CRIMINAL LAW 2 CASES

Title 1

 People v Catantan, G.R. No. 118075, Sept. 5, 1997

[G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMILIANO CATANTAN y
TAYONG, accused-appellant.

Facts: The Pilapil brothers Eugene and Juan Jr. were fishing in the sea some 3 kilometers
away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. Emiliano Catantan, boarded the pumpboat of the
Pilapils and leveled his gun and struck Eugene with it. They left behind the other
pumpboat which the accused had earlier used together. Due to their operating pumpboat
breaking down, Catantan boarded another pumpboat and ordered the operator Juanito to
take them to Mungaz, Cebu. When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying that he would still
pull up his net and harvest his catch, Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You choose
between the two, or I will kill you."Juanito, terrified, immediately obeyed and Ursal
hopped in from the other pumpboat and joined Catantan.The Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano Catantan y Tayong and Jose Macven Ursal
alias "Bimbo" guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. Of
the duo only Emiliano Catantan appealed.

In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of
piracy as the facts proved only constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the Revised
Penal Code and not piracy under PD No. 532.

Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential that
there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his companion did not
attack or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation but
merely boarded the boat, and it was only when they were already on board that they used
force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some other place. Appellant also insists that
he and Ursal had no intention of permanently taking possession or depriving complainants
of their boat. As a matter of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered the
brothers right away to approach that boat so they could leave the Pilapils behind in their
boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.

Issue: Whether accused-appellant committed grave coercion or Piracy under PD 532?

Held: The Court affirmed the sentence of reclusion perpetua upon EMILIANO
CATANTAN being guilty for the crime of piracy penalized under PD No. 532.

The Court does not agree with appellant’s abovementioned contentions. Under the
definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the
Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be
true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of
destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat.

Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure of any
vessel, xxx by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things,

Page 1
committed by any person, xxx in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The
offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided."

On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code is
committed by "any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence,
prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do
something against his will, whether it be right or wrong." The testimony of Eugene, one of
the victims, shows that the appellant actually seized the vessel through force and
intimidation. To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave
coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters was
seized by the accused by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. The fact
that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced in evidence
cannot exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it again, that
Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through force and intimidation the pumpboat of
the Pilapils while thelatter were fishing in Philippine waters.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 118075 September 5, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG, accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias "Bimbo" were charged
with violation of PD No. 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery
Law of 1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while armed with a firearm and a bladed
weapon, acting in conspiracy with one another, by means of violence and intimidation,
wilfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and inflicted physical injuries on Eugene
Pilapil and Juan Pilapil Jr. who were then fishing in the seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and
seized their fishing boat, to their damage and prejudice.1

The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano Catantan y
Tayong and Jose Macven Ursal alias "Bimbo" guilty of the crime charged and sentenced
them to reclusion perpetua.2 Of the duo only Emiliano Catantan appealed.

In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of
piracy as the facts proved only constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the Revised
Penal Code and not piracy under PD No. 532.

The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of 27 June 1993, the
Pilapil brothers Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea some 3 kilometers

Page 2
away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught up with them. One
of them, later identified as the accused Emiliano Catantan, bearded the pump boat of the
Pilapils and leveled his gun at Eugene. With his gun, Catantan struck Eugene on the left
cheekbone and ordered him and Juan Jr. to "dapa." Then Catantan told Ursal to follow him
to the pumpboat of the Pilapils. There they hogtied Eugene, forced him to lie down at the
bottom of the boat, covered him with a tarpaulin up to his neck, stepped on him and
ordered Juan Jr. to ferry them to Daan Tabogon. They left behind the other pumpboat
which the accused had earlier used together with its passengers one of whom was visibly
tied.

Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene reminded Catantan that they
were now off-course but Catantan told Eugene to keep quiet or he would be killed. Later,
the engine conked out and Juan Jr. was directed to row the boat. Eugene asked to be set
free so he could help but was not allowed; he was threatened with bodily harm instead.

Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they went farther out into the open
sea the engine stalled again. This time Eugene was allowed to assist his brother. Eugene's
hands were set free but his legs were tied to the outrigger. At the point of a tres cantos4
held by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat.

As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. Catantan asked whose boat
that was and the Pilapils told him that it was operated by a certain Juanito and that its
engine was new. Upon learning this, Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to approach the
boat cautioning them however not to move or say anything.

On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the "new" pumpboat. Once
aboard he ordered the operator Juanito to take them to Mungaz, another town of Cebu.
When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying that he would still pull up his net and harvest his
catch, Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You choose between the two, or I will kill
you."5 Juanito, obviously terrified, immediately obeyed and Ursal hopped in from the
other pumpboat and joined Catantan.

But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its outrigger caught the front part of
the pumpboat of the Pilapils so he kicked hard its prow; it broke. The jolt threw Eugene
into the sea and he landed on the water headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his brother's legs and
the two swam together clinging to their boat. Fortunately another pumpboat passed by and
towed them safely ashore.

Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure of any
vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the
personal belongings of the complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by
any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in
Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as
pirates and punished as hereinafter provided." And a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par. (b),
of the same decree as "any vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo
from one place to another through Philippine waters. It shall include all kinds and types of
vessels or boats used in fishing (emphasis supplied).

On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code is
committed by "any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence,

Page 3
prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do
something against his will, whether it be right or wrong."

Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential that
there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his companion did not
attack or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation but
merely boarded the boat, and it was only when they were already on board that they used
force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some other place. Appellant also insists that he
and Ursal had no intention of permanently taking possession or depriving complainants of
their boat. As a matter of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered the brothers
right away to approach that boat so they could leave the Pilapils behind in their boat.
Accordingly, appellant claims, he simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.

We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as
penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the
purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go
elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the
act of seizing their boat. The testimony of Eugene, one of the victims, shows that the
appellant actually seized the vessel through force and intimidation. The direct testimony of
Eugene is significant and enlightening —

Q: Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing at the seawaters of Tabogon at
that time, was there anything unusual that happened?

A: Yes.

Q: Will you please tell the Court what that was?

A: While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat arrived and the passengers of that
pumpboat boarded our pumpboat.

Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you, how many were riding in that
pumpboat?

A: Four.

Q: When you said the passengers of that pumpboat boarded your pumpboat, how did they
do that?

A: They approached somewhat suddenly and came aboard the pumpboat (emphasis
supplied).

Q: How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat?

A: Only one.

Q: What did that person do when he came aboard your pumpboat?

A: When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his revolver at us (emphasis supplied).

Q: By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did he say anything to you?

Page 4
xxx xxx xxx

A: He said, "dapa," which means lie down (emphasis supplied).

COURT:

Q: To whom did he aim that revolver?

A: He aimed the revolver on me.

TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ:

Q: What else did he do?

A: Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the pumpboat.

Q: What did he do with his revolver?

A: He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower portion of my left eye.

Q: Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did these persons do?

A: We were ordered to take them to a certain place.

Q: To what place did he order you to go?

A: To Daan Tabogon. 6

To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave coercion would be
to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters was seized by the
accused by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. As Eugene Pilapil
testified, the accused suddenly approached them and boarded their pumpboat and Catantan
aimed his revolver at them as he ordered complaining witness Eugene Pilapil to "dapa" or
lie down with face downwards, and then struck his face with a revolver, hitting the lower
portion of his left eye, after which, Catantan told his victims at gun point to take them to
Daan Tabogon.

The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. The sudden appearance of another
pumpboat with four passengers, all strangers to them, easily intimidated the Pilapil
brothers that they were impelled to submit in complete surrender to the marauders. The
moment Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he had full control of his victims. The
sight of a drawn revolver in his hand drove them to submission. Hence the issuance of PD
No. 532 designed to avert situations like the case at bar and discourage and prevent piracy
in Philippine waters. Thus we cite the succeeding "whereas" clauses of the decree —

Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still
committing acts of depredations upon the persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace,
order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the
people;

Page 5
Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway robbery/brigandage
which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all
countries; and,

Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such
acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of
eliminating all obstacle to the economic, social, educational and community progress of
the people.

The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of livelihood is fishing in sea
waters. They brave the natural elements and contend with the unknown forces of the sea to
bring home a bountiful harvest. It is on these small fishermen that the townspeople depend
for the daily bread. To impede their livelihood would be to deprive them of their very
subsistence, and the likes of the accused within the purview of PD No. 532 are the obstacle
to the "economic, social, educational and community progress of the people." Had it not
been for the chance passing of another pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil brothers, left alone
helpless in a floundering, meandering outrigger with a broken prow and a conked-out
engine in open sea, could not be ascertained.

While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils
permanently of their boat, proof of which they left behind the brothers with their boat, the
truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only because their pumpboat broke
down and it was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that would take them back to
their lair. Unfortunately for the pirates their "new" pumpboat ran out of gas so they were
apprehended by the police soon after the Pilapils reported the matter to the local
authorities.

The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced in
evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it again, that
Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through force and intimidation the pumpboat of
the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the conviction
of accused-appellant EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of piracy
penalized under PD No. 532 and sentencing him accordingly to reclusion perpetua, is
AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Title 2

 Soria vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 153524, January 31, 2005

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 153524-25            January 31, 2005

RODOLFO SORIA and EDIMAR BISTA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ANIANO DESIERTO in his capacity as Head of the Office of the Ombudsman,

Page 6
HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Military,
P/INS. JEFFREY T. GOROSPE, SPO2 ROLANDO G. REGACHO, SPO1 ALFREDO B.
ALVIAR, JR., PO3 JAIME D. LAZARO, PO2 FLORANTE B. CARDENAS, PO1 JOSEPH A.
BENAZA, SPO1 FRANKLIN D. CABAYA and SPO4 PEDRO PAREL, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Yet again, we are tasked to substitute our judgment for that of the Office of the Ombudsman
in its finding of lack of probable cause made during preliminary investigation. And, yet again,
we reaffirm the time-honored practice of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary
investigations by our prosecutory bodies absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion on
their part.

Petitioners, thru a special civil action for certiorari,1 contend precisely that the public
respondents herein – officers of the Office of the Ombudsman – gravely abused their
discretion in dismissing the complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
(Delay in the delivery of detained persons) against private respondents herein, members of
the Philippine National Police stationed at the Municipality of Santa, Ilocos Sur.

From the respective pleadings2 of the parties, the following facts appear to be indubitable:

1. On or about 8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001 (a Sunday and the day before the 14
May 2001 Elections3 ), petitioners were arrested without a warrant by respondents police
officers for alleged illegal possession of firearms and ammunition;

2. Petitioner Soria was arrested for alleged illegal possession of .38 cal. revolver (a crime
which carries with it the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period) and for violation
of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the Commission on Election
Resolution No. 3328 (which carries the penalty of imprisonment of not less than one [1] year
but not more than six [6] years);

3. Petitioner Bista was arrested for alleged illegal possession of sub-machine pistol UZI, cal.
9mm and a .22 cal. revolver with ammunition;

4. Immediately after their arrest, petitioners were detained at the Santa, Ilocos Sur, Police
Station. It was at the Santa Police Station that petitioner Bista was identified by one of the
police officers to have a standing warrant of arrest for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6
issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 12272;

5. The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of 14 May 2001 (Monday and election day), petitioners
were brought to the residence of Provincial Prosecutor Jessica Viloria in San Juan, Ilocos Sur,
before whom a "Joint-Affidavit" against them was subscribed and sworn to by the arresting
officers. From there, the arresting officers brought the petitioners to the Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, and there at about 6:00 p.m. the "Joint-Affidavit" was
filed and docketed;

6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner Soria was
released upon the order of Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the requisite preliminary
investigation, while petitioner Bista was brought back and continued to be detained at the
Santa Police Station. From the time of petitioner Soria’s detention up to the time of his
release, twenty-two (22) hours had already elapsed;

7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, petitioner Bista was brought before the
MTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 was

Page 7
pending. Petitioner Bista posted bail and an Order of Temporary Release was issued
thereafter;

8. At this point in time, no order of release was issued in connection with petitioner Bista’s
arrest for alleged illegal possession of firearms. At 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day
(15 May 2001), an information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 4413-S, was filed against petitioner Bista with the 4th Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. At 5:00 in the afternoon, informations for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition and violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus
Election Code in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 3328, docketed as Criminal Cases No.
2269-N and No. 2268-N, respectively, were filed in the Regional Trial Court at Narvacan,
Ilocos Sur;

9. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was released upon filing of bail bonds in Criminal Cases
No. 2268-N and No. 4413-S. He was detained for 26 days.

10. On 15 August 2001, petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Military Affairs
a complaint-affidavit for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private
respondents.

11. After considering the parties’ respective submissions, the Office of the Ombudsman
rendered the first assailed Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002 dismissing the complaint
for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code for lack of merit; and

12. On 04 March 2002, petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration which was
denied for lack of merit in the second assailed Resolution dated 25 March 2002.

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The
penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such
person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for
crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.

In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall
be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or
counsel.

It is not under dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Soria was arrested without
warrant are punishable by correctional penalties or their equivalent, thus, criminal complaints
or information should be filed with the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours of his arrest.
Neither is it in dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Bista was arrested are
punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he could only be detained
for 36 hours without criminal complaints or information having been filed with the proper
judicial authorities.

The sole bone of contention revolves around the proper application of the 12-18-36 periods.
With respect specifically to the detention of petitioner Soria which lasted for 22 hours, it is
alleged that public respondents gravely erred in construing Article 125 4 as excluding Sundays,
holidays and election days in the computation of the periods prescribed within which public
officers should deliver arrested persons to the proper judicial authorities as the law never
makes such exception. Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear and unequivocal,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any attempts at interpretation.5 Public
respondents, on the other hand, relied on the cases of Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,6 and Sayo v.

Page 8
Chief of Police of Manila7 and on commentaries8 of jurists to bolster their position that
Sundays, holidays and election days are excluded in the computation of the periods provided
in Article 125,9 hence, the arresting officers delivered petitioners well within the allowable time.

In addition to the foregoing arguments and with respect specifically to petitioner Bista,
petitioners maintain that the filing of the information in court against petitioner Bista did not
justify his continuous detention. The information was filed at 4:30 p.m. of 15 May 2001 but
the orders for his release were issued by the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on 08 June 2001. They argued that based on law and
jurisprudence, if no charge is filed by the prosecutor within the period fixed by law, the
arresting officer must release the detainee lest he be charged with violation of Article
125.10 Public respondents countered that the duty of the arresting officers ended upon the
filing of the informations with the proper judicial authorities following the rulings in Agbay v.
Deputy Ombudsman for the Military ,11 and People v. Acosta.12

From a study of the opposing views advanced by the parties, it is evident that public
respondents did not abuse their discretion in dismissing for lack of probable cause the
complaint against private respondents.

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part
of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.  The
1awphi1.nét

abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.13

No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to herein public respondents. Their
disposition of petitioners’ complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
cannot be said to have been conjured out of thin air as it was properly backed up by law and
jurisprudence. Public respondents ratiocinated thus:

As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar as the complaint of Rodolfo Soria is
concerned, based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday,
should not be included in the computation of the period prescribed by law for the filing of
complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a "no-office day."
(Medina vs. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313.) In the instant case, while it appears that the complaints
against Soria for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Violation of COMELEC Resolution No.
3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos
Sur, only on May 15, 200[1] at 4:30 p.m., he had already been released the day before or on
May 14, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m. by the respondents, as directed by Prov. Prosecutor Jessica
[Viloria]. Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code to speak of.14

Indeed, we did hold in Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,15 that —

. . . The arresting officer’s duty under the law was either to deliver him to the proper judicial
authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter release him. The fact however is that he was not
released. From the time of petitioner’s arrest at 12:00 o’clock p.m. on November 7 to 3:40
p.m. on November 10 when the information against him for murder actually was in court, over
75 hours have elapsed.

But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday; November 8 was
declared an official holiday; and November 9 (election day) was also an official holiday. In
these three no-office days, it was not an easy matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and
stenographer, draft the information and search for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get
the clerk of court to open the courthouse, docket the case and have the order of commitment
prepared. And then, where to locate and the uncertainty of locating those officers and
employees could very well compound the fiscal’s difficulties. These are considerations

Page 9
sufficient enough to deter us from declaring that Arthur Medina was arbitrarily detained. For,
he was brought to court on the very first office day following arrest.

And, in Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila16 --

. . . Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a
person for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of
communication as well as the hour of arrest and other circumstances, such as the time of
surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time
the necessary information, must be taken into consideration.

As to the issue concerning the duty of the arresting officer after the information has already
been filed in Court, public respondents acted well within their discretion in ruling thus:

In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista against the respondents for Violation of Article
125, will not prosper because the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law
for the filing of the complaint against him from the time of his arrest was tolled by one day
(election day). Moreover, he has a standing warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it
was only on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to post bail and secure an
Order of Release. Obviously, however, he could only be released if he has no other pending
criminal case requiring his continuous detention.

The criminal Informations against Bista for Violations of Article 125, RPC and COMELEC
Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, on May 15, 2001 (Annexes "G" and "I", Complaint-Affidavit of Edimar
Bista) but he was released from detention only on June 8, 2001, on orders of the RTC and
MTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur (Annexes "J" and "K", Complaint-Affidavit). Was there a delay in
the delivery of detained person to the proper judicial authorities under the circumstances? The
answer is in the negative. The complaints against him was (sic) seasonably filed in the court
of justice within the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law as discussed above. The duty
of the detaining officers is deemed complied with upon the filing of the complaints. Further
action, like issuance of a Release Order, then rests upon the judicial authority (People v.
Acosta [CA] 54 O.G. 4739).17

The above disposition is in keeping with Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the

Military,18 wherein we ordained that –

. . . Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the intent
behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of
the crime imputed against him and, upon his application with the court, he may be released on
bail. Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his release when he
applied for and was granted his release upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying
Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC. We agree
with the position of the Ombudsman that such filing of the complaint with the MCTC
interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.

All things considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, we have no choice but to
defer to the Office of the Ombudsman’s determination that the facts on hand do not make out
a case for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. l^vvphi1.net

As we have underscored in numerous decisions --

We have consistently refrained from interfering with the investigatory and prosecutorial
powers of the Ombudsman absent any compelling reason. This policy is based on
constitutional, statutory and practical considerations. We are mindful that the Constitution and
RA 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutorial powers, virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention, in order

Page 10
to insulate it from outside pressure and improper influence. Moreover, a preliminary
investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof
of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may
not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal. Hence, if the Ombudsman, using
professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such
findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the functions of the
courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it. In much the same way, the courts will be swamped with cases if
they will have to review the exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time the latter decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a
private complainant.19 (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition dated 27 May 2002 is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002 and the Order dated 25 March
2002 of the Office of the Ombudsman are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

 Judge Español vs. Judge Mupas, AM 03-1462 MTJ, April 9, 2007

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

EN BANC

A.M. No. 03-1462-MTJ             April 19, 2007

JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas,

Cavite, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE LORINDA B. TOLEDO-MUPAS, Municipal Trial Court, Dasmariñas,
Cavite, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Bizarre. The word would aptly describe this tale of the accuser turning out to be the culprit.

This case started with Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas (Judge Mupas) of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Dasmariñas, Cavite, filing an administrative complaint (Administrative Matter
No. OCA IPI No. 02-1515-RTJ) against Judge Dolores L. Español (Judge Español) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite, for Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Grave Abuse of Authority, Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service. She imputed these offenses against Judge Español for allegedly illegally usurping
the functions of the Executive Judge of Dasmariñas, Cavite, and for ordering her (Mupas) on
April 18, 2002, in connection with Criminal Case No. 9292-01 (People v. Belinda Ventura
Singello), "to desist from accepting, for ‘preliminary investigation,' criminal cases falling within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, where suspects are apprehended
pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure."

Page 11
Judge Español filed her Comment dated September 16, 2002 1 stating that since she was
appointed to the single sala RTC of Dasmariñas, Cavite, under Supreme Court Administrative
Order No. 6 of 1975, she ipso facto became the Executive Judge exercising supervision over
the MTC of Dasmariñas, Cavite. She further stated that her Order dated April 18, 2002,
directing the respondent to desist from conducting preliminary investigation, did not deprive
the latter of the authority to conduct preliminary investigation but merely stopped her from
conducting the same for being

violative of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
and Republic Act No. 7438.

In the same Comment, Judge Español said that Judge Mupas operated the MTC of
Dasmariñas, Cavite as a "One-Stop Shop" where criminal suspects apprehended without a
warrant are ordered detained in the municipal jail by virtue of an unsigned "Detention Pending
Investigation of the Case," in lieu of a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as prescribed by R.A. No. 7438 and by Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Thus, according to Judge Español, the apprehended persons were
detained for a long time until Judge Mupas set the case for preliminary investigation. If the
detainee can post bail, Judge Mupas would fix the amount of bail and require that the
premium, usually equivalent to 20% or 30% thereof, be paid in cash. If the surety bond was
secured outside of the MTC, the bond would be rejected. Hence, the applicants for bail bonds
would go to the RTC of Dasmariñas, Cavite to complain and apply for the release of the
detention prisoners.

This Court, acting on the Report dated July 4, 2003 of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), issued on August 6, 2003 a Resolution, 2 the dispositive portion of which reads:

"(T)he Court Resolved to ADOPT the following recommendations:

(a) to DISMISS the charges against Judge Dolores L. Español for lack of merit;

(b) to TREAT the comment dated September 16, 2002 of Judge Español as a SEPARATE
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT against Judge Lorinda Mupas of MTC, Dasmariñas, Cavite;
and

(c) to REQUIRE Judge Toledo-Mupas to COMMENT on the allegations against her, contained
in Judge Español’s comment."

Thus, a complaint against the respondent Judge Mupas was deemed filed, and docketed as
OCA IPI No. 03-1462-MTJ.

On September 8, 2003, Judge Mupas filed a motion seeking reconsideration of this Court’s
Resolution. On October 1, 2003, this Court required the OCA to file its comment thereon
within 15 days from notice. The OCA wrote a Memorandum dated April 15, 2004 3 to then
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. recommending the denial of the respondent’s motion being
a mere reiteration of her arguments already passed upon by the Court. This Court adopted
the said recommendation of the OCA in its Resolution dated May 31, 2004. 4

Accordingly, Judge Mupas faced the following charges: (1) violation of Rule 112, Section 7 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, and
Republic Act No. 7438; and (2) violation of the rules on preliminary investigation (a) for the
delay in the resolution of preliminary investigation cases pending in [Judge Mupas’] court; (b)
for failure to perform her ministerial duty of transmitting the records of the case, including the
resolution on the preliminary investigation, within 10 days from the issuance of the said
resolution to the provincial prosecutor of Cavite; and (c) for conducting preliminary
investigation despite the fact that there were many prosecutors in Cavite not indisposed to do
the job.

Page 12
On September 19, 2005, Judge Mupas filed her Reply 5 (should be Comment) to Judge
Español’s Comment which was treated as a separate administrative complaint. She claimed
that the August 6, 2003 Resolution of this Court failed to consider relevant laws, rules, and
pronouncements of the Court itself. She further said that under Rule 112, Section 2 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, she is expressly authorized to conduct preliminary
investigation. She questioned the authority of Judge Español in ordering her to desist from
conducting preliminary investigations in the guise of "supervising" or "reviewing" her actions,
as the said authority was lodged in the provincial prosecutors. She pointed out that, in the
case of "People vs. Belinda Ventura Singello" (Criminal Case No. 9292-01), subject of Judge
Español’s Order dated April 18, 2002, the provincial prosecutor affirmed her (Mupas’) finding
of probable cause against the accused without any question on the manner in which the
preliminary investigation was conducted.

She likewise claimed that, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 59-99 dated 1 June 1999,
while in single-sala stations the presiding judges are ex officio executive judges, for purposes
of supervision in the interest of the service, their salas may be merged with multi-sala stations.
Therefore, the RTC of Dasmariñas, Cavite had long been merged with the multi-sala station of
the RTC of Imus, Cavite. In support of this claim, Judge Mupas noted that then Executive
Judge Lucenito N. Tagle of the RTC of Imus, Cavite issued a Memorandum to all judges
within his supervision, including both Judge Español and Judge Mupas, to submit periodic
reports on detention prisoners.

She further argued that none of the detention prisoners had filed an administrative complaint
against her. She said that it was her duty to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints
filed with her sala. In addition, Judge Mupas posited that Judge Español could not entertain
applications for bail in the RTC because the cases were pending before the MTC.

On January 30, 2006, the Court noted this Reply (should be Comment), and referred the
same to the OCA for evaluation, report, and recommendation.

In the Memorandum dated July 26, 20066 addressed to then Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, the OCA found that the Reply of Judge Mupas was merely a rehash of the
arguments she raised in her Motion for Reconsideration; it did not refute the specific
allegations of Judge Español. The OCA said that the explanation given by the respondent was
unsatisfactory and insufficient to absolve her from administrative liability. However, the OCA
recommended that this case be referred to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report, and recommendation. Eventually, this case was referred to Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal.

During the proceedings before Justice Vidal, Judge Español filed her Rejoinder [Re: Reply
dated September 19, 2005] dated December 8, 20067 reiterating that: (1) her Order dated
April 18, 2002 was lawful and within her authority to issue as the OCA declared that she was
merely performing her function as Executive Judge of Dasmariñas, Cavite; (2) Judge Mupas
violated the rights of the accused whose preliminary investigation is pending in her court, they
being detained by virtue only of a "Detention Pending Investigation of the Case" in place of a
valid waiver signed in the presence of counsel for considerable lengths of time; (3) there was
no basis for Judge Mupas’ counter-charge that she could not grant bail while preliminary
investigation was pending before the Mupas court, considering the latter's absence upon the
prisoners' applications for bail; and (4) Judge Mupas failed to adequately explain her failure to
forward the records and the resolution of the preliminary investigation of accused Belinda
Singello in Criminal Case No. 9292-01.

Judge Mupas filed her Comment (Re: Rejoinder Dated December 8, 2006) dated December
21, 20068 and averred that: (1) acts made in her judicial capacity and in good faith could not
be subject to disciplinary action; (2) as judge, she enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of her duties; (3) the preliminary investigation she conducted was within the
scope of her authority; and (4) the reason behind the seeming delay in the conduct of

Page 13
preliminary investigation was the heavy congestion of the dockets of the MTC of Dasmariñas,
Cavite.

Preliminary conferences were conducted by Justice Vidal on January 2, 2007 and January 9,
2007.9 However, both parties opted not to present any testimonial evidence. In fact, Judge
Español filed on January 5, 2007 an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Resolve, 10 praying
that, inasmuch as the proceedings were summary in nature, the case be decided based on
the available records and pleadings submitted.

On the same day, Judge Español filed her Reply [Re: Comment dated December 21,
2006],11 arguing that: (1) Judge Mupas is guilty of gross ignorance of the law even if she acted
in good faith; and (2) the presumption of regularity in the performance of her judicial function
could not cure the incompetence of the respondent.

Both the complainant12 and the respondent13 filed their respective memoranda encompassing

all the arguments they raised in their respective pleadings. Judge Español also filed a Counter
Memorandum (Re: Memorandum of the Respondent dated January 18, 2007) dated January
29, 2007.14

In an undated Resolution filed with the OCA on February 9, 2007, Justice Myrna Dimaranan-
Vidal found, contrary to Judge Mupas’ claim, that the document entitled "Detention Pending
Investigation of Cases" cannot validly be deemed to be an implied waiver of the rights of the
accused under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Justice Vidal submits the following
findings:

"Extant from the records, is Respondent’s admission of her practice in the issuance of the
document entitled ‘Detention Pending Investigation of Cases’ claiming, however, that such
document served as an implied waiver of the rights of the accused under Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.

"The undersigned disagrees.

"Sec. 2 e) of RA 7438 is in point, thus:

xxx Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such
person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no
effect. (Underscoring supplied)

"The afore cited law is clear and simple. Thus, construction is unnecessary. Clearly, what the
said provision requires to protect the rights of the accused is a written waiver signed by the
accused with the assistance of a counsel. However, the procedure adopted by the
Respondent runs counter thereto. She resorted to the issuance of a commitment order
dubbed as ‘Detention Pending Investigation of the Case’ to legally prolong the detention of the
accused pending the resolution of the preliminary investigation. Obviously, this is not within
the contemplation of the law. Thus, the practice is highly erroneous – a blatant manifestation
of ignorance in the legal procedure.

