Psychology of Sport and Exercise 12 (2011) 324e332

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Psychology of Sport and Exercise

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/psychsport

Automatic judgments of exercise self-efficacy and exercise disengagement

in adults experienced and inexperienced in exercise self-regulation
Jude Buckley*, Linda D. Cameron
Department of Psychology, The University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland, New Zealand

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Objective: We investigated whether judgments of exercise self-efficacy and exercise disengagement can
Received 6 June 2010 be made automatically in situations of time pressure and information overload in individuals experi-
Received in revised form enced and inexperienced in exercise self-regulation. Social Cognitive Theory (SCT) was used as the
28 November 2010
guiding framework.
Accepted 18 December 2010
Design: The study utilized a 2 (Exercise Self-Regulation Experience Group)
4 (Judgments)
2 (Memory
Available online 30 December 2010
Load)
4 (Exercise Self-Efficacy) mixed design with repeated measures on the latter three factors.
Methods: Participants (N ¼ 124) judged whether they (self) or an average other person were confident in
Keywords:
Automaticity
their ability to exercise and to avoid exercise. Judgments were made under both memory-load and
Self-efficacy no-memory-load conditions, and response times were assessed.
Disengagement Results: The experienced exercise group had faster response times for self judgments (than for other
Exercise judgments) of schedule, barrier and coping efficacy. The inexperienced exercise group did not; instead,
Experience they exhibited faster response times for self judgments (than for other judgments) of exercise disen-
gagement. For both exercise experience groups, response times for self and other judgments of exercise
disengagement were faster when under no memory load than when under memory load.
Conclusions: When under time pressure, individuals experienced in exercise self-regulation make
automatic judgments of exercise self-efficacy, whereas inexperienced individuals make automatic
decisions to avoid exercise. For both experience groups, when under memory overload, decisions to
avoid exercise require attention.
Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

In today’s busy life, decisions of whether or not to exercise are
routinely made in the face of time pressures, numerous competing
goals (e.g., family and work), and disincentives to exercise (e.g.,
fatigue and stress). Exercise decisions may thus be highly suscep-
tible to automatic cognitive processes (Dimmock & Banting, 2009).
Research has shown that health-related self-regulation processes
can be activated automatically in response to both internal cues
(e.g., feeling tired) and external cues (e.g., weather conditions), and
that these automatically-elicited processes influence health
behavior (Goldman, Reich, & Darkes, 2006; Shadel & Cervone,
2006; Sheeran et al., 2005). Yet, to date, the focus of exercise
research has been primarily on non-automatic processes involved
in exercise decisionsdin particular, on the roles of exercise-related
beliefs and appraisals that are consciously elicited in response to
self-report measures (Dimmock & Banting, 2009). Measures of
automatic and non-automatic thought processes have been shown
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: jb.h.adv@xtra.co.nz (J. Buckley).
to tap different aspects of mental representations and explain
unique variance in behavior (De Houwer, 2006). Identifying
whether exercise-related decisions can be made rapidly and
effortlessly may provide important insights into key factors that
promote or deter exercise in the busy, multi-tasking contexts of
daily life. Utilizing a perspective derived from Social Cognitive
Theory (SCT; Bandura, 1986, 1997), this study examined the auto-
matic processing of two sets of cognitive factors known to influence
exercise decisions: Exercise self-efficacy and exercise disengage-
ment judgments.
Self-regulation, exercise self-efficacy and exercise
disengagement
Exercise behavior can be construed as a dynamic process of self-
regulation, which can be defined as the management of cognitive,
emotional, motivational, and social processes to make decisions,
engage in behavior, and appraise feedback in the pursuit of goals
(Cameron & Leventhal, 2003). These self-regulation processes
involve cognitions and responses that are elicited through

