on owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own
July 27, 1990, 10 the dispositive portion of which reads right as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not
barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to
protect their own interest.
"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the
questioned orders dated February 25, 1985, May 19, 1989 and February 26, WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1990 as
1990 issued in Civil Case No. 51203 are hereby annulled, further respondent well as its Resolution of August 28, 1990 are hereby REVERSED and set
Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203." 11  aside; and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion
which belongs to petitioners and to annul the sale with regard to said portion.
Hence, this appeal.
SO ORDERED.
Even without touching on the incidents and issues raised by both petitioner
and private respondents and the developments subsequent to the filing of the
complaint, We cannot but notice the glaring error committed by the trial court.

It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on the validity of the

execution and the manner of publicly selling en masse the subject properties
for auction. To start with, only one-half of the 5 parcels of land should have
been the subject of the auction sale.

The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time
of the institution of the case.

Assignment No. 1 – Succession Page 31 of 74

[8] G.R. No. L-14070             March 29, 1961
MARIA GERVACIO BLAS, MANUEL GERVACIO BLAS, LEONCIO
GERVACIO BLAS and LODA GERVACIO BLAS, plaintiffs-appellants,  and evidently partitioned and conveyed to his heirs in the proceedings for the
vs. ROSALINA SANTOS, in her capacity as Special Administratrix of the
Estate of the deceased MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS, in Sp. Proc.
No. 2524, Court of First Instance of Rizal, defendants-appellants.
MARTA GERVACIO BLAS and DR. JOSE CHIVI, defendants-appellants.
Wills; Succession; Contracts; Compromise; Future inheritance; When agreement to
transmit one-half of conjugal share is a contract as to future inheritance.—-A
document signed by the testator's wife, promising that she would respect and obey all
the dispositions in the latter's will, and that she would hold one-half of her share in
the conjugal assets in trust for the heirs and legatees of her husband in his will, with
the obligation of conveying the same to such of his heirs or legatees as she might
choose in her last will and testament, is a compromise and at the same time a
contract with sufficient cause or consideration.
Same; Prescription; Actions; Accrual of cause of action upon death.—The action to
enforce the wife's promise to convey in her testament, upon her death, one-half of the
conjugal properties, did not arise until and after her death when it was found that she
did not comply with her promise.
Same; Definition of future inheritance.—Future inheritance is any property or right,
not .in existence or capable of determination at the time of the contract, that a person
may in the future acquire by succession.
LABRADOR, J.:
This action was instituted by plaintiffs against the administration of the estate
of Maxima Santos, to secure a judicial declaration that one-half of the
properties left by Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas, the greater bulk of which are
set forth and described in the project of partition presented in the
proceedings for the administration of the estate of the deceased Simeon
Blas, had been promised by the deceased Maxima Santos to be delivered
upon her death and in her will to the plaintiffs, and requesting that the said
properties so promised be adjudicated to the plaintiffs. The complaint also
prays for actual damages in the amount of P50,000. (Record on Appeal, pp.
1-65.) The alleged promise of the deceased Maxima Santos is contained in a
document executed by Maxima Santos on December 26, 1936 attached to
the complaint as Annex "H" and introduced at the trial as Exhibit "A". (Ibid.,
pp. 258-259.) The complaint also alleges that the plaintiffs are entitled to
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
inherit certain properties enumerated in paragraph 3 thereof, situated in
Malabon, Rizal and Obando, Bulacan, but which properties have already
been in included in the inventory of the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas
administration of his (Simeon Blas) estate.
Defendant, who is the administratrix of the estate of the deceased Maxima
Santos Vda. de Blas, filed an answer with a counterclaim, and later, an
amended answer and a counterclaim. The said amended answer admits the
allegations of the complaint as to her capacity as administratrix the death of
Simeon Blas on January 3, 1937; the fact that Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz
begot three children only one of whom, namely, Eulalio Blas, left legitimate
descendants; that Simeon Blas contracted a second marriage with Maxima
Santos on June 28, 1898. She denies for lack of sufficient information and
belief, knowledge edge of the first marriage of Simeon Blas to Marta Cruz,
the averment that Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz acquired properties situated
in Obando, Bulacan, that said properties were utilized as capital, etc. As
special defenses, she alleges that the properties of the spouses Blas and
Santos had been settled and liquidated in the project of partition of the estate
of said Simeon Blas; that pursuant to the project of partition, plaintiffs and
some defendants had already received the respective properties adjudicated
to them; that the plaintiffs and the defendants Marta Geracio and Jose Chivi
are estopped from impugning the validity of the project of partition of the
estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and from questioning the ownership in
the properties conveyed in the project of partition to Maxima Santos as her
own exclusive property; that the testament executed by Maxima Santos is
valid, the plain plaintiffs having no right to recover any portion of Maxima
Santos' estate now under administration by the court. A counterclaim for the
amount of P50,000 as damages is also included in the complaint, as also a
cross-claim against Marta Gervacio Blas and Jose Chivi.
Trial of the case was Conducted and, thereafter, the court, Hon. Gustave
Victoriano, presiding, rendered judgment dismissing the complaint, with costs
against plaintiff, and dismissing also the counterclaim and cross-claim
decision ,the plaintiffs filed by the defendants. From this district have
appealed to this Court.
The facts essential to an understanding of the issues involved in the case
may be briefly summarized as follows: Simeon Blas contracted a first
marriage with Marta Cruz sometime before 1898. They had three children,
only one of whom, Eulalio, left children, namely, Maria Gervacio Blas, one of
Page 32 of 74
the plaintiffs, Marta Gervacio Blas, one of the defendants, and Lazaro
Gervacio Blas. Lazaro died in 1950, and is survived by three legitimate
children who are plaintiffs herein, namely, Manuel Gervacio Blas, Leoncio
Gervacio Blas and Loida Gervacio Blas. Marta Cruz died in 1898, and the
following year, Simeon Blas contracted a second marriage with Maxima
Santos. At the time of this second marriage, no liquidation of the properties
required by Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz was made. Three of the properties
left are fishponds located in Obando, Bulacan. Maxima Santos does not
appear to have apported properties to her marriage with Simeon Blas.
On December 26, 1936, only over a week before over a week before his
death on January 9, 1937, Simeon Blas executed a last will and testament. In
the said testament Simeon Blas makes the following declarations:
I A — Don Simeon Blas asked me to prepare this document (referring to
2. Sa panahon ng aking pangalawang asawa, MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS,
ay nagkaroon ako at nakatipon ng mga kayamanan (bienes) at pag-aari
(propriedades) na ang lahat ng lupa, palaisdaan at iba pang pag-aari ay
umaabot sa halagang ANIM NA RAAN PITONG PU'T WALONG DAAN LIBO
WALONG DAAN WALONG PUNG PISO (678,880-00) sang-ayon sa mga
halaga sa amillarimento (valor Amillarado.)
II
1. Ang kalahati ng lahat ng aming pag-aari, matapos mabayaran ang lahat ng
aking o aming pag-kakautang na mag-asawa, kung mayroon man, yayamang
ang lahat ng ito ay kita sa loob ng matrimonio (bienes ganaciales) ay bahagi
ng para sa aking asawa, MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, sang-ayon sa batas.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 250-251.)
The above testamentary provisions may be translated as follows:
I
2. During my second marriage with Maxima Santos de Blas, I possessed and
acquired wealth and properties, consisting of lands, fishponds and other
kinds of properties, the total assessed value of which reached the amount
P678,880.00.
II
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
1. One-half of our properties, after the payment of my and our indebtedness,
all these properties having been acquired during marriage (conjugal
properties), constitutes the share of my wife Maxima Santos de Blas,
according to the law.
At the time of the execution of said will, Andres Pascual a son-in-law of the
testator, and Avelina Pascual and others, were present. Andres Pascual had
married a descendant by the first marriage. The will was prepared by Andres
Pascual, with the help of his nephew Avelino Pascual. The testator asked
Andres Pascual to prepare a document which was presented in court as
Exhibit "A", thus:
Q — Was there anybody who asked you to prepare this document?
Exhibit "A"), (t.s.n., Sarmiento to, P. 24).
The reason why the testator ordered the preparation of Exhibit "A" was
because the properties that the testator had acquired during his first marriage
with Marta Cruz had not been liquidated and were not separated from those
acquired during the second marriage. Pascual's testimony is as follows:
Q — To whom do you refer with the word "they"?
A — Simeon Blas and his first wife, Marta Cruz. When Marta Cruz died they
had not made a liquidation of their conjugal properties and so all those
properties were included all in the assets of the second marriage, and that is
the reason why this document was prepared. (t.s.n., Sarmiento, p. 36.)
The above testimony is fully corroborated by that of Leoncio Gervacio, son-
in-law of Simeon Blas.
Q — Please state to the Court?
A — My children were claiming from their grandfather Simeon Blas the
properties left by their grandmother Marta Cruz in the year 1936.
Q — And what happened with that claim of your children against Simeon
Blas regarding the assets or properties of the first marriage that were left
after the death of Marta Cruz in 1936?
A — The claim was not pushed through because they reached into an
agreement whereby the parties Simeon Blas Maxima Santos, Maria Gervacio
Page 33 of 74
Bias, Marta Gervacio Blas and Lazaro Gervacio Blas agreed that Simeon
Blas and Maxima Blas will give one-half of the estate of Simeon Blas. (t.s.n.,
Sarmiento, pp. 143-144).
The document which was thus prepared and which is marked as Exhibit "A"
reads in Tagalog, thus:
MAUNAWA NG SINO MANG MAKABABASA:
Na akong si MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, nasa hustong gulang, kasal kay
SIMEON BLAS, taga bayan ng Malabon, Rizal, Philippines, sa pamamagitan
ng kasulatang ito ay malaya kong ipinahahayag:
Na aking nabasa at naunawa ang testamento at huling kalooban na
nilagdaan ng aking asawa, SIMEON BLAS, at ipinahahayag ko sa ilalim ng
aking karangalan at sa harap ng aking asawa na igagalang at
pagpipitaganan ang lahat at bawa't isang bahagi ng nabanggit na testamento
at ipinangangako ko pa sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito na ang lahat ng
maiiwang pag-aari at kayamanan naming mag-asawa, na nauukol at
bahaging para sa akin sa paggawa ko naman ng aking testamento ay
ipagkakaloob ko ang kalahati (½) sa mga herederos at legatarios o
pinamamanahan ng aking nabanggit na asawa, SIMEON BLAS, sa kaniyang
testamento, na ako'y makapipili o makahihirang na kahit kangino sa kanila ng
aking pagbibigyan at pamamanahan sang-ayon sa paggalang, paglilingkod,
at pakikisama ng gagawin sa akin.
SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT NG ITO ay nilagdaan ko ang kasulatang ito
ngayon ika 26 ng Diciembre ng taong 1936, dito sa San Francisco del Monte,
San Juan, Rizal, Philippines. (Exh. "A", pp. 29-30 — Appellant's brief).
(Fdo.) MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS
and which, translated into English, reads as follows:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, of legal age, married to SIMEON BLAS,
resident of Malabon, Rizal, Philippines, voluntarily state:
That I have read and knew the contents of the will signed by my husband,
SIMEON BLAS, (2) and I promise on my word of honor in the presence of my
husband that I will respect and obey all and every disposition of said will (3)
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
and furthermore, I promise in this document that all the properties my
husband and I will leave, the portion and share corresponding to me when I
make my will, I will give one-half (½) to the heirs and legatees or the
beneficiaries named in the will of my husband, (4) and that I can select or
choose any of them, to whom I will give depending upon the respect, service
and treatment accorded to me.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I signed this document this 26th day of December,
1936 at San Francisco del Monte, San Juan, Rizal, Philippines. (Exh. "A", pp.
30-31, Appellant's brief).
(Sgd.) MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS
The court below held that said Exhibit "A" has not created any right in favor of
plaintiffs which can serve as basis for the complaint; that neither can it be
considered as a valid and enforceable contract for lack of consideration and
because it deals with future inheritance. The court also declared that Exhibit
"A" is not a will because it does not comply with the requisites for the
execution of a will; nor could it be considered as a donation, etc.
Both the court below in its decision and the appellees in their brief before us,
argue vehemently that the heirs of Simeon Blas and his wife Marta Cruz can
no longer make any claim for the unliquidated conjugal properties acquired
during said first marriage, because the same were already included in the
mass of properties constituting the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and
in the adjudications made by virtue of his will, and that the action to recover
the same has prescribed. This contention is correct. The descendants of
Marta Cruz can no longer claim the conjugal properties that she and her
husband may have required during their marriage although no liquidation of
such properties and delivery thereof to the heirs of Marta Cruz have been
made, no action to recover said propertied having been presented in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Simeon Blas.
But the principal basis for the plaintiffs' action in the case at bar is the
document Exhibit "A". It is not disputed that this document was prepared at
the instance of Simeon Blas for the reason that the conjugal properties of me
on Blas for the reason his first marriage had not been liquidated; that it was
prepared at the same time as the will of Simeon Blas on December 26, 1936,
at the instance of the latter himself. It is also not disputed that the document
was signed by Maxima Santos and one copy thereof, which was presented in
court as Exhibit "A", was kept by plaintiffs' witness Andres Pascual.
Page 34 of 74
Plaintiffs-appellants argue before us that Exhibit "A" is both a trust agreement
and a contract in the nature of a compromise to avoid litigation. Defendants-
appellees, in answer, claim that it is neither a trust agreement nor a
compromise a agreement. Considering that the properties of the first
marriage of Simeon Blas had not been liquidated when Simeon Blas
executed his will on December 26, 1936', and the further fact such properties
where actually , and the further fact that included as conjugal properties
acquired during the second marriage, we find, as contended by plaintiffs-
appellants that the preparation and execution of Exhibit "A" was ordered by
Simeon Blas evidently to prevent his heirs by his first marriage from
contesting his will and demanding liquidation of the conjugal properties
acquired during the first marriage, and an accounting of the fruits and
proceeds thereof from the time of the death of his first wife.
Exhibit "A", therefore, appears to be the compromise defined in Article 1809
of the Civil Code of Spain, in force at the time of the execution of Exhibit "A",
which provides as follows:
Compromise is a contract by which each of the parties in interest, by
giving, promising, or retaining something avoids the provocation of a suitor
terminates one which has already the provocation been instituted. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Exhibit "A" states that the maker (Maxima Santos) had read and knew the
contents of the will of her husband read and knew the contents of the will
Simeon Blas — she was evidently referring to the declaration in the will(of
Simeon Blas) that his properties are conjugal properties and one-half thereof
belongs to her (Maxima Santos) as her share of the conjugal assets under
the law. The agreement or promise that Maxima Santos makes in Exhibit "A"
is to hold one-half of her said share in the conjugal assets in trust for the
heirs and legatees of her husband in his will, with the obligation of conveying
the same to such of his heirs or legatees as she may choose in her last will
and testament. It is to be noted that the conjugal properties referred to are
those that were actually existing at that time, December 26, 1936. Simeon
Blas died on January 9, 1937. On June 2, 1937, an inventory of the
properties left by him, all considered conjugal, was submitted by Maxima
Santos herself as administratrix of his estate. A list of said properties is found
in Annex "E", the complete inventory submitted by Maxima Santos Vda. de
Blas, is administratrix of the estate of her husband, dated March 10, 1939.
The properties which were given to Maxima Santos as her share in the
conjugal properties are also specified in the project of partition submitted by
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
said Maxima Santos herself on March 14, 1939. (Record on Appeal, pp. 195-
241.) Under Exhibit "A", therefore, Maxima Santos contracted the obligation
and promised to give one-half of the above indicated properties to the heirs
and legatees of Simeon Blas.
Counsel for the defendant-appellee claims Exhibit "A" is a worthless piece of
paper because it is not a will nor a donation mortis causa nor a contract. As
we have in indicated above, it is a compromise and at the same time a
contract with a sufficient cause or consideration. It is also contended that it
deals with future inheritance. We do not think that Exhibit "A" is a contract on
future inheritance. it is an obligation or promise made by the maker to
transmit one-half of her share in the conjugal properties acquired with her
husband, which properties are stated or declared to be conjugal properties in
the will of the husband. The conjugal properties were in existence at the time
of the execution of Exhibit "A" on December 26, 1936. As a matter of fact,
Maxima Santos included these properties in her inventory of her husband's
estate of June 2, 1937. The promise does not refer to any properties that the
maker would inherit upon the death of her husband, because it is her share in
the conjugal assets. That the kind of agreement or promise contained in
Exhibit "A" is not void under Article 1271 of the old Civil Code, has been
decided by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of October 8, 19154,
thus:
Que si bien el art. 1271 del Codigo civil dispone que sobre la herenciafutura
no se podra celebrar otros contratos que aquellos cuyo objecto seapracticar
entre vivos la division de un caudal, conforme al articulo 1056, esta
prohibicion noes aplicable al caso, porque la obligacion que contrajoel recurr
en contrato privado de otorgar testamento e instituir heredera a su subrina
de los bienes que adquirio en virtud de herencia, procedentes desu finada
consorte que le quedasen sobrantes despues de pagar las deudas, y del
ganacial que se expresa, asi como de reconocer, ademas, con alguna cosaa
otros sobrinos, se refiere a bienes conocidos y determinados existentes
cuando tal compromisi se otorgo, y no a la universalidad de una herencia
que, sequn el art. 659 del citado Codigo civil, as determina a muerte,
constituyendola todos los bienes, derechos y obligaciones que por ella no
sehayan extinguido: ..." (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted that what is prohibited to be the subject matter of a contract
under Article 1271 of the Civil Code is "future inheritance." To
us future inheritance is any property or right not in existence or capable of
determination at the time of the contract, that a person may in the future
Page 35 of 74
acquire by succession. The properties subject of the contract Exhibit "A" are action on December 27, 1956, upon learning of such failure on the part of
well defined properties, existing at the time of the agreement, which Simeon Maxima Santos to comply with said promise. This defense is, therefore, also
Blas declares in his statement as belonging to his wife as her share in the without merit.
conjugal partnership. Certainly his wife's actual share in the conjugal
properties may not be considered as  future  inheritance because they were It is next contended by the defendant-appellee that Maxima Santos complied
actually in existence at the time Exhibit "A" was executed. with her above-mentioned promise, — that Andres Pascual, Tomasa Avelino,
Justo Garcia, Ludovico Pimpin and Marta Gervacio Blas were given
The trial court held that the plaintiffs-appellants in the case at bar are substancial legacies in the will and testament of Maxima Santos. To
concluded by the judgement rendered in the proceedings for the settlement determine whether she had actually complied with the promise made in
of the estate of Simeon Blas for the reason that the properties left by him Exhibit "A", there is herein set forth a list only of the fishponds and their
belonged to himself and his wife Maxima Santos; that the project of partition respective areas as contained in the list of properties she acquired as her
in the said case, adjudicating to Maxima Santos one-half as her share in the share in the conjugal partnership, which list includes, besides many ricelands
conjugal properties, is a bar to another action on the same subject matter, as well as residential lots, thus:
Maxima Santos having become absolute owner of the said properties
adjudicated in her favor. As already adverted to above, these contentions 31. Paco, Obando, Bulacan 5.8396 has.
would be correct if applied to the claim of the plaintiffs-appellants that said
properties were acquired with the first wife of Simeon Blas, Marta Cruz. But 32. Pangjolo, Obando 3.5857    "    
the main ground upon which plaintiffs base their present action is the
document Exhibit "A", already fully considered above. As this private 34. Batang Pirasuan, Lubao, Pampanga 11.9515    "    
document contains the express promise made by Maxima Santos to convey
in her testament, upon her death, one-half of the conjugal properties she 35. Calangian, Lubao, Pampanga 30.2059    "    
would receive as her share in the conjugal properties, the action to enforce
the said promise did not arise until and after her death when it was found that 38. Bakuling, Lubao, Pampanga 215.4325    "    
she did not comply with her above-mentioned promise. (Art. 1969, old Civil
Code.) The argument that the failure of the plaintiffs-appellants herein to 39. Bakuling, Lubao, Pampanga 8.3763    "    
oppose the project of partition in the settlement of the estate of Simeon Blas,
especially that portion of the project which assigned to Maxima Santos one- 40. Bangkal, Sinubli 23.0730    "    
half of all the conjugal properties bars their present action, is, therefore,
devoid of merit. It may be added that plaintiffs-appellants did not question the 41. Tagulod, 6.8692    "    
validity of the project of partition precisely because of the promise made by
Maxima Santos in the compromise Exhibit "A"; they acquised in the approval 44. Bangkal Pugad (a) 34.2779    "    
of said project of partition because they were relying on the promise made by
Maxima Santos in Exhibit "A", that she would transmit one-half of the (b) 51.7919    "    
conjugal properties that she was going to receive as her share in the conjugal
partnership upon her death and in her will, to the heirs and legatees of her (c) 2.5202    "    
husband Simeon Blas.
45. Magtapat Bangkal, Lubao, Pampanga (a) 18.0024    "    
Neither can the claim of prescription be considered in favor of the
defendants. The right of action arose at the time of the death of Maxima (b) 7.3265    "    
Santos on October 5,1956, when she failed to comply with the promise made
by her in Exhibit "A". The plaintiffs-appellants immediately presented this