"The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary 15 provides:

Canon 6 – Competence and Diligence

xxx

Sec. 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills
and personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking

Page 14
advantage for this purpose of the training and other facilities which should be made available,
under judicial control, to judges.

xxx

"Otherwise put, Respondent is presumed to know the basic measures to protect the rights of
the accused during preliminary investigation. Sadly, Respondent failed in this regard. Instead,
she maintained the practice of issuing this highly improper order, i.e., ‘Detention Pending
Investigation of the Case’, just to put a semblance of legality in the detention of the accused." 16

With respect to the other charges, Justice Vidal found the evidence insufficient to support the
accusations that Judge Mupas: (1) detained the accused for a long period of time while the
preliminary investigation was pending in her court; (2) failed to transmit to the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cavite the records of the case within 10 days after preliminary investigation; and
(3) acted without authority to conduct preliminary investigation because there were enough
prosecutors in Cavite to conduct the same. 1a\^/phi1.net

Justice Vidal then concludes:

"However, the undersigned finds that Respondent should still be held administratively liable.
Respondent’s act of issuing orders dubbed as ‘Detention Pending Investigation of Cases’
instead of requiring the accused to execute a written waiver, with the assistance of counsel,
pursuant to Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, fall [sic] short of the measure of
responsibility expected from a judge.

"Respondent should be reminded that the actions of everyone connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the clerk of lowest rank,
should be circumscribed with a high degree of responsibility. The image of a court, as a true
temple of justice, is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who
work thereat. Judicial personnel are expected to be living examples of uprightness in the
performance of official duties [and] preserve at all times the good name and standing of the
courts in the community."17

Thus, the dispositive portion of her Resolution reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, and it appearing that this is the first time the
Respondent has committed the infraction, supra, the undersigned respectfully recommends
that she be REPRIMANDED for her practice of issuing the "Detention Pending Investigation of
the Case" orders with STERN WARNING that a repetition thereof or any similar act will be
dealt with more severely".

We agree with the findings of Justice Vidal, but We find the recommended penalty too light,
grossly disproportionate to the offense committed, especially when viewed in the light of
Judge Mupas’ record of incorrigible misconduct.

There is no gainsaying that Judge Mupas’ practice of issuing "Detention Pending Investigation
of the Case" orders in lieu of a written waiver signed by the accused with the assistance of
counsel is, in the words of Justice Vidal, "a blatant manifestation of ignorance in the legal
procedure." It is gross ignorance of the law, pure and simple.

Under Rule 140, Section 8, of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10 SC, gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge, and Section 11 thereof
provides the sanctions, as follows:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. – A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:

Page 15
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations: Provided, however, that the forfeiture
of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

While Justice Vidal considered the respondent's practice of issuing "Detention Pending
Investigation of the Case" orders as a first-time infraction, We note that this case is not the
first time the respondent was charged and found guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

In Español v. Mupas,18 the respondent judge was fined the amount of P21,000.00 for violation
of the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law when she ordered the
arrest of the accused in six criminal cases before the expiration of the 10-day period she gave
them to file their counter-affidavits, and without any finding of probable cause.

In Loss of Court Exhibits at MTC-Dasmariñas, Cavite,19 aside from being found guilty of grave
misconduct for refusing to turn over to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for ballistics
examination a firearm that a court employee surreptitiously took from the court's steel cabinet
and used to commit suicide, Judge Mupas was held administratively liable for gross ignorance
of the law for her failure to submit to the provincial prosecutor her resolution and the records
of the case within 10 days after preliminary investigation. The Court imposed on the
respondent the penalty of suspension for three (3) months without pay, with a stern warning
that a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.

In Bitoon, et al. v. Toledo-Mupas,20 the respondent was also found administratively liable for
gross ignorance of the law for changing the designation of the crime from a non-bailable
offense to a bailable one, i.e., syndicated estafa to simple estafa, and granted bail without
hearing on the ground that the accused is entitled to it as a matter of right. The Court found
her to have exceeded her authority in the conduct of preliminary investigation and to have
failed to observe the elementary rules on bail. She was meted the penalties of a fine in the
amount of P40,000.00, suspension for three (3) months without salaries and benefits, and a
stern warning that a same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Upon motion for reconsideration, however, the penalty of fine of P40,000.00 was deleted on
the ground that the acts of the respondent in the Español v. Mupas and the Loss of Court
Exhibits cases were done after the acts complained of in Bitoon. While the Court maintained
that the respondent's acts in Bitoon remain inexcusable, the respondent was not found to be
an incorrigible third-time offender deserving the penalty originally imposed. The Court also
noted that the respondent was not motivated by malice, bad faith or corrupt motives and that
there was an absence of any serious damage to the complainants. However, the stern
warning of the Court should have been ample reminder that the penalty of dismissal would be
imposed should the respondent commit the same or a similar infraction. 21

In the present case, while the documents denominated "Detention Pending Investigation of
the Case" were issued during the same period of time that the three (3) above-cited cases
were decided, it is noteworthy that Judge Mupas continued with the practice even after her
attention had been called. Worse, she remained insistent that the document was an implied
waiver of the rights of the accused under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. 22 Judge
Mupas must be reminded that although judges have in their favor the presumption of
regularity and good faith in the performance of their official functions, a blatant disregard of
the clear and unmistakable terms of the law obviates this presumption and renders them
susceptible to administrative sanctions.23 Being among the judicial front-liners who have direct
contact with the litigants, a wanton display of utter lack of familiarity with the rules by the judge
inevitably erodes the confidence of the public in the competence of our courts to render

Page 16
justice. 24 It subjects the judiciary to embarrassment. Worse, it could raise the specter of
corruption.

When the gross inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a
law, or a principle in the discharge of his or her duties, a judge is either too incompetent and
undeserving of the exalted position and title he or she holds, or the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. 25

All said, this Court finds the respondent, Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas, administratively
liable for gross ignorance of the law. Considering that this is her fourth offense, she deserves
to be meted the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, with all the accessory
penalties appurtenant thereto.

WHEREFORE, Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas of the Municipal Trial Court of Dasmariñas,

Cavite is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law. This being her fourth offense, she is
hereby ORDERED DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of all benefits due her,
excluding her accrued leave benefits, and with perpetual disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

This Decision is final and immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Title 3

 Enrile vs. Salazar, G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE

ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
[Br. 103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR
FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO
MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM,
BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police District)
AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE
PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.

G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990

SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,

vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R.
ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
103, respondents.

Page 17
NARVASA, J.:

Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once more takes center stage as the
focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the
intervening period saw a number of similar cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it
would Beem, where season and circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite
impassioned debate, even among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now
brought to bear on the same question.

The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor
Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo
Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime
Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No.
9010941. The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a
panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State
Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr.,
charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan
with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed
during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue,
Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the
arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres. 3

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition
for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2,
1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:

(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;

(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed
or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process;

(c) denied his right to bail; and

(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it
first having personally determined the existence of probable cause.  4

The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on
March 6, 1990.   On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return   for the
5 6

respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164   Which had been contemporaneously but
7

separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does not fall
within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it very simply-the information
in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means
for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged
murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of
rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex
crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing
another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is
the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising
from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first
clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which,
therefore, it should not apply.

Page 18
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the
Court issued its Resolution of the same date   granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio
8

spouses provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or
surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios),
respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice to a more extended
resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not
passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court   voted against
9

granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two   against granting bail to the Panlilios.
10

The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator
Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.

The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:

(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of Justice
Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed with common
offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument
although it is not offered in his written pleadings;

(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a necessary

means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion
which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave character;

(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in
its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.

On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez.
Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined.  -A In the view of the majority,
10

the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent
challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete
reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President,
exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others,
Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or
neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to
the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this
Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon
which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious
offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."'   In thus acting, the
11

President in effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect
of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently
powerful reason against so doing.

On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or
should be, limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the
complexing of rebellion with other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in
furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments
were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome
what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with
any other offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48,
as is made clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that case:

There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal Code
cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two
crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties
would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not
exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the

Page 19
modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for
the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article
48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single
aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of
the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.

Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of
sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts
performed by him were punished separately. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro:

La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia este
articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina
Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)

We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish
Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932,
reading:

Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho
constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el
otro.

En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado
maximo, hasta el limite que represents la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando
separadamente los delitos.

Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por
separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)

and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment,
restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period to the
case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged
were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our
mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more
offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each
one of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in
such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than
to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed
separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two
or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when
he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each
crime independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more
serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate
penalties for each offense. 12

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is
that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with
any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.

This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here
inquired into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The
Court's ruling merely provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to
the petitioner's complaints about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he
has taken.

Page 20
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner
does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as
charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:

In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against

defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described
therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants,
as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the
crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not
the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum
penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a
fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused
persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail.  13

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the
statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be
complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be
dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does
indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code:
simple rebellion.

Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary
investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for
simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on
the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent
prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the questioned information.   There is nothing
14

inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an

offense different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence
developed during the preliminary investigation.

It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest
without first personally determining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath
or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the
Constitution.   This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the
15

judge to make such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he follows established
procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor.  Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty
16

minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter
sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary
investigation.   Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a
17

relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he
had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to
overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's
reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary
corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of
simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct
proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a
petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or
vindicating its denial?

The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the
petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction
to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to
invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se
by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by

Page 21
the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then,
not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.

Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information

charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more
than one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either
hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal
action before the respondent Judge.  18

There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded
the present petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the
information or imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the
respondent Judge in dealing with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the
criminal case before said Judge and should have been brought up there instead of directly to
this Court.

There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was
beyond the ability or competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would
be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such
complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from
deciding them; none, in short that would justify by passing established judicial processes
designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is
the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner:
the view that the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to
grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It
makes no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail.
Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's recommendation regarding
bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail
hearing where a capital offense is charged.  It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as
19

to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and
thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.

It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other
parties in a similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous
of the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of
such pleas has only contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by
coming directly to this Court.

Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but
also because to wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound
the delay that it has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But
in so doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the
ordered and orderly progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial court
and reached this Court only if the relief appealed for was denied by the former and, in a
proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.

Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give
short shrift to, pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it
with the resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts. What
has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio
spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in
factual milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said
spouses have uncontestedly pleaded   that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-
20

accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before
NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and
detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of their
constitutional rights.

Page 22
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that
quitessentiany quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and
punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for
power and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity
of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this
aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted
mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as
against the military, but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be
part of, an ongoing rebellion.

It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded
streets of our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the
public peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent
need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define
and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be
conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name.
The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at
any given time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will
perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its
province.

WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence
said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's
earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in
both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be
posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the
corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Medialdea, J., concurs in G.R. No. 92164 but took no part in G.R. No. 92163.

Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions

 
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine, which has been with us for the
past three decades, remains good law and, thus, should remain undisturbed, despite periodic
challenges to it that, ironically, have only served to strengthen its pronouncements.

I take exception to the view, however, that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy.

Page 23
Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of Rebellion, that proposition
could have been plausible. But that Information charged Rebellion complexed with Murder
and Multiple Frustrated Murder, a crime which does not exist in our statute books. The charge
was obviously intended to make the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum
period imposable upon the offender pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
no bail was recommended in the Information nor was any prescribed in the Warrant of Arrest
issued by the Trial Court.

Under the attendant circumstances, therefore, to have filed a Motion to Quash before the
lower Court would not have brought about the speedy relief from unlawful restraint that
petitioner was seeking. During the pendency of said Motion before the lower Court, petitioner
could have continued to languish in detention. Besides, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may still
issue even if another remedy, which is less effective, may be availed of (Chavez vs. Court of
Appeals, 24 SCRA 663).

It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not he when a person is under custody by virtue
of a process issued by a Court.

The Court, however, must have jurisdiction to issue the process. In this case, the Court below
must be deemed to have been ousted of jurisdiction when it illegally curtailed petitioner's
liberty. Habeas corpus is thus available.

The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. But where
the detention or confinement is the result of a process issued by the court or judge or by virtue
of a judgment or sentence, the writ ordinarily cannot be availed of. It may still be invoked
though if the process, judgment or sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction
of which may be assailed. Even if it had authority to act at the outset, it is now the prevailing
doctrine that a deprivation of constitutional right, if shown to exist, would oust it of jurisdiction.
In such a case, habeas corpus could be relied upon to regain one's liberty (Celeste vs.
People, 31 SCRA 391) [Emphasis emphasis].

The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation of petitioner's

constitutional right to bail inasmuch as rebellion, under the present state of the law, is a
bailable offense and the crime for which petitioner stands accused of and for which he was
denied bail is non-existent in law.

While litigants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder, nothing should stop
this Court from taking cognizance of petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional
issues, any procedural flaw notwithstanding.

The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. Quilen, 42 Phil. 805),
the writ of habeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual
freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. The scope and flexibility of the writ-its
capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention-its ability to cut through barriers of form and
procedural mazes-have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and
lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [emphasis supplied].

The proliferation of cases in this Court, which followed in the wake of this Petition, was
brought about by the insistence of the prosecution to charge the crime of Rebellion complexed
with other common offenses notwithstanding the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the
validity of that charge and had granted provisional liberty to petitioner.

If, indeed, it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense (now punishable
by reclusion perpetua), the remedy lies in legislation. But Article 142-A   of the Revised Penal
1

Code, along with P.D. No. 942, were repealed, for being "repressive," by EO No. 187 on 5
June 1987. EO 187 further explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others enumerated) of the
Revised Penal Code was "restored to its full force and effect as it existed before said
amendatory decrees." Having been so repealed, this Court is bereft of power to legislate into

Page 24
existence, under the guise of re-examining a settled doctrine, a "creature unknown in law"- the
complex crime of Rebellion with Murder. The remand of the case to the lower Court for further
proceedings is in order. The Writ of Habeas Corpus has served its purpose.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I join the Court's decision to grant the petition. In reiterating the rule that under existing law
rebellion may not be complexed with murder, the Court emphasizes that it cannot legislate a
new-crime into existence nor prescribe a penalty for its commission. That function is
exclusively for Congress.

I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues arising from these cases,
especially on how the defective informations filed by the prosecutors should have been
treated.

I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the proper
procedure to assert the right to bail. Under the special circumstances of this case, however,
the petitioners had no other recourse. They had to come to us.

First, the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515
(1956) that there is no such crime in our statute books as rebellion complexed with murder,
that murder committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion,
and that a resort to arms resulting in the destruction of life or property constitutes neither two
or more offenses nor a complex crime but one crime-rebellion pure and simple.

Second, Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. It has been reiterated in equally
sensational cases. All lawyers and even law students are aware of the doctrine. Attempts to
have the doctrine re-examined have been consistently rejected by this Court.

Third, President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers, issued Pres. Decree
942, thereby installing the new crime of rebellion complexed with offenses like murder where
graver penalties are imposed by law. However, President Aquino using her then legislative
powers expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. Order 187. She thereby erased the crime
of rebellion complexed with murder and made it clear that the Hernandez doctrine remains the
controlling rule. The prosecution has not explained why it insists on resurrecting an offense
expressly wiped out by the President. The prosecution, in effect, questions the action of the
President in repealing a repressive decree, a decree which, according to the repeal order, is
violative of human rights.

Fourth, any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post facto principle into
the picture. Decisions of this Court form part of our legal system. Even if we declare that
rebellion may be complexed with murder, our declaration can not be made retroactive where
the effect is to imprison a person for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme Court
reversed itself.

And fifth, the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case by stressing that the
killings charged in the information were committed "on the occasion of, but not a necessary
means for, the commission of rebellion" result in outlandish consequences and ignore the
basic nature of rebellion. Thus, under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on PTV-4 which
kills government troopers results in simple rebellion because the act is a necessary means to
make the rebellion succeed. However, if the same bomb also kills some civilians in the
neighborhood, the dropping of the bomb becomes rebellion complexed with murder because
the killing of civilians is not necessary for the success of a rebellion and, therefore, the killings
are only "on the occasion of but not a 'necessary means for' the commission of rebellion.

Page 25
This argument is puerile.

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as
a separate crime of rebellion. Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing
of thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate
offenses, if each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property.
The same act cannot be punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the
fancy of prosecutors-punishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of
civilians. The prosecution also loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in
rebellion the killing of civilians, the laying waste of civilian economies, the massacre of
innocent people, the blowing up of passenger airplanes, and other acts of terrorism are all
used by those engaged in rebellion. We cannot and should not try to ascertain the intent of
rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not connected to the rebellion. We cannot
use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to- be-enacted legislation. The killing of
civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the rebellion and is part of the
rebellion.

The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. I cannot understand why
the trial Judge issued the warrant of arrest which categorically states therein that the
accused was not entitled to bail. The petitioner was compelled to come to us so he would not
be arrested without bail for a nonexistent crime. The trial court forgot to apply an established
doctrine of the Supreme Court. Worse, it issued a warrant which reversed 34 years of
established procedure based on a well-known Supreme Court ruling.

All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial system; they do not
belong to the prosecution service. A court should never play into the hands of the prosecution
and blindly comply with its erroneous manifestations. Faced with an information charging a
manifestly non-existent crime, the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. Or, at the very least
and where possible, make it conform to the law.

A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme Court especially a
decision consistently followed for 34 years. Where a Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court
ruling, he is free to express his reservations in the body of his decision, order, or resolution.
However, any judgment he renders, any order he prescribes, and any processes he
issues must follow the Supreme Court precedent. A trial court has no jurisdiction to reverse or
ignore precedents of the Supreme Court. In this particular case, it should have been the
Solicitor General coming to this Court to question the lower court's rejection of the application
for a warrant of arrest without bail. It should have been the Solicitor-General provoking the
issue of re-examination instead of the petitioners asking to be freed from their arrest for a non-
existent crime.

The principle bears repeating:

Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not have ruled in
any other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey.
It is as simple as that. There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera. (L-31589,
July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 98) 'The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to
a constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal
ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that
appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure
stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with
finality, logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then
should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the
judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit.' (Ibid, 107. The opinion of Justice Laurel
in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited). The ensuing paragraph of the opinion in
Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: 'Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be
reminded that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has

Page 26
the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. There is
only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings.
(Ibid. Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Br. VI), L-
26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961. (Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226 [1978].
See also Albert v. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948 [1968] and Vir-Jen Shipping and
Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577 [1983])

I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors Fernando de Leon, et al. even more
inexplicable. In the case of the Panlilios, any probable cause to commit the non- existent
crime of rebellion complexed with murder exists only in the minds of the prosecutors, not in
the records of the case.

I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members of the Supreme Court. I
listened intently to the oral arguments during the hearing and it was quite apparent that the
constitutional requirement of probable cause was not satisfied. In fact, in answer to my query
for any other proofs to support the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the answer was that the
evidence would be submitted in due time to the trial court.

The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for decades.
Under the records of these petitions, any restaurant owner or hotel manager who serves food
to rebels is a co-conspirator in the rebellion. The absurdity of this proposition is apparent if we
bear in mind that rebels ride in buses and jeepneys, eat meals in rural houses when mealtime
finds them in the vicinity, join weddings, fiestas, and other parties, play basketball with barrio
youths, attend masses and church services and otherwise mix with people in various
gatherings. Even if the hosts recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo them away, it does
not necessarily follow that the former are co-conspirators in a rebellion.

The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio case is the alleged fact
that the petitioners served food to rebels at the Enrile household and a hotel supervisor asked
two or three of their waiters, without reason, to go on a vacation. Clearly, a much, much
stronger showing of probable cause must be shown.

In Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), then Senator Salonga was charged as a
conspirator in the heinous bombing of innocent civilians because the man who planted the
bomb had, sometime earlier, appeared in a group photograph taken during a birthday party in
the United States with the Senator and other guests. It was a case of conspiracy proved
through a group picture. Here, it is a case of conspiracy sought to proved through the catering
of food.

The Court in Salonga stressed:

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious
and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime,
from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from
useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashimn v. Boncan, 71
Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would
be to transgress constitutional due process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277)
However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary
investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not escape
with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. More
important, it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who
live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be,
to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a
sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed
rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the
conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the
finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard

Page 27
the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason (See La Chemise
Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on
with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for
this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It
bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so. (id., pp. 461- 462)

Because of the foregoing, I take exception to that part of the ponencia which will read the
informations as charging simple rebellion. This case did not arise from innocent error. If an
information charges murder but its contents show only the ingredients of homicide, the Judge
may rightly read it as charging homicide. In these cases, however, there is a deliberate
attempt to charge the petitioners for an offense which this Court has ruled as non-existent.
The prosecution wanted Hernandez to be reversed. Since the prosecution has filed
informations for a crime which, under our rulings, does not exist, those informations should be
treated as null and void. New informations charging the correct offense should be filed. And in
G.R. No. 92164, an extra effort should be made to see whether or not the Principle in Salonga
v. Cruz Patio, et al. (supra) has been violated.

The Court is not, in any way, preventing the Government from using more effective weapons
to suppress rebellion. If the Government feels that the current situation calls for the imposition
of more severe penalties like death or the creation of new crimes like rebellion complexed with
murder, the remedy is with Congress, not the courts.

I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent court to DISMISS the
void informations for a non-existent crime.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court.

I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that, as an abstract question
of law, could stand reexamination or clarification. I have in mind in particular matters such as
the correct or appropriate relationship between Article 134 and Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code. This is a matter which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in our legal
system. If one examines the actual terms of Article 134 (entitled: "Rebellion or Insurrection-
How Committed"), it would appear that this Article specifies both the overt acts and
the criminal purpose which, when put together, would constitute the offense of rebellion. Thus,
Article 134 states that "the crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking arms
against the Government "(i.e., the overt acts comprising rebellion), "for the purpose of (i.e., the
specific criminal intent or political objective) removing from the allegiance to said government
or its laws the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of
land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly
or partially, of their powers or prerogatives." At the same time, Article 135 (entitled: "Penalty
for Rebellion or Insurrection.") sets out a listing of acts or particular measures which appear to
fall under the rubric of rebellion or insurrection: "engaging in war against the forces of the
Government, destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting contributions or
diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated." Are
these modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they particular modes by which those
"who promote [ ], maintain [ ] or head [ ] a rebellion or insurrection" commit rebellion, or
particular modes of participation in a rebellion by public officers or employees? Clearly, the
scope of the legal concept of rebellion relates to the distinction between, on the one hand, the
indispensable acts or ingredients of the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code and,
on the other hand, differing optional modes of seeking to carry out the political or social
objective of the rebellion or insurrection.

Page 28
The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more even the above
threshold questions is that the results of such re-examination may well be that acts which
under the Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion, may be characterized as separate
or discrete offenses which, as a matter of law, can either be prosecuted separately from
rebellion or prosecuted under the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which
(both Clause 1 and Clause 2 thereof) clearly envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct
offenses. To reach such a conclusion in the case at bar, would, as far as I can see, result in
colliding with the fundamental non-retroactivity principle (Article 4, Civil Code; Article 22,
Revised Penal Code; both in relation to Article 8, Civil Code).

The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not exist in the
abstract but rather bear upon the lives of people with the specific form given them by judicial
decisions interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific
shape and content to such norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted with the
glosses placed upon them by the courts and the glosses become integral with the norms
(Cf Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial interpretation
of a statute becomes part of the law as of the date that the law was originally enacted, I
believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously where a new judicial doctrine is announced,
in particular one overruling a previous existing doctrine of long standing (here, 36 years) and
most specially not where the statute construed is criminal in nature and the new doctrine is
more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607
[1974]; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420
[1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of legislative acts or judicial
decisions has constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the United States is that a
judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of the
penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule
against ex post facto laws and the due process clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US
347,12 L. Ed. 2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine v.
New Mexico Department of Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).

It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle does not present any real
problem for the reason that the Hernandez doctrine was based upon Article 48, second
clause, of the Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof, while it is precisely
the first clause of Article 48 that the Government here invokes. It is, however, open to serious
doubt whether Hernandez can reasonably be so simply and sharply characterized. And
assuming the Hernandez could be so characterized, subsequent cases refer to
the Hernandez doctrine in terms which do not distinguish clearly between the first clause and
the second clause of Article 48 (e.g., People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v.
Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]). Thus, it appears to me that the critical question would be
whether a man of ordinary intelligence would have necessarily read or understood
the Hernandez doctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48, second clause. Put in slightly
different terms, the important question would be whether the new doctrine here proposed by
the Government could fairly have been derived by a man of average intelligence (or counsel
of average competence in the law) from an examination of Articles 134 and 135 of the
Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in the Hernandez and subsequent cases. To
formulate the question ill these terms would almost be to compel a negative answer,
especially in view of the conclusions reached by the Court and its several Members today.

Finally, there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the Government would
have us discover for the first time since the promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in 1932,
would be more onerous for the respondent accused than the simple application of
the Hernandez doctrine that murders which have been committed on the occasion of and in
furtherance of the crime of rebellion must be deemed absorbed in the offense of simple
rebellion.

I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as charging only the crime
of simple rebellion.

Page 29
 

FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a rigid adherence to the
1956 ruling of the Court. The numerous challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case
of People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) should at once demonstrate the need to
redefine the applicability of said doctrine so as to make it conformable with accepted and well-
settled principles of criminal law and jurisprudence.

To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority

for the rule that all common crimes committed on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in
connection with, rebellion are absorbed by the latter. To that extent, I cannot go along with the
view of the majority in the instant case that 'Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to
prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof,
either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that
constitutes rebellion" (p. 9, Decision).

The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was appealed by the Court in
1956 during the communist-inspired rebellion of the Huks. The changes in our society in the
span of 34 years since then have far-reaching effects on the all-embracing applicability of the
doctrine considering the emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the duly
constituted Government not contemplated in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code
and their consequent effects on the lives of our people. The doctrine was good law then, but I
believe that there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that needs clarification.

With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court, I believe that the Court, in the
instant case, should have further considered that distinction between acts or offenses which
are indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the one hand, and those acts or offenses
that are merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the other.
The majority of the Court is correct in adopting, albeit impliedly, the view in Hernandez case
that when an offense perpetrated as a necessary means of committing another, which is an
element of the latter, the resulting interlocking crimes should be considered as only one
simple offense and must be deemed outside the operation of the complex crime provision
(Article 48) of the Revised Penal Code. As in the case of Hernandez, the Court, however,
failed in the instant case to distinguish what is indispensable from what is merely necessary in
the commission of an offense, resulting thus in the rule that common crimes like murder,
arson, robbery, etc. committed in the course or on the occasion of rebellion are absorbed or
included in the latter as elements thereof.

The relevance of the distinction is significant, more particularly, if applied to contemporaneous

events happening in our country today. Theoretically, a crime which is indispensable in the
commission of another must necessarily be an element of the latter; but a crime that is merely
necessary but not indispensable in the commission of another is not an element of the latter,
and if and when actually committed, brings the interlocking crime within the operation of the
complex crime provision (Art. 48) of the Revised Penal Code. With that distinction, common
crimes committed against Government forces and property in the course of rebellion are
properly considered indispensable overt acts of rebellion and are logically absorbed in it as
virtual ingredients or elements thereof, but common crimes committed against the civilian
population in the course or on the occasion of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, may be
necessary but not indispensable in committing the latter, and may, therefore, not be
considered as elements of the said crime of rebellion. To illustrate, the deaths occurring
during armed confrontation or clashes between government forces and the rebels are
absorbed in the rebellion, and would be those resulting from the bombing of military camps
and installations, as these acts are indispensable in carrying out the rebellion. But deliberately
shooting down an unarmed innocent civilian to instill fear or create chaos among the people,
although done in the furtherance of the rebellion, should not be absorbed in the crime of

Page 30
rebellion as the felonious act is merely necessary, but not indispensable. In the latter case,
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should apply.