1469-0292/$ e see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.psychsport.2010.12.003
 J. Buckley, L.D. Cameron / Psychology of Sport and Exercise 12 (2011) 324e332
conscious effort as well as those elicited automatically (Bandura,
1986, 1997).
SCT and related research identify self-efficacy and disengage-
ment judgments as cognitions that play a critical role in guiding
exercise decisions (Bandura, 1997; Fletcher & Banasik, 2001;
Schwarzer & Renner, 2000). Exercise self-efficacy is comprised of
beliefs in one’s abilities to engage in exercise self-regulation, such
as abilities to overcome barriers to exercise (barrier efficacy),
schedule regular exercise sessions (schedule efficacy), and cope
with daily impediments to exercise (coping efficacy). Disengage-
ment judgments include those justifying procrastination (i.e., delay
in starting an exercise session) and reflecting denial (i.e., rejecting
the negative impact of not exercising). Research supports SCT
hypotheses that both self-efficacy and disengagement predict
exercise behavior. High exercise self-efficacy is associated with
greater exercise frequency (Rodgers et al., 2002), whereas exercise
disengagement decisions, such as procrastination, are associated
with lower exercise frequency (Kendzierski & Johnson, 1993) and
greater exercise attrition (McAuley, Poag, Gleason, & Wraith, 1990).
Yet these studies evaluated controlled, deliberative appraisals of
self-efficacy and disengagement; to date, the possibility that exer-
cise self-efficacy and disengagement judgments may be processed
automatically has not been empirically tested.
Automaticity, exercise self-regulation experience, and
representations of self-efficacy and exercise disengagement
Automatic judgments can promote adaptive self-regulation to
the extent that they facilitate performance of desired behaviors
while enhancing the efficiency of information and attentional
processes (Bandura, 1986, 1997). Automatic judgments can impair
self-regulation, however, if they involve thought processes that
inhibit desirable behaviors. Once habitual ways of thinking and
acting are automated, individuals pay little attention to aspects of
their environment that may call for discerning or alternative
responses. Automatic judgments of exercise self-efficacy and
disengagement could thus foster ingrained habits of active or
sedentary behavior.
According to SCT (Bandura, 1986, 1997), representations of self-
efficacy emerge from experiences in self-regulation. Building on this
perspective, we posit that exercise self-regulation experience,
defined as the extent to which one contemplates exercise, exerts
self-regulatory effort (i.e., attempts exercise) and engages in exer-
cise, plays a critical role in the formation of mental representations
of exercise that, over time, can be automatically activated by situ-
ational cues. With greater exercise self-regulation experience,
representations of exercise self-efficacy become more elaborated
and coherently integrated (Gill, Swann, & Silvers, 1998). Greater
representational integration has been shown to correspond with
greater accessibility, as reflected by faster and more effortless
activation of representational beliefs (Anderson, 1983, 1993;
Beilock, Bertenthal, Hoerger, & Carr, 2008).
Just as exercise self-regulation experience can enhance the
automatic accessibility of self-efficacy representations, frequent
experience with sedentary behavior can generate automatically
accessible representations of exercise disengagement. Given that
judgments of exercise self-efficacy and exercise disengagement are
activated repeatedly, these automatic elicitations can promote or
undermine the initiation and maintenance of regular exercise.
Research also suggests that, for exercise experiences, people
develop representations of others as well as representations of the
self (Ouellette, Hessling, Gibbons, Reis-Bergan, & Gerrard, 2005).
With greater experience in exercise contemplation and attempts,
the difference in accessibility of self and other representations
should increase. Research demonstrates that greater differences in
325
the speed of activation of self versus other representations are
observed when mental constructs have strong (versus weak)
associations with representations of the self (Bargh & Tota, 1988;
Dijksterhuis, Chartrand, & Aarts, in press; Williams, Wasserman,
& Lotto, 2003).
It should be noted that our conceptualization of exercise
self-regulation experience is distinct from the concept of exerciser
self-schema, which are held by people who see themselves as
regular exercisers and who regard exercise as important to their
self-image. Although exercise self-schema have been linked with
variations in exercise cognitions and behavior (Kendzierski, 1990;
Yin & Boyd, 2000), they may not fully explain automatic exercise
self-regulation processes, particularly since they may not be
chronically accessible (Banting, Dimmock, & Lay, 2009; Brown &
McConnell, 2009). In contrast, exercise self-regulation experience
may be more strongly linked with automatic judgments of self-
efficacy and exercise disengagement because it takes into account
whether exercise is a significant concern, regardless of exercise
frequency. Many individuals who do not exercise regularly never-
theless report having enduring exercise goals (Seppo & St. Clair,
2000). For these individuals, representations relating to exercise
self-regulation (e.g., self-efficacy) can emerge because they
frequently think about fitting exercise into their lifestyles even
though they may not regularly engage in exercise.
Assessing automaticity of judgments of self-efficacy
and exercise disengagement
According to a decompositional theory of automaticity (Moors &
De Houwer, 2006), properties of automaticity can be investigated as
separate entities. The property of efficiency encompasses two
components: Fast speed of information processing (i.e., individuals
become faster at making judgments) and effortlessness (i.e.,
information processing for two tasks can occur simultaneously
without interference, such as talking while typing; Cohen, Servan-
Schreiber, & McClelland, 1992; Moors & De Houwer, 2006; Pashler,
Johnston, & Ruthruff, 2001). Efficient processes occur rapidly and
induce the subjective experience that processing is effortless
because they consume little or no processing resources or attention
(Bargh, 1989, 1994; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). Each component of
efficiency has been shown to have its own time course of change as
processing becomes more automatic; thus, it is possible that the
level of experience required for developing fast judgments (e.g., of
exercise self-efficacy and disengagement) may differ from that
required for these judgments to be processed effortlessly (Logan,
1985; MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988; Smith & Lerner, 1986).
In this study, we employed a dual-task paradigm adapted from
Bargh and Tota (1988) (see also Andersen & Limpert, 2001;
Andersen, Spielman, & Bargh, 1992), in which response latencies
to relevant stimuli and a concurrent memory-load task were used to
investigate whether judgments of exercise self-efficacy and exercise
disengagement can manifest the property components of efficiency.
In the dual-task paradigm, participants performed a primary task
involving judgments of exercise self-efficacy and exercise
disengagement either for self or for other, either on its own or
simultaneously with a secondary, digit-retention task. For example,
participants responded “yes” or “no” as quickly as possible to
statements such as “Can I? Exercise when I am tired?” The efficiency
