UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS – SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
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1. NISSAN GALLERY-ORTIGAS vs PURIFICACION FELIPE
G.R. No. 1999067. November 11, 2013.
Facts:
Frederick Felipe (Frederick) attracted by a huge discount of
220,000.00PhP, cash-on-delivery, and no downpayment required
terms of transaction, purchased a Nissan Terrano 4x4 SUV. The SUV
was delivered on 14 May 1997, and despite Frederick’s failure to pay
upon delivery, took possession of the vehicle.
Frederick used and enjoyed the SUV for more than four (4) months
without paying a single centavo of the purchase price. This constrained
Nissan-Gallery Ortigas (Petitioner) to send him two (2) demand
letters, on different dates, and subsequently, a final demand letter.
Reacting on the final demand, he went to Petitioner’s office and asked
for a grace period, which Petitioner reluctantly granted.
Despite the lapse of the grace period, Respondent reneged on his
promise, and on 25 November 1997, asked his mother, Purificacion
Felipe (Respondent), to issue the subject check as payment for his
obligation. Respondent acceded to his request and tendered her
postdated check. The check, however, was dishonored upon
presentment due to “STOP PAYMENT.”
A demand letter was served upon Respondent, through Frederick, who
lived with her. The letter informed her of the dishonor and gave her
five (5) days from receipt within which to replace it with cash or
manager’s check. Despite receipt of the demand letter, Respondent
refused to replace the check giving the reason that she was not the one
who purchased the vehicle. On 6 January 1998, Petitioner filed a
criminal case for violation of B.P. 22 against her.
After trial, the MeTC rendered its judgment acquitting Respondent of
the charge, but holding her civilly liable to Petitioner.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not Respondent is civilly liable for the issuance
of a worthless check despite her acquittal from the criminal charge.
Held:
1. Yes, if the accused, however, is not found to be criminally
liable, it does not necessarily mean that he will not likewise be held
civilly liable because extinction of the penal action does not carry with
it the extinction of the civil action. This rule more specifically applies
when (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the
liability of the accused is civil only; and (c) the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which
the accused was acquitted. The civil action based on the delict is
extinguished only if there is a finding in the final judgment of the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts
or omission imputed to him.
If the judgment is of acquittal, then the imposition of the civil liability
will depend on whether or not the act or omission from which it might
arise exists.
In the instant case, Respondent was acquitted from criminal liability
because of the failure of the prosecution to sufficiently establish the
third element for violations of B.P. 22 (i.e. the notice of dishonor).
Nevertheless, the act or omission from which her civil liability arose,
which was the making or the issuing of the subject worthless check,
clearly existed. Respondent’s acquittal from the criminal charge was
based on reasonable doubt and it did not relieve her of the
corresponding civil liability. The Court cannot agree more when the
MeTC ruled that:
“A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not
necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in
criminal prosecution (i.e. proof beyond reasonable doubt) is
greater than that required for civil liability (i.e., mere
preponderance of evidence). In order to be completely free from
civil liability, a person’s acquittal must be based on the fact that
he did not commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely
on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly
liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act
complained of. It may only be that the facts proved did not
constitute the offense charged.”
Case Digests: Criminal Procedure | by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes
2. LEE PUE LIONG vs CHUA PUE CHIN LEE
G.R. No. 181658. August 7, 2013.
Facts:
Lee Pue Liong (Petitioner), is the President of Centillion Holdings,
Inc. (CHI), a company affiliated with the CKC Group of Companies
(CKC Group) which includes the pioneer company Clothman Knitting
Corporation (CKC). The CKC Group is the subject of intra-corporate
disputes between Petitioner and his siblings, including Chua Pue Chin
Lee (Respondent), a majority stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.
On June 14, 1999, Petitioner on behalf of CHI caused the filing of a
verified Petition for the Issuance of an Owner's Duplicate Copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 232238 which covers a
property owned by CHI. Petitioner submitted before the said court an
Affidavit of Loss stating that: (1) by virtue of his position as President
of CHI, he had in his custody and possession the owner's duplicate
copy of TCT No. 232238 issued by the Register of Deeds for Manila;
(2) that said owner's copy of TCT No. 232238 was inadvertently lost
or misplaced from his files and he discovered such loss in May 1999;
(3) he exerted diligent efforts in locating the said title but it had not
been found and is already beyond recovery; and (4) said title had not
been the subject of mortgage or used as collateral for the payment of
any obligation with any person, credit or banking institution. Petitioner
likewise testified in support of the foregoing averments during an ex-
parte proceeding. In its Order dated September 17, 1999, the RTC
granted the petition and directed the Register of Deeds of Manila to
issue a new Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in lieu of the
lost one.