The occurrence of a coup d' etat in our country as a mode of seizing the powers of the duly-
constituted government by staging surprise attacks or occupying centers of powers, of which
this Court should take judicial notice, has introduced a new dimension to the interpretation of
the provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. Generally, as a mode
of seizing the powers of the duly constituted government, it falls within the contemplation of
rebellion under the Revised Penal Code, but, strictly construed, a coup d'etat per se is a class
by itself. The manner of its execution and the extent and magnitude of its effects on the lives
of the people distinguish a coup d'etat from the traditional definition and modes of commission
attached by the Revised Penal Code to the crime of rebellion as applied by the Court to the
communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950's. A coup d'etat may be executed successfully
without its perpetrators resorting to the commission of other serious crimes such as murder,
arson, kidnapping, robbery, etc. because of the element of surprise and the precise timing of
its execution. In extreme cases where murder, arson, robbery, and other common crimes are
committed on the occasion of a coup d' etat, the distinction referred to above on what is
necessary and what is indispensable in the commission of the coup d'etat should be
painstakingly considered as the Court should have done in the case of herein petitioners.

I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but I take exception
to the vote of the majority on the broad application of the Hernandez doctrine.

BIDIN, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive portion thereof which
orders the remand of the case to the respondent judge for further proceedings to fix the
amount of bail to be posted by the petitioner.

I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose
of fixing bail since we have construed the indictment herein as charging simple rebellion, an
offense which is bailable. Consequently, habeas corpus is the proper remedy available to
petitioner as an accused who had been charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but
who had been denied his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of petitioner's
constitutional right to bail. In view thereof, the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and
approval thereof when filed, devolves upon us, if complete relief is to be accorded to petitioner
in the instant proceedings.

It is indubitable that before conviction, admission to bail is a matter of right to the defendant,
accused before the Regional Trial Court of an offense less than capital (Section 13 Article III,
Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114). Petitioner is, before Us, on a petition for habeas
corpus praying, among others, for his provisional release on bail. Since the offense charged
(construed as simple rebellion) admits of bail, it is incumbent upon us m the exercise of our
jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus (Section 5 (1), Article VIII, Constitution; Section
2, Rule 102), to grant petitioner his right to bail and having admitted him to bail, to fix the
amount thereof in such sums as the court deems reasonable. Thereafter, the rules require
that "the proceedings together with the bond" shall forthwith be certified to the respondent trial
court (Section 14, Rule 102).

Accordingly, the cash bond in the amount of P 100,000.00 posted by petitioner for his
provisional release pursuant to our resolution dated March 6, 1990 should now be deemed
and admitted as his bail bond for his provisional release in the case (simple rebellion) pending
before the respondent judge, without necessity of a remand for further proceedings,
conditioned for his (petitioner's) appearance before the trial court to abide its order or
judgment in the said case.

Page 31
SARMIENTO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I agree that People v. Hernandez   should abide. More than three decades after which it was
1

penned, it has firmly settled in the tomes of our jurisprudence as correct doctrine.

As Hernandez put it, rebellion means "engaging m war against the forces of the
government,"   which implies "resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of
2

taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of
life, and the hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. ..."   whether
3

committed in furtherance, of as a necessary means for the commission, or in the course, of

rebellion. To say that rebellion may be complexed with any other offense, in this case murder,
is to play into a contradiction in terms because exactly, rebellion includes murder, among
other possible crimes.

I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple rebellion. Since the
acts complained of as constituting rebellion have been embodied in the information, mention
therein of murder as a complexing offense is a surplusage, because in any case, the crime of
rebellion is left fully described. 
4

At any rate, the government need only amend the information by a clerical correction, since
an amendment will not alter its substance.

I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of the matter of bail to the lower
court. I take it that when we, in our Resolution of March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner
"provisional liberty" upon the filing of a bond of P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact
that we gave him "provisional liberty" is in my view, of no moment, because bail means
provisional liberty. It will serve no useful purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again
when we ourselves have been satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People vs. Hernandez, 99
Phil. 515 "remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion."

I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the information in
question, while charging the complex crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, "is to be read as charging simple rebellion."

The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in at least one (1)
material respect. In the Hernandez case, this Court was confronted with an appealed case,
i.e., Hernandez had been convicted by the trial court of the complex crime of rebellion with
murder, arson and robbery, and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme Court,
pending appeal, gave birth to the now celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the crime of
rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery does not exist. In the present cases, on
the other hand, the Court is confronted with an original case, i.e., where an information has
been recently filed in the trial court and the petitioners have not even pleaded thereto.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was "ground-breaking" on the issue

of whether rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases,
on the other hand, the prosecution and the lower court, not only had the Hernandez doctrine
(as case law), but Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June
1987 (as statutory law) to bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion
complexed with murder, and multiple frustrated murder does not exist.

Page 32
And yet, notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights-absent when this
Court laid down the Hernandez doctrine-the prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower
court has persisted in hearing, an information charging the petitioners with rebellion
complexed with murder an multiple frustrated murder. That information is clearly a nullity and
plainly void ab initio. Its head should not be allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law,
it charges nothing; it has given rise to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto
are as null and void as the information on which they are anchored. And, since the entire
question of the information's validity is before the Court in these habeas corpus cases, I
venture to say that the information is fatally defective, even under procedural law, because it
charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court).

I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and, at best, fatally decrepit
information by labelling or "baptizing" it differently from what it announces itself to be. The
prosecution must file an entirely new and proper information, for this entire exercise to merit
the serious consideration of the courts.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH the warrants of arrest, and ORDER
the information for rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal
Case Nos. 90-10941, RTC of Quezon City, DISMISSED.

Consequently, the petitioners should be ordered permanently released and their bails
cancelled.

Paras, J., concurs.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine, which has been with us for the
past three decades, remains good law and, thus, should remain undisturbed, despite periodic
challenges to it that, ironically, have only served to strengthen its pronouncements.

I take exception to the view, however, that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy.

Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of Rebellion, that proposition
could have been plausible. But that Information charged Rebellion complexed with Murder
and Multiple Frustrated Murder, a crime which does not exist in our statute books. The charge
was obviously intended to make the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum
period imposable upon the offender pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
no bail was recommended in the Information nor was any prescribed in the Warrant of Arrest
issued by the Trial Court.

Under the attendant circumstances, therefore, to have filed a Motion to Quash before the
lower Court would not have brought about the speedy relief from unlawful restraint that
petitioner was seeking. During the pendency of said Motion before the lower Court, petitioner
could have continued to languish in detention. Besides, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may still
issue even if another remedy, which is less effective, may be availed of (Chavez vs. Court of
Appeals, 24 SCRA 663).

It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not he when a person is under custody by virtue
of a process issued by a Court.

Page 33
The Court, however, must have jurisdiction to issue the process. In this case, the Court below
must be deemed to have been ousted of jurisdiction when it illegally curtailed petitioner's
liberty. Habeas corpus is thus available.

The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. But where
the detention or confinement is the result of a process issued by the court or judge or by virtue
of a judgment or sentence, the writ ordinarily cannot be availed of. It may still be invoked
though if the process, judgment or sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction
of which may be assailed. Even if it had authority to act at the outset, it is now the prevailing
doctrine that a deprivation of constitutional right, if shown to exist, would oust it of jurisdiction.
In such a case, habeas corpus could be relied upon to regain one's liberty (Celeste vs.
People, 31 SCRA 391) [Emphasis emphasis].

The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation of petitioner's

constitutional right to bail inasmuch as rebellion, under the present state of the law, is a
bailable offense and the crime for which petitioner stands accused of and for which he was
denied bail is non-existent in law.

While litigants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder, nothing should stop
this Court from taking cognizance of petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional
issues, any procedural flaw notwithstanding.

The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. Quilen, 42 Phil. 805),
the writ of habeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual
freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. The scope and flexibility of the writ-its
capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention-its ability to cut through barriers of form and
procedural mazes-have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and
lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [emphasis supplied].

The proliferation of cases in this Court, which followed in the wake of this Petition, was
brought about by the insistence of the prosecution to charge the crime of Rebellion complexed
with other common offenses notwithstanding the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the
validity of that charge and had granted provisional liberty to petitioner.

If, indeed, it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense (now punishable
by reclusion perpetua), the remedy lies in legislation. But Article 142-A   of the Revised Penal
1

Code, along with P.D. No. 942, were repealed, for being "repressive," by EO No. 187 on 5
June 1987. EO 187 further explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others enumerated) of the
Revised Penal Code was "restored to its full force and effect as it existed before said
amendatory decrees." Having been so repealed, this Court is bereft of power to legislate into
existence, under the guise of re-examining a settled doctrine, a "creature unknown in law"- the
complex crime of Rebellion with Murder. The remand of the case to the lower Court for further
proceedings is in order. The Writ of Habeas Corpus has served its purpose.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I join the Court's decision to grant the petition. In reiterating the rule that under existing law
rebellion may not be complexed with murder, the Court emphasizes that it cannot legislate a
new-crime into existence nor prescribe a penalty for its commission. That function is
exclusively for Congress.

I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues arising from these cases,
especially on how the defective informations filed by the prosecutors should have been
treated.

Page 34
I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the proper
procedure to assert the right to bail. Under the special circumstances of this case, however,
the petitioners had no other recourse. They had to come to us.

First, the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515
(1956) that there is no such crime in our statute books as rebellion complexed with murder,
that murder committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion,
and that a resort to arms resulting in the destruction of life or property constitutes neither two
or more offenses nor a complex crime but one crime-rebellion pure and simple.

Second, Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. It has been reiterated in equally
sensational cases. All lawyers and even law students are aware of the doctrine. Attempts to
have the doctrine re-examined have been consistently rejected by this Court.

Third, President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers, issued Pres. Decree
942, thereby installing the new crime of rebellion complexed with offenses like murder where
graver penalties are imposed by law. However, President Aquino using her then legislative
powers expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. Order 187. She thereby erased the crime
of rebellion complexed with murder and made it clear that the Hernandez doctrine remains the
controlling rule. The prosecution has not explained why it insists on resurrecting an offense
expressly wiped out by the President. The prosecution, in effect, questions the action of the
President in repealing a repressive decree, a decree which, according to the repeal order, is
violative of human rights.

Fourth, any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post facto principle into
the picture. Decisions of this Court form part of our legal system. Even if we declare that
rebellion may be complexed with murder, our declaration can not be made retroactive where
the effect is to imprison a person for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme Court
reversed itself.

And fifth, the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case by stressing that the
killings charged in the information were committed "on the occasion of, but not a necessary
means for, the commission of rebellion" result in outlandish consequences and ignore the
basic nature of rebellion. Thus, under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on PTV-4 which
kills government troopers results in simple rebellion because the act is a necessary means to
make the rebellion succeed. However, if the same bomb also kills some civilians in the
neighborhood, the dropping of the bomb becomes rebellion complexed with murder because
the killing of civilians is not necessary for the success of a rebellion and, therefore, the killings
are only "on the occasion of but not a 'necessary means for' the commission of rebellion.

This argument is puerile.

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as
a separate crime of rebellion. Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing
of thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate
offenses, if each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property.
The same act cannot be punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the
fancy of prosecutors-punishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of
civilians. The prosecution also loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in
rebellion the killing of civilians, the laying waste of civilian economies, the massacre of
innocent people, the blowing up of passenger airplanes, and other acts of terrorism are all
used by those engaged in rebellion. We cannot and should not try to ascertain the intent of
rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not connected to the rebellion. We cannot
use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to- be-enacted legislation. The killing of
civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the rebellion and is part of the
rebellion.

Page 35
The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. I cannot understand why
the trial Judge issued the warrant of arrest which categorically states therein that the
accused was not entitled to bail. The petitioner was compelled to come to us so he would not
be arrested without bail for a nonexistent crime. The trial court forgot to apply an established
doctrine of the Supreme Court. Worse, it issued a warrant which reversed 34 years of
established procedure based on a well-known Supreme Court ruling.

All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial system; they do not
belong to the prosecution service. A court should never play into the hands of the prosecution
and blindly comply with its erroneous manifestations. Faced with an information charging a
manifestly non-existent crime, the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. Or, at the very least
and where possible, make it conform to the law.

A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme Court especially a
decision consistently followed for 34 years. Where a Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court
ruling, he is free to express his reservations in the body of his decision, order, or resolution.
However, any judgment he renders, any order he prescribes, and any processes he
issues must follow the Supreme Court precedent. A trial court has no jurisdiction to reverse or
ignore precedents of the Supreme Court. In this particular case, it should have been the
Solicitor General coming to this Court to question the lower court's rejection of the application
for a warrant of arrest without bail. It should have been the Solicitor-General provoking the
issue of re-examination instead of the petitioners asking to be freed from their arrest for a non-
existent crime.

The principle bears repeating:

Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not have ruled in
any other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey.
It is as simple as that. There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera. (L-31589,
July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 98) 'The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to
a constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal
ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that
appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure
stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with
finality, logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then
should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the
judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit.' (Ibid, 107. The opinion of Justice Laurel
in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited). The ensuing paragraph of the opinion in
Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: 'Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be
reminded that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has
the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. There is
only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings.
(Ibid. Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Br. VI), L-
26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961. (Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226 [1978].
See also Albert v. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948 [1968] and Vir-Jen Shipping and
Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577 [1983])

I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors Fernando de Leon, et al. even more
inexplicable. In the case of the Panlilios, any probable cause to commit the non- existent
crime of rebellion complexed with murder exists only in the minds of the prosecutors, not in
the records of the case.

I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members of the Supreme Court. I
listened intently to the oral arguments during the hearing and it was quite apparent that the
constitutional requirement of probable cause was not satisfied. In fact, in answer to my query
for any other proofs to support the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the answer was that the
evidence would be submitted in due time to the trial court.

Page 36
The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for decades.
Under the records of these petitions, any restaurant owner or hotel manager who serves food
to rebels is a co-conspirator in the rebellion. The absurdity of this proposition is apparent if we
bear in mind that rebels ride in buses and jeepneys, eat meals in rural houses when mealtime
finds them in the vicinity, join weddings, fiestas, and other parties, play basketball with barrio
youths, attend masses and church services and otherwise mix with people in various
gatherings. Even if the hosts recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo them away, it does
not necessarily follow that the former are co-conspirators in a rebellion.

The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio case is the alleged fact
that the petitioners served food to rebels at the Enrile household and a hotel supervisor asked
two or three of their waiters, without reason, to go on a vacation. Clearly, a much, much
stronger showing of probable cause must be shown.

In Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), then Senator Salonga was charged as a
conspirator in the heinous bombing of innocent civilians because the man who planted the
bomb had, sometime earlier, appeared in a group photograph taken during a birthday party in
the United States with the Senator and other guests. It was a case of conspiracy proved
through a group picture. Here, it is a case of conspiracy sought to proved through the catering
of food.

The Court in Salonga stressed:

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious
and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime,
from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from
useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashimn v. Boncan, 71
Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would
be to transgress constitutional due process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277)
However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary
investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not escape
with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. More
important, it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who
live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be,
to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a
sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed
rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the
conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the
finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard
the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason (See La Chemise
Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on
with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for
this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It
bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so. (id., pp. 461- 462)

Because of the foregoing, I take exception to that part of the ponencia which will read the
informations as charging simple rebellion. This case did not arise from innocent error. If an
information charges murder but its contents show only the ingredients of homicide, the Judge
may rightly read it as charging homicide. In these cases, however, there is a deliberate
attempt to charge the petitioners for an offense which this Court has ruled as non-existent.
The prosecution wanted Hernandez to be reversed. Since the prosecution has filed
informations for a crime which, under our rulings, does not exist, those informations should be
treated as null and void. New informations charging the correct offense should be filed. And in
G.R. No. 92164, an extra effort should be made to see whether or not the Principle in Salonga
v. Cruz Patio, et al. (supra) has been violated.

Page 37
The Court is not, in any way, preventing the Government from using more effective weapons
to suppress rebellion. If the Government feels that the current situation calls for the imposition
of more severe penalties like death or the creation of new crimes like rebellion complexed with
murder, the remedy is with Congress, not the courts.

I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent court to DISMISS the
void informations for a non-existent crime.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court.

I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that, as an abstract question
of law, could stand reexamination or clarification. I have in mind in particular matters such as
the correct or appropriate relationship between Article 134 and Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code. This is a matter which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in our legal
system. If one examines the actual terms of Article 134 (entitled: "Rebellion or Insurrection-
How Committed"), it would appear that this Article specifies both the overt acts and
the criminal purpose which, when put together, would constitute the offense of rebellion. Thus,
Article 134 states that "the crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking arms
against the Government "(i.e., the overt acts comprising rebellion), "for the purpose of (i.e., the
specific criminal intent or political objective) removing from the allegiance to said government
or its laws the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of
land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly
or partially, of their powers or prerogatives." At the same time, Article 135 (entitled: "Penalty
for Rebellion or Insurrection.") sets out a listing of acts or particular measures which appear to
fall under the rubric of rebellion or insurrection: "engaging in war against the forces of the
Government, destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting contributions or
diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated." Are
these modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they particular modes by which those
"who promote [ ], maintain [ ] or head [ ] a rebellion or insurrection" commit rebellion, or
particular modes of participation in a rebellion by public officers or employees? Clearly, the
scope of the legal concept of rebellion relates to the distinction between, on the one hand, the
indispensable acts or ingredients of the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code and,
on the other hand, differing optional modes of seeking to carry out the political or social
objective of the rebellion or insurrection.

The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more even the above
threshold questions is that the results of such re-examination may well be that acts which
under the Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion, may be characterized as separate
or discrete offenses which, as a matter of law, can either be prosecuted separately from
rebellion or prosecuted under the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which
(both Clause 1 and Clause 2 thereof) clearly envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct
offenses. To reach such a conclusion in the case at bar, would, as far as I can see, result in
colliding with the fundamental non-retroactivity principle (Article 4, Civil Code; Article 22,
Revised Penal Code; both in relation to Article 8, Civil Code).

The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not exist in the
abstract but rather bear upon the lives of people with the specific form given them by judicial
decisions interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific
shape and content to such norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted with the
glosses placed upon them by the courts and the glosses become integral with the norms
(Cf Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial interpretation
of a statute becomes part of the law as of the date that the law was originally enacted, I
believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously where a new judicial doctrine is announced,
in particular one overruling a previous existing doctrine of long standing (here, 36 years) and

Page 38
most specially not where the statute construed is criminal in nature and the new doctrine is
more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607
[1974]; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420
[1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of legislative acts or judicial
decisions has constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the United States is that a
judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of the
penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule
against ex post facto laws and the due process clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US
347,12 L. Ed. 2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine v.
New Mexico Department of Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).

It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle does not present any real
problem for the reason that the Hernandez doctrine was based upon Article 48, second
clause, of the Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof, while it is precisely
the first clause of Article 48 that the Government here invokes. It is, however, open to serious
doubt whether Hernandez can reasonably be so simply and sharply characterized. And
assuming the Hernandez could be so characterized, subsequent cases refer to
the Hernandez doctrine in terms which do not distinguish clearly between the first clause and
the second clause of Article 48 (e.g., People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v.
Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]). Thus, it appears to me that the critical question would be
whether a man of ordinary intelligence would have necessarily read or understood
the Hernandez doctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48, second clause. Put in slightly
different terms, the important question would be whether the new doctrine here proposed by
the Government could fairly have been derived by a man of average intelligence (or counsel
of average competence in the law) from an examination of Articles 134 and 135 of the
Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in the Hernandez and subsequent cases. To
formulate the question ill these terms would almost be to compel a negative answer,
especially in view of the conclusions reached by the Court and its several Members today.

Finally, there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the Government would
have us discover for the first time since the promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in 1932,
would be more onerous for the respondent accused than the simple application of
the Hernandez doctrine that murders which have been committed on the occasion of and in
furtherance of the crime of rebellion must be deemed absorbed in the offense of simple
rebellion.

I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as charging only the crime
of simple rebellion.

FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a rigid adherence to the
1956 ruling of the Court. The numerous challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case
of People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) should at once demonstrate the need to
redefine the applicability of said doctrine so as to make it conformable with accepted and well-
settled principles of criminal law and jurisprudence.

To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority

for the rule that all common crimes committed on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in
connection with, rebellion are absorbed by the latter. To that extent, I cannot go along with the
view of the majority in the instant case that 'Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to
prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof,
either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that
constitutes rebellion" (p. 9, Decision).

Page 39
The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was appealed by the Court in
1956 during the communist-inspired rebellion of the Huks. The changes in our society in the
span of 34 years since then have far-reaching effects on the all-embracing applicability of the
doctrine considering the emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the duly
constituted Government not contemplated in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code
and their consequent effects on the lives of our people. The doctrine was good law then, but I
believe that there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that needs clarification.

With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court, I believe that the Court, in the
instant case, should have further considered that distinction between acts or offenses which
are indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the one hand, and those acts or offenses
that are merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the other.
The majority of the Court is correct in adopting, albeit impliedly, the view in Hernandez case
that when an offense perpetrated as a necessary means of committing another, which is an
element of the latter, the resulting interlocking crimes should be considered as only one
simple offense and must be deemed outside the operation of the complex crime provision
(Article 48) of the Revised Penal Code. As in the case of Hernandez, the Court, however,
failed in the instant case to distinguish what is indispensable from what is merely necessary in
the commission of an offense, resulting thus in the rule that common crimes like murder,
arson, robbery, etc. committed in the course or on the occasion of rebellion are absorbed or
included in the latter as elements thereof.

The relevance of the distinction is significant, more particularly, if applied to contemporaneous

events happening in our country today. Theoretically, a crime which is indispensable in the
commission of another must necessarily be an element of the latter; but a crime that is merely
necessary but not indispensable in the commission of another is not an element of the latter,
and if and when actually committed, brings the interlocking crime within the operation of the
complex crime provision (Art. 48) of the Revised Penal Code. With that distinction, common
crimes committed against Government forces and property in the course of rebellion are
properly considered indispensable overt acts of rebellion and are logically absorbed in it as
virtual ingredients or elements thereof, but common crimes committed against the civilian
population in the course or on the occasion of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, may be
necessary but not indispensable in committing the latter, and may, therefore, not be
considered as elements of the said crime of rebellion. To illustrate, the deaths occurring
during armed confrontation or clashes between government forces and the rebels are
absorbed in the rebellion, and would be those resulting from the bombing of military camps
and installations, as these acts are indispensable in carrying out the rebellion. But deliberately
shooting down an unarmed innocent civilian to instill fear or create chaos among the people,
although done in the furtherance of the rebellion, should not be absorbed in the crime of
rebellion as the felonious act is merely necessary, but not indispensable. In the latter case,
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should apply.

The occurrence of a coup d' etat in our country as a mode of seizing the powers of the duly-
constituted government by staging surprise attacks or occupying centers of powers, of which
this Court should take judicial notice, has introduced a new dimension to the interpretation of
the provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. Generally, as a mode
of seizing the powers of the duly constituted government, it falls within the contemplation of
rebellion under the Revised Penal Code, but, strictly construed, a coup d'etat per se is a class
by itself. The manner of its execution and the extent and magnitude of its effects on the lives
of the people distinguish a coup d'etat from the traditional definition and modes of commission
attached by the Revised Penal Code to the crime of rebellion as applied by the Court to the
communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950's. A coup d'etat may be executed successfully
without its perpetrators resorting to the commission of other serious crimes such as murder,
arson, kidnapping, robbery, etc. because of the element of surprise and the precise timing of
its execution. In extreme cases where murder, arson, robbery, and other common crimes are
committed on the occasion of a coup d' etat, the distinction referred to above on what is
necessary and what is indispensable in the commission of the coup d'etat should be
painstakingly considered as the Court should have done in the case of herein petitioners.

Page 40
I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but I take exception
to the vote of the majority on the broad application of the Hernandez doctrine.

BIDIN, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive portion thereof which
orders the remand of the case to the respondent judge for further proceedings to fix the
amount of bail to be posted by the petitioner.

I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose
of fixing bail since we have construed the indictment herein as charging simple rebellion, an
offense which is bailable. Consequently, habeas corpus is the proper remedy available to
petitioner as an accused who had been charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but
who had been denied his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of petitioner's
constitutional right to bail. In view thereof, the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and
approval thereof when filed, devolves upon us, if complete relief is to be accorded to petitioner
in the instant proceedings.

It is indubitable that before conviction, admission to bail is a matter of right to the defendant,
accused before the Regional Trial Court of an offense less than capital (Section 13 Article III,
Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114). Petitioner is, before Us, on a petition for habeas
corpus praying, among others, for his provisional release on bail. Since the offense charged
(construed as simple rebellion) admits of bail, it is incumbent upon us m the exercise of our
jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus (Section 5 (1), Article VIII, Constitution; Section
2, Rule 102), to grant petitioner his right to bail and having admitted him to bail, to fix the
amount thereof in such sums as the court deems reasonable. Thereafter, the rules require
that "the proceedings together with the bond" shall forthwith be certified to the respondent trial
court (Section 14, Rule 102).

Accordingly, the cash bond in the amount of P 100,000.00 posted by petitioner for his
provisional release pursuant to our resolution dated March 6, 1990 should now be deemed
and admitted as his bail bond for his provisional release in the case (simple rebellion) pending
before the respondent judge, without necessity of a remand for further proceedings,
conditioned for his (petitioner's) appearance before the trial court to abide its order or
judgment in the said case.

SARMIENTO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I agree that People v. Hernandez   should abide. More than three decades after which it was
1

penned, it has firmly settled in the tomes of our jurisprudence as correct doctrine.

As Hernandez put it, rebellion means "engaging m war against the forces of the
government,"   which implies "resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of
2

taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of
life, and the hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. ..."   whether
3

committed in furtherance, of as a necessary means for the commission, or in the course, of

rebellion. To say that rebellion may be complexed with any other offense, in this case murder,
is to play into a contradiction in terms because exactly, rebellion includes murder, among
other possible crimes.

I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple rebellion. Since the
acts complained of as constituting rebellion have been embodied in the information, mention
therein of murder as a complexing offense is a surplusage, because in any case, the crime of
rebellion is left fully described. 
4

Page 41
At any rate, the government need only amend the information by a clerical correction, since
an amendment will not alter its substance.

I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of the matter of bail to the lower
court. I take it that when we, in our Resolution of March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner
"provisional liberty" upon the filing of a bond of P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact
that we gave him "provisional liberty" is in my view, of no moment, because bail means
provisional liberty. It will serve no useful purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again
when we ourselves have been satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People vs. Hernandez, 99
Phil. 515 "remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion."

I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the information in
question, while charging the complex crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, "is to be read as charging simple rebellion."

The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in at least one (1)
material respect. In the Hernandez case, this Court was confronted with an appealed case,
i.e., Hernandez had been convicted by the trial court of the complex crime of rebellion with
murder, arson and robbery, and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme Court,
pending appeal, gave birth to the now celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the crime of
rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery does not exist. In the present cases, on
the other hand, the Court is confronted with an original case, i.e., where an information has
been recently filed in the trial court and the petitioners have not even pleaded thereto.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was "ground-breaking" on the issue

of whether rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases,
on the other hand, the prosecution and the lower court, not only had the Hernandez doctrine
(as case law), but Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June
1987 (as statutory law) to bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion
complexed with murder, and multiple frustrated murder does not exist.

And yet, notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights-absent when this

Court laid down the Hernandez doctrine-the prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower
court has persisted in hearing, an information charging the petitioners with rebellion
complexed with murder an multiple frustrated murder. That information is clearly a nullity and
plainly void ab initio. Its head should not be allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law,
it charges nothing; it has given rise to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto
are as null and void as the information on which they are anchored. And, since the entire
question of the information's validity is before the Court in these habeas corpus cases, I
venture to say that the information is fatally defective, even under procedural law, because it
charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court).

I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and, at best, fatally decrepit
information by labelling or "baptizing" it differently from what it announces itself to be. The
prosecution must file an entirely new and proper information, for this entire exercise to merit
the serious consideration of the courts.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH the warrants of arrest, and ORDER
the information for rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal
Case Nos. 90-10941, RTC of Quezon City, DISMISSED.

Page 42
Consequently, the petitioners should be ordered permanently released and their bails
cancelled.