of judgments is inferred from: (1) speed of response time; and (2)
the extent to which processing of the judgments is unaffected by
processing of the digit-retention task, as measured by changes in
response latencies from no-memory-load to memory-load condi-
tions. We expected that individuals experienced in exercise self-
regulation would exhibit relatively automatic self judgments of
326 J. Buckley, L.D. Cameron / Psychology of Sport and Exercise 12 (2011) 324e332
exercise self-efficacy, whereas inexperienced individuals would
exhibit relatively automatic self judgments of disengagement.
Research using the dual-task paradigm provides support that
variations in response latencies are associated with differences in
the contents and integration of representations, such as with
representations of exercise for exercisers versus non exercisers
(Harju & Reed, 2003). With regard to variations in response laten-
cies for processing self-efficacy beliefs, one study found that indi-
viduals made self-efficacy judgments of smoking avoidance faster if
an attribute for smoking avoidance in a particular situation was
self-relevant than if it was not (Cervone, Orom, Shadel, & Kassel,
2007). For example, individuals who reported that ‘strong will to
avoid smoking if drinking at a bar’ was self-relevant (compared to
individuals reporting it was not) had faster yes responses to judg-
ments about their ability to perform a smoking-avoidance behavior.
Other evidence demonstrates that speed of information processing
distinguishes experienced individuals from those who are
inexperienced in an activity (Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006; Smith,
Branscombe, & Bormann, 1988). For instance, experienced
smokers have been shown to process smoking information faster
than infrequent smokers (Field et al., 2006).
While associations of experience with increased speed of pro-
cessing are well-documented, the findings for memory-load effects
are equivocal. Some studies have observed group differences in
memory-load effects on speed of processing information. For
example, memory load was found to have a greater impact on the
speed of processing information about future events for non-
depressed (versus depressed) individuals (Andersen & Limpert,
2001) and on the speed of processing information about smoking
in inexperienced (versus experienced) smokers (Field et al., 2006).
Yet other studies have not observed magnitude differences across
memory-load conditions, even for beliefs expected to be strongly
ingrained such as racial stereotypes (e.g., Gilbert & Hixon, 1991;
Oberauer, Demmrich, Mayr, & Kliegl, 2001; Saling & Phillips,
2007). Establishing that a belief is immune to interference from
competing cognitive tasks provides important information about
its role in influencing decisions via automatic processes. In cogni-
tive load situations, such beliefs can promote efficient decision-
making with minimal disruption from competing, irrelevant
information (Feldon, 2007; Gilbert & Krull, 1988). In daily life,
exercise decisions are usually made while simultaneously coping
with an abundance of environmental distractions and so self-
efficacy and disengagement judgments that can be made effort-
lessly are more likely to influence exercise behavior. Memory-load
effects on exercise self-efficacy and disengagement judgments
were therefore assessed in this study.
Present study design and hypotheses
The primary study aim was to use the dual-task paradigm to
determine whether judgments of exercise self-efficacy and exer-
cise disengagement can manifest the two components of efficiency
(fast and effortless information processing). For judgments of
exercise self-efficacy (i.e., can one engage in schedule, barrier, and
coping self-regulation strategies), we predicted that only experi-
enced participants would exhibit the following patterns of
responses indicative of efficiency: For self judgments (relative to
other judgments), they would have faster yes response latencies
as well as smaller increases in response latencies from the no-
memory-load to the memory-load condition. For judgments of
exercise disengagement (i.e., using strategies to avoid exercising
such as making excuses), it was predicted that only inexperienced
participants would exhibit the following patterns indicative of
efficiency: For self judgments (relative to other judgments), they
would have faster yes response latencies as well as smaller
increases in response latencies from the no-memory-load to the
memory-load condition.
Method
Participants and design
A total of 124 (76 female, 48 male) staff and students (age
M ¼ 25.59, SD ¼ 9.06) at a New Zealand University participated in
the study. Care was taken to recruit staff and students from
numerous departments across the university (e.g., administration,
business, arts, science, architecture, and education) so that no one
department was overrepresented. The majority of participants
were New Zealand European (n ¼ 83, 67%), with the rest identifying
their ethnicity as Maori/Pacific Island (n ¼ 8), Asian (n ¼ 17), or
other (n ¼ 16). Participants were categorized into groups of expe-
rienced and inexperienced exercisers based on a median split of
exercise self-regulation experience scores completed prior to the
experimental session. Self-report measures of exercise self-efficacy
and exercise disengagement, also completed prior to the experi-
mental session, were used to confirm that the groups differed as
expected in their controlled (non-automatic) reports of these
attributes. Participants were randomly assigned to receive either
the no-memory-load condition or memory-load condition first in
the dual-task paradigm so as to counterbalance potential order
effects. Participants made one of four types of judgments (Can I?
Can the average person? Contains the word? Contains the letter?) For
each of a series of exercise self-efficacy and exercise disengagement
phrases. The within-subjects design enabled us to draw conclusions
about the efficiency (fast, effortlessness) of exercise self-efficacy
and disengagement judgments based on response latencies
because other influences such as response strategies (e.g., self-
presentation) or length of time needed to read the questions are
held constant across trials.
Efficiency manipulations
Efficiency was assessed using response latencies for self versus
other judgments of schedule efficacy, barrier efficacy, coping
efficacy, and exercise disengagement in no-memory-load and
memory-load conditions to provide a laboratory analog of the time
pressured and cognitively busy ‘real world’ environments in which
these judgments are made. Automaticity is typically conceptualized
in relative terms (Bargh, 1989, 1994; Moors & De Houwer, 2006)
and the comparison of processing speeds for self versus other
judgments is an established technique for assessing efficiency of
information processing (Andersen & Limpert, 2001; Bargh & Tota,
1988). Other-referent judgments refer to a generalized average
person; in comparison with self-referent judgments, other judg-
ments are assumed to require elaboration and thus are attention
demanding (Bargh, 1984). The use of response latencies per se as
a measure of efficiency is problematic as it is not possible to discern
how much of the response latency is due to construct activation
and how much is due to the decision and response selection (Bargh
& Tota, 1988; Logan, 1979). By specifying a standard of comparison
(e.g., self versus other) it is possible to evaluate relative differences
in automatic processing (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). For both sets
