Parental Authority and Custody
put a stop to the rotation of custody
1. Characteristics of Parental Authority, Art. 210,
FC
G.R. No. 114742 July 17, 1997
CARLITOS E. SILVA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SUZANNE T.
GONZALES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral
and legal duty, to care for their children, see to their
proper upbringing and safeguard their best interest
and welfare. This authority and responsibility may
not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be
renounced by them. Even when the parents are
estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the
attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably
remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts
allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any
real, grave and imminent threat to the well-being of
the child.
The petition bears upon this concern.
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and
Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local actress,
cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union
saw the birth of two children: Ramon Carlos and Rica
Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship
surfaced. It began, according to Silva, when Gonzales
decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous
objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by
Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had never
stopped working throughout their relationship. At any
rate, the two eventually parted ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February
1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to allow Silva, in
apparent contravention of a previous understanding,
1
to have the children in his company on weekends.
Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the
children before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"),
Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed
by Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in
"gambling and womanizing" which she feared could
affect the moral and social values of the children.
In an order, dated 07 April 1989, the trial court
adjudged:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is rendered
directing respondent to allow
herein petitioner visitorial rights to
his children during Saturdays
and/or Sundays, but in no case
should he take out the children
without the written consent of the
mother or respondent herein. No
pronouncement as to costs.1
Silva appeared somehow satisfied with the judgment
for only Gonzales interposed an appeal from the
RTC's order to the Court of Appeals.
In the meantime, Gonzales got married to a Dutch
national. The newlyweds emigrated to Holland with
Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.
On 23 September 1993, the appellate tribunal ruled in
favor of Gonzales; it held:
"In all questions, regarding the
care, custody, education and
property of the child, his welfare
shall be the paramount
consideration" — not the welfare
of the parents (Art. 8, PD 603).
Under the predicament and/or
status of both petitioner-appellee
and respondent-appellant, We find
it more wholesome morally and
emotionally for the children if we
of said children. Allowing these
children to stay with their mother
on weekdays and then with their
father and the latter's live-in partner
on weekends may not be conducive
to a normal up-bringing of children
of tender age. There is no telling
how this kind of set-up, no matter
how temporary and/or remote,
would affect the moral and
emotional conditions of the minor
children. Knowing that they are
illegitimate is hard enough, but
having to live with it, witnessing
their father living with a woman
not their mother may have a more
damaging effect upon them.
Article 3 of PD 603, otherwise
known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, provides in part:
Art. 3. Rights of the Child. — . . .
(1) . . .
(2) . . .
(3) . . .
(4) . . .
(5) Every child has the right to be
brought up in an atmosphere of
morality and rectitude for the
enrichment and the strengthening
of his character.
(6) . . .
(7) . . .
 (8) Every child has the right to
protection
against exploitation, improper
influences, hazards and other
conditions or circumstances
prejudicial to his physical, mental
emotional social and moral
development.
xxx xxx xxx
With Articles 3 and 8 of PD 603, in
mind, We find it to the best interest
of the minor children, to deny
visitorial and/or temporary
custodial rights to the father, even
at the expense of hurting said
parent. After all, if indeed his love
for the children is genuine and
more divine than the love for
himself, a little self-sacrifice and
self-denial may bring more benefit
to the children. While petitioner-
appellee, as father, may not
intentionally prejudice the children
by improper influence, what the
children may witness and hear
while in their father's house may
not be in keeping with the
atmosphere of morality and
rectitude where they should be
brought up.
The children concerned are still in
their early formative years of life.
The molding of the character of the
child starts at home. A home with
only one parent is more normal
than two separate houses — (one
house where one parent lives and
another house where the other
parent with another
woman/man lives). After all, under
Article 176 of the Family Code,
illegitimate children are supposed
2
to use the surname of and shall be
under the parental authority of their
mother.
The child is one of the most
important assets of the nation. It is
thus important we be careful in
rearing the children especially so if
they are illegitimates, as in this
case.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered giving due course to the
appeal. The Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City dated
April 7, 1989 is hereby reversed.
Petitioner-appellee's petition for
visitorial rights is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.2
Silva comes to this Court for relief.
The issue before us is not really a question of child
custody; instead, the case merely concerns the
visitation right of a parent over his children which the
trial court has adjudged in favor of petitioner by
holding that he shall have "visitorial rights to his
children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no
case (could) he take out the children without the
written consent of the mother . . . ." The visitation
right referred to is the right of access of a
noncustodial parent to his or her child or children.3
There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions,
enough recognition on the inherent and natural
right of parents over their children. Article 150 of the
Family Code expresses that "(f)amily relations
include those . . . (2) (b)etween parents and children; .
. . ." Article 209, in relation to Article 220, of the
Code states that it is the natural right and duty of
parents and those exercising parental authority to,
among other things, keep children in their company
and to give them love and affection, advice and
counsel, companionship and understanding. The
Constitution itself speaks in terms of the "natural and
primary rights" of parents in the rearing of the
youth.4 There is nothing conclusive to indicate that
these provisions are meant to solely address
themselves to legitimate relationships. Indeed,
although in varying degrees, the laws on support and
successional rights, by way of examples, clearly go
beyond the legitimate members of the family and so
explicitly encompass illegitimate relationships as
well.5 Then, too, and most importantly, in the
declaration of nullity of marriages, a situation that
presupposes a void or inexistent marriage, Article 49
of the Family Code provides for appropriate visitation
rights to parents who are not given custody of their
children.
There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child,
his interest and welfare is always the paramount
consideration. The Court shares the view of the
Solicitor General, who has recommended due course
to the petition, that a few hours spent by petitioner
with the children, however, could not all be that
detrimental to the children. Similarly, what the trial
court has observed is not entirely without merit; thus:
The allegations of respondent
against the character of petitioner,
even assuming as true, cannot be
taken as sufficient basis to render
petitioner an unfit father. The fears
expressed by respondent to the
effect that petitioner shall be able to
corrupt and degrade their children
once allowed to even temporarily
associate with petitioner is but the
product of respondent's unfounded
imagination, for no man, bereft of
all moral persuasions and goodness,
would ever take the trouble and
expense in instituting a legal action
for the purpose of seeing his
illegitimate children. It can just be
imagined the deep sorrows of a
 father who is deprived of his
children of tender ages.6
The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private
respondent and their well-meant concern for the
children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that
petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue
designs more than a parent's natural desire to be able
to call on, even if it were only on brief visits, his own
children. The trial court, in any case, has seen it fit to
understandably provide this precautionary
measure, i.e., "in no case (can petitioner) take out the
children without the written consent of the mother."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is
REINSTATED, reversing thereby the judgment of
the appellate court which is hereby SET ASIDE. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 204819               April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C.
IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their
minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and
BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and
MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT
CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN
A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934
3
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION
PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its
President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses
Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S.
Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M.
Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante,
Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista &
Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho &
Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco
& Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on
behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette
C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel
F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C.
Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses
Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children,
Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z.
Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C.
Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor
children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C.
Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor,
Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children
Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho,
Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R.
Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on
behalf of their minor children Michael Racho,
Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho,
Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R.
Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on
behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy
M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children
Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas,
Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R .
Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON
SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social
Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN,
Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA
Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE
COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its
Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE
PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE
CORPORATION, represented by its President
Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF
PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and
THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
Donato Marcos, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE
VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S.
AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Education; and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC.,
represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as
President and in his personal capacity,
ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented
by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of
the school board and in his personal capacity,
ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G.
IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd.,
ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C.
GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department
of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T.
ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON.
SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and
HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC
XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA
DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG
SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS
SECRETARY ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
4
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS,
INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National
President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own
behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B.
Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor,
Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan,
Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana,
Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno
and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN
A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN,
Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and
Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN,
Director-General, National Economic and
Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H.
LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs
Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS,
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine
Commission on Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D.,
JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T.
DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE
MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known
as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ,
MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS
ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE,
CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and
GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as
Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary of the Department of Health; HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the
Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA
FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for
themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino
posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of
the Philippines, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc.,
represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive
Director, and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN
B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A.
CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA,
CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A.
NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG,
RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department
of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T.
ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC.,
ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA
BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA,
ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA
CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG,
ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH
MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R.
ROXAS and LOTA LAT-
GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and
HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
5
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC.,
SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI
SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE
BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS
FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH
MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN
A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and
ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of
the Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by
the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court
has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well
aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his
beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block
to the nation's emergence as a developed country,
leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger,
illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental
policies have been geared towards the revitalization
of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social
services remains to be a problem that concerns not
only the poor, but every member of society. The
government continues to tread on a trying path to the
realization of its very purpose, that is, the general
welfare of the Filipino people and the development of
the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the
main facet of a representative government, endeavors
to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming
societal woes, while the executive is closed set to
fully implement these measures and bring concrete
and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela
Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch,
oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body
that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing
stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate.
Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the
Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty
to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and
enduring principle that holds Philippine society
together - the supremacy of the Philippine
Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years
than the issues of population growth control, abortion
and contraception. As in every democratic society,
diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their
perceived consequences freely circulate in various
media. From television debates2 to sticker
campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to
mass gatherings organized by members of the
clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical
ideologies of the religious conservatives and
progressive liberals has caused a deep division in
every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold
support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012
(RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December
21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on
the said law, challengers from various sectors of
society came knocking on the doors of the Court,
beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down
constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound
and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the
Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in
fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-
intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James
M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in
their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers
and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor
children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming
Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned
educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the
Alliance for the Family Foundation
Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty.
Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and several
others8 in their personal capacities as
citizens and on behalf of the generations
unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task
Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and
Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan
De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation,
Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned
educational institution, and several
others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve
Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin,
Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
6
(6) Petition for Certiorari and (13) Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ
the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the Foundation, Inc. and several others,31 in their
Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens capacities as citizens (CFC);
and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M.
Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Kashim in their capacities as citizens and
Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several taxpayers (Tillah); and
others19 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (PAX); (15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty.
Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities
as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez); (16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by
Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an
(9) Petition for Certiorari and accredited political party.
Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and
Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the
Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH
taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Law on the following GROUNDS:
Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in
his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the
unborn. According to the petitioners,
(10) Petition for Certiorari and notwithstanding its declared policy against
Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines abortion, the implementation of the RH Law
Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in would authorize the purchase of hormonal
their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and
on behalf of its associates who are members injectables which are abortives, in violation
of the Bar (Pro-Life); of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
which guarantees protection of both the life
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by of the mother and the life of the unborn from
Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. conception.35
Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia,
Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia • The RH Law violates the right to health
Causing, in their capacities as citizens, and the right to protection against hazardous
taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF); products. The petitioners posit that the RH
Law provides universal access to
(12) Petition for Certiorari and contraceptives which are hazardous to one's
Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat health, as it causes cancer and other health
and several others,29 in their capacities as problems.36
citizens (Juat) ;
• The RH Law violates the right to religious
freedom. The petitioners contend that the
 RH Law violates the constitutional
guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes
the use of public funds for the procurement
of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use
of public funds for purposes that are
believed to be contrary to their beliefs is
included in the constitutional mandate
ensuring religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens
conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it
compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who
seek advice on reproductive health programs to other
doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct
information on reproductive health programs and
service, although it is against their religious beliefs
and convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-
IRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals who
are public officers such as, but not limited to,
Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers,
medical officers, medical specialists, rural health
physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses,
or rural health midwives, who are specifically
charged with the duty to implement these Rules,
cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the
formulation of mandatory sex education in schools
should not be allowed as it is an affront to their
religious beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of
religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the
RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger
test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify
the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion
and the right to free speech.42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional
provision on involuntary servitude.
According to the petitioners, the RH Law
7
subjects medical practitioners to involuntary
servitude because, to be accredited under the
PhilHealth program, they are compelled to
provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona
services for indigent women, under threat of
criminal prosecution, imprisonment and
other forms of punishment.43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of
patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical
practitioner would effectively be forced to render
reproductive health services since the lack of
PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the
majority of the public would no longer be able to
avail of the practitioners services.44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal
protection of the law. It is claimed that the
RH Law discriminates against the poor as it
makes them the primary target of the
government program that promotes
contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that,
rather than promoting reproductive health
among the poor, the RH Law seeks to
introduce contraceptives that would
effectively reduce the number of the poor.45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in
violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution. In imposing the penalty of
imprisonment and/or fine for "any
violation," it is vague because it does not
define the type of conduct to be treated as
"violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the
RH Law violates the right to due process by
removing from them (the people) the right to manage
their own affairs and to decide what kind of health
facility they shall be and what kind of services they
shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative
inherent in corporations for employers to conduct
their affairs in accordance with their own discretion
and judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free
speech. To compel a person to explain a full
range of family planning methods is plainly
to curtail his right to expound only his own
preferred way of family planning. The
petitioners note that although exemption is
granted to institutions owned and operated
by religious groups, they are still forced to
refer their patients to another healthcare
facility willing to perform the service or
procedure.48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of
privacy of one's family protected by the
Constitution. It is contended that the RH
Law providing for mandatory reproductive
health education intrudes upon their
constitutional right to raise their children in
accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the
person who will undergo reproductive health
procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue
between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses
to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the
overall well-being of their family. In the same breath,
it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has
suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental
authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional
principle of non-delegation of legislative
authority. The petitioners question the
delegation by Congress to the FDA of the
power to determine whether a product is
non-abortifacient and to be included in the
Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one
bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ),
Article VI of the Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
 • The RH Law violates the principle of
Autonomy of Local Government Units
(LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended
that the RH Law, providing for reproductive
health measures at the local government
level and the ARMM, infringes upon the
powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM
under the Local Government Code and R.A .
No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to
file their respective comments-in-intervention in
defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside
from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which
commented on the petitions in behalf of the
respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C.
Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of
Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan,
and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez, 57 the Filipino
Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health
(C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and
Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective
Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with
several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana
S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene. 61
The respondents, aside from traversing the
substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the
dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons
that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and,
therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial
determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to
question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are
essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which
the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the
enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and
arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo
Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and
implementation of the assailed legislation for a period
8
of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July
17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary
conference with the counsels of the parties to
determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised
by the parties and the sequence by which these issues
were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9
and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the
cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013,
the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders
of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit
their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days
and, at the same time posed several questions for
their clarification on some contentions of the
parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health
Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the
country has allowed the sale, dispensation and
distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As
far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A.
No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale,
Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive
Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs
and devices were allowed, they could not be sold,
dispensed or distributed "unless such sale,
dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed
drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921, 66 approved on June 21,
1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of
abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and
devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided
that "no drug or chemical product or device capable
of provoking abortion or preventing conception as
classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall
be delivered or sold to any person without a proper
prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to
the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized
that the population problem should be considered as
the principal element for long-term economic
development, enacted measures that promoted male
vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population
growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No.
6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act
Establishing a National Policy on Population,
Creating the Commission on Population and for
Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family
planning will be made part of a broad educational
program; safe and effective means will be provided to
couples desiring to space or limit family size;
mortality and morbidity rates will be further
reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President
Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree.
(P.D.) No. 79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which,
among others, made "family planning a part of a
broad educational program," provided "family
planning services as a part of over-all health care,"
and made "available all acceptable methods of
contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens
desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing
pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives
and family planning methods evolved from being a
component of demographic management, to one
centered on the promotion of public health,
particularly, reproductive health.69 Under that policy,
the country gave priority to one's right to freely
choose the method of family planning to be adopted,
in conformity with its adherence to the commitments
made in the International Conference on Population
and Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the
country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta
for Women, " which, among others, mandated the
State to provide for comprehensive health services
and programs for women, including family planning
and sex education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the
population of the country kept on galloping at an
uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just
over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of
the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000
and over 92 million in 2010. 72 The executive and the
legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not
adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was
enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and
the marginalized, access and information to the full
range of modem family planning methods, and to
ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples'
right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it
more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for
health providers to provide information on the full
range of modem family planning methods, supplies
and services, and for schools to provide reproductive
health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law
criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its
mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement
measure to fortify and make effective the current
laws on contraception, women's health and
population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH
Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in
particular, argues that the government sponsored
contraception program, the very essence of the RH
Law, violates the right to health of women and the
sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect
and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo
ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH
Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:
9
x x x. The instant Petition does not question
contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided
under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No.
4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are
prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly
licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find
deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the
role that the State and its agencies - the entire
bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the
barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country
- is made to play in the implementation of the
contraception program to the fullest extent possible
using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the
funder and provider of all forms of family planning
methods and the implementer of the program by
ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and
universal access to, a full range of family planning
methods, devices and supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and
contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized
and refined them to the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise
its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is
unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to
Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic
Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local
Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH
Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the
Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can
exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial
hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the
legislative and political wisdom of Congress and
respect the compromises made in the crafting of the
RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian
democratic process"75 and "characterized by an
inordinate amount of transparency." 76 The OSG posits
that the authority of the Court to review social
legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak,"
since the Constitution vests the discretion to
implement the constitutional policies and positive
norms with the political departments, in particular,
with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the
Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-
Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to
assail the validity of the acts of the legislature. 79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied
challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the
assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the
petitioners, and that the government has yet to
distribute reproductive health devices that are
abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-
regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the
constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and
the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court
temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due
respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the
basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be
clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government, which obtains
not through express provision but by actual division
in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines;83 and (c)
the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with
deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers
among the three branches of government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary
recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which
10
imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the
nature of their functions and of their respect for the
other branches of government, in striking down the
acts of the Executive or the Legislature as
unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious
blend of courtesy and caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times
of social disquietude or political instability, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten
or marred, if not entirely obliterated. 87 In order to
address this, the Constitution impresses upon the
Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal
branch done within its sphere of competence and
authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the
line of separation - but only at a very limited and
specific point - to determine whether the acts of the
executive and the legislative branches are null
because they were undertaken with grave abuse of
discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH
Law, it may do so where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion
results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching
commitment to protect those cherished rights and
principles embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the
scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the
Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of
legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be
it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The
reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point.
The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts
of the legislative and the executive branches, since its
duty is not to review their collective wisdom but,
rather, to make sure that they have acted in
consonance with their respective authorities and
rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If
after said review, the Court finds no constitutional
violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority
of proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in
line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution
which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases
supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara, 91 the Court has
unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and
executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy
or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v.
COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v.
Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the Court
wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate
on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy.
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate)
remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to
the application or interpretation of constitutional
provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant
case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is
bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
[Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court
Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is
essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the
separation of powers and the balancing of powers
among the three great departments of government
through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them. To
him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only,
medium of participation - or instrument of
intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing
operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that
the Court does not have the unbridled authority to
rule on just any and every claim of constitutional
violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that
the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess
locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue
of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect
petitions do not present any actual case or
controversy because the RH Law has yet to be
implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised
by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for
adjudication since no one has been charged with
violating any of its provisions and that there is no
showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been
adversely affected by its operation. 98 In short, it is
contended that judicial review of the RH Law is
premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case
or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to
adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy
scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.
The controversy must be justiciable-definite and
concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. In other words, the
pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion
of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof,
11
on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible
and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There
ought to be an actual and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness. 101 A
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be considered
ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed
by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of
an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a
result of the challenged action. He must show that he
has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The
Government of the Republic of the
Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an
unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it
was argued that the Court has no authority to pass
upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete
act performed that could possibly violate the
petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing
precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or
act in question being not yet effective does not negate
ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary
to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough
to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual
case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe
for judicial determination. Considering that the RH
Law and its implementing rules have already taken
effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the
law have already been passed, it is evident that the
subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As
stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch
is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a
duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is
so because medical practitioners or medical providers
are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under
the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly
public health officers who are threatened to be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be
heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial
challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending
that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as
it is not a speech regulating measure.105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial
challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the
validity of statutes concerning not only protected
speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment.106 These include religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances. 107 After all, the
fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of
the press and peaceful assembly are but component
rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as
they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines
originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While
this Court has withheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statues, 108 it has expanded
its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free
speech, but also those involving religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights.109 The underlying
reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its
counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded
jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not
only to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, but
also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive
Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing
petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional
human rights to life, speech and religion and other
fundamental rights mentioned above have been
violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has
authority to take cognizance of these kindred
petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed
pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these
petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no
actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court
as a reactive branch of government, acting only when
the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the
detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the
petitioners to file their respective petitions. It
contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by
the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has
yet to be enforced and applied against them, 111 and
the government has yet to distribute reproductive
health devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the
"transcendental importance" doctrine and their status
as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite
locus standi.
12
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal
and substantial interest in a case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the challenged governmental act.113 It requires a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge"
embodies the rule that one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a
violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one
from challenging the constitutionality of the statute
grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons
not before the court. This rule is also known as the
prohibition against third-party standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that
"the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence,
can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the
public interest so requires, such as when the matter is
of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public
interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v.
Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount
importance where serious constitutional questions are
involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed
and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where
there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right
of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers
Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
allowed to question the constitutionality of several
executive orders although they had only an indirect
and general interest shared in common with the
public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the
RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied
challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted
liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has
accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not
otherwise directly injured or with material interest
affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance is
invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a
procedural technicality which the Court has, on more
than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing
non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public
interest, albeit they may not have been directly
injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be
properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case warrants that we set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition
at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein
have potentially pervasive influence on the social and
moral well being of this nation, specially the youth;
hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not
inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice.
Their strict and rigid application, which would result
in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents, not only to the public, but also to the
bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for
the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically
affects the constitutional provisions on the right to
life and health, the freedom of religion and
expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of
all these and the fact that the issues of contraception
and reproductive health have already caused deep
division among a broad spectrum of society, the
Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise
issues of transcendental importance warranting
immediate court adjudication. More importantly,
considering that it is the right to life of the mother
and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court
need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking
action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial
restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the
Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To
do so, when the life of either the mother or her child
is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they
are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over
which the Court has no original
jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the
petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the
Court would just consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching
implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the
Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition
under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of
the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ),
Article VI of the Constitution,122 prescribing the one
subject-one title rule. According to them, being one
for reproductive health with responsible parenthood,
the assailed legislation violates the constitutional
standards of due process by concealing its true intent
- to act as a population control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that
the RH Law is not a birth or population control
measure,124 and that the concepts of "responsible
parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both
interrelated as they are inseparable. 125
13
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive
health law, the Court sees it as principally a
population control measure. The corpus of the RH
Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's
population. While it claims to save lives and keep our
women and children healthy, it also promotes
pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the
RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access
to information on the full range of modem family
planning products and methods. These family
planning methods, natural or modem, however, are
clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of
the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the
country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to
provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large
portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination
of information and provisions on access to medically-
safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable,
and quality reproductive health care services,
methods, devices, and supplies, which are all
intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners'
contention that the whole idea of contraception
pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central
idea of the RH Law. 126 Indeed, remove the provisions
that refer to contraception or are related to it and the
RH Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier
explained, "the other positive provisions such as
skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-
and post-natal services, prevention and management
of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS
are already provided for in the Magna Carta for
Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the
one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling,
Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis
Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule
does not require the Congress to employ in the title of
the enactment language of such precision as to
mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and
the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently
complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as
to include the general object which the statute seeks
to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested
are informed of the nature, scope and consequences
of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this
Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than
technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple
or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various
provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive
health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated
and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth. As expressed in the first
paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes
and guarantees the human rights of all persons
including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health
which includes reproductive health, the right to
education and information, and the right to choose
and make decisions for themselves in accordance
with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural
beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle
that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that
the average person reading it would not be informed
of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as
to its contents, or which is misleading, either in
referring to or indicating one subject where another
or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real
subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between
"reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood"
which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving
"sustainable human development" as stated under its
terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that
Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as
to the contents of the assailed legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates
the right to life and health of the unborn child under
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The
assailed legislation allowing access to
abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions
abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms
prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law
considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning
contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and
prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the
fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law
allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and
other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning products and supplies, medical
research shows that contraceptives use results in
abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum
which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a
fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that
the State sanction of contraceptive use contravenes
natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH
Law requires the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to
14
be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation
effectively confirms that abortifacients are not
prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the
agency that will actually supervise or administer the
use of these products and supplies to prospective
patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a
certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient
purposes.133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out
that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was
simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that
the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since
the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient"
reproductive health care services, methods, devices
products and supplies shall be made accessible to the
public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a
legislative determination that contraceptives are not
abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH
Law was enacted with due consideration to various
studies and consultations with the World Health
Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical
field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and
respect to such a determination and pass judgment
only when a particular drug or device is later on
determined as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the
constitutional protection of one's right to life is not
violated considering that various studies of the WHO
show that life begins from the implantation of the
fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH
Law is constitutional since the law specifically
provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent
the implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed.136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every
human being enjoys the right to life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life,
being grounded on natural law, is inherent and,
therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a
particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and
transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than
ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and
family planning methods in the Philippines is not of
recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729,
entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation,
and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on
contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent
fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy
and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous
international agreements, the country has long
recognized the need to promote population control
through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve
long-term economic development. Through the years,
however, the use of contraceptives and other family
planning methods evolved from being a component
of demographic management, to one centered on the
promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive
health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various
measures promoting women's rights and health and
the overall promotion of the family's well-being.
Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or
"The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No.
9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of
Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this
paradigm shift, the Philippine national population
program has always been grounded two cornerstone
principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the
"principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed
later, these principles are not merely grounded on
administrative policy, but rather, originates from the
constitutional protection expressly provided to afford
protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the
position that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be
decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was
agreed upon that the individual members of the Court
could express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that
life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus
should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12
which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and shall protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception. The natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the
Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the
unborn from conception. This is undisputable because
before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For
said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is
mute as to any proscription prior to conception or
when life begins. The problem has arisen because,
amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently
disregarded the scientific fact that conception is
reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the
view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue
of when life begins.
15
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend
that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of
the female ovum by the male sperm. 142 On the other
side of the spectrum are those who assert that
conception refers to the "implantation" of the
fertilized ovum in the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words
of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain
and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of
Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory
construction is that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language
employed in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed. As much as possible, the words of the
Constitution should be understood in the sense they
have in common use. What it says according to the
text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to
alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Verba legis non est
recedendum - from the words of a statute there should
be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold:
First, because it is assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained; and second, because
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document
but essentially that of the people, in whose
consciousness it should ever be present as an
important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional
meaning of the word "conception" which, as
described and defined by all reliable and reputable
sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary
describes it as the act of becoming pregnant,
formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that
results in a new entity capable of developing into a
being like its parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the
term "conception" as the fecundation of the female
ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human
life capable of survival and maturation under normal
conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a
legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator
Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One
need not acquire civil personality first before he/she
could die. Even a child inside the womb already has
life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life
of the unborn from conception, that the State must
protect equally with the life of the mother. If the
unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof
even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as
death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy,
writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State
"has respect for human life at all stages in the
pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest
in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in
the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a
baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed
light on the intention of the Framers regarding the
term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly
refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records
reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence
which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship
speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm
that there is human life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization
and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was
explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a
biological manner. The first question that needs to be
answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically
categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive.
First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in
nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing
this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these
nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies
itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of
cell division. All these processes are vital signs of
life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically
the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an
equally categorical "yes." At the moment of
conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm
rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the
ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to
form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome
count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in
human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
16
Since these questions have been answered
affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized
ovum is both alive and human, then, as night follows
day, it must be human life. Its nature is human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the
moment of conception" and not "from the moment of
fertilization" was not because of doubt when human
life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of
conception" was described by us here before with the
scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the
comprehension of some people; we want to use the
simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is
given ample protection under the Constitution, it was
discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is
sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution,
without specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular
view because according to the Commissioner's own
admission, he would leave it to Congress to define
when life begins. So, Congress can define life to
begin from six months after fertilization; and that
would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now
determined by science that life begins from the
moment of conception. There can be no doubt about
it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress,
too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to
ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of
the questions I was going to raise during the period of
interpellations but it has been expressed already. The
provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception,"
does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the
sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to
Congress the right to determine whether certain
contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient
or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called
contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the
uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next
process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the
uterus and to take root. What happens with some
contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the
fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we
take the provision as it is proposed, these so called
contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established,
then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore,
would be unconstitutional and should be banned
under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it
is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain
contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and
based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are
already considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent
that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that
the State shall provide equal protection to both the
mother and the unborn child from the earliest
opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon
the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It
is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution
intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting
measures that would allow it determine when life
begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the
Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives
for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner
Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a
constitutional provision on the right to life,
recognized that the determination of whether a
contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question
of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on
based on established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill
or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an
abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely,
contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the
male sperm and the female ovum, and those that
similarly take action prior to fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally
permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on
the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would
like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also
the lives of the millions of people in the world by
fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to
be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of
the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the
moment of conception." I raised some of these
implications this afternoon when I interjected in the
interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would
like to ask that question again for a categorical
answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the
life of the unborn from the moment of conception"
we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to
certain contraceptives which are already being
encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of
the committee or does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because
contraceptives would be preventive. There is no
unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was
speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the
intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg
which has already been fertilized from taking route to
the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of
conception," what really occurs is that some of these
contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the
fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. 156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by
the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners
during the oral arguments. There it was conceded that
tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not
classified as abortifacients. 157
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm,
there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms
sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to
that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here
Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient,
Your Honor.158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of
medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and
Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the
beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the
instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a
viable zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and
female gametes to form a zygote from which the
embryo develops."160

Under Section 12, yes.

17
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological &
Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools
in the Philippines, also concludes that human life
(human person) begins at the moment of fertilization
with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in
the formation of a new individual, with a unique
genetic composition that dictates all developmental
stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also
reveals that: "Human development begins after the
union of male and female gametes or germ cells
during a process known as fertilization (conception).
Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with
the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a
secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of
their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and
ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to
form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a
zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or
primordium, of a human being."162
The authors of Human Embryology &
Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote:
"Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is
a critical landmark because, under ordinary
circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human
organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23
chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46
chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number
is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The
embryo now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical
Association came out with a "Paper on the
Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood
Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH
Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong
position that fertilization is sacred because it is at this
stage that conception, and thus human life, begins.
Human lives are sacred from the moment of
18
conception, and that destroying those new lives is
never licit, no matter what the purported good
outcome would be. In terms of biology and human
embryology, a human being begins immediately at
fertilization and after that, there is no point along the
continuous line of human embryogenesis where only
a "potential" human being can be posited. Any
philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot
escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a
zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new
human being commences at a scientifically well
defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is
objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and
independent of any specific ethical, moral, political,
or religious view of human life or of human
embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned
from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or
understood under medical parlance, and more
importantly, following the intention of the Framers of
the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a
zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new
human being commences at a scientifically well-
defined moment of conception, that is, upon
fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to
the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins
at implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization
and conception are two distinct and successive stages
in the reproductive process. They are not identical
and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he
wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the
implantation of the fertilized ovum is the
commencement of conception and it is only after
implantation that pregnancy can be medically
detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is
devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not
pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of
the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an
inanimate object - it is a living human being complete
with DNA and 46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has
been conceptualized only for convenience by those
who had population control in mind. To adopt it
would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH
Law but also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this
position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would
unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or
device that would prevent the implantation of the
fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and
further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution
proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of
the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the
unborn from conception was to prevent the
Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing
abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot
interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was
captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of
the unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be
no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any
pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme
Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line
with this intent and actually proscribes abortion.
While the Court has opted not to make any
determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds
that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that
protection be afforded from the moment of
fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH
Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy
of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it
should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for
implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a
crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code,
which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the
fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of
this Act, the following terms shall be defined as
follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a
full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies
that contribute to reproductive health and well-being
by addressing reproductive health-related problems.
It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is
the enhancement of life and personal relations. The
elements of reproductive health care include the
following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of
abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
19
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of
individuals and couples, to decide freely and
responsibly whether or not to have children; the
number, spacing and timing of their children; to make
other decisions concerning reproduction, free of
discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the
information and means to do so; and to attain the
highest standard of sexual health and reproductive
health: Provided, however, That reproductive health
rights do not include abortion, and access to
abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing
laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or
issuance, executive order, letter of instruction,
administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or
is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known
as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or
amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is
consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear,
Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient
as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that
induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that
protection must be afforded from the moment of
fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law
prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent
implantation, but also those that induce abortion and
those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or
device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother's womb, upon
determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the
Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the
Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum
already has life and that the State has a bounden duty
to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because
the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that
induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed
exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the
killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and,
second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that
prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient
(third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at
all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon.
Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that
protection will only be given upon implantation, as
the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes
that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum
which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum
must be protected the moment it becomes existent -
all the way until it reaches and implants in the
mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized
and afforded protection from the moment the
fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent
any drug or device from killing or destroying the
fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as
it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH
Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the
Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at
implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in
the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that
instance of implantation is not the point of beginning
of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH
Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is,
which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or
prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso
under Section 9 of the law that "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must
have a certification from the FDA that said product
and supply is made available on the condition that it
is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is
absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully
attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an
abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in
every instance when the contraceptive product or
supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access
only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient
contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the
proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the
legislative intent and mean that "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must
have a certification from the FDA that said product
and supply is made available on the condition that it
cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction
is consistent with the proviso under the second
paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not
purchase or acquire by any means emergency
contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that
will be used for such purpose and their other forms or
equivalent.
20
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the
authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office
when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient.
The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this
Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that
induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb upon determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines
"abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms
shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that
primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb upon determination of the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR,
"contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective
and scientifically proven modern family planning
method, device, or health product, whether natural or
artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not
primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a
fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's
womb in doses of its approved indication as
determined by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows
"contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient"
only those that primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and
Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed
out, with the insertion of the word "primarily,"
Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR 173 must be
struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily,"
in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed
ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law
and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is
danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily"
will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives
which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn
from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution. With such
qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate
that a contraceptive will only be considered as an
"abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or,
as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation
of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of
"contraceptive" would permit the approval of
contraceptives which are actually abortifacients
because of their fail-safe mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the
certification by the FDA that these contraceptives
cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the
definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of
the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion,
the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be
included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be
those contraceptives that do not have the primary
action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb, but also those that do not have the
secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy
prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle
that laws should be construed in a manner that its
constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its
implementing rules must be consistent with each
other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word "
primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR
should be declared void. To uphold the validity of
Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit
only those contraceptives that have the primary effect
of being an abortive would effectively "open the
floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which
may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle
of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional
protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the
right to health because it requires the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices,
injectables and family products and supplies in the
National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the
same in the regular purchase of essential medicines
and supplies of all national hospitals. 176 Citing
various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that
the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is
greatly increased in women who use oral
contraceptives as compared to women who never use
them. They point out that the risk is decreased when
the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is
contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive
pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of
venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of
ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk
of myocardial infarction.177 Given the definition of
"reproductive health" and "sexual health" under
Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the
21
petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only
seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and
satisfying sex lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15,
Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it
being a mere statement of the administration's
principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory,
the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the
claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of
women.181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional
right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is
replete with provisions protecting and promoting the
right to health. Section 15, Article II of the
Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the
right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides
for the States' duty to provide for the health of the
people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health
and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs
of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an
effective food and drug regulatory system and
undertake appropriate health, manpower
development, and research, responsive to the
country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency
for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-
development, and self-reliance, and their integration
into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from
trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous
products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these
provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions
clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executory.
There is no need for legislation to implement these
self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel
v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions
of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically
nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can
be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as
it has always been, that –
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be
considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended,
the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would
give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. These provisions
would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely meaningless
by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the
petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question
contraception and contraceptives per se. 184 In fact,
ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921
and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of
contraceptives are not prohibited when they are
dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a
physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law
in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A.
No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with
it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in
to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the
observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity
of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated
proliferation of contraceptives since the sale,
distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs
and devices will still require the prescription of a
licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place,
there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public
that only contraceptives that are safe are made
available to the public. As aptly explained by
respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of
contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and
used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate
the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act
No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of
Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical
Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes"
are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of
said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and
dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are
particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which
provides in full:
22
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person,
partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or
otherwise distribute whether for or without
consideration, any contraceptive drug or device,
unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company
and with the prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine,
drug, chemical, or portion which is used
exclusively for the purpose of preventing
fertilization of the female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any
instrument, device, material, or agent
introduced into the female reproductive
system for the primary purpose of
preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation,
violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished
with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an
imprisonment of not less than six months or more
than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner,
Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs
and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of
whatever nature and kind or device shall be
compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise
be made available to the consuming public except
through a prescription drugstore or hospital
pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided
for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the
pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will
lead to the unmitigated proliferation of
contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely
unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the
Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in
connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which
provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family
Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure,
distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family
planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH
shall coordinate with all appropriate local
government bodies to plan and implement this
procurement and distribution program. The supply
and budget allotments shall be based on, among
others, the current levels and projections of the
following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age
and couples who want to space or limit their
children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of
method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own
procurement, distribution and monitoring program
consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and
the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive
drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of
R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that
the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company
and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive
drugs and devices will done following a prescription
of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of
contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be
protected by all possible means. As pointed out by
Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden
are assumed by the government in supplying
contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held
accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life
resulting from or incidental to their use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single
contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA
pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to
await its determination which drugs or devices are
declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency
tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to
the public are safe for public consumption.
Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the
attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature.
Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first
be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as
expounded herein, to be determined as the case
presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that
Congress cannot legislate that hormonal
contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and
non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that
ordains their inclusion by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall"
is to be construed as operative only after they have
been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA.
The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to
determine whether a particular hormonal
contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-
abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence
concerning the requirements for the inclusion or
removal of a particular family planning supply from
the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering
the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-
uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal,
23
non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must
first be a determination by the FDA that they are in
fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies. There can be no
predetermination by Congress that the gamut of
contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective" without the proper scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy
and tubal ligation are not covered by the
constitutional proscription, there are those who,
because of their religious education and background,
sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether
abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are
medical practitioners who essentially claim that their
beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but
also the willing participation and cooperation in all
things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX
explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to
marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the
transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving
of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the
sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human
life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored
procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the
expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates
the guarantee of religious freedom since
contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH
Law attempts to address religious sentiments by
making provisions for a conscientious objector, the
constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated
because the law also imposes upon the conscientious
objector the duty to refer the patient seeking
reproductive health services to another medical
practitioner who would be able to provide for the
patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to
requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate with
the very thing he refuses to do without violating
his/her religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious
objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition
is unduly limited, because although it allows a
conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option
to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services
and information - no escape is afforded the
conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e.
against a patient seeking reproductive health
procedures. They claim that the right of other
individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a)
those working in public health facilities referred to in
Section 7; b) public officers involved in the
implementation of the law referred to in Section
23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in
Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical
practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement
to refer the matter to another health care service
provider is still considered a compulsion on those
objecting healthcare service providers. They add that
compelling them to do the act against their will
violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality.
Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that
they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos.
Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive
effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-
bono reproductive health services to indigents
encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon
whom they are required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a
conscientious objector to refer the person seeking
reproductive health care services to another provider
infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the
objector to become an unwilling participant in the
commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings.
While the right to act on one's belief may be
regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH
Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor
injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show
compelling state interest to justify regulation of
religious freedom because it mentions no emergency,
risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not
explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-
discrimination of rights, sustainable human
development, health, education, information, choice
and to make decisions according to religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands
of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are
not being met as to justify the impairment of religious
freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the
RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family
planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to
obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the
provision forces individuals to participate in the
implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes
their religious beliefs. 195 As the assailed law dangles
the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in
case of non-compliance with its provisions, the
petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to
provide, support and facilitate access and information
to contraception against their beliefs must be struck
down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee
of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the
RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or
type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or
artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any
24
religion or belief.196 They point out that the RH Law
only seeks to serve the public interest by providing
accessible, effective and quality reproductive health
services to ensure maternal and child health, in line
with the State's duty to bring to reality the social
justice health guarantees of the Constitution,197 and
that what the law only prohibits are those acts or
practices, which deprive others of their right to
reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed
law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which
is an assurance that no one will be compelled to
violate his religion against his free will.199
The respondents add that by asserting that only
natural family planning should be allowed, the
petitioners are effectively going against the
constitutional right to religious freedom, the same
right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the
RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration
that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners
are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic
Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods
and impose this on the entire citizenry. 201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents
insist that the same does not violate the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully
balanced compromise between the interests of the
religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to
keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the
citizen who needs access to information and who has
the right to expect that the health care professional in
front of her will act professionally. For the
respondents, the concession given by the State under
Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to
the right to freely exercise one's religion without
unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's
religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is
limited in duration, location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under
Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a
reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for
would-be couples to have access to information
regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding
and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who object
to any information received on account of their
attendance in the required seminars are not compelled
to accept information given to them. They are
completely free to reject any information they do not
agree with and retain the freedom to decide on
matters of family life without intervention of the
State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute
the notion that natural family planning is the only
method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic
hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the
matter, they highlight the changing stand of the
Catholic Church on contraception throughout the
years and note the general acceptance of the benefits
of contraceptives by its followers in planning their
families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a
heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of
diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and
backgrounds. History has shown us that our
government, in law and in practice, has allowed these
various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to
thrive in a single society together. It has embraced
minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the
religious people of different sects and the non-
believers. The undisputed fact is that our people
generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived
Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and
enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus,
the preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid
of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane
society, and establish a Government that shall
embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the
common good, conserve and develop our patrimony,
and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the
blessings of independence and democracy under the
rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom,
love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate
this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty
God " manifested their spirituality innate in our
nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by
tradition and historical experience. As this is
embodied in the preamble, it means that the State
recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so
far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of
morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the
contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973
and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and
accommodating provisions towards religions such as
tax exemption of church property, salary of religious
officers in government institutions, and optional
religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a
strong barrier so that the State would not encroach
into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The
principle of separation of Church and State was, thus,
enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall
be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and
State is based on mutual respect.1âwphi1 Generally,
the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the
church, much less question its faith and dogmas or
dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and
discriminate against another. On the other hand, the
church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on
the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot
demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it
sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion
should ever be preferred over another, the
Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the
term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a
temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of
25
God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious
organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious
congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the
need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State
from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the
Constitution lays down the following mandate in
Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2),
of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated,
applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other
religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious
freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the
State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any
religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict
neutrality in affairs among religious
groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment
of a state religion and the use of public resources for
the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise
clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom
guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly
interfering with the outside manifestations of one's
belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious
freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits
legislation for the support of any religious tenets or
the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or
the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard,
322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures
the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion
within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said
that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all
designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live
as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the
liberty of others and with the common good. Any
legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the
observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate
invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even
though the burden may be characterized as being only
indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10
L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates
conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law
which has for its purpose and effect to advance the
state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its
indirect burden on religious observance, unless the
state can accomplish its purpose without imposing
such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6
Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not
designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have
a single goal-to promote freedom of individual
religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the
free exercise clause prohibits government from
inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious
beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause
prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief
with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In
other words, the two religion clauses were intended to
deny government the power to use either the carrot or
the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and
practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's
religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious
freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to
believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The
first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v.
Secretary of Education:211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless
bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is
the freedom of belief, including religious belief,
limitless and without bounds. One may believe in
most anything, however strange, bizarre and
unreasonable the same may appear to others, even
heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or
doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of
belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a
stretch of road to travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the
awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only
with proper regard to the rights of others. It is
"subject to regulation where the belief is translated
into external acts that affect the public welfare." 213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise
clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine
of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly
decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor,
(Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent
neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or
permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework
26
underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In the
same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with
respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to
promote the government's favored form of religion,
but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance. "The purpose of
accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate
the exercise of, a person's or institution's
religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of
accommodation is not a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an
exemption from its application or its 'burdensome
effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious
freedom, the compelling state interest test is
proper.218 Underlying the compelling state interest
test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental
right and that laws burdening it should be subject to
strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to
determine these limits. Beginning with the first case
on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society,
the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger"
test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test
continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious
liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test
of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it
violates the established institutions of society and
law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate
and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a
law of general applicability may burden religious
exercise provided the law is the least restrictive
means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case
also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling
state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went
back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the
"grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the
Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo
went back to the " clear and present danger" test in
the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not
surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear
and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger"
test involved, in one form or another, religious speech
as this test is often used in cases on freedom of
expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and
German cases set the rule that religious freedom will
not prevail over established institutions of society and
law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited
by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which
employed the "grave and immediate danger" test .
Victoriano was the only case that employed the
"compelling state interest" test, but as explained
previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the
facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A
merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo
where the "clear and present danger" and "grave and
immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech
has easily discernible or immediate effects. The
Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been
overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent
neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this
jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case
involves purely conduct arising from religious belief.
The "compelling state interest" test is proper where
conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human
conduct has different effects on the state's interests:
some effects may be immediate and short-term while
others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would
protect the interests of the state in preventing a
substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is
therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the
state would suffice to prevail over the right to
religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that
enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights -
"the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights",
in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an
invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to
a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order
of limited government is premised upon an
acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the
Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order
to build a just and humane society and establish a
government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit
this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests
which balances a right with just a colorable state
interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a
compelling interest of the state can prevail over the
fundamental right to religious liberty. The test
requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a
compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the
state to batter religion, especially the less powerful
ones until they are destroyed. In determining which
shall prevail between the state's interest and religious
liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The
"compelling state interest" serves the purpose of
revering religious liberty while at the same time
affording protection to the paramount interests of the
state. This was the test used in Sherbert which
involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays.
In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by
upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks
to protect the very state, without which, religious
liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the
original. Underlining supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of
the Court to determine whether the use of
contraceptives or one's participation in the support of
modem reproductive health measures is moral from a
religious standpoint or whether the same is right or
wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the
Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith,
practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical
law, custom and rule of a church ... are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are
outside the province of the civil courts." 220 The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court
makes in the case at bench should be understood only
in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise,
while the Court stands without authority to rule on
ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the
Constitution, it does have authority to determine
whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of
religious freedom.
27
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes
and respects religion and religious beliefs and
convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one
can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion
or defy his religious convictions against his free will.
Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious
freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human
rights of all persons including their right to equality
and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health
which includes reproductive health, the right to
education and information, and the right to choose
and make decisions for themselves in accordance
with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural
beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
[Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable
social institution and the foundation of the family
which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant
thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in
accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood." [Section 2,
Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information
and access, without bias, to all methods of family
planning, including effective natural and modern
methods which have been proven medically safe,
legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance
with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards such as those registered and approved by
the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified
through the NHTS-PR and other government
measures of identifying marginalization: Provided,
That the State shall also provide funding support to
promote modern natural methods of family planning,
especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent
with the needs of acceptors and their religious
convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable
individuals and couples to have the number of
children they desire with due consideration to the
health, particularly of women, and the resources
available and affordable to them and in accordance
with existing laws, public morals and their religious
convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and
choice of family planning methods that are in
accordance with their religious convictions and
cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's
obligations under various human rights instruments.
[Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment
organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's
organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations,
the religious sector and communities is crucial to
ensure that reproductive health and population and
development policies, plans, and programs will
address the priority needs of women, the poor, and
the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and
ability of a parent to respond to the needs and
aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a
shared responsibility between parents to determine
and achieve the desired number of children, spacing
and timing of their children according to their own
family life aspirations, taking into account
psychological preparedness, health status,
sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with
their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases
supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were
enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some
medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of
using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with
the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs
should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause
restricts what the government can do with religion, it
also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with
the government. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as
policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in
simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion and, thus, establishing a state
religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their
supposition that the State cannot enhance its
population control program through the RH Law
simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is
not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular
objectives without being dictated upon by the policies
of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his
taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The
demarcation line between Church and State demands
that one render unto Caesar the things that are
Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to
promote reproductive health manifestly respects
diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-
Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be
reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof.
The said provisions commonly mandate that a
hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer
a person seeking health care and services under the
law to another accessible healthcare provider despite
their conscientious objections based on religious or
ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is
allegedly burdened by government legislation or
practice, the compelling state interest test in line with
the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent
Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case,
28
the conscientious objector's claim to religious
freedom would warrant an exemption from
obligations under the RH Law, unless the government
succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state
interest in the accomplishment of an important
secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of
conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH
Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a
conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has
been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that
an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious
objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the
law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs,
while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet
under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an
illustration of the predicament of medical
practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent
with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer
imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief
and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the
medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient
seeking information on modem reproductive health
products, services, procedures and methods, his
conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As
Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner
Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise
clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an
opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise
because it makes pro-life health providers complicit
in the performance of an act that they find morally
repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience,
do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may
not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he
abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is
necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech,
it being an externalization of one's thought and
conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent.
With the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom follows the protection that should be
afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs
to others as well as the protection for simply being
silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the
individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty
not to utter what is not in his mind. 223 While the RH
Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through
informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the
liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any
degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or
indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and
moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and
the interest of the State, on the other, to provide
access and information on reproductive health
products, services, procedures and methods to enable
the people to determine the timing, number and
spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of
the strong view that the religious freedom of health
providers, whether public or private, should be
accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious
objector should be exempt from compliance with the
mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled
to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction,
it would be violative of "the principle of non-
coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free
exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner
House of the Court of Session, found in the case of
Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and
Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to
be conscientious objectors under the provisions of
Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be
required to delegate, supervise or support staff on
their labor ward who were involved in
abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if
'participation' were defined according to whether the
person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this
would actually mean more complexity and
uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral,
the applicable principle was the same - they could not
be forced to assist abortions if it would be against
their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity
specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated
by a religious group and health care service
providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law
penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse
to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and
Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be
struck down for being violative of the freedom of
religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)
(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the
dissemination of information regarding programs and
services and in the performance of reproductive
health procedures, the religious freedom of health
care service providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the
Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive
Secretary228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by
the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court
has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well
aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his
beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties
provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance.
Without set consequences for either an active
violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless
and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered
for an effective implementation of a law is a
constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly
chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of
a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses
29
to refer a patient to another, or who declines to
perform reproductive health procedure on a patient
because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear
inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the
Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR
reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as
provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of
hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among
others, who by virtue of their office are specifically
charged with the duty to implement the provisions of
the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered
as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal
protection clause. The conscientious objection clause
should be equally protective of the religious belief of
public health officers. There is no perceptible
distinction why they should not be considered exempt
from the mandates of the law. The protection
accorded to other conscientious objectors should
equally apply to all medical practitioners without
distinction whether they belong to the public or
private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is
intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe
that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even
if one acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies
a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human
values. The mind must be free to think what it wills,
whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give
expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through
the media and, thus, seek other candid views in
occasions or gatherings or in more permanent
aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are
freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press,
assembly and petition, and freedom of association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because
no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but
also because it is violative of the equal protection
clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent
Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR
and the RH Law, the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your
Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned
RH Law is replete with provisions in upholding the
freedom of religion and respecting religious
convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with
qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you
have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's
a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the
nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24.