Assignment No. 1 – Succession Page 36 of 74


46. Pinanganakan, Lubao, Pampanga
47. Emigdio Lingid, Lubao, Pampanga
48. Propios, Lubao, Pampanga
49. Batang Mabuanbuan, Sexmoan, Pampanga
50. Binatang Mabuanbuan, Sexmoan, Pampanga
51. Sapang Magtua, Sexmoan, Pampanga
52. Kay Limpin, Sexmoan, Pampanga
53. Calise Mabalumbum, Sexmoan, Pampanga
54. Messapinit Kineke, Sexmoan, Pampanga
55. Dalang, Banga, Sexmoan, Pampanga
62. Alaminos, Pangasinan
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
(c) 53.5180    "     80. Mangasu Sexmoan, Pampanga 10.000    "    
159.0078    "     81. Don Tomas, Sexmoan, Pampanga 21.6435    "    
34.5229    "     82. Matikling, Lubao, Pampanga       16.0000    "    
80.5382    "               Total area ............................... 1045.7863    "    
43.3350    "                         (See Record on Record, pp. 195-241.)
3.5069    "     In her will, Maxima Santos devised to Marta Gervacio Blas the 80-hectare
fishpond situated in Lubao, Pampanga. The fishpond devised is evidently
56,8242    "     that designated as "Propios" in Lubao, Pampanga, item No. 8 in the list of
properties adjudicated to her in the project of partition. (Record on Appeal, p.
5.0130    "     215.) Considering that the total area of the fishponds amount to 1045.7863
hectares, the 80 hectares devised to Marta Gervacio Blas is not even one-
23.8935    "     tenth of the total area of the fishponds. Add to this the fact that in the will she
imposed upon Marta Gervacio Blas de Chivi an existing obligation on said
(a) 5.2972     "     fishponds, namely, its lease in 1957 and the duty to pay out of the rentals
thereof an obligation to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation RFC (Ibid.,
(b) 5.9230    "     pp. 262-263.) Angelina Blas was given only a lot of 150 square meters in
Hulong Duhat, Malabon, Rizal, and Leony Blas, the sum of P300.00 (Ibid., p.
(c) 1.4638    "     264.)
(d) 1.4638    "     It is evident from a consideration of the above figures and facts that Maxima
Santos did not comply with her obligation to devise one-half of her conjugal
(e) 2.8316    "     properties to the heirs and legatees of her husband. She does not state that
she had complied with such obligation in her will. If she intended to comply
(f) 10.4412    "     therewith by giving some of the heirs of Simeon Blas the properties
mentioned above, the most that can be considered in her favor is to deduct
(g) 3.9033    "     the value of said properties from the total amount of properties which she had
undertaken to convey upon her death.
(h) 11.9263    "    
All the issues in the pleadings of the parties and in their respective briefs,
(i) 6.0574    "     have now been fully discussed and considered. Reiterating what we have
stated above, we declare that by Exhibit "A", a compromise to avoid litigation,
23.3989    "     Maxima Santos promised to devise to the heirs and legatees of her husband
Simeon Blas, one-half of the properties she received as her share in the
147.1242    "     conjugal partnership of herself and her husband, which share is specified in
the project of partition submitted by herself on March 14, 1939 in the
settlement of the estate of her husband, and which is found on pages 195 to
Page 37 of 74
240 of the record on appeal and on pages 27 to 46 of the project of partition,
submitted by Maxima Santos herself before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal in Civil Case No. 6707, entitled "Testamentaria del Finado Don Simeon
Blas, Maxima Santos Vda. de Bias, Administradora"; and that she failed to
comply with her aforementioned obligation. (Exhibit "A")

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the

defendant-appellee, administratrix of the estate of Maxima Santos, is ordered
to convey and deliver one-half of the properties adjudicated o Maxima Santos
as her share in the conjugal properties in said Civil Case No. 6707, entitled
"Testamentaria del Finado Don Simeon Blas, Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas,
Administradora", to the heirs and the legatees of her husband Simeon Blas.
Considering that all said heirs and legatees, designated in the will of Simeon
Blas as the persons for whose benefit Exhibit "A" had been executed, have
not appeared in these proceedings, the record is hereby remanded to the
court below, with instructions that, after the conveyance of the properties
hereinabove ordered had been effected, the said heirs and legatees (of
Simeon Blas) file adversary pleadings to determine the participation of each
and every one of them in said properties. Costs against the defendant-
appellee Rosalina Santos.

Assignment No. 1 – Succession Page 38 of 74

[9] G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996
JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA.
IMMACULADA T. ALANON, ROBERTO A. TORRES, CRISTINA A.
TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and AGUSTIN TORRES, petitioners, 
vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and
ANTONIA ARUEGO, respondents.
Parent and Child; Filiation; Recognition; Family Code; Words and Phrases; The
phrase “vested or acquired rights” under Article 256 is not defined by the Family
Code, leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as each particular issue is
submitted to them.—The phrase “vested or acquired rights” under Article 256, is not
defined by the Family Code. “The Committee did not define what is meant by a
‘vested or acquired right,’ thus leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as
each particular issue is submitted to them. It is difficult to provide the answer for
each and every question that may arise in the future.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Actions; An action for compulsory recognition and
enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family
Code must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code.—Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench.
The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory
recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the
advent of the Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and
not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given
retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will
prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under
Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed
her action under the regime of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; The jurisdiction of a court, whether
in criminal or civil cases, once attached, cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings
or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from
attaching in the first instance, and the Court retains jurisdiction until it finally
disposes of the case.—Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the
action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the
putative father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor
when it was filed, an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the
Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the
filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of
E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the Philippines. Our ruling herein
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil
cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although
of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
On March 7, 1983, a Complaint 1 for Compulsory Recognition and
Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed before Branch 30 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila by the minors, private respondent Antonia F.
Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego, represented by their mother
and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian. Named defendants therein were Jose
E. Aruego, Jr. and the five (5) minor children of the deceased Gloria A.
Torres, represented by their father and natural guardian, Justo P. Torres, Jr.,
now the petitioners herein.
In essence, the complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married
man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until
his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonia F.
Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego on October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963,
respectively. The complaint prayed for an Order praying that herein private
respondent and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased
Jose M. Aruego, Sr.; that herein petitioners be compelled to recognize and
acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose M. Aruego;
that their share and participation in the estate of their deceased father be
determined and ordered delivered to them.
The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged "open
and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children" as stated in
paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Complaint, to wit:
6. The plaintiffs' father, Jose M. Aruego, acknowledged and recognized the
herein plaintiffs as his children verbally among plaintiffs' and their mother's
family friends, as well as by myriad different paternal ways, including but not
limited to the following:
(a) Regular support and educational expenses;
(b) Allowance to use his surname;
(c) Payment of maternal bills;
(d) Payment of baptismal expenses and attendance therein;
Page 39 of 74
(e) Taking them to restaurants and department stores on occasions of family
rejoicing;
(f) Attendance to school problems of plaintiffs;
(g) Calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every now and then;
(h) Introducing them as such children to family friends.
7. The plaintiffs are thus, in continuous possession of the status
of (illegitimate) children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego who showered
them, with the continuous and clear manifestations of paternal care and
affection as above outlined.2
Petitioners denied all these allegations.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, dated June 15, 1992, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered —
1. Declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz
Fabian;
2. Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz
Fabian;
3. Declaring that the estate of deceased Jose Aruego are the following:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Antonia Aruego is entitled to a share equal to 1/2 portion of share of the
legitimate children of Jose Aruego;
5. Defendants are hereby ordered to recognize Antonia Aruego as the
illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;
6. Defendants are hereby ordered to deliver to Antonia Aruego (her) share in
the estate of Jose Aruego, Sr.;
7. Defendants to play (sic) plaintiffs (Antonia Aruego) counsel the sum of
P10,000.00 as atty's fee;
8. Cost against the defendants.3
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision
alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the complaint by
virtue of the passage of Executive Order No. 209 (as amended by Executive
Order No. 227), otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines
which took effect on August 3, 1988. This motion was denied by the lower
court in the Order, dated January 14, 1993.
Petitioners interposed an appeal but the lower court refused to give it due
course on the ground that it was filed out of time.
A Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was filed by herein petitioners before respondent Court of Appeals,
the petition was dismissed for lack of merit in a decision promulgated on
August 31, 1993. A Motion for Reconsideration when filed was denied by the
respondent court in a minute resolution, dated October 13, 1993.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 alleging the
following grounds:
A
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN
A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY
CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY ISSUED
BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
B
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FILED
BY PETITIONERS BEFORE IT DOES NOT INVOLVE A QUESTION OF
JURISDICTION.
C
RESPONDENT COURT HAD CLEARLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE
IS NO PERCEPTIBLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CIVIL CODE
PROVISION AND THOSE OF THE FAMILY CODE ANENT THE TIME AN
ACTION FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION MAY BE MADE AND THAT
THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE FROM THAT OF
THE FAMILY CODE CONCERNING THE REQUIREMENT THAT AN
ACTION FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION ON THE GROUND OF
CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE STATUS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE
CHILD SHOULD BE FILED DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE PUTATIVE
Page 40 of 74
PARENT, IN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT IN THE UYGUANGCO CASE THAT THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION
HAD BEEN SUPERSEDED OR AT LEAST MODIFIED BY THE
CORRESPONDING ARTICLES IN THE FAMILY CODE.
D (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS' PETITION
FOR PROHIBITION AND IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS REMEDY IS
THAT OF AN APPEAL WHICH ALLEGEDLY HAD ALREADY BEEN LOST. 4
Private respondent's action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child
was brought under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on PERSONS,
specifically Article 285 thereof, which state the manner by which illegitimate
children may prove their filiation, to wit:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought
only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following
cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case
the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority; . . . .
Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that with the advent of the New Family
Code on August 3, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint of
private respondent on the ground of prescription, considering that under
Article 175, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 172 of the New Family Code, it
is provided that an action for compulsory recognition of illegitimate filiation, if
based on the "open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child," must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent without any
exception, otherwise the action will be barred by prescription.
The law cited reads:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173
[during the lifetime of the child], except when the action is based on the
second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
In the case at bench, petitioners point out that, since the complaint of private
respondent and her alleged sister was filed on March 7, 1983, or almost one
(1) year after the death of their presumed father on March 30, 1982, the
action has clearly prescribed under the new rule as provided in the Family
Code. Petitioners, further, maintain that even if the action was filed prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code, this new law must be applied to the instant
case pursuant to Article 256 of the Family Code which provides:
This Code shall, have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested of acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws.
The basic question that must be resolved in this case, therefore, appears to
be:
Should the provisions of the Family Code be applied in the instant case? As
a corollary Will the application of the Family Code in this case prejudice or
impair any vested right of the private respondent such that it should not be
given retroactive effect in this particular case?
The phrase "vested or acquired rights" under Article 256, is not defined by
the Family Code. "The Committee did not define what is meant by a 'vested
or acquired right,' thus leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as
each particular issue is submitted to them. It is difficult to provide the answer
for each and every question that may arise in the future." 5
In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals,6 a case which involves a similar complaint
denominated as "Claim for Inheritance" but treated by this court as one to
Page 41 of 74
compel recognition as an illegitimate child brought prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code by the mother of the minor child, and based also on the
"open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," we
had occasion to rule that:
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right
of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in
court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of
the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. 7 where we held that the fact of
filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to
have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in
force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by
the enactment of a new law.
Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court,
whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by
subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it retains
jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case. 8
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 31, 1993 and its Resolution dated October 13, 1993
are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

xxx xxx xxx

Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the
instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private
respondent and, consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of
which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial
court is, therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil
Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet
prescribed.

Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by

private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and
enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the
Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by
Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be
given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its
application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her
case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her
by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code.
Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not
yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative
father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor
when it was filed, an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285
of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the
case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same
despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the
Philippines.