of judgments, speed of processing was assessed using response
latencies measured in milliseconds, with faster response latencies
indicating greater efficiency. Effortlessness was assessed by
manipulating attention across two experimental conditions: no
memory load versus memory load.
In the memory-load condition, participants retained a new six-
digit number in memory while concurrently making judgments of
 J. Buckley, L.D. Cameron / Psychology of Sport and Exercise 12 (2011) 324e332
exercise self-efficacy and exercise disengagement. After making
each judgment, they typed the digits into the computer. In the
no-memory-load condition, participants made these judgments
without a concurrent memory-load task. Effortlessness of exercise
self-efficacy and exercise disengagement judgments was oper-
ationalized as smaller increases in response latencies from the
no-memory-load condition to the memory-load condition for self
judgments than for other judgments.
Efficiency of structural judgments was assessed with response
latencies for contains the word and contains the letter judgments.
The assessment of these structural judgments of exercise-related
phrases served two purposes: (1) to demonstrate that the memory-
load task was sufficiently strong to deplete attention; and (2) to
prevent expectancy influences on exercise self-efficacy and exercise
disengagement judgments.
In both conditions (no memory load, memory load), and for each
judgment category (self, other, contains the word, contains the letter),
participants judged 20 stimulus phrases (exercise self-efficacy,
exercise disengagement, general exercise) that were equated in
length. Each judgment category was presented for 1 s and was
sufficient for participants to read the judgment yet prevented any
conscious deliberation about a given judgment. The presentation
order of the four judgment categories was randomly generated by
the computer so that participants could not anticipate a judgment
category, preventing them from developing a set of strategic
responses for a particular type of judgment.
Pilot studies (sample n ¼ 120) confirmed that a timeframe of up
to 9000 ms was conservative but sufficient to answer judgments
about exercise self-efficacy. Response times of 9000 ms or more
were recorded as null responses. Response latencies less than
300 ms were recorded as null responses because they are deemed
too fast to be meaningful (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Guttman split-
half coefficients for judgments of exercise self-efficacy, exercise
disengagement and structural exercise phrases were high
(range ¼ .81e.95), indicating that response latencies did not change
over time due to learning or fatigue.
We restricted analyses to yes responses because response type
(yes or no) is shown to be confounded with response times (Bargh &
Chartrand, 2000; Fazio, 1990). The majority of responses were yes
responses in both the no memory load (self 75%, other 72%) and
memory load (self 73%, other 72%). The no responses were low in
both the no memory load (self 25%, other 28%) and memory load
(self 27%; other 28%). As this is the first time efficiency of exercise
self-efficacy and exercise disengagement has been empirically
tested we opted to analyze efficiency only for yes responses as they
constituted the majority response type.
Procedure
This project was approved by the University of Auckland
Human Participants Ethics Committee. All participants were blind
to the study purpose and were told that the study was designed
to explore the unique ways in which individuals process infor-
mation about themselves and others across different modes (i.e.,
computer versus questionnaire). Participants completed the self-
report measures of exercise self-regulation experience, exercise
self-efficacy and exercise disengagement 7e10 days before the
first computer task session in order to avoid any preactivation of
these constructs. Participants completed the computer task
sessions individually. In the no-memory-load condition, the
computer task lasted 17 min on average. In the memory-load
condition, the computer task lasted 31 min on average. Partici-
pants then completed the debriefing questions, after which they
were fully debriefed.
327
Measures
Computer task stimuli
A total of 100 exercise phrases were used as stimuli (20 practice
trials) for the judgment task; all phrases were punctuated with
a question mark to reflect the evaluative nature of these judgments.
For self and other judgments, stimuli were drawn from corre-
sponding items used in the self-report measures self-efficacy and
exercise disengagement completed prior to the experimental
session. The results of the pilot studies and participant debriefing
confirmed that the meanings extracted from these exercise self-
efficacy and exercise disengagement stimuli were as intended and
in line with the meanings inferred from the corresponding items on
the self-report measures (e.g., “Can I distract myself if I don’t feel like
exercising” was interpreted by participants as preoccupation with
other goals or preferred activities in order to avoid exercising).
There were three self-efficacy categories, schedule efficacy, barrier
efficacy and coping efficacy; and one category of exercise disen-
gagements. There were five stimulus items in each category.
Schedule efficacy stimuli assessed belief in one’s ability to schedule
regular exercise (e.g., Can I? Plan my exercise schedule in advance?).
Barrier efficacy stimuli assessed belief in one’s ability to overcome
barriers to exercise (e.g., Can I? Exercise when I feel tired?). Coping
efficacy stimuli assessed belief in one’s ability to cope with
impediments to exercise (e.g., Can I? Exercise after injury or illness?).
Exercise disengagement stimuli assessed the use of strategies
to avoid exercise (e.g., Can I? Distract myself if I don’t feel like
exercising?).
To ensure that differences in response latencies could not be
attributed to idiosyncratic characteristics of the stimulus phrases
(instead of self versus other judgments); thesaurus-based syno-
nyms were used for half of the self items and half of the other items
to counterbalance the effects of stimulus phrase. Participants rated
their confidence by pushing computer keys corresponding to yes or
no. In each category, response latencies for the five phrases were
averaged to generate scores. Faster response latencies reflect
greater efficiency.
For contains the word and contains the letter judgments, there
were four categories of general exercise phrases (e.g., Contains the
word regular? Regular exercise in the sun?; Contains the letter X? Feel
physically fit and well?). For contains the word judgments, partici-
pants rated whether the presented exercise phrase contains
a particular word by pushing computer keys corresponding to yes
or no. In each category, response latencies for the five phrases were
averaged to generate scores. Faster response latencies reflect faster
word finding. The procedure for contains the letter judgments was
identical to that of contains the word judgments, except that
participants rated whether the presented exercise phrase con-
tained a particular letter. Faster response latencies reflect faster
letter finding. For the analyses of contains the word and contains the
letter judgments, the four categories of general exercise phrases
were collapsed because, individually, they were not conceptually
meaningful to the main study objectives thus, were expected to be
equivalent.
Exercise self-regulation experience
Exercise self-regulation experience was assessed with four
items, each with 8-point rating scales (a ¼ . 75): (1) “How often in