Paras, J., concurs.

 Beltran v People, G.R. No. 175013, June 1, 2007

Issues:
1. WON the inquest for rebellion against Beltran was valid? NO.
2. WON there is probable cause to indict Beltran for rebellion? NO.
3. WON the PI conducted against Ladlad and Maza were tainted with irregularity? YES.

Held:

1)

The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void. Inquest proceedings are proper only
when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant.

The joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers15 states that the officers arrested Beltran, without a
warrant,16 for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only

Page 43
have conducted – as he did conduct – an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other.
Consequently, when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest
proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void. None
of Beltran’s arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of Rebellion. Nor did
they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran had just committed
Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had committed Rebellion. What
these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and heard Beltran make an
allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006.

2)

Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by rising publicly and taking
arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government
or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land,
naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially,
of any of their powers or prerogatives.

Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in
furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the
inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents25 attached to the
CIDG letters. We have gone over these documents and find merit in Beltran’s contention that the
same are insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for Rebellion.
Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not acknowledge, mere
membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion.

3)

The prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3a of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint
must be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and
sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their
absence or unavailability, before a notary public. Here, the prosecutors treated the unsubscribed
letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as complaints and accepted the affidavits
attached to the letters even though some of them were notarized by a notary public without any
showing that a prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as required by Section
3(a) of Rule 112.

Section 3(b) of Rule 112 also mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the complaint, must
determine if there are grounds to continue with the investigation. If there is none, he shall dismiss
the case, otherwise he shall “issue a subpoena to the respondents.” Here, after receiving the CIDG
letters, respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to
appear at the DOJ office on 13 March 2006 “to secure copies of the complaints and its
attachments.”

During the investigation, prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who
subscribed to an affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco. Velasco proceeded to distribute
copies of Fuentes’ affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to members of the media who
covered the proceedings. Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating
the complainant’s antics during the investigation, and distributing copies of a witness’ affidavit to
members of the media knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the
charges against them, respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation but also lent
credence to petitioners’ claim that the entire proceeding was a sham. Hence, the court concluded
that there was indeed partiality on the part of the prosecutors who conducted the PI.

 Office of the Prov. Prosecutor vs. CA, G.R. No. 125796, December 27, 2000 

SECOND DIVISON

Page 44
G.R. No. 125796, Promulgated: December 27, 2000

OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, Petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ATICO ABORDO, JUDY CATUBIG, PETER MOLATO, and
FLORENCIO CANDIA, Respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

The issue in this case is whether, even before the start of trial, the prosecution can be ordered
to change the information which it had filed on the ground that the evidence presented at the
preliminary investigation shows that the crime committed is not murder with multiple frustrated
murder, but rebellion. The trial court ruled that the power to determine what crime to charge
on the basis of the evidence gathered is the prerogative of the public prosecutor. The Court of
Appeals, however, while agreeing with the trial court, nevertheless found the prosecutor to
have gravely abused his discretion in charging murder with frustrated murder on the ground
that the evidence adduced at the preliminary investigation shows that the crime committed
was rebellion. Accordingly, it ordered the prosecutor to substitute the information filed by him.
Hence, this petition brought by the provincial prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte for a review
of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are not in dispute. On August 3, 1993, the provincial prosecutor of Zamboanga del
Norte1 filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Dipolog City, an information (docketed as
Criminal Case No, 6427) charging private respondents and 10 other individuals with murder
and multiple frustrated murder. The Information reads:

The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor, accuses ATICO OBODO alias "Dondoy,"

NACENCIANO PACA-LIUGA, JR., ELEAZAR FLORENDO, NESTOR BASES alias
‘Beses/Belly,’ FLORENCIO CANDIA alias "Bimbo," JUDY CATUBIG alias ‘Elboy/Al," PETER
MOLATO alias, Joker,’ ALBERTO CATUBIG alias "Blacky", ALMARIO CATUBIG alias ‘Nixon,’
JIMMY BENGAL alias "Macoboy," ENRICO SIMBULAN alias ‘Monstop,’ JIMMY GARIG alias
"Gino" and BERNIDO QUENCAS alias "Digoy’ of the crime of MURDER WITH MULTIPLE
FRUSTRATED MURDER, committed as follows:

That, in the morning, on or about the 1st day of May, 1988, in the Municipality of Katipunan,
Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused armed with the high caliber firearms, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping one another and with intent to kill by means of treachery and evident premeditation
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and fire
several shots to one Cpl. ALFREDO DELA CRUZ PA, which accused his instantaneous death
and causing injuries to the following victims namely: SGT. RODRIGO ALVIAR PA, SGT.
RODRIGO BARADI, SGT. LINOGAMAN PIATOS and SGT. BELLIZAR PA, which injuries
would ordinarily cause their death; thus performing all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of MURDER, as a consequence, but which nevertheless did not produce
it for reason of causes independent of the will of the herein accused, that is the timely and
able medical attendance rendered to the said victims which prevented their death; that as a
result of the commission of the said crime the heirs of Cpl. Alfredo de la Cruz and the herein
victims suffered the following damages, vis:

On victim CPL ALFREDO DELA CRUZ:

a. Indemnity for

Victim’s death ….. P50, 000.00

b. Loss of earning

Page 45
 Capacity ………… 30,000.00

P80, 000.00

SGT. RODRIGO ALVIAR:

a) Hospitalization …… P10, 000.00

c. Loss of earning

Capacity ………….. 10,000.00

P20, 000.00

SGT. LINOGAMAN PIATOS:

a) Hospitalization …… P10, 000.00

d. Loss of earning

Capacity ………….. 10,000.00

P20,000.00

SGT. RODRIGO BARADI;

a) Hospitalization …… P10,000.00

e. Loss of earning

Capacity ………….. 10,000.00

P20,000.00

SGT. BELLIZAR:

a) Hospitalization …… P10,000.00

f. Loss of earning

Capacity ………….. 10,000.00

P20,000.00

CONTR ARY TO LAW (Viol. Of Art. 248, in relation or Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code),
with the aggravating circumstance of superior strength and with the qualifying circumstances
of treachery and evident premeditation. 2

The foregoing information is based on a joint affidavit executed on June 1, 1993 by five
individuals, who claim to be former members of the New People’s Army (NPA), before the
Municipal Trial Court of Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. The affiants stated that on May 1,
1988, their group, which included private respondents, figured in an armed encounter with
elements of the Philippine Army in Campo Uno, Femagas, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte,
as a result of which one solider, Cpl. Alfredo de la Cruz, was killed while four others, Sgts.
Rodrigo Alviar, Linomagan Piatos, Rodrigo Baradi, and a certain Bellizar, were seriously

Page 46
wounded. Although private respondents did not appear nor submit affidavits in the preliminary
investigation, they appealed the resolution of the provincial prosecutor to the Secretary of
Justice on the ground that, in accusing them of murder and multiple frustrated murder, the
provincial prosecutor disregarded the political motivation which made the crime committed
rebellion. When the case was filed in court, private respondents reiterated their contention and
prayed that the provincial prosecutor be ordered to change the charge from murder with
multiple frustrated murder to rebellion.

On September 29, 1995, the trial court issued an order denying private respondents’ motion
for the correction or amendment of the information. The trial court said. 3

Be it recalled, that as pointed out by the Asst. Provincial Prosecutor, the same moving
counsel sometime on July 22, 1993 filed a notice of appeal assailing the resolution of the
provincial prosecutor dated July 16, 1993 finding probable cause against all the above-named
accused for the crime of Murder and Multiple frustrated Murder, to the Honorable Secretary of
Justice, by raising the same issue that "instead of recommending the filing of a political crime
such as subversion or rebellion, the investigating prosecutor is recommending the filing of the
common crime of murder to cover-up the apparent political color of the alleged crime
committed.’ Until the Secretary of Justice therefore resolves the appeal by the movant, this
court will have no basis to order the public prosecutor to amend or change the crime charged
in the information. Besides, this Court recognizes and respects the prerogative of the fiscal to
determine whether or not a prima facie case exists in a given case against the accused. This
power vested in the fiscal cannot be interfered with even by the courts.

But since the case has already been filed with this Court, jurisdiction therefor now lies with the
court. It may not even be bound by the ruling of the Secretary of Justice…

Private respondents twice moved for reconsideration and twice were rebuffed. They then filed
a petition for certiorari with this Court to set aside the orders dated September 29, October 24,
and November 3, 1995 of the trial court. They impleaded the provincial prosecutor of
Zamboanga del Norte as co-respondent of Judge Pacifico Garcia of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8, Dipolog City.

Without ruling on the petition, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals, which, in
decision4 dated July 24, 1996, the subject of this review, found the provincial prosecutor guilty
of grave abuse of discretion in charging private respondents with murder with multiple
frustrated murder. The Court of Appeals held:

The New People’s Army (NPA) is the armed component of the Communist
Party in this country called the national Democratic Front (NDF). The ultimate
objective of the NPA/NDF is to overthrow the constitutional democratic plant it
with a government anchored on the communist ideology.

It is common practice of the military and police to charge captured or arrested members f the
NPA with capital offenses like murder, robbery with homicide, illegal possession of firearms
used in the commission of homicide or murder, arson resulting in death rather than on simple
rebellion.

If an NPA fighter (terrorist, according to the military lexicon) commits homicide, murder, arson,
robbery, illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance or on the occasion of
his revolutionary pursuit, the only crime he has committed is rebellion because all those
common crimes are absorbed in the latter one pursuant to the ruling in People v. Hernandez,
99 Phil. 515 and several subsequent cases.

The reason why instead of charging the NPA fighter with capital offenses mentioned supra
and not the proper offense of rebellion is obvious. Rebellion is a bailable offense and given
the resources of the NPA, it is the easiest thing for it to bail out its members facing rebellion
charges in court. Once out, the NPA fighter goes back to his mountain lair and continues the

Page 47
fight against the government. If he is accused of a capital offense where the granting of bail is
a matter of discretion, his chances of securing provisional liberty during the pendency of the
trial are very much lessened.

Since, the military and the police carry the brunt of fighting the NPAs and in so doing they put
their limbs and lives on the line, it is easy for Us to understand why they usually charge the
captured or arrested NPAs with capital offenses instead of the proper offense which is
rebellion. The police or military practice is of course wrong, but it is not much of a problem
because it is at most recommendatory in nature. It is the prosecutory service that ultimately
decides the offense to be charged.

No one disputes the well-entrenched principle in criminal procedure that the public prosecutor
has the discretion to determine the crime to be charged in a criminal action. But like all
discretion’s, his must be exercised soundly, meaning, reasonably, responsibly, and fairly. As
stated by the Supreme Court in Misola v. Panga cited in respondents’ Comment (p. 61, Rollo);
"The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the
investigating Fiscal. The information must be supported by the facts brought about by an
inquiry made by him." (Underscoring supplied).

If then, a public prosecutor deliberately ignores or suppresses an evidence in his hands which
palpably indicates the chargeable offense and files an information charging a more serious
one, he departs from the precinct of discretion and treads on the forbidden field or arbitrary
action.

This was what happened in the case at bench. The evidentiary bases of the criminal action
against petitioners are the Joint Affidavit and the recorded testimony earlier adverted to. It is
not at all disputed that based upon these two documents, the proper offense to charge
petitioners with is rebellion. No amount of legalistic sophistry can make those documents
support murder for these offenses in the factual milieu in this case were all absorbed by
rebellion.

We vehemently reject respondents’ contention that the petitioners do not suffer any prejudice
because they can use their theory that the chargeable offense is only rebellion as a defense in
the trial on the merits and if the trial court finds that the evidence establishes only rebellion,
then, it can convict them under the Information for just that lesser crime. This argument is not
only wrong but betrays insensitivity to violation of human rights. If prosecutory discretion is
twisted to charge a person of an unbailable offense and, therefore, keeps him under detention
when the truly chargeable offense is a bailable one, the prosecutor transgresses upon the
human rights of the accused.5

The appeals court was more kindly disposed toward the trial court. It said:

Respecting the respondent court, the situation is different…

The Joint Affidavit and the recorded testimony mentioned earlier are not part of the records.
The trial has not yet been started and, therefore, no evidence has yet been adduced. There is
no basis then for the trial court even to call the attention of the prosecutor to a mistake in the
crime charged.

We hold that respondent court did not commit an error in issuing the assailed orders, much
less gravely abused its discretion in issuing them.6

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals ordered:

WHEREFORE, with the foregoing premises, We a) dismiss the petition as against respondent
court for lack of merit; and b) order the respondent office of Provincial Prosecutor to file a
substitute Information in Criminal Case No. 6472 charging the petitioners with rebellion only. 7

Page 48
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred

I. IN MAKING DISPARATE AND IRRECONCILABLE RULINGS CONCERNING

THE CORRECTNESS OF THE ACTION OF PETITIONER AND THE LOWER
COURT.
II. IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
CHARGING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WITH MURDER AND MULTIPLE
FRUSTRATED MURDER.8

We find the contentions to be well taken.

First. It was improper for the Court of Appeals to consider the record of the preliminary
investigation as basis for finding petitioner provincial prosecutor guilty of grave abuse of
discretion when such record was not presented before the trial court and, therefore, was not
part of the record of the case. Rule 112, 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal procedure provide;

SEC. 8. Record of preliminary investigation. – The record of the preliminary investigation

whether conducted by a judge or a fiscal, shall not form part of the record of the case in the
Regional Trial Court. However, the said court, on its own initiative or that of any party, may
order the production of the record of any part thereof whenever the same shall be necessary
in the resolution of the case or any incident therein, or shall be introduced as evidence by the
party requesting for its production.

The certiorari proceedings in the Court of Appeals was limited to the record of the trial court
and indeed the Court of Appeals recognized this by absolving the trial court of any liability for
abuse of its discretion. It is petitioner provincial prosecutor, which it found guilty of grave
abuse of discretion in filing a case for murder with multiple frustrated murder against private
respondents because, in its view, the crime committed is rebellion. The Court of Appeals
based its ruling on the joint affidavit of five prosecution witnesses and their testimonies
relating to such affidavit before the Municipal Trial Court of Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte,
which had conducted the preliminary investigation. But this could not be done because the
petition before it was a petition for certiorari to set aside orders of the Regional Trial Court
denying private respondents’ motion to compel petitioner to change the charge against them
from murder with frustrated murder to rebellion.

To sustain the procedure followed by the Court of Appeals of considering evidence dehors the
record of the trial court would be to set a bad precedent whereby the accused in any case can
demand, upon the filing of the information, a review of the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation for the purpose of compelling the trial court to change the charge to a
lesser offense. Such a ruling would undermine the authority of the prosecutor and impose and
intolerable burden on the trial court. As held in Depamaylo v. Brotario.9

The Court in a number of cases has declared that a municipal judge has no legal authority to
determine the character of the crime but only to determine whether or not the evidence
presented supported prima facie the allegation of facts contained in the complaint. He has no
legal authority to determine the character of the crime and his declaration upon that point can
only be regarded as an expression of opinion in no wise binding on the court (People vs.
Gorospe, 53 Phil. 960; de Guzman vs. Escalona, 97 SCRA 619). This power belongs to the
fiscal Bais vs. Tugaoen, 89 SCRA 101).

It is to be noted that private respondents did not even attend the preliminary investigation
during which they could have shown that the crime committed was rebellion because the

Page 49
killing and wounding of the government troopers was made in furtherance of rebellion and not
for some private motive.

Second. Indeed, it is not at all clear that the crime as made out by the facts alleged in the
Joint Affidavit of witnesses is rebellion and not murder with multiple murder. The affidavit
reads:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE) S.S

Municipality of Jose Dalman)

X---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------x

JOINT AFFIDAVIT

I..Teofilo D. Sarigan, 31 years old, Manuel A. Cuenca, 28 yrs. Old, Romulo A.

Pacaldo, 25 years old, Carmelito Carpe, 36 yrs. Old, all married and Pablo D.
Maladia, 20 yrs. old and with postal address of Brgy. Lopero, Brgy. Lumaping,
of Jose Dalman, Brgy. Villahermosa, Roxas, all of ZDN, Brgy. Sigamok,
Dumingag, ZDS and Brgy. Lipay. Jose Dalman, ZDN after having been duly
sworn to an oath in accordance to law do hereby depose and answer
questions propounded:

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

1. Q – Why are you here now in this office?

A – To render statement regarding the alleged incident wherein we were

previously involved when we were still with the underground movement of
CPP/NPA that transpired on or about 011000H May 1988 at vicinity Campo
Uno, Femagas, Katipunan, ZDN against the government troops of 321B.

2. Q – Since when the five (5) of you entered the underground movement of
CPP.NPA?

A – Since May 16, 1980, August 12, 1980, March 12, 1981, May 7, 1983 and
August 27, 2987, sir.

3. Q – What is your previous position?

A – CO, FCOM (Front Command) and second deputy secretary of FC-1 "BBC,
the Vice CO, FCOM, the CO, FCOM after @ Bebeth surrender, a Unit Militia
(YM) member, GYP element under squad Lion all of FC-1 "BBC" in which we
are operating within the Province of ZDN.

4. Q – Will you narrate to me what and how the incident you are referring to all
about?

A – Actually sir, last 30 April 1988 our main force of FGU, FC-1 "BBC" had a
meeting at vicinity basketball court of vicinity Campo Uno, Femagas,
Katipunan ZDN. While on that status our security group left at the high ground
portion of the place and engaged the advancing government troops of 321B
after which we then decided to postpone the meeting hence, the government

Page 50
 troops presence. However, on the following day of 01 May 1988 at about
10:00 o’clock in the morning when we assembled again at the aforesaid place,
firefight occurred between us and the government troops of 321B which
resulted to inflict casualties to the 321B troopers, KIA one (1) Cpl. Alfredo Dela
Cruz and wounding four (4) others, Sgt. Rodrigo Alviar, Sgt. Linogaman
Piatos, Sgt. Rodrigo Baradi and Sgt. Bellizar while on our side with one
wounded @ TOY.

5. Q – Can you still recall the names of those other NPA’s that participated in that
encounter against the government troops?

A – Yes, sir. ATICO OBORDO @ DONDOY, NACENCIANO

PACALIUGA JR., @ ALFIE/IGI, ELEAZAT FLOREDO, NESTOR
BASES @ BELOY/BELLY. FLORENCIO CANDIA @ BIMBO, JUDY
CATUBIG @ ELBOY/AL, PETER MOLATO @ JOKER, BIENVENIDO
CATUBIG @ RASTY, ALBERTO CATUBIG @ BLACKY/RENATO,
ALMARIO CATUBIG @ NOEL, ROGER CATUBIG @ JAMSE, JOEL
CATUBIG @ NIXON, JIMMY DINGAL @ MACBOY, ENRICO
SIMBULAN @ NONSTOP, @ DANDY, @ WAWAY, @ ALBA/JONAS,
JIMMY GARIG @ NONOY, NILO CATUNGAN @ GINO, BERNIDO
QUENECAS @ DIGOY, @ CRISTINE/LFA @ MARILOU @ ELNA, @
BENIGNO PAULINO CORPUZ @ JR/PAWA, BENJAMIN
SANTANDER @ JAKE, @NESTOR, @ JAY, @ ISAGANI, @ RONIE,
ESMAEL OBORDO @ ANICIO, @ FREDO, @ RUEL, @ DODONG,
JULITA ADJANAN @ GENIE, @ TONY, @ RJ, @ LANNIE @
DEMET, @ RENDON, @JESS, @ SAMSON AND many others, sir.

Q – Then what transpired next?

A – Right after the encounter, we withdraw our troops towards

vicinity SVR, complex, Sergio Osmeña, Sr., ZDN.

Q – Do you have something more to say?

A – Nothing more, sir.

Q – Are you willing to sign you statement without being forced, coerced or intimidated?

A – Yes, sir.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, WE hereunto affix our signature this 1st day of June 1993 at

Katipunan, ZN Philippines.

(SGD.) TEOFILO D. SARIGAN

Affiant

(SGD,) MANUEL A. CUENCA

Affiant

(SGD,) ROMULO A. PACALDO

Affiant

(SGD.) CARMELITO L. CARPE

Page 51
 Affiant

(SGD.) PABLO G. MALADIA

Affiant

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 1st day of June 1993 at Katipunan, ZN,
Philippines.

(SGD.) ADELA S. GANDOLA

Municipal Trial Judge

Nowhere is the political motivation for the commission of the crime indicated in foregoing
affidavit. Merely because it is alleged that private respondents were members of the
CCP/NPA who engaged government troops in a firefight resulting in the death of a
government trooper and the wounding of four others does not necessarily mean that the killing
and wounding of the victims was made in furtherance of a rebellion. The political motivation
for the crime must be shown in order to justify finding the crime committed to be rebellion.
Otherwise, as in People v. Ompad,10 although it was shown that the accused was an NPA
commander, he was nonetheless convicted of murder for the killing of a person suspected of
being a government informer. At all events, as this Court said in Balosis v. Chanvez:11

Certainly, the public prosecutors should have the option to ascertain which prosecutions
should be initiated on the basis of the evidence at hand. That a criminal act may have
elements common to more than one offense does not rob the prosecutor of that option (or
discretion) and mandatory require him to charge the lesser offense although the evidence
before him may warrant prosecution of the more serious one. 12

In Baylosis v. Chavez, the accused, who were NPA members, assailed the constitutionality of
P.D. No. 1866 under which they were charged with illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition on the ground that it gave prosecutors the discretion to charge an accused either
with rebellion or with other crimes committed in furtherance thereof. In rejecting their
contention, this Court said:

The argument is not tenable. The fact is that the Revised Penal Code trets rebellion or
insurrection as a crime distinct from murder, homicide, arson, or other felonies that might
conceivably be committed in the course of rebellion. It is the Code, therefore, in relation to the
evidence in the hands of the public prosecutor, and not the latter’s whim or caprice, which
gives the choice. The Code allows, for example, separate prosecutions for either murder or
rebellion, although not for both where the indictment alleges that the former has been
committed in furtherance of or in connection with the latter. 13

The burden of proving that the motivation for the crime is political and not private is on the
defense. This is the teaching of another case.14 in which it was held;

In deciding if the crime is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to
ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive
of the act should be conclusively demonstrated.

In such cases the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive, being
a state of mind which the accused better than any individual knows.

Page 52
Its not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts
are essential components of the crime. With either of these elements wanting, the crime of
rebellion legally does not exist.

The proceedings in the case at bar is still in the pre-arraignment stage. The parties have yet
to present their respective evidence. If during the trial, private respondents are able to show
proof which would support their present contention, then they can avail of the remedy
provided under the second paragraph of Rule 110, 14 15 which provides:

If it appears at any time before judgement that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a
new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the
accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy…

Until then, however, petitioner provincial prosecutor is under no obligation to change against
private respondents.

Third. The Court of Appeals says it is a common practice of the military and the police to
charge captured members of the NPA with capital offenses like murder, robbery with
homicide, or illegal possession of firearms rather than rebellion. The alleged purpose is to
deny them bail only if it can be shown that the evidence against them is not strong, whereas if
the charge is rebellion, private respondents would have an absolute right to bail.

As already stated, however, given the Joint affidavit of the prosecution witnesses alone, it is
not possible to determine at this stage of the criminal proceeding that in engaging the
government troops in a "firefight," private respondents were acting in pursuance of rebellion. It
could be that the "firefight" was more of an ambush staged by the NPA, as shown by the fact
that while the government troop suffered one dead and four wounded, the CPP/NPA suffered
only one wounded.

The charge that it is "common practice’ for the military and the police to charge suspected
rebels with murder in order to prevent them from going on bail can be laid equally at the door
of the accused. As noted in Enrile v. Salazar:16

It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that
quintessentially quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and
punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for
power and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sancity
of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so c this aberration as
the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so
much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the
military, but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so called rebels to be part of, an
ongoing rebellion.17

What the real crime is must await the presentation of evidence at the trial or at the hearing on
the application for bail. Those accused of common crimes can then show proof that the crime
with which they were charged is really rebellion. They are thus not without any remedy.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated July 24, 1996,
is REVERSED insofar as it orders petitioner to file a substitute information for rebellion in
Criminal Case No. 6427. In other respects, it is AFFIRMED. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Page 53
 People vs. Dasig, G.R. No. 100231, April 28, 1993

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODRIGO DASIG

@ KA RUBIN DAKU @ ARMAND; EDWIN NUÑEZ Y TABANAS @ MABI;
ALVIN DOE @ AL @ KA ALVIN; ROGER DOE @ KA JAMES @ KA PEPE;
TUDING ANDRINO @ KA ERMI @ KA ROEL @ KA GRINGO MONTAYRE;
RUBEN DOE @ KA RUBEN @ KA JOJI @ INO ECHAVEZ; ANASTACIO
BANGKAL @ KA JUNIOR; AND CARLITO MAGASIN @ BOBBY, Accused,
RODRIGO DASIG, Accused-Appellant.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Kinaadman and Archival for Accused-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CONFESSION, AS A RULE, ADMISSIBLE;

EXCEPTION; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The settled jurisprudence on
the matter is that a confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves
that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward
or leniency. Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicial
confession was legally defective and hence, should not have been admitted and
considered by the trial judge. This accusation is whimsical and obviously a mere
refuge for appellant’s turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal liability, he now

Page 54
questions the integrity of the police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer
who stood by him during the investigation. Indubitably established and now a
matter of record is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty. Parawan who
even signed the former’s sworn declarations. It is likewise a matter of record that
before appellant made his extra-judicial confession, he was first asked if he was
amenable to the services of Atty. Parawan to which query he answered
affirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of force and intimidation has not been
substantiated by evidence other than his self-serving testimony. as has been
pointed out, such allegation is another naive effort of appellant to back track from
his prior voluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial
confession was done with regularity and legality.

2. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ABSORBS THE CRIME OF DIRECT ASSAULT WHEN

DONE IN FURTHERANCE THEREOF. — The crime of rebellion consists of may acts.
It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts
committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. The act of killing a police officer,
knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or
ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be
made a basis of a separate charge.

3. ID.; ID.; NOT COVERED BY INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (R.A. 4203). —

The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to persons convicted of
rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General.
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a
fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes, maintains, or heads
a rebellion.

DECISION

NOCON, J.:

Appellant, Rodrigo Dasig is now before Us to plead the reversal of his conviction
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Mandaue City finding him guilty of Murder
with Direct Assault.

He was charged together with Edwin Nuñez and 6 others who are still at large, in
an information which reads: chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

"That on or about the 4th day of August, 1987, in the city of Mandaue, of this
Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, conspiring and confederating together
and helping one another, with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation,
abuse of superior strength and use of motor vehicle, all armed with unlicensed
firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot one Redempto Manatad, a police officer on traffic duty, at his vital
portion which caused his death soon thereafter, knowing beforehand that the
victim was a policeman who was then in the performance of his official duties." 1

Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nuñes entered a plea of "not guilty."
However, after the prosecution had presented its first witness, Accused Nuñes
changed his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." Hence, the lower court held in
abeyance the promulgation of a judgment against said accused until the

Page 55
prosecution had finished presenting its evidence. While trial was still ongoing,
Nuñez died on March 10, 1989, thereby extinguishing his criminal liability. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

The facts surrounding this case show that in the afternoon of August 4, 1987, Pfc.
Redempto Manatad, Pfc. Ninah Tizon and Pfc. Rene Catamora were tasked by
their commanding officer to assist in canning the traffic at M.N. Briones and
Bonifacio Streets in Mandaue City. Pfc. Tizon controlled the traffic lighting facility;
Pfc. Manatad manned the traffic; while Pfc. Catamora acted as back-up and
posted himself at Norkis Trading building.

At about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8) persons,
one of whom he identified as Edwin Nuñez, acting suspiciously. He noticed one of
them giving instructions to two of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. He followed
the two, but sensing that they were being followed, they immediately proceeded
to the middle of the road and engaged Pfc. Catamora to a gun battle. At that
instant, Pfc. Catamora heard a series of shots from the other group and thereafter
saw Pfc. Manatad sprawled on the ground. Being out-numbered and to save his
own life, Pat. Catamora sought refuge at the nearby BIR Office from where he
saw two (2) persons take Pfc. Manatad’s gun and again fired at him to make sure
that he is dead while the rest of the group including Nuñes acted as back up.
Thereafter, the Nuñes group commandeered a vehicle and fled from the scene of
the shooting. Pfc. Rene Catamora testified that he can identify accused-appellant
Nuñes because of a mole at the bridge of his nose near the left eye which he
noticed when the accused passed 2 or 3 meters in front of him together with his
companions.