This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it
says: " .... skilled health professionals such as
provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of
hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among
others, who by virtue of their office are specifically
charged with the duty to implement the provisions of
the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered
as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your
Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to
the private practitioners who can be conscientious
objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be
considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree
with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to
the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR
and the law, the law must prevail.230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on
whether the respondents, in defense of the subject
provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more
compelling state interest to restrain conscientious
objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2]
discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory
character of the law is the least intrusive means to
achieve the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents'
submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was
curiously silent in the establishment of a more
compelling state interest that would rationalize the
curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to
adhere to an action contrary to his religious
convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG
maintained the same silence and evasion. The
Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the
following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector
to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
30
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice
Abad. What is the compelling State interest in
imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious objector
which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this
burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the
standard is a compelling State interest, this is an
ordinary health legislation involving professionals.
This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise
matter. This is a regulation by the State of the
relationship between medical doctors and their
patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state
interest which would limit the free exercise clause of
the conscientious objectors, however few in number.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave
danger to the security and welfare of the community
can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If
the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the
freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act
or not to act according to what one believes. And this
freedom is violated when one is compelled to act
against one's belief or is prevented from acting
according to one's belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate
danger to the life or health of an individual in the
perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all,
a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing
of the birth of their children refers to a future event
that is contingent on whether or not the mother
decides to adopt or use the information, product,
method or supply given to her or whether she even
decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand,
the burden placed upon those who object to
contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the
moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive
health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists
to justify the infringement of the conscientious
objector's religious freedom, the respondents have
failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests" which could limit
or override a person's fundamental right to religious
freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented
any government effort exerted to show that the means
it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the
least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that
the act of referring would only be momentary,
considering that the act of referral by a conscientious
objector is the very action being contested as
violative of religious freedom, it behooves the
respondents to demonstrate that no other means can
be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective
without violating the rights of the conscientious
objector. The health concerns of women may still be
addressed by other practitioners who may perform
reproductive health-related procedures with open
willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person
who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance
deserves the protection of the Court as the last
vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already
taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to
health is protected. Considering other legislations as
they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive
Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as
"The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the
needs of women in relation to health services and
programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on
comprehensive health services and programs for
women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a)
Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at
all times, provide for a comprehensive, culture-
sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and
programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle
and which addresses the major causes of women's
mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the
provision for comprehensive health services, due
respect shall be accorded to women's religious
convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a
family in accordance with their religious convictions,
and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the
right of women to protection from hazardous drugs,
devices, interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre-
and post-natal services to address
pregnancy and infant health and
nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe,
and effective methods of family
planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration
in youth sexuality education and
health services without prejudice to
the primary right and duty of
parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of
reproductive tract infections,
including sexually transmitted
diseases, HIV, and AIDS;
31
(6) Prevention and management of
reproductive tract cancers like
breast and cervical cancers, and
other gynecological conditions and
disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and
management of pregnancy-related
complications;
(8) In cases of violence against
women and children, women and
children victims and survivors shall
be provided with comprehensive
health services that include
psychosocial, therapeutic, medical,
and legal interventions and
assistance towards healing,
recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of
infertility and sexual dysfunction
pursuant to ethical norms and
medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women
beyond their child-bearing years;
and
(11) Management, treatment, and
intervention of mental health
problems of women and girls. In
addition, healthy lifestyle activities
are encouraged and promoted
through programs and projects as
strategies in the prevention of
diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and
Education. - The State shall provide women in all
sectors with appropriate, timely, complete, and
accurate information and education on all the above-
stated aspects of women's health in government
education and training programs, with due regard to
the following:
(1) The natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth and the development of
moral character and the right of
children to be brought up in an
atmosphere of morality and
rectitude for the enrichment and
strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's
sexuality that affirms human
dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and
effective family planning methods
including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay
eventually replied that the compelling state interest
was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of
thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed,
x x x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this
point by concrete facts and figures from reputable
sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World
Health Organization reported that the Filipino
maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from
1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law
at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents
still insist that such number of maternal deaths
constitute a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in
the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino
women, they could not be solved by a measure that
puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious
beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly
recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law.
While generally healthcare service providers cannot
be forced to render reproductive health care
procedures if doing it would contravene their
religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-
threatening cases that require the performance of
emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to
life of the mother should be given preference,
considering that a referral by a medical practitioner
would amount to a denial of service, resulting to
unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave
danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban,
representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral
clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation
of freedom of religion does not contemplate an
emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother
and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged
always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is
impossible, the resulting death to one should not be
deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind
the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of
Representatives of the principle of double-effect
wherein intentional harm on the life of either the
mother of the child is never justified to bring about a
"good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life
of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is
morally obliged always to try to save both lives.
However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily
the mother) when it is medically impossible to save
both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the
other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of
the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional
and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would
not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is
never pitted against the child because both their lives
are equally valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a
mother, procedures endangering the life of the child
may be resorted to even if is against the religious
32
sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted
above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical
practitioner in this case would have been more than
justified considering the life he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 239 as
a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the
Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of
police power by the government. A cursory reading
of the assailed provision bares that the religious
freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All
the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a
seminar on parenthood, family planning
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even
mandate the type of family planning methods to be
included in the seminar, whether they be natural or
artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who
receive any information during their attendance in the
required seminars are not compelled to accept the
information given to them, are completely free to
reject the information they find unacceptable, and
retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life
without the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section
23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the
Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and
autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and
fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its
solidarity and total development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions
strengthening the family as it is the basic social
institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted
entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as
the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance
with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper
care and nutrition, and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and
other conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and
income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to
participate in the planning and implementation of
policies and programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire
to control population growth, contains provisions
which tend to wreck the family as a solid social
institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from
participating in the decision making process
regarding their common future progeny. It likewise
deprives the parents of their authority over their
minor daughter simply because she is already a
parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public
or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe
reproductive health procedures on any person of legal
age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization
of the following persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons:
provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision
of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail.
[Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health
procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which,
by their very nature, should require mutual consent
and decision between the husband and the wife as
they affect issues intimately related to the founding of
a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution
espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the
spouses to found a family." One person cannot found
a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both
spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to
participate in the planning and implementation of
policies and programs that affect them " is equally
recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this
mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority
to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and
barring the other spouse from participating in the
decision would drive a wedge between the husband
and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and
endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake
of reducing the population. This would be a marked
departure from the policy of the State to protect
marriage as an inviolable social institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health
procedure is a private matter which belongs to the
couple, not just one of them. Any decision they
would reach would affect their future as a family
because the size of the family or the number of their
children significantly matters. The decision whether
or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively
33
to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit
as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally
guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the
State, which has not shown any compelling interest,
the State should see to it that they chart their destiny
together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro,
Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as
the "Magna Carta for Women," provides that women
shall have equal rights in all matters relating to
marriage and family relations, including the joint
decision on the number and spacing of their children.
Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the
RH Law states, is a shared responsibility between
parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not
be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to
protect and strengthen the family by giving to only
one spouse the absolute authority to decide whether
to undergo reproductive health procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls
within the protected zone of marital privacy and such
state intervention would encroach into the zones of
spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In
our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first
recognized in Marje v. Mutuc, 243 where the Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that
"the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in
itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US
Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 245 where
Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights -older than our political parties, older than our
school system. Marriage is a coming together for
better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate
to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association
for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute
which made the use of contraceptives a criminal
offense on the ground of its amounting to an
unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of
married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone
of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice
Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of
privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple,
the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental
consent in cases where the minor, who will be
undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has
had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to
family planning services, whether natural or artificial:
Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to
modern methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s except when
the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision
except that when a minor is already a parent or has
had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the
decision making process of the minor with regard to
family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated,
the parental authority is already cut off just because
there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent
needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her
own parents. The State cannot replace her natural
mother and father when it comes to providing her
needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no
longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not
promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the
family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the
constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the
Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas
wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary"
to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion
that the right of parents is superior to that of the
State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of
parents to exercise parental control over their minor-
child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on
matters which very well affect the very purpose of
marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and
family life, would result in the violation of one's
privacy with respect to his family. It would be
dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino
tradition of maintaining close family ties and
violative of the recognition that the State affords
couples entering into the special contract of marriage
to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family
and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest,
take over the role of parents in the care and custody
of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling
state interest can justify a state substitution of their
parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under
the exception provided in the second paragraph of
Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse
34
under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made.
There must be a differentiation between access to
information about family planning services, on one
hand, and access to the reproductive health
procedures and modern family planning methods
themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to
information is concerned, the Court finds no
constitutional objection to the acquisition of
information by the minor referred to under the
exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that
would enable her to take proper care of her own body
and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to
protect both the life of the mother as that of the
unborn child. Considering that information to enable
a person to make informed decisions is essential in
the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access
to such information with respect to reproductive
health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that
parents might be deprived of their parental control is
unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise
parental guidance and control over their minor child
and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject
the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an
exception must be made in life-threatening cases that
require the performance of emergency procedures. In
such cases, the life of the minor who has already
suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should
not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It
should be emphasized that no person should be
denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed
to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to
life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section
23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By effectively
limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only
in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents
their right of parental authority in cases where what is
involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the
two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an
abused child as provided in the first sentence of
Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be
deprived of their constitutional right of parental
authority. To deny them of this right would be an
affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in
relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching
of Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive
Health Education under threat of fine and/or
imprisonment violates the principle of academic
freedom . According to the petitioners, these
provisions effectively force educational institutions to
teach reproductive health education even if they
believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to
their students.250 Citing various studies conducted in
the United States and statistical data gathered in the
country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of
contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-
wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families;
the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the
"feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and
promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the
validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature
because the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-
appropriate reproductive health education. One can
only speculate on the content, manner and medium of
instruction that will be used to educate the
adolescents and whether they will contradict the
religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature
nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to
rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987
Constitution provides that the natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
for civic efficiency and development of moral
character shall receive the support of the
Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the
1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the
State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in
preparing the youth to become productive members
of society. Notably, it places more importance on the
role of parents in the development of their children by
recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is,
that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is
superior to that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as
parens patriae to aid parents in the moral
development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution
makes mention of the importance of developing the
youth and their important role in nation
building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not
only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health
education, but also for values formation; the
development of knowledge and skills in self-
protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and
violence against women and children and other forms
of gender based violence and teen pregnancy;
physical, social and emotional changes in
adolescents; women's rights and children's rights;
responsible teenage behavior; gender and
development; and responsible parenthood, and that
Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section
4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of
responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and
physical and emotional changes among adolescents -
the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under
the assailed provision supplements, rather than
supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the
moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the
mandatory reproductive health education program
shall be developed in conjunction with parent-
teacher-community associations, school officials and
other interest groups, it could very well be said that it
will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes
apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section
14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the
Constitution is without merit.254
35
While the Court notes the possibility that educators
might raise their objection to their participation in the
reproductive health education program provided
under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that
the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court
reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed
before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from
vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of
the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l)
mentions a "private health service provider" among
those who may be held punishable but does not
define who is a "private health care service provider."
They argue that confusion further results since
Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health
care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the
assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by
religious groups from rendering reproductive health
service and modern family planning methods. It is
unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt
from giving reproductive health information under
Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive
health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the
withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect
information, but at the same time fails to define
"incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness
when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess its
meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the
words used in a statute are vague, words must not
only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning
alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute.
It is a rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is,
every part of it must be construed together with the
other parts and kept subservient to the general intent
of the whole enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the
definition of "private health care service provider,"
reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH
Law which defines a "public health service provider,"
viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1)
public health care institution, which is duly licensed
and accredited and devoted primarily to the
maintenance and operation of facilities for health
promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment
and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease,
injury, disability or deformity, or in need of
obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2)
public health care professional, who is a doctor of
medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health
worker engaged in the delivery of health care
services; or (4) barangay health worker who has
undergone training programs under any accredited
government and NGO and who voluntarily renders
primarily health care services in the community after
having been accredited to function as such by the
local health board in accordance with the guidelines
promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care
institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private
health care service provider," should not be a cause of
confusion for the obvious reason that they are used
synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the
right to be exempt from being obligated to render
reproductive health service and modem family
planning methods, includes exemption from being
obligated to give reproductive health information and
to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly,
subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier
discussed, the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and
modem family planning methods, necessarily
includes exemption from being obligated to give
reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. The terms "service"
and "methods" are broad enough to include the
providing of information and the rendering of
medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention
that the RH Law punishes health care service
providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and
provide incorrect information regarding reproductive
health programs and services. For ready reference,
the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are
prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public
or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the
dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide
incorrect information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health including the right to
informed choice and access to a full range of legal,
medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here
denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with
established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree
with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety;
and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other
hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or
deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used together in
relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of
malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the
36
public as to the nature and effect of programs and
services on reproductive health. Public health and
safety demand that health care service providers give
their honest and correct medical information in
accordance with what is acceptable in medical
practice. While health care service providers are not
barred from expressing their own personal opinions
regarding the programs and services on reproductive
health, their right must be tempered with the need to
provide public health and safety. The public deserves
no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates
the equal protection clause under the Constitution as
it discriminates against the poor because it makes
them the primary target of the government program
that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that,
rather than promoting reproductive health among the
poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that
would effectively reduce the number of the poor.
Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law
dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in
the guiding principles259 and definition of terms260 of
the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational
institutions from the mandatory reproductive health
education program imposed by the RH Law renders it
unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, 261 the
Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of
equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government
was founded is that of the equality of right which is
embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is
embraced in the concept of due process, as every
unfair discrimination offends the requirements of
justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a
separate clause, however, to provide for a more
specific guaranty against any form of undue
favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the
basis of the due process clause. But if the particular
act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the
equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It
"requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat
similarly situated individuals in a similar manner."
"The purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a state's jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue
or by its improper execution through the state's duly
constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept
of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official
state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its
inhibitions cover all the departments of the
government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state
denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application
of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however,
to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The
test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class. "Superficial differences
do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
persons who naturally belong to the class. "The
classification will be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not similarly treated, both as
to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not
necessary that the classification be made with
absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of
the class should possess the same characteristics in
equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and
as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the
classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact
that an individual belonging to a class differs from
the other members, as long as that class is
substantially distinguishable from all others, does not
justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing
circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude
addition to the number included in the class. It must
be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may
thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions.
It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that
should otherwise fall into a certain classification.
[Emphases supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
government's reproductive health care program is not
a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is
pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity
to address the needs of the underprivileged by
providing that they be given priority in addressing the
health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health
and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs
of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.
37
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are
suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. There is, therefore, no merit to the
contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the
poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law
admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as
elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1)
explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the
population growth rate is incidental to the
advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number
of children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children.
While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law
seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children
only if they would raise them in a truly humane way,
a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the
law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the
poor in the implementation of government programs
to promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational
institutions from the mandatory reproductive health
education program under Section 14, suffice it to
state that the mere fact that the children of those who
are less fortunate attend public educational
institutions does not amount to substantial distinction
sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the
other hand, substantial distinction rests between
public educational institutions and private educational
institutions, particularly because there is a need to
recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions especially with respect to
religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity
towards the teaching of reproductive health
education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is
constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional
prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit
that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring
private and non-government health care service
providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono
reproductive health services, actually amounts to
involuntary servitude because it requires medical
practitioners to perform acts against their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono
services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be
considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as
reproductive health care service providers have the
discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro
bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the
imposition is within the powers of the government,
the accreditation of medical practitioners with
PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of
medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest
that it is both a power and a duty of the State to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote
the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the
practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged
burdened with conditions as it directly involves the
very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power
includes the power of Congress263 to prescribe the
qualifications for the practice of professions or trades
which affect the public welfare, the public health, the
public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate
or control such professions or trades, even to the
point of revoking such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of
involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force,
threats, intimidation or other similar means of
coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed
provision, however, reveals that it only encourages
private and non- government reproductive healthcare
service providers to render pro bono service. Other
than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is
imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private
and non-government reproductive healthcare service
providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind
of health service they wish to provide, when, where
and how to provide it or whether to provide it all.
Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is
made upon them to render pro bono service against
their will. While the rendering of such service was
made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth,
the Court does not consider the same to be an
unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary
incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a
perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed,
however, it should be emphasized that conscientious
objectors are exempt from this provision as long as
their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow
them to render reproductive health service, pro bona
or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by
Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
whether or not a supply or product is to be included
in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation.
The FDA does not only have the power but also the
competency to evaluate, register and cover health
services and methods. It is the only government entity
empowered to render such services and highly
proficient to do so. It should be understood that
health services and methods fall under the gamut of
terms that are associated with what is ordinarily
understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as
amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there
is hereby created an office to be called the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of
Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under
the Office of the Secretary and shall have the
following functions, powers and duties:
38
"(a) To administer the effective
implementation of this Act and of the rules
and regulations issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the
collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products
in connection with the implementation of
this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as
basis for the preparation of health products
standards, and to recommend standards of
identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and
fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with
technical requirements to serve as basis for
the issuance of appropriate authorization and
spot-check for compliance with regulations
regarding operation of manufacturers,
importers, exporters, distributors,
wholesalers, drug outlets, and other
establishments and facilities of health
products, as determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all
applicable health products prior to the
issuance of appropriate authorizations to
ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders,
distributors, importers, exporters,
wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-
consumer users of health products to report
to the FDA any incident that reasonably
indicates that said product has caused or
contributed to the death, serious illness or
serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or
any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu
propio or upon verified complaint for health
products, whether or not registered with the
FDA Provided, That for registered health
products, the cease and desist order is valid
for thirty (30) days and may be extended for
sixty ( 60) days only after due process has
been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban,
recall, and/or withdrawal of any health
product found to have caused death, serious
illness or serious injury to a consumer or
patient, or is found to be imminently
injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly
deceptive, and to require all concerned to
implement the risk management plan which
is a requirement for the issuance of the
appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions,
powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable
the agency to carry out the mandates of the law.
Being the country's premiere and sole agency that
ensures the safety of food and medicines available to
the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary
powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to
the principle of necessary implication, the mandate
by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and
safety by permitting only food and medicines that are
safe includes "service" and "methods." From the
declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that
Congress intended that the public be given only those
medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-
abortifacient, and effective in accordance with
scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards. The philosophy behind the permitted
delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary
of Justice,267 as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of
the government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization
even in legislation has become necessary. To many of
the problems attendant upon present day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence, let alone the interest and the time, to
provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say
specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the
Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the
petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the
powers devolved to local government units (LGUs)
under Section 17 of the Local Government Code.
Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and
functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services
and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to
be self-reliant and shall continue exercising
the powers and discharging the duties and
functions currently vested upon them. They
shall also discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and
offices devolved to them pursuant to this
Code. Local government units shall likewise
exercise such other powers and discharge
such other functions and responsibilities as
are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to
efficient and effective provision of the basic
services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include,
but are not limited to, x x x.
39
While the aforementioned provision charges
the LGUs to take on the functions and
responsibilities that have already been
devolved upon them from the national
agencies on the aspect of providing for basic
services and facilities in their respective
jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same
provision provides a categorical exception of
cases involving nationally-funded projects,
facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of
subsection (b) hereof, public works and
infrastructure projects and other facilities,
programs and services funded by the
National Government under the annual
General Appropriations Act, other special
laws, pertinent executive orders, and those
wholly or partially funded from foreign
sources, are not covered under this Section,
except in those cases where the local
government unit concerned is duly
designated as the implementing agency for
such projects, facilities, programs and
services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by
the national government is that, unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it
has no power over a program for which funding has
been provided by the national government under the
annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services
within the jurisdiction of the LGU. 269 A complete
relinquishment of central government powers on the
matter of providing basic facilities and services
cannot be implied as the Local Government Code
itself weighs against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows
that whether it pertains to the establishment of health
care facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health
professionals,272 or the training of barangay health
workers,273 it will be the national government that
will provide for the funding of its implementation.
Local autonomy is not absolute. The national
government still has the say when it comes to
national priority programs which the local
government is called upon to implement like the RH
Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the
LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these
services. There is nothing in the wording of the law
which can be construed as making the availability of
these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said
reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to
an undue encroachment by the national government
upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local
governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the
autonomy of local governments can be equally
applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe
upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6,
10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the
ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the
exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the
autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for
the guidance of the regional government. These
provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply
delineate the powers that may be exercised by the
regional government, which can, in no manner, be
characterized as an abdication by the State of its
power to enact legislation that would benefit the
general welfare. After all, despite the veritable
autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and
the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand,
reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the
relationship between the national and the regional
governments.274 Except for the express and implied
limitations imposed on it by the Constitution,
Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent
and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which
extends to all matters of general concern or common
interest.275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law
violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court
does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for
upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost
is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man
emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the
Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive
issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin
with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate
body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and
notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists,
philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the
philosophical school are interested in the law as an
abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or
present.277 Unless, a natural right has been
transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a
basis to strike down a law. In Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the
petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not
duty-bound to examine every law or action and
whether it conforms with both the Constitution and
natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used
sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances
involving rights inherent to man where no law is
applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does
not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow
abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to
enhance the population control program of the
government by providing information and making
non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily
available to the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as
unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access
to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare
services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier
pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some
sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit
40
of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the
Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a
recognition that man stands accountable to an
authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of
Church and State, one religious group cannot be
allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the
society. Philippine modem society leaves enough
room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone
should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and
harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside
each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be,
the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks
to address is the problem of rising poverty and
unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the
cause of these perennial issues is not the large
population but the unequal distribution of wealth.
Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will
remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the
hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial
for the country in the long run. The European and
Asian countries, which embarked on such a program
generations ago , are now burdened with ageing
populations. The number of their young workers is
dwindling with adverse effects on their economy.
These young workers represent a significant human
capital which could have helped them invigorate,
innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are
now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still
struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives,
is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up
by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers.
This is because we have an ample supply of young
able-bodied workers. What would happen if the
country would be weighed down by an ageing
population and the fewer younger generation would
not be able to support them? This would be the
situation when our total fertility rate would go down
below the replacement level of two (2) children per
woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population
problem, but the State should not use coercive
measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law
against conscientious objectors) to solve it.
Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-
interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the
legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the
law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not
the same as saying what the law should be or what is
the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is
not the province of the judiciary to look into the
wisdom of the law nor to question the policies
adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the
business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust
situation that may arise from the application of a
particular law. It is for the legislature to enact
remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the
premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and
cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate
function of interpreting the law, guided by the
Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of
settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is
therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself
to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as
enacted by the lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law
is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior
existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws,
but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees
the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will
still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the
Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the
reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta
of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive
provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same,
the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in
the adoption of any family planning method should
be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A.
No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except
with respect to the following provisions which are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision
in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
private health facilities and non-maternity
specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer
patients, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic
Act No. 8344, to another health facility
which is conveniently accessible; and b)
allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modem
methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any healthcare service provider who fails
and or refuses to disseminate information
regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her
religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures
without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
limit the requirement of parental consent
only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish
41
any healthcare service provider who fails
and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health care service provider within
the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or
her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any public officer who refuses to support
reproductive health programs or shall do any
act that hinders the full implementation of a
reproductive health program, regardless of
his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding
prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the
rendering of pro bona reproductive health
service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing
PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the
RH-IRR, which added the qualifier
"primarily" in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and,
therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on
March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July
16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the
provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein
declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
2. Who exercises parental authority and custody,
Art. 211, FC
G.R. No. 122906               February 7, 2002
DINAH B. TONOG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR V.
DAGUIMOL, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review
on certiorari seeking the reversal of two (2)
Resolutions dated August 29, 1995 and November
29, 1995 issued by the former Second Division 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35971. The first
resolution modified the appellate court’s decision
promulgated in the said case, and granted custody of
the minor, Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, to private
respondent. The second resolution denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
The pertinent facts are:
On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog
gave birth2 to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her
illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar
V. Daguimol. Petitioner was then a nursing student
while private respondent was a licensed physician.
They cohabited for a time and lived with private
respondent’s parents and sister in the latter’s house in
Quezon City where the infant, Gardin Faith, was a
welcome addition to the family.
A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left
for the United States of America where she found
work as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in
the care of her father (private respondent herein) and
paternal grandparents.
On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a
petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith, docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053, in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. On March 9, 1992, the trial
court rendered judgment appointing private
respondent as legal guardian of the minor, Gardin
Faith.
Petitioner avers that she learned of the judgment of
the trial court rendered in Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053
only on April 1, 1992. Accordingly, on May 27,
1992, she filed a petition for relief from judgment. In
a resolution dated September 15, 1992, the trial court
set aside its original judgment and allowed petitioner
to file her opposition to private respondent’s petition.
The latter, in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration.
In a related incident, petitioner filed on October 4,
1993, a motion to remand custody of Gardin Faith to
her.
On November 18, 1994, the trial court issued a
resolution denying private respondent’s motion for
reconsideration and granting petitioner’s motion for
custody of their child, Gardin. Petitioner moved for
immediate execution of the said resolution.
Due to the adverse turn of events, private respondent
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35971,
questioning the actuations of the trial court. On
March 21, 1995, the appellate court dismissed the
petition on the ground of lack of merit. However,
after private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, the appellate court issued a
Resolution3 dated August 29, 1995 modifying its
decision, as follows:
Although We do find the Petition dismissible, insofar
as it assails the September 15, 1993 Resolution of the
respondent Court, giving due course to private
respondent’s Petition for Relief from Judgment, and
the November 18, 1995 Resolution denying his
Motion for Reconsideration, We discern a good
ground to let physical custody of subject child,
Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, continue under the
petitioner, with whom the said child had been living,
since birth.
42
While it is understandable for private respondent, as
mother, to assert and seek enforcement of her legal
and natural rights as the natural guardian of her child,
the emotional and psychological effects upon the
latter of a change in custody should be considered. To
be sure, transfer of custody of the child from
petitioner to private respondent will be painful for the
child who, all her life, has been in the company of
petitioner and her paternal grandparents.
Now, inasmuch as the issue of guardianship and
custody over the same child is still pending
determination before the respondent Court, the
possibility of petitioner’s appointment as the guardian
cannot be discounted. It would certainly wreak havoc
on the child’s psychological make-up to give her to
the custody of private respondent, only to return her
to petitioner should the latter prevail in the main case.
Subjecting the child to emotional seesaw should be
avoided. It is thus more prudent to let physical
custody of the child in question be with petitioner
until the matter of her custody shall have been
determined by final judgment.
WHEREFORE, the Decision, promulgated here on
March 21, 1995 is accordingly MODIFIED, and
status quo with respect to the physical custody of the
child, Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, is ordered. It is
understood that the latter shall remain with petitioner
until otherwise adjudged.
Petitioner thus interposed the instant appeal after the
appellate court denied her motion for reconsideration
in its Resolution4 dated November 29, 1995.
Petitioner contends that she is entitled to the custody
of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. First,
as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers
parental authority upon her as the mother of the
illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin Faith cannot be
separated from her since she had not, as of then,
attained the age of seven. Employing simple
arithmetic however, it appears that Gardin Faith is
now twelve years old.
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount
criterion is the welfare and well-being of the child. 5 In
arriving at its decision as to whom custody of the
minor should be given, the court must take into
account the respective resources and social and moral
situations of the contending parents.6
In turn, the parents’ right to custody over their
children is enshrined in law. Article 220 of the
Family Code thus provides that parents and
individuals exercising parental authority over their
unemancipated children are entitled, among other
rights, "to keep them in their company." In legal
contemplation, the true nature of the parent-child
relationship encompasses much more than the
implication of ascendancy of one and obedience by
the other. We explained this in Santos, Sr. v. Court
of Appeals: 7
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from
the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority
or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical
institution whereby parents rightfully assume control
and protection of their unemancipated children to the
extent required by the latter’s needs. It is a mass of
rights and obligations which the law grants to parents
for the purpose of the children’s physical preservation
and development, as well as the cultivation of their
intellect and the education of their heart and senses.
As regards parental authority, "there is no power, but
a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no
sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the
minor."
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable
and may not be transferred or renounced except in
cases authorized by law. The right attached to
parental authority, being purely personal, the law
allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s
home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts
the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is
merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
same.
Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making
an informed decision.1âwphi1 Insofar as illegitimate
children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family
Code provides that illegitimate children shall be
under the parental authority of their mother.
Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides
that "[n]o child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise." It will be
observed that in both provisions, a strong bias is
created in favor of the mother. This is specially
evident in Article 213 where it may be said that the
law presumes that the mother is the best custodian.
As explained by the Code Commission:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid
many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby
torn away from her. No man can sound the deep
sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of
tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to
be for "compelling reasons" for the good of the child;
those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother’s heart
is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases
of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the
divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be
sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral
dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby
who is as yet unable to understand her situation.8
This is not intended, however, to denigrate the
important role fathers play in the upbringing of their
children. Indeed, we have recognized that both
parents "complement each other in giving nurture and
providing that holistic care which takes into account
the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social
and spiritual needs of the child."9 Neither does the
law nor jurisprudence intend to downplay a father’s
sense of loss when he is separated from his child:
While the bonds between a mother and her small
child are special in nature, either parent, whether
father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if
43
deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her
suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is
not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of
either parent but the welfare of the child which is the
paramount consideration.10
For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of
the custody of her child who is below seven years of
age for "compelling reasons." Instances of
unsuitability are neglect, abandonment,
unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness,
drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity,
and affliction with a communicable illness. 11 If older
than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his
preference, but the court is not bound by that choice.
The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding
the child’s preference should the parent chosen be
found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be
given to the other parent, or even to a third person. 12
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on
the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith,
since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship
before the trial court have not been terminated, and
no pronouncement has been made as to who should
have final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that
the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor,
we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing
her father (private respondent herein) to retain in the
meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the
child should not be wrenched from her familiar
surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment
away from the people and places to which she had
apparently formed an attachment.
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her
child is a question of fact to be properly entertained in
the special proceedings before the trial court. 13 It
should be recalled that in a petition for review on
certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are
not in the best position to assess the parties’
respective merits vis-à-vis their opposing claims for
custody. Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as
the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded
the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her
preference and opinion must first be sought in the
choice of which parent should have the custody over
her person.
A word of caution: our pronouncement here should
not be interpreted to imply a preference toward the
father (herein private respondent) relative to the final
custody of the minor, Gardin Faith. Nor should it be
taken to mean as a statement against petitioner’s
fitness to have final custody of her said minor
daughter. It shall be only understood that, for the
present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody
of the subject minor should remain with her father,
the private respondent herein pending final judgment
of the trial court in Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED. The trial court is directed to
immediately proceed with hearing Sp. Proc. No. Q-
92-11053 upon notice of this decision. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132223            June 19, 2001
BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, petitioner,
vs.
HELEN G. BELMES, respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45650, "In the
Matter of Guardianship of Minors Valerie Vancil and
Vincent Vancil – Bonifacia P. Vancil, Petitioner-
Appellee, vs. Helen G. Belmes, Oppositor-
Appellant," promulgated on July 29, 1997, and its
Resolution dated December 18, 1997 denying the
motion for reconsideration of the said Decision.
The facts of the case as summarized by the Court of
Appeals in its Decision are:
 "Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother
of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of
the United States of America who died in
the said country on December 22, 1986.
During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2)
children named Valerie and Vincent by his
common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.
"Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia
Vancil commenced before the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City a guardianship
proceedings over the persons and properties
of minors Valerie and Vincent docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB. At the
time, Valerie was only 6 years old while
Vincent was a 2-year old child. It is claimed
in the petition that the minors are residents
of Cebu City, Philippines and have an estate
consisting of proceeds from their father’s
death pension benefits with a probable value
of P100,000.00.
"Finding sufficiency in form and in
substance, the case was set for hearing after
a 3-consecutive-weekly publications with
the Sunstar Daily.
"On July 15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia
Vancil was appointed legal and judicial
guardian over the persons and estate of
Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.
"On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of
the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an
opposition to the subject guardianship
proceedings asseverating that she had
already filed a similar petition for
guardianship under Special Proceedings No.
2819 before the Regional Trial Court of
Pagadian City.
"Thereafter, on June 27, 1988, Helen
Belmes followed her opposition with a
motion for the Removal of Guardian and
Appointment of a New One, asserting that
44
she is the natural mother in actual custody of
and exercising parental authority over the
subject minors at Maralag, Dumingag,
Zamboanga del Sur where they are
permanently residing; that the petition was
filed under an improper venue; and that at
the time the petition was filed Bonifacia
Vancil was a resident of 140 Hurliman
Court, Canon City, Colorado, U.S.A. being a
naturalized American citizen.
"On October 12, 1988, after due
proceedings, the trial court rejected and
denied Belmes’ motion to remove and/or to
disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie
and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered
petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter the
office and perform her duties as such
guardian upon the posting of a bond of
P50,000.00. The subsequent attempt for a
reconsideration was likewise dismissed in an
Order dated November 24, 1988."1
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed
Decision reversing the RTC order of October 12,
1988 and dismissing Special Proceedings No. 1618-
CEB.
The Court of Appeals held:
"Stress should likewise be made that our
Civil Code considers parents, the father, or
in the absence, the mother, as natural
guardian of her minor children. The law on
parental authority under the Civil Code or
P.D. 603 and now the New Family Code,
(Article 225 of the Family Code) ascribe to
the same legal pronouncements. Section 7 of
Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court
confirms the designation of the parents as
ipso facto guardian of their minor children
without need of a court appointment and
only for good reason may another person be
named. Ironically, for the petitioner, there is
nothing on record of any reason at all why
Helen Belmes, the biological mother, should
be deprived of her legal rights as natural
guardian of her minor children. To give
away such privilege from Helen would be an
abdication and grave violation of the very
basic fundamental tenets in civil law and the
constitution on family solidarity."2
On March 10, 1998, Bonifacia Vancil filed with this
Court the present petition, raising the following "legal
points":
"1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in
ruling that the preferential right of a parent
to be appointed guardian over the persons
and estate of the minors is absolute, contrary
to existing jurisprudence.
"2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in
ruling that Oppositor Helen G. Belmes, the
biological mother, should be appointed the
guardian of the minors despite the
undisputed proof that under her custody, her
daughter minor Valerie Vancil was raped
seven times by Oppositor’s live-in partner.
"3. The respondent (sic) Court of Appeals
gravely erred when it disqualified petitioner
Bonifacia P. Vancil to be appointed as
judicial guardian over the persons and estate
of subject minors despite the fact that she
has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications as judicial guardian, merely
on the basis of her U.S. citizenship which is
clearly not a statutory requirement to
become guardian."
At the outset, let it be stressed that in her
"Manifestation/Motion," dated September 15, 1998,
respondent Helen Belmes stated that her daughter
Valerie turned eighteen on September 2, 1998 as
shown by her Birth Certificate.3 Respondent thus
prayed that this case be dismissed with respect to
Valerie, she being no longer a proper subject of
guardianship proceedings. The said
"Manifestation/Motion" was noted by this Court in its
Resolution dated November 11, 1998.
Considering that Valerie is already of major age, this
petition has become moot with respect to her. Thus,
only the first and third "legal points" raised by
petitioner should be resolved.
The basic issue for our resolution is who between the
mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be
his guardian.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
respondent, being the natural mother of the minor,
has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be
his guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211
of the Family Code which provides:
"Art. 211. The father and the mother shall
jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the father’s decision shall
prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the
contrary. xxx."
Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent,
respondent has the corresponding natural and legal
right to his custody. In Sagala-Eslao vs. Court of
Appeals,4 this Court held:
"Of considerable importance is the rule long
accepted by the courts that ‘the right of
parents to the custody of their minor
children is one of the natural rights incident
to parenthood,’ a right supported by law and
sound public policy. The right is an inherent
one, which is not created by the state or
decisions of the courts, but derives from the
nature of the parental relationship."
Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as
guardian of Vincent.
45
Petitioner’s claim to be the guardian of said minor
can only be realized by way of substitute parental
authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code,
thus:
"Art. 214. In case of death, absence or
unsuitability of the parents, substitute
parental authority shall be exercised by the
surviving grandparent. xxx."
In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals,5 this Court ruled:
"The law vests on the father and mother
joint parental authority over the persons of
their common children. In case of absence or
death of either parent, the parent present
shall continue exercising parental authority.
Only in case of the parents’ death, absence
or unsuitability may substitute parental
authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent."
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise
substitute parental authority only in case of death,
absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering
that respondent is very much alive and has exercised
continuously parental authority over Vincent,
petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the
minor’s guardian, respondent’s unsuitability.
Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing
evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be
the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that
respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie
considering that her (respondent’s) live-in partner
raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now
of major age, is no longer a subject of this
guardianship proceeding.
Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of
minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot qualify as a
substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an
American citizen and a resident of Colorado.
Obviously, she will not be able to perform the
responsibilities and obligations required of a
guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the
difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by
an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely
delegate those duties to someone else who may not
also qualify as a guardian.
Moreover, we observe that respondent’s allegation
that petitioner has not set foot in the Philippines since
1987 has not been controverted by her. Besides,
petitioner’s old age and her conviction of libel by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City in
Criminal Case No. CBU-168846 filed by one Danilo
R. Deen, will give her a second thought of staying
here. Indeed, her coming back to this country just to
fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent for only two
years is not certain.
Significantly, this Court has held that courts should
not appoint persons as guardians who are not within
the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it
difficult to protect the wards. In Guerrero vs.
Teran,7 this Court held:
"Doña Maria Muñoz y Gomez was, as above
indicated, removed upon the theory that her
appointment was void because she did not
reside in the Philippine Islands. There is
nothing in the law which requires the courts
to appoint residents only as administrators or
guardians. However, notwithstanding the
fact that there are no statutory requirements
upon this question, the courts, charged with
the responsibilities of protecting the estates
of deceased persons, wards of the estate,
etc., will find much difficulty in complying
with this duty by appointing administrators
and guardians who are not personally
subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding
that there is no statutory requirement, the
courts should not consent to the appointment
of persons as administrators and guardians
who are not personally subject to the
jurisdiction of our courts here."
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED, with modification in the sense that
Valerie, who has attained the age of majority, will no
longer be under the guardianship of respondent Helen
Belmes.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140817      December 7, 2001
SABRINA ARTADI BONDAGJY, petitioner,
vs.
FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY, JUDGE BENSAUDI I.
ARABANI, SR., in his capacity as presiding judge
of the 3rd Shari'a District Court, Shari'a Judicial
District, Zamboanga City, respondent.
PARDO, J.:
Is a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before
her marriage to a Muslim and converted back to
Catholicism upon their separation, still bound by the
moral laws of Islam in the determination of her
fitness to be the custodian of her children?
We apply civil law in the best interest of the children.
The Facts
Respondent Fouzi (then 31 years of age) and Sabrina
(then 20 years of age) were married on February
3,1988, at the Manila Hotel, Ermita, Manila under
Islamic rites.1 On October 21, 1987, or four (4)
months before her marriage, Sabrina became a
Muslim by conversion. However, the conversion was
not registered with the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines.
Out of their union, they begot two (2) children,
namely, Abdulaziz, born on June 13, 1989,2 and
Amouaje, born on September 29, 1990.3 The children
were born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
46
At the time of their marriage, unknown to petitioner,
respondent was still married to a Saudi Arabian
woman whom he later divorced.
After their marriage, the couple moved in with
respondent's family in Makati City. In 1990, the
parties migrated and settled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
where they lived for more than two years.
Sometime in December 1995, the children lived in
the house of Sabrina's mother in 145 Tanguile Street,
Ayala Alabang. Fouzi alleged that he could not see
his children until he got an order from the court. Even
with a court order, he could only see his children in
school at De La Salle-Zobel, Alabang, Muntinlupa
City .
On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the children
baptized as Christians4 and their names changed from
Abdulaziz Bondagjy to Azziz Santiago Artadi and
from Amouaje Bondagjy to Amouage Selina Artadi.
Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina
was seen with different men at odd hours in
Manila,5 and that she would wear short skirts,
sleeveless blouses, and bathing suits.6 Such clothing
are detestable under Islamic law on customs.
Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their children sweep
their neighbor's house for a fee of P40.00 after the
children come home from school. Whenever Fouzi
sees them in school,7 the children would be happy to
see him but they were afraid to ride in his car.
Instead, they would ride the jeepney in going home
from school.
The Case
On March 11, 1996, respondent Fouzy Ali Bondagjy
filed with the Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, an
actions8 to obtain custody of his two minor children,
Abdulaziz, 10 and Amouaje, 9.
On June 6, 1996, petitioner filed her answer with
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the persons of the parties since both
parties were residents of Manila and for lack of cause
of action. Petitioner likewise moved to transfer the
venue to Zamboanga, which was more accessible by
plane.
On June 18, 1996, the Shari'a District Court granted
petitioner's motion to transfer the venue to
Zamboanga.9
On June 27, 1996, respondent filed a reply10 and
motion for a temporary restraining order against
petitioner.11 He moved that petitioner desist from
preventing him from exercising parental authority
over his minor children.
On July 12, 1996, the court granted the motion and
issued a writ of preliminary injunction.12
On August 12, 1996, the court ordered the parties to
submit their memoranda on the issue of jurisdiction.
On October 30, 1996, the court granted petitioner's
motion to withdraw motion to dismiss on the issue of
jurisdiction and set the proceedings for pre-trial
conference on November 14, 1996.
On November 14, 1996, respondent filed a motion to
drop Joyce Artadi as defendant in the case and the
trial court issued an order:
"During the pre-trial conference held this
morning, the parties made their respective
offer and counter proposals for amicable
settlement. The plaintiff proposed (1)
solidarity of the family, and (2) alternate
custody. The defendant advanced the
proposal of reasonable visitation of the
father at their residence, for which the court
will possibly fix the period or time and
schedule of visitations.
 "With these proposals, both parties agreed to
continue the pre-trial conference on
December 9, 1996.
"WHEREFORE, let the pre-trial conference
be again held on December 9, 1996, at 9:00
o'clock in the morning."13
Meantime, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City14 an action for
nullity of marriage, custody and support, ordered the
parties to maintain status quo until further orders
from said court.15
On March 2, 1999, petitioner filed another motion to
dismiss16 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case since P.D. No. 1083 is
applicable only to Muslims. On March 3, 1999, Fouzi
filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss and
argued that at the inception of the case, both parties
were Muslims, Fouzi by birth and Sabrina by
conversion.
On March 29, 1999, the court denied the motion to
dismiss since P.D. No. 1083 had jurisdiction over all
cases of Muslims involving custody.17
On April 23, 1999, Sabrina filed a motion to
reconsider the order of March 29, 1999 denying the
motion to dismiss.18
On June 22, 1999, the court denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. Thus-
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
reasons, the motion for reconsideration of
the defendant-movant is hereby ordered
DENIED; Defendant is further ordered to
comply with the order of this Court dated
July 12, 1996, to allow plaintiff to exercise
his right of parental authority over their
minor children with that of the defendant in
accordance with article 71, of P.D. 1083, the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
47
"Let the continuation of this case be set on
July 15, 1999 at 8:30 in the morning."19
On July 15, 1999, the trial court decided to move
forward to the next stage of the case and allowed
respondent Fouzi to present evidence ex-parte.
On August 18, 1999, the court issued an
Order20 giving respondent fifteen (15) days to submit
his formal offer of evidence and fifteen (15) days
from receipt of transcript of stenographic notes to
submit memorandum.
The Shari'a District Court's Decision
On November 16, 1999, the Shari'a Court rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing considered,
judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Awarding the custody of the minors
Abdulaziz Artadi Bondagjy and Amouaje
Artadi Bondagjy in favor of their natural
father, petitioner Fouzi Ali Bondagjy; and
for this purpose ordering the respondent
Sabrina Artadi Bodagjy or any person
having the care of said minors in her stead or
behalf, to turn over, relinguish and surrender
the custody of said minors to their natural
father, the petitioner in this case Fouzi Ali
Bondagjy;
(b) Ordering the petitioner Fouzi Ali
Bondagjy to ensure that the said minors are
provided with reasonable support according
to his means and in keeping with the
standard of his family, and, a suitable home
conducive to their physical,
(c) mental and moral development; and, with
his knowledge and under reasonable
circumstances allow the respondent and
natural mother of the said minors Mrs.
Sabrina Artadi Bondagjy to visit her minor
children Abdulaziz Artadi Bondagjy and
Amouje Artadi Bondagjy."21
Hence, this petition.22
The Court's Ruling
The Shari'a District Court held that P.D. No. 1083 on
Custody and Guardianship does not apply to this case
because the spouses were not yet divorced.
However, the Shari' a District Court found petitioner
unworthy to care for her children. Thus -
"A married woman, and a mother to growing
children, should live a life that the
community in which she lives considers
morally upright, and in a manner that her
growing minor children will not be socially
and morally affected and prejudiced. It is
sad to note that respondent has failed to
observe that which is expected of a married
woman and a mother by the society in which
she lives. xxx The evidence of this case
shows the extent of the moral depravity of
the respondent, and the kind of concern for
the welfare of her minor children which on
the basis thereof this Court finds respondent
unfit with the custody of her minor children.
"xxx Under the general principles of Muslim
law, the Muslim mother may be legally
disentitled to the custody of her minor
children by reason of 'wickedness' when
such wickedness is injurious to the mind of
the child, such as when she engages in 'zina'
(illicit sexual relation); or when she is
unworthy as a mother; and, a woman is not
worthy to be trusted with the custody of the
child who is continually going out and
leaving the child hungry .(A. Baillie,
Muhammadan Law, p. 435; citing Dar-ul-
Muktar, p. 280)."23
On the other hand, the Shari'a Court found that
respondent Fouzi was capable both personally and
financially to look after the best interest of his minor
children.24
"When he was asked during the direct
examination the question that, 'if ever this
Honorable Court will grant you custody of
your children will you be able to house and
give support to your children?' He answered,
"Of course, even up to now I am giving
support to my children; And my comment is
that the father should give everything the
needs of the family and now whatever the
children needs even in school, considering
the past, I have to love them, I have to care
for my children. In school, even when they
see something they love and like, I buy it for
them. Or sometime (sic) I send my staff and
bring something for them in their house. It is
very hard, in school in front of other parents
my son would still climb on my shoulder. I
want to see them happy. I have pictures of
my children with me, taken only last
week."25
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are
final and binding upon the parties.26 The Court is not
expected or required to examine or contrast the oral
and documentary evidence submitted by the
parties.27 However, although this Court is not a trier
of facts, it has the authority to review or reverse the
factual findings of the lower courts if we find that
these do not conform to the evidence on record.28
In Reyes vs. Court of Appeals,29 the Court held that
the exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the
trial court are final and. conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal are the following: (1) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely
on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
48
fact are conflicting; ( 6) when the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion, and (10) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised
on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by
the evidence on record.1âwphi1.nêt
Fitness as a Mother
The burden is upon respondent to prove that
petitioner is not worthy to have custody of her
children. We find that the evidence presented by the
respondent was not sufficient to establish her
unfitness according to Muslim law or the Family
Code.
In Pilipinas Shell Corp. vs. Court of Appeals (April
20, 2001, G. R. No. 114923), we said that in the
hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is at the highest level, followed by
clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of
evidence and substantial evidence, in that order.30
The standard in the determination of sufficiency of
proof, however, is not restricted to Muslim laws. The
Family Code shall be taken into consideration in
deciding whether a non-Muslim woman is
incompetent. What determines her capacity is the
standard laid down by the Family Code now that she
is not a Muslim.
Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is
the ability to see to the physical, educational, social
and moral welfare of the children,31 and the ability to
give them a healthy environment as well as physical
and financial support taking into consideration the
respective resources and social and moral situations
of the parents.
The record shows that petitioner is equally financially
capable of providing for all the needs of her children.
The children went to school at De La Salle Zobel
School, Muntinlupa City with their tuition paid by
petitioner according to the school's certification.32
Parental Authority and Custody
The welfare of the minors is the controlling
consideration on the issue.33
In ascertaining the welfare and best interest of the
children, courts are mandated by the Family Code to
take into account all relevant considerations.34
Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the
father and mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children"
Similarly, P. D. No. 1083 is clear that where the
parents are not divorced or legally separated, the
father and mother shall jointly exercise just and
reasonable parental authority and fulfill their
responsibility over their legitimate children.
In Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals,35 we stated:
"xxx [Parental authority] is a mass of rights
and obligations which the law grants to
parents for the purpose of the children's
physical preservation and development, as
well as the cultivation of their intellect and
the education of their heart and senses. 36 As
regards parental authority, 'there is no
power, but a task; no complex of rights, but
a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred
trust for the welfare of the minor.37
"xxx
 "The father and mother, being the natural
guardians of unemancipated children, are
dutybound and entitled to keep them in their
custody and company. 38
We do not doubt the capacity and love of both parties
for their children, such that they both want to have
them in their custody.
Either parent may lose parental authority over the
child only for a valid reason. In cases where both
parties cannot have custody because of their
voluntary separation, we take into consideration the
circumstances that would lead us to believe which
parent can better take care of the children. Although
we see the need for the children to have both a
mother and a father, we believe that petitioner has
more capacity and time to see to the children's needs.
Respondent is a businessman whose work requires
that he go abroad or be in different places most of the
time. Under P.D. No. 603, the custody of the minor
children, absent a compelling reason to the contrary,
is given to the mother.39
However, the award of custody to the wife does not
deprive" the husband of parental authority. In the
case of Silva v. Court of Appeals,40 we said that:
"Parents have the natural right, as well as the
moral and legal duty, to care for their
children, see to their upbringing and
safeguard their best interest and welfare.
This authority and responsibility may not be
unduly denied the parents; neither may it be
renounced by them. Even when the parents
are estranged and their affection for each
other is lost, the attachment and feeling for
their offsprings invariably remain
unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts
allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course,
any real, grave and imminent threat to the
well-being of the child."
Thus, we grant visitorial rights to respondent as his
Constitutionally protected natural and primary right.41
49
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The decision in Spl. Proc. No. 13-96 is hereby SET
ASIDE. Petitioner SABRINA ARTADI
BONDAGJY shall have custody over minors
Abdulaziz, and Amouaje Bondagjy, until the children
reach majority age. Both spouses shall have joint
responsibility over all expenses of rearing the
children.
The father, FOUZI ALl BONDAGJY, shall have
visitorial rights at least once a week and may take the
children out only with the written consent of the
mother.
No costs. 1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 116773 January 16, 1997
TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA PAZ
CORDERO-OUYE, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Children begin by loving their parents. After a time
they judge them. Rarely, if ever, do they forgive
them.1 Indeed, parenthood is a riddle of no mean
proportions except for its mission. Thus, a mother's
concern for her child's custody is undying — such is
a mother's love.
The right of the mother to the custody of her daughter
is the issue in the case at bar.