the past 12 months have you thought about fitting regular exercise
into your lifestyle?” (almost everyday to at no time); (2) “How often
in the past 12 months have you actually attempted to fit regular
exercise into your lifestyle?” (no attempts to greater than 10
attempts); (3) “In the last week on which days have you exercised?”
(0 dayse7 days); and (4) “How many times in the past week have
you exercised?” (free response of exercise frequency). Item ratings
328 J. Buckley, L.D. Cameron / Psychology of Sport and Exercise 12 (2011) 324e332
were averaged to generate scores, which ranged from .33 to 7.00.
A median split (Median ¼ 3.83) was used to classify participants
into groups.
Exercise self-efficacy
Three measures of exercise self-efficacy were employed. A
measure of schedule efficacy (11 items; a ¼ .93) was adapted from
DuCharme and Brawley (1995) to assess beliefs in one’s abilities to
organize and schedule regular exercise. Barrier efficacy (15 items;
a ¼ .93) assessed beliefs in one’s abilities to overcome barriers to
exercise (DuCharme & Brawley, 1995). A 16-item measure (a ¼ .92)
was developed to assess coping efficacy. Participants rated their
confidence to cope with each of 16 impediments to exercise
including common daily stressors, managing priorities, managing
negative thoughts and feelings, and dealing with unexpected
events. Example items are: ‘manage problems with family and
friends’; ‘deal with deadlines and time pressures’; and ‘deal with
unexpected disruptions’. On the three measures, ratings ranged
from 1 (I cannot do it at all) to 7 (certain I can do it) and they were
averaged to generate scores.
Exercise disengagement
A 6-item measure (a ¼ .57) was developed to assess participants
use of strategies to avoid exercise. Participants rated the extent to
which they engage in each of six strategies for avoiding exercise.
Example items are: ‘I distract myself with other priorities if I don’t
feel like doing my exercise session’ and ‘when I fail to exercise or
miss my planned exercise session it’s usually due to other people’.
Ratings ranged from 1 (to no extent at all) to 7 (to a great extent), and
they were averaged to generate scores.
Debrief questionnaire
A debrief questionnaire (4 items), adapted from Bargh and
Chartrand (2000), probed for: (1) awareness of the study purpose
(1 item), (2) whether participants gave attention to both the digit
and judgment tasks (1 item), (3) which task they gave most
attention to (1 item), and (4) whether participation in the study
caused participants to change their exercise behavior (1 item).
Responses to item 4 would indicate whether responses to the study
tasks were influenced by a change in exercise behavior induced by
the pretest.
Statistical analyses
Analysis of the normality of distributions revealed positive
skewness in all four judgment categories (self, other, contains the
word, contains the letter). Logarithmic transformations of response
latencies were therefore used in analyses (Bargh & Chartrand,
2000). Between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted to assess the
validity of the Exercise Self-Regulation Experience measure used to
classify participants into groups. Pearson correlation analyses were
used to verify that automatic and non-automatic assessments of
exercise self-efficacy and exercise disengagement were measuring
distinct but related aspects of these constructs. A series of repeated
measures ANOVAs were conducted to assess the main and inter-
active effects of Exercise Self-Regulation Experience (experienced
,inexperienced), Judgment Category (self, other) and Memory-Load
Condition (no memory load, memory load) on response latencies to
yes judgments of schedule efficacy, barrier efficacy, coping efficacy,
and exercise disengagement. Significant Exercise Self-Regulation
Experience
Judgment Category interactions were followed up
with simple effects analyses assessing differences among the
Judgment Categories within each of the exercise self-regulation
experience groups.
Results
Validity evidence for the exercise self-regulation
experience classification
Preliminary assessments confirmed that the experienced and
inexperienced exercise self-regulation groups differed as expected
on key aspects of exercise self-regulation experience. Relative to
participants in the inexperienced group, the experienced group
exercised more often (M ¼ 3.50, SD ¼ 1.50 versus M ¼ 1.10,
SD ¼ .90), F (1, 122), ¼ 112.07, p < .001, partial h ¼ .48. The expe-
rienced group (relative to the inexperienced group) also reported
higher levels of schedule self-efficacy, M ¼ 5.43, SD ¼ .84 versus
M ¼ 4.39, SD ¼ 1.21 F (1, 122), ¼ 29.96, p < .001, partial h ¼ .20;
barrier self-efficacy, M ¼ 4.66, SD ¼ 1.00 versus M ¼ 3.55, SD ¼ 1.21;
F (1,122), ¼ 31.07, p < .001, partial h ¼ .20 and coping efficacy
M ¼ 4.74, SD ¼ .89 versus M ¼ 4.26, SD ¼ 1.01; F (1, 122), ¼ 7.86,
p < .01, partial h ¼ .06; but, lower levels of exercise disengagement
M ¼ 3.62, SD ¼ .97 versus M ¼ 4.21, SD ¼ .92; F (1, 119), ¼ 11.61,
p < .001, partial h ¼ .09.
Correlations between automatic and non-automatic measures
of self-efficacy and exercise disengagement
Pearson correlational analyses established that automatic and
non-automatic measures were tapping related but distinct aspects
of exercise self-efficacy, but unrelated aspects of exercise disen-
gagement. In both the no-memory-load and memory-load condi-
tions, the results showed weak-to-moderate associations between
baseline self-report responses and post-computer tasks responses
latencies for self judgments for judgments of schedule efficacy
(r ¼ .19 e r ¼ .37, p < .01), barrier efficacy (r ¼ .22 e r ¼ .40,
p < .01), and coping efficacy (r ¼ . 29 e r ¼ .30, p < .01); however,
automatic and non-automatic measures of exercise disengagement
were not associated (r ¼ .03 e r ¼ .15, ns).
Memory-load manipulation analyses
Response latencies to the structural (contains the word and
contains the letter) judgments were used as a check that the digit-
retention task was equally effective at depleting attention across
both exercise self-regulation experience groups (see Table 1). A
repeated measures ANOVA on the main and interactive effects of
Exercise Self-Regulation Experience and Memory-Load Condition
on response latencies to these judgments revealed that the main
effect of exercise self-regulation experience group was not signifi-
cant F < 1, indicating that the digit-retention task was equally
effective at depleting attention in both exercise self-regulation
experience groups. A significant Memory-Load effect showed that,
relative to response latencies in the memory-load condition,
response latencies in the no-memory-load condition were faster F
(1, 122) ¼ 28.79, p < .001, partial h ¼ .19, providing evidence that
attention was effectively depleted by the digit task. Consistent with
the expectation that, under time pressure, it is easier to find a word
compared with a letter within a phrase, a significant Judgment
Category showed that, compared with response latencies for
contains the letter judgments, response latencies for contains the
word judgments were faster F (1, 122) ¼ 183.47, p < .001, partial
h ¼ .60.
Within the memory-load condition, Pearson correlational
analyses between the digit task performance and response laten-
cies revealed, that for all judgment categories, faster response
latencies were associated with better digit retention (as indicated
by significant negative correlations; see Table 2). Analyses
computed separately by exercise self-regulation experience group
 J. Buckley, L.D. Cameron / Psychology of Sport and Exercise 12 (2011) 324e332 329