Respondent, joined by her brother Nixon Lee, filed an Omnibus
Motion praying, among others, that the September 17, 1999 Order be
set aside claiming that petitioner knew fully well that Respondent was
in possession of the said Owner's Duplicate Copy, the latter being the
Corporate Treasurer and custodian of vital documents of CHI.
Respondent added that petitioner merely needs to have another copy
of the title because he planned to mortgage the same with the Planters
Development Bank. Respondent even produced the Owner's Duplicate
Copy of TCT No. 232238 in open court. Thus, on November 12, 1999,
the RTC recalled and set aside its September 17, 1999 Order.
Subsequently, Respondent instituted a criminal case for Perjury
against Petitioner. At the trial, Atty. Macam appeared as counsel for
Respondent and as private prosecutor with the consent and under the
control and supervision of the public prosecutor.
Petitioner’s counsel moved in open court that Respondent and her
lawyer should be excluded from participating in the case since perjury
is a public offense; that the offended party is the State alone. After
hearing, the Court issued the assailed order denying the same.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the Court committed grave abuse of discretion
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied Petitioner’s
motion to exclude Atty. Macam as private prosecutor in the criminal
case.
Held:
1. Yes. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime
is the fundamental postulate of our law that “every person criminally
liable is also civilly liable” (Article 100, RPC) Section 1, Rule 111 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. –(a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.
For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appearance
of a private prosecutor is allowed under Section 16 of Rule 110:
SECTION. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. –
Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the
criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by
counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
defines an offended party as "the person against whom or against
whose property the offense was committed."
 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS – SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT
No. 232238 covering CHI’s property and its loss through inadvertence,
if found to be perjured is, without doubt, injurious to respondent’s
personal credibility and reputation insofar as her faithful performance
of the duties and responsibilities of a Board Member and Treasurer of
CHI. The potential injury to the corporation itself is likewise
undeniable as the court-ordered issuance of a new owner’s duplicate
of TCT No. 232238 was only averted by respondent’s timely discovery
of the case filed by petitioner in the RTC.
Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the
perjury case being tried in the MeTC, the Court declared in the early
case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco (94 Phil 197), cited by both MeTC and
CA, that whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous
for the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended party by
counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private
prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that
right must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended
party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil
liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of
the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the
direction and control of the public prosecutor.
3. ELIZALDE CO vs LUDOLFO P. MUÑOZ, JR.
G.R. No. 181986. December 4, 2013.
Facts:
Prior to the filing of the instant case, Ludolfo Muñoz, Jr. (Respondent),
a contractor, was charged and arrested for perjury. Supecting that
against Elizalde Co (Petitioner), a wealthy businessman, was behind
the filing of the suit, Petitioner made several statements in several
interviews with radio stations in Legaspi City:
(a) Co influenced the Office of the City Prosecutor to expedite the
issuance of warrant of arrest against Muñoz in connection with
the perjury case;
(b) Co manipulated the resuts of the government bidding involving
the Masarawag-San Francisco dredging project; and
(c) Co received PhP2M from Muñoz on the condition that Co will
sub-contract the project to Muñoz, which condition Co did not
comply with.
These statements prompted Petitioner to filing three criminal cases for
libel against Respondent before the RTC. Notably, Petitioner did not
waive, institute or reserve his right to file a separate civil action arising
from Respondent’s alleged libelous remarks against him.
After trial, the RTC found Respondent guilty of three counts of libel.
In addition to imprisonment, the Court ordered Respondent to pay
Petitioner for damages. Aggrieved, the same was elevated to the CA.
The CA, however, reversed the RTC’s ruling, and effectively acquitted
Respondent. It opined that the subject matter of the interviews were
impressed with public interest and Respondent’s statements were
protected as privileged communication under Article 354 (1) of the
RPC. It also declared that Co was a public figure based on the RTC’s
finding that he was “well-known, highly-regarded and recognized in
business circles.” As a public figure, Co is subject to criticisms on his
acts that are imbued with public interest.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the Private Complainant may appeal the
judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce the accused’s civil
liability.
2. Whether or not Respondent is liable for damages arising
from the libelous remarks despite his acquittal.
Held:
1. Yes, the extinction of the penal action does not necessarily
carry with it the extinction of the civil action (Section 2, Rule 111,
ROC), whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the
criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex
delicto if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action
that the act or omission from which the liability may arise exists.
Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding
the accused’s acquittal, the offended party may still claim liability ex
delicto: (a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the court declared that the
liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) if the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which
the accused is acquitted. Moreover, an appeal is favored over the
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Case Digests: Criminal Procedure | by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes
institution of a separate civil action because the latter would only add
to the clogging of the Court dockets.