On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to conduct
surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of the sparrow unit located in
Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon reaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig
and Edwin Nuñes trying to escape. The team of Capt. Antonio Gorre captured
Nuñes and confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3 magazines and ammunitions,
while the group of Sgt. Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig, who threw a grenade at his
pursuers, but was shot on his left upper arm and subsequently apprehended. A .
38 caliber revolver with 17 live ammunitions were confiscated from him. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for treatment, while Nuñes was
turned over to the Metrodiscom for investigation. Meanwhile, Dasig was
interrogated by M/Sgt. Ariston Ira of the PC Criminal Investigation Service on
August 19, 1987 at his hospital bed at the Lapulapu Army Hospital in Cebu City.
Assisting Dasig during the interrogation was Atty. Fortunato Parawan of the Creer
Law Office, who was requested by the military to represent appellant who did not
have a lawyer. Before the start of the interrogation, Atty. Parawan asked
appellant whether he was willing to avail of his services, to which appellant
agreed. M/Sgt. Ira then appraised Dasig of his constitutional rights. The
interrogation was conducted in Cebuano upon appellant’s request. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nuñes killed Pfc. Manatad. He
likewise admitted that he and Nuñes were members of the sparrow unit and the
their aliases were "Armand" and "Mabi," respectively. The extra-judicial
confession of appellant marked as Exhibit "J" 2 was signed by him on every page
thereof with the first page containing a certification likewise signed by him, which
states: "I hereby certify that the herein statement is free and voluntary, and that
I am assisted by my counsel in the course of this investigation" followed by the
signed conformity of Atty. Parawan. The extra-judicial confession was subscribed
and sworn to before Cebu City Asst. Fiscal Salvador Solima.

Page 56
In the present appeal, Dasig contends that the procedure by which his extra-
judicial confession was taken was legally defective, and contrary to his
Constitutional rights. He further contends that assuming he conspired in the
killing of Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple rebellion and not
murder with direct assault.

Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was done while he was still
very sick and consequently, he could not have fully appreciated the wisdom of
admitting such a serious offense. That even with the presence of counsel, his
extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence as said counsel did not
actively assist him and advise him of his rights. In effect, his presence was merely
to give a semblance of legality to the proceedings and not to protect appellant
against possible abuses of the investigator. Dasig, likewise questions the sincerity
of Atty. Parawan in protecting his rights considering that the latter is a known
anti-Communist advocate and that the law firm to which he belongs has
represented high ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

We find the argument specious. Fiscal Salvador Solima in his certification, Exhibit
"J-7-B," stated that he had personally examined the affiant and that he is
convinced that the latter’s statement was free and voluntary and that the affiant
signed the same in his presence and swore under oath as to the veracity of
everything therein. Atty. Fortunato L. Parawan also testified that he assisted the
affiant from the start of the investigation up to its termination. Atty. Parawan
testified thus:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q Who introduced Rodrigo Dasig to you?

A I inquired from the personnel of the hospital the whereabout of Rodrigo Dasig
and I introduced myself as a lawyer. So they informed me the room of Rodrigo
Dasig. At that time I introduced myself as a lawyer who came to assist the person
of Rodrigo Dasig. Once we had a confrontation with Rodrigo Dasig, I asked him
whether he was willing to get me as his lawyer in that investigation. Then he told
me yes.

Q Did he tell you whether he as a counsel of his own choice?

A No.

x           x          x

Q In other words he accepted your services as counsel in connection with that

investigation which was about to be made?

A Yes.

Q Who are the persons present at that time?

A There were guards outside and inside. There was a man from the CIS in the
person of Sgt. Ira, myself and Dasig.

Q What happened after that?

A The CIS started the investigation.

Q You mean this Ariston Ira?

Page 57
A Yes.

Q Before Ariston Ira conducted the investigation was Dasig informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and if he chooses to testify or say
something, that statement of his will be used against or in his favor in the court of
justice?

A Yes. He was willing to get me as counsel in that investigation.

Q After he was informed of his constitutional rights what transpired next?

A The investigation started.

Q Were you present at the very start of that investigation?

A Yes. I was present from the start until it was finished.

Q Was that reduced to writing?

A Yes.

x           x          x

Q You said you were present during the entire investigation. Were the answers of
the accused, Rodrigo Dasig, to the questions propounded by the investigator
voluntary?

A Yes, they voluntary.

Q After the investigation was finished what transpired next?

A After the investigation, I think that was already past 3:00 or 4:00, we
proceeded to the office of the City Fiscal at F. Ramos St., Cebu City and then we
proceeded to the Office of Fiscal Solema (sic) and then it was subscribed there
before Fiscal Solema (sic).

Q Were you present during the proceeding?

A I was also present." 3

We do not find any reason to doubt the factual findings and conclusions of the
trial court that the extra-judicial confession of the appellant was voluntarily made.
Said the trial court:
chanrobles law library

"The prosecution’s evidence clearly shows that herein accused during his
investigation was properly informed and appraised of his constitutional right to
remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice but since at that time he did not signify his intention to retain a lawyer
of his own choice, so he was provided with a lawyer in the person of Atty.
Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office who was available at that time, to
assist him during the custodial investigation conducted by T/Sgt. Ariston L. Ira at
his hospital bed at Camp Lapulapu Army Station Hospital, Cebu City where he was
confined after being hit on his upper left arm and in fact, Atty. Parawan only
consented to assist herein accused after the latter has answered in the affirmative

Page 58
to his question as to whether he would be amenable to be assisted by him as his
counsel of his own choice.

"The prosecution’s evidence further show that Atty. Fortunato Parawan after
consenting to be his counsel was with him when his extra-judicial confession or
sworn statement was subscribed and sworn to by him before Assistant City Fiscal
Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal’s Office who, before accused has
actually affixed his signature on each and every pages of his extra-judicial
confession, has informed him (accused) of his constitutional rights and has
explained the contents of his extra-judicial confession.

"Moreover, per certification made by Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of

the Cebu City Fiscal’s Office, clearly shows that accused in executing the same
has done so voluntarily and after having understood the contents thereof which is
in the visayan language, a language known to him, found on the last page thereof
now marked as Exhibit "J-7-B." cralaw virtua1aw library

"Furthermore, this sworn statement of accused Dasig is collaborated by the sworn

statement of his co-accused Edwin Nuñes dated August 18, 1987 which is sworn
and subscribed to before City Fiscal Jopelinito Pareja of the city Fiscal’s Office of
Cebu City." 4

The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is admissible until the
accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation,
threat or promise of reward or leniency. 5 The case of People of the Philippines v.
Parojinog is four square to the case at bar. In Parojinog this court had this to
say:cralawnad

"Anent his claim that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice, Section 12 (1) of Article III
of the 1987 Constitution provides: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘Sec. 12(1). — Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel he must provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.’

"It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a person under investigation
for the commission of an offense may choose his own counsel but if he cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. While the initial
choice of the lawyer in the latter case is naturally lodged in the police
investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel
chosen for him and ask for another one. In the instant case, the records show
that no objection was voiced by the accused throughout the entire proceedings of
the investigation and afterwards when he subscribed to its veracity before City
Prosecutor Luzminda V. Uy. Thus, he apparently acquiesced to the choice of the
investigators. He complained for the first time that Atty. Fuentes was not his
choice only during trial. Thus it was too late." 6

Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicial confession was
legally defective and hence, should not have been admitted and considered by the
trial judge. This accusation is whimsical and obviously a mere refuge for
appellant’s turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal liability, he now questions
the integrity of the police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who stood
by him during the investigation. Indubitably established and now a matter of
record is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty. Parawan who even signed

Page 59
the former’s sworn declarations. It is likewise a matter of record that before
appellant made his extra-judicial confession, he was first asked if he was
amenable to the services of Atty. Parawan to which query he answered
affirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of fore and intimidation has not been
substantiated by evidence other than his self-serving testimony. As has been
pointed out, such allegation is another naive effort of appellant to back track from
his prior voluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial
confession was done with regularity and legality. 7

Nevertheless, there is merit in appellant’s argument that granting he is guilty,

what he committed was a political crime of simple rebellion, and hence he should
not be convicted of murder with direct assault. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The Solicitor General agrees with the accused-appellant on this point as

manifested in the People’s brief, which We quote: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"However, as correctly pointed by appellant, the lower court erroneously

convicted him of Murder with Assault Upon a Person in Authority, instead of
Rebellion.

"Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the government, among other

means. (Article 135, Revised Penal Code). In this case, appellant not only
confessed voluntarily his membership with the sparrow unit but also his
participation and that of his group in the killing of Pfc. Manatad while manning the
traffic in Mandaue City in the afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is of judicial notice
that the sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People’s Army with the
objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not
hard to comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to
or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA. Consequently, appellant is
liable for the crime of rebellion, not murder with direct assault upon a person in
authority." 8

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a
complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion
though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of
rebellion. 9 The act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a
person in authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done
in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.

Moreover, in the case of People v. Mangallan 10 We held that where the accused
who was charged with murder admitted his membership with the NPA and the
killing of a suspected PC informer, the crime committed is not murder but
rebellion punishable under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code.

As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not

applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the
insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes
the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person
who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion. However, in the case at bar, there
is no evidence to prove that appellant Dasig headed the crime committed. As a
matter of fact he was not specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as the person
giving instructions to the group which attacked Pfc. Manatad. chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just executed the

command of an unknown leader. Hence, he should be made to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor. For the resulting death,

Page 60
appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Pfc. Manatad FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.

Premises considered, We uphold the findings of the trial court that the extra-
judicial confession was legally obtained. However, appellant being a confessed
member of the sparrow unit, the liquidation squad of the New People’s Army
whose objective is to overthrow the duly constituted government, the crime
committed is simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.

WHEREFORE, Accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of

rebellion beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc.
Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

People vs Dasig
People vs Dasig
G.R. No. 100231
April 28, 1993

Facts:

Appellants Rodrigo Dasig, Edwin Nuñez and 6 others were charged together of shooting
Redempto Manatad, a police officer, as he died while performing duties. Upon arraignment,
appellant and Edwin Nuñes entered a plea of "not guilty." However, after the prosecution had
presented its first witness, accused Nuñes changed his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." Hence, the
lower court held in abeyance the promulgation of a judgment against said accused until the
prosecution had finished presenting its evidence. While trial was still ongoing, Nuñez died on
March 10, 1989, thereby extinguishing his criminal liability.

At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8) persons, one of whom he
identified as Edwin Nuñez, acting suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructions to two of
the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked
to conduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of the sparrow unit located in
Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon reaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nuñes
trying to escape. The team of Capt. Antonio Gorre captured Nuñes and confiscated a .45 caliber
revolver with 3 magazines and ammunitions, while the group of Sgt. Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig,
who threw a grenade at his pursuers, but was shot on his left upper arm and subsequently
apprehended while a .38 caliber revolver with 17 live ammunitions were confiscated from him.
Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for treatment, while Nuñes was turned over to the
Metrodiscom for investigation. Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nuñes killed Pfc.
Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and Nuñes were members of the sparrow unit and the their
aliases were "Armand" and "Mabi," respectively.

The extra-judicial confession of appellant was signed by him on every page thereof with the first
page containing a certification likewise signed by him. However, Dasig contends that the
procedure by which his extra-judicial confession was taken was legally defective, and contrary to
his Constitutional rights. He further contends that assuming he conspired in the killing of Pfc.
Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.
Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was done while he was still very sick and
consequently, he could not have fully appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a serious offense.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused-appellant is liable for extra-judicial killing of the deceased and
participated in the act of rebellion?

Page 61
Held:

Yes. Accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of rebellion beyond
reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years
of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc. Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to persons
convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General.
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not
exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion. However, in
the case at bar, there is no evidence to prove that appellant Dasig headed the crime committed. As
a matter of fact he was not specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as the person giving
instructions to the group which attacked Pfc. Manatad.

Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just executed the command of an unknown
leader. Hence, he should be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of
prision mayor. For the resulting death, appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Pfc.
Manatad FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.

 People vs. Abalos, G.R. No. 88189, July 9, 1996 

PEOPLE vs. ABALOS (G.R. No. 88189) Facts: The incident transpired during the barangay fiesta
near the house of appellant at the said barangay. Appellant was then having a drinking session in
front of the shanty of one Rodulfo Figueroa, Jr. which was situated just a few meters from his
residence. Basal, prosecution witness, said that he saw Police Major Cecilio Abalos, scolding his
employees in his transportation business. While Major Abalos was thus berating his employees,
appellant arrived and asked his father not to scold them and to just let them take part in the
barangay festivities. This infuriated the elder Abalos and set off a heated argument between
father and son. While the two were thus quarreling, a woman shouted and asked for help. The
victim then appeared on the scene and asked Major Abalos, "What is it, sir?" The victim saluted
Abalos when the latter turned around to face him. As Major Abalos leveled his carbine at the
victim, appellant hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood. He then swiftly returned and
unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece at the victim from behind, hitting the policeman

Page 62
at the back of the right side of his head. The victim collapsed unconscious in a heap, and he later
expired from the severe skull fracture he sustained from that blow. Issue: Whether or not
appellant was correctly convicted by the lower court with the complex crime of direct assault
with murder. Held: Yes. The accused is guilty of direct assault with murder. There are two modes
of committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus agentes under Article 148 of the Revised Penal
Code. The first is not a true atentado as it is tantamount to rebellion or sedition, except that there
is no public uprising. On the other hand, the second mode is the more common way of
committing assault and is aggravated when there is a weapon employed in the attack, or the
offender is a public officer, or the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. 10 Appellant
committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that there must be an attack,
use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the
assault was made when the said person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such
performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is,
that the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a
person in authority or an agent of a person in authority. When the assault results in the killing of
that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there arises the complex crime of direct
assault with murder or homicide. The killing in the instant case constituted the felony of murder
qualified by alevosia through treacherous means deliberately adopted Pfc. Labine was struck
from behind while he was being confronted at the same time by appellant's father. The evidence
shows that appellant deliberately went behind the victim whom he then hit with a piece of wood
which he deliberately got for that purpose. Obviously, appellant resorted to such means to avoid
any risk to himself, knowing fully well that his quarry was a policeman who could readily mount a
defense. The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and nocturnity, however, were
not duly proven, as correctly ruled by the court below. On the other hand, appellant's voluntary
surrender even if duly taken into account by the trial court would have been inconsequential.

 Gelig vs. People, G.R. No. 173150, July 28, 2010 

In the case of Gelig vs. People (G.R. No. 173150. July 28, 2010), the Court had the
occasion in demonstrating a more discreet scenario of its application. Two public school
teachers falling under the definition of “persons in authority under Art.152 of the Revised
Penal Code were involved, one Lydia Gelig and the other Gemma Micarsos. The RTC
decided the case convicting Lydia with complex crime of “Direct Assault with
Unintentional Abortion”. The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court ruling with Slight
Physical Injuries. It ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for direct assault since Gemma
descended from being a person in authority to a private individual when, instead of
pacifying Lydia or informing the principal of the matter, she engaged in a fight with Lydia.
Likewise, Lydia’s purpose was not to defy the authorities but to confront Gemma on the
alleged name-calling of her son.

It seems that for some reason, the Court of Appeals realized that there is equal fault or pari
delicto in the case, thereby mitigating the penalty imposed to Lydia . Unfortunately, this
was reversed by the Supreme Court:

xxx

The fact remains that at the moment Lydia initiated her tirades, Gemma was busy
attending to her official functions as a teacher. She tried to pacify Lydia by offering her a
seat so that they could talk properly, but Lydia refused and instead unleashed a barrage of
verbal invectives. When Lydia continued with her abusive behavior, Gemma merely
retaliated in kind as would a similarly situated person. Lydia aggravated the situation by
slapping Gemma and violently pushing her against a wall divider while she was going to

Page 63
the principal’s office. No fault could therefore be attributed to Gemma. (emphasis
supplied)

xxx

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner Lydia Gelig guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Judgment is hereby rendered finding Lydia Gelig guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of direct assault and is ordered to suffer an indeterminate prison term of one
(1) year and one (1) day to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of
prision correccional. She is also ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00. SO ORDERED.

Title 4

 Ruzol vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 186739, April 17, 2013

Page 64
 Union Bank vs. People, G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012,

G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Page 65
Facts:

Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Then, she was
charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC (perjury) “by falsely declaring
under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did
not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal
or agency”. The Certification was notarized in Makati City but was submitted and used in
Pasay City, while the Information against Union Bank and Tomas was filed in Makati.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash. She argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is
the Pasay City Court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and
used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case.

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the
case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City. The
MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged
Tomas with perjury.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set
aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The
petitioners anchored their petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet and Ilusorio v.
Bildner which ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false
document was presented.

Issue:

Whether or not the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be –
Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City,
where the Certification was presented to the trial court.

Held:

The SC denied the petition and held that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and
the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.

The criminal charged was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a
falsity. Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and
venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who “makes
an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer
an oath in cases in which the law so requires.” The constitutive act of the offense is the
making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement
containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.

Based on these considerations, SC held that its ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with
Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury
committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is
committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at
that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is
committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as

Page 66
supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil,
a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn
statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the
submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases,
determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be
constitutive of the crime committed.

 Choa vs. People, G.R. No. 142011, March 14, 2003

Page 67
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two children
were born, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan.

RTC – Negros Occidental – On October 27, 1993, respondent husband filed a Complaint
for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. Afterwards he filed an Amended
Complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner based on her alleged
psychological incapacity.

The case went to trial with respondent presenting his evidence in chief. After his last
witness testified, he submitted his Formal Offer of Exhibits. Instead of offering any
objection to it, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence). The lower
court then allowed a number of pleadings to be filed thereafter.

Finally, the RTC issued its Order denying petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence. It held that
respondent established a quantum of evidence that the petitioner must controvert.

Court of Appeals – After her MR was denied, petitioner elevated the case to the CA by
way of a Petition for Certiorari. The CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely
interlocutory; hence, certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was not available. The
proper remedy was for the defense to present evidence; and if an unfavorable decision was
handed down later, to take an appeal therefrom. In any event, no grave abuse of discretion
was committed by respondent judge in issuing the assailed Orders.

ISSUES:
(1) WON certiorari available to correct an order denying a demurrer to evidence? (YES)

(2) WON the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied the demurrer to
evidence? (YES)

RATIO:
(1)
In general, interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari proceedings.
However, this rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v. People, this Court declared that appeal —
not certiorari — in due time was indeed the proper remedy, provided there was no grave
abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction or oppressive exercise of judicial authority.

(2)
A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection or exception by one of the parties in an
action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in
point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue.

We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the present case, and we are convinced that
the evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any
finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the
parties marriage.

First. Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him are
proof of the latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. These charges included Complaints for perjury, false testimony, concubinage

Page 68
and deportation. According to him, the filing and the prosecution of these cases clearly
showed that his wife (herein petitioner) wanted not only to put him behind bars, but also to
banish him from the country. He contends that this is very abnormal for a wife who,
instead of protecting the name and integrity of her husband as the father of her children,
had acted to the contrary.

We do not agree. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as

psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed
cases against him. The evidence presented, even if taken as true, merely establishes the
prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that the filings are sufficient to establish her
psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion
bordering on absurdity.

Second. Neither is the testimony of respondent, taken by itself or in conjunction with his
documentary offerings, sufficient to prove petitioners alleged psychological incapacity.
Even if taken as true, the testimony of respondent basically complains about three aspects
of petitioners personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their children, (2)
immaturity and (3) lack of an intention of procreative sexuality. None of these three,
singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity. Far from it. In Santos v. CA,
this Court clearly explained that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.

Third. Most telling is the insufficiency, if not incompetency, of the supposed expert
testimony presented by respondent. His witness, Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to
identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Specifically, his
testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

His testimony established merely that the spouses had an incompatibility, a defect that
could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. We need not expound
further on the patent insufficiency of the expert testimony to establish the psychological
incapacity of petitioner.

Furthermore, the assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions
communicated to him by respondent. The doctor never conducted any psychological
examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done so.

Conclusion: The trial court should have carefully studied and assessed the evidence
presented by respondent and taken into account the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.
It could then have easily concluded, as we conclude now, that it was useless to proceed
further with the tedious process of hearing contravening proof.

His evidence was obviously, grossly and clearly insufficient to support a declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Withal, it was grave abuse of
discretion for the RTC to deny the Demurrer and to violate or ignore this Courts rulings in
point. Indeed, continuing the process of litigation would have been a total waste of time
and money for the parties and an unwelcome imposition on the trial courts docket.

DISPOSITIVE:
Petition granted.

Page 69
 Batulanon vs. People, G.R. No. 139857, September 15, 2006

G.R. No. 139857 September 15, 2006

LEONILA BATULANON, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Facts:
Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Batulanon as
its Cashier/Manager. She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to
the member of the cooperative.
During an audit conducted, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were
discovered. Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents were filed against Batulanon, the amounts of which ranges from P3,500 to
P5,000. Batulanon even made it appear in one of the cases that the payee had deposited a
fixed deposit so that she could avail of the loan.
Batulanon herself forges the signatures on the documents and makes it appear that the
payees received the loans when in fact said persons were never granted a loan, never
received the same, and never signed the Cash/Check voucher issued in their names.
Issue:
Won petitioner may be convicted of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.
Held:
No. Although the offense charged in the information is estafa through falsification of
commercial document, appellant could be convicted of falsification of private document
under the well-settled rule that it is the allegations in the information that determines the
nature of the offense and not the technical name given in the preamble of the information.
The subject vouchers are private documents and not commercial documents because they
are not documents used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or
credit transactions nor are they defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or other
commercial law.
The elements of falsification of private document under Art 172, par 2 of the RPC are: (1)
that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in par 7, Art171;
(2) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (3) that the
falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with
intent to cause such damage.
Batulanon's act of falsification is that she caused it to appear that persons have participated
in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. She made it appear that
they obtained a loan and received its proceeds when they did not in fact secure said loan
nor receive the amounts reflected in the cash vouchers to the detriment of private
complainant.
As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, it is
important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private
document or with estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means
to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be
committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged
is estafa.
However, in the 3rd case, petitioner Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis.
What she did was to sign: "by: lbatulanon" to indicate that she received the proceeds of the
loan in behalf of Dennis. She fraudulently used the name of her son who is likewise
disqualified to secure a loan from PCCI. The disturbance in property rights caused by

Page 70
Batulaono's misappropriation is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning
of Article 315 which penalizes estafa and not falsification.

 Dabu vs. Kapunan, A.M. RTJ-00-1600, February 1, 2011

Title 5

 Dela Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014

FACTS:

Complainants alleged that a certain Ariel Escobedo was picked up by

several unknown male persons believed to be police officers for allegedly
selling drugs. Complainants were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo
Police Station. They met “James” at the Police Station, who demanded
from them P100,000.00 which was later lowered to P40,000.00, in
exchange for the release of Ariel. 

The accused was nabbed after an entrapment operation was conducted.

The accused was later brought to the forensic laboratory where he was
required to submit his urine for drug testing. The test yielded a positive
result for presence of dangerous drugs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal. (NO)

HELD:

The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or

arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed
under Article II of the law.

The drug test was in violation of the petitioner’s right to privacy and right
against self-incrimination. It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to
have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. 

Page 71
 People vs Dilao, G.R. No. 170359, July 27, 2007
 People vs Quiaoit, G.R. No. 175222, July 27, 2007
 People vs. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. 171019, Feb. 23, 2007

People v. Sta. Maria(G.R. No. 171019) Entrapment v. Instigation Art. 12 Exempting

Circumstances

Facts:

On November 27, 2002, at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning, P/Chief Insp. Noli
Pacheco, Chief of the Provincial Drug Enforcement Group of the Bulacan Provincial
Office based at Camp Alejo Santos, Malolos, Bulacan received an intelligence report
about the illegal drug activities in Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan of
a certain "Fael," who later turned out to be appellant Rafael Sta. Maria. P/Chief Insp.

Pacheco formed a surveillance team to look for a police asset to negotiate a drug deal with
appellant.

In the morning of November 29, 2002, the surveillance team reported to P/Chief Insp.
Pacheco that a confidential asset found by the team had already negotiated a drug deal for
the purchase of P200 worth of shabu from appellant at the latter’s house at No. 123 Sitio
Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan between 7:00 and 7:30 in the evening of
November 29, 2002. The surveillance team then prepared for a buy-bust operation, with
PO3 Enrique Rullan as team leader, and PO1 Rhoel Ventura, who was provided with two
(2) marked P100-bills, as poseur-buyer. At the appointed time and place, PO1 Ventura and
the confidential informant proceeded to appellant’s house and knocked at the door.
Appellant opened the door and the confidential informant introduced to him PO1 Ventura
as a prospective buyer. PO1 Ventura later handed the two (2) marked P100-bills to

Page 72
appellant who, in turn, gave him a plastic sachet of shabu. Thereupon, PO1 Ventura
sparked his cigarette lighter, which was the pre-arranged signal to the other members of
the buy-bust team that the sale was consummated. Appellant was arrested and the two
marked P100-bills recovered from him. Also arrested on that occasion was one Zedric dela
Cruz who was allegedly sniffing shabu inside appellant’s house and from whom drug
paraphernalia were recovered. Upon laboratory examination of the item bought from
appellant, the same yielded positive for methylampetamine
hydrochloride or shabu weighing 0.041 gram.

The accused was charged of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.The trial court found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The Court of Appeals
promulgated the assailed decision denying the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not instigation was the act which preceded Sta. Maria’s arrest?

Decision:

In entrapment, the entrapper resorts to ways and means to trap and capture a lawbreaker
while executing his criminal plan. In instigation, the instigator practically induces the
would-be-defendant into committing the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal. In
entrapment, the means originates from the mind of the criminal.

The idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from him. In instigation, the law
enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts
the idea and carries it into execution. The legal effects of entrapment do not exempt the
criminal from liability.

Instigation does.It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its
commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the
"decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning
complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its commission.

Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one habitually committed,
and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.The solicitation of
drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the police merely furnishes evidence of
the course of conduct.

The police received an intelligence report that appellant has been habitually dealing in
illegal drugs. They duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction
with the appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced appellant to sell
illegal drugs to him

 People vs. Laylo, G.R. No. 192235, July 6, 2011,

 People vs. Nicolas, G.R. No. 170234, Feb. 8, 2007

Page 73
PEOPLE vs NICOLAS Case Digest
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNARDO F. NICOLASG.R. No. 170234
February 8, 2007FACTS:

In an Information dated 7 August 2002, accused-appellant Bernardo Felizardo Nicolas,

a.k.a.Bernie, was charged with Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
for allegedly having sold one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.42
gram of white crystalline substance which was found positive to the test for
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug,to PO2 Danilo S. Damasco.

During trial, the prosecution testified that the accused was caught in a buy-bust operation
conducted by the team of PO2 Danilo S. Damasco, PO2 Montefalcon, PO2 Orig and SPO2
Zipagan through the information given by a confidential informant, who went with the
said team during the operation.

Accused, however, refuted said claims, saying that: 1) there was no buy-bust operation and
that theshabu (methamphetamine hydrochloride) allegedly sold by him to the poseur buyer
was plantedevidence; and 2) the trumped-up charge is a way of getting even with him
because he, together with his wife, had filed a case before the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) for grave misconduct against several policemen (PO2 Joel Tapec, PO1
Christopher Semana and five John Does) assigned at the Station Drug Enforcement Unit of
the Pasig Police Station, for entering and robbing their house on 5 February 2002.