Table 1
Means and standard deviations of response latencies for structural judgments of exercise phrases in experienced and inexperienced exercise self-regulation groups.

Exercise self-regulation experience

Judgment Experienced Inexperienced Experienced Inexperienced

M SD M SD M SD M SD

(n ¼ 62) (n ¼ 62) (n ¼ 62) (n ¼ 62)

Contains the word Contains the letter

Structural
Exercise phrases NML 1472.92 1.47 1556.20 1.58 1697.48 1.38 1754.61 1.48
Exercise phrases ML 1684.12 1.46 1786.48 1.53 1924.65 1.39 2065.44 1.46

Note: No-Memory-load condition (NL), Memory-load condition (L). Analyses include only “yes” responses for structural judgments (contains the word and contains the letter) of
the exercise phrases.

replicated these results. The findings demonstrate that, for all
participants, memory-load effects on the judgments tasks were not
produced by switching attention away from the digit-retention
task. Further, the results showed that the mean number of digits
correct was between 4.2 and 4.7. That participants made some, but
not too many errors in the digit-retention task indicates that they
were giving attention to the primary judgment task (self, other,
word, letter) as well as the digit-retention task.
Responses to the debrief questionnaire confirmed that all
participants were blind to the purpose of the study. Almost all
participants reported giving attention to both the judgment and
digit tasks (96%), and that the study did not prompt them to change
their exercise behavior (99%). These findings establish that the
responses to the study tasks can be interpreted in terms of effi-
ciency in processing judgments of exercise self-efficacy and exer-
cise disengagement.
Efficiency of exercise self-efficacy exercise disengagement
judgments effects
Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations of response
latencies for self and other “yes” judgments of exercise efficacy and
exercise disengagement. Repeated measures ANOVAs assessing the
main and interactive effects of Exercise Self-Regulation Experience,
Judgment Category and Memory-Load Condition were conducted
on each of these four dependent measures. The analyses yielded
main effects of Judgment Category on all four measures: schedule
efficacy F (1, 116) ¼ 4.86, p < .05, partial h ¼ .04; barrier efficacy F (1,
101) ¼ 8.03, p < .01, partial h ¼ .07; coping efficacy F (1, 103) ¼ 6.81,
p < .01, partial h ¼ .06, and exercise disengagement F (1, 107) ¼ 4.56,
p < .05, partial h ¼ .04. For each measure, self judgments were made
more quickly than other judgments, suggesting that, in the context
of self-referent thought, exercise self-efficacy and exercise disen-
gagement judgments are processed relatively rapidly.
A significant main effect of Exercise Self-Regulation Experience
for schedule efficacy, F (1, 116) ¼ 5.10, p < .05, partial h ¼ .04, and
barrier efficacy, F (1, 101) ¼ 5.10, p < .05, partial h ¼ .05, showed that
response latencies for these judgments were faster for the experi-
enced group than for the inexperienced group. Response latencies
for coping efficacy and exercise disengagement were similar for
both groups.
Interpretations of the main effects of Exercise Self-Regulation
Experience and Judgment Category are qualified, however, by
significant Exercise Self-Regulation Experience X Judgment Cate-
gory interaction effects for all three types of exercise self-efficacy
judgments and an interaction trend for exercise disengagement
judgments. For schedule efficacy, F (1, 116) ¼ 10.09, p < .01, partial
h ¼ .08; barrier efficacy, F (1, 101) ¼ 7.89, p < .01, partial h ¼ .07; and
coping efficacy; F (1, 103) ¼ 8.06, p < .01 partial h ¼ .07. As pre-
dicted, participants experienced in exercise self-regulation had
faster response latencies for self judgments than for other judg-
ments of self-efficacy: for schedule efficacy, F (1, 116) ¼ 14.99,
p < .001, partial h ¼ .11; for barrier efficacy, F (1, 101) ¼ 17.82,
p < .001, partial h ¼ .15; and for coping efficacy, F (1, 103) ¼ 15.90,
p < .001, partial h ¼ .13. These findings confirm predictions that, for
individuals high in exercise self-regulation experience, self judg-
ments of exercise self-efficacy were processed relatively automat-
ically. For the inexperienced group, response latencies for self and
other judgments of exercise self-efficacy were equivalent
(F’s < .46 ns); thus, as expected, there is no evidence that these
judgments are processed automatically by this group.
A trend toward an Exercise Self-Regulation Experience
Group
Judgment Category interaction effect for exercise disen-
gagement judgments was in the predicted direction; F (1,
107) ¼ 3.21, p < .07, partial h ¼ .03. Although the interaction effect
was not statistically significant, the simple effects analyses revealed
a significant effect of judgment category for the inexperienced
group but not for the experienced group. For the inexperienced
group, response latencies for self judgments of exercise disen-
gagement were faster compared with response latencies for other
judgments. F (1, 107) ¼ 7.93, p < .01, partial h ¼ .07. In contrast, for
the experience group, response latencies for self and other judg-
ments of exercise disengagement were equivalent (F ¼ .06, ns).
Although the interaction effect was not statistically significant, the