2. No, Respondent is not liable for damages because no libel
was committed. The Court of Appeals acquitted Respondent because
his statement is a privileged communication. In libel, the existence of
malice is essential as it is an element of the crime. The law presumes
that every imputation is malicious; this is referred to as malice in law.
The presumption relieves the prosecution of the burden of proving that
the imputations were made with malice. This presumption is rebutted
if the accused proves that the imputation is true and published with
good intention and justifiable motive.
In order to justify a conviction in libel involving privileged
communication, the prosecution must establish that the libelous
statements were made or published with actual malice or malice in fact
– the knowledge that the statement is false or with reckless disregard
as to whether or not it was true.
In the present case, the CA declared that the libelous remarks are
privileged. The legal conclusion was arrived at from the fact that
Petitioner is a public figure, the subject of the libelous remarks was of
public interest, and the context of Respondent’s statements were fair
comments. Consequently, malice is no longer presumed and the
prosecution has the burden of proving malice in fact – this, the CA
found the prosecution to have failed in this regard.
4. DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION vs CLEOFE JANIOLA
G.R. No. 184861. June 30, 2009.
Facts:
On 2 February 2005, pursuant to a Complaint-Affidavit by Dreamwork
Construction, Inc. (Petitioner), through its President, a corresponding
criminal Information for violation of B.P. 22 against Cleofe Janiola
(Respondent) was filed before the MTC.
On 20 September 2006, Respondent instituted a civil complaint against
Petitioner for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement
between the parties, with damages. Notably, the checks, subject of the
criminal case for B.P. 22 were issued in consideration of the
construction agreement.
Thereafter, Respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the
aforesaid criminal case, alleging that the civil and criminal cases
involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the
resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.
Petitioner’s Argument/s:
For its part, Petitioner opposed the Motion to Suspend Proceedings,
arguing, among others, that Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that “the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action” – this element is wanting in this case, due to the criminal case
having preceded the civil action.
Respondent’s Argument/s:
On the other hand, Respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which
provides that: Prejudicial questions which must be decided before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be
governed by the rules of court which the Supreme Court shall
promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of
this Code. They posit that it must be interpreted to mean that a
prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed wither before
the institution of the criminal action or during its pendency.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the Civil Action must precede the filing of
the Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to exist.
Held:
1. Yes. On December 2000, the Rules on Criminal Procedure
was amended, and Section 7, Rule 111 now reads:
SECTION 7. Elements of prejudicial question – The elements of
a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS – SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
The phrase “previously instituted” was inserted to qualify the nature of
the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the
criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the
insertion of “subsequent” directly before the term criminal action.
There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to
qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil
action must precede the criminal action. Thus, the Court ruled in
Torres vs Garchitorena (394 SCRA 106), that: A prejudicial question
is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal
action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can
be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is
closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the
institution of the criminal action.
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that “a statute
should be construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to
harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a
complete, coherent and intelligible system.” In the instant case, Art. 36
of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are
susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions
of law. The phrase "previously instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule
111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative
interpretations. The clause "before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however,
be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action
may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public
prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial
with the court hearing the case.
It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case
indicate that the filing of the civil action and the subsequent move to
suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a
prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and instituted to delay
the criminal proceedings. Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years
after the institution of the criminal complaint.
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the
criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that
would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to
support the issuance of the check/s or that the checks were issued for
valuable consideration does not make up the elements of the crime.
Thus, the Court has held in a long line of cases that the agreement
surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the
prosecution for violation of BP 22.
5. PRIMO MINA vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 239521. January 28, 2019.
Facts:
This case stemmed from an Affidavit-Complaint for Perjury, filed by
Primo Mina (Petitioners) against Rodolfo Tandoc (Respondent) before
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan (OPP).
After the requisite preliminary investigation proceedings, the OPP
dismissed Petitioner’s criminal complaint for lack of probable cause.
Aggrieved, Petitioners appealed before the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor (ORSP). However, the ORSP affirmed the OPP’s finding
that no probable cause exists to indict Respondent for the crime of
perjury. Undaunted, Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals.
In a Resolution dated 22 May 2017, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition outright on the ground that Petitioners availed of the wrong
remedy. It held that under DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A,
Petitioners should have first appealed the adverse ORSP ruling to the
Secretary of Justice (SOJ) before elevating the matter to the regular
courts.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the Petitioners had availed of the wrong
remedy, and thus, should have first elevated the matter before the SOJ.
Held:
1. No. DOJ Department Circular No. 70 which governs the
appeals process in the National Prosecution Service, provides that
resolutions of, inter alia, the Regional State Prosecutor, in cases
subject of preliminary investigation/reinvestigation shall be appealed
by filing a verified petition for review before the Secretary of Justice.