Assignment No. 1 – Succession Page 42 of 74

[10] G.R. No. 108947 September 29, 1997
ROLANDO SANCHEZ, FLORIDA MIERLY SANCHEZ, ALFREDO T.
SANCHEZ and MYRNA T. SANCHEZ, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, ROSALIA S. LUGOD, ARTURO S. LUGOD,
EVELYN LUGOD-RANISES and ROBERTO S. LUGOD, respondents.
Actions; Certiorari; Doctrinally entrenched is the general rule that certiorari is not
a substitute for a lost appeal; Exceptions.—Doctrinally entrenched is the general rule
that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. However, Justice Florenz D.
Regalado lists several exceptions to this rule, viz.: “(1) where the appeal does not
constitute a speedy and adequate remedy (Salvadades vs. Pajarillo, et al., 78 Phil.
77), as where 33 appeals were involved from orders issued in a single proceeding
which will inevitably result in a proliferation of more appeals (PCIB vs. Escolin, et
al., L-27860 and 27896, Mar. 29, 1974); (2) where the orders were also issued either
in excess of or without jurisdiction (Aguilar vs. Tan, L-23600, June 30, 1970, Cf.
Bautista, et al. vs. Sarmiento, et al., L-45137, Sept. 23, 1985); (3) for certain special
consideration, as public welfare or public policy (See Jose vs. Zulueta, et al.—16598,
May 31, 1961 and the cases cited therein); (4) where in criminal actions, the court
rejects rebuttal evidence for the prosecution as, in case of acquittal, there could be no
remedy (People vs. Abalos, L-029039, Nov. 28, 1968); (5) where the order is a
patent nullity (Marcelo vs. De Guzman, et al., L-29077, June 29, 1982); and (6)
where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future litigations (St. Peter
Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Campos, et al., L-38280, Mar. 21, 1975).” Even in a case
where the remedy of appeal was lost, the Court has issued the writ of certiorari where
the lower court patently acted in excess of or outside its jurisdiction, as in the present
case.
Same; Same; Requisites for Certiorari.—A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is appropriate and allowable when the following requisites
concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. After a thorough review of the case at bar, we are
convinced that all these requirements were met.
Same; Succession; Settlement of Estates; Probate Courts; It is hornbook doctrine
that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an
extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality, a
pronouncement that applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding.—As a
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
probate court, the trial court was exercising judicial functions when it issued its
assailed resolution. The said court had jurisdiction to act in the intestate proceedings
involved in this case with the caveat that, due to its limited jurisdiction, it could
resolve questions of title only provisionally. It is hornbook doctrine that “in a special
proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous
matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. This pronouncement no
doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether
testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties.—In the instant
case, the trial court rendered a decision declaring as simulated and fictitious all the
deeds of absolute sale which, on July 26, 1963 and June 26, 1967, Juan C. Sanchez
and Maria Villafranca executed in favor of their daughter, Rosalia Sanchez Lugod;
and grandchildren, namely, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn S. Lugod and Roberto S.
Lugod. The trial court ruled further that the properties covered by the said sales must
be subject to collation. Citing Article 1409 (2) of the Civil Code, the lower court
nullified said deeds of sale and determined with finality the ownership of the
properties subject thereof. In doing so, it clearly overstepped its jurisdiction as a
probate court. Jurisprudence teaches: “[A] probate court or one in charge of
proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to
outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and
good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have
to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title because the probate court cannot do so.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Compromise Agreements; A court commits grave abuse
of discretion when it renders a decision in disregard of the parties’ compromise
agreement merely on the ground that such compromise agreement was not approved
by the court.—Furthermore, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when
it rendered its decision in disregard of the parties’ compromise agreement. Such
disregard, on the ground that the compromise agreement “was not approved by the
court,” is tantamount to “an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation and within the bounds of law.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; An act done by a probate court in excess of
its jurisdiction may be corrected by certiorari.—The foregoing issues clearly involve
not only the correctness of the trial court’s decision but also the latter’s jurisdiction.
Page 43 of 74
They encompass plain errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, not merely
errors of judgment. Since the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, a petition for
certiorari is certainly a proper remedy. Indeed, it is wellsettled that “(a)n act done by
a probate court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected by certiorari.”
Contracts; Compromise Agreements; Words and Phrases; “Compromise
Agreement,” Defined; Being a consensual contract, a compromise agreement is
perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties—judicial approval is not
required for its perfection.—Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise
agreement as “a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,
avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.” Being a consensual
contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties. Judicial
approval is not required for its perfection. Petitioners’ argument that the compromise
was not valid for lack of judicial approval is not novel; the same was raised in
Mayuga vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court, through Justice Irene R. Cortes,
ruled: “It is alleged that the lack of judicial approval is fatal to the compromise. A
compromise is a consensual contract. As such, it is perfected upon the meeting of the
minds of the parties to the contract. (Hernandez v. Barcelon, 23 Phil. 599 [1912]; see
also De los Reyes v. De Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505 [1945].) And from that moment not
only does it become binding upon the parties (De los Reyes v. De Ugarte, supra), it
also has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata (Civil Code, Art. 2037),
even if not judicially approved (Meneses v. De la Rosa, 77 Phil. 34 [1946]; Vda. De
Guilas v. David, 132 Phil. 241, L-24280, 23 SCRA 762 [May 27, 1968]; Cochingyan
v. Cloribel, L-27070-71 [April 22, 1977], 76 SCRA 361).” (Italics found in the
original.)
Same; Same; To be valid, a compromise agreement is merely required under the law
to be based on real claims and actually agreed upon in good faith by the parties
thereto.—In the case before us, it is ineludible that the parties knowingly and freely
entered into a valid compromise agreement. Adequately assisted by their respective
counsels, they each negotiated its terms and provisions for four months; in fact, said
agreement was executed only after the fourth draft. As noted by the trial court itself,
the first and second drafts were prepared successively in July, 1969; the third draft
on September 25, 1969; and the fourth draft, which was finally signed by the parties
on October 30, 1969, followed. Since this compromise agreement was the result of a
long drawn out process, with all the parties ably striving to protect their respective
interests and to come out with the best they could, there can be no doubt that the
parties entered into it freely and voluntarily. Accordingly, they should be bound
thereby. To be valid, it is merely required under the law to be based on real claims
and actually agreed upon in good faith by the parties thereto.
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
Same; Same; Partition; Minority; Every act which is intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition,
although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction.—In opposing the validity and enforcement of the compromise
agreement, petitioners harp on the minority of Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna.
Citing Article 2032 of the Civil Code, they contend that the court’s approval is
necessary in compromises entered into by guardians and parents in behalf of their
wards or children. However, we observe that although denominated a compromise
agreement, the document in this case is essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to
Article 1082 of the Civil Code which provides that “[e]very act which is intended to
put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a
partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any
other transaction.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites for a Valid Partition.—For a partition to be
valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of the
following conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or
if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age,
or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardians or legal
representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or
affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds. We find that all the foregoing
requisites are present in this case. We therefore affirm the validity of the parties’
compromise agreement/partition in this case.
Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; Estoppel; An issue raised for the first time on
appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court is barred by
estoppel.—The issue of minority was first raised only in petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ Decision; thus, it “is as if it was never duly
raised in that court at all.” Hence, this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal,
entertain this issue, for to do so would plainly violate the basic rule of fair play,
justice and due process. We take this opportunity to reiterate and emphasize the well-
settled rule that “(a)n issue raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in
the proceedings in the lower court is barred by estoppel. Questions raised on appeal
must be within the issues framed by the parties and, consequently, issues not raised
in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”
Compromise Agreements; Succession; Settlement of Estates; Waiver; There is no
legal obstacle to an heir’s waiver of his/her hereditary share “even if the actual
extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the
estate.”—The petitioners likewise assail as void the provision on waiver contained in
No. 8 of the aforequoted compromise, because it allegedly constitutes a
Page 44 of 74
relinquishment by petitioners of “a right to properties which were not known.” They
argue that such waiver is contrary to law, public policy, morals or good custom. The
Court disagrees. The assailed waiver pertained to their hereditary right to properties
belonging to the decedent’s estate which were not included in the inventory of the
estate’s properties. It also covered their right to other properties originally belonging
to the spouses Juan Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez which have been
transferred to other persons. In addition, the parties agreed in the compromise to
confirm and ratify said transfers. The waiver is valid because, contrary to petitioners’
protestation, the parties waived a known and existing interest—their hereditary right
which was already vested in them by reason of the death of their father. Article 777
of the Civil Code provides that “(t)he rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent.” Hence, there is no legal obstacle to an heir’s
waiver of his/her hereditary share “even if the actual extent of such share is not
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.” At any rate, such waiver is
consistent with the intent and letter of the law advocating compromise as a vehicle
for the settlement of civil disputes.
Same; Rescission; A party to a compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it has
enjoyed its benefits.—It is also significant that all the parties, including the then
minors, had already consummated and availed themselves of the benefits of their
compromise. This Court has consistently ruled that “a party to a compromise cannot
ask for a rescission after it has enjoyed its benefits.” By their acts, the parties are
ineludibly estopped from questioning the validity of their compromise agreement.
Bolstering this conclusion is the fact that petitioners questioned the compromise only
nine yearsafter its execution, when they filed with the trial court their Motion to
Defer Approval of Compromise Agreement, dated October 26, 1979.
Same; Contracts; It is a well-entrenched doctrine that “the law does not relieve a
party from the effects of an unwise, foolish, or disastrous contract, entered into with
all the required formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing” and “a
compromise entered into and carried out in good faith will not be discarded even if
there was a mistake of law or fact.”— In hindsight, it is not at all farfetched that
petitioners filed said motion for the sole reason that they may have felt shortchanged
in their compromise agreement or partition with private respondents, which in their
view was unwise and unfair.
While we may sympathize with this rueful sentiment of petitioners, we can only
stress that this alone is not sufficient to nullify or disregard the legal effects of said
compromise which, by its very nature as a perfected contract, is binding on the
parties. Moreover, courts have no jurisdiction to look into the wisdom of a
compromise or to render a decision different therefrom. It is a well-entrenched
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
doctrine that “the law does not relieve a party from the effects of an unwise, foolish,
or disastrous contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with full
awareness of what he was doing” and “a compromise entered into and carried out in
good faith will not be discarded even if there was a mistake of law or fact,
(McCarthy vs. Barber Steamship Lines, 45 Phil. 488) because courts have no power
to relieve parties from obligations voluntarily assumed, simply because their
contracts turned out to be disastrous deals or unwise investments.”
Succession; Settlement of Estates; Probate Courts; The Court of Appeals commits no
grave abuse of discretion in deeming the intestate proceedings closed and
terminated even if there was as yet no order of distribution of the estate where the
facts show that the probate court had essentially finished said intestate proceedings.
—Corollarily, the petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion in deeming Special Proceedings Nos. 44-M and 1022 “CLOSED and
TERMINATED,” arguing that there was as yet no order of distribution of the estate
pursuant to Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. They add that they had not received their
full share thereto. We disagree. Under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, an
order for the distribution of the estate may be made when the “debts, funeral charges,
and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if
any,” had been paid. This order for the distribution of the estate’s residue must
contain the names and shares of the persons entitled thereto. A perusal of the whole
record, particularly the trial court’s conclusion, reveals that all the foregoing
requirements already concurred in this case. The payment of the indebtedness of the
estates of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca in the amount of P51,598.93 was
shouldered by Private Respondent Rosalia, who also absorbed or charged against her
share the advances of Rolando T. Lugod in the sum of P8,533.94, in compliance with
Article 1061 of the Civil Code on collation. Furthermore, the compromise of the
parties, which is the law between them, already contains the names and shares of the
heirs to the residual estate, which shares had also been delivered. x x x All the
foregoing show clearly that the probate court had essentially finished said intestate
proceedings which, consequently, should be deemed closed and terminated. In view
of the above discussion, the Court sees no reversible error on the part of the Court of
Appeals.
Same; Same; Collation; Collation mandated under Article 1061 of the Civil Code
contemplates properties conveyed inter vivos by the decedent to an heir by way of
donation or other gratuitous title.—Similarly, petitioners’ allegations of fraud in the
execution of the questioned deeds of sale are bereft of substance, in view of the
palpable absence of evidence to support them. The legal presumption of validity of
the questioned deeds of absolute sale, being duly notarized public documents, has not
been overcome. On the other hand, fraud is not presumed. It must be proved by clear
Page 45 of 74
and convincing evidence, and not by mere conjectures or speculations. We stress that
these deeds of sale did not involve gratuitous transfers of future inheritance; these
were contracts of sale perfected by the decedents during their lifetime. Hence, the
properties conveyed thereby are not collationable because, essentially, collation
mandated under Article 1061 of the Civil Code contemplates properties conveyed
inter vivos by the decedent to an heir by way of donation or other gratuitous title.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is a petition for certiorari, in lieu of appeal, the proper remedy to correct
orders of a probate court nullifying certain deeds of sale and, thus, effectively
passing upon title to the properties subject of such deeds? Is a compromise
agreement partitioning inherited properties valid even without the approval of
the trial court hearing the intestate estate of the deceased owner?
The Case
These questions are answered by this Court as it resolves the petition for
review on certiorari before us assailing the November 23, 1992 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 28761 which annulled the
decision3 of the trial court4 and which declared the compromise agreement
among the parties valid and binding even without the said trial court's
approval. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for the reasons hereinabove set forth and discussed, the
instant petition is GRANTED and the challenged decision as well as the
subsequent orders of the respondent court are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on October 14, 1992 is
made PERMANENT. The compromise agreement dated October 30, 1969 as
modified by the memorandum of agreement of April 13, 1970 is DECLARED
valid and binding upon herein parties. And Special Proceedings No. 44-M
and 1022 are deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED.5
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are narrated by the Court of Appeals as follows:
[Herein private respondent] Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses
Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while [herein private respondents]
Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod are the legitimate
children of [herein private respondent] Rosalia.
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
[Herein petitioners] Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed
Sanchez, are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez.
Following the death of her mother, Maria Villafranca, on September 29, 1967,
[herein private respondent] Rosalia filed on January 22, 1968, thru counsel, a
petition for letters of administration over the estate of her mother and the
estate of her father, Juan C. Sanchez, who was at the time in state of senility
(Annex "B", Petition).
On September 30, 1968, [herein private respondent] Rosalia, as
administratrix of the intestate estate of her mother, submitted an inventory
and appraisal of the real and personal estate of her late mother (Annex "C",
Petition).
Before the administration proceedings Special in Proceedings No. 44-M
could formally be terminated and closed, Juan C. Sanchez, [herein private
respondent] Rosalia's father, died on October 21, 1968.
On January 14, 1969, [herein petitioners] as heirs of Juan C. Sanchez, filed a
petition for letters of administration (Special Proceedings No. 1022) over the
intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez, which petition was opposed by (herein
private respondent) Rosalia.6
On October 30, 1969, however, [herein private respondent] Rosalia and
[herein petitioners] assisted by their respective counsels executed a
compromise agreement (Annex "D", Petition) wherein they agreed to divide
the properties enumerated therein of the late Juan C. Sanchez.
On November 3, 1969, petitioner Rosalia was appointed by [the trial court],
and took her oath as the administratrix of her father's intestate estate.
On January 19, 1970, [herein petitioners] filed a motion to require
administratrix, [herein private respondent] Rosalia, to deliver deficiency of 24
hectares and or to set aside compromise agreement (Annex "E", Petition).
Under date of April 13, 1970, (herein private respondent) Rosalia and [herein
petitioners] entered into and executed a memorandum of agreement which
modified the compromise agreement (Annex "F". Petition)
On October 25, 1979, or nine years later, [herein petitioners] filed, thru
counsel, a motion to require [herein private respondent] Rosalia to submit a
new inventory and to render an accounting over properties not included in the
compromise agreement (Annex "G", Petition). They likewise filed a motion to
Page 46 of 74
defer the approval of the compromise agreement (Annex "H", Ibid), in which
they prayed for the annulment of the compromise agreement on the ground
of fraud.
On February 4, 1980, however, counsel for [herein petitioners] moved to
withdraw his appearance and the two motions he flied, Annex "G" and "H"
(Annex "I", Petition).
On February 28, 1980, the [trial] court issued an order directing [herein
private respondent] Rosalia to submit a new inventory of properties under her
administration and an accounting of the fruits thereof, which prompted [herein
private respondent] Rosalia to file a rejoinder on March 31, 1980 (Annex "K",
Petition).
On May 12, 1980, [herein petitioners], thru new counsel, filed a motion to
change administratrix (Annex "L", Petition) to which [herein private
respondent] Rosalia filed an opposition (Annex "M", Ibid).
The parties were subsequently ordered to submit their respective position
papers, which they did (Annexes "N" and "O", Petition). On September 14,
1989, former counsel of (herein petitioners) entered his re-appearance as
counsel for (herein petitioners).
On the bases of memoranda submitted by the parties, the [trial court], this
time presided by Judge Vivencio A. Galon, promulgated its decision on June
26, 1991, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows
by declaring and ordering:
1. That the entire intestate estate of Maria Villafranca Sanchez under Special
Proceedings No. 44-M consists of all her paraphernal properties and one-half
(1/2) of the conjugal properties which must be divided equally between
Rosalia Sanchez de Lugod and Juan C. Sanchez;
2. That the entire intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez under Special
Proceedings No. 1022 consists of all his capital properties, one-half (1/2)
from the conjugal partnership of gains and one-half (1/2) of the intestate
estate of Maria Villafranca under Special Proceedings No. 44-M;
3. That one-half (1/2) of the entire intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez shall
be inherited by his only legitimate daughter, Rosalia V. Sanchez de Lugod
while the other one-half (1/2) shall be inherited and be divided equally by,
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
between and among the six (6) illegitimate children, namely: Patricia Alburo,
Maria Ramuso Sanchez, Rolando Pedro T. Sanchez, Florida Mierly T.
Sanchez, Alfredo T. Sanchez and Myrna T. Sanchez;
4. That all the Deed (sic) of Absolute Sales executed by Juan C. Sanchez
and Maria Villafranca in favor of Rosalia Sanchez Lugod, Arturo S. Lugod,
Evelyn S. Lugod and Roberto S. Lugod on July 26, 1963 and June 26, 1967
are all declared simulated and fictitious and must be subject to collation and
partition among all heirs;
5. That within thirty (30) days from finality of this decision, Rosalia Sanchez
Lugod is hereby ordered to prepare a project of partition of the intestate
estate of Juan C. Sanchez under Special Proceedings No. 1022 and
distribute and deliver to all heirs their corresponding shares. If she fails to do
so within the said thirty (30) days, then a Board of Commissioners is hereby
constituted, who are all entitled to honorarium and per diems and other
necessary expenses chargeable to the estate to be paid by Administratrix
Rosalia S. Lugod, appointing the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO) of Gingoog City as members thereof, with the
task to prepare the project of partition and deliver to all heirs their respective
shares within ninety (90) days from the finality of said decision;
6. That within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision, Administratrix
Rosalia Sanchez Vda. de Lugod is hereby ordered to submit two (2) separate
certified true and correct accounting, one for the income of all the properties
of the entire intestate estate of Maria Villafranca under Special Proceedings
No. 44-M, and another for the properties of the entire intestate estate of Juan
C. Sanchez under Special Proceedings No. 1022 duly both signed by her
and both verified by a Certified Public Accountant and distribute and deliver
to her six (6) illegitimate brothers and sisters in equal shares, one-half (1/2)
of the net income of the estate of Juan C. Sanchez from October 21, 1968 up
to the finality of this decision;
7. For failure to render an accounting report and failure to give cash
advances to the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez during their minority
and hour of need from the net income of the estate of Juan C. Sanchez,
which adversely prejudiced their social standing and pursuit of college
education, (the trial court) hereby orders Rosalia Sanchez Vda. de Lugod to
pay her six (6) illegitimate brothers and sisters the sum of Five Hundred
Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos, as exemplary damages, and also the sum
of One Hundred Fifty Thousand (P150,000.00) Pesos for attorney's fees;
Page 47 of 74
8. Upon release of this decision and during its pendency, should appeal be
made, the Register of Deeds and Assessors of the Provinces and Cities
where the properties of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca are located,
are all ordered to register and annotate in the title and/or tax declarations, the
dispositive portion of this decision for the protection of all heirs and all those
who may be concerned.
SO ORDERED.
[Herein private respondent] Rosalia filed a motion for reconsideration dated
July 17, 1991 (Annex "P", Petition) on August 6, 1991.
On August 13, 1991, [herein petitioners] filed a motion for execution and
opposition to [herein private respondent] Rosalia's motion for reconsideration
(Annex "Q", Petition).
On September 3, 1991, [the trial court] issued an Omnibus Order (Annex "S",
Petition) declaring, among other things, that the decision at issue had
become final and executory.
[Herein private respondent] Rosalia then filed a motion for reconsideration of
said Omnibus Order (Annex "T", Petition). Said [herein private respondent]
was allowed to file a memorandum in support of her motion (Annex "V",
Petition).
On June 26, 1991, [the trial court] issued and Order denying petitioner
Rosalia's motion for reconsideration (Annex "W", Petition). 7
Thereafter, private respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via
a petition for certiorari and contended:
I
The [trial court] has no authority to disturb the compromise agreement.
II
The [trial court] has arbitrarily faulted [herein private respondent] Rosalia S.
Lugod for alleged failure to render an accounting which was impossible.
III
The [trial court] acted without jurisdiction in derogation of the constitutional
rights of [herein private respondents] Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
Roberto S. Lugod when [the trial court] decided to annul the deed of sale
between the said [herein private respondents] and Juan C. Sanchez without
affording them their day in court.
IV
[The trial court judge] defied without rhyme or reason well-established and
entrenched jurisprudence when he determined facts sans any evidence
thereon.
V
[The trial court] grossly misinterpreted [herein private respondent] Rosalia S.
Lugod's right to appeal.8
For clarity's sake, this Court hereby reproduces verbatim the compromise
agreement9 of the parties:
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
COME NOW, the parties in the above-entitled case, motivated by their
mutual desire to preserve and maintain harmonious relations between and
among themselves, for mutual valuable considerations and in the spirit of
good will and fair play, and, for the purpose of this Compromise Agreement,
agree to the following:
1. That the deceased Juan C. Sanchez who died intestate on October 21,
1968 was legally married to Maria Villafranca de Sanchez, who predeceased
her on September 29, 1967, out of whose wedlock Rosalia Sanchez Lugod,
Oppositor herein, was born, thus making her the sole and only surviving
legitimate heir of her deceased parents;
2. That the said deceased Juan C. Sanchez, left illegitimate children,
Intervenors-Oppositors and Petitioners, respectively, herein namely;
(1) Patricio Alburo, born out of wedlock on March 17, 1926 at Cebu City,
Philippines, to Emilia Alburo;
(2) Maria Ramoso Sanchez, born out of wedlock on May 9, 1937 at Gingoog,
Misamis Oriental, now, Gingoog City, to Alberta Ramoso;
(3) (a) Rolando Pedro Sanchez, born on May 19, 1947,
(b) Florida Mierly Sanchez, born on February 16, 1949,
Page 48 of 74
(c) Alfredo Sanchez, born on July 21, 1950, and
(d) Myrna Sanchez, born on June 16, 1952, all born out of wedlock to
Laureta Tampus in Gingoog City, Philippines.
3. That the deceased Juan C. Sanchez left the following properties, to wit:
I. SEPARATE CAPITAL OF JUAN C. SANCHEZ
NATURE, DESCRIPTION AND AREA ASSESSED VALUE
(1) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax. Decl. No. 06458, Cad. Lot No. 1041
C-2, located at Murallon, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot Nos.
1033, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1039, 1040, 1042 & 1043; South by Lot No. 1080,
1088, 1087 & 1084; East by Lot Nos. 1089, 1061 & 2319; West by Lot Nos.
954, 1038, 1057 & 1056, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO (183, 672) sq. ms.
more or less.
P21,690.00
II. CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF JUAN C. SANCHEZ AND MARIA
VILLAFRANCA DE SANCHEZ
(1) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06447, Cad. Lot No. 2745,
C-7 located at Agay-ayan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot
Nos. 2744, 2742, 2748; South by Lot No. 2739; East by Lot No. 2746; West
by Lot No. 2741, containing an area of FOURTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED (14,700) sq. ms. more or less.
P1,900.00
(2) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06449, Cad, Lot No. 3271 C-
7 located at Panyangan, Lanao, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by
Lot No. 3270; South by Lot Nos. 2900 & 3462; East by Panyangan River & F.
Lumanao; and Part of Lot 3272; and West by Samay Creek, containing an
area of ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (104,600) sq.
ms. more or less.
P11,580.00
(3) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06449, Cad. Lot No. 2319,
Case 2, located at Murallon, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
No. 1061; South by Hinopolan Creek; East by Lot No. 1044; and West by Lot
No. 1041, containing an area of THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
TWENTY FIVE (3,225) sq. ms. more or less.
(4) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06452, Cad. Lot No. 3272,
C-7 Part 4 located at Panyangan, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on the
North by Lot Nos. 3270 & 3273; East by Panyangan River; South by
Panyangan River; and West by Lot Nos. 3270 & 3271, containing an area of
FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (55,600) sq. ms. more or less,
being claimed by Damian Querubin.
P2,370.00
(5) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06453, Cad. Lot No. 3270
Case 7, located at Sunog, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by
Samay Creek & Lot 3267; South by Lot Nos. 3271 & 3272; East by Lot Nos.
3269 & 3273; and West by Samay Creek, containing an area of FOUR
HUNDRED EIGHT THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (483,600) sq. ms.
more or less.
P61,680.00
(6) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06457, Cad. Lot No. 3273,
C-7 Part 2 located at Panyangan, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on the
North by Lot No. 3269; South by Lot No. 3272; East by Panyangan River;
and West by Lot No. 3270, containing an area of THIRTY FOUR
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (34,300) sq. ms. more or less, being
claimed by Miguel Tuto.
P3,880.00
(7) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12000, Cad. Lot No. 2806,
Case 7 located at Agayayan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by
Agayayan River; South by Victoriano Barbac; East by Isabelo Ramoso; and
West by Restituto Baol, containing an area of SIX THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX (6,676) sq. ms. more or less.
P380.00
Page 49 of 74
(8) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12924, Cad. Lot No. 1206 C-
1 located at Cahulogan, Gingoog City and bounded on the NW., by Lot No.
1209; SW., by Lot No. 1207; Eastby National Highway; and West by Lot No.
1207; containing an area of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTEEN
(4,513) sq. ms. more or less.
No. 7-A-16-0; South by Lot No. 7-16-0; East by Lot No. 7-A-18-Road; West
by Lot No. 8, PSU-120704-Julito Arengo vs. Restituto Baol, containing an
area of TWO HUNDRED SIXTEEN (216) sq. ms. more or less.
P1,050.00