Table 2
Correlations among average number of correct digits, judgment category and exercise self-efficacy “yes” response latencies.

Judgment category 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Can I? Digits correct e
2 Can the average other person? Digits correct .86** e
3 Contains the word? Digits correct .81** .81** e
4 Contains the letter? Digits corrects .79** .77** .86** e
5 Can I? Response latencies .23* .18* .16 .13 e
6 Can the average other person? Response latencies .21* .22* .18* .15 .93** e
7 Contains the word? Response latencies .15 .15 .26** .26** .71** .69** e
8 Contains the letter? Response latencies .15 .16 .24** .27** .72** .71** .94** e

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01.

330 J. Buckley, L.D. Cameron / Psychology of Sport and Exercise 12 (2011) 324e332

Table 3
Means and standard deviations of response latencies for “yes” judgments of exercise self-efficacy and exercise disengagement for self and other by experienced and
inexperienced exercise self-regulation groups.

Self judgments Other judgments

Experienced ESR Group Inexperienced ESR Experienced ESR Group Inexperienced ESR
Group Group

M SD M SD M SD M SD

(n ¼ 61) (n ¼ 61) (n ¼ 61) (n ¼ 61)

Exercise self-efficacy
Schedule NML 1808.04 1.30 2079.74 1.42 1919.85 1.36 2100.65 1.42
Schedule ML 1863.11 1.32 2186.37 1.36 2018.28 1.32 2100.65 1.39
Barrier NML 1826.21 1.35 2143.08 1.38 2038.56 1.36 2230.54 1.42
Barrier ML 1939.14 1.40 2298.47 1.45 2100.65 1.35 2208.35 1.30
Coping NML 1958.63 1.34 2143.08 1.43 2186.37 1.36 2186.37 1.39
Coping ML 2038.56 1.35 2252.96 1.38 2186.37 1.28 2208.35 1.39

Exercise disengagement
ED NML 2440.60 1.39 2321.57 1.39 2514.93 1.30 2514.93 1.42
ED ML 2565.73 1.42 2489.91 1.38 2540.20 1.36 2670.44 1.38

Note: ESR Group ¼ Exercise Self-Regulation Group, ED ¼ Exercise Disengagement, No-memory-load condition (NML), memory-load condition (LM) response latencies are in
milliseconds.