In this petition for review, Teresita Sagala-Eslao
seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals
decision2 dated March 25, 1994, which affirmed the
trial court's judgment granting the petition of Maria
Paz Cordero-Ouye to recover the custody of her
minor daughter from her mother-in-law, Teresita
Sagala-Eslao.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts of the
case are as follows:
From the evidence, it appears that on June
22, 1984, petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-
Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were
married;3 after their marriage, the couple
stayed with respondent Teresita Eslao,
mother of the husband, at 1825, Road 14,
Fabie Estate, Paco, Manila; that out of their
marriage, two children were begotten,
namely, Leslie Eslao who was born on
February 23, 1986 and Angelica Eslao who
was born on April 20,
1987;4 in the meantime, Leslie was entrusted
to the care and custody of petitioner's mother
in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, while Angelica
stayed with her parents at respondent's
house; on August 6, 1990, petitioner's
husband Reynaldo Eslao died;5 petitioner
intended to bring Angelica with her to
Pampanga but the respondent prevailed upon
her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her,
respondent reasoning out that her son just
died and to assuage her grief therefor, she
needed the company of the child to at least
compensate for the loss of her late son. In
the meantime, the petitioner returned to her
mother's house in Pampanga where she
stayed with Leslie.
Subsequently, petitioner was introduced by
her auntie to Dr. James Manabu-Ouye, a
Japanese-American, who is an orthodontist
practicing in the United States; their
acquaintance blossomed into a meaningful
relationship where on March 18, 1992, the
petitioner and Dr. James Ouye decided to
get married; less than ten months thereafter,
or on January 15, 1993, the petitioner
migrated to San Francisco, California, USA,
 to join her new husband. At present, the
petitioner is a trainee at the Union Bank in
San Francisco, while her husband is a
progressive practitioner of his profession
who owns three cars, a dental clinic and
earns US$5,000 a month. On June 24, 1993,
the petitioner returned to the Philippines to
be reunited with her children and bring them
to the United States; the petitioner then
informed the respondent about her desire to
take informed the respondent about her
desire to take custody of Angelica and
explained that her present husband, Dr.
James Ouye, expressed his willingness to
adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for
their support and education; however,
respondent resisted the idea by way of
explaining that the child was entrusted to her
when she was ten days old and accused the
petitioner of having abandoned Angelica.
Because of the adamant attitude of the
respondent, the petitioner then sought the
assistance of a lawyer, Atty. Mariano de
Joya, Jr., who wrote a letter to the
respondent demanding for the return of the
custody of Angelica to her natural
mother6 and when the demand remain[ed]
unheeded, the petitioner instituted the
present action.7
After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered
its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be
meritorious, the Court grants the same and
let the corresponding writ issue. As a
corollary, respondent Teresita Sagala-Eslao
or anyone acting under her behalf is hereby
directed to cause the immediate transfer of
the custody of the minor Angelica Cordero
Eslao, to her natural mother, petitioner
Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye.
No pronouncement as to costs.
50
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the respondent court affirmed in full the
decision of the trial court.
Hence, the instant petition by the minor's paternal
grandmother, contending that the Court of Appeals
erred:
I
IN RULING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT MARIA PAZ CORDERO-
OUYE, DID NOT ABANDON MINOR,
ANGELICA ESLAO, TO THE CARE AND
CUSTODY OF THE PETITIONER
TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO.
II
IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO
COMPELLING REASON TO SEPARATE
MINOR, ANGELICA ESLAO, FROM
PRIVATE RESPONDENT MARIA PAZ
CORDERO-OUYE, IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER TERESITA SAGALA-
ESLAO.
III
IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONER
TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO, IS FIT TO
BE GIVEN THE CUSTODY OF MINOR,
ANGELICA ESLAO.
The petition is without merit.
Being interrelated, the issues shall be discussed
jointly.
Petitioner argues that she would be deserving to take
care of Angelica; that she had managed to raise 12
children of her own herself; that she has the financial
means to carry out her plans for Angelica; that she
maintains a store which earns a net income of about
P500 a day, she gets P900 a month as pension for the
death of her husband, she rents out rooms in her
house which she owns, for which she earns a total of
P6,000 a month, and that from her gross income of
roughly P21,000, she spends about P10,000 for the
maintenance of her house.
Despite the foregoing, however, and petitioner's
"genuine desire to remain with said child, that would
qualify her to have custody of Angelica," the trial
court's disquisition, in consonance with the provision
that the child's welfare is always the paramount
consideration in all questions concerning his care and
custody8 convinced this Court to decide in favor of
private respondent, thus:
On the other hand, the side of the petitioner
must also be presented here. In this case, we
see a picture of a real and natural mother
who is —
. . . legitimately,
anxiously, and desperately
trying to get back her child
in order to fill the void in
her heart and existence.
She wants to make up for
what she has failed to do
for her boy during the
period when she was
financially unable to help
him and when she could
not have him in her house
because of the objection of
the father. Now that she
has her own home and is
in a better financial
condition, she wants her
child back, and we repeat
that she has not and has
never given him up
definitely or with any idea
of permanence.9
 The petitioner herein is married to an
Orthodontist who has lucrative practice of
his profession in San Francisco, California,
USA. The petitioner and her present
husband have a home of their own and they
have three cars. The petitioner's husband is
willing to adopt the petitioner's children. If
the children will be with their mother, the
probability is that they will be afforded a
bright future. Contrast this situation with the
one prevailing in the respondent's
[grandmother's] house. As admitted by the
respondent, four of the rooms in her house
are being rented to other persons with each
room occupied by 4 and 5 persons. Added to
these persons are the respondent's 2 sons,
Samuel and Alfredo, and their respective
families (ibid., p. 54) and one can just
visualize the kind of atmosphere pervading
thereat. And to aggravate the situation, the
house has only 2 toilets and 3 faucets.
Finally, considering that in all controversies
involving the custody of minors, the
foremost criterion is the physical and moral
well being of the child taking into account
the respective resources and social and
moral situations of the contending parties
(Union III vs. Mariano, 101 SCRA 183), the
Court is left with no other recourse but to
grant the writ prayed for.10
Petitioner further contends that the respondent court
erred in finding that there was no abandonment
committed by the private respondent; that while
judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a
case filed for the purpose is not her obtaining as
mandated in Art. 229 of the Family Code because
petitioner failed to resort to such judicial action, it
does not ipso facto follow that there was in fact no
abandonment committed by the private respondent.
Petitioner also argues that it has been amply
demonstrated during the trial that private respondent
had indeed abandoned Angelica to the care and
custody of the petitioner; that during all the time that
51
Angelica stayed with petitioner, there were only three
instances or occasions wherein the private respondent
saw Angelica; that private respondent never visited
Angelica on important occasions, such as her
birthday, and neither did the former give her cards or
gifts, "not even a single candy;"11 that while private
respondent claims otherwise and that she visited
Angelica "many times" and insists that she visited
Angelica as often as four times a month and gave her
remembrances such as candies and clothes, she would
not even remember when the fourth birthday of
Angelica was.
We are not persuaded by such averments.
In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA
407,12 we stated, viz:
. . . [Parental authority] is a mass of rights
and obligations which the law grants to
parents for the purpose of the children's
physical preservation and development, as
well as the cultivation of their intellect and
the education of their heart and senses.13 As
regards parental authority, "there is no
power, but a task; no complex of rights, but
a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred
trust for the welfare of the minor."14
Parental authority and responsibility are
inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by
law.15 The right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law
allows a waiver of parental authority only in
cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a children's home or an orphan
institution.16 When a parent entrusts the
custody of a minor to another, such as a
friend or godfather, even in a document,
what is given is merely temporary custody
and it does not constitute a renunciation of
parental authority.17 Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same.18
The father and mother, being the natural
guardians of unemancipated children, are
duty-bound and entitled to keep them in
their custody and company.19
Thus, in the instant petition, when private respondent
entrusted the custody of her minor child to the
petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely
temporary custody and it did not constitute
abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.
For the right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental
authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a children's home or an orphan
institution which do not appear in the case at bar.
Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted
by the courts that "the right of parents to the custody
of their minor children is one of the natural rights
incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and
sound public policy. The right is an inherent one,
which is not created by the state or decisions of the
courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship.20
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from
dated March 25, 1994 being in accordance with law
and the evidence, the same is hereby AFFIRMED and
the petition DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 111876             January 31, 1996
JOHANNA SOMBONG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIETTA NERI
ALVIAR, LILIBETH NERI and all persons
holding the subject child ARABELA SOMBONG
in their custody, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Every so often two women claim to be the legitimate
parent of the same child. One or the other, whether
for financial gain or for sheer cupidity, should be an
impostor. The court is consequently called upon to
decide as to which of them should have the child's
lawful custody. This is the very nature of this case.
The child herein had considerably grown through the
years that this controversy had unbearably lagged.
The wisdom of the ages should be of some help,
delicate as the case considerably is. The earliest
recorded decision on the matter is extant in the Bible,
I Kings 3. As it appears, King Solomon in all his
glory resolved the controversy posed by two women
claiming the same child:
And the King said, Bring me a sword. And
they brought a sword before the King.
And the King said, Divide the living child in
two, and give half to the one, and half to the
other.
Then spoke the woman whose the living
child was unto the King, for her bowels
yearned upon her son, and she said, O my
Lord, give her the living child, and in no
wise slay it. But the other said, Let it be
neither mine nor thine, but divide it.
Then the King answered and said, Give her
the living child, and in no wise slay it: she is
the mother thereof. (1 Kings, Chapter 3,
Verses 25-27)
King Solomon's wisdom, was inspired by God:
And all Israel heard of the judgment which
the King had judged; and they feared the
King: for they saw that the wisdom of God
was in him, to do judgment. (Ibid, Verse 28)
We do resolve the herein controversy inspired by
God's own beloved King.
52
The Petition for Review on Certiorari before us seeks
the reversal of the decision1 of respondent Court of
Appeals2 which had reversed the decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court4 which granted the Petition
for Habeas Corpus filed by petitioner.
The following facts were developed by the evidence
presented by the opposing parties:
Petitioner is the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who
was born on April 23, 1987 in Signal Village, Taguig,
Metro Manila.5 Some time in November, 1987,
Arabella, then only six months old, was brought to
the Sir John Clinic, located at 121 First Avenue,
Kaloocan City, for relief of coughing fits and for
treatment of colds. Petitioner did not have enough
money to pay the hospital bill in the amount of
P300.00. Arabella could not be discharged, then,
because of the petitioner's failure to pay the bill.
Petitioner surprisingly gave testimony to the effect
that she allegedly paid the private respondents by
installments in the total amount of P1,700.00,
knowing for a fact that the sum payable was only
P300.00. Despite such alleged payments, the owners
of the clinic, Dra. Carmen Ty and her husband, Mr.
Vicente Ty, allegedly refused to turn over Arabella to
her. Petitioner claims that the reason for such a
refusal was that she refused to go out on a date with
Mr. Ty, who had been courting her. This allegedly
gave Dra. Ty a reason to be jealous of her, making it
difficult for everyone all around.
On the other hand and in contrast to her foregoing
allegations, petitioner testified that she visited
Arabella at the clinic only after two years, i.e., in
1989. This time, she did not go beyond berating the
spouses Ty for their refusal to give Arabella to her.
Three years thereafter, i.e., in 1992, petitioner again
resurfaced to lay claim to her child. Her pleas
allegedly fell on deaf ears.
Consequently, on May 21, 1992, petitioner filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus against
the spouses Ty. She alleged therein that Arabella was
being unlawfully detained and imprisoned at No. 121,
First Avenue, Grace Park, Kalookan City. The
petition was denied due course and summarily
dismissed,6 without prejudice, on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction, the alleged detention having been
perpetrated in Kalookan City.
Petitioner, thereafter, filed a criminal complaint7 with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Kalookan City
against the spouses Ty. Dr. Ty, in her counter-
affidavit, admitted that petitioner's child, Arabella,
had for some time been in her custody. Arabella was
discharged from the clinic in April, 1989, and was, in
the presence of her clinic staff, turned over to
someone who was properly identified to be the child's
guardian.
In the face of the refusal of the spouses Ty to turn
over Arabella to her, she had sought the help of
Barangay Captains Alfonso and Bautista of Kalookan
City, Mayor Asistio of the same city, and even
Congresswoman Hortensia L. Starke of Negros
Occidental. Their efforts to help availed her nothing.
On September 4, 1992, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Kalookan City, on the basis of
petitioner's complaint, filed an information 8 against
the spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal Detention
of a Minor before the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City.9 On September 16, 1992, an order for
the arrest of the spouses Ty was issued in the criminal
case. Facing arrest, Dra. Ty disclosed the possibility
that the child, Arabella, may be found at No. 23 Jesus
Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The
agents of the National Bureau of Investigation went
to said address and there found a female child who
answered to the name of Cristina Grace Neri. Quite
significantly, the evidence disclosed that the child,
Cristina, had been living with respondent Marietta
Neri Alviar since 1988. When she was just a baby,
Cristina was abandoned by her parents at the Sir John
Clinic. On April 18, 1988, Dr. Fe Mallonga, a dentist
at the Sir John Clinic and niece of both Dra. Ty and
respondent Alviar, called the latter up to discuss the
possibility of turning over to her care one of the
several abandoned babies at the said clinic.
Respondent Alviar was told that this baby whose
name was unknown had long been abandoned by her
parents and appeared to be very small, very thin, and
full of scabies. Taking pity on the baby, respondent
Alviar and her mother, Maura Salacup Neri, decided
to take care of her. This baby was baptized at the
Good Samaritan Church on April 30, 1988. Her
Certificate of Baptism10 indicates her name to be
Cristina Grace S. Neri; her birthday to be April 30,
1987; her birthplace to be Quezon City; and her foster
father and foster mother to be Cicero Neri and Maura
Salacup, respectively. Respondent Alviar was invited
by the National Bureau of Investigation for
questioning on September 22, 1992 in the presence of
Dra. Ty and petitioner. Cristina was also brought
along by said respondent. At that confrontation, Dra.
Ty could not be sure that Cristina was indeed
petitioner's child, Arabella. Neither could petitioner
with all certainty say that Cristina was her long lost
daughter.
On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for
the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the
Regional Trial Court11 of Quezon City. The trial court
conducted a total of eight (8) hearings, for the period,
from October 28, 1992 to December 11, 1992. On
January 15, 1993, it rendered a decision granting the
Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordering respondent
Alviar to immediately deliver the person of Cristina
Grace Neri to the petitioner, the court having found
Cristina to be the petitioner's long lost child,
Arabella.
The trial court, in justification of its conclusions,
discussed that:
On the issue of whether or not the minor
child, in question, is the daughter of the
petitioner, there seems to be no question, to
the mind of this Court, that the petitioner, is,
indeed, the mother of the child, registered by
the name of Arabella O. Sombong, per her
Certificate of Birth . . . and later caused to be
baptized as Cristina Grace S. Nery (sic) . . .
53
For, this child is the same child which was
delivered by the Sir John Clinic at Kalookan
City, owned by Dra. Carmen Ty, to Dra. Fe
Mallonga and later given to the custody of
the respondents. In fact, Dra. Carmen Ty, in
her testimony admitted that the petitioner is
the mother of Arabella . . .
On the question of whether or not the
petitioner has the rightful custody of the
minor child, in question, which is being
withheld by the respondents from her, as
will authorize the granting of the petition
for habeas corpus . . . there is no question
that the minor . . . is only about five (5)
years old . . . it follows that the child must
not be separated from the mother, who is the
petitioner, unless, of course, this Court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Heretofore, under the New Civil Code of the
Philippines, the compelling reasons which
may deprive the parents of their authority or
suspend exercise thereof are stated. It was
then provided in Article 332, supra, that:
The courts may deprive the parents
of their authority . . . if they should
treat their children with excessive
harshness . . . or abandon them. . . .
(Emphasis supplied by the RTC)
Unfortunately, the foregoing article, which
was under Title XI, parental authority, was
expressly repealed by Article 254 of the
Family Code of the Philippines . . .
xxx       xxx       xxx
It can be seen, therefore, that the words "or
abandoned them" mentioned in Article 332
of the New Civil Code . . . is (sic) no longer
mentioned in the amending (of) Art. 231 of
the Family Code of the Philippines.
It is clear . . . that under the law presently
controlling, abandonment is no longer
considered a compelling reason upon the
basis of which the Court may separate the
child below seven (7) years old from the
mother.
Conceivably, however, in paragraph 6 of
Article 231, supra, the effects of culpable
negligence on the part of the parent may be
considered by this Court in suspending
petitioner's parental authority over her
daughter, in question . . .
The question, therefore, is whether there is
culpable negligence on the part of the
petitioner so that her parental authority over
her child, in question, may at least be
suspended by this Court.
This Court is not persuaded that the
petitioner is guilty of culpable
negligence vis-a-vis her daughter, in
question, upon the bases of the facts
adduced. For, there is no question that from
April, 1988 she kept on demanding from
Dra. Carmen Ty . . . the return of her child to
her but the latter refused even to see her or
to talk to her. Neither did Vicente Ty, the
husband of Dra. Carmen Ty, respond to her
entreaties to return her daughter.
xxx       xxx       xxx
Besides, in the interim, while petitioner was
looking for her daughter, she made
representations for her recovery with
Barangay Captains Alfonso and Bautista,
and Mayor Asistio, all of Kalookan City, as
well as with Congresswoman Hortensia L.
Starke to intervene in her behalf.
It cannot be said, therefore, no matter how
remotely, that the petitioner was negligent,
 nay culpably, in her efforts for the recovery
of her daughter.
xxx       xxx       xxx
Certainly, the respondents have no right to
the parental authority of the child, superior
to that of the petitioner as they are not her
parents. They have, therefore, no right to the
custody of petitioner's daughter. The Sir
John Clinic, or Dra. Carmen Ty, have (sic)
no right to deliver the child, in question, to
Dra. Fe Mallonga. Neither had the latter the
right and the authority to gave (sic) the child
to the respondents, whose custody of
petitioner's daughter is, consequently,
illegal.12
Herein private respondents filed an appeal from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of
Appeals. The Appellate Court took cognizance of the
following issues: (1) The propriety of the habeas
corpus proceeding vis-a-vis the problem respecting
the identity of the child subject of said proceeding;
(2) If indeed petitioner be the mother of the child in
question, what the effect would proof of
abandonment be under the circumstances of the case;
and (3) Will the question of the child's welfare be the
paramount consideration in this case which involves
child custody.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
decision of the trial court, ruling as it did that:
. . . the lower court erred in sweepingly
concluding that petitioner's child Arabella
Sombong and respondents' foster child
Cristina Neri are one and the same person to
warrant the issuance of the writ. . . .
As clearly stated in the facts of this case, not
even petitioner herself could recognize her
own child when respondents' foster child
Cristina Neri was presented to her before the
54
NBI and respondent court. Dr. Carmen Ty at
the NBI investigation could not also
ascertain whether or not Cristina Neri and
petitioner's missing child are one and the
same person.
Before the lower court, petitioner-appellee
presented two physicians from the Sir John
Clinic, namely, Dr. Carmen Ty and Dr.
Angelina Trono to identify the child in
question. But both witnesses could not
positively declare that Cristina Neri is the
same missing child Arabella Sombong of
petitioner. Dr. Trono even declared in court
that there were other babies left in the clinic
and that she could not be certain which baby
was given to respondents (pp. 48-49, tsn,
Nov. 10, 1992). . . . Petitioner, herself, could
not identify her own child, prompting the
respondent court to call for child Cristina
Neri to come forward near the bench for
comparison of her physical features with
that of her alleged mother, the petitioner (p.
32, tsn, Nov. 5, 1992). After a comparison of
petitioner and Cristina Neri's physical
features, the lower court found no similarity
and to which petitioner agreed claiming that
said child looked like her sister-in-law (p.
33, id.). When the lower court instructed
petitioner to bring said sister-in-law in the
next hearing, petitioner stated they were not
on good terms (p. 34, id.) No one, therefore,
up to this time has come forward to testify as
a witness in order to positively identify
respondents' child Cristina Neri to be one
and the same as petitioner's missing child,
Arabella Sombong.
xxx       xxx       xxx
The issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus does not lie in this case considering
that petitioner is not entitled to the custody
of Cristina Neri because she is not the
mother of the said child, and does not have
the right to have custody over said child.
xxx       xxx       xxx
We do not agree with the lower court that
the ground of abandonment of a child has
been repealed by Art. 231 of the Family
Code for abandonment can also be included
under the phrase "cases which have resulted
from culpable negligence of the parent" (par.
2, Art. 231 of the Family Code). What can
be the worst culpable negligence of a parent
than abandoning her own child. This court
does not believe petitioner-appellee's
explanation that she had been negotiating for
the discharge of her child for the past five
years. That was too long a time for
negotiation when she could have filed
immediately a complaint with the authorities
or the courts . . .
As to the issue of the welfare of the child,
petitioner-appellee's capability to give her
child the basic needs and guidance in life
appear (sic) to be bleak. Before the lower
court petitioner-appellee filed a motion to
litigate as pauper as she had no fixed
income. She also admitted that she had no
stable job, and she had been separated from
a man previously married to another woman.
She also confessed that she planned to go
abroad and leave her other child Johannes to
the care of the nuns. The child Arabella
Sombong wherever she is certainly does not
face a bright prospect with petitioner-
appellee.13
This prompted the petitioner to file this petition.
We do not find the petition to be meritorious.
While we sympathize with the plight of petitioner
who has been separated from her daughter for more
than eight years, we cannot grant her the relief she is
seeking, because the evidence in this case does not
support a finding that the child, Cristina, is in truth
and in fact her child, Arabella; neither is there
sufficient evidence to support the finding that private
respondents' custody of Cristina is so illegal as to
warrant the grant of a Writ of Habeas Corpus. In
general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is
to determine whether or not a particular person is
legally held. A prime specification of an application
for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and
effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal
restraint of liberty. "The writ of habeas corpus was
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy
to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the
best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
A prime specification of an application for a writ
of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient."14
Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the
writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be
in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation
of freedom of action. This is the basic requisite under
the first part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised
Rules of Court, which provides that "except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ
of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty."
In the second part of the same provision,
however, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases
where "the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto." Thus, although the
writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the
restraint is voluntary, we have held time and again
that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable
parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if
the latter be in the custody of a third person of her
own free will.15
55
It may even be said that in custody cases involving
minors, the question of illegal and involuntary
restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for
the availability of the writ as a remedy; rather, the
writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of
determining the right of custody over a child.
The controversy does not involve the question of
personal freedom, because an infant is presumed to
be in the custody of someone until he attains majority
age. In passing on the writ in a child custody case, the
court deals with a matter of an equitable nature. Not
bound by any mere legal right of parent or guardian,
the court gives his or her claim to the custody of the
child due weight as a claim founded on human nature
and considered generally equitable and just.
Therefore, these cases are decided, not on the legal
right of the petitioner to be relieved from unlawful
imprisonment or detention, as in the case of adults,
but on the court's view of the best interests of those
whose welfare requires that they be in custody of one
person or another. Hence, the court is not bound to
deliver a child into the custody of any claimant or of
any person, but should, in the consideration of the
facts, leave it in such custody as its welfare at the
time appears to require. In short, the child's welfare is
the supreme consideration.
Considering that the child's welfare is an all-
important factor in custody cases, the Child and
Youth Welfare Code16 unequivocally provides that in
all questions regarding the care and custody, among
others, of the child, his welfare shall be the
paramount consideration.17 In the same vein, the
Family Code authorizes the courts to, if the welfare
of the child so demands, deprive the parents
concerned of parental authority over the child or
adopt such measures as may be proper under the
circumstances.18
The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the
writ in the instant case will all depend on the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the
petitioner has the right of custody over the minor; (2)
that the rightful custody of the minor is being
withheld from the petitioner by the respondent; and
(3) that it is to the best interest of the minor
concerned to be in the custody of petitioner and not
that of the respondent.
Not all of these requisites exist in this case. The
dismissal of this petition is thus warranted.
I
As to the question
of identity.
Petitioner does not have the right of custody over the
minor Cristina because, by the evidence disclosed
before the court a quo, Cristina has not been shown to
be petitioner's daughter, Arabella. The evidence
adduced before the trial court does not warrant the
conclusion that Arabella is the same person as
Cristina. It will be remembered that, in habeas
corpus proceedings, the question of identity is
relevant and material, subject to the usual
presumptions including those as to identity of
person.19 These presumptions may yield, however, to
the evidence proffered by the parties.
Identity may be thought of as a quality of a
person or thing, — the quality of sameness
with another person or thing. The essential
assumption is that two persons or things are
first thought of as existing, and that then the
one is alleged, because of common features,
to be the same as the other.20
Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that
two persons, initially thought of to be distinct and
separate from each other, are indeed one and the
same. The process is both logical and analytical.
. . . it operates by comparing common marks
found to exist in the two supposed separate
objects of thought, with reference to the
possibility of their being the same. It follows
that its force depends on the necessariness of
 the association between the mark and a
single object. Where a certain circumstance,
feature, or mark, may commonly be found
associated with a large number of objects,
the presence of that feature or mark in two
supposed objects is little indication of their
identity, because . . . the other conceivable
hypotheses are so numerous, i.e., the objects
that possess that mark are numerous and
therefore any two of them possessing it may
well be different. But where the objects
possessing the mark are only one or a few,
and the mark is found in two supposed
instances, the chances of two being different
are "nil" or are comparatively small.
Hence, in the process of identification of
two supposed objects, by a common mark,
the force of the inference depends on the
degree of necessariness of association of that
mark with a single object.
For simplicity's sake, the evidential
circumstance may thus be spoken of as "a
mark." But in practice it rarely occurs that
the evidential mark is a single circumstance.
The evidencing feature is usually a group of
circumstances, which as a whole constitute a
feature capable of being associated with a
single object. Rarely can one circumstance
alone be so inherently peculiar to a single
object. It is by adding circumstance to
circumstance that we obtain a composite
feature or mark which as a whole cannot be
supposed to be associated with more than a
single object.
The process of constructing an inference of
identity thus consists usually in adding
together a number of circumstances, each of
which by itself might be a feature of many
objects, but all of which together make it
more probable that they co-exist in a single
object only. Each additional circumstance
56
reduces the chances of there being more than
one object so associated.21
In the instant case, the testimonial and circumstantial
proof establishes the individual and separate
existence of petitioner's child, Arabella, from that of
private respondents' foster child, Cristina.
We note, among others, that Dr. Trono, who is
petitioner's own witness, testified in court that,
together with Arabella, there were several babies left
in the clinic and so she could not be certain whether it
was Arabella or some other baby that was given to
private respondents. Petitioner's own evidence shows
that, after the confinement of Arabella in the clinic in
1987, she saw her daughter again only in 1989 when
she visited the clinic. This corroborates the testimony
of petitioner's own witness, Dra. Ty, that Arabella
was physically confined in the clinic from November,
1987 to April, 1989. This testimony tallies with her
assertion in her counter-affidavit to the effect that
Arabella was in the custody of the hospital until
April, 1989. All this, when juxtaposed with the
unwavering declaration of private respondents that
they obtained custody of Cristina in April, 1988 and
had her baptized at the Good Samaritan Church on
April 30, 1988, leads to the conclusion that Cristina is
not Arabella.
Significantly, Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros,
herself a mother and the ponente of the herein
assailed decision, set the case for hearing on August
30, 1993 primarily for the purpose of observing
petitioner's demeanor towards the minor Cristina. She
made the following personal but relevant
manifestation:
The undersigned ponente as a mother herself
of four children, wanted to see how
petitioner as an alleged mother of a missing
child supposedly in the person of Cristina
Neri would react on seeing again her long
lost child. The petitioner appeared in the
scheduled hearing of this case late, and she
walked inside the courtroom looking for a
seat without even stopping at her alleged
daughter's seat; without even casting a
glance on said child, and without even that
tearful embrace which characterizes the
reunion of a loving mother with her missing
dear child. Throughout the proceedings, the
undersigned ponente noticed no signs of
endearment and affection expected of a
mother who had been deprived of the
embrace of her little child for many years.
The conclusion or finding of
undersigned ponente as a mother, herself,
that petitioner-appellee is not the mother of
Cristina Neri has been given support by
aforestated observation . . .22
The process of constructing an inference of identity
having earlier been explained to consist of adding one
circumstance to another in order to obtain a
composite feature or mark which as a whole cannot
be supposed to be associated with more than a single
object, the reverse is also true, i.e., when one
circumstance is added to another, and the result is a
fortification of the corporeality of each of the two
objects the identity of which is being sought to be
established, the nexus of circumstances
correspondingly multiply the chances of there being
more than one object so associated. This is the
situation that confronts us in this case, and so the
inevitable but sad conclusion that we must make is
that petitioner has no right of custody over the minor
Cristina, because Cristina is not identical with her
missing daughter Arabella.
II
Private respondents
not unlawfully
withholding custody.
Since we hold that petitioner has not been established
by evidence to be entitled to the custody of the minor
Cristina on account of mistaken identity, it cannot be
said that private respondents are unlawfully
withholding from petitioner the rightful custody over
Cristina. At this juncture, we need not inquire into the
validity of the mode by which private respondents
acquired custodial rights over the minor, Cristina.
This matter is not ripe for adjudication in this instant
petition for habeas corpus.
III
Private respondents
have the interest of
the child Cristina at
heart.
We find that private respondents are financially,
physically and spiritually in a better position to take
case of the child, Cristina. They have the best interest
of Cristina at heart. On the other hand, it is not to the
best interest of the minor, Cristina, to be placed in the
custody of petitioner, had the petitioner's custody
rights over Cristina been established. The Court of
Appeals gave the reason:
As to the issue of the welfare of the child,
petitioner-appellee's capability to give her
child the basic needs and guidance in life
appear (sic) to be bleak. Before the lower
court petitioner-appellee filed a motion to
litigate as pauper as she had no fixed
income. She also admitted that she had no
stable job, and she had been separated from
a man previously married to another woman.
She also confessed that she planned to go
abroad and leave her other child Johannes to
the care of the nuns. The child Arabella
Sombong wherever she is certainly does not
face a bright prospect with petitioner-
appellee.23
In the light of the aforegoing premises, we are
constrained to rule that Habeas Corpus does not lie
to afford petitioner the relief she seeks.
57
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of On December 23, 2005, the RTC issued, ex parte, a
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 30574 is AFFIRMED IN Temporary Protection Order (TPO),5 granting, among
TOTO. Costs against petitioner. others, the temporary custody of their fifteen (15)
month-old child, Julian Henri "Harry" R. Peña
SO ORDERED. (Henri), to her former live-in partner, Magdaleno
Peña (Peña). Specifically, the December 23, 2005
Order reads:
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2508 [Formerly OCA IPI No. WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be sufficient in
06-2416-RTJ], November 07, 2017 form and substance, the court hereby directs the Clerk
of Court to issue Summons which shall be served,
MARIE ROXANNE G. together with copy of the petition and its annexes
RECTO, Complainant, v. HON. HENRY J.
thereto, personally to the respondent.
TROCINO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 62, BAGO CITY, NEGROS TEMPORARY CUSTODY OVER JULIAN HENRI
OCCIDENTAL, Respondent. "HARRY" R. PEÑA IS HEREBY VESTED UPON
THE PETITIONER MAGDALENO M. PEÑA; AND
DECISION FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE PNP-CIDG (NCR) IS
ORDERED TO ASSIST THE SHERIFF OF THIS
COURT IN [TAKING CUSTODY] OF JULIAN
PER CURIAM:
HENRI "HARRY" R. PEÑA WHEREVER HE
MIGHT BE FOUND WHO SHALL THEREAFTER
Before the Court is an administrative
complaint1 against Judge Henry J. Trocino (Judge BE IMMEDIATELY TURNED OVER TO HIS
Trocino), former Executive Judge and Presiding FATHER, THE HEREIN PETITIONER.
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Bago City
(RTC), filed by Marie Roxanne G. Recto A protection order, which shall be effective for thirty
(30) days from service upon respondent Marie
(Complainant) for bias and partiality, ignorance of
the law, grave oppression, and violation of the Code Roxanne G. Recto, is hereby issued as follows:
of Judicial Conduct for issuing an ex
parte Temporary Protection Order (TPO) in relation 1. prohibiting the respondent from
threatening to commit or
to Civil Case No. 1409, a case for Child Custody
under the Family Code. committing, personally or through
another, acts of violence against the
offended party;
Antecedents:
2. prohibiting the respondent from
The controversy stemmed from a petition 2 for Child
Custody with Prayer for Protection Order under A.M. harassing, annoying, contacting or
otherwise communicating in any
No. 04-10-11-SC3 in relation to A.M. No. 03-04-04-
SC4 and damages filed by Magdaleno Peña (Peña) on form with the offended party, either
December 20, 2005 against complainant, directly or indirectly;
entitled Magdaleno M. Peña, for himself and in
behalf of his minor son, Julian Henri "Harry" R. 3. removing and excluding the
Peña v. Marie Roxanne G. Recto. The petition was offended party from the residence
raffled to the RTC-Branch 62. of the respondent or from any other
place where said offended party
may be found;
 4. requiring the respondent to stay
away from the offended party and
any designated family or household
member at a distance of two
hundred (200) meters;
5. requiring the respondent to stay
away from the residence, or any
specified place frequented regularly
by the offended party and any
designated family or household
member;
6. prohibiting the respondent from
carrying or possessing any firearms
or deadly weapon, and ordering her
to immediately surrender the same
to the court for proper disposition;
and
7. directing the respondent to put up a
bond of ONE MILLION PESOS
(P1,000,000.00) to keep the peace
and to present two sufficient
sureties who shall undertake that
respondent shall not commit any of
the acts of violence on the offended
party and/ or the petitioner or
violate the protection order.
Lastly, pursuant to Section 16 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-
SC (Rule on Custody of Minors) a HOLD
DEPARTURE ORDER is hereby issued for the
purpose of preventing the minor child from being
brought out of the country without prior order from
the court, during the pendency of the petition.
Accordingly, the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation is directed NOT to allow the departure of
the minor child from the Philippines without the
court's permission. Likewise, the Department of
Foreign Affairs is ordered NOT to issue any passport
to said minor without the prior authority of this court.
58
For the guidance of said government entities,
hereunder are the pertinent information about the
subject of the Hold Departure Order:
x x x custody should have been observed by the
Furnish copies of this order the Department of
Foreign Affairs, the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation within twenty four (24) hours hereof and
through the most expeditious means of transmittal.
Likewise furnish copies hereof the petitioner and
counsel.
SO ORDERED.6
The Complaint
In vehement protest, complainant filed this
administrative complaint against Judge Trocino
alleging that he (1) exhibited bias and gross
ignorance of the law; (2) acted with grave oppression;
and (3) violated the Code of Judicial Conduct when
he issued the TPO, ex parte, vesting immediate
custody of Henri to Peña based on hypothetical
assumptions. Specifically, the complainant alleged as
follows:
9. Respondent judge is biased, ignorant of the law,
and acted with grave oppression when he issued the
TPO based on a complaint for child custody.
Respondent judge, in full disregard of the law and
rule of the Supreme Court on Custody (A.M. No. 03-
04-04-SC), issued ex-parte the so called
"TPO" without giving herein complainant Recto
opportunity to file her answer, enter into Pre-trial,
and without social worker's case study report.
This conduct of the respondent judge manifests patent
bias in favor of Peña, who is a resident of Negros
Occidental. Moreover, Peña is not the natural
guardian of Julian Harry, being an illegitimate child.
10. Respondent judge deliberately did not apply the
Rule on Custody but instead erroneously used
R.A. 9262 to support his order giving temporary
custody of minor Harry Peña to Magdaleno Peña, to
the prejudice of herein complainant;
11. Respondent Judge inappropriately issued the so
called "TPO" considering that the case filed by
Magdaleno Peña is for Child Custody. The Rule on
respondent judge and not the Rule on Anti-
Violence against Women and their Children. A
TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man because only
women and their children are protected by R.A. 9262.
Moreso, respondent's Order giving temporary child
custody to Magdaleno Peña has no legal leg to stand
on because in custody cases, only provisional
orders for custody is issued after an Answer is
filed and after Pre-trial is conducted and a DSWD
Social Worker Case Study Report is filed. Thus,
the Temporary Protection Order used by respondent
Judge is not proper and patently illegal and void;
12. Respondent's obvious bias is further shown by the
fact that he was aware that a TPO was previously
issued against Magdaleno Peña who is a respondent
in a Petition for Temporary and Permanent Protection
Order in the RTC of Mandaluyong City, yet he issued
the so called "TPO" by deliberately mis-applying
the provisions of R.A. 9262. The so called "TPO" of
respondent judge was not a product of innocent
error in judgment. x x x
13. Likewise, it is gross ignorance of the law on the
part of respondent judge in awarding temporary
custody of minor Harry to Magdaleno Peña based
on hypothetical assumptions. Respondent judge in
justifying his unfounded order said, and we quote:
x x x x
14. Under Section 15 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the
Court may issue an ex-parte TPO where there is
reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger
of violence against women and their children exists
or is about to recur. There is complete absence of
allegation to this effect in the petition. Clearly, the
basis of the so called "TPO" is hypothetical and not
factual. Thus, respondent issued the so called "TPO"
without legal basis;
15. There is no legal basis to award custody of minor
Harry (an illegitimate child) to Magdaleno Peña,
based on the Preamble of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child in the light
of Article 213 of the Philippine Family Code that
clearly state: "No child under seven years of age
shall be separated from the mother, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise." Moreover, illegitimate children shall
be under the sole parental authority of the
mother (Briones vs. Miguel, 440 SCRA 455);
16. The averments in the Petition for Child Custody
are not compelling reasons to immediately award
custody of the minor child to Magdaleno Peña to
overcome Article 213 of the Family Code and the
ruling in the case of Briones vs. Miguel. Not to be
ignored is Article 213 of the Family Code is the
caveat that, generally, no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother, except when
the court finds cause to order otherwise. Only the
most compelling reasons, such as the mother's
unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, shall
justify her deprivation of parental authority and the
award of custody to someone else (Briones vs.
Miguel, Ibid). It is elementary that basic Philippine
Law has greater weight than any international law;
17. Likewise, Respondent Judge committed grave,
whimsical and capricious abuse of discretion in the
exercise of his judicial function in taking cognizance
over the petition despite apparent lack of jurisdiction
and in issuing the so called "Temporary Protection
Order" against complainant;
18. Magdaleno M. Peña has no standing to institute
an action in behalf of complainant's 15 month old
child because being illegitimate, only complainant
has parental authority on Julian Henri "Harry"
being the natural guardian, and yet with such
knowledge, the respondent judge abused his power
with full disregard for the law and the right of
complainant in order to favor Magdaleno Peña;
19. The respondent judge could not have innocently
missed the fact that the court had no jurisdiction
59
because Magdaleno M. Peña in filing for himself has
no cause of action against herein complainant (Marie
Roxanne G. Recto), and avail of TPO [under] RA
9262 because the remedies of the law could not be
availed of by a man;
20. Likewise clearly alleged in the petition is that
Peña is bringing the action for and in behalf of the
offended party JULIAN HENRI (HARRY R. PEÑA)
- his minor illegitimate son [with complainant]. As
such, it is manifest that the real petitioner is minor
Harry Peña who is a resident of Mandaluyong City.
Under Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the verified
petition for Temporary Protection Order may be
filed with the Family Court of the place where the
offended party resides. Accordingly, the petition
must be filed before the Family Court of
Mandaluyong City;
21. Respondent Judge is fully aware of this defect of
jurisdiction in the petition considering that the alleged
offended party Julian Henri "Harry" R. Peña is not
within his territorial jurisdiction. His awareness of
wrong venue is manifested in his order stating in page
9 paragraph a) that "Harry" lives in Mandaluyong
City and not in Negros. We quote the following:
x x x x
22. Respondent judge blindly issued the so called
"TPO" without serious and judicious assessment of
the contents of and averments in the petition filed by
Peña. This is an obvious fact because the
hypothetical approach in the petition for custody
was based on psychological incapacity for
annulment of marriage and not incapacity to rear
a child. The documents speak for themselves;
23. Apparently, respondent has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition before him and to issue the
so called "Temporary Protection Order" yet, he did
so. In so doing, respondent judge committed grave
abuse of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the so called
"TPO" issued is null and void;
24. Respondent blindly assumed jurisdiction because
respondent Judge Trocino and petitioner Peña were in
connivance. Complainant has personal knowledge
that respondent judge was working under the dictates
of Peña. On several occasions, while complainant and
Peña were still live-in partners, she has full personal
and direct knowledge that respondent judge was
dictated upon by Peña to decide on cases at the desire
of Peña in her presence. Aside from the personal
knowledge of complainant, the close relationship
of Judge Trocino and Peña is evident in the case
entitled Eric L. Lee vs. Hon. Henry J. Trocino, et
al., under G.R. No. 164648 x x x before the
Supreme Court, where respondent and Judge
Trocino and Magdaleno Peña are co-
respondents;7 [Emphases supplied]
Respondent's Position
In his Comment,8 Judge Trocino denied the
allegations and pointed out that the TPO was
sanctioned by Sections 119 and 1510 of A.M. No. 04-
10-11-SC in relation to Section 32 11 thereof as an
ancillary remedy incident to the petition for custody
filed by Peña for himself and in behalf of his minor
son. Judge Trocino asserted that the ex parte TPO
was issued after a careful evaluation not only of the
material allegations in the petition but all other
circumstances relevant to the welfare and best interest
of the minor offended party, and that it was issued
judiciously in complete good faith, devoid of any
grave, whimsical and capricious abuse of discretion.
Judge Trocino explained that the December 23, 2005
TPO was a temporary order in contemplation of A.M.
No. 04-1 0-11-SC and not an order of temporary
custody pursuant to A.M. 03-04-04-SC which
requires the prior filing of an answer, pre-trial, and a
social worker's study report. Judge Trocino insisted
that the TPO was properly issued considering that
Civil Case No. 1409 was a case for child custody
with ancillary prayer for the issuance of a protection
order under Section 32 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC and
that said provision of the law authorizes an
application for protection order as an incident in
criminal or civil actions.
Judge Trocino contended that the issuance of the
TPO was not based on hypothetical assumptions but
was made after a thorough evaluation of the
allegations set forth in the petition and its supporting
documents, and after assessment, he believed in good
faith that the TPO was legal and necessary for the
protection of the minor offended party. Judge Trocino
insisted that his act was a bonafide exercise of
judicial discretion, the paramount consideration of
which was the interest of the minor child. And even
assuming that the TPO was erroneously/improperly
issued, the proper remedy lies with the proper court
as the matter was judicial in nature, and not with
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by means of
an administrative complaint.
On the issue of jurisdiction, Judge Trocino asserted
that the petition for child custody and damages was
within the competence and jurisdiction of the RTC
pursuant to Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980 and A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. Judge Trocino
argued that the petition substantially complied with
the requirements on non-forum shopping and that
there was nothing in the Verification and
Certification against Non Forum Shopping that would
indicate that the parties raised a similar issue or cause
of action in another court, tribunal or agency.
As to the allegation that he worked under the dictates
of Peña, Judge Trocino vehemently denied the same
and asserted that he never allowed anyone to either
influence or dictate on him in the discharge of his
official functions; and the fact that he and Peña were
co-respondents in a particular case filed before the
Court was not an indication that he worked under
Peña's whims.
Meanwhile, on January 27, 2006, Judge Trocino
voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the
petition.12
Complainant likewise questioned the December 23,
2005 TPO before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 01394.13
60
Report and Recommendation of the OCA
In a Resolution,14 dated July 17, 2017, the OCA
found no basis to hold Judge Trocino liable for bias
and partiality and grave oppression. It, however,
found him liable for gross ignorance of the law for
issuing an ex parte TPO pursuant to A.M. No. 04-10-
11-SC in relation to R.A. No. 9262 and recommended
that he be fined in the amount of Sixty Thousand
Pesos (P60,000.00) considering that Judge Trocino
compulsorily retired from the service on July 15,
2006 and was previously found administratively
liable of undue delay in rendering a decision in A.M.
No. RTJ-05-193615 and A.M. No. RTJ-07-2057.16
The Ruling of the Court
Upon review of the records, the Court agrees with the
findings and recommendation of the OCA that Judge
Trocino acted with gross ignorance of the law when
he issued, ex parte, the December 23, 2005 TPO
pursuant to A.M. No. 04-1 0-11-SC in relation to
R.A. No. 9262, which granted, among others, the
temporary custody of the minor child to Peña and
issued a protection order against complainant
effective for thirty (30) days. He deliberately ignored
the provisions of the Family Code, A.M. No. 03-04-
04-SC otherwise known as the Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in relation to
Custody of Minors and A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC or
the Rule on Violence against Women and their
Children.
Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of the
basic rules and settled jurisprudence. 17 A judge owes
it to his office to simply apply the law when the law
or a rule is basic18 and the facts are evident. 19 Not to
know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.20
On Child Custody
Article 176 of the Family Code explicitly confers the
sole parental authority of an illegitimate child to the
mother. This preference favoring the mother is
reiterated in Article 213 of the Family Code which
provides that no child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother. Only the most
compelling of reasons, such as the mother's unfitness
to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her
deprivation of parental authority and the award of
custody to someone else.21 The mother's fitness is a
question of fact to be properly entertained in the
special proceedings before the trial court.22
On Provisional Custody
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC is instructive. Specifically,
Section 13 thereof provides:
Section 13. Provisional order awarding custody.
- After an answer has been filed or after
expiration of the period to file it, the court may
issue a provisional order awarding custody of the
minor. As far as practicable, the following order of
preference shall be observed in the award of custody:
(a) Both parents jointly;
(b) Either parent, taking into account all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the minor
over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment,
unless the parent chosen is unfit;
(c) The grandparent, or if there are several
grandparents, the grandparent chosen by the minor
over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment,
unless the grandparent chosen is unfit or disqualified;
(d) The eldest brother or sister over twenty-one years
of age, unless he or she is unfit or disqualified;
(e) The actual custodian of the minor over twenty-one
years of age, unless the former is unfit or
disqualified; or
(f) Any other person or institution the court may
deem suitable to provide proper care and guidance for
the minor. [Emphasis supplied
Clearly, a court is not authorized to issue a
provisional order awarding custody of a minor child
until after an answer to the petition has been filed or
when the period to file the same have expired and no
such answer was filed in court.
Temporary Protection Order
Judge Trocino's contention that the TPO was a
temporary protection order pursuant to A.M. No. 04-
10-11-SC, and not an order of temporary custody as
contemplated in A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, is not
tenable.
Section 15 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides:
SEC. 15. Ex parte issuance of temporary protection
order. - (a) If the court is satisfied from the verified
allegations of the petition that there is reasonable
ground to believe that an imminent danger of
violence against women and their children exists
or is about to recur, the court may issue ex parte a
temporary protection order which shall be effective
for thirty days from service on the party or person
sought to be enjoined.
x x x. [Emphasis supplied]
Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262 further
provides:
SEC. 11. How to Apply for a Protection Order. - The
application for a protection order must be in
writing, signed and verified under oath by the
applicant. It may be filed as an independent action or
as an incidental relief in any civil or criminal case the
subject matter or issues thereof partakes of a violence
as described in this Act. A standard protection order
application form, written in English with translation
to the major local languages, shall be made available
to facilitate applications for protection orders, and
shall contain, among others, the following
information:
(a) names and addresses of petitioner and respondent;
(b) description of relationships between petitioner
and respondent;
(c) a statement of the circumstances of the abuse;
(d) description of the reliefs requested by petitioner
as specified in Section 8 herein;
(e) request for counsel and reasons for such;
(f) request for waiver of application fees until
hearing; and
(g) an attestation that there is no pending application
for a protection order in another court.
If the applicant is not the victim, the application
must be accompanied by an affidavit of the
61
applicant attesting to (a) the circumstances of the
abuse suffered by the victim and (b) the
circumstances of consent given by the victim for
the filing of the application. When disclosure of the
address of the victim will pose danger to her life, it
shall be so stated in the application. In such a case,
the applicant shall attest that the victim is residing in
the municipality or city over which court has
territorial jurisdiction, and shall provide a mailing
address for purposes of service processmg.
An application for protection order filed with a court
shall be considered an application for both a TPO and
PPO. Barangay officials and. court personnel shall
assist applicants in the preparation of the application.
Law enforcement agents shall also extend assistance
in the application for protection orders in cases
brought to their attention.[Emphasis supplied]
A protection order is issued to prevent further acts of
violence against women and their children, their
family or household members, and to grant other
necessary reliefs.23 It is issued for the purpose of
safeguarding the offended party from further harm,
minimizing any disruption in the victim's daily life,
and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the
victim to independently regain control over her
life.24 A protection order may be issued ex parte if the
court finds that there is danger of domestic violence
to the offended party. This provisionary protection
order, however, may be issued only if the court finds
that the life, limb or property of the offended party is
in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe
that the order is necessary to protect the victim from
the immediate and imminent danger of violence or to
prevent such violence, which is about to recur. 25 If
after examining the verified petition and its
accompanying affidavits the court is satisfied that
there is, indeed, a reasonable ground to believe that
an imminent danger of violence against the offended
party exists or is about to recur, it may issue a
TPO ex parte.26
In the case at bar, a reading of the petition for child
custody filed by Peña would show that no specific
allegation of violence or abuse, whether physical,
emotional or psychological was committed or was
about to be committed against Henri. Not even the
affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition
supported his positions. The averments in the petition
that complainant was suffering from personality
disorder, that she subjected Henri to psychological
violence as she would always shout at the helpers,
and that complainant always leave Henri to the yaya,
to name a few, are not sufficient bases to issue the
TPO.
Moreover, a perusal of the Verification with
Certification of Non forum Shopping27 attached to the
petition for child custody would reveal that a similar
case for protection order and child custody, docketed
as Civil Case No. MC05-2779, was filed by
complainant against Peña before the RTC
Mandaluyong City. Considering that there was such a
declaration, it behooves upon Judge Trocino to
inquire first about the nature and the status of the said
pending case before taking cognizance of the case
and eventually issue the TPO.
In fact, the December 23, 2005 TPO was eventually
annulled and set aside by the CA in its
Decision28 dated September 15, 2006. In the same
decision, Civil Case No. 1409 was likewise dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction over the petition for protection
order and child custody. The CA held that Judge
Trocino gravely abused his discretion when he issued
the December 23, 2005 TPO awarding the custody of
parties' common child to Peña. It ruled that since the
RTC-Mandaluyong City had already taken
cognizance of the petition for protection order and
child custody, it exercises jurisdiction thereon to the
exclusion of all other courts. Hence, the RTC-
Mandaluyong City has exclusive jurisdiction over
said petition and no other petition involving the same
subject matter may be filed before any other court.
The CA decision was affirmed by the Court in a
Resolution,29 dated June 20, 2007.
The Court has always reminded judges to be extra
prudent and circumspect in the performance of their
duties. This exalted position entails a lot of
responsibilities, foremost of which is proficiency in
the law.30 Though not every judicial error bespeaks
ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good
faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, the
same, nonetheless, applies only in cases within the
parameters of tolerable misjudgment.31 Where the
procedure is so simple and the facts so evident as to
be beyond permissible margins of error, to still err
thereon amounts to ignorance of the law. 32 In the case
of Bautista v. Causapin Jr.,33 the Court explained
thus:
Where the law involved is simple and elementary,
lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit
more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply
them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence
requires no less. The mistake committed by
respondent Judge is not a mere error of judgment that
can be brushed aside for being minor. The disregard
of established rule of law which amounts to gross
ignorance of the law makes a judge subject to
disciplinary action.34
Given the foregoing, Judge Trocino's actions cannot
be considered a mere error in judgment that can be
easily ignored. His act of issuing the questioned TPO
is not a simple lapse of judgment but a blatant
disregard of the basic rules on child custody and the
rule on the issuance of a protection order. As held by
the Court in a number of cases, a patent disregard of
the basic legal commands embodied in the law and
the rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law from
which no one may be excused, not even a judge.35
Verily, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge
to be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence.36 A judge owes it to himself and his
office to know by heart the basic legal principles and
relevant doctrines.37 It is highly imperative that he be
conversant with them because when a judge displays
an utter lack of familiarity with the laws and rules, he
erodes the confidence of the public in the courts.38
Previous Record; Penalty
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance
of the law is a serious charge, punishable by
62
dismissal from service, suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for more than three
(3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of
more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00.39 In the consolidated cases
of Department of Justice v. Judge
Mislang40 and Home Development Mutual Fund v.