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Case Digests: Criminal Procedure | by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes
However, this procedure was immediately amended by DOJ
Department Circular No. 70-A, entitled “Delegation of Authority to
Regional State Prosecutors to Resolve Appeals in Certain Cases”
which provides that: “In order to expedite the disposition of appealed
cases, all petitions for review of resolutions of Provincial/City
Prosecutors in cases cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (except in
the National Capital Region), shall be filed with the Regional State
Prosecutor concerned who shall resolve such petitions with finality.
The foregoing amendment is further strengthened by the later issuance
of DOJ Department Circular No. 018-14, dated 18 June 2014, entitled
“Revised Delegation of Authority on Appealed Cases,” which the
Supreme Court had the opportunity to harmonize in Cariaga vs
Sapigao (828 SCRA 436):
A reading of the foregoing provisions shows that the prevailing
appeals process in the NPS with regard to complaints subject of
preliminary investigation would depend on two factors, namely: where
the complaint was filed, i.e., whether in the NCR or in the provinces; and
which court has original jurisdiction over the case, i.e. whether or not it is
cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs. Thus, the rule shall be as
follows:
(a) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is cognizable by the
MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OPP may be appealable
by way of petition for review before the ORSP, which ruling shall
be with finality;
(b) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is not cognizable by the
MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OPP may be appealable by
way of petition for review before SOJ, which ruling shall be with
finality;
(c) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is cognizable by the
MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OCP may be appealable by
way of petition for review before the Prosecutor General, whose
ruling shall be with finality;
(d) If the complaint is filed with the NCR and is not cognizable by the
MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OCP may be appealable by
way of petition for review before the SOJ, whose ruling shall be with
finality;
(e) Provided, that in instances covered by (a) and (c), the SOJ may,
pursuant to his power of control and supervision over the entire
National Prosecution Service, review, modify, or reverse the
ruling of the ORSP or the Prosecutor General, as the case may
be.
In this case, since (a) the criminal case was filed outside of the NCR;
(b) perjury cases are cognizable by the first-level courts since the
maximum penalty therefor is imprisonment of less than six (6) years;
and (c) it appears that the SOJ did not exercise its power of control and
supervision over the NPS by reviewing the ORSP ruling, the ORSP’s
affirmance of the OPP ruling was with finality. As such, Petitioners
have already exhausted its administrative remedies and may go to the
Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari.
6. LIGAYA SANTOS vs DOMINGO ORDA, JR.
G.R. No. 189402. May 6, 2010
Facts:
On 2 April 2001, Francis Orda (Francis), son of Domingo Orda, Jr.
(Respondent) was shot to death. A certain Gina Azarcon (Gina)
executed her sworn statement that she saw three male persons
pepetrate the crime; two of them later identified as Rolly Tonion
(Rolly) and Jhunrey Soriano (Jhunrey), shot Francis inside his car. An
Information for murder against the two was then subsequently filed.
Two more witnesses Ernesto Regala (Ernesto) and his son, Dennis,
surfaced. They testified that they saw Ligaya Santos (Petitioner) hand
a gun to accused Rolly, saying “Gusto ko malinis na trabaho at walang
bulilyaso, baka makaligtas na naman si Orda.” Hence, an Amended
Information was filed implicating more accused.
Gina, Ernesto and Dennis later recanted their testimonies. On 11 June
2002, the DOJ issued a Joint Resolution directing the City Prosecutor
to cause the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against the
accused, holding that the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies were not
credible because of their recantation. On motion of the prosecution, the
RTC, Brach 258, issued and Order allowing the withdrawal of the
Informations and consequently recalled the warrants of arrest.
Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, to which the
CA nullified the aforesaid Order, declaring RTC-Brach 258 to have
committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the withdrawal of the
Information without making an independent evaluation on the merits
 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS – SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
of the case. On final review, this Court (Supreme Court) affirmed the
CA decision in G.R. No. 158236. The case was then re-raffled to RTC-
Branch 274.
On 30 September 2005, RTC-Branch 274 issued an Order dismissing
the case for murder, ratiocinating that no probable cause existed to
indict accused for the crime. Consequently, it lifted the warrants for
their arrests and ordered the immediate release from detention. This
Order was then again subject to a petition for certiorari before the CA.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the RTC-Branch 274 erred in allowing the
withdrawal of the Informations and consequently dismissing the case
for lack of probable cause.
Held:
1. No. The task of the Presiding Judge when an Information is
filed with the Court is first and foremost, to determine the existence or
non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. Probable
cause is such set of facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense
charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining
probable cause, the average man weights the facts and circumstances
without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which
he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding
of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed
by the accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it
requires less than evidence that would justify conviction.
