Villasanta

Morfe v. Mutuc
January 11, 1968 No. L-20387

Nature of the case: Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Pangasinan

Doctrine: Zones of Privacy – Self-Incrimination

Petitioner: Jesus P. Morfe

Respondents: Amelito R. Mutuc as Executive Secretary, Et. al.

Facts:
Congress enacted Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) to deter public officials and employees from committing acts
of dishonesty and improve the tone of morality in public service.
 Petitioner contends specific provision stating that every public officer, either within (30) days after its approval or after his
assumption of office “and within the month of January of every other year therafter”, as well as upon the termination of his
position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, “a true detailed and sworn statement of assets
and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year” (SALN)

Lower court declared said section of the Act unconstitutional, insofar as it required periodical submittal of sworn statements of
financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official or employee of the government after he had once submitted such a sworn
statement upon assuming office.

Petitioner’s Argument:
Alleges that said provision violates due process and the assurance of the privacy of the individual, as may be inferred from the
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure and self-incrimination.

Said requirement amounts to “an insult to the personal integrity and official dignity of public officials, premised as it is “on the
unwarranted and derogatory assumption” that they are “corrupt at heart.”

Respondents’ Argument:
No violation of constitutional rights against self-incrimination as well as unreasonable search and seizure and maintained that “the
provision of law in question cannot be attacked on the ground that it impairs plaintiff’s normal and legitimate enjoyment of his life and
liberty because said provision merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest or general welfare in honest and
clean public service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of the police power.”

Issue: WON said provision violated liberty protected by the due process clause – NO

Fallo: “WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court declaring Section 7, of R.A. No. 3019 is REVERSED.” Without costs.

Held:
Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as
well, if it is to be repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom. – Justice Douglas

It cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a person to
privacy. This is not so say that public officer, by virtue of a position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to
emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement of the
amounts and sources of income, the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private sphere.

Nor does the contention of the plaintiff gain greater plausibility, much less elicit acceptance, by his invocation of the non-
incrimination clause. According to the Constitution: “No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” This
constitutional provision gives the accused immunity from any attempt by the prosecution to make easier its task by coercing or
intimidating him to furnish the evidence necessary to convict. He may confess, but only if he voluntarily wills it. He may admit certain
facts but only if he freely chooses to. Or he could remain silent, and the prosecution is powerless to compel him to talk. Proof is not
solely testimonial in character. It may be documentary. Neither then could the accused be ordered to write, when what comes from his
pen may constitute evidence of guilt or innocence. Moreover, there can be no search or seizure of his house, papers or effects for the
purpose of locating incriminatory matter.

Notes:
Zones of Privacy (Griswold v. Connecticut)
(1) Right to association (First Amendment)
(2) Prohibition against quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of peace without the consent of the owner (Third
Amendment)
(3) Right of people against unreasonable searches and seizures (Fourth Amendment)
(4) Self-Incrimination clause, enables a citizen to create a zone of privacy w/c government may not force him to surrender to his
detriment (Fifth Amendment)
(5) Enumeration in constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. (Ninth
Amendment)