Judge Mislang,41 the respondent judge was found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and was
dismissed from the service considering that he was
previously found administratively liable in two cases.
The Court held that despite previous warnings that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely, he still continued to transgress
the norm of judicial conduct.
Similarly, the records show that Judge Trocino was
previously found administratively liable on two (2)
cases for undue delay in rendering judgments. In
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1936,42 Judge Trocino was
suspended for three (3) months; while in A.M. No.
RTJ-07-2057,43 he was fined in the amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
Doubtless, Judge Trocino's infraction on this instance
would have warranted the ultimate penalty of
dismissal had he not compulsory retired from the
service effective July 15, 2006.
Consequently, considering the past infractions of
Judge Trocino, the Court finds that the OCA's
recommended penalty of fine in the amount of Sixty
Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) is disproportionate to
the present charge which he was found guilty of.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Ret.
Judge Henry J. Trocino, Regional Trial Court, Branch
62, Bago City, Negros Occidental, GUILTY of
Gross Ignorance of the Law. In lieu of dismissal from
the service, the Court imposes the penalty
of FORFEITURE of all his retirement benefits
except accrued leave credits.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018
RENALYN A. MASBATE AND SPOUSES
RENATO MASBATE AND MARLYN
MASBATE, Petitioners, v. RICKY JAMES
RELUCIO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are
the Decision2 dated January 12, 2017 and the
Omnibus Resolution3 dated October 3, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 144406,
which set aside the Orders dated December 4,
20154 and January 7, 20165 of the Regional Trial
Court of Legazpi City, Albay, Branch 8 (RTC) in
Special Proceeding (SP) No. FC-15-239, directed the
remand of the case to the RTC for trial, and granted
respondent Ricky James Relucio (Ricky James)
"temporary custody" once a month for a period not
exceeding twenty-four (24) hours over the minor,
Queenie Angel M. Relucio (Queenie), his illegitimate
daughter with petitioner Renalyn A. Masbate
(Renalyn), on top of visitation rights fixed at two (2)
days per week.
The Facts
Queenie was born on May 3, 2012 to Renalyn and
Ricky James, who had been living together with
Renalyn's parents without the benefit of marriage.
Three (3) years later, or in April 2015, the
relationship ended. Renalyn went to Manila,
supposedly leaving Queenie behind in the care and
custody of her father, Ricky James.6
Ricky James alleged that on November 7, 2015,
Spouses Renata and Marlyn Masbate (Renalyn's
parents) took Queenie from the school where he had
enrolled her. When asked to give Queenie back,
Renalyn's parents refused and instead showed a copy
of a Special Power of Attorney 7 (SPA) executed by
Renalyn granting full parental rights, authority, and
custody over Queenie to them. Consequently, Ricky
James filed a petition for habeas corpus and child
custody8 docketed as SP No. FC-15-239 before the
RTC (petition a quo).9
A hearing was conducted on December 3, 2015,
where Renalyn brought Queenie and expressed the
desire for her daughter to remain in her custody.10
The RTC Ruling
In an Order11 dated December 4, 2015, the RTC ruled
that the custody of three (3)-year-old Queenie
rightfully belongs to Renalyn, citing the second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code, which
states that "[n]o child under seven [(7)] years of age
shall be separated from the mother x x x." The RTC
likewise found that, while Renalyn went to Manila to
study dentistry and left Queenie in the custody of her
parents, her intention was to bring Queenie to Manila
at a later time. Thus, in the fallo of said Order, the
RTC declared that it will "NOT GIVE FURTHER
DUE COURSE" to the petition a quo.12
Dissatisfied, Ricky James moved for
reconsideration,13 lamenting the "[extraordinary]
speed in the issuance of the x x x award of custody
over the child to [petitioners]."14 He claimed that the
hearing conducted on December 3, 2015 was not the
kind of hearing that was procedurally contemplated
under A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC,15 otherwise known as
the "Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors," because
the RTC merely propounded random questions
without placing the witnesses on the stand to testify
under oath. Moreover, he was allegedly deprived of
his right to due process when the RTC refused to give
further due course to the petition  a quo.16
17
The motion was denied in an Order  dated January 7,
2016, wherein the RTC emphasized that Queenie was
born out of wedlock, for which reason she shall be
under the parental authority of her mother, Renalyn,
63
pursuant to Article 17618 of the Family Code. In
addition, the RTC faulted Ricky James for failing to
present credible evidence in court to demonstrate that
Renalyn is unfit to take custody of their daughter.19
Aggrieved, Ricky James filed an appeal 20 before the
CA, imputing error upon the RTC: (a) in not
conducting a full blown trial and not receiving
evidence; (b) in granting sole custody to Renalyn
without giving paramount consideration to the best
interests of the child; and (c) in not granting him
shared custody and/or visitation rights.21 Ricky James
insisted that the tender-age presumption in Article
213 of the Family Code is rebuttable by evidence of
the mother's neglect, abandonment, and
unemployment, among other factors, and claimed that
Renalyn abandoned Queenie when she went to live in
Manila and failed to seek employment to support her
daughter.22
For their part, Renalyn and her parents (petitioners)
moved for the outright dismissal of the appeal on the
ground that no appeal can be had against an order
denying a motion for reconsideration. In addition,
petitioners argued that being the illegitimate father of
Queenie, Ricky James has absolutely no right of
custody over her, and that Renalyn's act of entrusting
the care of Queenie to her parents was not a
renunciation of parental authority but only a
temporary separation necessitated by her need to
adjust to her studies, which she undertook to improve
her and Queenie's life.23
On September 2, 2016, the case was referred to
mediation, but the parties were unable to arrive at a
settlement.24
The CA Ruling
In a Decision25 dated January 12, 2017, the CA set
aside the assailed RTC Orders and remanded the case
to the lower court for determination of who should
exercise custody over Queenie.26 The CA found that
the RTC hastily dismissed the petition a quo upon
Queenie's production in court, when the objective of
the case was to establish the allegation that Renalyn
had been neglecting Queenie, which was a question
of fact that must be resolved by trial. 27 Citing Section
18 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, which states that,
"[a]fter trial, the court shall render judgment
awarding the custody of the minor to the proper party
considering the best interests of the minor," the CA
declared that the dismissal by the RTC of the
petition a quo was not supported by the Rules.28
Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the RTC Orders
granting custody to Renalyn "pending the outcome of
the case," stating that only Queenie's mother,
Renalyn, has parental authority over her as she is an
illegitimate child. Further, the CA declared that the
RTC must thresh out Renalyn's capacity to raise her
daughter, which shall, in tum, determine whether or
not the tender-age presumption must be upheld, or
whether Queenie's well-being is better served with
her remaining in the custody of her maternal
grandparents in the exercise of their substitute
parental authority or with Ricky James, who was
Queenie's actual custodian before the controversy.29
Finally, the CA granted Ricky James visitation rights
of two (2) days a week, with provision for additional
visitation days that may be permitted by Renalyn.30
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, 31 while
Ricky James filed a motion for clarification 32 asking
that he be allowed to pick up Queenie from
petitioners' residence on a Friday afternoon and to
return the child on a Sunday afternoon. 33 In their
Comment,34 petitioners argued that the arrangement
proposed by Ricky James is not within the scope of
his visitation rights, but that he may, through
Renalyn's written consent, take Queenie home on
certain family occasions.35
In its Omnibus Resolution36 dated October 3, 2017,
the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit, insisting on its application of the
case of Bagtas v. Santos,37 which held that a trial is
still necessary to determine the issue of custody
despite the production of the child.38 On the other
hand, the CA ruled in favor of Ricky James' motion
for clarification, granting the latter what it calls a
" limited and temporary custody" that will allow him
to take Queenie out once a month, or on the first
Saturday of each month, for a period not exceeding
twenty-four (24) hours, but which shall not reduce his
visitation days fixed at two (2) days per week. 39 In so
holding, the appellate court cited "humane and
practical considerations"40 and argued that it is in
Queenie's best interest to have an exclusive time with
Ricky James.41
Undaunted, petitioners filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari, maintaining that the RTC
correctly dismissed the petition a quo after the
hearing on December 3, 2015 on the grounds that: (a)
the purported custodial right that Ricky James seeks
to enforce in filing his petition has no legal
basis; (b) the petition a quo does not comply with the
requisites for habeas corpus petitions involving
custody of minors; and (c) there are no more factual
issues to be resolved as it had already been admitted
by Renalyn during the hearing that she goes to
Manila to study but that she comes home every week
for Queenie and whenever there is a problem.42
Ricky James filed a Comment/Opposition43 as well as
an Urgent Omnibus Motion44 to dismiss the petition
and for immediate execution pending appeal of the
Omnibus Resolution dated October 3, 2017, claiming
that the instant petition was filed out of time and that
it was erroneous for petitioners to state that the last
day of filing fell on November 4, 2017, a Saturday,
which compelled them to file their petition on
November 6, 2017, a Monday. By his calculation, the
fifteen (15)-day reglementary period, which
commenced to run upon petitioners' receipt on
October 19, 2017 of the Omnibus Resolution dated
October 3, 2017, ended on November 3, 2017, a
Friday, and not on November 4, 2017.45
The Issue Before the Court
64
The main issue for the Court's resolution is whether
or not the CA correctly remanded the case a quo for
determination of who should exercise custody over
Queenie.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partially meritorious.
I.
At the outset, it must be stressed that while
petitioners may have erroneously determined the
expiration of the reglementary period for filing the
instant petition, which resulted in the same being
filed a day late on November 6, 2017, the Court finds
it proper to overlook this procedural lapse given the
compelling merit of the petition in the interest of
substantial justice.
The Court has declared that rules on the perfection of
appeals, particularly on the period of filing thereof,
must occasionally yield to the loftier ends of
substantial justice and equity. In the same manner
that the CA took cognizance of respondent's appeal
from the denial of his motion for reconsideration of
the RTC Order dated December 4, 2015, 46 which is
technically prohibited under the Rules of Court, so
shall this Court hold that the ends of justice would be
served better when cases are determined, not on mere
technicality or some procedural nicety, but on the
merits – after all the parties are given full opportunity
to ventilate their causes and defenses. Lest it be
forgotten, dismissal of appeals purely on technical
grounds is frowned upon. The rules of procedure
ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense, for they have been adopted to help secure – not
override – substantial justice.47
In this relation, it may not be amiss to point out that
the fundamental policy of the State, as embodied in
the Constitution in promoting and protecting the
welfare of children, shall not be disregarded by the
courts by mere technicality in resolving disputes
which involve the family and the youth.48 The State is
mandated to provide protection to those of tender
years. Through its laws, it safeguards them from
everyone, even their own parents, to the end that their
eventual development as responsible citizens and
members of society shall not be impeded, distracted
or impaired by family acrimony.49
Accordingly, the Court shall delve into the
substantive arguments propounded in this case.
II.
It is settled that habeas corpus may be resorted to in
cases where "the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto." 50 In
custody cases involving minors, the writ of habeas
corpus  is prosecuted for the purpose of determining
the right of custody over a child. The grant of the writ
depends on the concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of
custody over the minor; (2) that the rightful custody
of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by
the respondents; and (3) that it is to the best interest
of the minor concerned to be in the custody of
petitioner and not that of the respondents.51
"The right of custody accorded to parents springs
from the exercise of parental authority. Parental
authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the
juridical institution whereby parents rightfully
assume control and protection of their unemancipated
children to the extent required by the latter's needs. It
is a mass of rights and obligations which the law
grants to parents for the purpose of the children's
physical preservation and development, as well as the
cultivation of their intellect and the education of their
heart and senses. As regards parental authority, 'there
is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a
sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for
the welfare of the minor.'"52
As a general rule, the father and the mother shall
jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of
their common children.53 However, insofar as
illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 54 of
the Family Code states that illegitimate children
shall be under the parental authority of their
mother. Accordingly, mothers (such as Renalyn) are
entitled to the sole parental authority of their
illegitimate children (such as Queenie),
notwithstanding the father's recognition of the child.
In the exercise of that authority, mothers are
consequently entitled to keep their illegitimate
children in their company, and the Court will not
deprive them of custody, absent any imperative
cause showing the mother's unfitness to exercise
such authority and care.55
In addition, Article 213 of the same Code provides
for the so-called tender-age presumption, stating that
"[n]o child under seven [(7)] years of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise." The
rationale behind the rule was explained by the Code
Commission in this wise:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid
many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby
torn away from her. No man can sound the deep
sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of
tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to
be for "compelling reasons" for the good of the child;
those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother's heart
is not to be unduly hurt. x x x56
According to jurisprudence, the following instances
may constitute "compelling reasons" to wrest away
custody from a mother over her child although under
seven (7) years of age: neglect, abandonment,
unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness,
drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or
affliction with a communicable disease.57
As the records show, the CA resolved to remand the
case to the RTC, ratiocinating that there is a need to
establish whether or not Renalyn has been neglecting
Queenie,58 for which reason, a trial is indispensable
for reception of evidence relative to the preservation
65
or overturning of the tender-age presumption under
Article 213 of the Family Code. 59 In opposition,
petitioners contend that the second paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code would not even apply
in this case (so as to determine Renalyn's unfitness as
a mother) because the said provision only applies to a
situation where the parents are married to each
other.60 As basis, petitioners rely on the Court's ruling
in Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto V61 (Pablo-
Gualberto), the pertinent portion of which reads:
In like manner, the word "shall" in Article 213 of the
Family Code and Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court has been held to connote a mandatory
character. Article 213 and Rule 99 similarly
contemplate a situation in which the parents of the
minor are married to each other, but are separated
by virtue of either a decree of legal separation or a de
facto separation. x x x62
For easy reference, Article 213 of the Family Code
and Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, which
were cited in Pablo-Gualberto, are quoted hereunder
in full:
Article 213 of the Family Code
Article 213. In case of separation of the parents,
parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the
parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise.
Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court
Section 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are
separated. Appeal. – When husband and wife are
divorced or living separately and apart from each
other, and the question to the care, custody, and
control of a child or children of their marriage is
brought before a Court of First Instance by petition or
as an incident to any other proceeding, the court,
upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall
award the care, custody, and control of each such
child as will be for its best interest, permitting the
child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if
it be over ten years of age, unless the parent so
chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason
of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity,
or poverty. If, upon such hearing, it appears that both
parents are improper persons to have the care,
custody, and control of the child, the court may either
designate the paternal or maternal grandparent of the
child, or his oldest brother or sister, or some reputable
and discreet person to take charge of such child, or
commit it to any suitable asylum, children's home, or
benevolent society. The court may in conformity with
the provisions of the Civil Code order either or both
parents to support or help support said child,
irrespective of who may be its custodian, and may
make any order that is just and reasonable permitting
the parent who is deprived of its care and custody to
visit the child or have temporary custody thereof.
Either parent may appeal from an order made in
accordance with the provisions of this section. No
child under seven years of age shall be separated
from its mother, unless the court finds there are
compelling reasons therefor.
Notably, after a careful reading of Pablo-
Gualberto, it has been determined that the
aforequoted pronouncement therein is based on a
previous child custody case, namely, Briones v.
Miguel63(Briones), wherein the Court pertinently held
as follows:
However, the CA erroneously applied Section 6 of
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This provision
contemplates a situation in which the parents of the
minor are married to each other but are separated
either by virtue of a decree of legal separation or
because they are living separately de facto. In the
present case, it has been established that petitioner
and Respondent Loreta were never married. Hence,
that portion of the CA Decision allowing the child to
choose which parent to live with is deleted, but
without disregarding the obligation of petitioner to
support the child.64
For guidance, the relevant issue in Briones for which
the stated excerpt was made is actually the
application of Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court insofar as it permits the child over ten (10)
years of age to choose which parent he prefers to
live with. As the Court's ruling in Briones was
prefaced: "[t]he Petition has no merit. However, the
assailed Decision should be modified in regard to its
erroneous application of Section 6 of Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court."65 Accordingly, since the statement
in Pablo-Gualberto invoked by
petitioners, i.e., that "Article 213 and Rule 99
similarly contemplate a situation in which the
parents of the minor are married to each other x x
x," was based on Briones, then that same statement
must be understood according to its proper context –
that is, the issue pertaining to the right of a child to
choose which parent he prefers to live with. The
reason as to why this statement should be understood
in said manner is actually not difficult to discern: the
choice of a child over seven (7) years of age (first
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) and
over ten (10) years of age (Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court) shall be considered in custody disputes only
between married parents because they are, pursuant
to Article 211 of the Family Code, accorded joint
parental authority over the persons of their common
children. On the other hand, this choice is not
available to an illegitimate child, much more one of
tender age such as Queenie (second paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code), because sole
parental authority is given only to the mother, unless
she is shown to be unfit or unsuitable (Article 176 of
the Family Code). Thus, since the issue in this case is
the application of the exception to the tender-age
presumption under the second paragraph of Article
213 of the Family Code, and not the option given to
the child under the first paragraph to choose which
parent to live with, petitioners' reliance on Pablo-
Gualberto is grossly misplaced.
66
In addition, it ought to be pointed out that the second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code, which
was the basis of the CA's directive to remand the
case, does not even distinguish between legitimate
and illegitimate children – and hence, does not factor
in whether or not the parents are married – in
declaring that "[n]o child under seven [(7)] years of
age shall be separated from the mother unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise." "Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos. When the law makes no
distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to
recognize any distinction."66 As such, petitioners'
theory that Article 213 of the Family Code is herein
inapplicable – and thus, negates the need for the
ordered remand – is not only premised on an
erroneous reading of jurisprudence, but is also one
that is fundamentally off-tangent with the law itself.
III.
The Court cannot also subscribe to petitioners'
contention that even if there are compelling reasons
to separate Queenie from her mother, Renalyn,
pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 213 of the
Family Code, Ricky James would still not acquire
custody over their daughter because there is no
provision of law granting custody rights to an
illegitimate father.67
In the event that Renalyn is found unfit or unsuitable
to care for her daughter, Article 214 of the Family
Code mandates that substitute parental
authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. However, the same Code further
provides in Article 216 that "[i]n default of parents or
judicially appointed guardian, the following persons
shall exercise substitute parental authority over the
child in the order indicated:"
  Article 216. x x x
(1)
The surviving grandparent as provided in Art. 214;
(2)
The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of
age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3)
The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one
years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
The same order of preference with respect to
substitute parental authority is reiterated in Section 13
of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, the "Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to
Custody of Minors," to wit:
Section 13. Provisional order awarding custody.
– After an answer has been filed or after expiration of
the period to file it, the court may issue a provisional
order awarding custody of the minor. As far as
practicable, the following order of preference shall be
observed in the award of custody:
(a) Both parents jointly;
(b) Either parent, taking into account all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the minor
over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment,
unless the parent chosen is unfit;
(c) The grandparent, or if there are several
grandparents, the grandparent chosen by the minor
over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment,
unless the grandparent chosen is unfit or disqualified;
(d) The eldest brother or sister over twenty-one years
of age, unless he or she is unfit or disqualified
(e) The actual custodian of the minor over twenty-
one years of age, unless the former is unfit or
disqualified; or
(f) Any other person or institution the court may
deem suitable to provide proper care and guidance for
the minor.
It was not disputed that Ricky James was in actual
physical custody of Queenie when Renalyn left for
Manila to pursue her studies until the instant
controversy took place. As such, Ricky James had
already assumed obligations and enjoyed privileges
of a custodial character, giving him a cause of action
to file a case of habeas corpus to regain custody of
Queenie as her actual custodian.
Indeed, it may be argued that Article 176 of the
Family Code has effectively disqualified the father of
an illegitimate child from exercising substitute
parental authority under Article 216 even if he were
the actual custodian of the child under the premise
that no one is allowed to do indirectly what he is
prohibited to do directly. However, the Court cannot
adopt a rigid view, without running afoul to the
overarching consideration in custody cases, which is
the best interest of the minor. Even way back,
Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all
questions relating to the care, custody, education and
property of the children, the latter's welfare is
paramount.68 Under present rules, A.M. No. 03-04-
04-SC explicitly states that "[i]n awarding custody,
the court shall consider the best interests of the minor
and shall give paramount consideration to [her]
material and moral welfare. The best interests of the
minor refer to the totality of the circumstances and
conditions as are most congenial to the survival,
protection, and feelings of security of the minor
encouraging to [her] physical, psychological and
emotional development. It also means the least
detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the
growth and development of the minor." 69
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that
Queenie's best interest demands that a proper trial be
conducted to determine if she had, indeed, been
neglected and abandoned by her mother, rendering
the latter unfit to exercise parental authority over her,
and in the event that Renalyn is found unsuitable,
whether it is in Queenie's best interest that she be in
the custody of her father rather than her grandparents
upon whom the law accords a far superior right to
exercise substitute parental authority. In the case
of Bagtas v. Santos,70 which was a tug-of-war
between the maternal grandparents of the illegitimate
minor child and the actual custodians of the latter, the
Court faulted the trial court for hastily dismissing the
petition for habeas corpus and awarding the custody
67
of the minor to the grandparents without conducting
any trial. The import of such decision is that the
preference accorded by Article 216 of the Family
Code does not automatically attach to the
grandparents, and is conditioned upon the
determination of their fitness to take care of their
grandchild. In ruling as it did, the Court ratiocinated
that the child's welfare being the most important
consideration, it is not bound by any legal right of a
person over the child. Reiterating its pronouncement
in the early case of Sombong v. CA,71 the Court held
that:
[I]n passing on the writ in a child custody case, the
court deals with a matter of an equitable nature. Not
bound by any mere legal right of parent or guardian,
the court gives his or her claim to the custody of the
child due weight as a claim founded on human nature
and considered generally equitable and just
Therefore, these cases are decided, not on the legal
right of the petitioner to be relieved from unlawful
imprisonment or detention, as in the case of adults,
but on the court's view of the best interests of those
whose welfare requires that they be in custody of one
person or another. Hence, the court is not bound to
deliver a child into the custody of any claimant or of
any person, but should, in the consideration of the
facts, leave it in such custody as its welfare at the
time appears to require. In short, the child's welfare is
the supreme consideration.
Considering that the child's welfare is an all-
important factor in custody cases, the Child and
Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in
all questions regarding the care and custody, among
others, of the child, his welfare shall be the
paramount consideration. In the same vein, the
Family Code authorizes the courts to, if the welfare
of the child so demands, deprive the parents
concerned of parental authority over the child or
adopt such measures as may be proper under the
circumstances.72
The Court cannot close its eyes to the sad reality that
not all fathers, especially those who have sired
children out of wedlock, have risen to the full height
of a parent's responsibility towards his offspring. Yet,
here is a father of an illegitimate child who is very
much willing to take on the whole gamut of
parenting. He, thus, deserves, at the very least, to be
given his day in court to prove that he is entitled to
regain custody of his daughter. As such, the CA's
order to remand the case is proper.
IV.
While the appellate court correctly remanded the case
for trial, the Court, however, holds that it erred in
granting Ricky James temporary custody for a limited
period of twenty-four (24) consecutive hours once
every month, in addition to visitation rights, invoking
"humane and practical considerations,"73 which were
based solely on Ricky James' allegations.
It should be stressed that Section 15 of A.M. No. 03-
04-04-SC provides for temporary visitation
rights, not temporary custody, as follows:
Section 15. Temporary visitation rights. – The court
shall provide in its order awarding provisional
custody appropriate visitation rights to the non-
custodial parent or parents, unless the court finds said
parent or parents unfit or disqualified.
The temporary custodian shall give the court and
non-custodial parent or parents at least five days'
notice of any plan to change the residence of the
minor or take him out of his residence for more than
three days provided it does not prejudice the
visitation rights of the non-custodial parent or
parents.
It is only after trial, when the court renders its
judgment awarding the custody of the minor to the
proper party, that the court may likewise issue "any
order that is just and reasonable permitting the parent
who is deprived of the care and custody of the
minor to visit or have temporary custody," pursuant
to Section 18 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, to wit:
Section 18. Judgment. – After trial, the court shall
render judgment awarding the custody of the minor to
the proper party considering the best interests of the
minor.
If it appears that both parties are unfit to have the care
and custody of the minor, the court may designate
either the paternal or maternal grandparent of the
minor, or his oldest brother or sister, or any reputable
person to take charge of such minor, or to commit
him to any suitable home for children.
In its judgment, the court may order either or both
parents to give an amount necessary for the support,
maintenance and education of the minor, irrespective
of who may be its custodian. In determining the
amount of support, the court may consider the
following factors: (1) the financial resources of the
custodial and non-custodial parent and those of the
minor; (2) the physical and emotional health, special
needs, and aptitude of the minor; (3) the standard of
living the minor has been accustomed to; and (4) the
non-monetary contributions that the parents would
make toward the care and well-being of the minor.
The court may also issue any order that is just and
reasonable permitting the parent who is deprived
of the care and custody of the minor to visit or
have temporary custody. (Emphasis supplied)
By granting temporary albeit limited custody ahead
of trial, the appellate court overturned the tender-age
presumption with nothing but Ricky James' bare
allegations, to which the Court cannot give its
imprimatur. As earlier intimated, the issue
surrounding Renalyn's fitness as a mother must be
properly threshed out in the trial court before she can
be denied custody, even for the briefest of periods,
over Queenie.
In view of the disposition in Silva and Briones and
the rules quoted above, the Court can only uphold
Ricky James' visitation rights, which shall be limited
to two (2) days per week, without prejudice to
68
Renalyn allowing him additional days. However,
consistent with the aforesaid cases, as well as the
more recent case of Grande v. Antonio,74 Ricky James
may take Queenie out only upon the written consent
of Renalyn. Contrary to the posturing75 of the
appellate court, the requirement for the consent of the
mother is consistent with the regime of sole maternal
custody under the second paragraph of Article 213 of
the Family Code with respect to children under seven
(7) years of age, which may be overcome only by
compelling evidence of the mother's unfitness. 76 Until
and unless Ricky James is able to substantiate his
allegations, he can only claim visitation rights over
his daughter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated January 12, 2017
and the Omnibus Resolution dated October 3, 2017 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 144406 are
hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION deleting the grant of limited
and temporary custody for lack of legal and factual
basis. The grant of visitation rights of two (2) days
per week shall be maintained. Respondent Ricky
James Relucio may take his daughter, Queenie Angel
M. Relucio, out but only with the written consent of
petitioner Renalyn A. Masbate in accordance with
this Decision.
The Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Albay,
Branch 8 is DIRECTED to immediately proceed
with hearing Special Proceeding No. FC-15-239 upon
notice of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
3. Effect of disagreement, absence, death,
separation or termination of marriage of parents,
Art. 212-213, FC; Art. 49 ,50, 62, and 63, FC
a. “Tender Age Presumption” Rule
G.R. No. 174485               July 11, 2007
AGNES GAMBOA-HIRSCH Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANKLIN
HARVEY HIRSCH, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari 1 under Rule 65 which
seeks to set aside the June 8, 2006 Decision 2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 94329,
which granted private respondent Franklin Harvey
Hirsch (Franklin) joint custody with petitioner Agnes
Gamboa-Hirsch (Agnes) of their minor daughter
Simone Noelle Hirsch (Simone); and the August 3,
2006 CA Resolution3 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioner also
prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order/injunction preventing the execution and
implementation of the assailed June 8, 2006 CA
Decision.
Franklin and Agnes were married on December 23,
2000 in the City of Bacolod, and established their
conjugal dwelling in Diniwid, Boracay Island, Malay,
Aklan. On December 21, 2002, a child was born to
them and was named Simone. In 2005, the couple
started to have marital problems as Agnes wanted to
stay in Makati City, while Franklin insisted that they
stay in Boracay Island. On March 23, 2006, Agnes
came to their conjugal home in Boracay, and asked
for money and for Franklin’s permission for her to
bring their daughter to Makati City for a brief
vacation. Franklin readily agreed, but soon thereafter
discovered that neither Agnes nor their daughter
Simone would be coming back to Boracay.
Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before
the CA for Agnes to produce Simone in court. On
May 19, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution which
ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be issued
ordering that Simone be brought before said court on
May 26, 2006. After a series of hearings and
presentation of evidence, the CA, on June 8, 2006,
promulgated the assailed Decision granting Franklin
joint custody with Agnes of their minor child. Agnes
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision,
which was denied in the CA’s August 3, 2006
Resolution for lack of merit.
Petitioner now comes before this Court praying that
we set aside the June 8, 2006 Decision and August 3,
2006 Resolution of the CA, and that we issue a
temporary restraining order/injunction on the
execution and implementation of the assailed rulings
of the CA based on the following grounds:
(A)
The Court of Appeals seriously erred and
acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it ruled upon, granted, and decided the
matter of custody x x x during the May 26,
2006 hearing conducted on the petition for
writ of habeas corpus in relation to and with
custody of a minor under A.M. No. 03-03-
04-SC, C.A.-GR SP. No. 94329, as no
reception of evidence to support said
decision was had thereon, and the honorable
court merely based its decision on mere
conjectures and presumptions.
(B)
The Court of Appeals seriously erred and
acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by [petitioner Agnes]
and only made addendums thereon
appertaining to the custody aspect in its
Decision that the same is deemed necessary
for the protection of the interest of the child
and a mere temporary arrangement while the
case involving the herein parties are pending
before the Regional Trial Court x x x quite
contrary to its pronouncements during the
May 26, 2006 hearing when the matter of
69
custody was insisted upon by [respondent
Franklin].
(C)
The Court of Appeals seriously erred and
acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it granted joint custody in utter
disregard of the provisions of the Family
Code, as to minors seven (7) years of age
and below, in relation to the jurisprudence
and pronouncements laid down by the
Honorable Supreme Court on the matter of
the said provision.4
Acting on the petition, this Court issued its October 2,
2006 Resolution denying petitioner’s prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order. Petitioner
then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this
Resolution, and on April 11, 2007, this Court granted
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, issued a
temporary restraining order, and awarded the sole
custody of the minor, Simone, to petitioner.
This petition has merit.
The CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it
granted joint custody of the minor child to both
parents.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides
that "in all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child
shall be a primary consideration (emphasis
supplied)."5 The Child and Youth Welfare Code, in
the same way, unequivocally provides that in all
questions regarding the care and custody, among
others, of the child, his/her welfare shall be the
paramount consideration.6
The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article
213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by
compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The
mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her
children in one or more of the following instances:
neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of
the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable
disease.7 Here, the mother was not shown to be
unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her
minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been
adduced to wrench the child from the mother’s
custody.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The June 8, 2006
Decision and August 3, 2006 Resolution of the CA
are hereby SET ASIDE. Sole custody over Simone
Noelle Hirsch is hereby AWARDED to the mother,
petitioner Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154994               June 28, 2005
JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO, petitioner,
vs.
CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO
V, respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 156254               June 28, 2005
CRISANTO RAFAELITO G. GUALBERTO
V, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; Hon. HELEN B.
RICAFORT, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court Parañaque City, Branch 260; and
JOYCELYN D. PABLO-
GUALBERTO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When love is lost between spouses and the marriage
inevitably results in separation, the bitterest tussle is
often over the custody of their children. The Court is
now tasked to settle the opposing claims of the
parents for custody pendente lite of their child who is
less than seven years of age. There being no
sufficient proof of any compelling reason to separate
the minor from his mother, custody should remain
with her.
The Case
Before us are two consolidated petitions. The first is
a Petition for Review1 filed by Joycelyn Pablo-
Gualberto under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the August 30, 2002 Decision2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 70878. The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Order of May 17, 2002 is hereby SET
ASIDE and ANNULLED. The custody of the child
is hereby ordered returned to [Crisanto Rafaelito G.
Gualberto V].
"The [respondent] court/Judge is hereby directed to
consider, hear and resolve [petitioner’s] motion to lift
the award of custody pendente lite of the child to
[respondent]."3
The second is a Petition for Certiorari4 filed by
Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, charging the appellate court with
grave abuse of discretion for denying his Motion for
Partial Reconsideration of the August 30, 2002
Decision. The denial was contained in the CA’s
November 27, 2002 Resolution, which we quote:
"We could not find any cogent reason why the [last
part of the dispositive portion of our Decision of
70
August 30, 2002] should be deleted, hence, subject
motion is hereby DENIED."5
The Facts
The CA narrated the antecedents as follows:
"x x x [O]n March 12, 2002, [Crisanto Rafaelito G.
Gualberto V] filed before [the Regional Trial Court
of Parañaque City] a petition for declaration of nullity
of his marriage to x x x Joycelyn D. Pablo Gualberto,
with an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of
their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello (the child,
for brevity), whom [Joycelyn] allegedly took away
with her from the conjugal home and his school
(Infant Toddler’s Discovery Center in Parañaque
City) when [she] decided to abandon [Crisanto]
sometime in early February 2002[.] x x x [O]n April
2, 2002, [RTC Judge Helen B. Ricafort] heard the
ancillary prayer of [Crisanto] for custody pendente
lite. x x x [B]ecause [Joycelyn] allegedly failed to
appear despite notice, [Crisanto], a certain Col.
Renato Santos, and Ms. Cherry Batistel, testified
before the x x x Judge; x x x documentary evidence
[was] also presented[.] x x x [O]n April 3, 2002, x x x
[the] Judge awarded custody pendente lite of the
child to [Crisanto.] [T]he Order partly read x x x:
‘x x x Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V testified. He
stated that [Joycelyn] took their minor child with her
to Caminawit, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. At that
time, the minor was enrolled at B.F. Homes,
Parañaque City. Despite effort[s] exerted by him, he
has failed to see his child. [Joycelyn] and the child
are at present staying with the former’s step-father at
the latter’s [residence] at Caminawit, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro.
‘Renato Santos, President of United Security Logistic
testified that he was commissioned by [Crisanto] to
conduct surveillance on [Joycelyn] and came up with
the conclusion that [she] is having lesbian relations
with one Noreen Gay Cuidadano in Cebu City.
‘The findings of Renato Santos [were] corroborated
by Cherry Batistel, a house helper of the spouses who
stated that [the mother] does not care for the child as
she very often goes out of the house and on one
occasion, she saw [Joycelyn] slapping the child.
‘Art. 211 of the Family Code provides as follows:
‘The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
parental authority over the persons of their children.
In the case of disagreement, the father’s decision
shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the
contrary.’
‘The authority of the father and mother over their
children is exercised jointly. This recognition,
however, does not place her in exactly the same place
as the father; her authority is subordinated to that of
the father.
‘In all controversies regarding the custody of minors,
the sole and foremost consideration is the physical,
educational, social and moral welfare of the child,
taking into account the respective resources and
social and moral situations of the contending parties.
‘The Court believes that [Joycelyn] had no reason to
take the child with her. Moreover, per Sheriff returns,
she is not with him at Caminawit, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro.
‘WHEREFORE, pendente lite, the Court hereby
awards custody of the minor, Crisanto Rafaello P.
Gualberto X to his father, Crisanto Rafaelito G.
Gualberto V.’
"x x x [O]n April 16, 2002, the hearing of
[Joycelyn’s] motion to lift the award of
custody pendente lite of the child to [Crisanto] was
set but the former did not allegedly present any
evidence to support her motion. However, on May
17, 2002, [the] Judge allegedly issued the assailed
Order reversing her Order of April 3, 2002 and this
time awarding custody of the child to [Joycelyn].
[T]he entire text of the Order [is] herein reproduced,
to wit:
‘Submitted is [Crisanto’s] Motion to Resolve Prayer
for Custody Pendente Lite and [Joycelyn’s] Motion to
Dismiss and the respective Oppositions thereto.
‘[Joycelyn], in her Motion to Dismiss, makes issue of
the fact that the person referred to in the caption of
the Petition is one JOCELYN Pablo Gualberto and
not Joycelyn Pablo Gualberto. [Joycelyn] knows she
is the person referred to in the Complaint. As a matter
of fact, the body of the Complaint states her name
correct[ly]. The law is intended to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice, not to hinder or
delay it. Litigation should be practicable and
convenient. The error in the name of Joycelyn does
not involve public policy and has not prejudiced
[her].
‘This case was filed on March 12, 2002. Several
attempts were made to serve summons on [Joycelyn]
as shown by the Sheriff’s returns. It appears that on
the 4th attempt on March 21, 2002, both Ma. Daisy
and x x x Ronnie Nolasco, [Joycelyn’s mother and
stepfather, respectively,] read the contents of the
documents presented after which they returned the
same.lawphil.net
‘The Court believes that on that day, summons was
duly served and this Court acquired jurisdiction over
[Joycelyn].
‘The filing of [Joycelyn’s annulment] case on March
26, 2002 was an after thought, perforce the Motion to
[D]ismiss should be denied.
‘The child subject of this Petition, Crisanto Rafaello
P. Gualberto is barely four years old. Under Article
213 of the Family Code, he shall not be separated
from his mother unless the Court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise. The Court finds the
reason stated by [Crisanto] not [to] be compelling
reasons.1avvphil.zw+ The father should however be
71
entitled to spend time with the minor. These do not
appear compelling reasons to deprive him of the
company of his child.
‘When [Joycelyn] appeared before this Court, she
stated that she has no objection to the father visiting
the child even everyday provided it is in Mindoro.
‘The Court hereby grants the mother, [Joycelyn], the
custody of Crisanto Rafaello P. Gualberto, with [the]
right of [Crisanto] to have the child with him every
other weekend.
‘WHEREFORE:
1. The [M]otion to Dismiss is hereby
DENIED;
2. Custody pendente lite is hereby given to
the mother Joycelyn Pablo Gualberto with
the right of the father, x x x [Crisanto], to
have him every other week-end.
3. Parties are admonished not to use any
other agencies of the government like the
CIDG to interfere in this case and to harass
the parties.’"6
In a Petition for Certiorari7 before the CA, Crisanto
charged the Regional Trial Court (Branch 260) of
Parañaque City with grave abuse of discretion for
issuing its aforequoted May 17, 2002 Order. He
alleged that this Order superseded, without any
factual or legal basis, the still valid and subsisting
April 3, 2002 Order awarding him custody pendente
lite of his minor son; and that it violated Section 14
of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Partly in Crisanto’s favor, the CA ruled that grave
abuse of discretion had been committed by the trial
court in reversing the latter court’s previous Order
dated April 3, 2002, by issuing the assailed May 17,
2002 Order. The appellate court explained that the
only incident to resolve was Joycelyn’s Motion to
Dismiss, not the issuance of the earlier Order.
According to the CA, the prior Order awarding
provisional custody to the father should prevail, not
only because it was issued after a hearing, but also
because the trial court did not resolve the correct
incident in the later Order.
Nonetheless, the CA stressed that the trial court judge
was not precluded from considering and resolving
Joycelyn’s Motion to lift the award of
custody pendente lite to Crisanto, as that Motion had
yet to be properly considered and ruled upon.
However, it directed that the child be turned over to
him until the issue was resolved.
Hence, these Petitions.8
Issues
In GR No. 154994, Petitioner Joycelyn submits these
issues for our consideration:
"1. Whether or not the Respondent Court of
Appeals, when it awarded the custody of the
child to the father, violated Art. 213 of the
Family Code, which mandates that ‘no child
under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.’
"2. Is it Article 213 or Article 211 which
applies in this case involving four-year old
Rafaello?"9
On the other hand, Crisanto raises the following
issues:
"A. Did Respondent Court commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to or in
excess of jurisdiction when, in its August 30,
2002 Decision, it ordered respondent
court/Judge ‘to consider, hear and resolve
 the motion to lift award of custody pendente
lite of the child to petitioner and x x x
denied the motion for reconsideration
thereof in its November 27, 2002
Resolution, considering that: (1) there is no
such motion ever, then or now pending, with
the court a quo; (2) the November 27, 2002
Resolution is unconstitutional; and (3) the
April 3, 2002 Order of respondent Judge, the
validity of which has been upheld in the
August 30, 2002 Decision of the respondent
Court, has become final and executory; and
"B. Ought not the ancillary remedies [o]f
habeas corpus, because the whereabouts,
physical and mental condition of the
illegally detained Minor Rafaello is now
unknown to petitioner and preliminary
mandatory injunction with urgent prayer for
immediate issuance of preliminary
[injunction], petitioner having a clear and
settled right to custody of Minor Rafaello
which has been violated and still is being
continuously violated by [petitioner
Joycelyn], be granted by this Honorable
Court?"10
Being interrelated, the procedural challenges and the
substantive issues in the two Petitions will be
addressed jointly.
The Court’s Ruling
There is merit in the Petition in GR No. 154994, but
not in GR No. 156254.
Preliminary Issue:
The Alleged Prematurity of the Petition in GR No.
154994
Before going into the merits of the present
controversy, the Court shall first dispose of a
threshold issue. In GR No. 154994, therein
72
Respondent Crisanto contends that the Petition for
Review was filed beyond the deadline (October 24,
2002) allowed by the Rules of Court and by this
Court. He claims that Registry Bill No. 88 shows that
the Petition was sent by speed mail, only on
November 4, 2002. Furthermore, he assails the
Petition for its prematurity, since his Motion for
Partial Reconsideration of the August 30, 2002 CA
Decision was still pending before the appellate court.
Thus, he argues that the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction over Joycelyn’s Petition.
Timeliness of the Petition
The manner of filing and service Joycelyn’s Petition
by mail is governed by Sections 3 and 7 of Rule 13 of
the Rules of Court, which we quote:
"SEC. 3. Manner of filing. – The filing of pleadings,
appearances, motions, notices, orders, judgments and
all other papers shall be made by presenting the
original copies thereof, plainly indicated as such
personally to the clerk of court or by sending them by
registered mail. xxx In the second case, the date of
mailing of motions, pleadings and other papers or
payments or deposits, as shown by the post office
stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall
be considered as the date of their filing, payment, or
deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the
records of the case.
"x x x x x x x x x
"SEC. 7. Service by mail. – Service by registered
mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the
office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the
party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise
at his residence, if known, with postage fully pre-
paid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return
the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if
undelivered. If no registry service is available in the
locality of either the sender of the addressee, service
may be done by ordinary mail. (Italics supplied)
The records disclose that Joycelyn received the CA’s
August 30, 2002 Decision on September 9, 2002. On
September 17, she filed before this Court a Motion
for a 30-day extension of time to file a petition for
review on certiorari. This Motion was granted,11 and
the deadline was thus extended until October 24,
2002.
A further perusal of the records reveals that copies of
the Petition were sent to this Court and to the parties
by registered mail12 at the Biñan, Laguna Post Office
on October 24, 2002. This is the date clearly stamped
on the face of the envelope13 and attested to in the
Affidavit of Service14 accompanying the Petition.
Petitioner Joycelyn explained that the filing and the
service had been made by registered mail due to the
"volume of delivery assignments and the lack of a
regular messenger."15
The Petition is, therefore, considered to have been
filed on October 24, 2002, its mailing date as shown
by the post office stamp on the envelope. The last
sentence of Section 3 of Rule 13 of the Rules
provides that the date of filing may be
shown either by the post office stamp on the
envelope or by the registry receipt. Proof of its filing,
on the other hand, is shown by the existence of the
petition in the record, pursuant to Section 12 of Rule
13.16
The postmaster satisfactorily clarifies that Registry
Bill No. 88, which shows the date November 2, 2002,
merely discloses when the mail matters received by
the Biñan Post Office on October 24, 2002, were
dispatched or sent to the Central Mail Exchange for
distribution to their final destinations.17 The Registry
Bill does not reflect the actual mailing date. Instead,
it is the postal Registration Book18 that shows the list
of mail matters that have been registered for mailing
on a particular day, along with the names of the
senders and the addressees. That book shows that
Registry Receipt Nos. 2832-A and 2832-B, pertaining
to the mailed matters for the Supreme Court, were
issued on October 24, 2002.
Prematurity of the Petition
As to the alleged prematurity of the Petition of
Joycelyn, Crisanto points out that his Urgent Motion
for Partial Reconsideration19 was still awaiting
resolution by the CA when she filed her Petition
before this Court on October 24, 2002. The CA ruled
on the Motion only on November 27, 2002.
The records show, however, that the Motion of
Crisanto was mailed only on September 12, 2002.
Thus, on September 17, 2002, when Joycelyn filed
her Motion for Extension of Time to file her Petition
for Review, she might have still been unaware that he
had moved for a partial reconsideration of the August
20, 2002 CA Decision. Nevertheless, upon being
notified of the filing of his Motion, she should have
manifested that fact to this Court.
With the CA’s final denial of Crisanto’s Motion for
Reconsideration, Joycelyn’s lapse may be excused in
the interest of resolving the substantive issues raised
by the parties.
First Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
In GR No. 156254, Crisanto submits that the CA
gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the trial
court judge to "consider, hear and resolve the motion
to lift the award of custody pendente lite" without any
proper motion by Joycelyn and after the April 3, 2002
Order of the trial court had become final and
executory. The CA is also charged with grave abuse
of discretion for denying his Motion for Partial
Reconsideration without stating the reasons for the
denial, allegedly in contravention of Section 1 of
Rule 36 of the Rules of Court.
The Order to Hear the Motion to Lift the Award of
Custody Pendente Lite Proper
73
To begin with, grave abuse of discretion is committed
when an act is 1) done contrary to the Constitution,
the law or jurisprudence;20 or 2) executed
"whimsically or arbitrarily" in a manner "so patent
and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined."21 What constitutes grave abuse of
discretion is such capricious and arbitrary exercise of
judgment as that which is equivalent, in the eyes of
the law, to lack of jurisdiction.22
On the basis of these criteria, we hold that the CA did
not commit grave abuse of discretion.
First, there can be no question that a court of
competent jurisdiction is vested with the authority to
resolve even unassigned issues. It can do so when
such a step is indispensable or necessary to a just
resolution of issues raised in a particular pleading or
when the unassigned issues are inextricably linked or
germane to those that have been pleaded.23 This
truism applies with more force when the relief
granted has been specifically prayed for, as in this
case.
Explicit in the Motion to Dismiss24 filed by Joycelyn
before the RTC is her ancillary prayer for the court to
lift and set aside its April 3, 2002 Order awarding to
Crisanto custody pendente lite of their minor son.
Indeed, the necessary consequence of granting her
Motion to Dismiss would have been the setting aside
of the Order awarding Crisanto provisional custody
of the child. Besides, even if the Motion to Dismiss
was denied -- as indeed it was -- the trial court, in its
discretion and if warranted, could still have granted
the ancillary prayer as an alternative relief.
Parenthetically, Joycelyn’s Motion need not have
been verified because of the provisional nature of the
April 3, 2002 Order. Under Rule 3825 of the Rules of
Court, verification is required only when relief is
sought from a final and executory Order.
Accordingly, the court may set aside its own orders
even without a proper motion, whenever such action
is warranted by the Rules and to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.26
Denial of the Motion for Reconsideration Proper
Second, the requirement in Section 1 of Rule 36 (for
judges to state clearly and distinctly the reasons for
their dispositions) refers only to decisions and final
orders on the merits, not to those resolving incidental
matters.27 The provision reads:
"SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments and final
orders. – A judgment or final order determining the
merits of the case shall be in writing personally and
directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,
signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court."
(Italics supplied)
Here, the declaration of the nullity of marriage is the
subject of the main case, in which the issue of
custody pendente lite is an incident. That custody and
support of common children may be ruled upon by
the court while the action is pending is provided in
Article 49 of the Family Code, which we quote :
"Art. 49. During the pendency of the action28 and in
the absence of adequate provisions in a written
agreement between the spouses, the Court shall
provide for the support of the spouses and the custody
and support of their common children. x x x."
Clearly then, the requirement cited by Crisanto is
inapplicable. In any event, in its questioned
Resolution, the CA clearly stated that it "could not
find any cogent reason" to reconsider and set aside
the assailed portion of its August 30, 2002 Decision.
The April 3, 2002 Order Not Final and Executory
Third, the award of temporary custody, as the term
implies, is provisional and subject to change as
circumstances may warrant. In this connection, there
is no need for a lengthy discussion of the alleged
finality of the April 3, 2002 RTC Order granting
Crisanto temporary custody of his son. For that
matter, even the award of child custody after a
judgment on a marriage annulment is not permanent;
it may be reexamined and adjusted if and when the
parent who was given custody becomes unfit.29
Second Issue:
Custody of a Minor Child
When love is lost between spouses and the marriage
inevitably results in separation, the bitterest tussle is
often over the custody of their children. The Court is
now tasked to settle the opposing claims of the
parents for custody pendente lite of their child who is
less than seven years old.30 On the one hand, the
mother insists that, based on Article 213 of the
Family Code, her minor child cannot be separated
from her. On the other hand, the father argues that
she is "unfit" to take care of their son; hence, for
"compelling reasons," he must be awarded custody of
the child.
31
Article 213 of the Family Code  provides:
"ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents,
parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the court. The court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the
parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother, unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise."
This Court has held that when the parents are
separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing
provision governs the custody of their child.32 Article
213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil
Code, which reads:
74
"Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody,
education and property of children, the latter’s
welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age,
unless the court finds compelling reasons for such
measure."(Italics supplied)
The general rule that children under seven years of
age shall not be separated from their mother finds
its raison d’etre in the basic need of minor children
for their mother’s loving care.33 In explaining the
rationale for Article 363 of the Civil Code, the Code
Commission stressed thus:
"The general rule is recommended in order to avoid a
tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away
from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a
mother who is deprived of her child of tender age.
The exception allowed by the rule has to be for
‘compelling reasons’ for the good of the child: those
cases must indeed be rare, if the mother’s heart is not
to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of
adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the
(relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient
punishment for her. Moreover, her moral dereliction
will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet
unable to understand the situation." (Report of the
Code Commission, p. 12)
A similar provision is embodied in Article 8 of the
Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree
No. 603).34 Article 17 of the same Code is even more
explicit in providing for the child’s custody under
various circumstances, specifically in case the parents
are separated. It clearly mandates that "no child under
five years of age shall be separated from his mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to do so."
The provision is reproduced in its entirety as follows:
"Art. 17. Joint Parental Authority. – The father and
the mother shall exercise jointly just and reasonable
parental authority and responsibility over their
legitimate or adopted children. In case of
disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail
unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
"In case of the absence or death of either parent, the
present or surviving parent shall continue to exercise
parental authority over such children, unless in case
of the surviving parent’s remarriage, the court for
justifiable reasons, appoints another person as
guardian.
"In case of separation of his parents, no child under
five years of age shall be separated from his mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to do so."
(Italics supplied)
The above mandates reverberate in Articles 211, 212
and 213 of the Family Code. It is unmistakable from
the language of these provisions that Article
21135 was derived from the first sentence of the
aforequoted Article 17; Article 212,36 from the second
sentence; and Article 213,37 save for a few additions,
from the third sentence. It should be noted that the
Family Code has reverted to the Civil Code provision
mandating that a child below seven years should not
be separated from the mother.38
Mandatory Character of Article 213 of the Family
Code
In Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson,39 the Court held that
the use of "shall" in Article 363 of the Civil Code and
the observations made by the Code Commission
underscore the mandatory character of the
word.40 Holding in that case that it was a mistake to
deprive the mother of custody of her two children,
both then below the age of seven, the Court stressed:
"[Article 363] prohibits in no uncertain terms the
separation of a mother and her child below seven
years, unless such a separation is grounded upon
compelling reasons as determined by a court."41
In like manner, the word "shall" in Article 213 of the
Family Code and Section 642 of Rule 99 of the Rules
of Court has been held to connote a mandatory
character.43 Article 213 and Rule 99 similarly
contemplate a situation in which the parents of the
minor are married to each other, but are separated by
virtue of either a decree of legal separation or a de
facto separation.44 In the present case, the parents are
living separately as a matter of fact.