Moreover, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information
on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a Resolution of the
DOJ Secretary, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an
independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired
jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such
resolution, but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with
the trial and should embody such assessment in the order disposing the
motion.
In the instant case, the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 274 allowed
the withdrawal of the Informations, consequently dismissed the case
against Petitioners, and lifted the warrants of arrest on the following
grounds: (1) the incredibility of the earlier statements of the witnesses
because of their subsequent recantation; (2) the improbability that the
witnesses saw and heard the conversations of the accused considering
the physical set-up of the building; (3) the lack or insufficiency of
evidence at the level of prosecution for purposes of determining
probable cause; and (4) the absence of corroborating evidence to the
witnesses’ testimony.
Thus, the RTC did not err in finding that no probable cause existed to
indict Petitioners. Neither did it gravely abused its discretion in making
said conclusion. On the contrary, he came to the conclusion that there
was no probable cause for petitioners to commit murder, by applying
basic precepts of criminal law to the facts, allegations and evidence on
record. On a final note, the Court stresses that the purpose of the
mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause is to insulate
from the very start those falsely charged with crimes from the
tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
7. REMY ANGELA JUNIO vs JUDGE CACTIAN-BELTRAN
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2367. January 13, 2014
Facts:
Claire Ann Campos, a 17-year old student filed an affidavit-complaint
for violation of R.A. 7610 (Child Abuse Law) and R.A. 7277 (Magna
Carta for the Disabled) against Remy Angela Junio and Dr. Josephine
Lorica (Petitioners), the President and Dean of the School of Health
Services, respectively, of St. Paul University of the Philippines
(SPUP). In her complaint, Claire alleged that she was refused
enrollment for the B.S. Nursing course in her sophomore year because
of her cleft palate; she alleged that the refusal was made despite her
completion of SPUP’s College Freshmen Program Curriculum.
In its Resolution, the prosecutor’s office found probable cause to indict
Petitioners for the crimes charged, and recommended the filing of the
corresponding Informations. The aforesaid Resolution was appealed
by Petitioners, but the undersecretary of the DOJ, in a Resolution dated
24 February 2011 denied their petition for review. Thus, the
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Case Digests: Criminal Procedure | by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes
Informations were assigned to the RTC, presided by Judge Marivic
Cacatian-Beltran (Respondent).
In the meantime, Petitioners sought a reconsideration of the DOJ’s 24
February 2011 Resolution. On 5 May 2011, the RTC found probable
cause to issue warrants of arrest against Petitioners, and accordingly,
issued the warrants against them.
Meanwhile, DOJ Secretary Leila de Lima granted Petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration and set aside the 24 February 2011 Resolution of
her undersecretary. Accordingly, she directed the Provincial
Prosecutor to immediately cause the withdrawal of the Informations
for lack of probable cause. Thus, Respondents filed a manifestation
and motion before the RTC, praying for the cancellation of their
scheduled arraignment, and for the dismissal of the cases against them.
On 5 September 2011, the City Prosecutor, and Petitioners filed a joint
motion to withdraw informations in view of Secretary De Lima’s
Resolution. In its Order dated 6 January 2012, however, the RTC
denied the joint motion for lack of merit. A subsequent motion for
reconsideration questioning the same was likewise denied by the court.
Petitioners thereafter filed an administrative case against Respondent
Judge for violations of Rules 1.02, 3.01, 3.02 and 3.05 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. They alleged that Respondent only resolved the joint
motion to withdraw informations after almost four months from the
time it was submitted for resolution; that four months was beyond the
period prescribed by existing rules for the resolution of simple
motions.
Petitioner’s Argument/s:
Petitioner argues that Respondent Judge “arrogated unto herself the
role of a prosecutor and a judge” when she insisted that the accused
stand trial although she did not find any grave abuse of discretion on
the part of Justice Secretary de Lima.
Respondent’s Argument/s:
In her comment, Respondent explained that Respondents might have
conducted a follow-up of the motions to dismiss at Branch 4 where the
records of the criminal cases had been retained, and that the staff of
Branch 4 failed to inform her of any follow-up. She maintained that
she "lost no time in finishing the draft" of her 6 January 2012 Order
when the motion was brought to her attention. Respondent maintained
that the RTC was not bound by the findings of the Secretary of Justice
since her court had already acquired jurisdiction over the case. She
added that she made an independent assessment of the evidence before
denying the motion. She further stated that she acted promptly on all
other incidents in the case.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not Respondent Judge should be held
administratively liable for resolving the aforesaid motion belatedly.
2. Whether or not Respondent Judge “arrogated unto herself
the role of prosecutor and a judge” when it resolved the motion,
contrary to the recommendation of the prosecutor.