In support of his first argument, accused claimed that the non-conduct of a surveillance
and the absence of any agreement as regards the money to be used in buying the shabu and
as regards the signal to inform the back-up policemen that the transaction has been
consummated shows that there is so much doubt as to the existence of a buy-bust
operation. After trial, the lower court decided convicting the accused. The Court of
Appeals then affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Are the non-conduct of surveillance and the absence of any agreement as regards the
money to be used in buying the shabu and as regards the signal to inform the back-up
policemen that the transaction has been consummated essential to establish the existence
of a buy-bust operation?

HELD:

No. Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test-buy does not affect
the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust
operations. The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of
effective means to apprehend drug dealers. A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one,
is not necessary especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant
during the entrapment. Flexibility is a trait of good policework. In the case at bar, the buy-
bust operation was conducted without need of any prior surveillance for the reason that the
informant accompanied the policemen to the person who is peddling the dangerous drugs.
The fact that the team leader and the other members of the team did not discuss or talk
about the marked money does not necessarily mean that there was no buy-bust operation.
As explained by SPO2 Zipagan, since PO2 Damasco was the designated poseur buyer it
was the latter's discretion as to how to prepare the marked money. It is not required that all

Page 74
the members of the buy-bust team knowhow the marked money is to be produced and
marked inasmuch as they have their respective roles to perform in the operation. As this
Court sees it, the other members of the team left the matter of the marked money to one
person
—
the poseur buyer
—
because it was he who was to deal directly with the drug pusher.

 SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008
 People vs. Robelo, G.R. No. 184181, November 26, 2012,

Title 7

 Dela Cruz vs. Judge Concepcion , A.M. No. RTJ-93-1062, August 25, 1994

Facts: 
Respondent Judge Crisanto C. Concepcion of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan, was administratively indicted for gross ignorance
of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment for acquitting the
accused who was charged before his court with acts of lasciviousness. 
Eliza Ratilla de la Cruz, Edeline Cuison, Ana Maria Cruz, and Lolita
Santiago filed a case against the accused for acts of lasciviousness. The
accused Loreto Estrella, Jr., summoned the victims and told them that he need to
examine their private parts pursuant to a DECS memorandum. 
During the hearing, the four girls gave almost identical experience. The
accused on his part admitted that indeed he made such examination; however
denied that he touched the private parts of the girl.  Moreover, he argued that he
only did such in compliance with the DECS order. 
Upon hearing the prosecution and the defense, respondent Judge
observed that the girls consented, without any force employed upon them. The
Judged reasoned out that it is inconceivable that the girls did not make any
objections if indeed their private parts were touched with lust on the mind of the
couch.  Thus, Respondent Judge arrived on the conclusion that since the touching
was necessary in the examination required by the memorandum, no acts of
lasciviousness can be attributed to the accused. 

Issue:

Page 75
 Whether or not the analysis of the Judge constitutes Gross Ignorance of the
law and against the Canon 5 of The Code of Professional Responsibility

Held:
 To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the subject decision, order or
actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties must not only be
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be
moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. 
In the case at bar, no bad faith nor malice may be imputed against the
respondent judge. More so, wrong appreciation of evidence cannot be a ground
for gross ignorance of the law. The court held that if we hold respondent guilty as
charged, then we might be telegraphing the wrong signals to our trial judges. For
then, where administrative sanctions are imposed on them for rendering
judgments of acquittal based on reasonable doubt or on difficult questions of law,
they would be inclined, and not without practical reason, to hand down verdicts of
conviction, in case of doubt. For that course would be safer for them to pursue
since, after all, erroneous convictions may still be corrected on appeal. But that
would be disregarding the true concept and judicial implication of "reasonable
doubt" in criminal cases, under which judges are directed according to the Rules
of Court to render a judgment of acquittal. 
As such, the reiterate that "mere errors in the appreciation of evidence,
unless so gross and patent as to produce an inference of ignorance or bad faith,
or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision, are irrelevant and
immaterial in an administrative proceeding against him. Therefore, respondent
judge was acquitted for the case charged.

 Manipon vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-58889, July 31, 1986

Facts:
Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., a deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City
and Benguet,Branch IV, was assigned to enforce an order of the Minister of Labor dated
October 31, 1979 directing theSheriff of Baguio City or his deputy to execute the decision
of the labor arbiter in NLRC Case No. RB-1-C-1428-79 entitled "Longog Tabek, et al vs.
Harry Dominguez et al" and to make a return within thirty (30)days from said date. The
labor arbiter's decision ordered Harry Dominguez, a building contractor and thethen
municipal mayor of Tadian, to pay Longog Tabek and the other judgment creditors the
amount ofP2,720.00 with interest, as the balance of their work contract.Pursuant to that
assignment, Manipon on November 9, 1979 sent a notice to the Commercial Bank

Page 76
andTrust branch (Comtrust) in Baguio City garnishing the bank accounts of Dominguez. 5
The bank agreedto hold the accounts. For one reason or another, Manipon did not inform
the labor arbiter of the garnishmentnor did he exert efforts to immediately satisfy the
judgment under execution.

On November 12, 1979,Dominguez sought Manipon's help in the withdrawal of the

garnished account. Manipon told Dominguezthat the money could not be
withdrawn.However, on December 27, 1979 when the two met again at the Office of the
National Intelligence andSecurity Authority (NISA) in Baguio City, Manipon told
Dominguez that he "can remedy the withdrawalso they will have something for the New
Year." Dominguez interpreted this to mean that Manipon wouldwithdraw the garnished
amount for a consideration. Dominguez agreed and they arranged to meet at thebank later
in the afternoon. After Manipon left, Dominguez confided the offer to NISA Sub-
StationCommander Luisito Sanchez. They then hatched up a plan to entrap Manipon by
paying him with markedmoney the next day.Thus, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
December 28, 1979, Dominguez went to Comtrust asplanned. Manipon showed up with
two companions, named Deputy Sheriff Crisanto Flora and BaltazarPacis. Manipon
delivered his letter to the bank lifting the garnishment. Then Dominguez prepared
awithdrawal slip for P2,500.00. As soon as Dominguez received the money from the teller,
he took outP300.00 therefrom added it to the P700.00 in marked bills and handed the total
amount of P1,000.00 toManipon. Then they all left the bank. Dominguez walked over to
his car and drove off. Manipon and histwo companions walked down Session Road.
Moments later, PC and NISA operatives accosted them,seized the P1,000.00 from the left
breast pocket of Manipon and thereafter brought them to Camp Dangwafor
questioning.Originally, Manipon was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 46
for having demanded andreceived P1,000.00 from Dominguez, a private individual, for a
favor extended by him to the latter, i.e., bynot enforcing the garnishment order issued to
Comtrust which was his official duty. However, in anamended information dated February
16, 1981, the charge was changed to direct bribery under the RevisedPenal Code.It is the
theory of the defense that the P1,000.00 Manipon collected from Dominguez on December
28,1979 was not a bribe but a payment in partial satisfaction of the judgment under
execution to which the judgment creditors headed by Longog Tabek had agreed.
Issue:
Whether the act of Manipon in garnishing the bank accounts and thereafter lifting the
same afterwhich he received P1,000.00 from Dominguez constitutes the crime of direct
bribery.

Criminal LawManipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan 2

Held:
Yes. Manipon's guilt for the crime of direct bribery has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt.The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code
consists of the followingelements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he
received directly or through another some giftor present, offer or promise; (3) that such
gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of hiscommission of some crime,
or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something whichit is his
official duty to do, and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a
publicofficer. The promise of a public officer to perform an act or to refrain from doing it
may be express orimplied.It is not disputed that at the time of the commission of the crime
Manipon was the deputy sheriff of theCourt of First Instance of Benguet and Baguio
assigned to implement the execution order issued in NLRCCass No. RB-1-C-1428-79. It is
also not disputed that Manipon garnished the bank accounts of Dominguezat Comtrust and

Page 77
that he lifted the same on December 28, 1979 after which he received P1,000.00
fromDominguez.Manipon's behavior at the very outset, had been marked with
irregularities. As early as November 9, 1979,he had already garnished the bank accounts
of Dominguez at Comtrust, but he did not notify the laborarbiter so that the corresponding
order for the payment by the bank of the garnished amount could be madeand the sum
withdrawn immediately to satisfy the judgment under execution. His lame excuse was that
hewas very busy in the sheriff's office, attending to voluminous exhibits and court
proceedings. That was alsothe same excuse he gave for not informing the labor arbiter of
the novation. In fact he candidly admittedthat he never communicated with the NLRC
concerning the garnishment. He returned the writ unsatisfiedonly on February 20, 1980
although by its express terms, it was returnable within thirty days from October29, 1979.
Clearly, Manipon had planned to get Dominguez to acquiesce to a consideration for lifting
thegarnishment order.

 Formilleza vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 75160, March 18, 1988

Page 78
 People vs. Pepito, G.R. Nos. 112761-65, February 3, 1997
 Abdulla vs. People, G.R. No. 150129, April 6, 2005

FACTS:

Convicted by the Sandiganbayan of the crime of illegal use of public funds, appellant
Abdulla is before the Court on petition for review under Rule 45. Appellant’s co-accused,
Aguil and Darkis, were both acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty and sentenced by
the Sandiganbayan. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended
appellant’s sentence by deleting the temporary special disqualification imposed upon her.
Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court, persistently pleas innocence of the
crime charged.

ISSUE:

Is there a presumption of criminal intent in malversation cases?

RULING:

No. The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to all charges of
technical malversation because disbursement of public funds for public use is per se not an
unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act when she
paid the obligation of the Sulu State College to its employees in the form of terminal leave

Page 79
benefits such employees were entitled to under existing civil service laws. In the absence
of any presumption of unlawful intent, the burden of proving by competent evidence that
appellant’s act of paying the terminal leave benefits of employees of the Sulu State
College was done with criminal intent rests upon the prosecution.

Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00)
released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave benefits
of other school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical
malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically
appropriating said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the third and
fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking
in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.

Title 8
 People vs. Abarca, G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987

FACTS: Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny,
had illicit relationship. The illicit relationship apparently began while the accused
was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations. The accused missed his
itineraries that day so he decided to go home. Upon reaching home, the accused
found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When
the wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his
revolver. The accused who was then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their
room jumped and ran away. The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban
City. He went to the house of a PC soldier, got an M-16 rifle, and went back to his
house but he was not able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the
“mahjong session” as it was the “hangout” of Kingsley Koh. The accused found
Koh playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh three times with his rifle hitting
Koh, as well as Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent
to the room where Koh was playing mahjong. Kingsley Koh died instantaneously.
Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and operated on in the kidney to remove a
bullet Arnold’s wife, Lina Amparado, was also treated in the hospital as she was
hit by bullet fragments.

The accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
murder with double frustrated murder as charged in the amended information, and
pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code which does not consider the effect of
mitigating or aggravating circumstances when the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty in relation to Art. 48, he is sentenced to death.

On appeal by the accused, the Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code defining death inflicted under exceptional
circumstances, complexed with double frustrated murder.

ISSUE: Is the trial court correct in finding Abarca guilty of the COMPLEX
CRIME OF MURDER with DOUBLE FRUSTRATED MURDER?

Page 80
HELD: NO.

Article 247 reads in full:

ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. —

Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both
of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.

If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt
from punishment.

These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with
respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while the
daughters are living with their parents.

Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or daughter, or
shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be
entitled to the benefits of this article.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies in the
instant case. There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her
paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of
which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247
prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his
spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that
he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These
elements are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the accused-
appellant of murder, therefore erred. It must be stressed furthermore that Article
247, supra, does not define an offense. Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted
upon the accused. He is banished, but that is intended for his protection. It shall
likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances, not being a
punishable act, cannot be qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or other
qualifying circumstances, We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.

The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the physical
injuries suffered by Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado who were caught in the
crossfire as the accused-appellant shot the victim. The Solicitor General
recommends a finding of double frustrated murder against the accused-appellant,
and being the more severe offense, proposes the imposition of reclusion temporal
in its maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. This is
where we disagree. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the
Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one committing an offense is liable for all
the consequences of his act, that rule presupposes that the act done amounts to a
felony. But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was
not committing murder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting

Page 81
 death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold the
appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.

This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any
responsibility. Granting the fact that he was not performing an illegal act when he
fired shots at the victim, he cannot be said to be entirely without fault. While it
appears that before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words (“an waray
labot kagawas,”) that is not enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries
sustained by the Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his part.
Accordingly, we hold him liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article
365, that is, less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or
negligence.

For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the
accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum
period, arresto to being the graver penalty (than destierro).

 People vs. De Castro, G.R. No. 205316, July 20, 2015

 People vs. Antonio, G.R. No. 208623, July 23, 2014
 People vs. Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014

FACTS:

                Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four
children.

                On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that

her husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998
at their residence in Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the
accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.

                As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not

really cause marital problems between her and the accused-appellant. It was, in
fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded
with equal degree of enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed.
He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis
in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so
she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.

                One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed
the matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and
instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted
him to ask angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”, and to instantaneously order:
“You transfer here to our bed.”

                KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and
abdominal pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not

Page 82
appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it
against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from
where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.

                The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long,
expressed his desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She
politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling
well.

                The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK
tried to resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they
tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.

                The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster,41 stretched her legs
apart and rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held
her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal
desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do that to me
because I’m not feeling well.”

                Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK
merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because he took over the control
and management of their businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital affairs.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

HELD:

                YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights
over their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if
not consensual, is rape.

Violation of equal protection clause

                The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-
marital rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the
rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause.

                The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between
marital rape and non-marital rape. The various rationales which have been
asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about
the consent and property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to
withstand even the slightest scrutiny.

                The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York
statute to be unconstitutional.

Page 83
                Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute
immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and
pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be
liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her.

                Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the

rapist’s legal relationship with his victim.

Implied consent theory untenable

                The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory
which was raised by the accused. The accused argued that consent to copulation is
presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.

                According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of

sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without
her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the
Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration,
defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

 People vs. Barde, G.R. No. 183094, September 22, 2010

SEPTEMBER 2010 PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT

DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE
Posted on October 18, 2010 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo • Posted in Criminal
Law • Tagged appeal, conspiracy, dangerous drugs, due
process, evidence, jurisdiction, Ombudsman, parricide, perjury, prejudicial question, rape, robbery, Sandiganbayan

Here are selected September 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
on criminal law and procedure:
Criminal Law

Page 84
1. Revised Penal Code
Attempted rape; acts of lasciviousness. Insisting that there was no attempted rape,
petitioner argues that AAA merely testified that he told her that they would have
sexual intercourse, and that “this is not equivalent to carnal knowledge, or even
an attempt to have carnal knowledge” since there is no showing that he had
commenced or attempted to insert his penis into her sexual organ before she fled.
Disagreeing with the accused, the Court ruled that while rape and acts of
lasciviousness have the same nature, they are fundamentally different. For in
rape, there is the intent to lie with a woman, whereas in acts of lasciviousness,
this element is absent. Petitioner’s acts, as narrated by AAA, far from being mere
obscene or lewd, indisputably show that he intended to have and was bent on
consummating carnal knowledge of AAA. Jaren Tibong y Culla-ag vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 191000, September 15, 2010.
Complex Crime; penalty. ART. 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period. Appellant’s single act of detonating an explosive device may quantitatively
constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct offenses, yet these component
criminal offenses should be considered only as a single crime in law on which a
single penalty is imposed because the offender was impelled by a single criminal
impulse which shows his lesser degree of perversity. Thus, applying the aforesaid
provision of law, the maximum penalty for the most serious crime, which is
murder, is death. Pursuant, however, to Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, the appellate court properly reduced the penalty
of death which it previously imposed upon the appellant to reclusion perpetua. People
of the Philippines vs. Reynaldo Barde, G.R. No. 183094, September 22, 2010.

 People vs. PO3 Fallorina, G.R. No. 137347, March 4, 2004

Facts: 

At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent Jorojoro, an eleven-year old minor and the
third child of Vicente and Felicisima Jorojoro, residing at Sitio Militar, Brgy. Bahay Toro, Project 8,
Quezon City, asked permission from his mother Felicisima if he could play outside. She agreed.
Together with his playmate Whilcon “Buddha” Rodriguez, Vincent played with his kite on top of the
roof of an abandoned carinderia beside the road. 

Beside the carinderia was a basketball court, where a fourteen-year old witness Ricardo Salvo and
his three friends, were playing basketball. Ricardo heard the familiar sound of a motorcycle coming
from the main road across the basketball court. Cognizant to Ricardo of the appellant, PO3
Ferdinand Fallorina, a Philippine National Police (PNP) officer, detailed in the Traffic Management
Group (TMG), knew that he abhorred kids playing on the roof, since one of his friends was
previously been scolded by the appellant before. 

Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from the roof. When PO3 Fallorina saw
them, the former stopped his motorcycle, he shouted and badmouthed at them. After hearing the
shouts of the appellant, Whilcon rushed to jump off from the roof while Vincent was lying on his
stomach on the roof flying his kite. When he heard the appellant’s shouts, Vincent stood up and
looked at the latter. As soon as Vincent turned his back, ready to get down from the roof, suddenly,
the appellant pointed the .45 caliber pistol towards the direction of Vincent and fired a shot. Vincent
fell from the roof, lying prostrate near the canal beside the abandoned carinderia and the
basketball court. 

The appellant approached Vincent and carried the latter’s hapless body in a waiting tricycle and
brought him to the Quezon City General Hospital. Vincent was pronounced dead on arrival caused
by a single gunshot wound in the head.

Page 85
Issues: 

(a) Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability? 

(b) Whether or not the appellant can offset the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of
public position from a mitigating circumstance of his voluntary surrender? 

Held: 

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) cites that the basis for exemption from a criminal liability
under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), is the complete absence of intent
and negligence on the part of the accused. For the accused to be guilty for a felony, it must be
committed either with criminal intent or with fault or negligence. 

Thusly, the elements of exempting circumstances are (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2)
with due care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without any fault or
intention of causing it. 

In the case at bar, the Court a quo erred in inequitably appreciating exculpatory and inculpatory
facts and circumstances which should have been considered in favor of the accused. The court
also failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the accused
since it was only after three days that the appellant gave himself up and surrendered his service
firearm. And lastly, the court considered the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of his
position by the accused. 

On January 19, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant-accused of
murder, qualified by treachery and aggravated by abuse of public position. The trial court did not
appreciate in favor of the appellant the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender. 

The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, found the accused PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y
Fernando GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder defined and penalized by
Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by the Republic Act No. 7659, and in view of the presence of
the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage by the accused of his public position (par. 1, Art.
14, RPC). Hence, the accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of late Vincent Jorojoro, Jr.
the amounts of actual damages of P49,174.00 (paid for funeral services); P50,000.00 for moral
damages; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P50,000.00 as death indemnity. The court a
quo sentenced the appellant to suffer the Death Penalty.

 De Ocampo vs. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. 147932, January 25, 2006
 People vs. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76, November 16, 2001

FACTS

The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is

now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two
counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant
filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

ISSUE

Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the

accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under
law by reason of the “mandate of the sovereign will”.

Page 86
 RULING

NO. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws.”, this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated
alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the
“mandate of the people” are multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality.
The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority
to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.

 People vs. Jose, G.R. No. L-28232, February 6, 1971

Facts:

On June 26, 1967, four (4) principal-accused Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., alias “Boy”, Eduardo
Aquino Alias “Eddie” and Rogelio Cañal; together with Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon and
Jessie Guion as accomplices, conspired together, confederated with and mutually helped one
another, then and there, to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design to forcibly
abduct Magdalena “Maggie” de la Riva, 25 years old and single, a movie actress by profession at
the time of the incident, where the four principal accused, by means of force and intimidation
using a deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the complainant against her will, and brought
her to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, and hence committed the crime of Forcible Abduction
with Rape.

Wherefore, the court finds that the accomplices Pueng, Guanzon and Guion, on the ground that
the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against them, the Motion to Dismiss
filed for and in their behalf is hereby granted, and the case dismissed against them.

(Facts of this case are too descriptive. I’d rather not include much details on the scene of the
crime to protect the complainant’s repute).

Issue:

(a) What kind of rape was committed?

Held:

Undoubtedly, rape is that which is punishable by the penalty reclusion perpetua to death, under
paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended by Republic Act 4111 which took effect on June 20, 1964.
Under the law, rape is committed by having canal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances: (1) by using force and intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of
reason and otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age, even
though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be
present. The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Whenever the rape is
committed the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.

As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes

Page 87
committed, and the latter is the more serious; hence, pursuant to the provision of Art 48 of the
RPC, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period. Consequently, the
appellants should suffer the extreme penalty of death. In this regard, there is hardly any
necessity to consider the attendance of aggravating circumstances, for the same would not alter
the nature of the penalty to be imposed.

However, said crime as attended with the following aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime,
appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the commission of these
crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the crime having been committed by the four appellants
in conspiracy with one another; (c) ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the complaint to
exhibit to them her complete nakedness for ten minutes before raping her, brought about a
circumstance which tended to make the effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) the use
of motor vehicle.

Of the three principal-appellants (Jose, Aquino and Cañal), none of them may claim aggravating
circumstances has been offset by the mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda should,
however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor
which does not in the least affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the
reason that there would still be three aggravating circumstances remaining.

Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is concerned, the order of the court a quo
for its confiscation is hereby set aside; and whoever is in custody thereof is hereby ordered to
deliver its possession to intervenor Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation in accordance
with the judgment of the First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 69993 thereof.

Before the actual promulgation of the decision, the Court received a formal manifestation on
the part of the Solicitor general to the effect that Rogelio Cañal, one of the herein appellants,
died in prison on December 28, 1970. As a result, the case is dismissed as to him alone, and only
insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, with one-fourth (1/4) of the costs declared de
officio.

Wherefore, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: Jaime G. Jose, Basilio
Pineda, Jr., and Eduardo P. Aquino are pronounced GUILTY of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape, and each and every one of them likewise convicted of three (3) of the
crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is hereby sentenced to four (4) death
penalties; all of them shall jointly and severally, indemnify the complainant of the sum of
P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a total of 40,000.00; and each shall pay one-fourth of
the costs.

 People vs. Glino, G.R. No. 173793, December 4, 2007

 People vs. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433, March 30, 2000
 People vs. Soria, G.R. No. 179031, November 14, 2012

Title 9

 People vs. Dionaldo, G.R. No. 207949, July 23, 2014

ACTS: Roderick dropped his brother Edwin off at the

Health Is Wealth Gym. A text message from another
brother told him that Edwin had been kidnapped. He
received a phone call from Edwin’s kidnappers who threatened
to kill Edwin if he should report the matter to the
police and demanded P15M as ransomed money. Roderick
told them he had no such money.

Page 88
 After negotiations, the kidnappers agreed to release
Edwin for P110,000.00. Roderick was then instructed to
bring the money to the kidnappers at the Libingan ng
mga Bayani.

Subsequently, an orange Mitsubishi car pulled up in

front of his vehicle. He saw one of the four men take
a mobile phone and upon uttering the word “alat,” the
men returned to their car and drove away.

During the course of the investigation, Rodolfo, an

employee of the Health gym, confessed that he was part
of the plan to kidnap Edwin, as in fact he tipped off
the kidnappers on the conditions that he will be given
a share in the ransom money.

Rodolfo gave information on the whereabouts of his

cohorts leading to their arrest. The dead body of Edwin
was found at Laurel, Batangas.

The RTC convicted the accused of kidnapping with

serious illegal detention.

ISSUE: What is the crime committed by the accused in

the instant case?

HELD: The accused are guilty of Special Complex Crime

of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide under the last
paragraph of Article 267 as amended by RA 7659.

Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of

the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely
sought or merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or
homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, not to
be treated as separate crime.

 People vs. Salvador, G.R. No. 201443, April 10, 2013

 People vs. Baldogo, G.R. Nos. 128106 07 January 24, 2003
 People vs. Norada, G.R. No. 218958, December 13, 2017
 Baleros, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 138033, January 30, 2007

Page 89
FACTS: One evening, inside her room, Malou retired at around 10:30.
Outside, right in front of her bedroom door, her maid slept on a folding bed.
Early morning of the following day, petitioner, clad in t-shirt and shorts,
entered the room of Malou through its window. Once inside, he approached
Malou and tightly pressed on her face a piece of cloth soaked with chemical
and. at the same time, pinned her down on the bed. She was awakened
thereby and she struggled but could not move.

She wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her mouth with cloth
wet with chemicals were very tight. Still, Malou continued fighting off her
attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand got free. With this, the
opportunity presented itself when she was able to grab hold of his sex organ
which she then squeezed. Petitioner let her go and escaped while Malou
went straight to the bedroom door and roused her maid.

ISSUE: Is petitioner guilty of attempted rape?

HELD: No, he is not. There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of

sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge in the present case. The next
question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the act of the
petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of
Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.

Page 90
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere
planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles
nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.

Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too
strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in
the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will
logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not
commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or
attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was
fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let
alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the
complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is
anybody’s guess.

 Marzalado vs. People, G.R. No. 152997, November 10, 2004

 People vs. Talusan, G.R. No. 179187, July 14, 2009

Page 91
 Title 10
 People vs. Cahilig, G.R. No. 199208, July 30, 2014

TOPIC: Qualified Theft

FACTS:

                Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings and

Loan Association, Inc. (WPESLAI). She was tasked with handling, managing,
receiving, and disbursing the funds of the WPESLAI.

                It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made
withdrawals from the funds of WPESLAI and appropriated the same for her
personal benefit. Cahilig would prepare disbursement vouchers, to be approved by
the WPESLAI president and Board of Directors, in order to withdraw funds from
one of WPESLAI’s bank accounts then transfer these funds to its other bank
account. The withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in her

Page 92
 capacity as WPESLAI cashier. This procedure for transferring funds from one
bank account to another was said to be standard practice at WPESLAI. However,
Cahilig did not actually transfer the funds. Instead, she made it appear in her
personal WPESLAI ledger that a deposit was made into her account and then she
would fill out a withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said amount from
her capital contribution.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not Cahilig was guilty of qualified theft.

HELD:

                YES. The elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of

confidence, are as follows:

1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things;
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

                All the elements are present in this case.

                Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking
advantage of her position. Her intent to gain is clear in the use of a carefully
planned and deliberately executed scheme to commit the theft.

Grave abuse of confidence, defined

                Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, “must be the

result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between
the appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence
between them which the appellant abused.”

                Cahilig’s position was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering
that it involves “handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing” money from
WPESLAI’s depositors and other funds of the association. Cahilig’s responsibilities
as WPESLAI cashier required prudence and vigilance over the money entrusted
into her care.

                However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the
board of directors into authorizing disbursements for money that
eventually ended up in her personal account, a fact that Cahilig did not deny.

Page 93
 Magsumbol vs. People, G.R. No. 207175, Nov. 26, 2014

 People vs Abarri, G.R. No. 90185, March 1, 1995

 People vs. Go, G.R. No. 191015, August 6, 2014

FACTS

Orient Commercial Banking Corporation (OCBC), a commercial bank was ordered closed
by the BSP.  PDIC was designated as OCBC receiver, and it took over the bank’s affairs,
assets and liabilities, records, and collected the bank’s receivables.

In 1997, it appears that fictitious loans in favor of two entities – Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia
Textile Mills, Inc. were approved, after which two manager’s checks representing the
supposed proceeds of these loans were issued but made payable to two different entities –
Philippine Recycler’s Inc. and Zeta International – without any documents issued by the

Page 94
supposed borrowers Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. assigning the supposed
loan proceeds to the two payees.

Thereafter, these two manager’s checks – together with several others totaling
P120,819,475.00 – were encashed, and then deposited in the OCBC Savings Account of
Jose Go.  Then, several automatic transfer deposits were made from Go’s savings account
to his OCBC Current which were then used to fund Go’s previously dishonored personal
checks.

PDIC as receiver sent demand letters to the bank’s debtor-borrowers on record, including
Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc..  In response to the demand letters, Timmy’s,
Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. denied having obtained loans from OCBC.  It was
discovered that the signatures of the corporate officers were forgeries, and the purported
loans were obtained through falsified loan documents.

After finding probable cause, Informations were filed against the private respondents.

After the presentation of all of the prosecution’s evidence, the private respondents filed a
Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence praying for the dismissal of the criminal
cases instituted against them due to the failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

The RTC judge finding the Demurrer to Evidence to be meritorious, dismissed the case
and acquitted all of the accused in these cases.