P740.00
(9) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12925, Cad. Lot No. 5554,
located at Tinaytayan, Pigsalohan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North
by Lot Nos. 5559 & 5558; South by Lot No. 3486; East by Lot No. 5555; and
West by Lot No. 5355, containing an area of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT (18,528) sq. ms. more or less.
(14) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax, Decl. No. 06789, Cad. Lot No. 5157-
C-7, located at Kiogat, Agayayan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by
Lot No. 5158, 5159, 5156; South by SE-Steep Bank; East by NW, by Lot No.
5158, Villafranca, containing an area of NINETY SIX THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED (96,200) sq. ms. more or less.
P3,370.00

P320.00 III. PERSONAL ESTATE (CONJUGAL)

(10) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12926, Cad. Lot No. 5555 NATURE AND DESCRIPTION LOCATION APPRAISAL
C-7 located at Tinaytayan, Pigsalojan, Gingoog City and bounded on the
1. Fifty (50) shares of stock
North by Tinaytayan Creek & Lot Nos. 5557 & 5558; South by Lot Nos. 3486,
Rural Bank of Gingoog, Inc.
3487, 3488, 3491 & 3496; East by Cr. & Lot No. 3496; and West by Lot No.
at P100.00 per share P5,000.00
5554, containing an area of SEVENTY SEVEN THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX (77,776) sq. ms. more or less. 2. Four (4) shares of Preferred Stock
with San Miguel Corporation 400.00
P1,350.00
4. That, the parties hereto have agreed to divide the above-enumerated
(11) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06454, Cad. Lot No. 61-
properties in the following manner, to wit:
C-1 located at Guno-Condeza Sts., Gingoog City and bounded on the North
by Lot 64; South by Road-Lot 613 Condeza St; East by Lot Nos. 63, and 62; (a) To Patricio Alburo, Maria Ramoso Sanchez, Roland Pedro T. Sanchez,
West by Road-Lot 614-Guno St., containing an area of ONE THOUSAND Florida Mierly Sanchez, Alfredo T. Sanchez and Myrna T. Sanchez, in equal
FORTY TWO (1,042) sq. ms. more or less. pro-indiviso shares, considering not only their respective areas but also the
improvements existing thereon, to wit:
P9,320.00
Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06453, Cad. Lot No. 3270 Case
(12) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06484, Lot No. 5, Block
7, located at Sunog, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by
2, located at Cabuyoan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No.
Samay Creek & Lot 3267; South by Lot Nos. 3271 and 3272; East by Lot
4, block 2; South by Lot No. 8, block 2; East by Lot No. 6, block 2, West by
Nos. 3269 & 3273; and West by Samay Creek, containing an area of FOUR
Subdivision Road, containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED (400) sq. ms.
HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (483,600) sq. ms.
more or less.
and assessed in the sum of P61,680.00.
P12,240.00
(b) To Rosalia Sanchez Lugod all the rest of the properties, both real and
(13) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 15798, Block No. 7-A- personal, enumerated above with the exception of the following:
16-0 located at Cabuyoan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot

Assignment No. 1 – Succession Page 50 of 74

(1) Two Preferred Shares of Stock in the San Miguel Corporation, indicated
in San Miguel Corporation Stock Certificate No. 30217, which two shares she
is ceding in favor of Patricio Alburo;
(2) The house and lot designated as Lot No. 5, Block 2 together with the
improvements thereon and identified as parcel No. II-12, lot covered by Tax
Decl. No. 15798 identified as Parcel No. II-13 in the above enumerated, and
Cad. Lot No. 5157-C-7 together with the improvements thereon, which is
identified as parcel No. II-14 of the above-enumeration of properties, which
said Rosalia S. Lugod is likewise ceding and renouncing in favor of Rolando
Pedro, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, in equal
pro-indiviso shares;
5. That Rolando Pedro, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed
Sanchez hereby acknowledge to have received jointly and severally in form
of advances after October 21, 1968 the aggregate sum of EIGHT
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE PESOS (P8,533.94) and
NINETY-FOUR CENTAVOS;
6. That the parties hereto likewise acknowledge and recognize in the
indebtedness of the deceased Juan G. Sanchez and his deceased wife Maria
Villafranca Sanchez to the Lugod Enterprises, Inc., in the sum of P43,064.99;
7. That the parties hereto shall be responsible for the payment of the estate
and inheritance taxes proportionate to the value of their respective shares as
may be determined by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and shall likewise be
responsible for the expenses of survey and segregation of their respective
shares;
8. That Patricio Alburo, Maria Ramoso Sanchez, Roland Pedro Sanchez,
Florida Mierly Sanchez, Alfredo Sanchez and Myrna Sanchez hereby waive,
relinquish and renounce, jointly and individually, in a manner that is absolute
and irrevocable, all their rights and interests, share and participation which
they have or might have in all the properties, both real and personal, known
or unknown and/or which may not be listed herein, or in excess of the areas
listed or mentioned herein, and/or which might have been, at one time or
another, owned by, registered or placed in the name of either of the spouses
Juan C. Sanchez or Maria Villafranca de Sanchez or both, and which either
one or both might have sold, ceded, transferred, or donated to any person or
persons or entity and which parties hereto do hereby confirm and ratify
together with all the improvements thereon, as well as all the produce and
proceeds thereof, and particularly of the properties, real and personal listed
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
herein, as well as demandable obligations due to the deceased spouses
Juan C. Sanchez, before and after the death of the aforementioned spouses
Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez, in favor of oppositor
Rosalia S. Lugod;
9. That the expenses of this litigation including attorney's fees shall be borne
respectively by the parties hereto;
10. That Laureta Tampus for herself and guardian ad-litem of her minor
children, namely: Florida Mierly, Alfredo, and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez,
hereby declare that she has no right, interest, share and participation
whatsoever in the estate left by Juan C. Sanchez and/or Maria Villafranca de
Sanchez, or both, and that she likewise waives, renounces, and relinquishes
whatever rigid, share, participation or interest therein which she has or might
have in favor of Rosalia S. Lugod;
11. That, the parties hereto mutually waive and renounce in favor of each
other any whatever claims or actions, arising from, connected with, and as a
result of Special Proceedings Nos. 44-M and 1022 of the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Oriental, Rosalia S. Lugod, warranting that the parcel of
land ceded to the other parties herein contains 48 hectares and 36 ares.
12. That, Rosalia S. Lugod shall assume as she hereby assumes the
payment to Lugod Enterprises, Inc., of the sum of P51,598.93 representing
the indebtedness of the estate of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de
Sanchez and the advances made to Rolando Pedro, Mierly, Alfredo, and
Myna all surnamed Sanchez, mentioned in paragraphs 5 hereto agree to
have letters of administration issued in favor of Rosalia S. Lugod without any
bond.
That Rosalia S. Lugod likewise agrees to deliver possession and enjoyment
of the parcel of land herein ceded to petitioners and intervenors immediately
after the signing of this agreement and that the latter also mutually agree
among themselves to have the said lot subdivided and partitioned
immediately in accordance with the proportion of one sixth (1/6) part for every
petitioner and intervenor and that in the meantime that the partition and
subdivision is not yet effected, the administrations of said parcel of land shall
be vested jointly with Laureta Tampos, guardian ad litem of petitioners and
Maria Ramoso, one of the intervenors who shall see to it that each petitioner
and intervenor is given one sixth (1/6) of the net proceeds of all agricultural
harvest made thereon.
Page 51 of 74
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the foregoing compromise Cagayan de Oro City
agreement be approved.
The Clerk of Court
Medina, Misamis Oriental, October 30, 1969. Court of First Instance
Branch III, Medina, Mis. Or.
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
PATRICIO ALBURO ROSALIA S. LUGOD Greetings:

Intervenor-Oppositor Oppositor Please set the foregoing compromise agreement for the approval of the
Honorable Court today, Oct. 30, 1969.
(Sgd.)
MARIA RAMOSO SANCHEZ ASSISTED BY: (Sgd.) (Sgd.) (Sgd.)
PABLO S. REYES TEOGENES VELEZ, JR. REYNALDO L. FERNANDEZ
Intervenor-Oppositor
The Memorandum of Agreement dated April 13, 1970, which the parties
(Sgd.) entered into with the assistance of their counsel, amended the above
ASSISTED BY: PABLO S. REYES compromise. (It will be reproduced later in our discussion of the second issue
R-101-Navarro Bldg. raised by the petitioners.)
(Sgd.) Don A. Velez St.
The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution 10 dated September 4, 1992, initially
REYNALDO L. FERNANDEZ Cagayan de Oro City dismissed private respondents' petition. Acting, however, on a motion for
Gingoong City reconsideration and a supplemental motion for reconsideration dated
September 14, 1992 and September 25, 1992, respectively, 11 Respondent
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
Court thereafter reinstated private respondents' petition in a
ROLANDO PEDRO T. SANCHEZ ALFREDO T. SANCHEZ
resolution 12 dated October 14, 1992.
Petitioner Petitioner
In due course, the Court of Appeals, as earlier stated, rendered its assailed
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
Decision granting the petition, setting aside the trial court's decision and
FLORIDA MIERLY T. SANCHEZ MYRNA T. SANCHEZ
declaring the modified compromise agreement valid and binding.
Petitioner Petitioner
Hence, this appeal to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
(Sgd.)
LAURETA TAMPUS The Issues
For herself and as Guardian
Ad-Litem of the minors In this appeal, petitioners invite the Court's attention to the following issues:
Florida Mierly, Alfredo, and
Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez I

ASSISTED BY:

TEOGENES VELEZ, JR.