Held:
1. Yes, Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution requires
lower court judges to decide a case within the period of ninety (90)
days. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct likewise
holds that judges should administer justice without delay and directs
every judge to dispose of the courts' business promptly within the
period prescribed by law. Rules prescribing the time within which
certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays
in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the ninety (90)
day period is mandatory. This mandate applies even to motions or
interlocutory matters or incidents pending before a magistrate.
In the present case, the City Prosecutor's joint motion to withdraw
informations was deemed submitted for resolution on September 14,
2011. Respondent, however, did not act on the motion within the
prescribed three (3) month period (or up to December 13, 2011), and
instead ruled on it only on January 6, 2012.
However, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that there had
been undue delay, any attendant bad faith, any intent to prejudice a
party to the case, or some other ulterior ends. The Office of the Court
Administrator, in fact, pointedly ruled that the inaction was not
attended with malice: Respondent resolved the joint motion to
withdraw informations two (2) days after she learned of its existence
 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS – SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
on January 4, 2012. To the Court’s mind, these circumstances are
sufficient to mitigate the liability of Respondent.
2. No, when a court acts, whether it action is consistent or
inconsistent with a prosecutor’s recommendation, it rules on the
prosecutor’s action and does not thereby assume the role of a
prosecutor. The case of Hipos, Sr. vs Bay (581 SCRA 674) best explains
why:
To clarify, we never stated in Ledesma that a judge is allowed to deny a
Motion to Withdraw Information from the prosecution only when there is
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors moving for such
withdrawal. Neither did we rule therein that where there is no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to
Withdraw Information is void. What we held therein is that a trial judge
commits grave abuse of discretion if he denies a Motion to Withdraw
Information without an independent and complete assessment of the
issues presented in such Motion.
With the independent and thorough assessment and evaluation of the
merits of the joint motion to withdraw information that Respondent
undertook before dismissing it, she acted as a judge should and can in
no way be said to have assumed the role of a prosecutor.
8. PEOPLE vs ROMAN ZAFRA y SERRANO
G.R. No. 197363. June 26, 2013
Facts:
On 19 December 2001, an Information was filed before the RTC
charging Roman Zafra y Serrano (Zafra) with the crime of qualified
rape of his minor daughter, AAA.
The contradicting versions of the parties, as culled from the records of
the case are as follows:
Version of the Prosecution
AAA testified that her father, Zafra, started molesting her when she was
around 13 or 14 years old. AAA claimed that her mother knew what her
father was doing to her but did nothing to stop it. Sometime in November
2001 however, she moved to her aunt’s house, after she was again raped by
Zafra.
On December 2001, her brother went to her aunt’s house to tell AAA that
Zafra had some chores for her. AAA followed him to their house, where she
found Zafra who asked her to fix the beddings and wash the dishes. Zafra
instructed AAA to get his dirt clothes in his room, and as she did what she
was told, Zafra went inside the room, locked the door, and thereafter raped
her.
Despite the prodding of her mother not to file any complaint. AAA
proceeded to file the complaint, and was subjected to a medical examination
on the same day.
Version of the Defense
Zafra denies the charges against him and claimed that it was filed as an act
of retaliation by his wife, having fought over the fact that about one of the
rooms he was renting out was offered to his parents-in-law free of charge;
and that when Zafra learned that AAA was not attending school, this
prompted him to scold her, but because his parents-in-law protected her,
Zafra went to the extent of driving AAA and his parents-in-law out of the
house. When this happened, Zafra’s wife threated to send him to jail.
As proof of his defense, Zafra presented letters from AAA wherein she
admitted to fabricating the charge against her father because he and her
mother fought, and because he drove all of them out of his house. She also
admitted therein to having worked at a beer house and prostituting herself.
The RTC convicted Zafra of the charge of qualified rape against his
minor daughter, and sentenced him to death. Upon appeal, the Court
of Appeals upheld the RTCs Decision, but modified the penalty to
reclusion perpetua instead.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the Courts erred in not considering Zafra’s
defense of Retraction.
Held:
1. No, Courts look upon retractions with considerable disfavor
because they are generally unreliable. To explain the rationale for
rejecting recantations, the Court, in People vs Alejo (458 Phil. 461),
held:
Mere retraction by a witness or by complainant of his or her testimony
does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony or statement, if credible.
The general rule is that courts look with disfavor upon retractions of
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Case Digests: Criminal Procedure | by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes
testimonies previously given in court. The reason is because affidavits of
retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually
through intimidation or for monetary consideration. Moreover, there is
always the probability that they will later be repudiated and there would
never be an end to criminal litigation. It would also be a dangerous rule
for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before courts of justice
simply because the witnesses who had given them later on changed their
minds for one reason or another. This would make solemn trials a
mockery and place the investigation of the truth at the mercy of
unscrupulous witnesses.