ISSUES

(a)  WON there was GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY

RESPONDENT RTC JUDGE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE;

(b) THE ORDER OF ACQUITTAL HAS ALREADY ATTAINED FINALITY WHEN IT

WAS NOT CHALLENGED IN A TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE MANNER; AND

(c) WHAT CRIME WAS COMMITTED

RULING:

The Court grants the Petition.

Demurrer to the evidence is “an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect
that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true
or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue.  The party demurring challenges the
sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict.  The court, in passing upon the
sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether
there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of
guilt. x x x Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such

Page 95
evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action
demanded according to the circumstances.

To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove:

(a) the commission of the crime, and

(b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused.

Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the court must evaluate whether the prosecution
evidence is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.

“The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of
such discretion.” (Te v. Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 127, 139)  As to effect, “the grant of a
demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would
place the accused in double jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.” (People
v. Sandiganbayan  645 SCRA 726, 731)

When grave abuse of discretion is present, an order granting a demurrer becomes null and
void.

As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to an

acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would not
violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled
that when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence, its
judgment is considered void, as this Court ruled in People v. Laguio, Jr.:

By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial
courts granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void
judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set
aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of
the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.

In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court when it granted the accused’s demurrer to evidence, we deem its
consequent order of acquittal void.

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as “that capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment

which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.  ‘The abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.’  The party

Page 96
questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able to clearly establish that the trial
court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its authority to dispense
justice.”

In the exercise of the Court’s “superintending control over inferior courts, we are to be
guided by all the circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’
So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to
do substantial justice.”wred

Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, the Court declares that the CA grossly erred in
affirming the trial court’s Order granting the respondent’s demurrer, which Order was
patently null and void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and manifest
irregularity, thus causing substantial injury to the banking industry and public interest.

The Court finds that the prosecution has presented competent evidence to sustain the
indictment for the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and that
respondents appear to be the perpetrators thereof.  In evaluating the evidence, the trial
court effectively failed and/or refused to weigh the prosecution’s evidence against the
respondents, which it was duty-bound to do as a trier of facts; considering that the case
involved hundreds of millions of pesos of OCBC depositors’ money – not to mention that
the banking industry is impressed with public interest, the trial court should have
conducted itself with circumspection and engaged in intelligent reflection in resolving the
issues.

ESTAFA

The elements of estafa through abuse of confidence under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code are:

“(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same;

(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the

offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;

(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and

(d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.”awred

Obviously, a bank takes its depositors’ money as a loan, under an obligation to return the
same; thus, the term “demand deposit.”

The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code on simple loan. Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “x x x savings
x x x deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the
provisions concerning simple loan.” There is a debtor-creditor relationship between the

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bank and its depositor.  The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the creditor.  The
depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. x x x

Moreover, the banking laws impose high standards on banks in view of the fiduciary
nature of banking.  “This fiduciary relationship means that the bank’s obligation to
observe ‘high standards of integrity and performance’ is deemed written into every deposit
agreement between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires
banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family.”

In Soriano v. People, it was held that the President of a bank is a fiduciary with respect to
the bank’s funds, and he holds the same in trust or for administration for the bank’s
benefit.  From this, it may be inferred that when such bank president makes it appear
through falsification that an individual or entity applied for a loan when in fact such
individual or entity did not, and the bank president obtains the loan proceeds and converts
the same, estafa is committed.

Next, regarding misappropriation, the evidence tends to establish that Manager’s Checks
were encashed, using the bank’s funds which clearly belonged to OCBC’s depositors, and
then deposited in Go’s savings account although he was not the named payee therein. The
evidence strongly indicates that Go converted OCBC funds to his own personal use and
benefit.  “The words ‘convert’ and ‘misappropriate’ connote an act of using or disposing
of another’s property as if it were one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different
from that agreed upon.

To misappropriate for one’s own use includes not only conversion to one’s personal
advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right. x x x
In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of
misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to
return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.  Thus, the
mere presumption of misappropriation or conversion is enough to conclude that a probable
cause exists for the indictment x x x.”cralawred

As to the third element of estafa, there is no question that as a consequence of the

misappropriation of OCBC’s funds, the bank and its depositors have been prejudiced; the
bank has been placed under receivership, and the depositors’ money is no longer under
their unimpeded disposal.

Finally, on the matter of demand, while it has not been shown that the bank
demanded the return of the funds, it has nevertheless been held that

“[d]emand is not an element of the felony or a condition precedent to the filing of a

criminal complaint for estafa.

Indeed, the accused may be convicted of the felony u

Facts:

Page 98
In October 14, 1998, the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) issued a Resolution ordering the closure of the Orient
Commercial Banking Corporation (OCBC) and placing such bank under
the receivership of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). 
PDIC took all the assets and liabilities of OCBC.  PDIC began collecting
OCBC’s due loans by sending demand letters from the borrowers. 
Among these borrowers are Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc.
which appeared to have loan in the amount of 10 million each. Both
Corporation denied the allegation. Because of this, the PDIC conducted
an investigation and found out that the loans purportedly for Timmy’s,
Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. were released in the form of manager’s
check deposited in the account of the private respondents.

PDIC filed two counts of Estafa thru falsification of Commercial

Documents against the private respondents. After finding probable
cause, the Office of the City Prosecutor of the City of Manila filed
Information against the private respondents. Upon being subjected to
arraignment by the RTC in Manila, the private respondents pleaded not
guilty to the criminal cases filed against them. A pre-trial was conducted.
Thereafter, trial of the cases ensued and the prosecution presented its
evidence. After the presentation of all of the prosecution’s evidence, the
private respondents filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to
Evidence and a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition.

The presiding judge granted the private respondents’ Motion for

Voluntary Inhibition and ordered the case to be re-raffled to another
branch. The case was subsequently re-raffled to the branch of the
respondent RTC judge. Respondent Judge granted the Motion for Leave
to File Demurrer of Evidence praying for the dismissal of the criminal
cases instituted against them due to the failure of the prosecution to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. An order was promulgated
by the respondent judge finding the private respondents’ Demurrer to
Evidence to be meritorious, dismissing the Criminal Case. Private
prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the RTC
Judge. The prosecution through the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
certiorari before the Court of Appeals but was also denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of RTC Judge erred
in granting the Motion for Leave to File Demurrer of Evidence.

Held:
No.  CA grossly erred in affirming the trial court’s Order granting the
respondent’s demurrer, which Order was patently null and void for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion and manifest irregularity, thus
causing substantial injury to the banking industry and public interest.

Page 99
The Court found that the prosecution has presented competent evidence
to sustain the indictment for the crime of estafa through falsification of
commercial documents, and that respondents appear to be the
perpetrators thereof. What the trial and appellate courts disregarded,
however, is that the OCBC funds ended up in the personal bank
accounts of respondent Go, and were used to fund his personal checks,
even as he was not entitled thereto. These, if not rebutted, are indicative
of estafa.

Hence, the Petition is GRANTED. Resolution of the Court of Appeals are

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 2, 2007 and October 19, 2007 Orders of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49 in Criminal Case Nos. 00-
187318 and 00-187319 are declared null and void, and the said cases are
ordered REINSTATED for the continuation of proceedings.

 People vs. Macabando, G.R. No. 188708, July 31, 2013

 Pideli vs. People, G.R. No. 163437, February 13, 2008

Page 100
 Ocampo vs. People, G.R. No. 163705, July 30, 2007
 People vs. Regala, G.R. No. 130508, April 15, 2000
 People vs. Puno, G.R. No. 97471. February 17, 1993
 People vs. Garcia, et al., G.R. No. 138470, April 1, 2003
 People vs. Juliano, G.R. No. 134120, January 17, 2005
 Intestate Estate vs. People, G.R. No. 181409, February 2010
 Milla vs. People, G.R. No. 188726, January 25, 2012

Title 11
 Olivarez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.163866, July 29, 2005

FACTS:

Isidro Olivares was charged with violation of RA 7610 for touching the breast and
kissing the lips of Cristina Elitiong, a 16-year old high school student employed by
the former in making sampaguita garlands during weekends. The trial court found
him guilty; affirmed by the CA. Petitioner now alleges that his right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated for failure to
allege in the information the essential elements of the offense for which he is being
charged.

Issue: WON Olivares can be charged with violation of RA 7610.

Held:

Yes.

The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 are as
follows:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

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 2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse.

3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

The first element obtains in this case. It was established beyond reasonable doubt
that petitioner kissed Cristina and touched her breasts with lewd designs as inferred
from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances. The
second element, i.e., that the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse, is likewise present.

Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. In this case,
Cristina was sexually abused because she was coerced or intimidated by petitioner
to indulge in a lascivious conduct. Furthermore, it is inconsequential that the
sexual abuse occurred only once. As expressly provided in Section 3 (b) of R.A.
7610, the abuse may be habitual or not. It must be observed that Article III of R.A.
7610 is captioned as “Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse” because
Congress really intended to cover a situation where the minor may have been
coerced or intimidated into lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit.
The law covers not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse.

As to the contention that the minority of Cristina was not properly alleged in the
information, the SC ruled that: Petitioner was furnished a copy of the Complaint
which was mentioned in the information, hence he was adequately informed of the
age of the complainant.

 Malto v P, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him was violated for failure to allege in the information the
essential elements of the offense, which are age of the offended party and that
she is an abused or exploited child as defined in the law, for which he is being
charged.
RULING:
NO. All the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 were
averred in the Complaint mentioned in the Information of which a copy was
furnished to the petitioner in which he was informed of the age of the complainant.
The prosecution has also established the minority of the offended party through
competent evidence. Cristina testified that she was 16 years old and a certification
from the Office of the Local Registrar of San Pedro, Laguna was presented
showing that she was born on October 17, 1980.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. A complaint is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where

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the offense was committed. The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.
If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it. The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used
in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding
to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

While it is necessary to allege the essential elements of the crime in the

information, the failure to do so is not an irremediable vice. When the complaint or
the resolution by the public prosecutor which contain the missing averments is
attached to the information and form part of the records, the defect in the latter is
effectively cured, and the accused cannot successfully invoke the defense that his
right to be informed is violated.

The information merely states that petitioner was being charged for the crime of
“violation of R.A. 7610” without citing the specific sections alleged to have been
violated by petitioner. This omission is not sufficient to invalidate the information.
The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they may be conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate facts
and circumstances in the complaint or information. The sufficiency of an
information is not negated by an incomplete or defective designation of the crime
in the caption or other parts of the information but by the narration of facts and
circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprise the
accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

NOTES:
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 are as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Lascivious conduct, defined
Section 32, Article XIII, of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 7610
defines lascivious conduct as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with
an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals
or pubic area of a person.
A child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. In this case, Cristina was
sexually abused because she was coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge
in a lascivious conduct. Furthermore, it is inconsequential that the sexual abuse
occurred only once. As expressly provided in Section 3 (b) of R.A. 7610, the
abuse may be habitual or not. It must be observed that Article III of R.A. 7610 is

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captioned as “Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse” because Congress
really intended to cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or
intimidated into lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit. The law
covers not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse.

 Ang vs. CA, G.R. NO. 182835, April 20, 2010

FACTS:

Irish and Rustan were classmates

at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they
became on-and-off sweethearts. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan
had taken a live-in partner, whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up
with him.

Rustan, however, got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope
with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish
rejected the proposal. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan
somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages.  Irish
replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.

Irish, later on, received through multimedia message service (MMS) a

picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face
superimposed on the figure. The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the
message, was one of the numbers that Rustan used. 

After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from
Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly
scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent
through the internet. 

Irish filed a case of violation of R.A. No. 9262 against Rustan.

Rustan argued that he cannot be held liable under R.A. No. 9262. Section
3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or

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acts of a person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or
dating relationship. Thus:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act,

(a) Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series
of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former
wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her
child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

Further, Section 3(e) provides that a dating relationship includes a situation

where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing
basis during the course of the relationship. Thus:

(e) Dating relationship refers to a situation wherein the parties live as

husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically
involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the
relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between
two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating
relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)

Hence, Rustan claims that, being romantically involved, implies that the
offender and the offended woman have or had sexual relations. According
to him, romance implies a sexual act. He cites Websters Comprehensive
Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal
meaning to the word romance used as a verb, i.e., to make love; to make
love to as in He romanced her.
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of
the on-and-off variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as
having developed over time and on a continuing basis. 

Page 105
ISSUES:

a)  Whether “dating relationship” exist even without sexual intercourse.

b) Whether the on and off relationship (away-bati) of Irish and Rustan can
be considered as “dating relationship” as contemplated by law.

RULING:

a) The dating relationship that the law contemplates can exist even
without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved.

The law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb romance that implies
a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have romanced the
offended woman. Rather, it used the noun romance to describe a couples
relationship, i.e., a love affair.
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that violence against women x x x refers to
any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman x x x
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Clearly,
the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating
relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines dating relationship while
Section 3(f) defines sexual relations. The latter refers to a single sexual
act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child. The
dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist
even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those
involved.

b) An away-bati or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common

occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation
between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of
misunderstanding. 

Page 106
THINGS DECIDED:

a) The elements of the crime of violence against women through

harassment under R.A. No. 9262 are:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the

offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of

acts of harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological

distress to her.

b) The dating relationship that the law contemplates can exist even
without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved.

c) An away-bati or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common

occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation
between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of
misunderstanding. 

 Domingo vs. Rayala, G.R. No. 155831, February 18, 2008

Page 107
Facts:
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a
Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala, the chairman of NLRC.
She alleged that Rayala called her in his office and touched her shoulder, part of her neck then
tickled her ears.  Rayala argued that his acts does not constitute sexual harassment because for
it to exist, there must be a demand, request or requirement of sexual favor.

Issue:
Whether or not Rayala commit sexual harassment.

Rulings:
Yes.

The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines
work-related sexual harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. – Work, education or
training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of
the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education
environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other,
regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the
object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment
or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable
compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual
favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would
discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said
employee;
. (2)  The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under existing labor laws;
or
. (3)  The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the
employee.

even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he
would still be administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a “demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor.” But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement
of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned,
with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders,
running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with
her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and
making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones – all these acts of Rayala resound with
deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.

 P vs. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006

[FACTS]

This is a case of child who allegedly raped by her own father. The mother of the
child abuse victim sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice expressing anxiety
over the posting of full text decisions of the Supreme Court on its Internet Web
Page. The mother submitted that confidentiality and the best interest of the child
must prevail over public access to information and pleaded that her daughter’s
case, as well as those of a similar nature, be excluded from the Web Page. The

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Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), National Press Club (NPC), Philippine Press Institute (PPI),
Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) and the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) to comment on the issue:

The position of the OSG in its Comment is noteworthy. The OSG submits that the
posting of the full text of decisions in cases involving child abuse on the Supreme
Court Web Page violates the right to privacy of the aggrieved parties. In order to
determine whether the subject matter upon which the right to privacy being
invoked falls within the constitutionally-protected zone of privacy, it must be
shown that the person’s expectation of privacy is reasonable. The reasonableness
of such expectancy depends on a two–part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the
individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation
is one that society recognizes as reasonable.

According to the OSG, the fact that the aggrieved child may have consented,
through a parent or guardian, to a public hearing of the case does not negate the
expectation of privacy which the child may later invoke because child victims
cannot be presumed to have intended their initial agreement to extend beyond the
termination of their case to the posting of the decision reached by the Court on the
Web Page. Moreover, such an expectation of privacy is reasonable considering the
various statutes and rules which reveal the intention of the State to maintain the
confidentiality of information pertaining to child abuse cases.

The DSWD imparted the same sentiment. It submits that the court records of child
abuse cases should be treated with strict confidentiality not only throughout the
court proceedings, but even after the promulgation of the decision in order to
protect the right to privacy of the child and her family and to preclude instances
where undue disclosure of information may impair the treatment and rehabilitation
of the child-victim.

The Court likewise appreciates the separate comments of the KBP and NPC. The
KBP informs the Court that its members have agreed not to identify in their
broadcasts the names of children who are victims of abuse or are in conflict with
the law. The NPC, on the other hand, tells us that the prevailing media practice is
to inquire whether these individuals wish to have their names appear in the report.
If they do not, media would normally take off the names and merely provide a very
general description of the individual in recognition of the need to carefully balance
the right to information with the welfare of the parties involved.

ISSUE

Whether or not it is proper to post the full text of decisions of similar cases on the
Supreme Court Web Page in cases involving child sexual abuse.

HELD

This case presents an opportunity for the Court not only to once again dispense due
requital for the sufferings of a child who has been defiled by her own father, but
also to effectuate the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610), otherwise
known as the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act, and its implementing rules, RA 9262, otherwise known as the

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 Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, and its
implementing rules, and our own Rule on Violence Against Women and their
Children.

The provisions on confidentiality of these enactments uniformly seek to respect the

dignity and protect the privacy of women and their children. Sec. 29 of RA 7610
provides:

Sec. 29. Confidentiality. — at the instance of the offended party, his name may be
withheld from the public until the court acquires jurisdiction over the case.

It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or columnist in case of
printed materials, announcer or producer in the case of television and radio
broadcasting, producer and director in the case of the movie industry, to cause
undue and sensationalized publicity of any case of a violation of this Act which
results in the moral degradation and suffering of the offended party.

Sec. 44 of RA 9262 similarly provides:

Sec. 44. Confidentiality.—All records pertaining to cases of violence against

women and their children including those in the barangay shall be confidential and
all public officers and employees and public or private clinics or hospitals shall
respect the right to privacy of the victim. Whoever publishes or causes to be
published, in any format, the name, address, telephone number, school, business
address, employer, or other identifying information of a victim or an immediate
family member, without the latter’s consent, shall be liable to the contempt power
of the court.

Any person who violates this provision shall suffer the penalty of one (1) year
imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00).

Likewise, the Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children states:

Sec. 40. Privacy and confidentiality of proceedings.—All hearings of cases of

violence against women and their children shall be conducted in a manner
consistent with the dignity of women and their children and respect for their
privacy.

Records of the cases shall be treated with utmost confidentiality. Whoever

publishes or causes to be published, in any format, the name, address, telephone
number, school, business address, employer or other identifying information of the
parties or an immediate family or household member, without their consent or
without authority of the court, shall be liable for contempt of court and shall suffer
the penalty of one year imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five Hundred
Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos.

Taking all these opinions into account and in view of recent enactments which
unequivocally express the intention to maintain the confidentiality of information in cases
involving violence against women and their children, in this case and henceforth, the Court
shall withhold the real name of the victim-survivor and shall use fictitious initials instead
to represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims-survivors or any

Page 110
other information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well those of their
immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed.

FACTS

Cabalquinto was accused of raping his eight-year old daughter seven times. He was found guilty of
by the Regional Trial Court for rape on two counts and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death. The victim testified that her father had raped her seven times since her mother left for
abroad. A medical certificate and the testimony of the mother further supported the charge. But the
defense pointed out some inconsistencies between the testimony of the victim and her mother on
certain circumstances of the alleged rape events. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the
trial court and also ordered payment of damages.

ISSUE

Is Cabalquinto guilty of rape?

RULING

Affirmed.

Supreme Court meticulously and painstakingly examined the records as well as the transcripts of
stenographic notes and found no cause to overturn the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals.

The mother’s testimony that she witnessed the act of rape corroborates the victim-daughter’s
account. The inconsistency between the testimony of AAA and her mother pertains merely to a
circumstance that is of little consequence to the question of whether rape was actually committed.
Whether the victim cried out or not does not discount rape. It should be emphasized that the victim
was only eight years old when she was raped. A child of her tender years cannot be expected to
be able to recount the details of her torment with exactitude.

Carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is rape as defined under Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, and is qualified when the offender is a parent of the victim, in which case, the
death penalty shall be imposed as provided under the Death Penalty Law. In this case, the
qualifying circumstances of the victim’s minority and her relationship with the accused as the
latter’s daughter were properly alleged in the Informations, proven during trial and not refuted by
Cabalquinto. However, in view of Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole should instead be imposed.

The accused is sentenced, in each of the criminal cases reviewed, to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay the victim P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
for each count, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each
count.

Moral damages, separate and distinct from the civil indemnity, are automatically granted in rape
cases. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed to deter fathers with aberrant sexual
behaviors from sexually abusing their daughters.

NOTA BENE

What was notable in this case was the Supreme Court’s pronouncement, in relation to Republic
Act 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act)
and Republic Act 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004), on the
confidential nature a rape trial. According to the Court, these laws uniformly seek to respect the
dignity and protect the privacy of women and their children. The Court thus withheld the real name
of the victim, and used fictitious initials instead to represent her.

 Aquino vs. Acosta, A.M. NO. CTA-01-1, April 2, 2002

Page 111
 Imbo vs. People, G.R. No. 197712, April 20, 2015

Title 12
 Ronulo versus People, G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014

BRION, J.:

Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the Sta. Rosa
Catholic Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day of the wedding, the church's officiating
priest refused to solemnize the marriage because of lack of a marriage license.

With the couple and the guests already dressed for the wedding, they headed to an Aglipayan
Church. The Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner Ronulo, conducted a ceremony on the same day
where the couple took each other as husband and wife in front of the guests. This was despite
Petitioner's knowledge of the couple's lack of marriage license.

Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal
marriage ceremony.

The MTC did not believe Petitioner's defense that what he did was an act of blessing and was not
tantamount to solemnization of marriage and was found guilty.

The decision was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioner committed an illegal marriage.

RULING: Yes.

Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize
any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are: 
1. authority of the solemnizing officer; and 
2. his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
The first element is present since Petitioner himself admitted that he has authority to solemnize a
marriage.

The second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by Petitioner is tantamount to the
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.

There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. However, Article 6 of the
Family Code provides that it shall be necessary: 
1. for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and 
2. declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each
other as husband and wife.
The first requirement is present since petitioner admitted to it. The second requirement is likewise
present since the prosecution, through the testimony of its witnesses, proved that the contracting
parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.

The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the provision of the Marriage
Law, specifically Article 44, which states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a
fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both,
in the discretion of the court.

Page 112
As such, Petitioner was held guilty of violating Article 352 and was fined P200 as penalty.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner was guilty of violating Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for allegedly
performing an illegal marriage ceremony.

HELD: YES.

RATIO: Petitioner conducted an illegal marriage ceremony. The crime as provided for in Art 352
of the RPC refers to the performance of marriages under Articles 3 and 6 of the Family Code
which reads:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

xxx

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

xxx

Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It
shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the
solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that
they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage
certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by
the solemnizing officer.

...

Page 113
 The Supreme Court explained that what made the petitioner’s act a marriage ceremony and not
just a mere blessing was that while there is no prescribed form or religious rite, all that was
required was “for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and
declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife.”

As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and
this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the
petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of witnesses, that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.  Thus, it
is clear that petitioner conducted a marriage ceremony and not a mere blessing.

The marriage ceremony was also illegal.  The Supreme Court stated that:

Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence
of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that
the couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the “blessing” of their relationship.

Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the
essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony,
therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates
his defense of good faith.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal liability in
the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage
certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed
above.

Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of the
petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime.

 Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119063, January 27, 1997

FACTS:

Page 114
Petitioner Jose G. Garcia filed an Affidavit of Complaint with the Q.C.
Prosecutor’s Office, charging his wife, private respondent Adela Teodora
P. Santos with Bigamy.

In the RTC trial, it was mentioned that the accused was previously
married with Reynaldo Quiroca, and without the said marriage having
been dissolved, subsequently contracted the second marriage with the
petitioner.

Private respondent filed a Motion to Quash alleging prescription of the

offense as ground. She contended that by the petitioner’s admissions in
his testimony in a Civil Case and in his complaint filed with the Civil
Service Commission, the petitioner discovered the offense as early as
1974. Pursuant then to Art 91 of the RPC, the period of prescription of
the offense started to run therefrom. Thus, the offense charged
prescribed in 1989, or 15 years after its discovery by the petitioner.

The CA, although gave credence to the respondent’s evidence and

recognized that the 15 year prescriptive period had certainly lapsed.
However, the quashal of an information based on prescription could only
be invoked before or after arraignment and even on appeal.

Hence, this appeal to remand the case in the RTC for further
proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the Trial
Court’s order granting the motion to quash the information for bigamy
based on prescription.

HELD:
The petitioner’s contention that a motion to quash cannot go beyond the
information in Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272 which states that the crime
was discovered in 1989, is palpably unmeritorious. Even People v.
Alaga,  which he cites, mentions the exceptions to the rule as provided in
paragraphs (f) and (h) of Section 2, and Sections 4 and 5 of the old Rule
117, viz., (a) extinction of criminal liability, and (b) double jeopardy. His
additional claim that the exception of extinction can no longer be raised
due to the implied repeal of the former Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules
of Court occasioned by its non-reproduction after its revision, is equally
without merit. No repeal, express or implied, of the said Section 4 ever
took place. While there is no provision in the new Rule 117 that
prescribes the contents of a motion to quash based on extinction of

Page 115
criminal liability, Section 2 thereof encapsulizes the former Sections 3, 4,
and 5 of the old Rule 117. The said Section 2 reads as follows:

Sec. 2. Foms and contents. — The motion to quash shall be in writing

signed by the accused or his counsel. It shall specify distinctly the factual
and legal grounds therefor and the court shall consider no grounds other
than those stated therein, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged. (3a, 4a, 5a).

It is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be based on

factual and legal grounds, and since extinction of criminal liability and
double jeopardy are retained as among the grounds for a motion to
quash in Section 3 of the new Rule 117, it necessarily follows that facts
outside the information itself may be introduced to grove such grounds.
As a matter of fact, inquiry into such facts may be allowed where the
ground invoked is that the allegations in the information do not constitute
the offense charged. Thus, in People v. De la Rosa, SC stated:

As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the

allegations of the information do not constitute the offense charged, or
any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said
allegations whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted.
However, as held in the case of People vs. Navarro, 75 Phil. 516,
additional facts not alleged in the information, but admitted or not denied
by the prosecution may be invoked in support of the motion to quash.

In Criminal Case No. 92-27272, the trial court, without objection on the
part of the prosecution, allowed the private respondent to offer evidence
in support of her claim that the crime had prescribed. Consequently, the
trial court, upon indubitable proof of prescription, correctly granted the
motion to quash. It would have been, to quote De la Rosa, “pure
technicality for the court to close its eyes to [the fact of prescription) and
still give due course to the prosecution of the case” — a technicality
which would have meant loss of valuable time of the court and the
parties.

 Nollora vs. People, G.R. No. 191425, September 7, 2011

FACTS: Atilano Nollora Jr was married to Jesus Nollora. Their marriage was still
subsisting when he contracted a 2nd marriage with Rowena Geraldino, who is
herself aware of his marriage with Jesusa but still agreed and contracted marriage
with him.

ISSUE: W/N the 2nd marriage is bigamous and null and void ab initio.

Page 116
HELD: Yes. Under Art 349 of the RPC, the marriage is bigamous and pursuant to Art 35
of the Family Code, it is void ab initio. Nollora’s religious affiliation is inapplicable here.
Neither of his marriages were solemnized under the Muslim Law. The SC ruled that his
two marriages were not conducted according to the Code of Muslim. Hence, his religious
affiliation may not be used as a defense.

FACTS:

While Jesusa Pinat Nollora was still in Saudi Arabia, she heard rumors that her
husband of two years has another wife. She returned to the Philippines and learned
that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., contracted second marriage with a certain
Rowena Geraldino on December 8, 2001.

Jesusa filed an instant case against Atilano and Rowena for bigamy. When asked
about the moral damages she suffered, she declared that money is not enough to
assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just asked for return of her money in the
amount of P 50,000.

Atilano admitted having contracted 2 marriages, however, he claimed that he was a

Muslim convert way back to 1992. He presented Certificate of Conversion and
Pledge of Conversion, proving that he allegedly converted as a Muslim in January
1992. And as a Muslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry wives as allowed
under the Islam belief.