Counsel for Petitioners

Assignment No. 1 – Succession Page 52 of 74

The respondent court grossly erred in granting the petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 considering that the special civil action of certiorari may not be
availed of as a substitute for an appeal and that, in any event, the grounds
invoked in the petition are merely alleged errors of judgment which can no
longer be done in view of the fact that the decision of the lower court had
long become final and executory.
II
Prescinding from the foregoing, the respondent court erred in annulling the
decision of the lower court for the reason that a compromise agreement or
partition as the court construed the same to be, executed by the parties on
October 30, 1969 was void and unenforceable the same not having been
approved by the intestate court and that the same having been seasonably
repudiated by petitioners on the ground of fraud.
III
The respondent court grossly erred in ignoring and disregarding findings of
facts of the lower court that the alleged conveyances of real properties made
by the spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca just before their death
in favor of their daughter and grandchildren, private respondents herein, are
tainted with fraud or made in contemplation of death, hence, collationable.
IV
In any event, the respondent court grossly erred in treating the lower court's
declaration of fictitiousness of the deeds of sale as a final adjudication of
annulment.
V inevitably result in a proliferation of more appeals (PCIB vs. Escolin, et al., L-
The respondent court grossly erred in declaring the termination of the
intestate proceedings even as the lower court had not made a final and
enforceable distribution of the estate of the deceased Juan C. Sanchez.
VI
Prescinding from the foregoing, the respondent court grossly erred in not at
least directing respondent Rosalia S. Lugod to deliver the deficiency of eight
(8) hectares due petitioners under the compromise agreement and
memorandum of agreement, and in not further directing her to include in the
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
inventory properties conveyed under the deeds of sale found by the lower
court to be part of the estate of Juan C. Sanchez. 13
The salient aspects of some issues are closely intertwined; hence, they are
hereby consolidated into three main issues specifically dealing with the
following subjects: (1) the propriety of certiorari as a remedy before the Court
of Appeals, (2) the validity of the compromise agreement, and (3) the
presence of fraud in the execution of the compromise and/or collation of the
properties sold.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
First Issue: Propriety of Certiorari Before the Court of Appeals
Since private respondents had neglected or failed to file an ordinary appeal
within the reglementary period, petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals
erred in allowing private respondent's recourse to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. They contend that private respondents' invocation of certiorari was
"procedurally defective." 14 They further argue that private respondents, in
their petition before the Court of Appeals, alleged errors of the trial court
which, being merely errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction, were not
correctable by certiorari. 15 This Court disagrees.
Doctrinally entrenched is the general rule that certiorari  is not a substitute for
a lost appeal. However, Justice Florenz D. Regalado lists several exceptions
to this rule, viz.: "(1) where the appeal does not constitute a speedy and
adequate remedy (Salvadades vs. Pajarillo, et al., 78 Phil. 77), as where 33
appeals were involved from orders issued in a single proceeding which will
27860 and 27896, Mar. 29, 1974); (2) where the orders were also issued
either in excess of or without jurisdiction (Aguilar vs. Tan, L-23600, Jun 30,
1970, Cf. Bautista, et al. vs. Sarmiento, et al., L-45137, Sept. 231985); (3) for
certain special consideration, as public welfare or public policy (See Jose vs.
Zulueta, et al. 16598, May 31, 1961 and the cases cited therein); (4) where in
criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal evidence for the prosecution as, in
case of acquittal, there could be no remedy (People vs. Abalos, L029039,
Nov. 28, 1968); (5) where the order is a patent nullity (Marcelo vs. De
Guzman, et al., L-29077, June 29, 1982); and (6) where the decision in
the certiorari  case will avoid future litigations (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc.
vs. Campos, et al., L-38280, Mar. 21, 1975)." 16 Even in a case where the
Page 53 of 74
remedy of appeal was lost, the Court has issued the writ of certiorari  where
the lower court patently acted in excess of or outside its jurisdiction, 17 as in
the present case.
A petition for certiorari  under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is appropriate and
allowable when the following requisites concur: (1) the writ is directed against
a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2)
such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. 18 After a thorough review of the case at bar, we are
convinced that all these requirements were met.
As a probate court, the trial court was exercising judicial functions when it
issued its assailed resolution. The said court had jurisdiction to act in the
intestate proceedings involved in this case with the caveat that, due to its
limited jurisdiction, it could resolve questions of title only provisionally. 19 It is
hornbook doctrine that "in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the
question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court
cannot resolve with finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal
force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar." 20 In the instant case,
the trial court rendered a decision declaring as simulated and fictitious all the
deeds of absolute sale which, on July 26, 1963 and June 26, 1967, Juan C.
Sanchez and Maria Villafranca executed in favor of their daughter, Rosalia
Sanchez Lugod; and grandchildren, namely, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn S.
Lugod and Roberto S. Lugod. The trial court ruled further that the properties
covered by the said sales must be subject to collation. Citing Article 1409 (2)
of the Civil Code, the lower court nullified said deeds of sale and determined
with finality the ownership of the properties subject thereof . In doing so, it
clearly overstepped its jurisdiction as a probate court. Jurisprudence teaches:
[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the
estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said
court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should
or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is not dispute, well and good, but if
there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to
resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims
of title because the probate court cannot do so. 21
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
Furthermore, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
rendered its decision in disregard of the parties' compromise
agreement. 22 Such disregard, on the ground that the compromise agreement
"was nor approved by the court," 23 is tantamount to "an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation and within the bounds of law. " 24
The foregoing issues clearly involve not only the correctness of the trial
court's decision but also the latter's jurisdiction. They encompass plain errors
of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, not merely errors of
judgment. 25 Since the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, a petition
for certiorari is certainly a proper remedy. Indeed, it is well-settled that "(a)n
act done by a probate court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected
by certiorari." 26
Consistent with the foregoing, the following disquisition by respondent
appellate court is apt:
As a general proposition, appeal is the proper remedy of petitioner Rosalia
here under Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court. But the availability of the
ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to [prevent] a
party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal
is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient
(Echauz vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 381). Here, considering that the
respondent court has disregarded the compromise agreement which has
long been executed as early as October, 1969 and declared null and void the
deeds of sale with finality, which, as a probate court, it has no jurisdiction to
do, We deem ordinary appeal is inadequate. Considering further the [trial
court's] granting of [herein petitioners') motion for execution of the assailed
decision, 27 [herein private respondent] Rosalia's resort to the instant petition
[for review on certiorari] is all the more warranted under the circumstances. 28
We thus hold that the questioned decision and resolutions of the trial court
may be challenged through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. At the very least, this case is a clear exception to the
general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal because the
trial court's decision and resolutions were issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction, which may thus be challenged or attacked at any time. "A void
judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source
of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it
and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never
become final and any writ of execution based on it is void; ' . . . it may be said
Page 54 of 74
to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.' " 29
Second Issue: Validity of Compromise Agreement
Petitioners contend that, because the compromise agreement was executed
during the pendency of the probate proceedings, judicial approval is
necessary to shroud it with validity. They stress that the probate court had
jurisdiction over the properties covered by said agreement. They add that
Petitioners Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna were all miners represented
only by their mother/natural guardian, Laureta Tampus. 30
These contentions lack merit. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a
compromise agreement as "a contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced." Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting
of the minds of the parties. Judicial approval is not required for its
perfection. 31 Petitioners' argument that the compromise was not valid for lack
of judicial approval is not novel; the same was raised in Mayuga vs. Court of
Appeals, 32 where the Court, through Justice Irene R. Cortes, ruled:
It is alleged that the lack of judicial approval is fatal to the compromise. A
compromise is a consensual contract. As such, it is perfected upon the
meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract. (Hernandez v. Barcelon,
23 Phil. 599 [1912]; see also De los Reyes v. de Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505 [1945].)
And from that moment not only does it become binding upon the parties (De
los Reyes v. De Ugarte, supra  ), it also has upon them the effect and
authority of res judicata (Civil Code, Art. 2037), even if not judicially
approved (Meneses v. De la Rosa, 77 Phil. 34 [1946]; Vda. De Guilas v.
David, 132 Phil. 241, L-24280, 23 SCRA 762 [May 27, 1968]; Cochingyan v.
Cloribel, L-27070-71 [April 22, 1977], 76 SCRA 361). (Emphasis found in the
original.)
In the case before us, it is ineludible that the parties knowingly and freely
entered into a valid compromise agreement. Adequately assisted by their
respective counsels, they each negotiated its terms and provisions for four
months; in fact, said agreement was executed only after the fourth draft. As
noted by the trial court itself, the first and second drafts were prepared
successively in July, 1969; the third draft on September 25, 1969; and the
fourth draft, which was finally signed by the parties on October 30,
1969, 33 followed. Since this compromise agreement was the result of a long
drawn out process, with all the parties ably striving to protect their respective
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
interests and to come out with the best they could, there can be no doubt that
the parties entered into it freely and voluntarily. Accordingly, they should be
bound thereby. 34 To be valid, it is merely required under the law to be based
on real claims and actually agreed upon in good faith by the parties
thereto. 35
Indeed, compromise is a form of amicable settlement that is not only allowed
but also encouraged in civil cases. 36Article 2029 of the Civil Code mandates
that a "court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree
upon some fair compromise."
In opposing the validity and enforcement of the compromise agreement,
petitioners harp on the minority of Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myna. Citing
Article 2032 of the Civil Code, they contend that the court's approval is
necessary in compromises entered into by guardians and parents in behalf of
their wards or children. 37
However, we observe that although denominated a compromise agreement,
the document in this case is essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Article
1082 of the Civil Code which provides that "[e]very act which is intended to
put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed
to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction."
For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires
the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2)
the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3)
the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are
represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the
partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with
the Register of Deeds. 38 We find that all the foregoing requisites are present
in this case. We therefore affirm the validity of the parties' compromise
agreement/partition in this case.
In any event, petitioners neither raised nor ventilated this issue in the trial
court. This new question or matter was manifestly beyond the pale of the
issues or questions submitted and threshed out before the lower court which
are reproduced below, viz.:
I Are the properties which are the object of the sale by the deceased spouses
to their grandchildren collationable?
Page 55 of 74
II Are the properties which are the object of the sale by the deceased
spouses to their legitimate daughter also collationable?
III The first and second issues being resolved, how much then is the rightful
share of the four (4) recognized illegitimate children? 39
Furthermore, the 27-page Memorandum dated February 17, 1990 filed by
petitioners before the Regional Trial Court 40 readily reveals that they never
questioned the validity of the compromise. In their comment before the Court
of Appeals, 41 petitioners based their objection to sad compromise agreement
on the solitary "reason that it was tainted with fraud and deception," zeroing
specifically on the alleged fraud committed by private respondent Rosalia S.
Lugod. 42 The issue of minority was first raised only in petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Decision; 43 thus, it "is as if it was
never duly raised in that court at all." 44 Hence, this Court cannot now, for the
first time on appeal, entertain this issue, for to do so would plainly violate the
basic rule of fair play, justice and due process. 45 We take this opportunity to
reiterate and emphasize the well-settled rule that "(a)n issue raised for the
first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower
court is barred by estoppel. Questions raised on appeal must be within the
issues framed by the parties and, consequently, issues not raised in the trial
court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." 46
The petitioners likewise assail as void the provision on waiver contained in
No. 8 of the aforequoted compromise, because it allegedly constitutes a
relinquishment by petitioners of "a right to properties which were not
known." 47They argue that such waiver is contrary to law, public policy,
morals or good custom. The Court disagrees. The assailed waiver pertained
to their hereditary right to properties belonging to the decedent's estate which
were not included in the inventory of the estate's properties. It also covered
their right to other properties originally belonging to the spouses Juan
Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez which have been transferred to
other persons. In addition, the parties agreed in the compromise to confirm
and ratify said transfers. The waiver is valid because, contrary to petitioners'
protestation, the parties waived a known and existing interest — their
hereditary right which was already vested in them by reason of the death of
their father. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent."
Hence, there is no legal obstacle to an heir's waiver of his/her hereditary
share "even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the
subsequent liquidation of the estate." 48 At any rate, such waiver is consistent
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
with the intent and letter of the law advocating compromise as a vehicle for
the settlement of civil disputes. 49
Finally, petitioners contend that Private Respondent Rosalia T. Lugod's
alleged fraudulent acts, specifically her concealment of some of the
decedent's properties, attended the actual execution of the compromise
agreement. 50This argument is debunked by the absence of any substantial
and convincing evidence on record showing fraud on her part. As aptly
observed by the appellate court:
[Herein petitioners] accuse [herein private respondent] Rosalia of fraud or
deception by alleging, inter alia, that the parcel of land given to them never
conformed to the stated area, i.e., forty-eight (48) hectares, as stated in the
compromise agreement. We find this argument unconvincing and
unmeritorious. [Herein petitioners'] averment of fraud on the part of [herein
private respondent] Rosalia becomes untenable when We consider the
memorandum of agreement they later executed with [herein private
respondent] Rosalia wherein said compromise agreement was modified by
correcting the actual area given to [herein petitioners] from forty-eight (48)
hectares to thirty-six (36) hectares only. If the actual area allotted to them did
not conform to the 48 hectare area stated in the compromise agreement,
then why did they agree to the memorandum of agreement whereby their
share in the estate of their father was even reduced to just 36 hectares?
Where is fraud or deception there? Considering that [herein petitioners] were
ably represented by their lawyers in executing these documents and who
presumably had explained to them the import and consequences thereof, it is
hard to believe their charge that they were defrauded and deceived by
[herein private respondent] Rosalia.
If the parcel of land given to [herein petitioners], when actually surveyed,
happened to be different in area to the stated area of 48 hectares in the
compromise agreement, this circumstance is not enough proof of fraud or
deception on [herein private respondent] Rosalia's part. Note that Tax
Declaration No. 06453 plainly discloses that the land transferred to [herein
petitioners] pursuant to the compromise agreement contained an area of 48
hectares (Annex "A", Supplemental Reply). And when [herein petitioners]
discovered that the land allotted to them actually contained only 24 hectares,
a conference between the parties took place which led to the execution and
signing of the memorandum of agreement wherein [herein petitioners']
distributive share was even reduced to 36 hectares. In the absence of
convincing and clear evidence to the contrary, the allegation of fraud and
Page 56 of 74
deception cannot be successfully imputed to [herein private respondent] Cagayan de Oro City, April 13, 1970.
Rosalia who must be presumed to have acted in good faith. 51
(Sgd.)
The memorandum of agreement freely and validly entered into by the parties LAURETA TAMPOS
on April 13, 1970 and referred to above reads:
For herself and as Guardian ad-litem of Rolando, Mierly,
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez

The parties assisted by their respective counsel have agreed as they hereby
agree:
1. To amend the compromise agreement executed by them on October 30,
1969 so as to include the following:
a. Correction of the actual area being given to the petitioners and intervenors,
all illegitimate children of the late Juan C. Sanchez, forty-eight (48) hectares,
thirty-six (36) ares as embodied in the aforementioned compromise
agreement to thirty-six (36) hectares only, thus enabling each of them to get
six (6) hectares each.
b. That the said 36-hectare area shall be taken from that parcel of land which
is now covered by O.C.T. No. 146 (Patent No. 30012) and the adjoining
areas thereof designated as Lot A and Lot C as reflected on the sketch plan
attached to the record of this case prepared by Geodetic Engineer Olegario
E. Zalles pursuant to the Court's commission of March 10, 1970 provided,
however, that if the said 36-hectare area could not be found after adding
thereto the areas of said lots A and C, then the additional area shall be taken
from what is designated as Lot B, likewise also reflected in the said sketch
plan attached to the records;
c. That the partition among the six illegitimate children of the late Juan C.
Sanchez (petitioners and intervenors) shall be effective among themselves in
such a manner to be agreed upon by them, each undertaking to assume
redemption of whatever plants found in their respective shares which need
redemption from the tenants thereof as well as the continuity of the tenancy
agreements now existing and covering the said shares or areas.
d. The subdivision survey shall be at the expense of the said petitioners and
intervenors prorata.
e. That the administratrix agrees to deliver temporary administration of the
area designated as Lot 5 of the Valles Sketch Plan pending final survey of
the said 36-hectare area.
Assisted by:
(Sgd.)
TEOGENES VELEZ, Jr.
Counsel for Petitioners
(Sgd.)
ROSALIA S. LUGOD
Administratrix
Assisted by:
(Sgd.)
PABLO S. REYES\
Counsel for Administratrix
(Sgd.)
MARIA RABOSO SANCHEZ
Intervenor 52
Not only did the parties knowingly enter into a valid compromise agreement;
they even amended it when they realized some errors in the original. Such
correction emphasizes the voluntariness of said deed.
It is also significant that all the parties, including the then minors, had
already consummated and availed themselves of the benefits of their
compromise. 53 This Court has consistently ruled that "a party to a
compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it has enjoyed its
benefits." 54 By their acts, the parties are ineludibly estopped from
questioning the validity of their compromise agreement. Bolstering this
conclusion is the fact that petitioners questioned the compromise only nine
years after its execution, when they filed with the trial court their Motion to
Defer Approval of Compromise Agreement, dated October 26, 1979. 55 In
hindsight, it is not at all farfetched that petitioners filed said motion for the
sole reason that they may have felt shortchanged in their compromise
agreement or partition with private respondents, which in their view was
unwise and unfair. While we may sympathize with this rueful sentiment of
petitioners, we can only stress that this alone is not sufficient to nullify or
disregard the legal effects of said compromise which, by its very nature as a

Assignment No. 1 – Succession Page 57 of 74

perfected contract, is binding on the parties. Moreover, courts have no
jurisdiction to look into the wisdom of a compromise or to render a decision
different therefrom. 56 It is a well-entrenched doctrine that "the law does not
relieve a party from the effects of an unwise, foolish, or disastrous contract,
entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what
he was doing" 57 and "a compromise entered into and carried out in good
faith will not be discarded even if there was a mistake of law or fact,
(McCarthy vs. Barber Steamship Lines, 45 Phil. 488) because courts have no
power to relieve parties from obligations voluntarily assumed, simply because
their contracts turned out to be disastrous deals or unwise
investments." 58 Volenti non fit injuria.
(Herein petitioners) also retained a house and lot, a residential lot and a
parcel of agricultural land (Annexes "I", "J" and "K", Ibid.) all of which were
not considered in the compromise agreement between the parties. Moreover,
in the compromise agreement  per se, it is undoubtedly stated therein that
cash advances in the aggregate sum of P8,533.94 were received by (herein
petitioners) after October 21, 1968 (Compromise Agreement, par. 5) 62
All the foregoing show clearly that the probate court had essentially finished
said intestate proceedings which, consequently, should be deemed closed
and terminated. In view of the above discussion, the Court sees no reversible
error on the part of the Court of Appeals.