Further propounding on retractions, usually contained in affidavits of
desistance, the Court said in People vs Alcazar (630 SCRA 622):
Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which
should not be given probative value. It would be a dangerous rule to reject
the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because the witness
who gave it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a
rule would make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at
the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can
easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary
consideration, the Court has invariably regarded such affidavits as
exceedingly unreliable.
In the case at bar, AAA's retractions were not even in an Affidavit of
Desistance. They were written on mere scraps of paper, and in different
handwritings. This Court agrees with both lower courts that if the notes
were genuine, they should have been authenticated according to the
rules on evidence. If it were true that AAA wanted to withdraw the
case against her father, she should have approached the prosecutor and
expressed her desire to do so. Moreover, she should have taken the
witness stand once more to attest to her alleged letters. It is worthy to
note that in her alleged recantations, AAA enumerated, as reasons for
her filing this complaint, the same exact defenses Zafra presented
before the court.
9. GEORGE ANTIQUERA y CODES vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 180661. December 11, 2013
Facts:
The prosecution evidence shows that at around 4:45 a.m. of 11
February 2004, PO1 Gregorio, et. al., on board a patrol car were
conducting a police visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City, when
they saw two unidentified men rush out of a house and immediately
boarded a jeep.
Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers
approached the house from where the men came and peeked through
the partially opened door. They saw accused Antiquera holding an
improvised tooter and a pink lighter. Beside him was his live-in
partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil and an improvised
burner. This prompted the police officers to enter the house, introduce
themselves, and arrest Antiquera and Cruz. They further searched the
house and seized drug paraphernalia, and plastic sachets, which were
confirmed to be shabu.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid.
Held:
1. Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides that a “peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.” This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act
constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. But the circumstances here do not make out a case of
arrest made in flagrante delicto:
Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in
the house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peaked
through its partially opened door, they saw not activity that warranted
their entering. Thus, PO1 Cabutihan testified:
THE COURT:
Q: So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the house,
if the door was only open by 6 inches? Or did you have to push
the door?
A: We pushed the door, Your Honor.
Q: Are you not required to get a search warrant before you can
search the interior of the house?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
xxx
 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS – SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
Q: So why did you not secure a search warrant first before you
tried to investigate the house, considering your admission that
you suspected there was something wrong inside the house?
A: Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session,
Your Honor.
Q: But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide
open to peep through the opening because you did not know
what was happening inside?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting
officers that authorized the arrest of the accused without warrant under
the above-mentioned rule. Consequently, the various drug
paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house are
inadmissible, having proceeding from an invalid search and seizure.
On a final note, the Court clarifies that the failure of the accused to
object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain
his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry
with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the
illegal warrantless arrest.
10. PEOPLE vs RENANTE COMPRADO y BRONOLA
G.R. No. 213225. April 4, 2018.
Facts:
On 15 July 2011, at 6:30 p.m., a confidential informant sent a text
message to the Deputy Station Commander of Police Station 6,
Cagayan de Oro, that an alleged courier of marijuana, together with a
female companion, would be travelling from Bukidnon to Cagayan de
Oro. At 9:30 p.m., the informant called to inform the police officers
that the alleged drug courier had boarded a bus with body number 2646
and plate number KVP 988 bound for Cagayan de Oro; and that the
alleged courier was wearing a backpack in black and violet colors with
the marking “Lowe Alpine.” Thus, at about 9:45 p.m., the police
officers put up a checkpoint in front of the station.
At 11:00 p.m., the police stopped the bus bearing the said body and
plate numbers, boarded the same, and saw a man matching the
description given by the informant. When the man was asked to open
the bag, the police officers saw a transparent cellophane containing
dried marijuana leaves.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not accused’s warrantless arrest was valid.
2. Whether or not the search was justified under the “Terry
doctrine.”
3. Whether or not the search was justified under “search of a
moving vehicle.”
4. Whether or not the seized items are admissible in evidence.
Held:
1. The Bill of Rights require that a search and seizure must be
carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, any evidence obtained
from such warrantless search is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. This proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:
(1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) search of
evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented
warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop-and-frisk; and (7)
exigent and emergency circumstances.
A stop-and-frisk search is often confused with a warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest. It is worth emphasizing that in the latter,
a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings;
the process cannot be reversed. Thus, it becomes imperative to
determine whether the accused-appellant’s warrantless arrest was
valid.
Here, without the tip provided by the confidential informant, accused-
appellant could not be said to have executed any overt act in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officers which would
indicate that he was committing the crime of illegal possession of
marijuana, as to justify an in flagrante delicto arrest (Sec. 5(a), Rule
113); neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of
facts indicating that accused-appellant had just committed an offense,
as to justify an arrest effected in hot pursuit (Sec. 5(b), Rule 113).