Accused Rowena alleged that she was a victim of bigamous marriage. She claimed
that she does not know Jesusa and only came to know her when the case was filed.
She insisted that she is the one lawfully married to Nollora because she believed
him to be single and a Catholic, as he told her so prior to their marriage. After she
learned of the first marriage of her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim
convert. After learning that Nollora was a Muslim convert, she and he also got
married in accordance with the Muslim rites.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous.

RULING:

Yes, the marriage between the Nollora and Geraldino is bigamous under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, and as such, the second marriage is considered null
and void ab initio under Article 35 of the Family Code.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are all present in the case: that 1) Atilano is
legally married to Jesusa; 2) that their marriage has not been legally dissolved prior
to the date of the second marriage; 3)that Atilano admitted the existence of his
second marriage to Rowena; and 4) the second marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Atilano due to his prior
marriage.

Before the trial and appellate courts, Atilano put up his Muslim religion as his sole
defense. Granting arguendo that he is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of
celebration of both marriages, he cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were

Page 117
 not conducted in accordance with Articles 14, 15, 17 up to 20 of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws .

In Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that any marriage
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim solemnized not in accordance with the
Muslim law, hence the Family Code of the Philippines shall apply. Nollora's
religious affiliation or his claim that his marriages were solemnized according to
Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, he cannot claim exemption
from liability for the crime of bigamy.

His second marriage did not comply with the Article 27 of the Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines providing: "[N]o Muslim male can have more than one
wife unless he can deal with them in equal companionship and just treatment as
enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional cases." Only with the permission
of the Shari'a Circuit Court can a Muslim be permitted to have a second, third or
fourth wife. The clerk of court shall serve a copy to the wife or wives, and should
any of them objects, an Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If the said
council fails to secure the wife's consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall
subject to Article 27, decide whether on not to sustain her objection (Art. 162,
Muslim Personal Laws)

Atilano asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that his civil status is
"single." Both of his marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although
the truth or falsehood of the declaration of one's religion in the marriage is not an
essential requirement for marriage, his omissions are sufficient proofs of his
liability for bigamy. His false declaration about his civil status is thus further
compounded by these omissions.

It is not for him to interpret the Shari'a law, and in apparent attempt to escape criminal
liability, he recelebrated their marriage in accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this
can no longer cure the criminal liability that has already been violated.

Title 13
 Chen vs. Calasan, G.R. No. 161685 July 24, 2007
G.R. No. 161685 July 24, 2007

ANG KEK CHEN, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES ATTY. ELEAZAR S. CALASAN and LETICIA B. CALASAN,
Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Page 118
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Court, the distinction between "actual residence" and "domicile" comes once
again under review.

The Facts

Petitioner Ang Kek Chen resides at 1287-1291 Jose Abad Santos Avenue corner
Padre Algue Street, Tondo, 1012 Manila.1 He is not a lawyer, and has filed
pleadings with this Court on his own behalf.

Respondent Atty. Eleazar S. Calasan was born in Aparri, Cagayan on September 8,

1947. He has been a registered voter in Aparri, Cagayan since 1969. He owns real
property, his ancestral home, which was donated to him by his mother, situated on
Quirino Street, Aparri, Cagayan.2 However, respondent Atty. Calasan also has a
house and lot in Las Piñas, Metro Manila, which he and his family live in; has a
business address at 10/F Manufacturers Building, Plaza Sta. Cruz, 1003 Manila;
applied for and received a commission as notary public from the Manila Regional
Trial Court (RTC); and secured a Community Tax Certificate in Las Piñas City,
Metro Manila.

Respondent Atty. Calasan was the counsel of one Jaime U. Lim, an opponent of
petitioner. Petitioner alleged that his residence had been damaged by the
corporation of which Jaime U. Lim was president.

While Atty. Calasan was acting as counsel for Jaime Lim, petitioner wrote a letter
and filed a counter-affidavit which respondent Atty. Calasan believed maligned
him, with copies furnished various people, among them high officials of the
Philippine government. Atty. Calasan then filed criminal cases for libel against
petitioner in Aparri, Cagayan, among them Crim. Case Nos. 07-1168 and VI-1094,
which were dismissed.

Petitioner responded by filing his own administrative cases against respondent

Atty. Calasan, among them Administrative Case Nos. 5444 and 6233, alleging
serious gross misconduct on the part of Atty. Calasan and praying for his
disbarment. It is noted that even among his pleadings in this particular case, even
in his final memorandum, he made references to what he believed were betrayals
of the attorney’s oath by Atty. Calasan, and with repeated calls for Atty. Calasan’s
disbarment.

On December 4, 2001, respondents spouses Atty. Eleazar S. Calasan and Leticia B.

Calasan filed a complaint for damages with the Aparri, Cagayan RTC against
petitioner and his spouse for alleged malicious imputations against Atty. Calasan
made by petitioner, and it was docketed as Civil Case No. 08-418.3

On January 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:

(1) that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim; (2) that
the venue was improperly laid; (3) that the pleading asserting the claim stated no
cause of action; (4) that a condition precedent for filing claim had not been
complied with; (5) that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations; and (6)
that the claim or demand set forth in plaintiff’s pleadings had been abandoned or
otherwise extinguished.4

Page 119
In the February 26, 2002 Order, the Aparri, Cagayan RTC, Branch 8 dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the venue had been improperly laid.5 Respondents
fared no better in their Motion for Reconsideration of that dismissal, as the motion
was denied in the March 20, 2002 Order.6

The Case in the Court of Appeals

Respondents brought the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65, dated April 5, 2002.7 This was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 70335.

Respondents raised one issue in their petition, thus:

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION AND IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR ALLEGED
IMPROPER VENUE AND THERE IS NO OTHER ADEQUATE, PLAIN AND
SPEEDY REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW OTHER THAN
THIS PETITION.8

In a Decision promulgated on August 12, 2002, the Special Fifth Division of the
CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.9

On August 26, 2002, respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration10 of the
CA Decision, which was granted by the CA in its November 21, 2002 Resolution,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Our decision

dated August 12, 2002 is SET ASIDE and a new one entered SETTING ASIDE the
trial court’s order dated February 26, 2002 and March 20, 2002. The trial Judge is
hereby ORDERED to proceed with the trial of Civil Case no. 08-418 with utmost
dispatch.

SO ORDERED.11

Dissatisfied with the result, Ang Kek Chen filed the present petition on March 5,
2004.

The Issues

Petitioner, who is not represented by counsel, presents the issues in the case as
follows:

(A) WHETHER OR NOT, the Petition for Certiorari was CORRECTLY

DISMISSED by the Honorable Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 70335 in its
decision promulgated on August 12, 2002, ANNEX "C" of this Petition, thereby
upholding the correct Decision of the respondent Judge that the venue of the out-
of-town complaint for libel is improperly laid.

(B) CONSEQUENTLY, WHETHER OR NOT, the decision ANNEX "C" of this

Petition, was ERRONEOUSLY REVERSED by the Honorable Court of Appeals
in its resolutions dated November 21, 2004 and January 21, 2004.

Page 120
(C) WHETHER OR NOT, the Petition for Certiorari filed by the respondents (then
petitioners) can substitute for their LOST APPEAL.12

The petition has merit.

This case will be resolved on the core issue—the interpretation and application of
the third paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the portion of which
reads:

The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as
provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed
and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time
of the commission of the offense x x x (emphasis supplied).

Respondents claim that their actual residence is in Aparri, Cagayan. The trial court
made the following findings on the matter:

True, plaintiffs are residents and domiciled in Aparri, Cagayan. In fact, they are
registered voters of Aparri, Cagayan. However, they also admit that they have a
residential house in Las Piñas and it is in Las Piñas where they stay most of the
time due to their profession and occupation. In short, plaintiffs are habitual
residents of Las Piñas and not in Aparri, Cagayan. Aparri is plaintiffs’ legal
residence and place of domicile. However, to the Court’s opinion, plaintiffs’ actual
residence is in Las Piñas, Metro-Manila [sic] as they are habitually residing thereat
due to their profession and occupation.13

When respondents raised this matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari, the
findings of the trial court were upheld by the appellate court in its August 12, 2002
Decision, when it said:

Petitioners thus appear to have misread the provisions of Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, when they filed their criminal and civil complaints in
Aparri, Cagayan. Clearly, the civil and criminal complaint should be filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, where petitioners reside or where the article was
first printed or published. But since petitioners opted to choose place of residence,
we shall now discussed [sic] where petitioners properly resides [sic]. In procedural
law, specifically for purposes of venue it has been held that the residence of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or place
of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency. Applying this, petitioners clearly
were residents of Manila for they have a residential house in Las Piñas where they
stay thereat due to their profession and occupation.14

The CA noted the findings of the other Aparri RTC branches in the dismissals of
criminal cases for libel filed by respondents against petitioner to conclude that
respondents had their actual residence in Las Piñas.

In Criminal Case No. 07-1168 decided by the Aparri Cagayan RTC, Branch 7, the
trial court, despite finding that Atty. Calasan’s domicile was in Aparri, Cagayan,
dismissed the criminal information against petitioner, stating, thus:

Page 121
Under the circumstances, therefore, the situation of private complainant does not
fall within the conceptual meaning of the term "residence" as explained in the cases
mentioned above. His situation is that he owns a house in Aparri and comes home
at least once a month. However, his presence in the place of his residence, although
consistent, is admittedly not continuous. For this reason, the complainant’s stay at
his house in Aparri may only be considered as occasional or intermittent. The
requirement is that his stay in his place of abode must not only be consistent but
also continuous. Therefore, his stay in Aparri is not "residence" for purposes of
determining venue in libel cases.15

In Criminal Case No. VI-1094 decided by the Aparri, Cagayan RTC, Branch 6, the
trial court likewise dismissed the information against petitioner, holding that:

The Court does not believe that the offended party is only temporarily residing in
Manila for the following reasons: Seventy percent of his cases are cases in Metro
Manila; he has his law office in Metro Manila but he has none in Aparri, Cagayan;
he and his family reside in Las Pinas [sic] though he has an ancestral house in
Aparri, Cagayan. His presence in Aparri is seldom, while he is most of the time in
Metro Manila. The offended party, therefore, is actually residing in Las Pinas [sic]
and he should have filed the libel case in Las Pinas [sic], Metro Manila.16

Considering the foregoing findings of these trial courts, as well as the findings of
the Aparri, Cagayan RTC, Branch 8 in Civil Case No. 08-418, the CA found that
respondents were residents of Las Piñas.

However, upon a Motion for Reconsideration from respondents, the CA set aside
its earlier Decision, its findings reading as follows:

We have closely examined the records and we find that petitioners’ residence is in
Aparri, Cagayan.

As stated, an individual does not lose the domicile even if he has lived and
maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a
factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal
residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a
temporary or semi permanent nature does no [sic] constituent loss of residence.
Thus, the assertion by the trial court that they could not have been a resident [sic]
of Aparri, Cagayan is misplaced.17

The CA erred in its findings.

The trial court did not find that respondents were not residents of Aparri, Cagayan.
It specifically stated that they were in fact "residents and domiciled in Aparri,
Cagayan."18

The crucial distinction that must be made is between "actual residence" and
"domicile." The case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals had already made the
distinction in 1976. The pertinent portion of the case reads as follows:

But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? x x x We
lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"

Page 122
like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules—x x x residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the
same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed
or understood in its popular sense, meaning the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it
one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary.19

It is clear that in granting respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration, the CA

accepted the argument of respondent Atty. Calasan that "residence" is synonymous
with "domicile."

In Saludo, Jr. v. American Express International, Inc., the term "residence" was
equated with "domicile" as far as election law was concerned. However the case
also stated that:

for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus,
it is understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile."20

There is clearly a distinction between the two terms, "residence" and "domicile,"
which shall be applied in this civil action for damages.

Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code does not use the term "domicile" in providing
for venue in the filing of the criminal case and the civil action for damages. The
applicable clause of Art. 360 in this case states that "where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense x x x
(emphasis supplied)." It is thus essential to determine where the offended parties,
the respondents in this case, actually resided during the year 2000, the time of the
commission of the offense.

The published matters, subjects of this civil action, are a counter affidavit dated
June 9, 2000 and a letter dated June 19, 2000, both from petitioner, neither of
which was submitted to persons in Aparri, Cagayan. To prove respondent Atty.
Calasan’s residence at the time, which petitioner alleged was No. 8 Galaxy
Avenue, Mapayapa Village, Las Piñas City, Metro Manila, Atty. Calasan’s
Community Tax Certificates (CTCs) for the years 2000 and 2001 were
presented.21 Respondent Atty. Calasan did not deny that he had such an address in
Las Piñas, which is only the import of the CTCs. He claimed that the Las Piñas

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residential unit was constructed out of convenience and necessity for his family
and his profession. There is no denial that he and his family lived at that particular
address during the time of the publication of petitioner’s documents. That is
actually enough to qualify it as a residence, even without the intention to maintain
it as legal residence.

Respondents’ legal residence or domicile has been established as being in Aparri,

Cagayan. The finding of the trial court that the actual residence of respondents was
in Las Piñas is not inconsistent with the establishment of respondents’ domicile in
Aparri. To state that respondents’ actual residence was in Las Piñas does not mean
that they have abandoned their legal residence. The case of Koh v. Court of
Appeals stated:

This Court held in the case of Uytengsu vs. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October 1954,
reversing its previous stand in Larena v. Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36 and Nuval v. Guray 52
Phil 645, that—

"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to

indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the
same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His
place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means,
necessarily so since no length of residence without any intention of remaining will
constitute domicile."22 (Italics supplied.)

In respondents’ case, they maintained a residence in Las Piñas in the year 2000,
and their domicile in Aparri, Cagayan which was maintained year after year. As
mentioned in Koh, one may have both a residence and a domicile. One need not
abandon one’s domicile to acquire a separate residence, if this separate residence is
not intended to be legal residence as well. The ideas of "domicile" and "actual
residence" may even at times refer to one and the same place, but not so in this
particular case, where there are two particular and distinct places referred to.

Thus, the trial court was correct in dismissing the complaint because it found that
the offended parties actually resided for the greater part of the year 2000 in Las
Piñas, even if their legal residence was in Aparri, Cagayan. To reiterate, for
purposes of determining venue, "residence" is not synonymous with "domicile."
One may reside in a place apart from one’s legal residence, without changing
domicile, and that residence would constitute "actual residence" for purposes of
determining venue.

In passing, it must be noted that petitioner is not a lawyer, and it may be instructive
for him to consult counsel before filing pleadings or praying for results that have
no legal basis, if for purposes of clarity alone. As for his prayer that respondent
Atty. Calasan be disbarred, this petition is not the proper remedy for such. Should
he still wish to pursue such an action, he must follow the proper procedure, which
would grant respondent Atty. Calasan due process. The fact that petitioner, who is
not an attorney, was allowed to plead his case before this Court does not exempt

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 him from proper procedure, which would put opposing lawyers at an unfair
disadvantage.1awphil

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned November 21, 2002

Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 70335 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and its August 12, 2002 Decision is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Consequently, the February 26, 2002 Order of the Aparri, Cagayan RTC, Branch 8,
dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 08-418, is likewise hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.
 Tulfo vs. People, G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008
 Facts:

 On the complaint of Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs, four (4)
separate informations were filed on September 8, 1999 with RTC Pasay City.
These were assigned to Branch 112 and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 99-1597
to 99-1600, and charged petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan Cambri,
as managing editor, Rey Salao, as national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor,
and Philip Pichay, as president of the Carlo Publishing House, Inc., of the daily
tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel in connection with the publication of the
articles in the column "Direct Hit" in the issues of May 11, 1999; May 12, 1999;
May 19, 1999; and June 25, 1999.

 In his (Erwin Tulfo) series of articles, he targeted one Atty. "Ding" So of the
Bureau of Customs as being involved in criminal activities, and was using his
public position for personal gain. He went even further than that, and called Atty.
So an embarrassment to his religion, saying "ikaw na yata ang pinakagago at
magnanakaw sa miyembro nito." He accused Atty. So of stealing from the
government with his alleged corrupt activities. And when Atty. So filed a libel suit
against him, Tulfo wrote another article, challenging Atty. So, saying, "Nagalit
itong tarantadong si Atty. So dahil binabantayan ko siya at in-expose  ang
kagaguhan niya sa [Bureau of Customs]."

 In his defense, petitioner Tulfo testified that he did not write the subject articles
with malice, that he neither knew Atty. So nor met him before the publication of
the articles. He testified that his criticism of a certain Atty. So of the South Harbor
was not directed against the complainant, but against a person by the name of Atty.
"Ding" So at the South Harbor. Tulfo claimed that it was the practice of certain
people to use other people's names to advance their corrupt practices. He also
claimed that his articles had neither discredited nor dishonored the complainant
because as per his source in the Bureau of Customs, Atty. So had been promoted.
He further testified that he did not do any research on Atty. So before the subject
articles, because as a columnist, he had to rely on his source, and that he had
several sources in the Bureau of Customs, particularly in the South Harbor.
 In a Decision dated November 17, 2000, the RTC found petitioners guilty of the
crime of Libel. In a Decision dated June 17, 2003, the Eighth Division of the CA
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

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 Borjal vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999

Facts:
Arturo Borjal was the president of PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., and Maximo Soliven
was the publisher and chairman of its editorial board. Borjal was among the
regular writers of The Philippien Star who runs the column Jaywalker. The case
stems from the articles written in Jaywalker, which called a certain organizer of
a conference a self-proclaimed hero.
Around that time, the First National Conference on Land Transportation
(FNCLT) was organized. Its objective was to draft an omnibus bill that would
embody a long-term land transportation policy for presentation to Congress. The
conference was estimated to cost around Php1,815,000, which would be funded
through solicitations from various sponsors. Private respondent Francisco
Wenceslao was elected as Executive Director of the FNCLT. As such, he wrote
numerous solicitation letters to the business committee to support the
conference.
The Jaywalkercontained articles allegedly referring to these solicitation letters
and other defamatory statements. However, none of these articles named the
organizer nor the conference referred to. Wenceslao, thinking he was the one
talked about in the article, filed a case of libel against Borjal, Soliven, and
others. The trial court as well as the appellate court found the accused guilty of
libel.
Issue:
Were the courts a quo correct in convicting the accused of libel?
Ruling:
No. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable
although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the
offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must
be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the
libelous publication. In the case at bar, these requisites were not complied with.
Even Wenceslao admitted that he had doubts whether he was really the
organizer referred to in the articles. In fact, he admitted that there were several
organizers and that he spoke to Borjal to inquire if he was the one talked about

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in the articles. Identification is grossly inadequate when even the victim is
unsure that he was the object of the attack.
The other errors revolve around the issue of whether the articles constitute
privileged communications. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative.
Article 354 of the RPC provides the cases of privileged communication, to wit:
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if
no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the
following cases:
1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance
of any legal, moral or social duty; and,
2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks,
of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions.
The Supreme Court agrees that the articles are not within the exceptions of
Article 354, but this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. The
enumeration under Article 354 is not exclusive. Fair commentaries on matters of
public interest are likewise privileged. The conference is one imbued with public
interest, and Wenceslao is a public figure. The rule is that discreditable
imputation to a public official may be actionable, but it must be a false
allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. Honest criticisms
on the conduct of public officials and public figures are insulated from libel
judgments.

 Villanueva vs. People, G.R. No. 160351, April 10, 2006

Facts:
This is no ordinary word war story. Here, the Councilor and Vice-Mayor of a town,
both holders of exalted government positions, became slaves to their human
limitations and engaged in a verbal scuffle at the municipal hall as if they were
ordinary men in the... streets.
Petitioner Noel Villanueva was then a member of the Municipal Council while private
complainant Yolanda C. Castro was then Municipal Vice Mayor
Noel L. Villanueva... while in the process of hurling verbal insults at the complainant,
then and there unlawfully, feloniously and contemptuously gave the complainant what
is commonly known as "dirty finger" by poking his hand at complainant's face... two
utility men came to complainant's office, bringing with them the application for
monetized leave of Sangguniang Bayan member Noel Villanueva, petitioner in this
case.
The application for monetized... leave was not immediately attended to by
complainant as she was then busy dictating some important matters to her secretary.
The accused at that time was standing in front of the Vice Mayor's Office and he
allegedly said: "E ano kung wala sa mood, e ano kung galit sya."

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These utterances of accused were disregarded by complainant but accused then
entered the... complainant's office bringing with him his Application for Monetized
Leave.
The alleged request of accused to the Secretary was made in a very sarcastic...
manner.
Complainant got the monetized leave and filed it in her "in and out" files and while
doing this, the paper accidentally fell on the floor.
When she was about to pick it up, the accused allegedly got a yellow pad and swung
it at complainant's face, but she was able to evade it.
Then the accused went out of the office and before leaving, he pointed a
"dirty finger" at complainant, prompting the latter to stand and get an empty bottle of
coke to shield her face.
Prosecution evidence further showed that accused allegedly mouthed the following
disparaging remarks,... You are pretending to be clean and honest... yet you are not
clean and honest, you are corrupt. You are like red apple, you are worm infested
inside and extremely dirty
Issues:
The issues are: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the conviction of
petitioner for grave oral defamation in Criminal Case No. 139-94, and (2) whether the
Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the conviction of petitioner for serious slander by
deed in Criminal
Case No. 140-94.
Ruling:
Art. 358. Slander. - Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and
insulting nature; otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine... not
exceeding 200 pesos.
Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing.
There is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting nature. The gravity of the
oral defamation depends not only (1) upon the expressions used, but also (2) on the
personal relations of the accused and the offended party, and (3) the circumstances
surrounding the... case.
However, we have, likewise, ruled in the past that uttering defamatory words in the...
heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only
a light felony.
In the case at bar, as a public official, petitioner, who was holding the position of
Councilor at that time, is hidebound to be an exemplar to society against the use of
intemperate language particularly because the offended party was a Vice-Mayor.
However, we cannot keep a... blind eye to the fact that such scathing words were
uttered by him in the heat of anger triggered by the fact, as found by the Court of
Appeals, that complainant refused, without valid justification to approve the
monetization of accrued leave credits of petitioner.
In a manner of speaking, she sowed the wind that reaped the storm.

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Guided by the foregoing precedents, we find petitioner guilty only of slight oral
defamation because of the attendant circumstances in the case at bar.
Lest we be misconstrued, the Court does not condone the vilification or use of
scurrilous language on the part of petitioner, but following the rule that all possible
circumstances favorable to the accused must be taken in his favor, it is our
considered view that the slander... committed by petitioner can be characterized as
slight slander following the doctrine that uttering defamatory words in the heat of
anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party, constitutes only a light
felony.
In fact, to be denied approval of monetization of leave without valid justification, but as
an offshoot of a political dissension may have been vexing for petitioner and may
have been perceived by him as provocation that triggered him to blow his top and
utter those disparaging... words.
The next issue that faces this Court is whether or not petitioner's act of poking a dirty
finger at complainant constitutes grave slander by deed.
Following the same principle as enunciated in our foregoing discussion of the first
issue, we find petitioner guilty only of slight slander by deed
Art. 359. Slander by deed. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who shall perform any act... not included and
punished in this title, which shall cast dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another
person. If said act is not of a serious nature, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a
fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
The elements are (1) that the offender performs any act not included in any other
crime against honor, (2) that such act is... performed in the presence of other person
or persons, and (3) that such act casts dishonor, discredit or contempt upon the
offended party.
Whether a certain slanderous act constitutes slander by deed of a serious nature or
not, depends on the social standing of the offended... party, the circumstances under
which the act was committed, the occasion, etc.
It is libel committed by actions rather than words.
Moreover, the "poking of the finger" in the case at bar was, palpably, of less serious
magnitude compared to the banging of chair, the choking in
Mari and the slapping of a face in Teodoro.
Thus, we find that the poking of dirty finger in the case at bar, while it smacks of
slander by deed, is of a lesser magnitude than the acts committed in the foregoing
cases.
Moreover, pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the phrase "Fuck You," which is
similar to the expression "Puta" or "Putang Ina mo," in local parlance.
Such expression was not held to be libelous in Reyes v.
People,... where the Court said that: "This is a common enough expression in the
dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or
displeasure.

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In the case at bar, complainant's... demeanor of refusing to sign the leave
monetization of petitioner, an otherwise valid claim, because of a political discord
smacks of a conduct unbecoming of a lady and a Vice-Mayor at that.
To be worthy of respect, one must act respectably, remembering always that courtesy
begets courtesy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 22932 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 139-94, petitioner Noel Villanueva is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of slight oral defamation only for which we
impose on him a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency;
2. In Crim. Case No. 140-94, petitioner Noel Villanueva is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of simple slander by deed for which we impose a fine of
P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
3. The awards for moral damages and attorney's fees are DELETED.

Title 14
1. Cruz vs. CA, G.R. No. 12245, November 18, 1997

acts: On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali de Ocampo, accompanied her mother to the
Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City, Laguna. They arrived
at the said hospital at around 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day. Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was
examined by the petitioner who found a “Myoma” in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy
operation on March 23, 1991. Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991 as
the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1pm. According to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was
untidy and the windows and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant fora rag to wipe the
window and floor with. Prior to the operation, Rowena tried to convince her mother to not proceed with the
operation and even asked petitioner for it to be postponed, however it still pushed through after the petitioner
told Lydia that operation must be done as scheduled. During the operation, the assisting doctor of the
petitioner, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating room and asked that tagmet ampules be bought which was
followed by another instruction to buy a bag of blood. After the operation, when Lydia came out of the OR,
another bag of blood was requested to be bought, however, the same was not bought due to unavailability of
type A from the blood bank. Thereafter a person arrived to donate blood which was later transferred to
Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breathe
apparently, the oxygen tank is empty, so her husband and petitioner’s driver bought an oxygen. Later,
without the knowledge of Lydia’s relatives,she was decided by the doctors to be transferred to San Pablo
District Hospital were she was supposed to be re-operated. After Lydia experienced shocks, she died.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has been negligent which caused the death of Lydia Umali.

Held: Yes. Whether or not a physician has committed an “inexcusable lack of precaution” in the treatment of
his patient to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in
good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time
of treatment or the present state of medical science. A doctor in effect represents that, having the needed
training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such
training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level
of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not
only the standard of care of the profession but also that the physician’s conduct in the treatment and care
falls below such standard. Further, in as much as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions

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are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is
usually necessary to the conclusion as to causation.

In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant’s negligence
and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the
surgeon as well as  causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient.

In order that there may be recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for which
recovery is sought must be legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the
negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural reference of events, unbroken by intervening efficient
causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For negligence, no matter
what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of
and the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would have occurred.

The elements of reckless imprudence are:

1. That the offender does or fails to do an act;

2. That the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary;
3. That it be without malice;
4. That material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and
5. That there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances
regarding persons, time, and place.

The possible causes of hemorrhage during an operation are: 1.) the failure of the surgeon to tie or suture a cut
blood vessel; 2.) allowing a cut blood vessel to get out of control; 3.) the subsequent loosening of the tie or
suture applied to a cut blood vessel; and 4.)and a clotting d

2. Ivler vs. Modesto-San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010

FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2)
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for the death of respondent
Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.

Crimes charged: 1) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries; and 2) reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property

On September 7, 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge in reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, Ivler
moved to quash the Information of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to
property for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence.

MeTC: denied the motion to quash

RTC: denied Ivler’s Petition for Certiorari in dismissing his Motion to Quash

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ISSUE: Whether or not Ivler’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in the information charging him with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
damage to property (YES)

Defense: Ivler argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense bars his prosecution in reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
damage to property having been previously convicted in reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries for injuries for the same offense. Ivler submits that the multiple consequences of
such crime are material only to determine his penalty

HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioner’s conviction in the case of
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries bars his prosecution in criminal reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property

1) Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime; its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material
Only to Determine the Penalty

Quasi-offenses penalize “the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,” unlike willful offenses which
punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set
them apart from the mass of intentional crimes.

2) Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-offense

Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi-offense of criminal negligence
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act
that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or
careless act, not the result thereof.

The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result
should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

3) Article 48 Does Not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either
of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus
excluding from its operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in
lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious
crime.

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In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but the
mental attitude behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, a single
mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one
quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of
quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.

Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually

impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less
grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another.

Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or
severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the
penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no
splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level
court.

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