The Best Interest of the Child a Primary
Consideration
The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides
that "[i]n all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration."45
The principle of "best interest of the child" pervades
Philippine cases involving adoption, guardianship,
support, personal status, minors in conflict with the
law, and child custody. In these cases, it has long
been recognized that in choosing the parent to whom
custody is given, the welfare of the minors should
always be the paramount consideration.46 Courts are
mandated to take into account all relevant
circumstances that would have a bearing on the
children’s well-being and development. Aside from
the material resources and the moral and social
situations of each parent, other factors may also be
considered to ascertain which one has the capability
to attend to the physical, educational, social and
moral welfare of the children.47 Among these factors
are the previous care and devotion shown by each of
the parents; their religious background, moral
uprightness, home environment and time availability;
as well as the children’s emotional and educational
needs
Tender-Age Presumption
As pointed out earlier, there is express statutory
recognition that, as a general rule, a mother is to be
preferred in awarding custody of children under the
age of seven. The caveat in Article 213 of the Family
Code cannot be ignored, except when the court finds
cause to order otherwise.48
75
The so-called "tender-age presumption" under
Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome
only by compelling evidence of the mother’s
unfitness. The mother has been declared unsuitable to
have custody of her children in one or more of the
following instances: neglect, abandonment,
unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness,
drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or
affliction with a communicable disease.49
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian
relations as the compelling reason to deprive
Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been held that
under certain circumstances, the mother’s immoral
conduct may constitute a compelling reason to
deprive her of custody.50
But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not
prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the
fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been
unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to
have custody of her minor child.51 To deprive the
wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish
that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on
the welfare of the child or have distracted the
offending spouse from exercising proper parental
care.52
To this effect did the Court rule in Unson III v.
Navarro,53 wherein the mother was openly living with
her brother-in-law, the child’s uncle. Under that
circumstance, the Court deemed it in the nine-year-
old child’s best interest to free her "from the
obviously unwholesome, not to say immoral
influence, that the situation in which the mother ha[d]
placed herself might create in [the child’s] moral and
social outlook."54
In Espiritu v. CA,55 the Court took into account
psychological and case study reports on the child,
whose feelings of insecurity and anxiety had been
traced to strong conflicts with the mother. To the
psychologist the child revealed, among other things,
that the latter was disturbed upon seeing "her mother
hugging and kissing a ‘bad’ man who lived in their
house and worked for her father." The Court held that
the "illicit or immoral activities of the mother had
already caused the child emotional disturbances,
personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting
moral values x x x."
Based on the above jurisprudence, it is therefore not
enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn
was a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she
carried on her purported relationship with a person of
the same sex in the presence of their son or under
circumstances not conducive to the child’s proper
moral development. Such a fact has not been shown
here. There is no evidence that the son was exposed
to the mother’s alleged sexual proclivities or that his
proper moral and psychological development suffered
as a result.
Moreover, it is worthy to note that the trial court
judge, Helen Bautista-Ricafort, ruled in her May 17,
2002 Order that she had found the "reason stated by
[Crisanto] not to be compelling"56 as to suffice as a
ground for separating the child from his mother. The
judge made this conclusion after personally observing
the two of them, both in the courtroom and in her
chambers on April 16, 2002, and after a chance to
talk to the boy and to observe him firsthand. This
assessment, based on her unique opportunity to
witness the child’s behavior in the presence of each
parent, should carry more weight than a mere reliance
on the records. All told, no compelling reason has
been adduced to wrench the child from the mother’s
custody.
No Grant of Habeas Corpus and Preliminary
Injunction
As we have ruled that Joycelyn has the right to keep
her minor son in her custody, the writ of habeas
corpus and the preliminary mandatory injunction
prayed for by Crisanto have no leg to stand on. A writ
of habeas corpus may be issued only when the
"rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto,"57 a situation that does not
apply here.
On the other hand, the ancillary remedy of
preliminary mandatory injunction cannot be granted,
because Crisanto’s right to custody has not been
proven to be "clear and unmistakable."58 Unlike an
ordinary preliminary injunction, the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction is more cautiously
regarded, since the latter requires the performance of
a particular act that tends to go beyond the
maintenance of the status quo.59 Besides, such an
injunction would serve no purpose, now that the case
has been decided on its merits.60
WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No. 154994
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the May 17, 2002
Regional Trial Court Order REINSTATED. The
Petition in GR No. 156254 is DISMISSED. Costs
against Petitioner Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES
LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA, respondents-
appellees.
ROMERO, J.:
In this petition for review, we are asked to overturn
the decision of the Court of Appeals1 granting
custody of six-year old Leouel Santos, Jr. to his
maternal grandparents and not to his father, Santos,
Sr. What is sought is a decision which should
definitively settle the matter of the care, custody and
control of the boy.
Happily, unlike King Solomon, we need not merely
rely on a "wise and understanding heart," for there is
man's law to guide us and that is, the Family Code.
76
The antecedent facts giving rise to the case at bench
are as follows:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and
Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in
Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child,
Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987.
From the time the boy was released from the hospital
until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and
custody of his maternal grandparents, private
respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in
the temporary custody of the latter's parents, the
respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they
paid for all the hospital bills, as well as the
subsequent support of the boy because petitioner
could not afford to do so.
The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the
United States in May 1988 to work. Petitioner alleged
that he is not aware of her whereabouts and his
efforts to locate her in the United States proved futile.
Private respondents claim that although abroad, their
daughter Julia had been sending financial support to
them for her son.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two
brothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-
year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents
contend that through deceit and false pretensions,
petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited
him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros
Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care,
Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos
Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
with Santos, Sr. as respondent.2
After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the
trial court issued an order on the same day awarding
custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his
grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.3
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of
Appeals.4 In its decision dated April 30, 1992,
respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's
order. 5 His motion for reconsideration having been
denied,6 petitioner now brings the instant petition for
review for a reversal of the appellate court's decision.
The Court of Appeals erred, according to petitioner,
in awarding custody of the boy to his grandparents
and not to himself. He contends that since private
respondents have failed to show that petitioner is an
unfit and unsuitable father, substitute parental
authority granted to the boy's grandparents under Art.
214 of the Family Code is inappropriate.
Petitioner adds that the reasons relied upon by the
private respondents in having custody over the boy,
are flimsy and insufficient to deprive him of his
natural and legal right to have custody.
On the other hand, private respondents aver that they
can provide an air-conditioned room for the boy and
that petitioner would not be in a position to take care
of his son since he has to be assigned to different
places. They also allege that the petitioner did not
give a single centavo for the boy's support and
maintenance. When the boy was about to be released
from the hospital, they were the ones who paid the
fees because their daughter and petitioner had no
money. Besides, Julia Bedia Santos, their daughter,
had entrusted the boy to them before she left for the
United States. Furthermore, petitioner's use of
trickery and deceit in abducting the child in 1990,
after being hospitably treated by private respondents,
does not speak well of his fitness and suitability as a
parent.
The Bedias argue that although the law recognizes
the right of a parent to his child's custody, ultimately
the primary consideration is what is best for the
happiness and welfare of the latter. As maternal
grandparents who have amply demonstrated their
love and affection for the boy since his infancy, they
claim to be in the best position to promote the child's
welfare.
The issue to be resolved here boils down to who
should properly be awarded custody of the minor
Leouel Santos, Jr.
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from
the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority
or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical
institution whereby parents rightfully assume control
and protection of their unemancipated children to the
extent required by the latter' s needs.7 It is a mass of
rights and obligations which the law grants to parents
for the purpose of the children's physical preservation
and development, as well as the cultivation of their
intellect and the education of their heart and
senses.8 As regards parental authority, "there is no
power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of
duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the
welfare of the minor."9
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable
and may not be transferred or renounced except in
cases authorized by law. 10 The right attached to
parental authority, being purely personal, the law
allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's
home or an orphan institution. 11 When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a
friend or godfather, even in a document, what is
given is merely temporary custody and it does not
constitute a renunciation of parental authority. 12 Even
if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same. 13
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of
unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled
to keep them in their custody and
company. 14 The child's welfare is always the
paramount consideration in all questions concerning
his care and custody. 15
77
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental
authority over the persons of their common
children. 16 In case of absence or death of either
parent, the parent present shall continue exercising
parental authority. 17 Only in case of the parents'
death, absence or unsuitability may substitute
parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. 18 The situation obtaining in the case at
bench is one where the mother of the minor Santos,
Jr., is working in the United States while the father,
petitioner Santos, Sr., is present. Not only are they
physically apart but are also emotionally separated.
There has been no decree of legal separation and
petitioner's attempt to obtain an annulment of the
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
of his wife has failed. 19
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court
and the appellate court to award custody of his minor
son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the
ground that under Art. 214 of the Family Code,
substitute parental authority of the grandparents is
proper only when both parents are dead, absent or
unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him,
has not been successfully shown by private
respondents.
The Court of Appeals held that although there is no
evidence to show that petitioner (Santos Sr.) is
"depraved, a habitual drunkard or poor, he may
nevertheless be considered, as he is in fact so
considered, to be unsuitable to be allowed to have
custody of minor Leouel Santos Jr." 20
The respondent appellate court, in affirming the trial
court's order of October 8, 1990, adopted as its own
the latter's observations, to wit:
From the evidence adduced, this
Court is of the opinion that it is to
be (sic) best interest of the minor
Leouel Santos, Jr. that he be placed
under the care, custody, and control
of his maternal grandparents the
petitioners herein. The petitioners
have amply demonstrated their love
and devotion to their grandson
while the natural father, respondent
herein, has shown little interest in
his welfare as reflected by his
conduct in the past. Moreover the
fact that petitioners are well-off
financially, should be carefully
considered in awarding to them the
custody of the minor herein, lest the
breaking of such ties with his
maternal grandparents might
deprive the boy of an eventual
college education and other
material advantages (Consaul vs.
Consaul, 63 N.Y.S. 688).
Respondent had never given any
previous financial support to his
son, while, upon the other hand, the
latter receives so much bounty from
his maternal grandparents and his
mother as well, who is now
gainfully employed in the United
States. Moreover, the fact that
respondent, as a military personnel
who has to shuttle from one
assignment to another, and, in these
troubled times, may have pressing
and compelling military duties
which may prevent him from
attending to his son at times when
the latter needs him most, militates
strongly against said respondent.
Additionally, the child is sickly and
asthmatic and needs the loving and
tender care of those who can
provide for it. 21
We find the aforementioned considerations
insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental authority
and the concomitant right to have custody over the
minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not
been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent.
Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection
for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is
still preferred over the grandparents. 22 The latter's
wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because
there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is
in no position to support the boy. The fact that he was
unable to provide financial support for his minor son
from birth up to over three years when he took the
boy from his in-laws without permission, should not
be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent
right to the child's custody. While petitioner's
previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only
the severest criticism, it cannot be construed as
abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision
against him and his efforts to keep his only child in
his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to
rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody
would help enhance the bond between parent and son.
It would also give the father a chance to prove his
love for his son and for the son to experience the
warmth and support which a father can give.
His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him
custody over the boy. So many men in uniform who
are assigned to different parts of the country in the
service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of
their children. It is not just to deprive our soldiers of
authority, care and custody over their children merely
because of the normal consequences of their duties
and assignments, such as temporary separation from
their families.
Petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away
his boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is
likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.
Private respondents' attachment to the young boy
whom they have reared for the past three years is
understandable. Still and all, the law considers the
natural love of a parent to outweigh that of the
grandparents, such that only when the parent present
is shown to be unfit or unsuitable may the
grandparents exercise substitute parental authority, a
fact which has not been proven here.
The strong bonds of love and affection possessed by
private respondents as grandparents should not be
78
seen as incompatible with petitioner' right to custody
over the child as a father. Moreover, who is to say
whether the petitioner's financial standing may
improve in the future?
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated
April 30, 1992 as well as its Resolution dated
November 13, 1992 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Custody over the minor Leouel Santos Jr. is
awarded to his legitimate father, herein petitioner
Leouel Santos, Sr.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995
DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R.
VILLAR, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of
private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in
Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man
and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a
while, the relationship between petitioner and private
respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result
of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9,
1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two
more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on
June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private
respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to
Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City
sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal
wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought
by Villar to his house as they were eventually
accepted by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow
Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his
family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip,
Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he
had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family
Academy for the next school year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas
corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
After hearing, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 at
Angeles City, rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the petitioner
and against the respondent:
1. the rightful custody of the minor
Christopher J. T. David is hereby
given to the natural mother, the
herein petitioner Daisie T. David;
2. respondent is hereby ordered to
give a temporary support of
P3,000.00 a month to the subject
minor Christopher J. T. David,
Christine David and Cathy Mae
David to take effect upon the
finality of this decision; and
3. to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed,
holding:
We agree with the respondent-
appellant's view that this is not
proper in a habeas corpus case.
 Law and jurisprudence wherein the
question of custody of a minor
child may be decided in a habeas
corpus case contemplate a situation
where the parents are married to
each other but are separated. This is
so because under the Family Code,
the father and mother have joint
parental authority over their
legitimate children and in case of
separation of the parents there is
need to determine rightful custody
of their children. The same does not
hold true in an adulterous
relationship, as in the case at bar,
the child born out of such a
relationship is under the parental
authority of the mother by express
provision of the law. Hence, the
question of custody and support
should be brought in a case
singularly filed for the purpose. In
point of fact, this is more advisable
in the case at bar because the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the other minor children of the
petitioner-appellee and respondent-
appellant and, therefore, cannot
properly provide for their support.
Admittedly, respondent-appellant is
financially well-off, he being a very
rich businessman; whereas,
petitioner-appellee depends upon
her sisters and parents for support.
In fact, he financially supported
petitioner-appellee and her three
minor children. It is, therefore, for
the best interest of Christopher J
that he should temporarily remain
under the custody of respondent-
appellant until the issue on custody
and support shall have been
determined in a proper case.
79
WHEREFORE, the decision
appealed from is hereby SET
ASIDE, and a NEW ONE
ENTERED dismissing the petition
for habeas corpus in Special
Proceeding No. 4489.
Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the
appellate court's decision.
Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the
writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person
is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto."
It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed,
that the determination of the right to the custody of
minor children is relevant in cases where the parents,
who are married to each other, are for some reason
separated from each other. It does not follow,
however, that it cannot arise in any other situation.
For example, in the case of Salvaña v. Gaela,1 it was
held that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper
remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a
minor daughter even though the latter be in the
custody of a third person of her free will because the
parents were compelling her to marry a man against
her will.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate
child since at the time of his conception, his father,
private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to
another woman other than the child's mother. As
such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code,
Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his
mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence
of such authority, is entitled to have custody of
him.2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived
of her rightful custody of her child by private
respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus.
Indeed, Rule 1021 §1 makes no distinction between
the case of a mother who is separated from her
husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and
that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law,
is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived
of her rightful custody of her child.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the
minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give
support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of
the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no
child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise."3
Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a
reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her
children, especially considering that she has been
able to rear and support them on her own since they
were born. Petitioner is a market vendor earning from
P2,000 to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the RTC
decision was rendered. She augments her income by
working as secretary at the Computer System
Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly income of
P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her
employer so that she can personally attend to her
children. She works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening
to make up for time lost during the day. That she
receives help from her parents and sister for the
support of the three children is not a point against her.
Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every
member of the family are characteristics of the close
family ties that bind the Filipino family and have
made it what it is.
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of
affluence that private respondent promises if the child
lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner
is earning a decent living and is able to support her
children according to her means.
The Regional Trial Court ordered private respondent
to give temporary support to petitioner in the amount
of P3,000.00 a month, pending the filing of an action
for support, after finding that private respondent did
not give any support to his three children by Daisie,
except the meager amount of P500.00 a week which
he stopped giving them on June 23, 1992. He is a rich
man who professes love for his children. In fact he
filed a motion for the execution of the decision of the
Court of Appeals, alleging that he had observed his
son "to be physically weak and pale because of
malnutrition and deprivation of the luxury and
amenities he was accustomed to when in the former
custody of the respondent." He prayed that he be
given the custody of the child so that he can provide
him with the "proper care and education."
Although the question of support is proper in a
proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in
this case is justified by the fact that private
respondent has expressed willingness to support the
minor child. The order for payment of allowance
need not be conditioned on the grant to him of
custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the Family
Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill his
obligation either by paying the allowance fixed by the
court or by receiving and maintaining in the family
dwelling the person who is entitled to support unless,
in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle
thereto."
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out,
Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at
least at the time the case was decided by the RTC,
cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now
that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's
custody over him will have to be upheld because the
child categorically expressed preference to live with
his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code,
courts must respect the "choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit"
and here it has not been shown that the mother is in
any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if
private respondent loves his child, he should not
condition the grant of support for him on the award of
his custody to him (private respondent).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED and private respondent is ORDERED
80
to deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the
custody of his mother, the herein petitioner, and to
give him temporary support in the amount of
P3,000.00, pending the fixing of the amount of
support in an appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995
REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA
LAYUG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA
MASAUDING, respondents.
MELO, J.:
This case concerns a seemingly void marriage and a
relationship which went sour. The innocent victims
are two children horn out of the same union. Upon
this Court now falls the not too welcome task of
deciding the issue of who, between the father and
mother, is more suitable and better qualified in
helping the children to grow into responsible, well-
adjusted, and happy young adulthood.
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita
Masauding first met sometime in 1976 in Iligan City
where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel
Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in
a local hospital. In 1977, Teresita left for Los
Angeles, California to work as a nurse. She was able
to acquire immigrant status sometime later. In 1984,
Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National
Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its
liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began
to maintain a common law relationship of husband
and wife. On August 16, 1986, their daughter,
Rosalind Therese, was born. On October 7, 1987,
while they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines,
Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their
return to the United States, their second child, a son,
this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was
born on January 12, 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they
decided to separate sometime in 1990. Teresita
blamed Reynaldo for the break-up, stating he was
always nagging her about money matters. Reynaldo,
on the other hand, contended that Teresita was a
spendthrift, buying expensive jewelry and antique
furniture instead of attending to household expenses.
Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as
allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left
Reynaldo and the children and went back to
California. She claims, however, that she spent a lot
of money on long distance telephone calls to keep in
constant touch with her children.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the
Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh
was not yet completed, he was sent back by his
company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children
with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her
family.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow
her children because Reynaldo filed a criminal case
for bigamy against her and she was afraid of being
arrested. The judgment of conviction in the bigamy
case was actually rendered only on September 29,
1994. (Per Judge Harriet O. Demetriou, Branch 70,
RTC, Pasig, pp. 210-222, Rollo). Teresita,
meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and
on December 8, 1992 and filed the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to
gain custody over the children, thus starting the
whole proceedings now reaching this Court.
On June 30, 1993, the trial court dismissed the
petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's
parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and
declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority
over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed
upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court.
On February 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals per
Justice Isnani, with Justices de Pano and Ibay-Somera
concurring, reversed the trial court's decision. It gave
custody to Teresita and visitation rights on weekends
to Reynaldo.
Petitioners now come to this Court on a petition for
review, in the main contending that the Court of
Appeals disregarded the factual findings of the trial
court; that the Court of Appeals further engaged in
speculations and conjectures, resulting in its
erroneous conclusion that custody of the children
should be given to respondent Teresita.
We believe that respondent court resolved the
question of custody over the children through an
automatic and blind application of the age proviso of
Article 363 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 363. In all questions on the
care, custody, education and
property of the children, the latter's
welfare shall be paramount. No
mother shall be separated from her
child under seven years of age,
unless the court finds compelling
reasons for such measure.
and of Article 213 of the Family Code which
in turn provides:
Art. 213. In case of separation of
the parents parental authority shall
be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court
shall take into account all relevant
considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years
of age unless the parent chosen is
unfit.
The decision under review is based on the report of
the Code Commission which drafted Article 213 that
a child below seven years still needs the loving,
81
tender care that only a mother can give and which,
presumably, a father cannot give in equal measure.
The commentaries of a member of the Code
Commission, former Court of Appeals Justice Alicia
Sempio-Diy, in a textbook on the Family Code, were
also taken into account. Justice Diy believes that a
child below seven years should still be awarded to her
mother even if the latter is a prostitute or is unfaithful
to her husband. This is on the theory that moral
dereliction has no effect on a baby unable to
understand such action. (Handbook on the Family
Code of the Philippines, 1988 Ed., p. 297.)
The Court of Appeals was unduly swayed by an
abstract presumption of law rather than an
appreciation of relevant facts and the law which
should apply to those facts. The task of choosing the
parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a
ministerial function to be determined by a simple
determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a
child is under or over seven years of age, the
paramount criterion must always be the child's
interests. Discretion is given to the court to decide
who can best assure the welfare of the child, and
award the custody on the basis of that consideration.
In Unson III vs. Navarro (101 SCRA 183 [1980]), we
laid down the rule that "in all controversies regarding
the custody of minors, the sole and foremost
consideration is the physical, education, social and
moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into
account the respective resources and social and moral
situations of the contending parents", and in Medina
vs. Makabali (27 SCRA 502 [1969]), where custody
of the minor was given to a non-relative as against
the mother, then the country's leading civilist, Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, explained its basis in this manner:
. . . While our law recognizes the
right of a parent to the custody of
her child, Courts must not lose
sight of the basic principle that "in
all questions on the care, custody,
education and property of children,
the latter's welfare shall be
paramount" (Civil Code of the
Philippines. Art. 363), and that for
compelling reasons, even a child
under seven may be ordered
separated from the mother (do).
This is as it should be, for in the
continual evolution of legal
institutions, the patria potestas has
been transformed from the jus vitae
ac necis (right of life and death) of
the Roman law, under which the
offspring was virtually a chattel of
his parents into a radically different
institution, due to the influence of
Christian faith and doctrines. The
obligational aspect is now supreme.
As pointed out by Puig Pena, now
"there is no power, but a task; no
complex of rights (of parents) but a
sum of duties; no sovereignty, but a
sacred trust for the welfare of the
minor."
As a result, the right of parents to
the company and custody of their
children is but ancillary to the
proper discharge of parental duties
to provide the children with
adequate support, education, moral,
intellectual and civic training and
development (Civil Code, Art.
356).
(pp. 504-505.)
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the
child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to
take into account all relevant considerations. If a
child is under seven years of age, the law presumes
that the mother is the best custodian. The
presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can
be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is
over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the
court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the
court may find the chosen parent unfit and award
custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as
it deems fit under the circumstances.
In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are
now over seven years of age. Rosalind celebrated her
seventh birthday on August 16, 1993 while Reginald
reached the same age on January 12, 1995. Both are
studying in reputable schools and appear to be fairly
intelligent children, quite capable of thoughtfully
determining the parent with whom they would want
to live. Once the choice has been made, the burden
returns to the court to investigate if the parent thus
chosen is unfit to assume parental authority and
custodial responsibility.
Herein lies the error of the Court of Appeals. Instead
of scrutinizing the records to discover the choice of
the children and rather than verifying whether that
parent is fit or unfit, respondent court simply
followed statutory presumptions and general
propositions applicable to ordinary or common
situations. The seven-year age limit was mechanically
treated as an arbitrary cut off period and not a guide
based on a strong presumption.
A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that
Teresita, or at least, her counsel are more intent on
emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a mother
separated from her children and the humiliation she
suffered as a result of her character being made a key
issue in court rather than the feelings and future, the
best interests and welfare of her children. While the
bonds between a mother and her small child are
special in nature, either parent, whether father or
mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived
of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is
greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much
the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either
parent but the welfare of the child which is the
paramount consideration.
We are inclined to sustain the findings and
conclusions of the regional trial court because it gave
greater attention to the choice of Rosalind and
82
considered in detail all the relevant factors bearing on
the issue of custody.
When she was a little over 5 years old, Rosalind was
referred to a child psychologist, Rita Flores
Macabulos, to determine the effects of uprooting her
from the Assumption College where she was
studying. Four different tests were administered. The
results of the tests are quite revealing. The responses
of Rosalind about her mother were very negative
causing the psychologist to delve deeper into the
child's anxiety. Among the things revealed by
Rosalind was an incident where she saw her mother
hugging and kissing a "bad" man who lived in their
house and worked for her father. Rosalind refused to
talk to her mother even on the telephone. She tended
to be emotionally emblazed because of constant fears
that she may have to leave school and her aunt's
family to go back to the United States to live with her
mother. The 5-1/2 page report deals at length with
feelings of insecurity and anxiety arising from strong
conflict with the mother. The child tried to
compensate by having fantasy activities. All of the 8
recommendations of the child psychologist show that
Rosalind chooses petitioners over the private
respondent and that her welfare will be best served by
staying with them (pp. 199-205, Rollo).
At about the same time, a social welfare case study
was conducted for the purpose of securing the travel
clearance required before minors may go abroad.
Social Welfare Officer Emma D. Estrada Lopez,
stated that the child Rosalind refused to go back to
the United States and be reunited with her mother.
She felt unloved and uncared for. Rosalind was more
attached to her Yaya who did everything for her and
Reginald. The child was found suffering from
emotional shock caused by her mother's infidelity.
The application for travel clearance was
recommended for denial (pp. 206-209, Rollo).
Respondent Teresita, for her part, argues that the 7-
year age reference in the law applies to the date when
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed, not to
the date when a decision is rendered. This argument
is flawed. Considerations involving the choice made
by a child must be ascertained at the time that either
parent is given custody over the child. The matter of
custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the
parent who was given custody suffers a future
character change and becomes unfit, the matter of
custody can always be re-examined and adjusted
(Unson III v. Navarro, supra, at p. 189). To be sure,
the welfare, the best interests, the benefit, and the
good of the child must be determined as of the time
that either parent is chosen to be the custodian. At the
present time, both children are over 7 years of age
and are thus perfectly capable of making a fairly
intelligent choice.
According to respondent Teresita, she and her
children had tearful reunion in the trial court, with the
children crying, grabbing, and embracing her to
prevent the father from taking them away from her.
We are more inclined to believe the father's
contention that the children ignored Teresita in court
because such an emotional display as described by
Teresita in her pleadings could not have been missed
by the trial court. Unlike the Justices of the Court of
Appeals Fourth Division, Judge Lucas P. Bersamin
personally observed the children and their mother in
the courtroom. What the Judge found is diametrically
opposed to the contentions of respondent Teresita.
The Judge had this to say on the matter.
And, lastly, the Court cannot look
at petitioner [Teresita] in similar
light, or with more understanding,
especially as her conduct and
demeanor in the courtroom (during
most of the proceedings) or
elsewhere (but in the presence of
the undersigned presiding judge)
demonstrated her ebulent temper
that tended to corroborate the
alleged violence of her physical
punishment of the children (even if
only for ordinary disciplinary
purposes) and emotional instability,
typified by her failure (or refusal?)
 to show deference and respect to
the Court and the other parties (pp.
12-13, RTC Decision)
Respondent Teresita also questions the competence
and impartiality of the expert witnesses. Respondent
court, in turn, states that the trial court should have
considered the fact that Reynaldo and his sister,
herein petitioner Guillerma Layug, hired the two
expert witnesses. Actually, this was taken into
account by the trial court which stated that the
allegations of bias and unfairness made by Teresita
against the psychologist and social worker were not
substantiated.
The trial court stated that the professional integrity
and competence of the expert witnesses and the
objectivity of the interviews were unshaken and
unimpeached. We might add that their testimony
remain uncontroverted. We also note that the
examinations made by the experts were conducted in
late 1991, well over a year before the filing by
Teresita of the habeas corpus petition in December,
1992. Thus, the examinations were at that time not
intended to support petitioners' position in litigation,
because there was then not even an impending
possibility of one. That they were subsequently
utilized in the case a quo when it did materialize does
not change the tenor in which they were first
obtained.
Furthermore, such examinations, when presented to
the court must be construed to have been presented
not to sway the court in favor of any of the parties,
but to assist the court in the determination of the issue
before it. The persons who effected such
examinations were presented in the capacity of expert
witnesses testifying on matters within their respective
knowledge and expertise. On this matter, this Court
had occasion to rule in the case of Sali vs. Abukakar,
et al. (17 SCRA 988 [1966]).
The fact that, in a particular
litigation, an NBI expert examines
certain contested documents, at the
83
request, not of a public officer or
agency of the Government, but of a
private litigant, does not necessarily
nullify the examination thus made.
Its purpose, presumably, to assist
the court having jurisdiction over
said litigation, in the performance
of its duty to settle correctly the
issues relative to said documents.
Even a non-expert private
individual may examine the same,
if there are facts within his
knowledge which may help, the
court in the determination of said
issue. Such examination, which
may properly be undertaken by a
non-expert private individual, does
not, certainly become null and void
when the examiner is an expert
and/or an officer of the NBI.
(pp. 991-992.)
In regard to testimony of expert witnesses it was held
in Salomon, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
et al. (185 SCRA 352 [1990]):
. . . Although courts are not
ordinarily bound by expert
testimonies, they may place
whatever weight they choose upon
such testimonies in accordance
with the facts of the case. The
relative weight and sufficiency of
expert testimony is peculiarly
within the province of the trial
court to decide, considering the
ability and character of the witness,
his actions upon the witness stand,
the weight and process of the
reasoning by which he has
supported his opinion, his possible
bias in favor of the side for whom
he testifies, the fact that he is a paid
witness, the relative opportunities
for study and observation of the
matters about which he testifies,
and any other matters which
reserve to illuminate his statements.
The opinion of the expert may not
be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be
considered by the court in view of
all the facts and circumstances in
the case and when common
knowledge utterly fails, the expert
opinion may be given controlling
effect (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058).
The problem of the credibility of
the expert witness and the
evaluation of his testimony is left to
the discretion of the trial court
whose ruling thereupon is not
reviewable in the absence of an
abuse of that discretion.
(p. 359)
It was in the exercise of this discretion, coupled with
the opportunity to assess the witnesses' character and
to observe their respective demeanor that the trial
court opted to rely on their testimony, and we believe
that the trial court was correct in its action.
Under direct examination an February 4, 1993, Social
Worker Lopez stated that Rosalind and her aunt were
about to board a plane when they were off-loaded
because there was no required clearance. They were
referred to her office, at which time Reginald was
also brought along and interviewed. One of the
regular duties of Social Worker Lopez in her job
appears to be the interview of minors who leave for
abroad with their parents or other persons. The
interview was for purposes of foreign travel by a 5-
year old child and had nothing to do with any
pending litigation. On cross-examination, Social
Worker Lopez stated that her assessment of the
minor's hatred for her mother was based on the
disclosures of the minor. It is inconceivable, much
less presumable that Ms. Lopez would compromise
her position, ethics, and the public trust reposed on a
person of her position in the course of doing her job
by falsely testifying just to support the position of any
litigant.
The psychologist, Ms. Macabulos, is a B.S. magna
cum laude graduate in Psychology and an M.A.
degree holder also in Psychology with her thesis
graded "Excellent". She was a candidate for a
doctoral degree at the time of the interview. Petitioner
Reynaldo may have shouldered the cost of the
interview but Ms. Macabulos services were secured
because Assumption College wanted an examination
of the child for school purposes and not because of
any litigation. She may have been paid to examine
the child and to render a finding based on her
examination, but she was not paid to fabricate such
findings in favor of the party who retained her
services. In this instance it was not even petitioner
Reynaldo but the school authorities who initiated the
same. It cannot be presumed that a professional of her
potential and stature would compromise her
professional standing.
Teresita questions the findings of the trial court that:
1. Her morality is questionable as
shown by her marrying Reynaldo at
the time she had a subsisting
marriage with another man.
2. She is guilty of grave
indiscretion in carrying on a love
affair with one of the Reynaldo's
fellow NSC employees.
3. She is incapable of providing the
children with necessities and
conveniences commensurate to
their social standing because she
does not even own any home in the
Philippines.
4. She is emotionally unstable with
ebullient temper.
84
It is contended that the above findings do not
constitute the compelling reasons under the law
which would justify depriving her of custody over the
children; worse, she claims, these findings are non-
existent and have not been proved by clear and
convincing evidence.
Public and private respondents give undue weight to
the matter of a child under 7 years of age not to be
separated from the mother, without considering what
the law itself denominates as compelling reasons or
relevant considerations to otherwise decree. In
the Unson III case, earlier mentioned, this Court
stated that it found no difficulty in not awarding
custody to the mother, it being in the best interest of
the child "to be freed from the obviously
unwholesome, not
to say immoral influence, that the situation where [the
mother] had placed herself . . . might create in the
moral and social outlook of [the child] who was in
her formative and most impressionable stage . . ."
Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and
Reginald are now over 7 years of age. They
understand the difference between right and wrong,
ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best
interests would be better served in an environment
characterized by emotional stability and a certain
degree of material sufficiency. There is nothing in the
records to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person
under Article 213 of the Family Code. In fact, he has
been trying his best to give the children the kind of
attention and care which the mother is not in a
position to extend.
The argument that the charges against the mother are
false is not supported by the records. The findings of
the trial court are based on evidence.
Teresita does not deny that she was legally married to
Roberto Lustado on December 17, 1984 in California
(p. 13, Respondent's Memorandum; p. 238, Rollo; pp.
11, RTC Decision). Less than a year later, she had
already driven across the continental United States to
commence living with another man, petitioner
Reynaldo, in Pittsburgh. The two were married on
October 7, 1987. Of course, to dilute this
disadvantage on her part, this matter of her having
contracted a bigamous marriage later with Reynaldo,
Teresita tried to picture Reynaldo as a rapist, alleging
further that she told Reynaldo about her marriage to
Lustado on the occasion when she was raped by
Reynaldo. Expectedly, Judge Harriet Demetriou of
the Pasig RTC lent no weight to such tale. And even
if this story were given credence, it adds to and not
subtracts from the conviction of this Court about
Teresita's values. Rape is an insidious crime against
privacy. Confiding to one's potential rapist about a
prior marriage is not a very convincing indication that
the potential victim is averse to the act. The
implication created is that the act would be
acceptable if not for the prior marriage.
More likely is Reynaldo's story that he learned of the
prior marriage only much later. In fact, the rape
incident itself is unlikely against a woman who had
driven three days and three nights from California,
who went straight to the house of Reynaldo in
Pittsburgh and upon arriving went to bed and, who
immediately thereafter started to live with him in a
relationship which is marital in nature if not in fact.
Judge Bersamin of the court a quo believed the
testimony of the various witnesses that while married
to Reynaldo, Teresita entered into an illicit
relationship with Perdencio Gonzales right there in
the house of petitioner Reynaldo and respondent
Teresita. Perdencio had been assigned by the
National Steel Corporation to assist in the project in
Pittsburgh and was staying with Reynaldo, his co-
employee, in the latter's house. The record shows that
the daughter Rosalind suffered emotional disturbance
caused by the traumatic effect of seeing her mother
hugging and kissing a boarder in their house. The
record also shows that it was Teresita who left the
conjugal home and the children, bound for California.
When Perdencio Gonzales was reassigned to the
Philippines, Teresita followed him and was seen in
his company in a Cebu hotel, staying in one room and
taking breakfast together. More significant is that
letters and written messages from Teresita to
Perdencio were submitted in evidence (p.12, RTC
Decision).
The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting
from one man to another does not fall under
"compelling reasons" is neither meritorious nor
applicable in this case. Not only are the children over
seven years old and their clear choice is the father,
but the illicit or immoral activities of the mother had
already caused emotional disturbances, personality
conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values, at
least in Rosalind. This is not to mention her
conviction for the crime of bigamy, which from the
records appears to have become final (pp. 210-
222, Rollo).
Respondent court's finding that the father could not
very well perform the role of a sole parent and
substitute mother because his job is in the United
States while the children will be left behind with their
aunt in the Philippines is misplaced. The assignment
of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh is or was a temporary one.
He was sent there to oversee the purchase of a steel
mill component and various equipment needed by the
National Steel Corporation in the Philippines. Once
the purchases are completed, there is nothing to keep
him there anymore. In fact, in a letter dated January
30, 1995, Reynaldo informs this Court of the
completion of his assignment abroad and of his
permanent return to the Philippines (ff.
p. 263, Rollo).
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the
trial court. The children are now both over seven
years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they
prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all
indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the
two requirements found in the first paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption
under the second paragraph of said article no longer
applies as the children are over seven years.
Assuming that the presumption should have
persuasive value for children only one or two years
beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the
85
statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant
considerations not to grant custody to the mother. The
children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of
their mother and have been affected in their
emotional growth by her behavior.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and
set aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region stationed in Quezon City and presided over
by the Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case
No. Q-92-14206 awarding custody of the minors
Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to their father,
Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No special
pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118870 March 29, 1996
NERISSA Z. PEREZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Division) and
RAY C. PEREZ, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:p
Parties herein would have this Court duplicate the
feat of King Solomon who was hailed in Biblical
times for his sagacious, if, at times unorthodox,
manner of resolving conflicts, the most celebrated
case being that when his authority was invoked to
determine the identity of the real mother as between
two women claiming the same infant. Since there
could only be one mother, the daunting task that
confronted the king/judge was to choose the true one.
In the instant case, we are faced with the challenge of
deciding, as between father and mother, who should
have rightful custody of a child who bears in his
person both their genes.
While there is a provision of law squarely in point,
the two courts whose authority have been invoked to
render a decision have arrived at diametrically
opposite conclusions.
It has fallen upon us now to likewise act as judge
between the trial court, on the one hand, and the
appellate, on the other.
On the issue of custody over the minor Ray Perez II,
respondent Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
boy's father Ray C. Perez, reversing the trial court's
decision to grant custody to Nerissa Z. Perez, the
child's mother.
Ray Perez, private respondent, is a doctor of
medicine practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife
who is petitioner herein, is a registered nurse. They
were married in Cebu on December 6, 1986. After six
miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk
pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray Perez
II in New York on July 20, 1992.
Petitioner who began working in the United States in
October 1988, used part of her earnings to build a
modest house in Mandaue City, Cebu. She also
sought medical attention for her successive
miscarriages in New York. She became a resident
alien in February 1992.
Private respondent stayed with her in the U.S. twice
and took care of her when she became pregnant.
Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa
and was not employed.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby
arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa
returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home
only for a five-week vacation and that they all had
round-trip tickets. However, her husband stayed
behind to take care of his sick mother and promised
to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they
had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines
but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her
mind and continued working. She was supposed to
come back immediately after winding up her affairs
there.
When Nerissa came home a few days, before Ray II's
first birthday, the couple was no longer on good
terms. That their love for each other was fading
became apparent from their serious quarrels.
Petitioner did not want to live near her in-laws and
rely solely on her husband's meager income of
P5,000.00.1 She longed to be with her only child but
he was being kept away from her by her husband.
Thus, she did not want to leave RJ (Ray Junior) with
her husband and in-laws. She wished for her son to
grow up with his mother.
On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he
could raise his son even as he practiced his
profession. He maintained that it would not be
difficult to live here since they have their own home
and a car. They could live comfortably on his
P15,000.00 monthly income2 as they were not
burdened with having to pay any debts.
Petitioner was forced to move to her parents' home on
Guizo Street in Mandaue. Despite mediation by the
priest who solemnized their marriage, the couple
failed to reconcile.
On July 26, 1993, Nerissa Z. Perez filed a petition
for habeas corpus3 asking respondent Ray C. Perez to
surrender the custody of their son, Ray Z. Perez II, to
her.
On August 27, 1993, the court a quo issued an Order
awarding custody of the one-year old child to his
mother, Nerissa Perez, citing the second paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code which provides that
no child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother, unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise. The dispositive portion of
the Order reads:
86
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises
considered, Order is hereby issued
ordering the respondent to turn over
the custody of their child Ray
Cortes Perez II, his passport and
round trip ticket to herein petitioner
with a warning that if he will
escape together with the child for
the purpose of hiding the minor
child instead of complying with this
Order, that warrant for his arrest
will be issued.
SO ORDERED.4
Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals, on
September 27, 1994, reversed the trial court's order
and awarded custody of the boy to his father.5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been
denied,6 she filed the instant petition for review
where the sole issue is the custody of Ray Perez II,
now three years old.
Respondent court differed in opinion from the trial
court and ruled that there were enough reasons to
deny Nerissa Perez custody over Ray II even if the
child is under seven years old. It held that granting
custody to the boy's father would be for the child's
best interest and welfare.7
Before us is the unedifying situation of a husband and
wife in marital discord, struggling for custody of their
only child. It is sad that petitioner and private
respondent have not found it in their hearts to
understand each other and live together once again as
a family. Separated in fact, they now seek the Court's
assistance in the matter of custody or parental
authority over the child.
The wisdom and necessity for the exercise of joint
parental authority need not be belabored. The father
and the mother complement each other in giving
nurture and providing that holistic care which takes
into account the physical, emotional, psychological,
mental, social and spiritual needs of the child. By
precept and example, they mold his character during
his crucial formative years.
However, the Court's intervention is sought in order
that a decision may be made as to which parent shall
be given custody over the young boy. The Court's
duty is to determine whether Ray Perez II will be
better off with petitioner or with private respondent.
We are not called upon to declare which party
committed the greater fault in their domestic quarrel.
When the parents of the child are separated, Article
213 of the Family Code is the applicable law. It
provides:
Art. 213. In case of separation of
the parents, parental authority shall
be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court
shall take into account all relevant
considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years
of age, unless the parent chosen is
unfit.
No child under seven years of age
shall be separated from the
mother. unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order
otherwise. (Emphasis supplied).
Since the Code does not qualify the word
"separation" to mean legal separation decreed by a
court, couples who are separated in fact, such as
petitioner and private respondent, are covered within
its terms.8
The Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar
provision. Rule 99, section 6 (Adoption and Custody
of Minors) provides:
 Sec. 6. Proceedings as to child
whose parents are separated.
Appeal. When husband and wife
are divorced or living separately,
and apart from each other, and the
questions as to the care, custody,
and control of a child or children of
their marriage is brought before a
Court of First Instance by petition
or as an incident to any other
proceeding, the court, upon hearing
the testimony as may be pertinent,
shall award the care, custody, and
control of each such child as will be
for its best interest, permitting the
child to choose which parent it
prefers to live with if it be over ten
years of age, unless the parent
chosen be unfit to take charge of
the child by reason of moral
depravity, habitual drunkenness,
incapacity, or poverty. . . . No child
under seven years of age shall be
separated from its mother, unless
the court finds there are
compelling reasons therefor.
(Emphasis supplied)
The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate
that a child under seven years of age shall not be
separated from his mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the
word "shall" in Article 213 of the Family Code and
Rule 99, section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court
connotes a mandatory character. In the case
of Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson,9 the Court declared:
The use of the word shall in article
363 10 of the Civil Code, coupled
with the observations made by the
Code Commission in respect to the
said legal provision, underscores its
mandatory character. It prohibits in
no uncertain terms the separation of
a mother and her child below seven
87
years, unless such separation is such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental
grounded upon compelling reasons authority. In the past the following grounds have been
as determined by a court.11 considered ample justification to deprive a mother of
custody and parental authority: neglect,
The rationale for awarding the custody of children abandonment,15 unemployment and
younger than seven years of age to their mother was immorality,16 habitual drunkenness,17 drug addiction,
explained by the Code Commission: maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick
with a communicable disease.18
The general rule is recommended in
order to avoid many a tragedy It has long been settled that in custody cases,  19 the
where a mother has seen her baby foremost consideration is always the welfare and best
torn away from her. No man can interest of the child. In fact, no less than an
sound the deep sorrows of a mother international instrument, the Convention on the
who is deprived of her child of Rights of the Child provides: "In all actions
tender age. The exception allowed concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
by the rule has to be for private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
"compelling reasons" for the good administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the
of the child; those cases must best interests of the child shall be a primary
indeed be rare, if the mother's heart consideration."20
is not to be unduly hurt. If she has
erred, as in cases of adultery, the Courts invariably look into all relevant factors
penalty of imprisonment and the presented by the contending parents, such as their
divorce decree (relative divorce) material resources, social and moral
will ordinarily be sufficient situations.21
punishment for her. Moreover,
moral dereliction will not have any
In the case at bench, financial capacity is not a
effect upon the baby who is as yet determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have
unable to understand her situation. demonstrated that they have ample means.
(Report of the Code Commission,
p. 12)12
The Family Code, in reverting to the provision of the
Civil Code that a child below seven years old should
not be separated from the mother (Article 363), has
expressly repealed the earlier Article 17, paragraph
three of the Child and Youth Welfare Code
(Presidential Decree No. 603) which reduced the
child's age to five years.13
The general rule that a child under seven years of age
shall not be separated from his mother finds
its raison d'être in the basic need of a child for his
mother's loving care.14 Only the most compelling of
reasons shall justify the court's awarding the custody
of such a child to someone other than his mother,
Respondent court stated that petitioner has no
permanent place of work in the U.S.A. and has taken
this point against her. The records, however, show
that she is employed in a New York hospital 22 and
was, at the time the petition was filed, still
abroad.23 She testified that she intends to apply for a
job elsewhere, presumably to improve her work
environment and augment her income, as well as for
convenience. 24 The Court takes judicial notice of the
fact that a registered nurse, such as petitioner, is still
very much in demand in the United States. Unlike
private respondent, a doctor who by his own
admission could not find employment there,
petitioner immediately got a job in New York.
Considering her skill and experience petitioner
should find no difficulty in obtaining work elsewhere,
should she desire to do so.
The decision under review casts doubt on petitioner's
capability to take care of the child, particularly since
she works on twelve-hour shifts thrice weekly, at
times, even at night. There being no one to help her
look after the child, it is alleged that she cannot
properly attend to him. This conclusion is as
unwarranted as it is unreasonable. First, her present
work schedule is not so unmanageable as to deprive
her of quality time for Ray II. Quite a number of
working mothers who are away from home for longer
periods of time are still able to raise a family well,
applying time management principles judiciously.
Second, many a mother, finding herself in such a
position, has invited her own mother or relative to
join her abroad, providing the latter with plane tickets
and liberal allowances, to look after the child until he
is able to take care of himself. Others go on leave
from work until such time as the child can be
entrusted to day-care centers. Delegating child care
temporarily to qualified persons who run day-care
centers does not detract from being a good mother, as
long as the latter exercises supervision, for even in
our culture, children are often brought up by
housemaids or "yayas" under the eagle eyes of the
mother. Third, private respondent's work schedule
was not presented in evidence at the trial. Although
he is a general practitioner, the records merely show
88
that he maintains a clinic, works for several
companies on retainer basis and teaches part-
time.25 Hence, respondent court's conclusion that "his
work schedule is flexible (and h)e can always find
time for his son"26 is not well-founded. Fourth, the
fact that private respondent lives near his parents and
sister is not crucial in this case. Fifth, petitioner's
work schedule cited in the respondent court's decision
is not necessarily permanent. Hospitals work in shifts
and, given a mother's instinctive desire to lavish upon
her child the utmost care, petitioner may be expected
to arrange her schedule in such a way as to allocate
time for him. Finally, it does not follow that
petitioner values her career more than her family
simply because she wants to work in the United
States. There are any number of reasons for a person's
seeking a job outside the country, e.g. to augment her
income for the family's benefit and welfare, and for
psychological fulfillment, to name a few. In the
instant case, it has been shown that petitioner earned
enough from her job to be able to construct a house
for the family in Mandaue City. The record describes
sketchily the relations between Ray and Nerissa
Perez. The transcripts of the three hearings are
inadequate to show that petitioner did not exert
earnest efforts and make sacrifices to save her
marriage.
It is not difficult to imagine how heart-rending it is
for a mother whose attempts at having a baby were
frustrated several times over a period of six years to
finally bear one, only for the infant to be snatched
from her before he has even reached his first year.
The mother's role in the life of her child, such as Ray
II, is well-nigh irreplaceable. In prose and poetry, the
depth of a mother's love has been immortalized times
without number, finding as it does, its justification,
not in fantasy but in reality.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated September 27, 1994 as well as its Resolution
dated January 24, 1995 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Order of the trial court dated
August 27, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED. Custody
over the minor Ray Z. Perez II is awarded to his
mother, herein petitioner Nerissa Z. Perez. This
decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168785               February 5, 2010
HERALD BLACK DACASIN, Petitioner,
vs.
SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
For review1 is a dismissal2 of a suit to enforce a post-
foreign divorce child custody agreement for lack of
jurisdiction.
The Facts
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and
respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin (respondent),
Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They
have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September
1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained
from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake
County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree
against petitioner.3 In its ruling, the Illinois court
dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent,
awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and
retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement
purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent
executed in Manila a contract (Agreement 4 ) for the
joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose
Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate
disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent
undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order
"relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to
enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in
violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised sole
custody over Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for,
among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the
Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce the
divorce decree.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court
sustained respondent’s motion and dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that: (1) it
is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit
considering the Illinois court’s retention of
jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its
order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to
respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on
petitioner following the "nationality rule" prevailing
in this jurisdiction;5 and (3) the Agreement is void for
contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil
Code6 prohibiting compromise agreements on
jurisdiction.7
Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new
argument that the divorce decree obtained by
respondent is void. Thus, the divorce decree is no bar
to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the
case.
In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied
reconsideration, holding that unlike in the case of
89
respondent, the divorce decree is binding on
petitioner under the laws of his nationality.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submits the following alternative theories
for the validity of the Agreement to justify its
enforcement by the trial court: (1) the Agreement
novated the valid divorce decree, modifying the terms
of child custody from sole (maternal) to joint; 8 or (2)
the Agreement is independent of the divorce decree
obtained by respondent.
The Issue
The question is whether the trial court has jurisdiction
to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit and enforce the
Agreement on the joint custody of the parties’ child.
The Ruling of the Court
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain
petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the Agreement
which is void. However, factual and equity
considerations militate against the dismissal of
petitioner’s suit and call for the remand of the case to
settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.
Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdictionto
Enforce Contracts
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the
time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court,
statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions
incapable of pecuniary estimation.9 An action for
specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to
enforce the Agreement on joint child custody,
belongs to this species of actions.10 Thus, jurisdiction-
wise, petitioner went to the right court.
Indeed, the trial court’s refusal to entertain
petitioner’s suit was grounded not on its lack of
power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois
court’s divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This
conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court
retained was "jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of
enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of
[its] Judgment for Dissolution."11 Petitioner’s suit
seeks the enforcement not of the "various provisions"
of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce
Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action
lies beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s so-called
"retained jurisdiction."
Petitioner’s Suit Lacks Cause of Action
The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot
enforce the Agreement which is contrary to law.
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to
stipulate the terms of agreement subject to the
minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public
policy.12 Otherwise, the contract is denied legal
existence, deemed "inexistent and void from the
beginning."13 For lack of relevant stipulation in the
Agreement, these and other ancillary Philippine
substantive law serve as default parameters to test the
validity of the Agreement’s joint child custody
stipulations.14
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28
January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie
was under seven years old (having been born on 21
September 1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent
were no longer married under the laws of the United
States because of the divorce decree. The relevant
Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated
in fact or in law15 (under the second paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed:
"no child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother x x x."16 (This statutory awarding of
sole parental custody17 to the mother is
mandatory,18 grounded on sound policy
consideration,19 subject only to a narrow exception
not alleged to obtain here. 20 ) Clearly then, the
Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint
custody regime between respondent and petitioner
over their child under seven years old contravenes
Philippine law.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being
contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the
mother when she refused to allow joint custody by
the father. The Agreement would be valid if the
spouses have not divorced or separated because the
law provides for joint parental authority when
spouses live together. 21 However, upon separation of
the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the
law if the child is below seven years old and any
agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law
suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children
under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses.
Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and
for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the
separated or divorced parents how best to take care of
the child and that is to give custody to the separated
mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract
away the provision in the Family Code on the
maternal custody of children below seven years
anymore than they can privately agree that a mother
who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug
addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable
disease will have sole custody of a child under seven
as these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude
the application of the exclusive maternal custody
regime under the second paragraph of Article 213.22
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to
judicial custodial agreements based on its text that
"No child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother, unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise." To limit this provision’s
enforceability to court sanctioned agreements while
placing private agreements beyond its reach is to
sanction a double standard in custody regulation of
children under seven years old of separated parents.
This effectively empowers separated parents, by the
simple expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert a
legislative policy vesting to the separated mother sole
custody of her children under seven years of age "to
avoid a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby
90
torn away from her."23 This ignores the legislative
basis that "[n]o man can sound the deep sorrows of a
mother who is deprived of her child of tender age."24
It could very well be that Article 213’s bias favoring
one separated parent (mother) over the other (father)
encourages paternal neglect, presumes incapacity for
joint parental custody, robs the parents of custodial
options, or hijacks decision-making between the
separated parents.25 However, these are objections
which question the law’s wisdom not its validity or
uniform enforceability. The forum to air and remedy
these grievances is the legislature, not this Court. At
any rate, the rule’s seeming harshness or
undesirability is tempered by ancillary agreements
the separated parents may wish to enter such as
granting the father visitation and other privileges.
These arrangements are not inconsistent with the
regime of sole maternal custody under the second
paragraph of Article 213 which merely grants to the
mother final authority on the care and custody of the
minor under seven years of age, in case of
disagreements.1avvphi1
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the
second paragraph of Article 213 is limited in
duration, lasting only until the child’s seventh year.
From the eighth year until the child’s emancipation,
the law gives the separated parents freedom, subject
to the usual contractual limitations, to agree on
custody regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly, even
supposing that petitioner and respondent are not
barred from entering into the Agreement for the joint
custody of Stephanie, respondent repudiated the
Agreement by asserting sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondent’s act effectively brought the parties back
to ambit of the default custodial regime in the second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code vesting
on respondent sole custody of Stephanie.
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree’s
alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court
lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated
Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by
his Filipino spouse26 - to support the Agreement’s
enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this
jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees
is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo27 settled the
matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is
bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. 28 There,
we dismissed the alien divorcee’s Philippine suit for
accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property
and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this
jurisdiction in this wise:
There can be no question as to the validity of that
Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as
an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union. What he is contending in this case is that
the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and
public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary
to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
xxxx
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent
is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have
no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction
over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said
Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property. (Emphasis supplied)
We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 29 to
dismiss criminal complaints for adultery filed by the
alien divorcee (who obtained the foreign divorce
decree) against his former Filipino spouse because he
no longer qualified as "offended spouse" entitled to
file the complaints under Philippine procedural rules.
Thus, it should be clear by now that a foreign divorce
decree carries as much validity against the alien
divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the
jurisdiction of the alien’s nationality, irrespective of
who obtained the divorce.
The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding
Justify Remand
Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioner’s suit,
the logical end to its lack of cause of action, we
remand the case for the trial court to settle the
question of Stephanie’s custody. Stephanie is now
nearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outside of
the ambit of the mandatory maternal custody regime
under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of
the default standard on child custody proceedings –
the best interest of the child.30 As the question of
custody is already before the trial court and the
child’s parents, by executing the Agreement, initially
showed inclination to share custody, it is in the
interest of swift and efficient rendition of justice to
allow the parties to take advantage of the court’s
jurisdiction, submit evidence on the custodial
arrangement best serving Stephanie’s interest, and let
the trial court render judgment. This disposition is
consistent with the settled doctrine that in child
custody proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve
the child’s best interest.31
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1
March 2005 and 23 June 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 60. The case is
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with
this ruling.
SO ORDERED.
91
5. Substitute Parental Authority
c. Extent of Authority
G.R. No. 170631, February 10, 2016
CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS
INTERNATIONAL,
INC., Petitioner, v. ERMILINDA R.
ABEJAR, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The plaintiff may first prove the employer's
ownership of the vehicle involved in a mishap by
presenting the vehicle's registration in evidence.
Thereafter, a disputable presumption that the
requirements for an employer's liability under Article
21801 of the Civil Code have been satisfied will arise.
The burden of evidence then shifts to the defendant to
show that no liability under Article 2180 has ensued.
This case, thus, harmonizes the requirements of
Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 2 of the Civil
Code, and the so-called registered-owner rule as
established in this court's rulings in Aguilar, Sr. v.
Commercial Savings Bank,3Del Carmen, Jr. v.
Bacoy,4Filcar Transport Services v.
Espinas,5 and Mendoza v. Spouses Gomez.6
Through this Petition for Review on
Certiorari,7 Caravel Travel and Tours International,
Inc. (Caravan) prays that the Decision8 dated October
3, 2005 and the Resolution 9 dated November 29,
2005 of the Court of Appeals Twelfth Division be
reversed and set aside.10
On July 13, 2000, Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was
walking along the west-bound lane of Sampaguita
Street, United Parañaque Subdivision IV, Parañaque
City.11 A Mitsubishi L-300 van with plate number
PKM 19512 was travelling along the east-bound lane,
opposite Reyes.13 To avoid an incoming vehicle, the
van swerved to its left and hit Reyes. 14 Alex Espinosa
(Espinosa), a witness to the accident, went to her aid
and loaded her in the back of the van. 15 Espinosa told
the driver of the van, Jimmy Bautista (Bautista), to
bring Reyes to the hospital. 16 Instead of doing so,
Bautista appeared to have left the van parked inside a
nearby subdivision with Reyes still in the
van.17 Fortunately for Reyes, an unidentified civilian
came to help and drove Reyes to the hospital. 18
Upon investigation, it was found that the registered
owner of the van was Caravan. 19 Caravan is a
corporation engaged in the business of organizing
travels and tours.20 Bautista was Caravan's employee
assigned to drive the van as its service driver. 21
Caravan shouldered the hospitalization expenses of
Reyes.22 Despite medical attendance, Reyes died two
(2) days after the accident. 23
Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes'
paternal aunt and the person who raised her since she
was nine (9) years old,24 filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Parañaque a Complaint 25 for damages
against Bautista and Caravan. In her Complaint,
Abejar alleged that Bautista was an employee of
Caravan and that Caravan is the registered owner of
the van that hit Reyes. 26
Summons could not be served on Bautista. 27 Thus,
Abejar moved to drop Bautista as a defendant. 28 The
Regional Trial Court granted her Motion. 29
After trial, the Regional Trial Court found that
Bautista was grossly negligent in driving the
vehicle.30 It awarded damages in favor of Abejar, as
follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, considering that the [respondent] was
able to provide by preponderance of evidence her
cause of action against the defendants, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering defendants JIMMY
BAUTISTA and CARAVAN TRAVEL and
TOURS[,] INC., to jointly and solidarity pay the
plaintiff, the following, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. The amount of P35,000.00 representing actual
damages;
2. The amount of P300,000.00 as moral damages;
3. The amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. The amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of
attorney's fees; and
5. The cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Caravan's Motion for Reconsideration32 was denied
through the October 20, 2003 Order 33 of the Regional
Trial Court.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
Regional Trial Court's July 31, 2003 Decision and
October 20, 2003 Order, as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
Decision dated 31 July 2003 and Order dated 20
October 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, City of
Para[ñ]aque, Branch 258, in Civil Case No. 00-0447
are AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1. Moral Damages is REDUCED to
Php 200,000.00;
2. Death Indemnity of Php 50,000.00
is awarded;
3. The Php 35,000.00 actual damages,
Php 200,000.00 moral damages,
Php 30,000.00 exemplary damages
and Php 50,000.00 attorney's fees
shall earn interest at the rate of
6% per annum computed from 31
July 2003, the date of the [Regional
Trial Court's] decision; and upon
finality of this Decision, all the
92
amounts due shall earn interest at
the rate of 12% per annum, in lieu
of 6% per annum, until full
payment; and
4. The Php 50,000.00 death indemnity
shall earn interest at the rate of
6% per annum computed from the
date of promulgation of this
Decision; and upon finality of this
Decision, the amount due shall earn
interest at the rate of 12% per
annum, in lieu of 6% per annum,
until full payment.
Costs against [Caravan].
SO ORDERED.34ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Caravan filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it
was denied in the Court of Appeals' assailed
November 29, 2005 Resolution.35
Hence, this Petition was filed.
Caravan argues that Abejar has no personality to
bring this suit because she is not a real party in
interest. According to Caravan, Abejar does not
exercise legal or substitute parental authority. She is
also not the judicially appointed guardian or the only
living relative of the deceased. 36 She is also not "the
executor or administrator of the estate of the
deceased."37 According to Caravan, only the victim
herself or her heirs can enforce an action based
on culpa aquiliana such as Abejar's action for
damages.38
Caravan adds that Abejar offered no documentary or
testimonial evidence to prove that Bautista, the
driver, acted "within the scope of his assigned
tasks"39 when the accident occurred.40 According to
Caravan, Bautista's tasks only pertained to the
transport of company personnel or products, and
when the accident occurred, he had not been
transporting personnel or delivering products of and
for the company.41
Caravan also argues that "it exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees."42
Caravan further claims that Abejar should not have
been awarded moral damages, actual damages, death
indemnity, exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees.43 It questions the Certificate provided by Abejar
as proof of expenses since its signatory, a certain
Julian Peñaloza (Peñaloza), was not presented in
court, and Caravan was denied the right to cross-
examine him.44 Caravan argues that the statements in
the Certification constitute hearsay. 45 It also contends
that based on Article 2206(3)46 of the Civil Code,
Abejar is not entitled to moral damages. 47 It insists
that moral and exemplary damages should not have
been awarded to Abejar because Caravan acted in
good faith.48 Considering that moral and exemplary
damages are unwarranted, Caravan claims that the
award of attorney's fees should have also been
removed.49
Lastly, Caravan argues that it should not be held
solidarily liable with Bautista since Bautista was
already dropped as a party.50
Abejar counters that Caravan failed to provide proof
that it exercised the requisite diligence in the
selection and supervision of Bautista.51 She adds that
the Court of Appeals' ruling that Caravan is solidarily
liable with Bautista for moral damages, exemplary
damages, civil indemnity ex delicto, and attorney's
fees should be upheld.52 Abejar argues that since
Caravan is the registered owner of the van, it is
directly, primarily, and solidarity liable for the
tortious acts of its driver.53
For resolution are the following issues:
First, whether respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar is a
real party in interest who may bring an action for
damages against petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours
International, Inc. on account of Jesmariane R. Reyes'
death; and
Second, whether petitioner should be held liable as an
employer, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
We deny the Petition.
I (2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years
Having exercised substitute parental authority,
respondent suffered actual loss and is, thus, a real
party in interest in this case.
In her Complaint, respondent made allegations that
would sustain her action for damages: that she
exercised substitute parental authority over Reyes;
that Reyes' death was caused by the negligence of
petitioner and its driver; and that Reyes' death caused
her damage.54 Respondent properly filed an action
based on quasi-delict. She is a real party in interest.
Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure defines a real party in interest:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RULE 3. Parties to Civil Actions
. . . .
SECTION 2. Parties in Interest. — A real party in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest.
"To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in
whose name an action must be prosecuted, he [or she]
must appear to be the present real owner of the right
sought to be enforced."55 Respondent's capacity to file
a complaint against petitioner stems from her having
exercised substitute parental authority over Reyes.
Article 216 of the Family Code identifies the persons
who exercise substitute parental authority:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially
appointed guardian, the following persons shall
exercise substitute parental authority over the child in
93
the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art.
214;56
of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one
years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over
the property of the child becomes necessary, the same
order of preference shall be observed. (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 233 of the Family Code provides for the
extent of authority of persons exercising substitute
parental authority, that is, the same as those of actual
parents:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental
authority shall have the same authority over the
person of the child as the parents. (Emphasis
supplied)
Both of Reyes' parents are already deceased. 57 Reyes'
paternal grandparents are also both deceased. 58 The
whereabouts of Reyes' maternal grandparents are
unknown.59 There is also no record that Reyes has
brothers or sisters. It was under these circumstances
that respondent took custody of Reyes when she was
a child, assumed the role of Reyes' parents, and thus,
exercised substitute parental authority over her. 60 As
Reyes' custodian, respondent exercised the full extent
of the statutorily recognized rights and duties of a
parent. Consistent with Article 22061 of the Family
Code, respondent supported Reyes' education62 and
provided for her personal needs.63 To echo
respondent's words in her Complaint, she treated
Reyes as if she were her own daughter.64
Respondent's right to proceed against petitioner,
therefore, is based on two grounds.
First, respondent suffered actual personal loss. With
her affinity for Reyes, it stands to reason that when
Reyes died, respondent suffered the same anguish
that a natural parent would have felt upon the loss of
one's child. It is for this injury — as authentic and
personal as that of a natural parent — that respondent
seeks to be indemnified.
Second, respondent is capacitated to do what Reyes'
actual parents would have been capacitated to do.
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,65Tapdasan, Jr. v. People,66 and Aguilar, Sr.
v. Commercial Savings Bank,67 this court allowed
natural parents of victims to recover damages for the
death of their children. Inasmuch as persons
exercising substitute parental authority have the full
range of competencies of a child's actual parents,
nothing prevents persons exercising substitute
parental authority from similarly possessing the right
to be indemnified for their ward's death.
We note that Reyes was already 18 years old when
she died. Having reached the age of majority, she was
already emancipated upon her death. While parental
authority is terminated upon
emancipation,68 respondent continued to support and
care for Reyes even after she turned 18.69 Except for
the legal technicality of Reyes' emancipation, her
relationship with respondent remained the same. The
anguish and damage caused to respondent by Reyes'
death was no different because of Reyes'
emancipation.
In any case, the termination of respondent's parental
authority is not an insurmountable legal bar that
precludes the filing of her Complaint. In interpreting
Article 190270 of the old Civil Code, which is
substantially similar to the first sentence of Article
217671 of the Civil Code, this court in The Receiver
For North Negros Sugar Company, Inc. v. Ybañez, et
al.72 ruled that brothers and sisters may recover
damages, except moral damages, for the death of
their sibling.73 This court declared that Article 1902
of the old Civil Code (now Article 2176) is broad
enough to accommodate even plaintiffs who are not
relatives of the deceased, thus:74
This Court said: "Article 1902 of the Civil Code
declares that any person who by an act or omission,
characterized by fault or negligence, causes damage
to another shall be liable for the damage done ... a
person is liable for damage done to another by any
culpable act; and by any culpable act is meant any act
which is blameworthy when judged by accepted legal
standards. The idea thus expressed is undoubtedly
broad enough to include any rational conception of
liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in
any society." The word "damage" in said article,
comprehending as it does all that are embraced in its
meaning, includes any and all damages that a human
being may suffer in any and all the manifestations of
his life: physical or material, moral or psychological,
mental or spiritual, financial, economic, social,
political, and religious.
It is particularly noticeable that Article 1902 stresses
the passive subject of the obligation to pay damages
caused by his fault or negligence. The article does
not limit or specify the active subjects, much less the
relation that must exist between the victim of the
culpa aquiliana and the person who may recover
damages, thus warranting the inference that, in
principle, anybody who suffers any damage from
culpa aquiliana, whether a relative or not of the
victim, may recover damages from the person
responsible therefor[.]75 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
II
Respondent's Complaint is anchored on an employer's
liability for quasi-delict provided in Article 2180, in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Articles
2176 and 2180 read:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
. . . . . Reyes.
ARTICLE 2180. The obligation imposed by article
2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
94
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by
the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the
minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts
through a special agent; but not when the damage has
been caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains, in which case what is provided in
article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to petitioner's position, it was not fatal to
respondent's cause that she herself did not adduce
proof that Bautista acted within the scope of his
authority. It was sufficient that Abejar proved that
petitioner was the registered owner of the van that hit
The resolution of this case must consider two (2)
rules. First, Article 2180's specification that
"[e]mployers shall be liable for the damages caused
by their employees . . . acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks[.]" Second, the operation of the
registered-owner rule that registered owners are liable
for death or injuries caused by the operation of their
vehicles.76
These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to
cases in which the employer is also the registered
owner of a vehicle. Article 2180 requires proof of
two things: first, an employment relationship between
the driver and the owner; and second, that the driver
acted within the scope of his or her assigned tasks.
On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule
only requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant-
employer is the registered owner of the vehicle.
The registered-owner rule was articulated as early as
1957 in Erezo, et al. v. Jepte,77 where this court
explained that the registration of motor vehicles, as
required by Section 5(a)78 of Republic Act No. 4136,
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, was
necessary "not to make said registration the operative
act by which ownership in vehicles is transferred, . . .
but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle
upon any public highway[.]" 79 Its "main aim . . . is to
identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or
that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on
the public highways, responsibility therefor can be
fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner." 80
Erezo notwithstanding, Castilex Industrial
Corporation v. Vasquez, Jr.81 relied on Article 2180
of the Civil Code even though the employer was also
the registered owner of the vehicle. 82 The registered-
owner rule was not mentioned.
In Castilex, Benjamin Abad (Abad) was a manager of
Castilex Industrial Corporation (Castilex). Castilex
was also the registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux
pick-up truck. While Abad was driving the pick-up
truck, it collided with a motorcycle driven by Romeo
Vasquez (Vasquez). Vasquez died a few days after.
Vasquez's parents filed a case for damages against
Abad and Castilex.83 Castilex denied liability, arguing
that Abad was acting in his private capacity at the
time of the accident. 84
This court absolved Castilex of liability, reasoning
that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that
the negligent employee was acting within the scope
of his assigned tasks.85 Vasquez's parents failed to
prove this.86 This court outlined the process necessary
for an employer to be held liable for the acts of its
employees and applied the process to the case:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or
not engaged in any business or industry, an employer
is liable for the torts committed by employees within
the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to
establish the employer-employee relationship; once
this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the
employer liable, that the employee was acting within
the scope of his assigned task when the tort
complained of was committed. It is only then that the
employer may find it necessary to interpose the
defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee.
. . . .
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was
acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to
him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that
it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus,
justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved
of vicarious liability for the consequences of the
negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.
(Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)87ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Aguilar, Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank recognized
the seeming conflict between Article 2180 and the
registered-owner rule and applied the latter. 88
In Aguilar, Sr., a Mitsubishi Lancer, registered in the
name of Commercial Savings Bank and driven by the
bank's assistant vice-president Ferdinand Borja, hit
Conrado Aguilar, Jr. The impact killed Conrado
Aguilar, Jr. His father, Conrado Aguilar, Sr. filed a
case for damages against Ferdinand Borja and
Commercial Savings Bank. The Regional Trial Court
95
found Commercial Savings Bank solidarity liable
with Ferdinand Borja.89
However, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the
trial court's Decision and dismissed the complaint
against the bank. The Court of Appeals reasoned that
Article 2180 requires the plaintiff to prove that at the
time of the accident, the employee was acting within
the scope of his or her assigned tasks. The Court of
Appeals found no evidence that Ferdinand Borja was
acting as the bank's assistant vice-president at the
time of the accident. 90
The Court of Appeals' ruling was reversed by this
court.91Aguilar, Sr. reiterated the following
pronouncements made in Erezo in ruling that the
bank, as the registered owner of the vehicle, was
primarily liable to the plaintiff:92
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to
identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or
that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on
the public highways, responsibility therefor can be
fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner....
....
A victim of recklessness on the public highways is
usually without means to discover or identify the
person actually causing the injury or damage. He has
no means other than by a recourse to the registration
in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the
owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to
him would become illusory were the registered owner
given the opportunity to escape liability by
disproving his
ownership.93ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, Aguilar, Sr. concluded:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In our view, respondent bank, as the registered owner
of the vehicle, is primarily liable for Aguilar, Jr.'s
death. The Court of Appeals erred when it concluded
that the bank was not liable simply because (a)
petitioner did not prove that Borja was acting as the
bank's vice president at the time of the accident; and
(b) Borja had, according to respondent bank, already
bought the car at the time of the mishap. For as long
as the respondent bank remained the registered
owner of the car involved in the vehicular accident, it
could not escape primary liability for the death of
petitioner's son.94 (Emphasis supplied)
Preference for the registered-owner rule became more
pronounced in Del Carmen, Jr. v. Bacoy:95
Without disputing the factual finding of the [Court of
Appeals] that Allan was still his employee at the time
of the accident, a finding which we see no reason to
disturb, Oscar Jr. contends that Allan drove the jeep
in his private capacity and thus, an employer's
vicarious liability for the employee's fault under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code cannot apply to him.
The contention is no longer novel. In Aguilar Sr. v.
Commercial Savings Bank, the car of therein
respondent bank caused the death of Conrado
Aguilar, Jr. while being driven by its assistant vice
president. Despite Article 2180, we still held the bank
liable for damages for the accident as said provision
should defer to the settled doctrine concerning
accidents involving registered motor vehicles, i.e.,
that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not
used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to third persons for
injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being
driven on the highways or streets. We have already
ratiocinated that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to
identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or
that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on
the public highways, responsibility therefor can be
fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.
Instances are numerous where vehicles running on
public highways caused accidents or injuries to
pedestrians or other vehicles without positive
identification of the owner or drivers, or with very
scant means of identification. It is to forestall these
circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the
public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily
ordained, in the interest of the determination of
persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on
public highways.96 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas97 stated that the
registered owner of a vehicle can no longer use the
defenses found in Article 2180:98
Neither can Filcar use the defenses available under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code - that the employee
acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it
exercised the due diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage - because the motor vehicle
registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article
2180 of the Civil Code by making these defenses
unavailable to the registered owner of the motor
vehicle. Thus, for as long as Filcar is the registered
owner of the car involved in the vehicular accident, it
could not escape primary liability for the damages
caused to Espinas.99ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Mendoza v. Spouses Gomez100 reiterated this doctrine.
However, Aguilar, Sr., Del Carmen, Filcar,
and Mendoza should not be taken to mean that Article
2180 of the Civil Code should be completely
discarded in cases where the registered-owner rule
finds application.
As acknowledged in Filcar, there is no categorical
statutory pronouncement in the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code stipulating the liability of a
registered owner.101 The source of a registered
owner's liability is not a distinct statutory provision,
but remains to be Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While Republic Act No. 4136 or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code does not contain any
provision on the liability of registered owners in case
of motor vehicle mishaps, Article 2176, in relation
with Article 2180, of the Civil Code imposes an
obligation upon Filcar, as registered owner, to answer
for the damages caused to Espinas'
car.102ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, it is imperative to apply the registered-owner
rule in a manner that harmonizes it with Articles 2176
and 2180 of the Civil Code. Rules must be construed
in a manner that will harmonize them with other rules
so as to form a uniform and consistent system of
jurisprudence.103 In light of this, the words used
in Del Carmen are particularly notable. There, this
96
court stated that Article 2180 "should defer to" 104 the
registered-owner rule. It never stated that Article
2180 should be totally abandoned.
Therefore, the appropriate approach is that in cases
where both the registered-owner rule and Article
2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the
employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in
question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves
ownership, there arises a disputable presumption that
the requirements of Article 2180 have been proven.
As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180
has arisen.
This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered
owner of the vehicle in relation to the actual driver is
concerned, recognizes that between the owner and the
victim, it is the former that should carry the costs of
moving forward with the evidence. The victim is, in
many cases, a hapless pedestrian or motorist with
hardly any means to uncover the employment
relationship of the owner and the driver, or any act
that the owner may have done in relation to that
employment.
The registration of the vehicle, on the other hand, is
accessible to the public.
Here, respondent presented a copy of the Certificate
of Registration105 of the van that hit Reyes. 106 The
Certificate attests to petitioner's ownership of the van.
Petitioner itself did not dispute its ownership of the
van. Consistent with the rule we have just stated, a
presumption that the requirements of Article 2180
have been satisfied arises. It is now up to petitioner to
establish that it incurred no liability under Article
2180. This it can do by presenting proof of any of the
following: first, that it had no employment
relationship with Bautista; second, that Bautista acted
outside the scope of his assigned tasks; or third, that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of Bautista. 107
On the first, petitioner admitted that Bautista was its
employee at the time of the accident. 108
On the second, petitioner was unable to prove that
Bautista was not acting within the scope of his
assigned tasks at the time of the accident. When
asked by the court why Bautista was at the place of
the accident when it occurred, Sally Bellido,
petitioner's accountant and supervisor,109 testified that
she did not "have the personal capacity to answer [the
question]"110 and that she had no knowledge to
answer it:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
COURT : Madam Witness, do you know the
reason why your driver, Jimmy
Bautista, at around 10:00 o' clock in
the morning of July 13, 2000 was in
the vicinity of Barangay Marcelo
Green, United Parañaque
Subdivision 4?
WITNESS : I don't have the personal capacity to
answer that, Sir.
Q : So you don't have any knowledge
why he was there?
A : Yes, Sir.111 (Emphasis supplied)
Sally Bellido's testimony does not affect the
presumption that Article 2180's requirements have
been satisfied. Mere disavowals are not proof that
suffice to overturn a presumption. To this end,
evidence must be adduced. However, petitioner
presented no positive evidence to show that Bautista
was acting in his private capacity at the time of the
incident.
On the third, petitioner likewise failed to prove that it
exercised the requisite diligence in the selection and
supervision of Bautista.
In its selection of Bautista as a service driver,
petitioner contented itself with Bautista's submission
of a non-professional driver's license.112 Hence, in
Sally Balledo's cross-examination:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 Evidently, petitioner did not only fail to exercise due
Q : . . . when he was promoted as service
diligence when it selected Bautista as service driver;
driver, of course, there were certain
it also committed an actual violation of law.
requirements and among other else,
you made mention about a driver's
To prove that it exercised the required diligence in
license.
supervising Bautista, petitioner presented copies of
A : Yes, Sir. several memoranda and company rules.114 These,
however, are insufficient because petitioner failed to
Q : Would you be able to show to this prove actual compliance. Metro Manila Transit
Honorable Court whether indeed this Corporation v. Court of Appeals115 emphasized that
person did submit a driver's license to to establish diligence in the supervision of
your company? employees, the issuance of company policies must be
coupled with proof of compliance:
A : Yes, Sir. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Due diligence in the supervision of employees, on the
.... other hand, includes the formulation of suitable rules
and regulations for the guidance of employees and
Q : Do you recall what kind of driver's the issuance of proper instructions intended for the
license is this? protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his or its employees
A : The Land Transportation Office. and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures
upon employees in case of breach or as may be
Q : Is it a professional driver's license or
warranted to ensure the performance of acts
non-proffesional [sic] driver's license?
indispensable to the business of and beneficial to
A : Non-professional. their employer. To this, we add that actual
implementation and monitoring of consistent
Q : You are not sure? compliance with said rules should be the constant
concern of the employer, acting through dependable
COURT : Non professional, professional? supervisors who should regularly report on their
supervisory functions.
A : It's a non-professional.113 (Emphasis
supplied) In order that the defense of due diligence in the
Employing a person holding a non-professional selection and supervision of employees may be
driver's license to operate another's motor vehicle deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to
violates Section 24 of the Land Transportation and emptily invoke the existence of said company
Traffic Code, which provides: guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision.
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the
SEC. 24. Use of driver's license and badge. — ... presumption of negligence on the part of the
employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it
. . . . has been diligent not only in the selection of
employees but also in the actual supervision of their
No owner of a motor vehicle shall engage, employ, or work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring
hire any person to operate such motor vehicle, unless procedures and supervisory policies, without
the person sought to be employed is a duly licensed anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to
professional driver. overcome presumption.
97
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning
to all employers, that "(t)he mere formulation of
various company policies on safety without showing
that they were being complied with is not sufficient
to exempt petitioner from liability arising from
negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon
petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing
the erring driver the recruitment procedures and
company policies on efficiency and safety were
followed." Paying lip-service to these injunctions or
merely going through the motions of compliance
therewith will warrant stern sanctions from the
Court.116 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
For failing to overturn the presumption that the
requirements of Article 2180 have been satisfied,
petitioner must be held liable.
III
Petitioner's argument that it should be excused from
liability because Bautista was already dropped as a
party is equally unmeritorious. The liability imposed
on the registered owner is direct and primary. 117 It
does not depend on the inclusion of the negligent
driver in the action. Agreeing to petitioner's assertion
would render impotent the rationale of the motor
registration law in fixing liability on a definite
person.
Bautista, the driver, was not an indispensable party
under Rule 3, Section 7118 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rather, he was a necessary party under
Rule 3, Section 8.119 Instead of insisting that Bautista
— who was nothing more than a necessary party —
should not have been dropped as a defendant, or that
petitioner, along with Bautista, should have been
dropped, petitioner (as a co-defendant insisting that
the action must proceed with Bautista as party) could
have opted to file a cross-claim against Bautista as its
remedy.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure spell out the rules
on joinder of indispensable and necessary parties.
These are intended to afford "a complete
determination of all possible issues, not only between
the parties themselves but also as regards to other
persons who may be affected by the judgment." 120 between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable siyang aking kakontrata sa
party if his presence would merely permit complete pagsasagawa ng naturang
However, while an exhaustive resolution of disputes relief between him and those already parties to the paglilibingan.127 (Emphasis
is desired in every case, the distinction between action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of supplied)
indispensable parties and necessary parties delineates the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a
a court's capacity to render effective judgment. As person to be an indispensable party that his presence It was respondent herself who identified the
defined by Rule 3, Section 7, indispensable parties will avoid multiple Certificate. She testified that she incurred funeral
are "[p]arties in interest without whom no final litigation.123ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary expenses amounting to P35,000.00, that she paid this
determination can be had of an action[.]" Thus, their Petitioner's interest and liability is distinct from that amount to Peñaloza, and that she was present when
non-inclusion is debilitating: "the presence of of its driver. Regardless of petitioner's employer- Peñaloza signed the Certificate:
indispensable parties is a condition for the exercise of employee relationship with Bautista, liability attaches chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
juridical power and when an indispensable party is to petitioner on account of its being the registered
not before the court, the action should be owner of a vehicle that figures in a mishap. This [ATTY. Did you incur any expenses?
dismissed."121 alone suffices. A determination of its liability as LIM] :
owner can proceed independently of a consideration
A: Meron po.
In contrast, a necessary party's presence is not of how Bautista conducted himself as a driver. While
imperative, and his or her absence is not debilitating. certainly it is desirable that a determination of Q: How much did you spend for the death of
Nevertheless, it is preferred that they be included in Bautista's liability be made alongside that of the Jesmarian [sic] Reyes?
order that relief may be complete. owner of the van he was driving, his non-inclusion in
these proceedings does not absolutely hamper a A: 'Yun pong P35,000.00 na pagpapalibing
The concept of indispensable parties, as against judicious resolution of respondent's plea for relief. at saka...
parties whose inclusion only allows complete relief,
was explained in Arcelona v. Court of Appeals:122 IV Q: You said that you spent P35,000.00. Do
An indispensable party is a party who has such an you have any evidence or proof that you
interest in the controversy or subject matter that a The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error spent that amount?
final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, when it awarded actual damages to respondent.
without injuring or affecting that interest, a party who Respondent's claim for actual damages was based on A: Meron po.
has not only an interest in the subject matter of the the Certificate124 issued and signed by a certain
controversy, but also has an interest of such nature Peñaloza showing that respondent paid Peñaloza Q: Showing to you this sort of certification.
that a final decree cannot be made without affecting P35,000.00 for funeral expenses. What relation has this...
his interest or leaving the controversy in such a
condition that its final determination may be wholly Contrary to petitioner's claim, this Certificate is not A: 'Yan po' yung contractor nagumawa.
inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has hearsay. Evidence is hearsay when its probative value
also been considered that an indispensable party is a Q: Contractor of what?
is based on the personal knowledge of a person other
person in whose absence there cannot be a than the person actually testifying.125 Here, the A: 'Yan po' yung mismong binilhan ko ng
determination between the parties already before the Certificate sought to establish that respondent herself lupa at nitso.
court which is effective, complete, or equitable. paid Peñaloza P35,000.00 as funeral expenses for
Further, an indispensable party is one who must be Reyes' death:126 ....
included in an action before it may properly go
forward. 3. Na ang aking kontrata ay ATTY. There is a signature at the top of the
nagkakahalaga ng P35,000-00 [sic] LIM : printed name Julian Penalosa [sic]. Whose
A person is not an indispensable party, however, if sa lahat ng nagamit na materiales at signature is this?
his interest in the controversy or subject matter is labor nito kasama ang lote na
separable from the interest of the other parties, so that ibinayad sa akin ni Gng. A: 'Yan po' yung mismong contractor.
it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously ERMILINDA REYES ABEJAR na
affected by a decree which does complete justice
98

....
Q: Did you see him sign this?
A: Opo.128 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent had personal knowledge of the facts
sought to be proved by the Certificate, i.e. that she
spent P35,000.00 for the funeral expenses of Reyes.
Thus, the Certificate that she identified and testified
to is not hearsay. It was not an error to admit this
Certificate as evidence and basis for awarding
P35,000.00 as actual damages to respondent.
(3)
The Court of Appeals likewise did not err in
awarding civil indemnity and exemplary damages.
Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE 2206. The amount of damages for death
caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least
three thousand pesos, even though there may have
been mitigating circumstances[.]
Further, Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages
may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.
Both the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Court found Bautista grossly negligent in driving the
van and concluded that Bautista's gross negligence
was the proximate cause of Reyes' death. Negligence
and causation are factual issues. 129 Findings of fact,
when established by the trial court and affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are binding on this court unless
they are patently unsupported by evidence or unless
the judgment is grounded on a misapprehension of
facts.130 Considering that petitioner has not presented
any evidence disputing the findings of the lower
courts regarding Bautista's negligence, these findings
cannot be disturbed in this appeal. The evidentiary
bases for the award of civil indemnity and exemplary
damages stand. As such, petitioner must pay the
exemplary damages arising from the negligence of its
driver.131 For the same reasons, the award of
P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity is justified. 132
99
The award of moral damages is likewise proper.
Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE 2206. The amount of damages
for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least three thousand pesos, even though there may
have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
. . . .
The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate
descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by
reason of the death of the deceased. (Emphasis
supplied)
For deaths caused by quasi-delict, the recovery of
moral damages is limited to the spouse, legitimate
and illegitimate descendants, and ascendants of the
deceased.133
Persons exercising substitute parental authority are to
be considered ascendants for the purpose of awarding
moral damages. Persons exercising substitute parental
authority are intended to stand in place of a child's
parents in order to ensure the well-being and welfare
of a child.134 Like natural parents, persons exercising
substitute parental authority are required to, among
others, keep their wards in their company,135 provide
for their upbringing,136 show them love and
affection,137 give them advice and counsel, 138 and
provide them with companionship and
understanding.139 For their part, wards shall always
observe respect and obedience towards the person
exercising parental authority.140 The law forges a
relationship between the ward and the person
exercising substitute parental authority such that the
death or injury of one results in the damage or
prejudice of the other.
Moral damages are awarded to compensate the
claimant for his or her actual injury, and not to
penalize the wrongdoer.141 Moral damages enable the
injured party to alleviate the moral suffering resulting
from the defendant's actions.142 It aims to restore —
to the extent possible — "the spiritual status quo
ante[.]"143
Given the policy underlying Articles 216 and 220 of
the Family Code as well as the purposes for awarding
moral damages, a person exercising substitute
parental authority is rightly considered an ascendant
of the deceased, within the meaning of Article
2206(3) of the Civil Code. Hence, respondent is
entitled to moral damages.
As exemplary damages have been awarded and as
respondent was compelled to litigate in order to
protect her interests, she is rightly entitled to
attorney's fees.144
However, the award of interest should be modified.
This modification must be consistent with Nacar v.
Gallery Frames,145 in which we ruled:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2. When an obligation, not
constituting a loan or forbearance
of money, is breached, an interest
on the amount of damages awarded
may be imposed at the discretion of
the court at the rate of 6% per
annum. No interest, however, shall
be adjudged on unliquidated claims
or damages, except when or until
the demand can be established with
reasonable certainty.
Accordingly, where the demand is
established with reasonable
certainty, the interest shall begin to
run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art.
1169, Civil Code), but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand
is made, the interest shall begin to
run only from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at
which time the quantification of
 damages may be deemed to have
been reasonably ascertained). The
actual base for the computation of
legal interest shall, in any case, be
on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court
awarding a sum of money becomes
final and executory, the rate of
legal interest, whether the case falls
under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2,
above, shall be 6% per annum from
such finality until its satisfaction,
this interim period being deemed to
be by then an equivalent to a
forbearance of credit.146 (Emphasis
supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 3, 2005 is AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) actual
damages in the amount of P35,000.00 shall earn
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the time it
was judicially or extrajudicially demanded from
petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours International,
Inc. until full satisfaction; (b) moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees shall earn
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
the Regional Trial Court Decision until full
satisfaction; and (c) civil indemnity shall earn interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the
Court of Appeals Decision until full satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.
6. Rights and Duties of persons exercising parental
authority, Art. 219-221, FC
[G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992.]
CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP
LIBI, Petitioners, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and
100
SHIRLEY GOTIONG, Respondents. REGALADO, J.:
One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is
that sorrow is sometimes a touchstone of love. A
SYLLABUS tragic illustration is provided by the instant case,
wherein two lovers died while still in the prime of
their years, a bitter episode for those whose lives they
have touched. While we cannot expect to award
1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI DELICT; LIABILITY OF
complete assuagement to their families through
PARENTS FOR CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING
seemingly prosaic legal verbiage, this disposition
FROM CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY
should at least terminate the acrimony and rancor of
THEIR MINOR CHILDREN; RULE. — The parents
an extended judicial contest resulting from the
are and should be held primarily liable for the civil
unfortunate occurrence.
liability arising from criminal offenses committed by
their minor children under their legal authority or
In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the
control, or who live in their company, unless it is
stages whereof were alternately initiated by the
proven that the former acted with the diligence of a
parties, petitioners are now before us seeking the
good father of a family to prevent such damages.
reversal of the judgment of respondent court
That primary liability is premised on the provisions
promulgated on January 2, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No.
of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect
69060 with the following decretal
to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years
portion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age
who acted without discernment; and, with regard to
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court
their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who
dismissing plaintiff’s complaint is hereby reversed;
acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under
and instead, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing
21 years of age, such primary liability shall be
defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay to plaintiffs
imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
the following amounts:chanrobles.com : virtual law
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such
library
liability shall be effected against the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was
1. Moral damages, P30,000.000;
amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code
which provides that the same shall devolve upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the 2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;
mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the
guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily 3. Attorney’s fees, P20,000.00, and costs.
assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful
offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil However, denial of defendants-appellees’
liability is now, without such alternative counterclaims is affirmed." 1
qualification, the responsibility of the parents and
those who exercise parental authority over the minor Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it
offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts appears that respondent spouses are the legitimate
parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the
committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in
accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil deplorable incident which took place and from which
she died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old first
Code, as so modified.
year commerce student of the University of San
Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the parents of
DECISION
Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years
of age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also
died in the same event on the same date.
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie
Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts
until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her
relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found
him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first
and second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept
pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation
but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the
former to resort to threats against her. In order to
avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best
friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria Cristina
and Juana Osmeña Streets, Cebu City, from January 7
to 13, 1978.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died,
each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the
same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed
in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was
recovered from the scene of the crime inside the
residence of private respondents at the corner of
General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets of the
same city.
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the
circumstances surrounding the death of both minors,
their parents, who are the contending parties herein,
posited their respective theories drawn from their
interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available
reports, documents and evidence of physical facts.
Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their
daughter, submitted that Wendell caused her death by
shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and,
thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit
suicide. On the other hand, Petitioners, puzzled and
likewise distressed over the death of their son,
rejected the imputation and contended that an
unknown third party, whom Wendell may have
displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a
narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-
Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell’s
death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any
101
witness and thereby avoid
identification.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann
filed Civil Case No. R-17774 in the then Court of
First Instance of Cebu against the parents of Wendell
to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious
liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After
trial, the court below rendered judgment on October
20, 1980 as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment
is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint
for insufficiency of the evidence. Defendants’
counterclaim is likewise denied for lack of sufficient
merit." 2
On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the
lower court dismissing the complaint of therein
plaintiffs-appellants was set aside and another
judgment was rendered against defendants-appellees
who, as petitioners in the present appeal
by certiorari, now submit for resolution the following
issues in this case:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed
the trial court in accordance with established
decisional laws; and
2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was
correctly interpreted by respondent court to make
petitioners liable for vicarious liability. 3
In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P.
Cerna, Police Medico-Legal Officer of Cebu,
submitted his findings and opinions on some
postulates for determining whether or not the gunshot
wound was inflicted on Wendell Libi by his own
suicidal act. However, undue emphasis was placed by
the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or
tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of
the bullet. It should be emphasized, however, that this
is not the only circumstance to be taken into account
in the determination of whether it was suicide or not.
It is true that said witness declared that he found no
evidence of contact or close-contact of an explosive
discharge in the entrance wound. However, as
pointed out by private respondents, the body of
deceased Wendell Libi must have been washed at the
funeral parlor, considering the hasty interment thereof
a little after eight (8) hours from the occurrence
wherein he died. Dr. Cerna himself could not
categorically state that the body of Wendell Libi was
left untouched at the funeral parlor before he was able
to conduct his autopsy. It will also be noted that Dr.
Cerna was negligent in not conducting a paraffin test
on Wendell Libi, hence possible evidence of
gunpowder residue on Wendell’s hands was forever
lost when Wendell was hastily buried.cralawnad
More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he
conducted an autopsy on the body of Wendell Libi
about eight (8) hours after the incident or, to be exact,
eight (8) hours and twenty (20) minutes based on the
record of death; that when he arrived at the
Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, the body of the
deceased was already on the autopsy table and in the
stage of rigor mortis; and that said body was not
washed, but it was dried. 4 However, on redirect
examination, he admitted that during the 8-hour
interval, he never saw the body nor did he see
whether said body was wiped or washed in the area
of the wound on the head which he examined because
the deceased was inside the morgue. 5 In fact, on
cross-examination, he had earlier admitted that as far
as the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the
bullet and the exit of the wound are concerned, it is
possible that Wendell Libi shot himself. 6
He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not
pressed on the head of the victim and that he found
no burning or singeing of the hair or extensive
laceration on the gunshot wound of entrance which
are general characteristics of contact or near-contact
fire. On direct examination, Dr. Cerna nonetheless
made these clarification:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q Is it not a fact that there are certain guns which are
so made that there would be no black residue or
tattooing that could result from these guns because
they are what we call clean?
A Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call
smokeless powder.
ATTY. ORTIZ:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the
powder is smokeless, those indications that you said
may not rule out the possibility that the gun was
closer than 24 inches, is that correct?
A If the . . . assuming that the gun used was .. the
bullet used was a smokeless powder.
Q At any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those
other matters that you have noticed, the singeing, etc.,
from the trajectory, based on the trajectory of the
bullet as shown in your own sketch, is it not a fact
that the gun could have been fired by the person
himself, the victim himself, Wendell Libi, because it
shows a point of entry a little above the right ear and
point of exit a little above that, to be very fair and on
your oath?
A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as
far as the trajectory of the bullet is concerned and as
far as the angle or the manner of fire is concerned, it
could have been fired by the victim." 7
As shown by the evidence, there were only two used
bullets 8 found at the scene of the crime, each of
which were the bullets that hit Julie Ann Gotiong and
Wendell Libi, respectively. Also, the sketch prepared
by the Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau
of Investigation, 9 shows that there is only one
gunshot wound of entrance located at the right temple
of Wendell Libi. The necropsy report prepared by Dr.
Cerna states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x       x       x
"Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4
cm., with contusion collar widest inferiorly by 0.2
102
cm., edges inverted, oriented upward, located at the
head, temporal region, right, 2.8 cms. behind and 5.5
cms. above right external auditory meatus, directed
slightly forward, upward and to the left, involving
skin and soft tissues, making a punch-in fracture on
the temporal bone, right, penetrating cranial cavity,
lacerating extensively along its course the brain
tissues, fracturing parietal bone, left, and finally
making an EXIT wound, irregular, 2.0 x 1.8 cms.,
edges (e)verted, parietal region, left, 2.0 cms. behind
and 12.9 cms. above left external auditory
meatus.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
x       x       x
"Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as
burning around the gunshot wound of entrance,
gunpowder tatooing (sic), smudging, singeing of hair,
extensive laceration or bursting of the gunshot wound
of entrance, or separation of the skin from the
underlying tissue, are absent." 10
On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his
theory which was made of record,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.p
"Q Now, will you please use yourself as Wendell
Libi, and following the entrance of the wound, the
trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound, and
measuring yourself 24 inches, will you please
indicate to the Honorable Court how would it have
been possible for Wendell Libi to kill himself? Will
you please indicate the 24 inches?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one
arm’s length.
ATTY. SENINING:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I would like to make of record that the witness has
demonstrated by extending his right arm almost
straight towards his head." 11
Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court
gave credence to the testimonies of defendants’
witnesses Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan, the first
being a resident of an apartment across the street
from the Gotiongs and the second, a resident of the
house adjacent to the Gotiong residence, who
declared having seen a "shadow" of a person at the
gate of the Gotiong house after hearing shots
therefrom.
On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the
apartment where she was staying faces the gas
station; that it is the second apartment; that from her
window she can see directly the gate of the Gotiongs
and, that there is a firewall between her apartment
and the gas station. 12 After seeing a man jump from
the gate of the Gotiongs to the rooftop of the Tans,
she called the police station but the telephone lines
were busy. Later on, she talked with James Enrique
Tan and told him that she saw a man leap from the
gate towards his rooftop. 13
However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a
"shadow" on top of the gate of the Gotiongs, but
denied having talked with anyone regarding what he
saw. He explained that he lives in a duplex house
with a garden in front of it; that his house is next to
Felipe Gotiong’s house; and he further gave the
following answers to these
questions:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
"ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).
Q What is the height of the wall of the Gotiong’s in
relation to your house?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A It is about 8 feet.
ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)
Q And where were you looking from?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A From upstairs in my living room.
ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)
Q From Your living room window, is that correct?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual
A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high."
14
Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with
respondent court that the same do not inspire
credence as to the reliability and accuracy of the
witnesses’ observations, since the visual perceptions
of both were obstructed by high walls in their
respective houses in relation to the house of herein
private respondents. On the other hand, witness
Manolo Alfonso, testifying on rebuttal, attested
without contradiction that he and his sister, Malou
Alfonso, were waiting for Julie Ann Gotiong when
they heard her scream; that when Manolo climbed the
fence to see what was going on inside the Gotiong
house, he heard the first shot; and, not more than five
(5) seconds later, he heard another shot.
Consequently, he went down from the fence and
drove to the police station to report the incident. 15
Manolo’s direct and candid testimony establishes and
explains the fact that it was he whom Lydia Ang and
James Enrique Tan saw as the "shadow" of a man at
the gate of the Gotiong house.
We have perforce to reject petitioners’ effete and
unsubstantiated pretension that it was another man
who shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It is significant that
the Libi family did not even point to or present any
suspect in the crime nor did they file any case against
any alleged "John Doe." Nor can we sustain the trial
court’s dubious theory that Wendell Libi did not die
by his own hand because of the overwhelming
evidence — testimonial, documentary and pictorial
— the confluence of which point to Wendell as the
assailant of Julie Ann, his motive being revenge for
103
her rejection of his persistent pleas for a firearm.
reconciliation.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Petitioners’ defense that they had exercised the due
diligence of a good father of a family, hence they
should not be civilly liable for the crime committed
by their minor son, is not borne out by the evidence
on record either.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell,
testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun
which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer
in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a
key to the safety deposit box and Amelita’s key is
always in her bag, all of which facts were known to
Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell
taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that
on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the
safety deposit box. 16 We, accordingly, cannot but
entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had
really been exercising the diligence of a good father
of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away.
Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless
one of the keys to the safety deposit box was
negligently left lying around or he had free access to
the bag of his mother where the other key was.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by
law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a
large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the
child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties
as parents in not diligently supervising the activities
of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so
much so that it was only at the time of Wendell’s
death that they allegedly discovered that he was a
CANU agent and that Cresencio’s gun was missing
from the safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly
wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring
and knowing the activities of their children who, for
all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work
such as being drug informers, 17 or even drug users.
Neither was a plausible explanation given for the
photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten
dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, 18
holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver
and on how or why he was in possession of that
In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and
holding petitioners civilly liable, as explained at the
start of this opinion, respondent court waved aside the
protestations of diligence on the part of petitioners
and had this to say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity
of their children who may be engaged in this
dangerous activity involving the menace of drugs.
Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in
supervising the activities of their son, Wendell, and in
keeping said gun from his reach, they could have
prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong.
Therefore, appellants are liable under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code which provides:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
‘The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by
their minor children who live in their company.’
"Having been grossly negligent in preventing
Wendell Libi from having access to said gun which
was allegedly kept in a safety deposit box,
defendants-appellees are subsidiarily liable for the
natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor
who was living in their company. This vicarious
liability of herein defendants-appellees has been
reiterated by the Supreme Court in many cases,
prominent of which is the case of Fuellas v. Cadano,
et. al. (L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 361-367),
which held that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘The subsidiary liability of parents for damages
caused by their minor children imposed by Article
2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations
arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal
offenses.’
‘The subsidiary liability of parent’s arising from the
criminal acts of their minor children who acted with
discernment is determined under the provisions of
Article 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code, because to hold that the former
only covers obligations which arise from quasi-
delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal
offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for
an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or
mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damages
caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if
the damage is caused with criminal intent.’ (3 SCRA
361-362).
". . . In the instant case, minor son of herein
defendants-appellees, Wendell Libi somehow got
hold of the key to the drawer where said gun was kept
under lock without defendant-spouses ever knowing
that said gun had been missing from that safety box
since 1978 when Wendell Libi had) a picture taken
wherein he proudly displayed said gun and dedicated
this picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also
since then, Wendell Libi was said to have kept said
gun in his car, in keeping up with his supposed role
of a CANU agent . . ." chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
x       x       x
"Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned
errors, this Court holds that the lower court was not
correct in dismissing herein plaintiffs-appellants’
complaint because as preponderantly shown by
evidence, defendants-appellees utterly failed to
exercise all the diligence of a good father of the
family in preventing their minor son from committing
this crime by means of the gun of defendants-
appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell
Libi for they have not regularly checked whether said
gun was still under lock, but learned that it was
missing from the safety deposit box only after the
crime had been committed." (Emphases ours.) 19
We agree with the conclusion of respondent court
that petitioners should be held liable for the civil
liability based on what appears from all indications
was a crime committed by their minor son. We take
this opportunity, however, to digress and discuss its
ratiocination therefor on jurisprudential dicta which
we feel require clarification.
104
In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious
liability of petitioners, respondent court cites Fuellas
v. Cadano, Et. Al. 20 which supposedly holds that"
(t)he subsidiary liability of parents for damages
caused by their minor children imposed by Article
2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations
arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal
offenses," followed by an extended quotation
ostensibly from the same case explaining why under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code parents should assume
subsidiary liability for damages caused by their minor
children. The quoted passages are set out two
paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring for
purposes of the discussion hereunder.chanrobles law
library
Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal
rule holding, the parents liable, but the categorization
of their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary,
in nature requires a hard second look considering
previous decisions of this court on the matter which
warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems
from our readings that if the liability of the parents
for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is
subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be
absolved of civil liability on the defense that they
acted with the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such
liability imputed to the parents is considered direct
and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid
and substantial defense.