Corollarily, the petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely abused Third Issue: Fraud and Collation
its discretion in deeming Special Proceedings Nos. 44-M and 1022 "CLOSED
Petitioners fault Respondent Court for not ordering Private Respondent
and TERMINATED," arguing that there was as yet no order of distribution of
Rosalia T. Lugod to deliver to them the deficiency as allegedly provided
the estate pursuant to Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. They add that they had
under the compromise agreement. They further contend that said court erred
not received their full share thereto. 59 We disagree. Under Section 1, Rule 90
in not directing the provisional inclusion of the alleged deficiency in the
of the Rules of Court, an order for the distribution of the estate may be made
inventory for purposes of collating the properties subject of the questioned
when the "debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the
deeds of sale. 63 We see no such error. In the trial court, there was only one
allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any," had been paid. This
hearing conducted, and it was held only for the reception of the evidence of
order for the distribution of the estate's residue must contain the names and
Rosalia S. Lugod to install her as administratrix of the estate of Maria
shares of the persons entitled thereto. A perusal of the whole record,
Villafranca. There was no other evidence, whether testimonial or otherwise,
particularly the trial court's conclusion, 60 reveals that all the foregoing
"received, formally offered to, and subsequently admitted by the probate
requirements already concurred in this case. The payment of the
court below"; nor was there "a trial on the merits of the parries' conflicting
indebtedness of the estates of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca in the
claims." 64 In fact, the petitioners "moved for the deferment of the
amount of P51,598.93 was shouldered by Private Respondent Rosalia, who
compromise agreement on the basis of alleged fraudulent concealment of
also absorbed or charged against her share the advances of Rolando T.
properties — NOT because of any deficiency in the land conveyed to them
Lugod in the sum of P8,533.94, in compliance with Article 1061 of the Civil
under the agreements." 65 Hence, there is no hard evidence on record to
Code on collation. 61 Furthermore, the compromise of the parties, which is the
back up petitioners' claims.
law between them, already contains the names and shares of the heirs to the
residual estate, which shares had also been delivered. On this point, we In any case, the trial court noted Private Respondent Rosalia's willingness to
agree with the following discussion of the Court of Appeals: reimburse any deficiency actually proven to exist. It subsequently ordered the
geodetic engineer who prepared the certification and the sketch of the lot in
But what the (trial court) obviously overlooked in its appreciation of the facts
question, and who could have provided evidence for the petitioners, "to bring
of this case are the uncontroverted facts that (herein petitioners) have been
records of his relocation survey." 66 However, Geodetic Engineer Idulsa did
in possession and ownership of their respective distributive shares as early
not comply with the court's subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum.
as October 30, 1969 and they have received other properties in addition to
Neither did he furnish the required relocation survey. 67 No wonder, even
their distributive shares in consideration of the compromise agreement which
after a thorough scrutiny of the records, this Court cannot find any evidence
they now assail. Proofs thereof are Tax Declarations No. 20984, 20985,
to support petitioners' allegations of fraud against Private Respondent
20986, 20987, 20988, 20989 and 20990 (Annexes "B" to "H", Supplemental
Rosalia.
Reply) in the respective names of (herein petitioners), all for the year 1972.

Assignment No. 1 – Succession Page 58 of 74

Similarly, petitioners' allegations of fraud in the execution of the questioned
deeds of sale are bereft of substance, in view of the palpable absence of
evidence to support them. The legal presumption of validity of the questioned
deeds of absolute sale, being duly notarized public documents, has not been
overcome. 68 On the other hand, fraud is not presumed. It must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence, and not by mere conjectures or speculations.
We stress that these deeds of sale did not involve gratuitous transfers of
future inheritance; these were contracts of sale perfected by the decedents
during their lifetime. 69 Hence, the properties conveyed thereby are not
collationable because, essentially, collation mandated under Article 1061 of
the Civil Code contemplates properties conveyed inter vivos by the decedent
to an heir by way of donation or other gratuitous title.

In any event, these alleged errors and deficiencies regarding the delivery of
shares provided in the compromise, concealment of properties and fraud in
the deeds of sale are factual in nature which, as a rule, are not reviewable by
this Court in petitions under Rule 45. 70 Petitioners have failed to convince us
that this case constitutes an exception to such rule. All in all, we find that the
Court of Appeals has sufficiently addressed the issues raised by them.
Indeed, they have not persuaded us that said Court committed any reversible
error to warrant a grant of their petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of

the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Assignment No. 1 – Succession Page 59 of 74

[11] G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL
RIGOR. THE PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF
VICTORIA, TARLAC, petitioner-appellant,  vs. BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA
RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and JOVITA ESCOBAR DE
FAUSTO, respondents-appellees.
Settlement of Estate; Will of Testator is the first and principal law in the matter of
Testaments.—The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments. When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation
must be in accord when it may certainly appear that his intention was different from
that literally expressed (In reEstate of Caldero, 26 Phil. 237-8).
Same; Same.—One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that
“the testator’s intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking into
consideration the circumstances as this intention” (Art. 789, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
Same; A bequest of land to the nearest male relative of the grantor who would study
for the priesthood construed to mean the grantor’s nearest male relative living at the
time of his death and not any indefinite time thereafter.—We hold that the said
bequest refers to the testator’s nearest male relative living at the time of his deathand
not to any indefinite time thereafter. “In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir,
devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case
of representation, when it is proper.” The said testamentary provisions should be
sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe them as referring to the testator’s
nearest male relative at any time after his death would render the provisions difficult
to apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could not have
been his intention.
Same; Same.—In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest legal heirs were his three
sisters or second-degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs.Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao.
Obviously, when the testator specified his nearest male relative, he must have had in
mind his nephew or a son of his sister, who would be his third-degree relative, or
possibly a grandnephew. But since he could not prognosticate the exact date of his
death or state with certitude what category of nearest male relative would be living at
the time of his death, he could not specify that his nearest male relative would be his
nephew or grandnephew (the son of his nephew or niece) and so he had to use the
term “nearest male relative.”
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
Same; Evidence; Evidence aliunde has no probative value.—Of course, Mrs.
Gamalinda’s affidavit, which is tantamount to evidence aliunde as to the testator’s
intention and which is hearsay, has no probative value. Our opinion that the said
bequest refers to the testator’s nephew who was living at the time of his death, when
his succession was opened and the successional rights to his estate became vested,
rests on a judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of the will.
Same; As the testator was not survived by a nephew who became a priest the bequest
became inoperative and the administration of the ricelands of the parish priest of
Victoria, Tarlac also became inoperative.—Inasmuch as the testator was not
survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the
bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of
the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the will, was likewise
inoperative.
Same; Where the parish priest of Victoria, Tarlac, could, under the bequest, become
a trustee only when any of the testator’s nephews living at the time of his death had
not yet entered the seminary or being a priest was excommunicated, and these
contingencies never arose, said parish priest cannot be deemed a substitute devisee.
—The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the
testator in his favor assumes that he was a trustee or substitute devisee. That
contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions regarding the
disputed bequest does not support the view that the parish priest of Victoria was a
trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator was not survived by a
nephew who became a priest. It should be underscored that the parish priest of
Victoria could become a trustee only when the testator’s nephew living at the time of
his death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or,
having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two contingencies did
not arise, and could not have arisen, in this case because no nephew of the testator
manifest any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.
Same; Where a bequest is inoperative the same shall be merged, as a rule, to the
testator’s estate.—The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by
article 888 of the Old Civil Code, now Article 956, which provides that if “the
bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate,
except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists.” (el
legado x x x por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto, se refundira en la masa de la
herencia, fuera, de los cases de sustitucion y derecho de acrecer”).
Same; A person may die partly testate and partly intestate.—The Civil Code
recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there may
Page 60 of 74
be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator’s will is no
longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate
succession as to the property covered by the said legacy (Macrahon Ong Ham vs.
Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267)
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of
ricelands located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty-
four hectares That devise was made in the will of the late Father Pascual
Rigor, a native of Victoria Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative who
would study for the priesthood.
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands,
appealed to this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
order of the probate court declaring that the said devise was inoperative
(Rigor vs. Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, CA-
G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan,
died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which
was probated by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December
5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the testators nearest relatives,
namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto
and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin,
Fortunato Gamalinda.
In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest
(paragraphing supplied to facilitate comprehension of the testamentary
provisions):
Doy y dejo como legado CUATRO (4) PARCELAS de terreno palayeros
situados en el municipiooo de Guimba de la provinciaaa de NUEVA ECIJA,
cuyo num. de CERTIFICADO DE TRANSFERENCIA DE TITULO SON; —
Titulo Num. 6530, mide 16,249 m. cuadrados de superficie Titulo Num. 6548,
mide 242,998 m. cuadrados de superficie y annual 6525, mide 62,665 m.
cuadrados de superficie; y Titulo Num. 6521, mide 119,251 m. cuadrados de
superficie; a cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie la
carrera eclesiatica hasta ordenarse de Presbiterado o sea Sacerdote; las
condiciones de estate legado son;
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
(1.a) Prohibe en absoluto la venta de estos terrenos arriba situados objectos
de este legado;
(2.a) Que el legatario pariente mio mas cercano tendra derecho de empezar
a gozar y administrar de este legado al principiar a curzar la Sagrada
Teologio, y ordenado de Sacerdote, hasta su muerte; pero que pierde el
legatario este derecho de administrar y gozar de este legado al dejar de
continuar sus estudios para ordenarse de Presbiterado (Sacerdote).
Que el legatario una vez Sacerdote ya estara obligado a celebrar cada año
VEINTE (20) Misas rezadas en sufragio de mi alma y de mis padres difuntos,
y si el actual legatario, quedase excomulgado, IPSO FACTO se le despoja
este legado, y la administracion de esto pasara a cargo del actual Parroco y
sus sucesores de la Iglecia Catolica de Victoria, Tarlac.
Y en intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado segun lo
arriba queda expresado, pasara la administracion de este legado a cargo del
actual Parroco Catolico y sus sucesores, de Victoria, Tarlac.
El Parroco administrador de estate legado, acumulara, anualmente todos los
productos que puede tener estate legado, ganando o sacando de los
productos anuales el CINCO (5) por ciento para su administracion, y los
derechos correspondientes de las VEINTE (20) Misas rezadas que debiera
el Parroco celebrar cada año, depositando todo lo restante de los productos
de estate legado, en un banco, a nombre de estate legado.
To implement the foregoing bequest, the administratix in 1940 submitted a
project containing the following item:
5. LEGACY OF THE CHURCH
That it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to be given to the
nearest male relative who shall take the priesthood, and in the interim to be
administered by the actual Catholic Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of
Victoria, Tarlac, Philippines, or his successors, the real properties
hereinbelow indicated, to wit:
Title No. Lot No. Area in Has. Tax Dec. Ass.
Value
T-6530 3663 1.6249 18740 P 340.00
Page 61 of 74
 ricelands to the testator's legal heirs in his order of June 28, 1957. The parish
T-6548 3445-C 24.2998 18730 7,290.00
priest filed two motions for reconsideration.

T-6525 3670 6.2665 18736 1,880.00 Judge De Aquino granted the respond motion for reconsideration in his order
of December 10, 1957 on the ground that the testator had a grandnephew
named Edgardo G. Cunanan (the grandson of his first cousin) who was a
T-6521 3666 11.9251 18733 3,580.00
seminarian in the San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in Quezon City.
The administrator was directed to deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of
Total amount and value — 44.1163 P13,090.00
Victoria as trustee.
Judge Roman A. Cruz in his order of August 15, 1940, approving the project
The legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed that order. It
of partition, directed that after payment of the obligations of the estate
held that Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for his nearest male
(including the sum of P3,132.26 due to the church of the Victoria parish) the
relative who would take the holy orders but that such trust could exist only for
administratrix should deliver to the devisees their respective shares.
twenty years because to enforce it beyond that period would violate "the rule
It may be noted that the administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to against perpetuities. It ruled that since no legatee claimed the ricelands
analyze the meaning and implications of Father Rigor's bequest to his within twenty years after the testator's death, the same should pass to his
nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood. Inasmuch as no legal heirs, citing articles 888 and 912(2) of the old Civil Code and article 870
nephew of the testator claimed the devise and as the administratrix and the of the new Civil Code.
legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer
The parish priest in this appeal contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
the ricelands, the same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic. The testate
not finding that the testator created a public charitable trust and in not
proceeding remained pending.
liberally construing the testamentary provisions so as to render the trust
About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on operative and to prevent intestacy.
February 19, 1954, the parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate
As refutation, the legal heirs argue that the Court of Appeals d the bequest
proceeding a petition praying for the appointment of a new administrator
inoperative because no one among the testator's nearest male relatives had
(succeeding the deceased administration Florencia Rigor), who should
studied for the priesthood and not because the trust was a private charitable
deliver to the church the said ricelands, and further praying that the
trust. According to the legal heirs, that factual finding is binding on this Court.
possessors thereof be ordered to render an accounting of the fruits. The
They point out that appellant priest's change of theory cannot be
probate court granted the petition. A new administrator was appointed. On
countenanced in this appeal .
January 31, 1957 the parish priest filed another petition for the delivery of the
ricelands to the church as trustee. In this case, as in cases involving the law of contracts and statutory
construction, where the intention of the contracting parties or of the
The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated March 25,
lawmaking body is to be ascertained, the primary issue is the determination
1957 praying that the bequest be d inoperative and that they be adjudged as
of the testator's intention which is the law of the case (dicat testor et erit lex.
the persons entitled to the said ricelands since, as admitted by the parish
Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 215; Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-
priest of Victoria, "no nearest male relative of" the testator "has ever studied
28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546).
for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal). That petition was
opposed by the parish priest of Victoria. The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments. When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any
Finding that petition to be meritorious, the lower court, through Judge
interpretation must be in accord with the plain and literal meaning of his
Bernabe de Aquino, declared the bequest inoperative and adjudicated the