Again, without the tipped information, accused-appellant would just
have been any other bus passenger who was minding his own business
and eager to reach his destination.
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Case Digests: Criminal Procedure | by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes
2. The court proceeds to the justification for and allowable
scope of a “stop-and-frisk” as a “limited protective search of outer
clothing for weapons,” as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as
a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the
initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his
own or others' safety, he is entitled [to] the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which
might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not
required to conduct a “stop-and-frisk” it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate the same. A genuine reason
must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-and-
frisk” serve a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective
crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a
police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the
more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the
police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom
he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly
be fatally used against him.
The Court finds that the totality of the circumstances in this case is not
sufficient to incite a genuine reason that would justify a stop-and-frisk
search on accused-appellant. An examination of the records reveals
that no overt physical act could be properly attributed to accused-
appellant as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers
that he had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
crime.
3. The search in this case, however, could not be classified as a
search of a moving vehicle. In this particular type of search, the vehicle
is the target and not a specific person. Further, in search of a moving
vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally used as a means to transport
illegal items. It is worthy to note that the information relayed to the
police officers was that a passenger of that particular bus was carrying
marijuana such that when the police officers boarded the bus, the
searched the bag of the person matching the description given by their
informant and not the cargo or contents of the said bus. Moreover, in
this case, it just so happened that the alleged drug courier was a bus
passenger. To extend to such breadth the scope of searches on moving
vehicles would open the floodgates to unbridled warrantless searches
which can be conducted by the mere expedient of waiting for the target
person to ride a motor vehicle, setting up a checkpoint along the route
of that vehicle, and then stopping such vehicle when it arrives at the
checkpoint in order to search the target person.
4. Any evidence obtained in violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. This exclusionary rule instructs that
evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be
excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
Thus, in this case, without the confiscated marijuana, no evidence is
left to convict accused-appellant. Thus, an acquittal is warranted,
despite accused-appellant’s failure to object to the regularity of his
arrest before arraignment. The legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS – SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
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Case Digests: Criminal Procedure | by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes

11. PEOPLE vs FRANCISCO MANLAGNGIT y TRESBALLES
G.R. No. 189806. January 12, 2011
Note: This case uses the (old) chain-of-custody rule under; for
future reference, please refer to the new chain-of-custody rule under
R.A. 10640, which amended R.A. 9165.
the Department of Justice, and any elected public official. However, as
ruled by the Court in Rosialda (G.R. No. 188330. 25 August 2010), as
long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, even though the
procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of RA 9165 was not
faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected.

Facts:
In the conduct of a buy-bust operation, the team spotted Francisco
Malangit (Accused) standing in front of his house. The informant
approached Accused and convinced the latter that Serrano wanted to
purchase shabu from him. The Accused asked Serrano how much
shabu he wanted, to which the latter replied that he wanted two
hundred pesos (200.00PhP) worth of shabu. Accused went inside his
house and later reappeared with a plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance, which he handed to Serrano who, in turn, gave
Accused the marked money.

Serrano then gave the pre-arranged signal of lighting a cigarette to

indicate to the rest of the team that the buy-bust operation had been
consummated. Thus, the rest of the team approached Accused and
proceeded to arrest him while informing him of his Constitutional
rights and the reason for his arrest. The marked money was recovered
from Accused’s pocket, and the plastic sachet was then marked with
the initials “FTM” and sent to the PNP crime laboratory, which yielded
a positive result for use of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride.

Accused-Appellant’s Argument/s:
The defense posits that the buy-bust team failed to comply with the
procedure for the custody and control of seized prohibited drugs under
Section 21 of R.A. 9165; that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official function was overturned by the officers’ failure
to follow the required procedure in the conduct of a buy-bust operation,
as well as the procedure in the proper disposition, custody, and control
of the subject specimen.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not non-compliance with the requirements of
Section 21, R.A. 9165 ipso facto renders the seized prohibited drug
inadmissible.

Held:
1. No. The procedure to be followed in the custody and
handling of seized dangerous drugs is outlined in Section 21,
paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. 9165. The same is implemented by
Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of R.A. 9165, viz:

(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of

the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items.

The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers

conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the
evidence confiscated pursuant to said guidelines, is not fatal and
does not automatically render accused-appellant’s arrest illegal or
the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. Indeed, the
implementing rules offer some flexibility when a proviso added that
'non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.' The
same provision clearly states as well, that it must still be shown that
there exists justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence have been preserved.

Here, accused-appellant does not question the unbroken chain of

evidence. His only contention is that the buy-bust team did not
inventory and photograph the specimen on site and in the presence of
accused-appellant or his counsel, a representative from the media and