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-
delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not
subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said
code which provides for solidary liability of joint
tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or
omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in
case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are
solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability
is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last
paragraph of Article 2180 provides that" (t)he
responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damages."cralaw virtua1aw library
We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents
for felonies committed by their minor children is
likewise primary, not subsidiary. Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in
certain cases. —
x       x       x
First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article
12, the civil liability for acts committed by . . . a
person under nine years of age, or by one over nine
but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment, shall devolve upon those having such
person under their legal authority or control, unless it
appears that there was no fault or negligence on their
part." (Emphasis supplied.) 21
Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, under the foregoing provision the civil
liability of the parents for crimes committed by their
minor children is likewise direct and primary, and
also subject to the defense of lack of fault or
negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family.
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents
primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by
the corresponding provisions in both codes that the
minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall
respond with his own property only in the absence or
in case of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil
liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of
the Civil Code states that" (i)f the minor causing
damage has no parents or guardian, the minor . . .
shall be answerable with his own property in an
action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be
appointed." For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an
equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph
of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Should there be no person having such . . . minor
under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or
if such person be insolvent, said . . . minor shall
respond with (his) own property, excepting property
exempt from execution, in accordance with civil
law."cralaw virtua1aw library
The civil liability of parents for felonies committed
by their minor children contemplated in the aforesaid
rule in Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code has, aside
from the aforecited case of Fuellas, been the subject
of a number of cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.:
Exconde v. Capuno, Et Al., 22 Araneta v. Arreglado,
23 Salen, Et. Al. v. Balce, 24 Paleyan, etc., Et. Al. v.
Bangkili, Et Al., 25 and Elcano, et al, v. Hill, Et. Al.
26 Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were basically
on the issue of the civil liability of parents for crimes
committed by their minor children over 9 but under
15 years of age, who acted with discernment, and also
of minors 15 years of aye or over, since these
situations are not covered by Article 101, Revised
Penal Code. In both instances, this Court held that the
issue of parental civil liability should be resolved in
accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code for the reasons well expressed in Salen
and adopted in the cases hereinbefore enumerated
that to hold that the civil liability under Article 2180
would apply only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal
offenses would result in the absurdity that in an act
involving mere negligence the parents would be
liable but not where the damage is caused with
criminal intent. In said cases, however, there are
unfortunate variances resulting in a regrettable
inconsistency in the Court’s determination of whether
the liability of the parents, in cases involving either
crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children, is
primary or subsidiary.
In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was
convicted of double homicide through reckless
imprudence, in a separate civil action arising from the
crime the minor and his father were held jointly and
105
severally liable for failure of the latter to prove the
diligence of a good father of a family. The same
liability in solidum and, therefore, primary liability
was imposed in a separate civil action in Araneta on
the parents and their 14-year old son who was found
guilty of frustrated homicide, but on the authority of
Article 2194 of the Civil Code providing for solidary
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable
for a quasi-delict.
However, in Salen, the father was declared
subsidiarily liable for damages arising from the
conviction of his son, who was over 15 but less than
18 years of age, by applying Article 2180 but, this
time, disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil Code. In
the present case, as already explained, the petitioners
herein were also held liable but supposedly in line
with Fuellas which purportedly declared the parents
subsidiarily liable for the civil liability for serious
physical injuries committed by their 13-year old son.
On the other hand, in Paleyan, the mother and her 19-
year old son were adjudged solidarily liable for
damages arising from his conviction for homicide by
the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
since this is likewise not covered by Article 101 of
the Revised Penal Code. Finally, in Elcano, although
the son was acquitted in a homicide charge due to
"lack of intent, coupled with mistake," it was ruled
that while under Article 2180 of the Civil Code there
should be solidary liability for damages, since the
son, "although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence," but "is now of age, as a matter of
equity" the father was only held subsidiarily liable.
It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal
Code provides for subsidiary liability only for
persons causing damages under the compulsion of
irresistible force or under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear; 27 innkeepers, tavernkeepers and
proprietors of establishments; 28 employers, teachers,
persons and corporations engaged in industry; 29 and
principals, accomplices and accessories for the
unpaid civil liability of their co-accused in the other
classes. 30
Also, coming back to respondent court’s reliance on
Fuellas in its decision in the present case, it is not
exactly accurate to say that Fuellas provided for
subsidiary liability of the parents therein. A careful
scrutiny shows that what respondent court quoted
verbatim in its decision now on appeal in the present
case, and which it attributed to Fuellas, was the
syllabus on the law report of said case which spoke of
"subsidiary" liability. However, such categorization
does not specifically appear in the text of the decision
in Fuellas. In fact, after reviewing therein the cases of
Exconde, Araneta and Salen and the discussions in
said cases of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, this
Court concluded its decision in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court
of Appeals on the basis of evidence submitted therein
by both parties, independent of the criminal case.
And responsibility for fault or negligence under
Article 2176 upon which the present action was
instituted, is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from fault or negligence under
the Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the
reasons behind the law as heretofore stated, any
discussion as to the minor’s criminal responsibility is
of no moment."cralaw virtua1aw library
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we
hereby rule that the parents are and should be held
primarily liable for the civil liability arising from
criminal offenses committed by their minor children
under their legal authority or control, or who live in
their company, unless it is proven that the former
acted with the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent such damages. That primary liability is
premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex
delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or
under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted
without discernment; and, with regard to their
children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted
with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21
years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 31
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such
liability shall be effected against the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was
amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code
which provides that the same shall devolve upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the
mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the
guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily
assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful
offender. 32 However, under the Family Code, this
civil liability is now, without such alternative
qualification, the responsibility of the parents and
those who exercise parental authority over the minor
offender. 33 For civil liability arising from quasi-
delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall
apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of
the Civil Code, as so modified.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless
Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-
delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court
did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages
arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding
modifications of the premises relied upon by it
therefor and on the bases of the legal imperatives
herein explained, we conjoin in its findings that said
petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite
diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such
damages.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED
and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO
and AURELIA TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON.
ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20,
Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and
CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.
106
FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor
of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air
rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death.
Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan,
Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by
petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting
parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia
Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against
respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc,
Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living
at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this
case for damages, a criminal information or
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed
[Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto
Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and
exempted from criminal liability on the ground that
he bad acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the
spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition
to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special
Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption
was grunted on, 18 November 1982, that
is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc,
Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the
foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they,
but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses
Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties
to the action since parental authority had shifted to
the adopting parents from the moment the successful
petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since
Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his
natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor
been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a
petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed
petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural
parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable
parties to the action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's
Decision on 7 December 1987. Within the 15-day
reglementary period, or on 14 December 1987,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
followed by a supplemental motion for
reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It appearing,
however, that the motions failed to comply with
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of
Court — that notice of the motion shall be given to
all parties concerned at least three (3) days before the
hearing of said motion; and that said notice shall state
the time and place of hearing — both motions were
denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18 April
1988. On 28 April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988, the trial court
dismissed the notice at appeal, this time ruling that
the notice had been filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period ending 22 December 1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition
for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial
court's Decision dated 3 December 1987 and the
Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June 1988, The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that
petitioners had lost their right to appeal.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once
again contend that respondent spouses Bundoc are the
indispensable parties to the action for damages
caused by the acts of their minor child, Adelberto
Bundoc. Resolution of this Petition hinges on the
following issues: (1) whether or not petitioners,
notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still
file the instant Petition; conversely, whether the
Court may still take cognizance of the case even
through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time;
and (2) whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar
as parental authority is concerned may be given
retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents
the indispensable parties in a damage case filed
against their adopted child, for acts committed by the
latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the
biological parents.
1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and
supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed before
the trial court, not having complied with the
requirements of Section 13, Rule 41, and Section 4,
Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of Court, were
considered pro forma and hence did not interrupt and
suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial
court held that the motions, not having contained a
notice of time and place of hearing, had become
useless pieces of paper which did not interrupt the
reglementary period. 1 As in fact repeatedly held by
this Court, what is mandatory is the service of the
motion on the opposing counsel indicating the time
and place of hearing. 2
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in
the instant. Petition, and in order that substantial
justice may be served, the Court, invoking its right to
suspend the application of technical rules to prevent
manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal
as having been seasonably filed before the trial court,
and the motion (and supplemental motion) for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as
having interrupted the reglementary period for
appeal. As the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals: 3
Dismissal of appeal; purely on
technical grounds is frowned upon
where the policy of the courts is to
encourage hearings of appeal on
their merits. The rules of procedure
ought not be applied in a very rigid
technical sense, rules of procedure
are used only to help secure not
override, substantial justice. if d
technical and rigid enforcement of
the rules is made their aim would
be defeated. 4
107
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's
voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an
air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-
delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code
provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability
upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, for any damages that may be caused by
a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of
the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article
2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused
by the minor children who live in
their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this
Article shall cease when the person
herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent
damage. (Emphasis supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of what
is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the
doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-
American tort law, where a person is not only liable
for torts committed by himself, but also for torts
committed by others with whom he has a certain
relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus,
parental liability is made a natural or logical
consequence of the duties and responsibilities of
parents — their parental authority — which includes
the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the
child. 5 The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability
was explained by the Court in Cangco v. Manila
Railroad Co. 6 in the following terms:
With respect to extra-contractual
obligation arising from negligence,
whether of act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature to
elect — and our Legislature has so
elected — to limit such liability to
cases in which the person upon
whom such an obligation is
imposed is morally culpable or, on
the contrary, for reasons of public
policy. to extend that liability,
without regard to the lack of moral
culpability, so as to
include responsibility for the
negligence of those persons whose
acts or omissions are imputable, by
a legal fiction, to others who are in
a position to exercise an absolute
or limited control over them. The
legislature which adopted our Civil
Code has elected to limit extra-
contractual liability — with certain
well-defined exceptions — to cases
in which moral culpability can be
directly imputed to the persons to
be charged. This moral
responsibility may consist in
having failed to exercise due care in
one's own acts, or in having failed
to exercise due care in the selection
and control of one's agent or
servants, or in the control of
 persons who, by reasons of their
status, occupy a position of
dependency with respect to the
person made liable for their
conduct.  7 (Emphasis Supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents for
the torts of their minor children living with
them, may be seen to be based upon the
parental authority vested by the Civil Code
upon such parents. The civil law assumes
that when an unemancipated child living
with its parents commits a tortious acts, the
parents were negligent in the performance of
their legal and natural duty closely to
supervise the child who is in their custody
and control. Parental liability is, in other
words, anchored upon parental authority
coupled with presumed parental dereliction
in the discharge of the duties accompanying
such authority. The parental dereliction is, of
course, only presumed and the presumption
can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code by proof that the parents had
exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by
Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental
authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc
spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It
would thus follow that the natural parents who had
then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly
maintain that because a decree of adoption was issued
by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura
spouses, parental authority was vested in the latter as
adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the
petition for adoption that is, before Adelberto had
shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses
contend that they were therefore free of any parental
responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious
conduct.
108
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the
Child and Youth Welfare Code 8 which reads as
follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If,
after considering the report of the
Department of Social Welfare or
duly licensed child placement
agency and the evidence submitted
before it, the court is satisfied that
the petitioner is qualified to
maintain, care for, and educate the
child, that the trial custody period
has been completed, and that the
best interests of the child will be
promoted by the adoption, a decree
of adoption shall be entered, which
shall be effective he date the
original petition was filed. The
decree shall state the name by
which the child is thenceforth to be
known. (Emphasis supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the
above Article 36 should be read in relation
to Article 39 of the same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The
adoption shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in
the natural parents, except where
the adopter is the spouse of the
surviving natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed
to have been dissolved as of the time the Petition for
adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under
the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for the
torts of a minor child is the relationship existing
between the parents and the minor child living with
them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents
exercise supervision and control. Article 58 of the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:
Article 58 Torts — Parents and
guardians are responsible for the
damage caused by the child under
their parental authority in
accordance with the civil
Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the
Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the requisite
that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have beer
in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held
liable for the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons
exercising parental authority shall
be civilly liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the acts or
omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their
company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate
defenses provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly
regarded as having been retroactively transferred to
and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura
spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened.
We do not consider that retroactive effect may be
giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a
liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time
when adopting parents had no actual or physically
custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect
may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition
for adoption where such is essential to permit the
accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the
adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold
that parental authority had been retroactively lodged
in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with
liability for a tortious act that they could not have
foreseen and which they could not have prevented
(since they were at the time in the United States and
had no physical custody over the child Adelberto)
would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result,
moreover, would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and policy basis underlying the
doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently,
no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of
the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could
have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to
their control at the time the tort was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code
fortifies the conclusion reached above. Article 35
provides as follows:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No
petition for adoption shall be finally
granted unless and until the
adopting parents are given by the
courts a supervised trial custody
period of at least six months to
assess their adjustment and
emotional readiness for the legal
union. During the period of trial
custody, parental authority shall be
vested in the adopting
parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is
provisionally vested in the adopting parents during
the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of
a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting
parents are given actual custody of the child during
such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody
period either had not yet begun or bad already been
completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any
case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his
natural parents, not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc
spouses, Adelberto's natural parents, were
109
indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought
by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court
of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties
being already before the court, constituted grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for
Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September
1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint
filed before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED
and this case is REMANDED to that court for further
proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs
against respondent Bundoc spouses. This Decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 235071, January 07, 2019
EVANGELINE PATULOT Y
GALIA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated
July 13, 2017 and the Resolution2 dated September
25, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 37385 which affirmed with modification the
Decision3 dated November 19, 2014 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 163, Taguig
City Station, finding Evangeline Patulot y Galia
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) charges of
child abuse.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
In two (2) separate Informations, Patulot was charged
with child abuse, defined and penalized under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, otherwise known as
the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act,4 the accusatory
portions of which read:
(Criminal Case No. 149971)
That on or about the 14th day of November 2012 in
the City of Taguig, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously commit acts of child
abuse upon one AAA,5 a three (3) year old minor, by
throwing on him a boiling oil, thereby inflicting upon
said victim-minor physical injuries, which acts are
inimical and prejudicial to the child's normal growth
and development.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(Criminal Case No. 149972)
That on or about the 14th day of November 2012, in
the City of Taguig, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of child
abuse upon one BBB, a two (2) month old baby, by
throwing on her a boiling oil, thereby inflicting upon
said victim-minor physical injuries, which acts are
inimical and prejudicial to the child's normal growth
and development.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
During arraignment, Patulot, assisted by counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the charges. Subsequently, trial
on the merits ensued wherein the prosecution
presented CCC, mother of minors AAA and BBB,
three (3) years old and two (2) months old,
respectively; DDD, father of the minors; and Dr.
Francis Jerome Vitales as its witnesses and offered
documentary evidence7 to establish the following
facts:

At around 2:00 p.m. of November 14, 2012, CCC
gathered clothes from the clothesline outside her
house. As she was about to enter the house, she was
surprised to see Patulot who was holding a casserole.
Without warning, Patulot poured the contents of the
casserole - hot cooking oil - on her. CCC tried to
dodge, but to no avail. AAA and BBB, who were
nearby, suddenly cried because they were likewise hit
by the hot cooking oil. CCC hurriedly brought AAA
and BBB to her three neighbors who volunteered to
bring the children to the Polyclinic at South Signal,
Taguig City, for treatment. She then went to the
barangay hall also at South Signal, Taguig City, to
report the incident. Accompanied by barangay
personnel, she went to Patulot's house, but Patulot
was not there. She instead returned to her children at
the Polyclinic. While there, she learned from a
neighbor that Patulot had been arrested.
Consequently, having been assured that her children
were all right and that medication had already been
given, they returned to the barangay hall, where DDD
met them. At the barangay hall, CCC noticed that her
children were shivering. Thus, she asked her
neighbors to bring them to Pateros-Taguig District
Hospital while she stayed behind to give her
statement. Afterwards, she proceeded to the hospital
where she was likewise treated for injuries. While she
and BBB were able to go home, AAA needed to be
confined but was discharged the next morning.
Before going home, however, CCC proceeded to the
Taguig Police Station where she executed
her Sinumpaang Salaysay.8
Subsequently, Dr. Vitales of the Pateros-Taguig
District Hospital, who examined and treated CCC and
her children, testified that the injuries suffered by
AAA and BBB would heal for an average period of
thirty (30) days. Next, DDD testified that he incurred
P7,440.00 in medical expenses for his wife and
children.9
Solely testifying in her defense, Patulot denied the
allegations against her. She recounted that prior to the
alleged incident, she was on her way to the market to
sell her merchandise when CCC bumped her on the
110
arm, uttering foul words against her. Due to the
impact, Patulot's merchandise fell. Because of this,
she cursed CCC back who, in turn, merely laughed
and repeated the invectives as she moved away.
Then, from 11:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. on November 14,
2012, she was repacking black pepper at her house
when she heard CCC taunt her in a loud voice, "Bakit
hindi ka pa sumama sa asawa mo? Dapat sumama ka
na para pareha kayong paglamayan." Because of
this, Patulot proceeded to Barangay Central Signal,
Taguig City, to file a complaint against CCC, but she
was ignored. So she went instead to the Barangay
South Signal, Taguig City. But upon reaching said
location, she was apprehended by the Barangay
Tanod and brought to the Barangay Hall of South
Signal, Taguig City for questioning.10
On November 19, 2014, the RTC found Patulot guilty
of child abuse and disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 149971, the Court finds
accused Evangeline Patulot y Galia GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged
and hereby sentences her to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1)
day of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to seven (7)
years and four (4) months of pris[i]on mayor, as
maximum. Accused is further ordered to pay the
offended party the amount of Three Thousand
Seven Hundred Two Pesos (P3,702), as actual
damages, and Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) by
way of moral damages;
2) In Criminal Case No. 149972, the Court finds
accused Evangeline Patulot y Galia GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged
and hereby sentences her to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1)
day of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to seven (7)
years and four (4) months of pris[i]on mayor, as
maximum. Accused is further ordered to pay the
offended party the amount of Three Thousand
Seven Hundred Two Pesos (P3,702), as actual
damages, and Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) by
way of moral damages; and
3) Finally, accused is ordered to pay a fine of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000) in each case,
conformably with section 31 (f) of R.A. 7610.
SO ORDERED.11 (Italics supplied.)
The RTC found that while Patulot may not have
intended to cause harm on AAA and BBB, her
negligence nonetheless caused injury on them, which
left visible scars that are most likely to stay on their
faces and bodies for the rest of their lives. Besides,
the trial court added that R.A. No. 7610 is a special
law such that intent is not necessary for its violator to
be liable.12
In a Decision dated July 13, 2017, the CA affirmed
Patulot's conviction, but modified the penalty
imposed by the RTC in the following wise:
WHEREFORE, the 19 November 2014 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163
(Taguig City Station) is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that:
1) in Criminal Case No. 149971, Evangeline Patulot y
Ga1ia is SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months, and
eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as
minimum[,] to seven (7) years and four (4) months
of prision mayor, as maximum; and
2) in Criminal Case No. 149972, Evangeline Patulot y
Galia is SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months, and
eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as
minimum[,] to seven (7) years and four (4) months
of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.13 (Italics supplied, underscoring in
the original.)
According to the appellate court, there was no reason
to deviate from the trial court's findings of guilt for it
had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses and their deportment on the witness
stand. It, however, ruled that the RTC was amiss in
finding it unnecessary to determine intent merely
because the act for which Patulot stood charged is
punishable by a special law. The CA clarified that the
index of whether a crime is malum prohibitum is not
its form, that is, whether or not it is found in the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) or in a special penal
statute, but the legislative intent. Nevertheless, this
reasoning still cannot help Patulot's case because
even if she did not intend on inflicting harm on the
children, there was still intent to harm CCC. Thus,
criminal liability is incurred although the wrongful
act done be different from that which Patulot
intended. For the same reason, the mitigating
circumstance of "no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed" cannot be appreciated in
Patulot's favor. Thus, Patulot must still be held guilty
of the offense charged.14
Aggrieved by the CA's denial of her Motion for
Reconsideration, Patulot filed the instant petition on
January 4, 2018, invoking the following arguments:
I.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
PETITIONER'S CONVICTION OF VIOLATING
SEC. 10(A) R.A. 7610 DESPITE THE FACT THAT
SHE HAD NO INTENT TO DEGRADE AND
DEMEAN THE INTRINSIC WORTH AND
DIGNITY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S
CHILDREN.
II.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY
ARTICLE 49 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
WITH REGARD TO THE IMPOSITION OF THE
PENALTY.15
According to Patulot, she can only be convicted of
physical injuries and not child abuse. Citing our
pronouncement in Bongalon v. People,16 she submits
that not every instance of laying hands on a child
constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section
10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Only when the laying of
hands is shown to be intended to debase, degrade, or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as
a human being should it be punished as child abuse.
111
Otherwise, it is punished under the RPC. Thus, in the
absence of such intention on the part of Patulot, her
true intention being to pour hot oil only on CCC with
AAA and BBB being merely accidentally hit, she
cannot be convicted of child abuse.
Patulot adds that even considering her to have
committed child abuse, the CA erred in determining
the imposable penalty for failing to apply Article
4917 of the RPC. According to Patulot, there was
error in personae as the oil that was intended for
CCC accidentally hit the children. She intended to
commit physical injuries, but ended up committing
child abuse. Applying Article 49, since the penalty of
the intended crime (physical injuries) is less than the
crime committed (child abuse), the imposable penalty
is that which refers to physical injuries, in its
maximum period. As to the extent of the physical
injuries intended, based on the finding of Dr. Vitales
that the injuries suffered by AAA and BBB would
heal for an average period of thirty (30) days, the
offense Patulot intended to commit is only Less
Serious Physical Injuries under the first paragraph of
Article 26518 of the RPC. Thus, the proper penalty
should only be arresto mayor in its maximum or four
(4) months and one (1) day to six (6) months for each
count.19
We deny the petition.
Under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610, "child abuse"
refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of
the child which includes any of the following: (1)
psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty,
sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) any act
by deeds or words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as
a human being; (3) unreasonable deprivation of his
basic needs for survival, such as food and
shelter; or (4) failure to immediately give medical
treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his
permanent incapacity or death.
In conjunction with this, Section 10(a) of the same
Act provides:
SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty
or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to
the Child's Development. -
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts
of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the
child's development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period. (Italics supplied.)
Corollarily, Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations
on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse
Cases defines the term "child abuse" as the infliction
of physical or psychological injury, cruelty to, or
neglect, sexual abuse or exploitation of a child. In
turn, the same Section defines "physical injury" as
those that include but are not limited to lacerations,
fractured bones, burns, internal injuries, severe injury
or serious bodily harm suffered by a child.
In view of these provisions, the Court, in Araneta v.
People,20 discussed the distinct acts punishable under
R.A. No. 7610, to wit:
As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision
punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59
of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct
acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child
exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions
prejudicial to the child's development. The Rules and
Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and
separately defined child abuse, cruelty and
exploitation just to show that these three acts are
different from one another and from the act
prejudicial to the child's development. Contrary to
petitioner's assertion, an accused can be prosecuted
and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of
Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four
acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the
acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child
exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child
because an act prejudicial to the development of the
child is different from the former acts.
Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the
word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation
and independence of one thing from other things
enumerated. It should, as a rule, be construed in the
sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of
"or" in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610
before the phrase "be responsible for other conditions
prejudicial to the child's development" supposes that
there are four punishable acts therein. First, the act of
child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child
exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for
conditions prejudicial to the child's development. The
fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted, as
petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the
three other acts, because an analysis of the entire
context of the questioned provision does not warrant
such construal.21 (Italics supplied, citations omitted.)
It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that when a
child is subjected to physical abuse or injury, the
person responsible therefor can be held liable under
R.A. No. 7610 by establishing the essential facts
above. Here, the prosecution duly proved the
following allegations in the Information charging
Patulot of child abuse: (1) the minority of both AAA
and BBB; (2) the acts committed by Patulot
constituting physical abuse against AAA and BBB;
and (3) the fact that said acts are punishable under
R.A. No. 7610. In particular, it was clearly
established that at the time of the incident, AAA and
BBB were merely three (3) years old and two (2)
months old, respectively; that Patulot consciously
poured hot cooking oil from a casserole on CCC,
consequently injuring AAA and BBB; and that said
act constitutes physical abuse specified in Section
3(b)(1) of R.A. No. 7610.
On this score, Patulot contends that on the basis of
our pronouncement in Bongalon, she cannot be
convicted of child abuse because it was not proven
that she intended to debase, degrade, or demean the
intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA and BBB as
human beings. Her reliance on said ruling, however,
is misplaced. In Bongalon, the Information
specifically charged George Bongalon, petitioner
therein, of committing acts which "are prejudicial to
the child's development and which demean the
intrinsic worth and dignity of the said child as a
112
human being."22 Thus, we ruled that he can only be
held liable for slight physical injuries instead of child
abuse in the absence of proof that he intended to
humiliate or "debase the 'intrinsic worth and
dignity'"23 of the victim.
A cursory review of the Informations in the instant
case, however, reveals no similar allegation that
Patulot's acts debased, degraded, or demeaned the
intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA and BBB as
human beings. Instead, they charged Patulot for
willfully committing acts of child abuse on AAA and
BBB "by throwing on [them] a (sic) boiling oil,
thereby inflicting upon said victim-minor physical
injuries, which acts are inimical and prejudicial to the
child's normal growth and
development."24 Accordingly, the RTC and the CA
duly found that this allegation in the Informations
was adequately established by the prosecution. It
bears stressing that Patulot did not even deny the fact
that she threw boiling oil on CCC which likewise fell
on AAA and BBB. Clearly, her actuations causing
physical injuries on babies, who were merely three
(3) years old and two (2) months old at the time, are
undeniably prejudicial to their development. In the
words of the trial court, Patulot's acts, which
practically burned the skin of AAA and BBB, left
visible scars that are most likely to stay on their faces
and bodies for the rest of their lives. She cannot,
therefore, be allowed to escape liability arising from
her actions.
Neither can Patulot argue that in the absence of
intention on her part to harm AAA and BBB, she
cannot be convicted of child abuse because she
merely intended on committing physical injuries
against CCC. Our pronouncement in Mabunot v.
People25 is squarely on point. There, petitioner Jester
Mabunot accidentally shoved a female minor child
consequently fracturing her rib while he was engaged
in a fistfight with another boy. But he points out that
the injury sustained by the minor victim was
unintentional. Thus, according to Mabunot, this
single and unintended act of shoving the child while
trading punches with another can hardly be
considered as within the definition of child abuse
under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Assuming,
therefore, that he was the cause of the injury,
Mabunot insists that he should only be held liable for
slight physical injuries under Section 265 of the RPC.
The Court, however, rejected Mabunot's contention
and held him liable not for slight physical injuries,
but for child abuse. We explained:
The petitioner also posits that since he and Dennis
were exchanging punches then, he could not have
made a deliberate design to injure Shiva. Without
intent to harm Shiva, the petitioner insists that he
deserves an acquittal.
The foregoing argument is untenable.
"When the acts complained of are inherently
immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are
punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal
intent must be clearly established with the other
elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is
committed."
The petitioner was convicted of violation of Section
10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, a special law.
However, physical abuse of a child is inherently
wrong, rendering material the existence of a criminal
intent on the part of the offender.
In the petitioner's case, criminal intent is not wanting.
Even if the Court were to consider for argument's
sake the petitioner's claim that he had no design to
harm Shiva, when he swang his arms, he was not
performing a lawful act. He clearly intended to injure
another person. However, it was not Dennis but
Shiva, who ended up with a fractured rib.
Nonetheless, the petitioner cannot escape liability for
his error. Indeed, criminal liability shall be incurred
by any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.26 (Citations omitted.)
Similarly, in the instant case, Patulot's criminal intent
is not wanting for as she expressly admitted, she
intended on pouring hot cooking oil on CCC. As
such, even granting that it was not her intention to
harm AAA and BBB, she was performing an
unlawful act when she threw the hot oil from her
casserole on CCC. She cannot, therefore, escape
liability from the same in view of the settled doctrine
mentioned in Mabunot that a person incurs criminal
liability although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended. As defined in the law,
child abuse charged against Patulot is physical abuse
of the child, whether the same is habitual or not. To
the Court, her act of pouring hot oil on AAA and
BBB falls squarely within this definition. Thus, in
view of the fact that her acts were proven to
constitute child abuse under the pertinent provisions
of the law, she must be held liable therefor.
Indeed, it cannot be denied that AAA and BBB are
children entitled to protection extended by R.A. No.
7610. Time and again, the Court has stressed that
R.A. No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the
implementation of a national comprehensive program
for the survival of the most vulnerable members of
the population, the Filipino children, in keeping with
the Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section
3, paragraph 2, that "[t]he State shall defend the right
of the children to assistance, including proper care
and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development." 27 This
piece of legislation supplies the inadequacies of
existing laws treating crimes committed against
children, namely, the RPC and Presidential Decree
No. 603 or The Child and Youth Welfare Code. As a
statute that provides for a mechanism for strong
deterrence against the commission of child abuse and
exploitation, the law has stiffer penalties for their
commission, and a means by which child traffickers
could easily be prosecuted and penalized. Also, the
definition of child abuse is expanded to encompass
not only those specific acts of child abuse under
existing laws but includes also "other acts of neglect,
abuse, cruelty or exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to the child's development."28
As regards the penalties imposed by the courts a quo,
we find no compelling reason to modify the same for
being within the allowable range. To conform to
recent jurisprudence, however, the Court deems it
113
proper to impose an interest of six percent (6%) per
annum on the actual damages in the amount of Three
Thousand Seven Hundred Two Pesos (P3,702) and
moral damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000), to be computed from the date of the
finality of this Decision until fully paid. 29
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
July 13, 2017 and Resolution dated September 25,
2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
37385 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
the P3,702.00 actual damages and P10,000.00 moral
damages awarded in each Criminal Case No. 149971
and Criminal Case No. 149972 shall be subject to an
interest of six percent (6%) per annum reckoned from
the finality of this Decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
11. Special parental authority
d. Extent of responsibility/liability
G.R. No. 184202               January 26, 2011
AQUINAS SCHOOL, Petitioner,
vs.
SPS. JOSE INTON and MA. VICTORIA S.
INTON, on their behalf and on behalf of their
minor child, JOSE LUIS S. INTON, and SR.
MARGARITA YAMYAMIN, OP, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the private school’s liability for the
outside catechist’s act of shoving a student and
kicking him on the legs when he disobeyed her
instruction to remain in his seat and not move around
the classroom.
The Facts and the Case
In 1998 respondent Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a
grade three student at Aquinas School (Aquinas).
Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin
(Yamyamin), a religion teacher who began teaching
at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose
Luis’ grade three religion class.
On July 14, 1998, while Yamyamin was writing on
the blackboard, Jose Luis left his assigned seat and
went over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising
him. Yamyamin noticed this and sent Jose Luis back
to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis got up again and
went over to the same classmate. This time, unable to
tolerate the child’s behavior, Yamyamin approached
Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several times.
She also pulled and shoved his head on the
classmate’s seat. Finally, she told the child to stay
where he was on that spot of the room and finish
copying the notes on the blackboard while seated on
the floor.
As a result of the incident, respondents Jose and
Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an action for
damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis against
Yamyamin and Aquinas before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case 67427. The
Intons also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin
for violation of Republic Act 7610 to which she
pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly.
With regard to the action for damages, the Intons
sought to recover actual, moral, and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney’s fees, for the hurt that
Jose Luis and his mother Victoria suffered. The RTC
dismissed Victoria’s personal claims but ruled in Jose
Luis’ favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for
moral damages of ₱25,000.00, exemplary damages of
₱25,000.00, and attorney’s fees of ₱10,000.00 plus
the costs of suit.1
Not satisfied, the Intons elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals (CA).2 They asked the CA to increase the
award of damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable
with Yamyamin. Finding that an employer-employee
relation existed between Aquinas and Yamyamin, the
CA found them solidarily liable to Jose Luis. The
CA, however, declined to increase the award of
damages.3 Jose Luis moved for partial
reconsideration but this was denied. Aquinas, for its
part, appealed directly to this Court from the CA
decision through a petition for review on certiorari.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not
the CA was correct in holding Aquinas solidarily
liable with Yamyamin for the damages awarded to
Jose Luis.
The Court’s Ruling
The CA found Aquinas liable to Jose Luis based on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code upon the CA’s belief
that the school was Yamyamin’s employer. Aquinas
contests this.
The Court has consistently applied the "four-fold
test" to determine the existence of an employer-
employee relationship: the employer (a) selects and
engages the employee; (b) pays his wages; (c) has
power to dismiss him; and (d) has control over his
work. Of these, the most crucial is the element of
control. Control refers to the right of the employer,
whether actually exercised or reserved, to control the
work of the employee as well as the means and
methods by which he accomplishes the same.4
In this case, the school directress testified that
Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of
sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the
congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas
to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists
that it was not the school but Yamyamin’s religious
congregation that chose her for the task of
catechizing the school’s grade three students, much
like the way bishops designate the catechists who
would teach religion in public schools. Under the
circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas did
not have control over Yamyamin’s teaching methods.
114
The Intons had not refuted the school directress’
testimony in this regard. Consequently, it was error
for the CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with
Yamyamin.1âwphi1
Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of
taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside
catechists are allowed to teach its young students. In
this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no
steps to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct
towards the students by their religion teacher.
First, Yamyamin’s transcript of records,
certificates, and diplomas showed that she
was qualified to teach religion.
Second, there is no question that Aquinas
ascertained that Yamyamin came from a
legitimate religious congregation of sisters
and that, given her Christian training, the
school had reason to assume that she would
behave properly towards the students.
Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of
the school’s Administrative Faculty Staff
Manual that set the standards for handling
students. It also required her to attend a
teaching orientation before she was allowed
to teach beginning that June of 1998.5
Fourth, the school pre-approved the content
of the course she was to teach6 to ensure that
she was really catechizing the students.
And fifth, the school had a program for
subjecting Yamyamin to classroom
evaluation.7 Unfortunately, since she was
new and it was just the start of the school
year, Aquinas did not have sufficient
opportunity to observe her methods. At any
rate, it acted promptly to relieve her of her
assignment as soon as the school learned of
the incident. 8 It cannot be said that Aquinas
was guilty of outright neglect.
Regarding the Intons’ plea for an award of greater
amounts of damages, the Court finds no justification
for this since they did not appeal from the decision of
the CA. The Intons prayed for the increase only in
their comment to the petition. They thus cannot
obtain from this Court any affirmative relief other
than those that the CA already granted them in its
decision.9
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition,
SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV 88106 dated August 4, 2008, and
HOLDS petitioner Aquinas School not liable in
damages to respondent Jose Luis Inton.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182353               June 29, 2010
ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI
AMBATALI, SFIC, and ROSALINDA
TABUGO, Petitioners,
vs.
JAYSON MIRANDA, represented by his father,
RODOLFO S. MIRANDA, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set
aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68367, which affirmed in toto the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
221, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-95-22889.
The facts, as found by the CA, follow:
On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the
afternoon inside St. Joseph College’s [SJC’s]
premises, the class to which [respondent Jayson Val
Miranda] belonged was conducting a science
experiment about fusion of sulphur powder and iron
fillings under the tutelage of [petitioner] Rosalinda
Tabugo, she being the subject teacher and employee
of [petitioner] SJC. The adviser of [Jayson’s] class is
x x x Estefania Abdan.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the
experiment without having adequately secured it
from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the
middle of the experiment, [Jayson], who was the
assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked
the result of the experiment by looking into the test
tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being
held by one of his group mates who moved it close
and towards the eye of [Jayson]. At that instance, the
compound in the test tube spurted out and several
particles of which hit [Jayson’s] eye and the different
parts of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a
result thereof, [Jayson’s] eyes were chemically
burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to
undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication.
Upon filing of this case [in] the lower court,
[Jayson’s] wound had not completely healed and still
had to undergo another surgery.
Upon learning of the incident and because of the need
for finances, [Jayson’s] mother, who was working
abroad, had to rush back home for which she spent
₱36,070.00 for her fares and had to forego her salary
from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in
the amount of at least ₱40,000.00.
Then, too, [Jayson] and his parents suffered sleepless
nights, mental anguish and wounded feelings as a
result of his injury due to [petitioners’] fault and
failure to exercise the degree of care and diligence
incumbent upon each one of them. Thus, they should
be held liable for moral damages. Also, [Jayson] sent
a demand letter to [petitioners] for the payment of his
medical expenses as well as other expenses incidental
thereto, which the latter failed to heed. Hence,
[Jayson] was constrained to file the complaint for
damages. [Petitioners], therefore, should likewise
compensate [Jayson] for litigation expenses,
including attorney’s fees.
115
On the other hand, [petitioners SJC, Sr. Josephini
Ambatali, SFIC, and Tabugo] alleged that [Jayson]
was a grade six pupil of SJC in the school year 1994-
1995. On November 17, 1994, at about 1:30 in the
afternoon, the class to which [Jayson] belong[s] was
conducting a science experiment under the guidance
and supervision of Tabugo, the class science teacher,
about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings by
combining these elements in a test tube and heating
the same. Before the science experiment was
conducted, [Jayson] and his classmates were given
strict instructions to follow the written procedure for
the experiment and not to look into the test tube until
the heated compound had cooled off. [Jayson],
however, a person of sufficient age and discretion and
completely capable of understanding the English
language and the instructions of his teacher, without
waiting for the heated compound to cool off, as
required in the written procedure for the experiment
and as repeatedly explained by the teacher, violated
such instructions and took a magnifying glass and
looked at the compound, which at that moment
spurted out of the test tube, a small particle hitting
one of [Jayson’s] eyes.
Jayson was rushed by the school employees to the
school clinic and thereafter transferred to St. Luke’s
Medical Center for treatment. At the hospital, when
Tabago visited [Jayson], the latter cried and
apologized to his teacher for violating her instructions
not to look into the test tube until the compound had
cooled off.
After the treatment, [Jayson] was pronounced ready
for discharge and an eye test showed that his vision
had not been impaired or affected. In order to avoid
additional hospital charges due to the delay in
[Jayson’s] discharge, Rodolfo S. Miranda, [Jayson’s]
father, requested SJC to advance the amount of
₱26,176.35 representing [Jayson’s] hospital bill until
his wife could arrive from abroad and pay back the
money. SJC acceded to the request.
On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of
[Jayson], through counsel, wrote SJC a letter
demanding that it should shoulder all the medical
expenses of [Jayson] that had been incurred and will
be incurred further arising from the accident caused
by the science experiment. In a letter dated December
14, 1994, the counsel for SJC, represented by Sr.
Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, explained that the school
cannot accede to the demand because "the accident
occurred by reason of [Jayson’s] failure to comply
with the written procedure for the experiment and his
teacher’s repeated warnings and instruction that no
student must face, much less look into, the opening of
the test tube until the heated compound has cooled.3
Since SJC did not accede to the demand, Rodolfo,
Jayson’s father, on Jayson’s behalf, sued petitioners
for damages.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of [Jayson] and against
[petitioners]. This Court orders and holds the
[petitioners] joint[ly] and solidarily liable to pay
[Jayson] the following amount:
1. To pay [Jayson] the amount of
₱77,338.25 as actual damages; However,
[Jayson] is ordered to reimburse [petitioner]
St. Joseph College the amount of ₱26,176.36
representing the advances given to pay
[Jayson’s] initial hospital expenses or in the
alternative to deduct said amount of
₱26,176.36 from the ₱77,338.25 actual
damages herein awarded by way of legal
compensation;
2. To pay [Jayson] the sum of ₱50,000.00 as
mitigated moral damages;
3. To pay [Jayson] the sum of ₱30,000.00 as
reasonable attorney’s fees;
4. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.4
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA. However,
as previously adverted to, the CA affirmed in toto the
ruling of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed
decision of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 221
dated September 6, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED IN
TOTO. Costs against [petitioners].51avvphi1
Undaunted, petitioners appealed` by certiorari to this
Court, adamant that the CA grievously erred, thus:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF JAYSON’S INJURY
WAS HIS OWN ACT OF LOOKING AT THE
HEATED TEST TUBE BEFORE THE
COMPOUND HAD COOLED IN COMPLETE
DISREGARD OF INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN PRIOR
TO THE EXPERIMENT.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO
APPRECIATE THAT, IN LIGHT OF THE RULING
IN THE CASE OF ST. MARY’S COLLEGE V.
WILLIAM CARPITANOS, x x x JAYSON’S
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PEEKING
INTO THE TEST TUBE WAS IN FACT THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURY FOR
WHICH THE PETITIONERS SHOULD NOT BE
HELD LIABLE.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF
ACTUAL DAMAGES DESPITE THE ABSENCE
OF PROOF TO SUPPORT THE SAME.
IV. THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED
IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES TO
[JAYSON].
116
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF
ATTORNEY’S FEES TO [JAYSON].
VI. THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED
IN DENYING THE PETITIONERS’
COUNTERCLAIM.6
We find no reason to depart from the uniform rulings
of the lower courts that petitioners were "negligent
since they all failed to exercise the required
reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to
prevent or avoid injuries to the students."
Jurisprudence dictates that factual findings of the trial
court, especially when affirmed by the appellate
court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and
are considered conclusive between the parties.7 A
review of such findings by this Court is not warranted
except for highly meritorious circumstances when:
(1) the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) a lower
court’s inference from its factual findings is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there
is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of
facts; (4) the findings of the appellate court go
beyond the issues of the case, or fail to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will
justify a different conclusion; (5) there is a
misappreciation of facts; (6) the findings of fact are
conclusions without mention of the specific evidence
on which they are based, are premised on the absence
of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on
record.8 None of the foregoing exceptions which
would warrant a reversal of the assailed decision
obtains in this instance.
Yet, petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of
Jayson’s injury was his own negligence in
disregarding the instructions given by Tabugo prior to
the experiment and peeking into the test tube.
Petitioners invoke our ruling in St. Mary’s Academy
v. Carpitanos9 which absolved St. Mary’s Academy
from liability for the untimely death of its student
during a school sanctioned activity, declaring that
"the negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy
was only a remote cause of the accident."
We are not convinced.
Contrary to petitioners’ assertions, the lower courts’
conclusions are borne out by the records of this case.
Both courts correctly concluded that the immediate
and proximate cause of the accident which caused
injury to Jayson was the sudden and unexpected
explosion of the chemicals, independent of any
intervening cause. The assailed Decision of the CA
quotes with favor the RTC decision, thus:
In this case, [petitioners] failed to show that the
negligence of [Jayson] was the proximate cause of
the latter’s injury. We find that the immediate cause
of the accident was not the negligence of [Jayson]
when he curiously looked into the test tube when the
chemicals suddenly exploded which caused his
injury, but the sudden and unexpected explosion of
the chemicals independent of any intervening cause.
[Petitioners] could have prevented the mishap if they
exercised a higher degree of care, caution and
foresight. The court a quo correctly ruled that:
"All of the [petitioners] are equally at fault and are
liable for negligence because all of them are
responsible for exercising the required reasonable
care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or
avoid injuries to the students. The individual
[petitioners] are persons charged with the teaching
and vigilance over their students as well as the
supervision and ensuring of their well-being. Based
on the facts presented before this Court, these
[petitioners] were remiss in their responsibilities and
lacking in the degree of vigilance expected of them.
[Petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo was
inside the classroom when the class undertook the
science experiment although [Jayson] insisted that
said [petitioner] left the classroom. No evidence,
however, was presented to establish that [petitioner]
Tabugo was inside the classroom for the whole
duration of the experiment. It was unnatural in the
ordinary course of events that [Jayson] was brought
to the school clinic for immediate treatment not by
[petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo but by
somebody else. The Court is inclined to believe that
[petitioner] subject teacher Tabugo was not inside the
classroom at the time the accident happened. The
Court is also perplexed why none of the other
students (who were eyewitnesses to the incident)
testified in Court to corroborate the story of the
[petitioners]. The Court, however, understands that
these other students cannot testify for [Jayson]
because [Jayson] is no longer enrolled in said school
and testifying for [Jayson] would incur the ire of
school authorities. Estefania Abdan is equally at fault
as the subject adviser or teacher in charge because
she exercised control and supervision over
[petitioner] Tabugo and the students themselves. It
was her obligation to insure that nothing would go
wrong and that the science experiment would be
conducted safely and without any harm or injury to
the students. [Petitioner] Sr. Josephini Ambatali is
likewise culpable under the doctrine of command
responsibility because the other individual
[petitioners] were under her direct control and
supervision. The negligent acts of the other individual
[petitioners] were done within the scope of their
assigned tasks.
xxxx
"The defense of due diligence of a good father of a
family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will
not exculpate it from liability because it has been
shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the
supervision of its teachers (despite an apparent rigid
screening process for hiring) and in the maintenance
of what should have been a safe and secured
environment for conducting dangerous experiments.
[Petitioner] school is still liable for the wrongful acts
of the teachers and employees because it had full
information on the nature of dangerous science
experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert
damage and injury to students. The fact that there has
never been any accident in the past during the
conduct of science experiments is not a justification
to be complacent in just preserving the status quo and
117
do away with creative foresight to install safety
measures to protect the students. Schools should not
simply install safety reminders and distribute safety
instructional manuals. More importantly, schools
should provide protective gears and devices to shield
students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.
"Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not extend
to the school or university itself, although an
educational institution may be held liable under the
principle of RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. It has also
been held that the liability of the employer for the
[tortuous] acts or negligence of its employees is
primary and solidary, direct and immediate and not
conditioned upon the insolvency of or prior recourse
against the negligent employee."10
Under the foregoing circumstances, we are hard
pressed to disturb the findings of the RTC, which the
CA affirmed.
Nonetheless, petitioners make much of the fact that
Tabugo specifically instructed her students, including
Jayson, at the start of the experiment, not to look into
the heated test tube before the compound had cooled
off. Petitioners would allocate all liability and place
all blame for the accident on a twelve (12)-year-old
student, herein respondent Jayson.
We disagree.
As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause
of Jayson’s injury was the concurrent failure of
petitioners to prevent the foreseeable mishap that
occurred during the conduct of the science
experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to
exercise the higher degree of care, caution and
foresight incumbent upon the school, its
administrators and teachers.
Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article
2180 of the Civil Code, bestows special parental
authority on the following persons with the
corresponding obligation, thus:
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers,
or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child
care shall have special parental authority and
responsibility over the minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all
authorized activities whether inside or outside the
premises of the school, entity or institution.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
Petitioners’ negligence and failure to exercise the
requisite degree of care and caution is demonstrated
by the following:
1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative
steps to avert damage and injury to its
students although it had full information on
the nature of dangerous science experiments
conducted by the students during class;
2. Petitioner school did not install safety
measures to protect the students who
conduct experiments in class;
3. Petitioner school did not provide
protective gears and devices, specifically
goggles, to shield students from expected
risks and dangers; and
4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the
classroom the whole time her class
conducted the experiment, specifically,
 when the accident involving Jayson
occurred. In any event, the size of the class
—fifty (50) students— conducting the
experiment is difficult to monitor.
Moreover, petitioners cannot simply deflect their
negligence and liability by insisting that petitioner
Tabugo gave specific instructions to her science class
not to look directly into the heated compound.
Neither does our ruling in St. Mary’s preclude their
liability in this case.
Unfortunately for petitioners, St. Mary’s is not in
point. In that case, respondents thereat admitted the
documentary exhibits establishing that the cause of
the accident was a mechanical defect and not the
recklessness of the minor, James Daniel II, in driving
the jeep. We held, thus:
Significantly, respondents did not present any
evidence to show that the proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence of the school authorities,
or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. x x x.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school
allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched
Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva, who had possession and control of the
jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed
James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time
of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by
the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep,
must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. The
negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was
only a remote cause of the accident. Between the
remote cause and the injury, there intervened the
negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.11
118
In marked contrast, both the lower courts similarly
concluded that the mishap which happened during the
science experiment was foreseeable by the school, its
officials and teachers. This neglect in preventing a
foreseeable injury and damage equates to neglect in
exercising the utmost degree of diligence required of
schools, its administrators and teachers, and,
ultimately, was the proximate cause of the damage
and injury to Jayson. As we have held in St. Mary’s,
"for petitioner [St. Mary’s Academy] to be liable,
there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of
the injury caused because the negligence must have a
causal connection to the accident."12
As regards the contributory negligence of Jayson, we
see no need to disturb the lower courts’ identical
rulings thereon:
As earlier discussed, the proximate cause of
[Jayson’s] injury was the explosion of the heated
compound independent of any efficient intervening
cause. The negligence on the part of [petitioner]
Tabugo in not making sure that the science
experiment was correctly conducted was the
proximate cause or reason why the heated compound
exploded and injured not only [Jayson] but his
classmates as well. However, [Jayson] is partly
responsible for his own injury, hence, he should not
be entitled to recover damages in full but must
likewise bear the consequences of his own
negligence. [Petitioners], therefore, should be held
liable only for the damages actually caused by their
negligence.13
Lastly, given our foregoing ruling, we likewise affirm
the lower courts’ award of actual and moral damages,
and grant of attorney’s fees. The denial of petitioners’
counterclaim is also in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
68367 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143363               February 6, 2002
ST. MARY'S ACADEMY, petitioner,
vs.
WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S.
CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES
DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL,
SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals as well as the
resolution denying reconsideration, holding petitioner
liable for damages arising from an accident that
resulted in the death of a student who had joined a
campaign to visit the public schools in Dipolog City
to solicit enrollment.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
"Claiming damages for the death of their only son,
Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and
Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against
James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and
Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio
Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.
"On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional
Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its decision the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"‘WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED,
judgment is hereby rendered in the following manner:
1. Defendant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City, is
hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs William Carpitanos
and Luisa Carpitanos, the following sums of money:
a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin S.
Carpitanos;
b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) actual
damages incurred by plaintiffs for burial and related
expenses;
c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for
attorney’s fees;
d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00) for moral damages; and to pay costs.
2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants
James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel are hereby
ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the amount of
damages above-stated in the event of insolvency of
principal obligor St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog
City;
3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the
time of the commission of the tort and who was under
special parental authority of defendant St. Mary’s
Academy, is ABSOLVED from paying the above-
stated damages, same being adjudged against
defendants St. Mary’s Academy, and subsidiarily,
against his parents;
4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby
ABSOLVED of any liability. His counterclaim not
being in order as earlier discussed in this decision, is
hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED."’ (Decision, pp. 32-33;
Records, pp. 205-206)."
119
"From the records it appears that from 13 to 20
February 1995, defendant-appellant St. Mary’s
Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment
drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the
enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools
from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a
student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos
was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on
the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school
students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to
Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City.
The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years
old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the
latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a
result the jeep turned turtle.
"Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he
sustained from the accident."2
In due time, petitioner St. Mary’s academy appealed
the decision to the Court of Appeals.3
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a decision reducing the actual damages
to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming the decision a
quo, in toto.4
On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Mary’s
Academy filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision. However, on May 22, 2000, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion.5
Hence, this appeal.6
The Issues
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
holding the petitioner liable for damages for
the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the award of moral damages
against the petitioner.