Assignment No. 1 – Succession Page 62 of 74

words, except when it may certainly appear that his intention was different
from that literally expressed (In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil. 333).
The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills." It is
"the life and soul of a will It is "the first greatest rule, the sovereign guide, the
polestar, in giving effect to a will". (See Dissent of Justice Moreland in Santos
vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 223, 237-8.)
One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that "the
testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the wilt taking into
consideration the circumstances under which it was made", but excluding the
testator's oral declarations as to his intention (Art. 789, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
To ascertain Father Rigor's intention, it may be useful to make the following
re-statement of the provisions of his will.
1. that he bequeathed the ricelands to anyone of his nearest male relatives
who would pursue an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as a priest.
2. That the devisee could not sell the ricelands.
3. That the devisee at the inception of his studies in sacred theology could
enjoy and administer the ricelands, and once ordained as a priest, he could
continue enjoying and administering the same up to the time of his death but
the devisee would cease to enjoy and administer the ricelands if he
discontinued his studies for the priesthood.
4. That if the devisee became a priest, he would be obligated to celebrate
every year twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of Father
Rigor and his parents.
5. That if the devisee is excommunicated, he would be divested of the legacy
and the administration of the riceland would pass to the incumbent parish
priest of Victoria and his successors.
6. That during the interval of time that there is no qualified devisee as
contemplated above, the administration of the ricelands would be under the
responsibility of the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his successors,
and
7. That the parish priest-administrator of the ricelands would accumulate
annually the products thereof, obtaining or getting from the annual produce
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
five percent thereof for his administration and the fees corresponding to the
twenty masses with prayers that the parish priest would celebrate for each
year, depositing the balance of the income of the devise in the bank in the
name of his bequest.
From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the
testator intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who
would become a priest, who was forbidden to sell the ricelands, who would
lose the devise if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or having
been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated, and who would be
obligated to say annually twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the
souls of the testator and his parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would
administer the ricelands only in two situations: one, during the interval of time
that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood
and two, in case the testator's nephew became a priest and he was
excommunicated.
What is not clear is the duration of "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya
legatario acondicionado", or how long after the testator's death would it be
determined that he had a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical
vocation. It is that patent ambiguity that has brought about the controversy
between the parish priest of Victoria and the testator's legal heirs.
Interwoven with that equivocal provision is the time when the nearest male
relative who would study for the priesthood should be determined.  Did the
testator contemplate only his nearest male relative at the time of his
death? Or did he have in mind any of his nearest male relatives at anytime
after his death?
We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male
relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter.
"In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be
living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation,
when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably
construed. To construe them as referring to the testator's nearest male
relative at anytime after his death would render the provisions difficult to
apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could not
have been his intention.
Page 63 of 74
In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest leagal heirs were his three
sisters or second-degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs.
Quiambao. Obviously, when the testator specified his nearest male relative,
he must have had in mind his nephew or a son of his sister, who would be his
third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But since he could not
prognosticate the exact date of his death or state with certitude what
category of nearest male relative would be living at the time of his death, he
could not specify that his nearest male relative would be his nephew or
grandnephews (the son of his nephew or niece) and so he had to use the
term "nearest male relative".
It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended
for Ramon Quiambao, the testator's nephew and godchild, who was the son
of his sister, Mrs. Quiambao. To prove that contention, the legal heirs
presented in the lower court the affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the maternal
grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who deposed that after Father Rigor's
death her own son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the devise,
although he was studying for the priesthood at the San Carlos Seminary,
because she (Beatriz) knew that Father Rigor had intended that devise for
his nearest male relative beloning to the Rigor family (pp. 105-114, Record
on Appeal).
Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G.
Cunanan, was not the one contemplated in Father Rigor's will and that
Edgardo's father told her that he was not consulted by the parish priest of
Victoria before the latter filed his second motion for reconsideration which
was based on the ground that the testator's grandnephew, Edgardo, was
studying for the priesthood at the San Jose Seminary.
Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be
a seminarian in 1961. For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of
Appeals that the probate court's order adjudicating the ricelands to the parish
priest of Victoria had no more leg to stand on (p. 84, Appellant's brief).
Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is tantamount to
evidence aliunde as to the testator's intention and which is hearsay, has no
probative value. Our opinion that the said bequest refers to the testator's
nephew who was living at the time of his death, when his succession was
opened and the successional rights to his estate became vested, rests on a
judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of the will.
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano
que estudie la camera eclesiatica" would include indefinitely anyone of his
nearest male relatives born after his death, he could have so specified in his
will He must have known that such a broad provision would suspend for an
unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his bequest.
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya
legatario acondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he was referring to a
situation whereby his nephew living at the time of his death, who would like to
become a priest, was still in grade school or in high school or was not yet in
the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the
ricelands before the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the
testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy
and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the
trusteeship would be terminated.
Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the
time Father Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the
priesthood or who had manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical
career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant
priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He
unequivocally alleged therein that "not male relative of the late (Father)
Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on
Appeal).
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a
priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was
ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by
the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.
The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by
the testator in is favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee
That contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions
regarding the disputed bequest not support the view that the parish priest of
Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator
was not survived by a nephew who became a priest.
It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a
trustee only when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who
desired to become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been
ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not
arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the
Page 64 of 74
testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a
priest.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888
of the old Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for
any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except
in cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists" ("el
legado ... por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto se refundira en la masa de la
herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y derecho de acrecer").

This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article
960 (2), which provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does
not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution
nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be distributed among
the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no
disposition as to the said ricelands.

The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly
intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the
indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional
legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the
property recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51
Phil. 267).

We find no merit in the appeal The Appellate Court's decision is affirmed.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED

Assignment No. 1 – Succession Page 65 of 74

[12] G.R. No. 118114 December 7, 1995
TEODORO ACAP, petitioner,  vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDY DE LOS
REYES, respondents.
Property; Ownership; An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a
thing arising from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give
rise to ownership over the res—that right or title must be completed by fulfilling
certain conditions imposed by law; While title is the juridical justification, mode is
the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question.—
In the first place, an asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing
arising from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise to
ownership over the res. That right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain
conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real rights are acquired only
pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is
the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question.
Same; Same; Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership
are generally classified into two (2) classes, namely, the original mode and the
derivative mode.— Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring
ownership are generally classified into two (2) classes, namely, the original mode
(i.e., through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual creation) and
the derivative mode (i.e., through succession mortis causa or tradition as a result of
certain contracts, such as sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum).
Same; Same; Sales; Succession; “Contract of Sale” and “Declara-tion of Heirship
and Waiver of Rights,” Distinguished.—In the case at bench, the trial court was
obviously confused as to the nature and effect of the Declaration of Heirship and
Waiver of Rights, equating the same with a contract (deed) of sale. They are not the
same. In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to
transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other party to
pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. Upon the other hand, a declaration of
heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public instrument when filed with the
Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by
the decedent among themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial
settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary
rights and a waiver of hereditary rights; A stranger to succession cannot
conclusively claim ownership over a lot on the sole basis of a waiver document
which does not recite the elements of either a sale, or a donation, or any other
derivative mode of acquiring ownership.—Hence, there is a marked difference
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The first
presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. The second
is, technically speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership where there is an
abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its
existence and intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in
the succession. Private respondent, being then a stranger to the succession of Cosme
Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the sole basis of
the waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a sale, or a
donation, or any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership.
Same; Same; Land Titles; Adverse Claims; Words and Phrases; A notice of adverse
claim is nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the registered owner, the validity
of which is yet to be established in court at some future date.—A notice of adverse
claim, by its nature, does not however prove private respondent’s ownership over the
tenanted lot. “A notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to
the registered owner, the validity of which is yet to be established in court at some
future date, and is no better than a notice of lis pendens which is a notice of a case
already pending in court.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where a person’s right or interest in a lot in question
remains an adverse claim, the same cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel the OCT
to the land.—It is to be noted that while the existence of said adverse claim was duly
proven, there is no evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed between
Cosme Pido’s heirs and private respondent transferring the rights of Pido’s heirs to
the land in favor of private respondent. Private respondent’s right or interest
therefore in the tenanted lot remains an adverse claim which cannot by itself be
sufficient to cancel the OCT to the land and title the same in private respondent’s
name.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals, 2nd Division, in CA-G.R. No. 36177, which affirmed the decision 2 of
the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental holding that
private respondent Edy de los Reyes had acquired ownership of Lot No.
1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental based on a
document entitled "Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights", and
ordering the dispossession of petitioner as leasehold tenant of the land for
failure to pay rentals.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Page 66 of 74
The title to Lot No. 1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental was evidenced by OCT No. R-12179. The lot has an area of
13,720 sq. meters. The title was issued and is registered in the name of
spouses Santiago Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma. After both spouses died,
their only son Felixberto inherited the lot. In 1975, Felixberto executed a duly
notarized document entitled "Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute
Sale" in favor of Cosme Pido.
The evidence before the court a quo established that since 1960, petitioner
Teodoro Acap had been the tenant of a portion of the said land, covering an
area of nine thousand five hundred (9,500) meters. When ownership was
transferred in 1975 by Felixberto to Cosme Pido, Acap continued to be the
registered tenant thereof and religiously paid his leasehold rentals to Pido
and thereafter, upon Pido's death, to his widow Laurenciana.
The controversy began when Pido died intestate and on 27 November 1981,
his surviving heirs executed a notarized document denominated as
"Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights of Lot No. 1130 Hinigaran
Cadastre," wherein they declared; to quote its pertinent portions, that:
. . . Cosme Pido died in the Municipality of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, he
died intestate and without any known debts and obligations which the said
parcel of land is (sic) held liable.
That Cosme Pido was survived by his/her legitimate heirs, namely:
LAURENCIANA PIDO, wife, ELY, ERVIN, ELMER, and ELECHOR all
surnamed PIDO; children;
That invoking the provision of Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the
above-mentioned heirs do hereby declare unto [sic] ourselves the only heirs
of the late Cosme Pido and that we hereby adjudicate unto ourselves the
above-mentioned parcel of land in equal shares.
Now, therefore, We LAURENCIANA3 , ELY, ELMER, ERVIN and ELECHOR
all surnamed PIDO, do hereby waive, quitclaim all our rights, interests and
participation over the said parcel of land in favor of EDY DE LOS REYES, of
legal age, (f)ilipino, married to VIRGINIA DE LOS REYES, and resident of
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, Philippines. . . .4 (Emphasis supplied)
The document was signed by all of Pido's heirs. Private respondent Edy de
los Reyes did not sign said document.
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
It will be noted that at the time of Cosme Pido's death, title to the property
continued to be registered in the name of the Vasquez spouses. Upon
obtaining the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of Rights in his favor,
private respondent Edy de los Reyes filed the same with the Registry of
Deeds as part of a notice of an adverse claimagainst the original certificate of
title.
Thereafter, private respondent sought for petitioner (Acap) to personally
inform him that he (Edy) had become the new owner of the land and that the
lease rentals thereon should be paid to him. Private respondent further
alleged that he and petitioner entered into an oral lease agreement wherein
petitioner agreed to pay ten (10) cavans of palay  per annum as lease rental.
In 1982, petitioner allegedly complied with said obligation. In 1983, however,
petitioner refused to pay any further lease rentals on the land, prompting
private respondent to seek the assistance of the then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform (MAR) in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. The MAR invited petitioner
to a conference scheduled on 13 October 1983. Petitioner did not attend the
conference but sent his wife instead to the conference. During the meeting,
an officer of the Ministry informed Acap's wife about private respondent's
ownership of the said land but she stated that she and her husband
(Teodoro) did not recognize private respondent's claim of ownership over the
land.
On 28 April 1988, after the lapse of four (4) years, private respondent filed a
complaint for recovery of possession and damages against petitioner,
alleging in the main that as his leasehold tenant, petitioner refused and failed
to pay the agreed annual rental of ten (10) cavans of palay despite repeated
demands.
During the trial before the court a quo, petitioner reiterated his refusal to
recognize private respondent's ownership over the subject land. He averred
that he continues to recognize Cosme Pido as the owner of the said land,
and having been a registered tenant therein since 1960, he never reneged
on his rental obligations. When Pido died, he continued to pay rentals to
Pido's widow. When the latter left for abroad, she instructed him to stay in the
landholding and to pay the accumulated rentals upon her demand or return
from abroad.
Petitioner further claimed before the trial court that he had no knowledge
about any transfer or sale of the lot to private respondent in 1981 and even
the following year after Laurenciana's departure for abroad. He denied
having entered into a verbal lease tenancy contract with private respondent
Page 67 of 74
and that assuming that the said lot was indeed sold to private respondent
without his knowledge, R.A. 3844, as amended, grants him the right to
redeem the same at a reasonable price. Petitioner also bewailed private
respondent's ejectment action as a violation of his right to security of tenure
under P.D. 27.
On 20 August 1991, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of private
respondent, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment in favor of
the plaintiff, Edy de los Reyes, and against the defendant, Teodoro Acap,
ordering the following, to wit:
1. Declaring forfeiture of defendant's preferred right to issuance of a
Certificate of Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27 and his
farmholdings;
2. Ordering the defendant Teodoro Acap to deliver possession of said farm to
plaintiff, and;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, the sum of
P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation and the amount of P10,000.00 as actual
damages.5
In arriving at the above-mentioned judgment, the trial court stated that the
evidence had established that the subject land was "sold" by the heirs of
Cosme Pido to private respondent. This is clear from the following
disquisitions contained in the trial court's six (6) page decision:
There is no doubt that defendant is a registered tenant of Cosme Pido.
However, when the latter died their tenancy relations changed since
ownership of said land was passed on to his heirs who, by executing a Deed
of Sale, which defendant admitted in his affidavit, likewise passed on their
ownership of Lot 1130 to herein plaintiff (private respondent). As owner
hereof, plaintiff has the right to demand payment of rental and the tenant is
obligated to pay rentals due from the time demand is made. . . . 6
xxx xxx xxx
Certainly, the sale  of the Pido family of Lot 1130 to herein plaintiff does not of
itself extinguish the relationship. There was only a change of the personality
of the lessor in the person of herein plaintiff Edy de los Reyes who being the
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
purchaser or transferee, assumes the rights and obligations of the former
landowner to the tenant Teodoro Acap, herein defendant. 7
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, imputing error to the
lower court when it ruled that private respondent acquired ownership of Lot
No. 1130 and that he, as tenant, should pay rentals to private respondent
and that failing to pay the same from 1983 to 1987, his right to a certificate of
land transfer under P.D. 27 was deemed forfeited.
The Court of Appeals brushed aside petitioner's argument that the
Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights (Exhibit "D"), the document
relied upon by private respondent to prove his ownership to the lot, was
excluded by the lower court in its order dated 27 August 1990. The order
indeed noted that the document was not identified by Cosme Pido's heirs and
was not registered with the Registry of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
According to respondent court, however, since the Declaration of Heirship
and Waiver of Rights appears to have been duly notarized, no further proof of
its due execution was necessary. Like the trial court, respondent court was
also convinced that the said document stands as prima facie proof of
appellee's (private respondent's) ownership of the land in dispute.
With respect to its non-registration, respondent court noted that petitioner
had actual knowledge of the subject saleof the land in dispute to private
respondent because as early as 1983, he (petitioner) already knew of private
respondent's claim over the said land but which he thereafter denied, and
that in 1982, he (petitioner) actually paid rent to private respondent.
Otherwise stated, respondent court considered this fact of rental payment in
1982 as estoppel on petitioner's part to thereafter refute private respondent's
claim of ownership over the said land. Under these circumstances,
respondent court ruled that indeed there was deliberate refusal by petitioner
to pay rent for a continued period of five years that merited forfeiture of his
otherwise preferred right to the issuance of a certificate of land transfer.
In the present petition, petitioner impugns the decision of the Court of
Appeals as not in accord with the law and evidence when it rules that private
respondent acquired ownership of Lot No. 1130 through the aforementioned
Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights.
Hence, the issues to be resolved presently are the following:
Page 68 of 74
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP AND
WAIVER OF RIGHTS IS A RECOGNIZED MODE OF ACQUIRING
OWNERSHIP BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT OVER THE LOT IN QUESTION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE SAID DOCUMENT CAN BE CONSIDERED A
DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT OF THE LOT IN
QUESTION.
Petitioner argues that the Regional Trial Court, in its order dated 7 August
1990, explicitly excluded the document marked as Exhibit "D" (Declaration of
Heirship, etc.) as private respondent's evidence because it was not
registered with the Registry of Deeds and was not identified by anyone of the
heirs of Cosme Pido. The Court of Appeals, however, held the same to be
admissible, it being a notarized document, hence, a prima facie proof of
private respondents' ownership of the lot to which it refers.
Petitioner points out that the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights is
not one of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership under Article 712 of
the Civil Code. Neither can the same be considered a deed of sale so as to
transfer ownership of the land to private respondent because no
consideration is stated in the contract (assuming it is a contract or deed of
sale).
Private respondent defends the decision of respondent Court of Appeals as
in accord with the evidence and the law. He posits that while it may indeed
be true that the trial court excluded his Exhibit "D" which is the Declaration of
Heirship and Waiver of Rights as part of his evidence, the trial court declared
him nonetheless owner of the subject lot based on other evidence adduced
during the trial, namely, the notice of adverse claim (Exhibit "E") duly
registered by him with the Registry of Deeds, which contains the questioned
Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights as an integral part thereof.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
In the first place, an asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a
thing arising from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to
give rise to ownership over the res. That right or title must be completed by
fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real rights
are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is the
juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of
ownership over a thing in question.8
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are
generally classified into two (2) classes, namely, the original mode (i.e.,
through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual creation) and
the derivative mode  (i.e., through succession mortis causa  or tradition as a
result of certain contracts, such as sale, barter, donation, assignment or
mutuum).
In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously confused as to the nature
and effect of the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights, equating the
same with a contract (deed) of sale. They are not the same.
In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to
transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other
party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. 9
Upon the other hand, a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates
as a public instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the
intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among
themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between
the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.10
Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and
a waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes the existence of a contract
or deed of sale between the parties. 11 The second is, technically speaking, a
mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional
relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and intention
to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the
succession.12 Private respondent, being then a stranger to the succession of
Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the
sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of
either a sale,13 or a donation,14 or any other derivative mode of acquiring
ownership.
Quite surprisingly, both the trial court and public respondent Court of Appeals
concluded that a "sale" transpired between Cosme Pido's heirs and private
respondent and that petitioner acquired actual knowledge of said sale when
he was summoned by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to discuss private
respondent's claim over the lot in question. This conclusion has no basis both
in fact and in law.
On record, Exhibit "D", which is the "Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of
Rights" was excluded by the trial court in its order dated 27 August
Page 69 of 74
1990 because the document was neither registered with the Registry of
Deeds nor identified by the heirs of Cosme Pido. There is no showing that
private respondent had the same document attached to or made part of the
record. What the trial court admitted was Annex "E", a notice of adverse
claim filed with the Registry of Deeds which contained the Declaration of
Heirship with Waiver of rights and was annotated at the back of the Original
Certificate of Title to the land in question.
A notice of adverse claim, by its nature, does not however prove private
respondent's ownership over the tenanted lot. "A notice of adverse claim is
nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the registered owner, the validity of
which is yet to be established in court at some future date, and is no better
than a notice of lis pendens which is a notice of a case already pending in
court."15
It is to be noted that while the existence of said adverse claim was duly
proven, there is no evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed
between Cosme Pido's heirs and private respondent transferring the rights of
Pido's heirs to the land in favor of private respondent. Private respondent's
right or interest therefore in the tenanted lot remains an adverse claim which
cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel the OCT to the land and title the same
in private respondent's name.
Consequently, while the transaction between Pido's heirs and private
respondent may be binding on both parties, the right of petitioner as a
registered tenant to the land cannot be perfunctorily forfeited on a mere
allegation of private respondent's ownership without the corresponding proof
thereof.
Petitioner had been a registered tenant in the subject land since 1960 and
religiously paid lease rentals thereon. In his mind, he continued to be the
registered tenant of Cosme Pido and his family (after Pido's death), even if in
1982, private respondent allegedly informed petitioner that he had become
the new owner of the land.
Under the circumstances, petitioner may have, in good faith, assumed such
statement of private respondent to be true and may have in fact delivered 10
cavans of palay as annual rental for 1982 to private respondent. But in 1983,
it is clear that petitioner had misgivings over private respondent's claim of
ownership over the said land because in the October 1983 MAR conference,
his wife Laurenciana categorically denied all of private respondent's
allegations. In fact, petitioner even secured a certificate from the MAR dated
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
9 May 1988 to the effect that he continued to be the registered tenant of
Cosme Pido and not of private respondent. The reason is that private
respondent never registered the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of
Rights with the Registry of Deeds or with the MAR. Instead, he (private
respondent) sought to do indirectly what could not be done directly, i.e., file
a notice of adverse claim on the said lot to establish ownership thereover.
It stands to reason, therefore, to hold that there was no unjustified or
deliberate refusal  by petitioner to pay the lease rentals or amortizations to
the landowner/agricultural lessor which, in this case, private respondent
failed to establish in his favor by clear and convincing evidence. 16
Consequently, the sanction of forfeiture of his preferred right to be issued a
Certificate of Land Transfer under P.D. 27 and to the possession of his
farmholdings should not be applied against petitioners, since private
respondent has not established a cause of action for recovery of possession
against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition
and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 1 May 1994 which affirmed
the decision of the RTC of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental dated 20 August
1991 is hereby SET ASIDE. The private respondent's complaint for recovery
of possession and damages against petitioner Acap is hereby DISMISSED
for failure to properly state a cause of action, without prejudice to private
respondent taking the proper legal steps to establish the legal mode by which
he claims to have acquired ownership of the land in question.
SO ORDERED.
Page 70 of 74
[13] G.R. No. 116018 November 13, 1996
NELIA A. CONSTANTINO, petitioner,  vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA
S. ROQUE, PRISCILLA S. LUNA and JOSEFINA S.
AUSTRIA, respondents.
Pleadings and Practice; Offer of Evidence; Speedy Disposition of Cases; A party is
deemed to have waived the right to formally offer his evidence where a considerable
lapse of time, about three (3) months, had already lapsed before his counsel made
effort to formally offer his evidence.—The trial court was correct in holding that
petitioner waived the right to formally offer his evidence. A considerable lapse of
time, about three (3) months, had already passed before petitioner’s counsel made
effort to formally offer his evidence. For the trial court to grant petitioner’s motion to
admit her exhibits would be to condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance
with a court order which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and derail the
speedy administration of justice.
Contracts; Notarial Law; The extrinsic validity of a document is not affected by the
fact that it was notarized in a place other than where the subject matter thereof is
located—what is more important under the Notarial Law is that the notary public has
authority to acknowledge the document executed within his territorial jurisdiction.—
We ruled in the Sales case that the extrinsic validity of a document was not affected
by the fact that it was notarized in a place other than where the subject matter thereof
was located. What is more important under the Notarial Law is that the notary public
has authority to acknowledge the document executed within his territorial
jurisdiction. The ruling in Sales is not applicable to the present case. Our concern
here is not whether the notary public had the authority to acknowledge the document
executed within his territorial jurisdiction but whether respondents indeed appeared
before him and signed the deed. However, the quantum of evidence shows that they
did not.
Same; Same; The fact that the deed was notarized in Manila when it could have been
notarized in Bulacan casts doubt on the procedural regularity in the preparation,
execution and signing of the deed—consequently, the claim of the signatories that
they did not sign the document before a notary public is more plausible than another
party’s feeble claim to the contrary.—The trial court correctly appreciated the fact
that the deed was notarized in Manila when it could have been notarized in Bulacan.
This additional detail casts doubt on the procedural regularity in the preparation,
execution and signing of the deed. It is not easy to believe that petitioner and the ten
(10) Torres heirs traveled all the way to Manila to have their questioned document
notarized considering that they, with the exception of respondent Roque, are
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
residents of Balagtas, Bulacan, where notaries public are easy to find. Consequently,
the claim of private respondents that they did not sign the document before a notary
public is more plausible than petitioner’s feeble claim to the contrary.
Same; Fraud; Elements of fraud vitiating consent for purposes of annulling a
contract are: (a) It was employed by a contracting party upon the other; (b) It
induced the other party to enter into the contract; (c) It was serious; and, (d) It
resulted in damages and injury to the party seeking annulment.—Quite obviously,
when respondents affixed their signatures on the deed, it was still incomplete since
petitioner who caused it to be prepared left several spaces blank, more particularly as
regards the dimensions of the property to be sold. The heirs were persuaded to sign
the document only upon the assurance of petitioner that respondent Roque, pursuant
to their understanding, would be present when the property would be surveyed after
obtaining permission from the Bureau of Lands. As it surfaced, the supposed
understanding was merely a ruse of petitioner to induce respondents to sign the deed
without which the latter would not have given their conformity thereto. Apparently,
petitioner deceived respondents by filling the blank spaces in the deed, having the
lots surveyed and subdivided, and then causing the issuance of transfer certificates of
title without their knowledge, much less consent. Thus all the elements of fraud
vitiating consent for purposes of annulling a contract concur: (a) It was employed by
a contracting party upon the other; (b) It induced the other party to enter into the
contract; (c) It was serious; and, (d) It resulted in damages and injury to the party
seeking annulment.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOSEFA TORRES died intestate leaving a parcel of land located at Balagtas,
Bulacan. Among her heirs are respondents Aurora S. Roque, Priscilla S.
Luna and Josefina S. Austria. Sometime in 1984, the heirs of Josefa Torres,
as vendors, and petitioner Nelia A. Constantino, as vendee, entered into a
contract to sell a parcel of land with a total land area of two hundred and fifty
(250) square meters. The lot, owned in common by the Torres heirs, is being
occupied by petitioners' mother and sister. An adjoining lot, also co-owned by
the heirs, is being occupied by spouses Severino and Consuelo Lim.
Pursuant to their agreement, the heirs authorized petitioner to prepare the
necessary Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale.
After having the document drafted — with several spaces left blank including
the specification as to the metes and bounds of the land — petitioner asked
the heirs to affix their signatures on the document. The heirs signed the
document with the understanding that respondent Aurora S. Roque, one of
Page 71 of 74
the heirs, would be present when the latter would seek permission from the
Bureau of Lands and have the land surveyed.
However, without the participation of any of the Torres heirs, the property
was subsequently surveyed, subdivided and then covered by TCT Nos. T-
292265 and T-292266. Petitioner did not furnish the heirs with copies of
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale  nor of the
subdivision plan and the certificates of title. Upon securing a copy of the deed
from the Registry of Deeds, the respondents learned that the area of the
property purportedly sold to petitioner was much bigger than that agreed
upon by the parties. It already included the portion being occupied by the
spouses Severino and Consuelo Lim.
On 2 June 1986, private respondents sent a letter to petitioner demanding
the surrender to them of the deed of settlement and conveyance, the
subdivision plan and the certificates of title; but to no avail. On 25 June 1986
respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan an action for
annulment of the deed and cancellation of the certificates of title, with prayer
for recovery of damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit. 1
Petitioner controverted the allegations of respondents by presenting
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale  dated 10 October
1984 wherein respondents agreed to divide and adjudicate among
themselves the inherited property with an area of one thousand five hundred
and three (1,503) square meters. In the same document, they caused the
subdivision of the property into two (2) lots according to Plan No. PSD-03-
009105 identified as Lot 4-A with an area of one thousand ninety-six (1,096)
square meters, and Lot 4-B with an area of four hundred and seven (407)
square meters, and acknowledged the sale to petitioner of said Lot 4-B. As a
consequence, on 18 March 1985, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. T-
292265 in the name of the heirs of Josefa Torres and TCT No. T-292266 in
the name of petitioner.
In reply, private respondents reiterated that all the heirs signed the document
before the land was surveyed and subdivided, hence, there was as yet no
definite area to be sold that could be indicated in the deed at the time of the
signing. They also claimed that they were not notified about the survey and
the subdivision of the lot and therefore they could not have agreed on the
area supposedly sold to petitioner. The respondent heirs insist that they
could not have agreed to the extent of the area actually reflected in the deed
because it included the portion being occupied by the Lim spouses, which
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
was already the subject of a previous agreement to sell between them and
their predecessor.
The trial court entertained serious doubts with respect to the preparation and
due execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
Sale  taking into account that (a) while petitioner claimed that all the heirs
signed before the notary public and in her presence, she was not able to
enumerate all the signatories to the document; (b) while petitioner claimed
that the document was signed only after the survey of the land was
completed, or on 10 October 1984, such fact was negated by her own
witness who testified that the survey was conducted only on 16 October
1984; and, (c) while petitioner alleged that the document was signed and
notarized in Manila no explanation was offered why the same could not have
been signed and notarized in Bulacan where notaries public abound which
could have been less inconvenient to the parties concerned. Additionally, the
trial court relied heavily on the assertions of respondents as reflected in their
demand letter that they did not give their consent to the sale of Lot 4-B.
Thus, on the basis of the evidence on record, the trial court on 27 September
1990 ordered the annulment and cancellation of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Sale, TCT Nos. T-292265 and T-292266 and
Subdivision Plan No. PSD-03-009105. It also ordered petitioner to pay
private respondents P50,000.00 for moral damages, P15,000.00 for
attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit. 2
On 16 March 1994 respondent Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the
trial court, 3 and on 20 June 1994 denied the motion to reconsider its
decision. 4
Petitioner faults respondent Court of Appeals: (a) for disregarding
documentary evidence already presented, marked and identified on a purely
technical ground, and (b) for concluding that the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Sale did not reflect the true intent of the parties.
Petitioner argues that the trial court should not have denied her motion to
admit formal offer of evidence merely on the basis of technicality such as late
filing, citing Siguenza v.  Court of Appeals. 5 We are not persuaded. Indeed,
we held in Siguenza  that rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very
rigid and technical sense as they are used only to help secure, not override,
substantial justice. Yet the holding is inapplicable to the present case as the
trial court had a reasonable basis for denying petitioner's motion —
Page 72 of 74
On February 6, 1990, Atty. Ponciano Mercado, defendant's counsel,
manifested in Court that he has (sic) no more witness to present. He asked
that he be given 15 days to make a formal offer of evidence and which the
Court granted. At the scheduled hearing of April 03, 1990, Atty. Ponciano
Mercado . . . . was not in Court. Atty. Veneracion, plaintiffs' counsel, called
the attention of the Court that Atty. Mercado has (sic) not yet filed and/or
complied with the Court Order dated February 06, 1990, which is to file his
formal offer of evidence. On motion of Atty. Veneracion, defendant's right to
file a formal offer of evidence was deemed waived. Atty. Veneracion waived
the presentation of rebuttal evidence considering that the defendant can (sic)
no longer make a formal offer of evidence.
On May 11, 1990, the Court was in receipt of a motion to admit formal offer of
exhibits filed by the defendant thru counsel, Atty. Ponciano Mercado, on May
02, 1990. Considering that the same was filed out of time and the plaintiffs
having filed their memorandum already, the motion to admit formal offer of
exhibits was denied (emphasis supplied).
The trial court was correct in holding that petitioner waived the right to
formally offer his evidence. A considerable lapse of time, about three (3)
months, had already passed before petitioner's counsel made effort to
formally offer his evidence. For the trial court to grant petitioner's motion to
admit her exhibits would be to condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-
compliance with a court order which, in effect, would encourage needless
delays and derail the speedy administration of justice.
Petitioner also insists that the real intent of the parties was to make the entire
Lot 4-B the subject matter of the sale. She claims that during cross-
examination respondent Aurora S. Roque admitted that she signed in behalf
of her co-heirs a receipt for P30,000.00 as partial payment for the lot
occupied by Ka Baring and Lina  (relatives of petitioner) and Iling (Consuelo
Lim). Moreover, according to petitioner, the assertions of private respondents
to petitioner contained in the demand letter should not necessarily be true
and that the validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
Sale  was not affected by the fact that it was notarized in a place other than
where the subject matter thereof was situated, citing Sales v. Court of
Appeals. 6
These other arguments of petitioner are barren and futile. The admission of
respondent Roque cannot prevail in the face of the clear evidence that there
was as yet no meeting of the minds on the land area to be sold since private
respondents were still awaiting the survey to be conducted on the premises.
Assignment No. 1 – Succession
Obviously, the trial court only lent credence to the assertions in the demand
letter after having weighed the respective evidence of the parties. But even
without the letter, the evidence of respondents had already amply
substantiated their claims.
We ruled in the Sales  case that the extrinsic validity of a document was not
affected by the fact that it was notarized in a place other than where the
subject matter thereof was located. What is more important under
the Notarial Law is that the notary public has authority to acknowledge the
document executed within his territorial jurisdiction. The ruling in Sales  is not
applicable to the present case. Our concern here is not whether the notary
public had the authority to acknowledge the document executed within his
territorial jurisdiction but whether respondents indeed appeared before him
and signed the deed. However, the quantum of evidence shows that they did
not.
The trial court correctly appreciated the fact that the deed was notarized in
Manila when it could have been notarized in Bulacan. This additional detail
casts doubt on the procedural regularity in the preparation, execution and
signing of the deed. It is not easy to believe that petitioner and the ten (10)
Torres heirs traveled all the way to Manila to have their questioned document
notarized considering that they, with the exception of respondent Roque, are
residents of Balagtas, Bulacan, where notaries public are easy to find.
Consequently, the claim of private respondents that they did not sign the
document before a notary public is more plausible than petitioner's feeble
claim to the contrary.
Likewise, we find the allegation of respondents that they signed the deed
prior to the survey, or before determination of the area to be sold, worthy of
credit as against the contention of petitioner that they signed after the survey
or on 10 October 1984. As found by the trial court, such contention was
contradicted by petitioner's own witness who positively asserted in court that
the survey was conducted only on 16 October 1984 or six (6) days after the
signing. Quite obviously, when respondents affixed their signatures on the
deed, it was still incomplete since petitioner who caused it to be prepared left
several spaces blank, more particularly as regards the dimensions of the
property to be sold. The heirs were persuaded to sign the document only
upon the assurance of petitioner that respondent Roque, pursuant to their
understanding, would be present when the property would be surveyed after
obtaining permission from the Bureau of Lands. As it surfaced, the supposed
understanding was merely a ruse of petitioner to induce respondents to sign
Page 73 of 74
the deed without which the latter would not have given their conformity
thereto. 7 Apparently, petitioner deceived respondents by filling the blank
spaces in the deed, having the lots surveyed and subdivided, and then
causing the issuance of transfer certificates of title without their knowledge,
much less consent. Thus all the elements of fraud vitiating consent for
purposes of annulling a contract concur: (a) It was employed by a contracting
party upon the other; (b) It induced the other party to enter into the contract;
(c) It was serious; and, (d) It resulted in damages and injury to the party
seeking annulment. 8

Perhaps, another compelling reason for the annulment of the document of

settlement and conveyance is that the second page thereof clearly manifests
that the number of the subdivision plan and the respective areas of Lots 4-A
and 4-B were merely handwritten while all the rest of the statements therein
were typewritten, which leads us to the conclusion that handwritten figures
thereon were not available at the time the document was formalized.

WHEREFORE, their being no error to warrant a reversal of the decision and

resolution in question of respondent Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Br. 22, the instant
petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

August 22, 2019

1st reading: Judges 11:29-39

Gospel: Matthew 22:1-14

Assignment No. 1 – Succession Page 74 of 74