The Court’s Ruling
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Mary’s
Academy liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos
under Articles 2187 and 2198 of the Family Code,
pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing
a minor to drive and in not having a teacher
accompany the minor students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following
shall have special parental authority over a minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody: (1) the school, its administrators and
teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child care. This special parental authority
and responsibility applies to all authorized activities,
whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution. Thus, such authority and
responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and
other affairs of the pupils and students outside the
school premises whenever authorized by the school
or its teachers.9
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person
under custody is a minor, those exercising special
parental authority are principally and solidarily liable
for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision,
instruction, or custody.10
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a
finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident.11
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury,
however, it must be shown that the ‘injury for which
recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done; the connection
between the negligence and the injury must be a
direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury.
For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot
create a right of action unless it is the proximate
cause of the injury complained of.’ And ‘the
proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.’"12
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the
negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of
the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted
that the immediate cause of the accident was not the
negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of
James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel
spouses and Villanueva admitted the documentary
exhibits establishing that the cause of the accident
was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the
recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical
defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva.
Respondents, including the spouses Carpitanos,
parents of the deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not
dispute the report and testimony of the traffic
investigator who stated that the cause of the accident
was the detachment of the steering wheel guide that
caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present any
evidence to show that the proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence of the school authorities,
or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the
respondents’ reliance on Article 219 of the Family
Code that "those given the authority and
responsibility under the preceding Article shall be
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused
by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor"
was unfounded.
120
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school
allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched
Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva, who had possession and control of the
jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed
James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time
of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by
the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep,
must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. The
negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was
only a remote cause of the accident. Between the
remote cause and the injury, there intervened the
negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
"The proximate cause of an injury is that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."13
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or
the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep
owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over
which petitioner St. Mary’s Academy had no control,
and which was the proximate cause of the accident,
petitioner may not be held liable for the death
resulting from such accident.
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot
be held liable for moral damages in the amount of
P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendant’s wrongful act or
omission.14 In this case, the proximate cause of the
accident was not attributable to petitioner.
For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable
for the accident, the decision of the Court of Appeals
ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to
respondent Carpitanos must be deleted. Moreover,
the grant of attorney’s fees as part of damages is the
exception rather than the rule.15 The power of the
court to award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of
the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable
justification.16 Thus, the grant of attorney’s fees
against the petitioner is likewise deleted.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered
owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He
never denied and in fact admitted this
fact.1âwphi1 We have held that the registered owner
of any vehicle, even if not used for public service,
would primarily be responsible to the public or to
third persons for injuries caused the latter while the
vehicle was being driven on the highways or
streets."17 Hence, with the overwhelming evidence
presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel
spouses that the accident occurred because of the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it
is not the school, but the registered owner of the
vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for
the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals 18 and that
of the trial court. 19 The Court remands the case to the
trial court for determination of the liability of
defendants, excluding petitioner St. Mary’s
Academy, Dipolog City.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA,
JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA
PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A.
AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA,
ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A.
AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA,
VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA
TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS,
VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR.,
CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA,
PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and natural
guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN,
and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian,
A. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was
looking forward to the commencement exercises
where he would ascend the stage and in the presence
of his relatives and friends receive his high school
diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled on April
16, 1972. As it turned out, though, fate would
intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On
April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of
their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a
classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally
hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as
well. The victim was only seventeen years old. 1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence . 2 Additionally, the herein petitioners, as
the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high
school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics
teacher, together with Daffon and two other students,
through their respective parents. The complaint
against the students was later dropped. After trial, the
Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining
defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of
P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss
of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral
expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and
121
attorney's fees .3 On appeal to the respondent court,
however, the decision was reversed and all the
defendants were completely absolved .4
In its decision, which is now the subject of this
petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the respondent court found that Article 2180
was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an
academic institution of learning. It also held that the
students were not in the custody of the school at the
time of the incident as the semester had already
ended, that there was no clear identification of the
fatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had
exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the
injury. 5
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora
went to the San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972,
and while in its auditorium was shot to death by
Pablito Daffon, a classmate. On the implications and
consequences of these facts, the parties sharply
disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the
school to show his physics experiment as a
prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then
under the custody of the private respondents. The
private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had
gone to the school only for the purpose of submitting
his physics report and that he was no longer in their
custody because the semester had already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun
used which the petitioners consider important
because of an earlier incident which they claim
underscores the negligence of the school and at least
one of the private respondents. It is not denied by the
respondents that on April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso,
Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban
an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him
without making a report to the principal or taking any
further action .6 As Gumban was one of the
companions of Daffon when the latter fired the gun
that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this
was the same pistol that had been confiscated from
Gumban and that their son would not have been
killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. The
respondents say, however, that there is no proof that
the gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on
the interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it
happens, is invoked by both parties in support of their
conflicting positions. The pertinent part of this article
reads as follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students or
apprentices so long as they remain
in their custody.
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in
connection with the above-quoted provision, to wit:
Exconde v. Capuno 7 Mercado v. Court of
Appeals, 8 and Palisoc v. Brillantes. 9 These will be
briefly reviewed in this opinion for a better resolution
of the case at bar.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the
Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy Scout,
attended a Rizal Day parade on instructions of the
city school supervisor. After the parade, the boy
boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it so
recklessly that it turned turtle, resulting in the death
of two of its passengers. Dante was found guilty of
double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the
separate civil action flied against them, his father was
held solidarily liable with him in damages under
Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of the Civil Code for
the tort committed by the 15-year old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista
Angelo on June 29,1957, exculpated the school in
an obiter dictum (as it was not a party to the case) on
the ground that it was riot a school of arts and trades.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino
Padilla and Alex Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing
that it was the school authorities who should be held
liable Liability under this rule, he said, was imposed
on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of
arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause "of
establishments of arts and trades" should apply only
to "heads" and not "teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and
with an elaboration. A student cut a classmate with a
razor blade during recess time at the Lourdes
Catholic School in Quezon City, and the parents of
the victim sued the culprits parents for damages.
Through Justice Labrador, the Court declared in
another obiter (as the school itself had also not been
sued that the school was not liable because it was not
an establishment of arts and trades. Moreover, the
custody requirement had not been proved as this
"contemplates a situation where the student lives and
boards with the teacher, such that the control,
direction and influences on the pupil supersede those
of the parents." Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part
but the other members of the court concurred in this
decision promulgated on May 30, 1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971,
a 16-year old student was killed by a classmate with
fist blows in the laboratory of the Manila Technical
Institute. Although the wrongdoer — who was
already of age — was not boarding in the school, the
head thereof and the teacher in charge were held
solidarily liable with him. The Court declared
through Justice Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited article
— "so long as (the students) remain
in their custody" — means the
protective and supervisory custody
that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils
and students for as long as they are
at attendance in the school,
including recess time. There is
nothing in the law that requires that
for such liability to attach, the pupil
or student who commits the tortious
122
act must live and board in the
school, as erroneously held by the
lower court, and the dicta in
Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on
which it relied, must now be
deemed to have been set aside by
the present decision.
This decision was concurred in by five other
members, 10 including Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who
stressed, in answer to the dissenting opinion, that
even students already of age were covered by the
provision since they were equally in the custody of
the school and subject to its discipline. Dissenting
with three others,11 Justice Makalintal was for
retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado and
submitted that the rule should apply only to torts
committed by students not yet of age as the school
would be acting only in loco parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with
Justice Reyes' dissent in the Exconde Case but added
that "since the school involved at bar is a non-
academic school, the question as to the applicability
of the cited codal provision to academic institutions
will have to await another case wherein it may
properly be raised."
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos has been directly impleaded and is
sought to be held liable under Article 2180; and
unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades
but an academic institution of learning. The parties
herein have also directly raised the question of
whether or not Article 2180 covers even
establishments which are technically not schools of
arts and trades, and, if so, when the offending student
is supposed to be "in its custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the
Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in
question should apply to all schools, academic as
well as non-academic. Where the school is academic
rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student
will attach to the teacher in charge of such student,
following the first part of the provision. This is the
general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and
trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall
be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In
other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the
acts of their students except where the school is
technical in nature, in which case it is the head
thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon
of reddendo singula singulis "teachers" should apply
to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of
establishments of arts and trades" to the word
"apprentices."
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion
expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where
he said in part:
I can see no sound reason for
limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil
Code to teachers of arts and trades
and not to academic ones. What
substantial difference is there
between them insofar as concerns
the proper supervision and vice
over their pupils? It cannot be
seriously contended that an
academic teacher is exempt from
the duty of watching that his pupils
do not commit a tort to the
detriment of third Persons, so long
as they are in a position to exercise
authority and Supervision over the
pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase
"teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades"
used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil
Code, the words "arts and trades"
does not qualify "teachers" but only
"heads of establishments." The
phrase is only an updated version
of the equivalent terms
 "preceptores y artesanos" used in
the Italian and French Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all
commentators, the basis of the
presumption of negligence of Art.
1903 in some culpa in
vigilando that the parents, teachers,
etc. are supposed to have incurred
in the exercise of their authority, it
would seem clear that where the
parent places the child under the
effective authority of the teacher,
the latter, and not the parent, should
be the one answerable for the torts
committed while under his custody,
for the very reason/that the parent
is not supposed to interfere with the
discipline of the school nor with the
authority and supervision of the
teacher while the child is under
instruction. And if there is no
authority, there can be no
responsibility.
There is really no substantial distinction between the
academic and the non-academic schools insofar as
torts committed by their students are concerned. The
same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the
students under his control and supervision, whatever
the nature of the school where he is teaching. The
suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that
the provision would make the teacher or even the
head of the school of arts and trades liable for an
injury caused by any student in its custody but if that
same tort were committed in an academic school, no
liability would attach to the teacher or the school
head. All other circumstances being the same, the
teacher or the head of the academic school would be
absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the non-
academic school would be held liable, and simply
because the latter is a school of arts and trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of
vigilance should be exercised by the school
123
authorities on the basis only of the nature of their
respective schools. There does not seem to be any
plausible reason for relaxing that vigilance simply
because the school is academic in nature and for
increasing such vigilance where the school is non-
academic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is
caused by the student and not by the school itself nor
is it a result of the operations of the school or its
equipment. The injury contemplated may be caused
by any student regardless of the school where he is
registered. The teacher certainly should not be able to
excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching
in an academic school where, on the other hand, the
head would be held liable if the school were non-
academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher
of the academic school is to be held answerable for
the torts committed by his students, why is it the head
of the school only who is held liable where the injury
is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the
case of the academic or non- technical school, why
not apply the rule also to the head thereof instead of
imposing the liability only on the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact
that historically the head of the school of arts and
trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than
the head of the academic school. The old schools of
arts and trades were engaged in the training of
artisans apprenticed to their master who personally
and directly instructed them on the technique and
secrets of their craft. The head of the school of arts
and trades was such a master and so was personally
involved in the task of teaching his students, who
usually even boarded with him and so came under his
constant control, supervision and influence. By
contrast, the head of the academic school was not as
involved with his students and exercised only
administrative duties over the teachers who were the
persons directly dealing with the students. The head
of the academic school had then (as now) only a
vicarious relationship with the students.
Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted
for the acts of the students, the head of the school of
arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them,
could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at
present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts
and trades, the consequent increase in their
enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the
direct and personal contract of their heads with the
students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged.
In its present state, the provision must be interpreted
by the Court according to its clear and original
mandate until the legislature, taking into account the
charges in the situation subject to be regulated, sees
fit to enact the necessary amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the
responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school
of arts and trades over the students. Is such
responsibility co-extensive with the period when the
student is actually undergoing studies during the
school term, as contended by the respondents and
impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it
is clear that while the custody requirement, to
repeat Palisoc v. Brillantes, does not mean that the
student must be boarding with the school authorities,
it does signify that the student should be within the
control and under the influence of the school
authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury.
This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be
co-terminous with the semester, beginning with the
start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and
excluding the time before or after such period, such
as the period of registration, and in the case of
graduating students, the period before the
commencement exercises. In the view of the Court,
the student is in the custody of the school authorities
as long as he is under the control and influence of the
school and within its premises, whether the semester
has not yet begun or has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under
the discipline of the school only upon the start of
classes notwithstanding that before that day he has
already registered and thus placed himself under its
rules. Neither should such discipline be deemed
ended upon the last day of classes notwithstanding
that there may still be certain requisites to be satisfied
for completion of the course, such as submission of
reports, term papers, clearances and the like. During
such periods, the student is still subject to the
disciplinary authority of the school and cannot
consider himself released altogether from observance
of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the
school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student
objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right,
and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate
student privilege, the responsibility of the school
authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if
the student should be doing nothing more than
relaxing in the campus in the company of his
classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience
and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the
custody and subject to the discipline of the school
authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-
in-charge who must answer for his students' torts, in
practically the same way that the parents are
responsible for the child when he is in their custody.
The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the
dean, principal, or other administrative superior to
exercise supervision over the pupils in the specific
classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is
not necessary that at the time of the injury, the
teacher be physically present and in a position to
prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and
actual physical control but refers more to the
influence exerted on the child and the discipline
instilled in him as a result of such influence. Thus, for
the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not
the parent shag be held responsible if the tort was
committed within the premises of the school at any
time when its authority could be validly exercised
over him.
124
In any event, it should be noted that the liability
imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on
the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades
and not on the school itself. If at all, the school,
whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the
acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under
the general principle of respondeat superior, but then
it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it
had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades
directly held to answer for the tort committed by the
student. As long as the defendant can show that he
had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the
injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from
the liability imposed by Article 2180, which also
states that:
The responsibility treated of in this
article shall cease when the Persons
herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent
damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the
teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting
in loco parentis for the law does not require that the
offending student be of minority age. Unlike the
parent, who wig be liable only if his child is still a
minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for
the act of the student under him regardless of the
student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability
attached to the teacher and the head of the technical
school although the wrongdoer was already of age. In
this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more
favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions
expressed by Justice Makalintal in his dissenting
opinion in Palisoc that the school may be unduly
exposed to liability under this article in view of the
increasing activism among the students that is likely
to cause violence and resulting injuries in the school
premises. That is a valid fear, to be sure.
Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the
present ruling, it is not the school that will be held
directly liable. Moreover, the defense of due
diligence is available to it in case it is sought to be
held answerable as principal for the acts or omission
of its head or the teacher in its employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper
measures in selecting the head or its teachers and the
appropriate supervision over them in the custody and
instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and
regulations for the maintenance of discipline among
them. In almost all cases now, in fact, these measures
are effected through the assistance of an adequate
security force to help the teacher physically enforce
those rules upon the students. Ms should bolster the
claim of the school that it has taken adequate steps to
prevent any injury that may be committed by its
students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this
defense as it would otherwise be unfair to hold him
directly answerable for the damage caused by his
students as long as they are in the school premises
and presumably under his influence. In this respect,
the Court is disposed not to expect from the teacher
the same measure of responsibility imposed on the
parent for their influence over the child is not equal in
degree. Obviously, the parent can expect more
obedience from the child because the latter's
dependence on him is greater than on the teacher. It
need not be stressed that such dependence includes
the child's support and sustenance whereas
submission to the teacher's influence, besides being
coterminous with the period of custody is usually
enforced only because of the students' desire to pass
the course. The parent can instill more las discipline
on the child than the teacher and so should be held to
a greater accountability than the teacher for the tort
committed by the child.
And if it is also considered that under the article in
question, the teacher or the head of the school of arts
and trades is responsible for the damage caused by
the student or apprentice even if he is already of age
— and therefore less tractable than the minor — then
there should all the more be justification to require
from the school authorities less accountability as long
as they can prove reasonable diligence in preventing
the injury. After all, if the parent himself is no longer
liable for the student's acts because he has reached
majority age and so is no longer under the former's
control, there is then all the more reason for leniency
in assessing the teacher's responsibility for the acts of
the student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has
arrived at the following conclusions:
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he
was still in the custody of the authorities of Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth
year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if
he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics
experiment or merely to submit his physics report for
what is important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. As previously observed, even the mere
savoring of the company of his friends in the
premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that
would have also brought him in the custody of the
school authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean
of boys cannot be held liable because none of them
was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Each
of them was exercising only a general authority over
the student body and not the direct control and
influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of
particular classes or sections and thus immediately
involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties
does not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the
offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo
Amadora had gone to school that day in connection
with his physics report did not necessarily make the
physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the
teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-
charge, there is no showing that Dicon was negligent
125
in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had
waived observance of the rules and regulations of the
school or condoned their non-observance. His
absence when the tragedy happened cannot be
considered against him because he was not supposed
or required to report to school on that day. And while
it is true that the offending student was still in the
custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was
physically absent when the tort was committed, it has
not been established that it was caused by his laxness
in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the
contrary, the private respondents have proved that
they had exercised due diligence, through the
enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining
that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably
the dean of boys who should be held liable especially
in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier
confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the
students and returned the same later to him without
taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to
higher authorities. While this was clearly negligence
on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the
school, it does not necessarily link him to the
shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he
confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed
the petitioners' son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under
the article because only the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades is made responsible for the
damage caused by the student or apprentice. Neither
can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any
of the other private respondents for none of them has
been found to have been charged with the custody of
the offending student or has been remiss in the
discharge of his duties in connection with such
custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed
by the record and in the light of the principles herein
announced that none of the respondents is liable for
the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo
Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the
auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on
April 13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize with the
petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic
circumstances here related, we nevertheless are
unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as
a balm to their grief, under the law they have
invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN
P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL.
PEDRO SACRO and LT. M.
SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA
ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial
Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and
ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused
the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-
floor premises of the Philippine School of Business
Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the
deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Branch 47) presided over by Judge (now
Court of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoñez-Benitez,
for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate
officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was
enrolled in the third year commerce course at the
PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not
members of the school's academic community but
were elements from outside the school.
Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the
following school authorities: Juan D. Lim (President),
Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M.
Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro
(Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant
Chief of Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now
private respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for
the victim's untimely demise due to their alleged
negligence, recklessness and lack of security
precautions, means and methods before, during and
after the attack on the victim. During the
proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his
relationship with the other petitioners by resigning
from his position in the school.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have
the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are
presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, the complaint states no cause of action against
them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect
that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are
beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated
article.
The respondent trial court, however, overruled
petitioners' contention and thru an order dated 8
December 1987, denied their motion to dismiss. A
subsequent motion for reconsideration was similarly
dealt with by an order dated 25 January 1988.
Petitioners then assailed the trial court's disposition
before the respondent appellate court which, in a
decision * promulgated on 10 June 1988, affirmed the
trial court's orders. On 22 August 1988, the
respondent appellate court resolved to deny the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition.
At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent
appellate court primarily anchored its decision on the
law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176
and 2180 of the Civil Code. 1 Pertinent portions of the
appellate court's now assailed ruling state:
Article 2180 (formerly Article
1903) of the Civil Code is an
adoption from the old Spanish Civil
Code. The comments of Manresa
126
and learned authorities on its
meaning should give way to present
day changes. The law is not fixed
and flexible (sic); it must be
dynamic. In fact, the greatest value
and significance of law as a rule of
conduct in (sic) its flexibility to
adopt to changing social conditions
and its capacity to meet the new
challenges of progress.
Construed in the light of modern
day educational system, Article
2180 cannot be construed in its
narrow concept as held in the old
case of Exconde
vs. Capuno  2 and Mercado
vs. Court of Appeals; 3 hence, the
ruling in the Palisoc  4 case that it
should apply to all kinds of
educational institutions, academic
or vocational.
At any rate, the law holds the
teachers and heads of the school
staff liable unless they relieve
themselves of such liability
pursuant to the last paragraph of
Article 2180 by "proving that they
observed all the diligence to
prevent damage." This can only be
done at a trial on the merits of the
case. 5
While we agree with the respondent appellate court
that the motion to dismiss the complaint was
correctly denied and the complaint should be tried on
the merits, we do not however agree with the
premises of the appellate court's ruling.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis.
This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited
cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more
recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. 6 In all
such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article
2180) plainly provides that the damage should have
been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he
educational institution sought to be held liable for the
acts of its pupils or students while in its custody.
However, this material situation does not exist in the
present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of
Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose
acts the school could be made liable.
However, does the appellate court's failure to
consider such material facts mean the exculpation of
the petitioners from liability? It does not necessarily
follow.
When an academic institution accepts students for
enrollment, there is established a contract between
them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both
parties are bound to comply with. 7 For its part, the
school undertakes to provide the student with an
education that would presumably suffice to equip him
with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school's academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or
"built-in" obligation of providing their students with
an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its
primary undertaking of imparting knowledge.
Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of
physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of
the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there looms
around the school premises a constant threat to life
and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that
adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order
within the campus premises and to prevent the
breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince
a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos
Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really
govern. 8 A perusal of Article 2176 shows that
obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also
known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only
between parties not otherwise bound by contract,
whether express or implied. However, this impression
has not prevented this Court from determining the
existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract.
In Air France vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the
private respondent was awarded damages for his
unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard
the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the
Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as
one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract
of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the
view that liability from tort may exist even if there is
a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be
also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs. Thomas,
248 Fed. 231).
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as
early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar
mind. In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780),
Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus:
The field of non-contractual
obligation is much broader than
that of contractual obligation,
comprising, as it does, the whole
extent of juridical human relations.
These two fields, figuratively
speaking, concentric; that is to say,
the mere fact that a person is bound
to another by contract does not
relieve him from extra-contractual
liability to such person. When such
a contractual relation exists the
obligor may break the contract
under such conditions that the
same act which constitutes a
breach of the contract would have
constituted the source of an extra-
contractual obligation had no
contract existed between the
parties.
127
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the
Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly Article
21, which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals,
good custom or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the
damage. (emphasis supplied).
Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline
which emboldened the petitioner's employee to
forcibly oust the private respondent to cater to the
comfort of a white man who allegedly "had a better
right to the seat." In Austro-American, supra, the
public embarrassment caused to the passenger was
the justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals,
(Second Circuit), to award damages to the latter.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that should
the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith
and be violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to
view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar,
however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract
between the school and Bautista had been breached
thru the former's negligence in providing proper
security measures. This would be for the trial court to
determine. And, even if there be a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally to a
breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test
of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would
not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that
negligence becomes material only because of the
contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In
other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine
qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of
the school cannot exist independently of the contract,
unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances
set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the attendant
difficulties posed by the obligation of schools, above-
mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common
carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students
against all risks. This is specially true in the populous
student communities of the so-called "university belt"
in Manila where there have been reported several
incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of
hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of
schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon
their premises, for notwithstanding the security
measures installed, the same may still fail against an
individual or group determined to carry out a
nefarious deed inside school premises and environs.
Should this be the case, the school may still avoid
liability by proving that the breach of its contractual
obligation to the students was not due to its
negligence, here statutorily defined to be the
omission of that degree of diligence which is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to
the circumstances of persons, time and place. 9
As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on
the substance of the private respondents' complaint,
the record is bereft of all the material facts.
Obviously, at this stage, only the trial court can make
such a determination from the evidence still to
unfold.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered,
the petition is DENIED. The court of origin (RTC,
Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue
proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 222740, September 28, 2016
ST. LUKE'S COLLEGE OF MEDICINE-
WILLIAM H. QUASHA MEMORIAL
FOUNDATION, DR. BRIGIDO L.
CARANDANG, AND DR. ALEJANDRO P.
ORTIGAS Petitioners, v. SPOUSES MANUEL
AND ESMERALDA PEREZ AND SPOUSES
ERIC AND JURISITA QUINTOS, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review
on certiorari is the Decision1 dated September 30,
2015 and the Resolution2 dated February 2, 2016 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
103529, which rulings reversed the Decision dated
July 7, 20143 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 84, Malolos City, Bulacan in Civil Case No.
145-M-2012 and remanded the case to the trial court
for reception of evidence on the amount of damages
to be awarded.
As a backgrounder, in 2006, the Commission on
Higher Education issued Memorandum Order No. 10,
series of 2006 which required medical students to
undergo rotating clinical clerkship in their fourth
year. As such, petitioner St. Luke's College of
Medicine (St. Luke's) entered into a Memorandum of
Intent with the Municipality of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija
for the construction of a community clinic. The said
facility consisted of a six-bed medical facility in the
ground floor, and a residential space for the medical
staff in the second floor.
The undisputed facts, as amply summarized by the
CA, are as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In February 2010, St. Luke's sent four (4) of its
4th year medical students to the clinic, namely:
plaintiffs-appellants Spouses Perez's daughter Jessa,
plaintiffs-appellants Spouses Quintos' daughter
Cecille, Jerillie Ann Murillo (Murillo) and Miguel
Rafael Ramos (Ramos). They were tasked to
complete a four-week clerkship rotation at the clinic
and like the previous batches, they were housed in the
second floor of the clinic.
According to Ramos, he and his groupmates reported
for duty at the Cabiao clinic at approximately 10
o'clock in the morning of February 8, 2010. When
their shift ended at 5 o'clock that afternoon, the group
went for a jog and returned to the clinic at around 7
128
o'clock in the evening. They again went out at 9
o'clock in the evening to buy beverages, cooking oil
and other items needed for their breakfast the next
day and went to sleep sometime after midnight.
Ramos admitted that one of the beverages they
bought was an alcoholic beverage called The Bar,
which consisted of either vodka or gin. He also
admitted that only he and Cecille drank the alcoholic
beverage which they mixed with the soda and that
they did not consume the whole bottle.
Ramos was awakened sometime between 3 o'clock
and 3:30 in the morning of February 9, 2010 when he
heard Murillo shouting from the other side of the
room that there was a fire. Ramos immediately ran to
the door which led to the living room and when he
opened the same, he saw thick smoke coming from
the left portion of the living room where there was a
glow. He also felt extreme heat, prompting him to run
to the bathroom to get a pail of water with which he
tried to extinguish the fire. The girls, who had
followed him to the bathroom, stayed behind. When
Ramos' attempt to put out the fire proved to be futile,
he went back to the bathroom and poured water on
the girls in an attempt to alleviate the extreme heat
coming from the fire.
According to Ramos, the smoke started to seep
through the bathroom door and the group had started
shouting for help. After a considerable amount of
time, he heard somebody outside instructing him to
get back from the window. When he did so,
somebody broke the window and started to dismantle
the iron grills barring the same. By that time, Ramos
had started losing consciousness due to smoke
inhalation and only remembered that he was being
pulled out of the building through the window.
Unfortunately, the fire resulted in the deaths of the
female medical students, including the daughters of
plaintiffs-appellants due to smoke inhalation
resulting" to asphyxia.
As a result of the deaths, defendant-appellee St.
Luke's compensated the parents of the three deceased
students in the amount of PhP300,000.00 each from
insurance proceeds. (Citations omitted)
The Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) conducted an
investigation on the incident, and in a Certification
dated April 18, 2011, it certified that the fire was
"purely accidental in nature due to unattended
cooking," to wit:4
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT as appearing on The
Blotter Book No. 0304-0287, pages 17 and 18, the
two storey Institutional building owned by Local
Government Unit (LGU) Cabiao, Nueva Ecija was
partially razed by fire including all the contents of the
second floor that transpired on or about 090245H
February 2010. The estimated cost of damage is two
Million pesos (P2,000,000.00) more or less.
Result of investigation conducted by the Investigator
on Case of this station, Bureau of Fire Protection,
Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, disclosed that the fire was
purely ACCIDENTAL IN NATURE due to
UNATTENDED COOKING that occurred at the
kitchen of said floor and no evidence were gathered
to show that the fire was intentionally, deliberately or
maliciously set.
Respondents had their doubts. Thus:5
xxx. xxx, plaintiffs-appellants, requested for a
meeting with defendant-appellee Dr. Alejandro
Ortigas, Associate Dean for Faculty and Student
Affairs of St. Luke's. During the meeting, plaintiffs-
appellants were surprised by the presence of
defendants-appellees Dr. Brigido Carandang, St.
Luke's Dean of Medicine, the Municipal Health
Officer of Cabiao Dr. De Leon, as well as Municipal
Fire Marshall of Cabiao Baby Boy Esquivel, a Cabiao
police officer and its barangay captain.
The officials informed plaintiffs-appellants that the
fire was caused by the gas burner left open by the
victims which greatly disturbed plaintiffs-appellants.
In a subsequent meeting, they were informed that
there was also evidence that the victims were
drinking alcoholic beverages on the night of the fire
which plaintiffs-appellants refused to accept.
Convinced that there was a cover-up, plaintiffs-
appellants continued to question individual
defendants-appellees. Exasperated, defendant-
appellee Dr. Carandang allegedly asked "Ano pa
bang gusto ninyo sa amin? Nakiramay na kami."
Offended and still unconvinced, respondent Spouses
Manuel and Esmeralda Perez, the parents of Jessa,
and respondent Spouses Eric and Jurisita Quintos, the
parents of Cecille, sought the help of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). In its Resolution dated
August 3, 2010, the existence of which is expressly
admitted by petitioners, having quoted the
contents6 and having attached a copy thereof to the
present petition,7 the NBI declared that the
construction of the Cabiao Community Clinic
building was in violation of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9514 (R.A. No. 9514) or
the Revised Fire Code of the Philippines, that the
cause of the fire was due to faulty electrical wiring,
and that St. Luke's negligence is criminal in nature.
The pertinent parts of the said Resolution reads:8
xxxx
2. The building structure of Cabiao Community
Center
The Cabiao Community Clinic/Center is a two-storey
concrete building. The ground floor is used as the
municipality's lie-in clinic or hospital during day
time. The students and in particular the victims use
this facility together with the. medical complement of
the municipality for their community medical service.
On the 2nd floor was the office of Dr. LEON DE
LEON, Cabiao Municipal Health Officer, adjacent
was a storage room for office and medical supplies
and documents, the bedrooms for the medical
students rendering community service, a dining area,
a kitchen, and the living-room. The second floor, it
may be said, is virtually dedicated for the board and
lodging of the students while on mission. These
rooms and areas are separated from each other by
wood panels made of plywood including the wall in
which the gas stove was located. All the windows at
the second floor are also covered by permanent
iron grills. There are no fire exits, fire alarms, fire
extinguishers, sprinklers, emergency lights.
129
The community center is a virtual fire/death trap.
During night time, medical students were left
alone inside the 2nd floor with the main gate
locked from the outside and with no apparent
signs of fire alarms, fire sprinklers, fire exit plan,
emergency lights, provisions of confining the fire
to its source, among others, for the occupants fire
safety and protection system. They were on their
own at the second floor, without anyone (maid or
security guard) to attend to their needs while the
ground floors and the adjoining building were
uninhabited.
3. The electrical system of Cabiao Community
Clinic;
Engr. DAVID R. AOANAN, Chief Electrical Section
of the (sic) and member of the NBI investigating
team observed that the facility has a main circuit
breaker and the two distribution panels, located at the
ground floor, just above the comfort room of the
2nd floor. The main breaker has a 500 amp capacity
while the two distribution panels serving the 1 st floor
and the 2nd floor has 200 amp capacity, each, as
against the main electrical service wire with the size
14 mm.
The ratio between the capacity of the circuit
breaker and the electrical service wire is out of
proportion and became electrically insensitive to
overload and wire short circuits; thereby negating
the very purpose the circuit breaker was designed.
The size of service wire is Small, suitable only for
lighting purposes and not to supply two buildings,
dedicated for public use. Six years of use in
overload capacity would have worn out the wire
and its strength and vitality, hence it will readily
overheat, notwithstanding at the time short
circuits, only few bulbs were in use.
The electrical meter used is appropriate only to
residential units and not to service the two buildings
intended for public which are [equipped] with
modern medical equipment; the old NFA and the
[Cabiao] Community Clinic.
Both live service wire and secondary electrical wires
were bundled together inside the same tube. At the
2nd floor, visible signs of cut wires were found
inside a tube, including the service wire as it pass
through going down to the main panel board and
several cut wires of the secondary breaker going
to the second floor for power distribution.
The main and secondary panel boards were
wrongly situated at the ground floor, above which
is the location of a comfort room, where water
could easily slip to the panel boards.
The installation of the secondary panel board at
the ground floor distributing power to the 2nd floor
defeats its purpose, considering that if electrical
trouble happens at the 2nd floor one has to go to
the 1st floor to shut off the power.
4. The construction of the Cabiao Community Center
building was in violation of the provision of Republic
Act No. 9514 (Revised Fire Code of the Philippines)
Owners, occupants or administrator of buildings or
structures are required to incorporate and provide fire
safety construction, protective and warning systems.
Investigation shows that a) there were no fire
protection features such as sprinkler systems, hose
boxes, hose reels or standpipe systems and other
firefighting equipment; fire alarm systems; b) no fire
exit, fire exit plan for each floor of the building
showing the routes from each other [sic] room to
appropriate exits, displayed prominently on the door
of such room; c) no properly marked and lighted exits
with provision for emergency light to adequately
illuminate exit ways in case of power failure, and d)
no provisions for confining the fire at its source such
as fire resistive floors and walls.
5. The Cabiao Bureau of Fire Protection failed to
perform its mandate pursuant to RA 9514.
Under the Fire Code, the Bureau of Fire Protection is
required to conduct fire safety inspections as pre-
requisite to the grant of licenses and permits for the
use and occupancy of buildings, structures, facilities
and their premises including the installation of fire
protections and fire safety equipment and electrical
systems in any building structure or facility; and the
storage of explosives or combustible, flammable,
toxic and other hazardous materials.
The BFP is likewise responsible for designating fire
inspectors who shall inspect every building at least
once a year, and every time the owner, administrator
or occupant [renews] its business permit or permit to
occupy; to issue a business permit or permit to
operate only after securing a Fire Safety Inspection
Certification (FSIC); require the building owner
occupant to submit plans and specifications and other
pertinent documents of building/structure in order to
ensure compliance of applicable codes and standards
and issue a written notice to the owner and/or
contractor to stop work on portion of any work due to
absence or in violation of approved plans and
specifications; to inspect at reasonable time, any
building, structure or premises and order the
owner/occupant to remove hazardous materials
and/or stop operation if the standards are not met; to
declare and summarily abate hazardous conditions of
the buildings or structures and/or declare the same as
fire hazards.
It is worthy to note that despite the long period of
time from the occurrence of the fire until the
termination of this investigation, the Cabiao BFP
headed by FO3 ESQUIVEL has yet to submit its
report and findings. However, inasmuch as FO3
ESQUIVEL has bungled the investigation of the
fire by removing items from the scene of the fire
and his failure to explain the disappearance of
other electrical debris, the opening and
enlargement of the iron grill where the sole
survivor passed, the back door broken, and the
non-recording of the investigations, FO3
Esquivel's action and behaviors are highly suspect
of a massive cover up of the real cause of the fire.
xxxx
7. St. Luke's negligence is criminal in nature.
130
ii. Explosion or tripping off
St. Luke's College of Medicine - William H. Quasha of the transformer, then a
Memorial, Inc., being the owner and operator of the black out - showing
Cabiao Community Clinic is not without liability for therefore that the circuit
the fate of the fire victims. As a learning institution, breaker did not trip off
which sends out its students to rural areas to
comply with its curriculum requirement, St. iii. Inspection of the main
Luke's has the duty and responsibility to see to it circuit breaker and the
that the premises to where it sends its students are secondary breakers show
safe. It is significant to stress that the Cabiao that these did not trip off
Community Clinic was established by the
Municipality of Cabiao and the St. Luke's College of iv. Presence of short circuited
Medicine in line with the latter's expansion of its wires located at the
Community Medicine undertaking to the rural areas 2nd floor, where buddle
in order to train its students in health promotion and wires were found
disease prevention as well as to provide medical
service to deserving population and to undertake v. Presence of numerous
clinical research on various health practices. spliced wires or jumped
wires in three different
The victims were sent there as part of their convenient outlets
community medicine module in the curriculum and
their assignments were determined by the officials of vi. Mainboard panel is
the College of Medicine. mismatched with the
service wire
8. The origin of fire.
vii. Other defective wirings
The Cabiao BFP has manifested its prejudice and
bias and thus, cannot be an independent, reliable It is a well done theory that the cause of the fire
and credible investigator of this fire incident. They was due to faulty electrical wiring with two
could not even entertain any theory, other than the reasons to support it, first is the physical
gas burner, because in doing so would place manifestation as mentioned by Engr. DAVE
themselves in jeopardy. They even resorted to AOANAN who conducted evaluation/investigation
tampering of premises by removing all electrical on what is left on the building of the Cabiao
wire debris, thinking that in its absence, fire Community Clinic; second is the personal
caused by short circuits cannot be proven. experience of MIGUEL RAFAEL RAMOS y
DAVID the lone survivor of the incident [who]
It is highly probable that the origin of fire is narrated what he perceived during last hour
electrical based on the Electrical Report No. 04-10- before he was rescued. MIGUEL['s] narration
001 submitted by Engr. DAVID R. AOANAN, Chief, contradict the theories laid down by Fire Marshall
Electrical Section, NBI because of the following. BABY BOY ESQUIVEL that the fire was by the
negligence of the victims [whom] he suspect[s] to
i. Presence of thick black have left [burning a] gas stove. MIGUEL'S narration
smoke that indicates heat specifically pointed out that the fire was primarily
caused by short-circuit coming from the living room and not at the kitchen
which is directly in front of their door way.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents then filed a Complaint for damages
against petitioners St. Luke's College of Medicine-
William H. Quasha Memorial Foundation, Dean of
Medicine Brigido L. Carandang, and Associate Dean
for Faculty and Student Affairs Alejandro P. Ortigas,
claiming that their negligence caused the deaths of
respondents' daughters. Respondents maintained that,
as a learning institution which sends out its medical
students to rural areas to comply with its curriculum
requirement, St. Luke's has the contractual duty and
legal responsibility to see to it that the premises to
where it sends its students are safe and that, in the
case at bar, St. Luke's refused to recognize its
obligations/liabilities.9 Respondents thus prayed as
follows:10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is
respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in
favor of plaintiffs -
1. Finding the defendants negligent and liable under
their contractual and legal obligations to Jessa and
Cecille;
2. Directing defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly and
severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages;
and cralawlawlibrary
3. Ordering defendants to pay the cost of suits and
attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs as the
Honorable Court may deem just and equitable under
the premises.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit.11 It held that the Cabiao Community Clinic was
not a fire trap as there were two (2) fire exits, and that
respondents failed to present any report or finding by
a competent authority that the said Clinic was not a
safe and secure place for the conduct of St. Luke's
clerkship program. The RTC did not take into
consideration the NBI Report as it was allegedly not
presented.12chanrobleslaw
The RTC further held that the Clinic is owned by the
Municipality of Cabiao, and that the latter and/or its
131
responsible officials should have been impleaded as
indispensable parties.13chanrobleslaw
The RTC summarized its findings in this manner: 14
Albeit the Court is saddened by what happened with
the untimely death of Perez and Quintos who are both
very bright with promising future in the field of
medicine, it cannot however close its eyes on the
evidence submitted before it by placing the blame on
the cause of their death[s] to the defendants just to
put the fault on anybody in order to appease their
grieving love[d] ones. For in the mind of the Court,
the omission of the defendants to secure a copy of the
fire safety license of the Clinic or verify if it has one
prior to its construction before allowing their senior
medical students to occupy and reside therein is not
per se a negligent act. Neither is the failure of the
defendants to orient their senior medical students,
who obviously are of legal ages already such as the
deceased, on how to take the necessary measures for
their safety and security before retiring to sleep in the
night considered negligent. Likewise, the failure of
the dialogue between the parties is not a legitimate
ground to declare the defendants negligent. Put
differently, the Court is not persuaded that there is
basis or justification to adjudge the defendants
negligent for the accidental death of Perez and
Quintos.
Upon appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and
remanded the case to the RTC for reception of
evidence on the amount of damages to be
awarded.15 Addressing the .preliminary issues, the
CA held that the Municipality of Cabiao was not an
indispensable party as the Complaint was one for
damages based on the allegations in the enrollment
contract. It explained that:16
While there was indeed an allegation of St. Luke's
ownership of the clinic, bulk of the arguments in the
complaint were based on St. Luke's duty to ensure its
students' safety based on its obligation as a school.
Not being contractually obligated to keep plaintiffs-
appellants' children safe from any risk as a result of
school-sanctioned activities, the Municipality of
Cabiao cannot be considered an indispensable party
to the action as it was not a participant in the contract
of enrollment.
Moreover, the CA held that although schools cannot
be insurers of its students against all risks, in the case
at bar, the safety of the victims was within the reach
of petitioners and the hazard of a fire was not
unforeseeable.17 Also, while the fire was beyond the
control of petitioners, their decision to house their
students in a place where there are no means of
escape in case of such an emergency shows a blatant
disregard for the students' welfare.18chanrobleslaw
The CA elucidated as follows:19
The testimonies of Dr. Ortigas, Dr. Carandang and
Dr. Macabulos all show a lack of effort on their part
to thoroughly inspect the conditions of the building in
relation to the safety of their enrolled medical
student-clerks.
According to Dr. Ortigas and Dr. Macabulos, 20 they
considered the doors leading out from the pantry and
the bedrooms as fire exits. However, as doctors who
presumably have a wider degree of foresight than
most, they failed to consider that a fire might break
out in areas which would block these doors that are
merely ordinary exits. Further, Dr. Ortigas himself
testified that permits are not part of their
consideration for safety and that they do not
specifically look for the same [xxx.]
xxxx
Dr. Ortigas admitted that, as a doctor, he was not
concerned with the permits issued regarding the
construction and safety of the building. However, at
the time he conducted the inspections of the clinic, he
was also the Associate Dean of St. Luke's College of
Medicine with the duty to ensure that the building
was safe for the security of the enrolled students of
St. Luke's College of Medicine who would be
assigned to the clinic during their clerkship and he
admittedly did not consider the same.
As Associate Dean for Student Affairs, it would be
reasonable to expect Dr. Ortigas to show concern for
the safety and security of the students enrolled in the
institution thus, ensure that the premises they were to
reside in would be properly equipped in case of fires
and other calamities. He himself stated that his
position as such put him "in charge of student and
student affairs, xxx and in general, the non-academic
matters involving students and the faculty."
Consequently, it is safe to conclude that his task
included the safety and welfare of the students
enrolled at St. Luke's College of Medicine, one which
he miserably failed to discharge.
Defendants-appellees also made a big deal out of the
procedure of asking feedback from students which
led to the assumption that the clinic was safe and
habitable. However, it must be remembered that the
students that gave the feedback were more concerned
with passing their course and presumably trusted that
the school would not send them to a location which it
has independently determined to be unsafe.
xxxx
In relation, defendants-appellees defend their
judgment to send plaintiffs-appellants' daughters to
the community clinic by contending that there has
been no untoward incident since the program began
in 2004. xxx.
xxxx
The same argument also runs contrary to defendants-
appellees' acceptance of the construction of iron grills
on the second floor windows of the clinic. According
to Dr. Ortigas, the same were constructed in order to
prevent people from using the same to enter the
building and not designed to prevent egress
therefrom. Dr. Ortigas was specificallly questioned if
there were prior incidents of intrusion into the clinic
to which he replied in the negative. If defendants-
appellees' logic of "no untoward incident has
happened" is to be applied then, the presence of the
grills was unnecessary in the same way that they
found the inspection of fire safety permits to be
unnecessary. It baffles the Court, therefore, that
defendants-appellees would accept the precaution
against an admittedly unlikely intrusion but ignore
any safety measures against a fire which was a great
possibility given that the clinic had flammable
132
equipment such as a gas burner for cooking.
(Citations omitted)
Hence, the present petition for review
on certiorari alleging that the CA committed
reversible error when it: (a) held that the Municipality
of Cabiao was not an indispensable party, 21 (b)
disregarded the findings of the BFP that the fire was
purely accidental and caused by unattended
cooking,22 and (c) ruled that petitioners were
negligent.23chanrobleslaw
We deny the petition.
A perusal of the Complaint readily shows that
respondents base their cause of action on petitioners'
breach of the contractual obligation, as an educational
institution, of ensuring that their students, in the
performance of a required school activity, would be
safe and secure. The Municipality of Cabiao, not
being a party to said enrollment contract, is not an
indispensable party to the case.
An indispensable party is defined by the Rules of
Court as a party-in-interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action. 24 In the present
case, respondents premise petitioners' liability on
their contractual obligation to their students and,
certainly, complete relief and a final judgment can be
arrived at by weighing the claims and defenses of
petitioners and respondents, without need of
evaluating the claims and defenses of the
Municipality of Cabiao. If at all, the Municipality of
Cabiao is a necessary party 25cralawred whose non-
inclusion in the case at bar shall not prevent the court
from proceeding with the action.
Indeed, the present case is one between a school and
its students, with their relationship being based on the
enrollment contracts. In the illuminating case
of PSBA, et al. v. CA, et al.,26 the Court had the
opportunity to lay down the principle
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
When an academic institution accepts students for
enrollment, there is established a contract between
them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both
parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the
school undertakes to provide the student with an
education that would presumably suffice to equip him
with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school's academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or
"built-in" obligation of providing their students with
an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its
primary undertaking of imparting knowledge.
Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of
physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of
the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there looms
around the school premises a constant threat to life
and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that
adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order
within the campus premises and to prevent the
breakdown thereof.
Indubitably, institutions of learning have the "built-
in" obligation of providing a conducive atmosphere
for learning, an atmosphere where there are no
constant threats to life and limb, and one where peace
and order are maintained.
In the case at bar, the Cabiao Community Clinic is to
be considered as part of the campus premises of St.
Luke's. In the course description of the clerkship
program in preventive and community medicine, it is
stated that the Cabiao Community Clinic serves as
the base operation of the clerkship program. 27 As
such, petitioner had the same obligation to their
students, even though they were stationed in the
Cabiao Community Clinic, and it was incumbent
upon petitioners to ensure that said Clinic was
conducive for learning, that it had no constant threats
to life and limb, and that peace and order was
maintained thereat. After all, although away from the
main campus of St. Luke's, the students were still
under the same protective and supervisory custody of
petitioners as the ones detailed in the main campus.
In the performance of its contractual and inherent
obligations, the Court is mindful of the attendant
difficulties on the part of institutions of learning, and
the Court recognizes that the latter cannot be an
insurer of its students against all risks. Thus, as also
laid out in the PSBA case, "the school may still avoid
liability by proving that the breach of its contractual
obligation to the students was not due to its
negligence, here statutorily defined to be the
'omission of that degree of diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time
and place."28chanrobleslaw
Our next query, then, is, in relation to the fire
incident, did petitioners commit a breach of contract
through negligence?
A review of the records compels the Court to answer
in the affirmative.
In Mendoza, et al. v. Sps. Gomez,29 we defined
negligence as "the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person, that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury."
In Gaid v. People,30 we enumerated the elements of
simple negligence as follows: (1) that there is lack of
precaution on the part of the offender, and (2) that the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate or
the danger is not clearly manifest. We explained
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The standard test in determining whether a person is
negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage
results to the person or property of another is this:
could a prudent man, in the position of the person to
whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the
person injured as a reasonable consequence of the
course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty
on the actor to refrain from that course or to take
precautions to guard against its mischievous results,
and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to
exist.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
133
In the case at bar, it is well to remember that the
victims were in the Cabiao Community Clinic
because it was a requirement of petitioners. The
students were complying with an obligation under the
enrollment contract — they were rendering medical
services in a community center as required by
petitioners. It was thus incumbent upon petitioners to
comply with their own obligations under the
enrollment contract - to ensure that the community
center where they would designate their students is
safe and secure, among others.
Petitioners failed to take the necessary precautions to
guard their students against foreseeable harm. As
correctly found by the CA, petitioners were remiss in
inspecting the premises of the Cabiao Community
Clinic and in ensuring that the necessary permits
were in order. These precautions could have
minimized the risk to the safety of the victims.
Indeed, the CA had basis in making the following
pronouncement:32
In the instant case, as previously emphasized,
defendants-appellees were aware that its medical
students were residing at the second floor of the
clinic. At the very least, during inspection, they
should have thoroughly inspected the building's
physical appearance and the documents pertinent to
the premises to make sure that the same minimized
the risk to the safety of the students. There is no
record that any inquiry on the condition of the
premises was even made by defendants-appellees
prior to the implementation of the program. In
addition to such failure, defendants-appellees would
have this Court believe that their participation in the
clinic was limited to providing the same with medical
personnel without considering that such personnel
also included its students which St. Luke's was
obliged to protect from unnecessary danger.
The petitioners were obviously negligent in detailing
their students to a virtual fire trap. As found by the
NBI, the Clinic was unsafe and was constructed in
violation of numerous provisions of the Revised Fire
Code of the Philippines. It had no emergency
facilities, no fire exits, and had no permits or
clearances from the appropriate government offices.
Petitioners additionally aver that the Clinic was built
under the direction, supervision, management and
control of the Municipality of Cabiao, 33 and that it
ensured that there was an agreement for the
Municipality of Cabiao to provide 24-hour security to
the Clinic.34chanrobleslaw
Petitioners, however, cannot escape liability based on
these arguments. As held in Saludaga v. FEU, et
al.,35 a learning institution should not be allowed to
completely relinquish or abdicate matters of safety
and security to a third party as to do so would result
to contracting away its inherent obligation of
ensuring a safe learning environment for its students.
In Saludaga, the Court chastised therein respondent
Far Eastern University (FEU) for its total reliance on
a security agency as to the qualifications of its
security guards, viz:36
Respondents also failed to show that they undertook
steps to ascertain and confirm that the security guards
assigned to them actually possess the qualifications
required in the Security Service Agreement. It was
not proven that they examined the clearances,
psychiatric test results, 201 files, and other vital
documents enumerated in its contract with Galaxy.
Total reliance on the security agency about these
matters or failure to check the papers stating the
qualifications of the guards is negligence on the part
of respondents. A learning institution should not be
allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate security
matters in its premises to the security agency it hired.
To do so would result to contracting away its inherent
obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for
its students.
Similarly, we cannot turn; a blind eye on petitioners'
total reliance on the Municipality of Cabiao in
ensuring the safety and security of their students. The
enrollment contract is between petitioners and the
victims, and petitioners cannot abdicate' on their
contractual obligation to provide their students a safe
learning environment, nor can it pass or contract
away such obligation to a third party.
Moreover, as to the stipulation of 24-hour security in
the Clinic, petitioners failed to present evidence that
this stipulation was actually enforced or that they students. For this contractual breach, petitioners
took measures to ensure that it was enforced. This, should be held liable.
once more, shows petitioners' propensity of relying
on third parties in carrying out its obligations to its WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
students. resolves to DENY the petition for review
on certiorari and AFFIRM the Court of Appeals'
It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof Decision and Resolution.
of the existence of the contract and the failure, of its
compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right SO ORDERED.
of relief.37 In Gilat Satellite Networks, Ltd. v. UCPB
General Insurance Co., Inc.,38 the Court
expounded:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxx. The law, recognizing the obligatory force of
contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from
liability for any kind of misperformance of the
contractual undertaking or a contravention of the
tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract confers
upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering
that which may have been lost or suffered. The
remedy serves to preserve the interests of the
promissee that may include his "expectation interest,"
which is his interest in having the benefit of his
bargain by being put in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract been performed,
or his "reliance interest," which is his interest in
being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the
contract by being put in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract not been made;
or his "restitution interest," which is his interest in
having restored to him any benefit that he has
conferred on the other party. Indeed, agreements can
accomplish little, either for their makers or for
society, unless they are made the basis for action. The
effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, that
is, to make RECOMPENSE to the one who has been
injured by the failure of another to observe his
contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating
circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due
diligence x x x or of the attendance of fortuitous
event, to excuse him from his ensuing liability. xxx.
(Emphasis omitted)
In the case at bar, it was amply shown that petitioners
and the victims were bound by the enrollment
contracts, and that petitioners were negligent in
complying with their obligation under the said
contracts to ensure the safety and security of their
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