pattern suggests a trend for self judgments of exercise disengage-
ment to be automatically processed by individuals inexperienced in
exercise self-regulation. In contrast, there is no evidence that these
judgments are processed automatically by the experienced group.
The repeated measures ANOVAs of schedule efficacy, barrier
efficacy and coping efficacy judgments revealed no main and
interactive effects of Memory-Load Condition (F0 s < 1, ns). These
findings are inconsistent with expectations that response latencies
would generally be faster under no memory load than under
memory load. Moreover, they fail to support predictions that, for
the experience exercise group, the differences in response latencies
between the no-memory-load and memory-load conditions would
be relatively smaller for self judgments than for other judgments.
For exercise disengagement judgments, there was a trend for
Memory Load main effect, such that response latencies for judg-
ments (for both self and other) tended to be faster in the no-
memory-load condition than in the memory-load condition
F (1, 107) ¼ 2.87, p < .09. Although not statistically significant, the
pattern suggests a trend for these judgments to be attention
demanding, thereby, susceptible to interference from the digit-
retention task. These effects are unexpected for the inexperienced
group.
Discussion
This research investigated the efficiency of exercise self-efficacy
and exercise disengagement judgments in individuals experienced
and inexperienced in exercise self-regulation. The results provide
evidence that these judgments can be automatically activated in
ways that might promote or deter regular exercise.
The findings demonstrating that self judgments of exercise
efficacy and disengagement were made more quickly than other
judgments, and that these effects varied according to exercise self-
regulation experience, add to evidence that speed of processing is
increased when the self-relevance of the construct is high (Bargh &
Tota, 1988; Rhodewalt & Agustdottic, 1986). For participants expe-
rienced in exercise self-regulation, relatively faster self judgments
(than other judgments) of schedule efficacy, barrier efficacy and
coping efficacy indicate that these exercise self-efficacy judgments
are coherently integrated and have strong associative links to
representations of the self. That is, self-referential thought made
exercise self-efficacy representations more accessible and thus able
to be processed relatively automatically (Bargh & Tota, 1988; Shah &
Higgins, 2001). The findings are consistent with evidence that
faster response latencies reflect expectations held with greater
certainty (Andersen et al., 1992). That the experienced group
showed relatively greater automaticity in their self judgment of
exercise self-efficacy than other judgments indicates that they are
more certain of their abilities to schedule exercise, overcome
exercise barriers and cope with impediments to exercise in time
pressure situations. The greater the certainty with which self-effi-
cacy beliefs are held, the higher the likelihood that individuals will
perform associated behaviors (Bandura, 1997). For experienced
participants, the greater certainty in their exercise self-efficacy
beliefs matches with their frequent exercise behavior (3.5 days per
week on average).
In contrast, for individuals inexperienced in exercise self-regu-
lation, speeds of processing self and other judgments of exercise self-
efficacy were equivalent, indicating that the self-relevant beliefs
were not processed with relatively greater automaticity. Moreover,
this inexperienced exercise group exhibited relatively faster pro-
cessing of self judgments (than other judgments) relating to exercise
disengagement. The Exercise Experience Group
Judgment inter-
action fell short of statistical significance and we thus cannot
conclude that the two groups differ significantly in this judgment
effect. Nevertheless, the pattern suggests that judgments of exercise
disengagement (i.e., avoiding exercise) are self-relevant for and held
with greater certainty by inexperienced participants. For inexperi-
enced participants, greater certainty that they can avoid exercise
matches with their low frequency of exercise (1.1 days per week on
average)da pattern that complements evidence linking exercise
disengagement judgments (e.g., procrastination) with infrequent
exercise (Kendzierski & Johnson, 1993). In contrast, for individuals
experienced in exercise self-regulation, the speeds of processing self
and other judgments of disengagement were equivalent. Taken
together, these findings add to evidence that individuals who are
experienced in an activity can be distinguished from those who are
inexperienced on speed of information processing (Field et al., 2006;
Smith et al., 1988).
Regardless of exercise self-regulation experience, the magni-
tude of memory-load/no-load differences was equivalent for self
and other judgments of exercise self-efficacy. This finding was not
expected; instead, we predicted that the experienced group would
show smaller increases in response latency due to load (versus no-
load) in making self (compared with other) judgments of exercise
self-efficacy. That is, we expected that, for individuals experienced
in exercise self-regulation, exercise self-efficacy beliefs would be
sufficiently integrated and have strong associative links to
 J. Buckley, L.D. Cameron / Psychology of Sport and Exercise 12 (2011) 324e332
representations of the self so that self judgments of exercise self-
efficacy would be processed relatively effortlessly in situations of
high cognitive load. Yet for both experienced and inexperienced
individuals, higher cognitive load did not increase the effort needed
to make self-efficacy judgments for either the self or other. It may be
the boundaries between self and other representations of exercise
self-efficacy overlap to the extent that, when distracted by
competing activities, participants become confused about whether
activated mental contents pertain to self or generic others (Wheeler,
DeMarree, & Petty, 2007). Under cognitive load, it may be easy to
err in applying self judgments when appraising an unspecified
target person (generic other) and to do so with as little effort as is
needed to make self judgments (Mussweiler & Epstude, 2009).
Future research might utilize alternative tests of effortlessness by
contrasting self-evaluations of exercise efficacy and exercise
disengagement to a different referent (e.g., a control standard or
a specific, previously unfamiliar person).
For both experience groups, response latencies for self and other
judgments of exercise disengagement were faster in the no-
memory-load condition than in memory-load condition. It appears
that, for both groups, the degree of exercise self-regulation expe-
riences was not sufficient to instill elaborated representations of
exercise disengagement that promote effortless processing of these
judgments (Logan, 1985; Tzelgov & Yehene, 2006). Consequently,
the processing of the digit-retention task significantly interfered
with processing of exercise disengagement judgments for both
groups.
Considered together, the results provide further evidence that
the speed of processing and effortlessness components are not
interchangeable measures of efficiency (Pashler et al., 2001). For
these exercise-related judgments, these components may have
different timelines for demonstrating automaticity (MacLeod &
Dunbar, 1988).
The study findings should be considered within the context of
several methodological constraints. First, the study was conducted
with university staff and students, the majority of whom were
relatively young and healthy New Zealand Europeans; the results
may not generalize to populations from other sociocultural back-
grounds or age groups, those with less tertiary education experi-
ence, or those with health conditions. Second, although the
exercise disengagement measure was shown to distinguish indi-
viduals experienced and inexperienced in exercise self-regulation,
the internal consistency was low. Exercise disengagement may be
a multidimensional construct and the measure may require addi-
tional items to more fully assess these dimensions. Finally, the
multiple analyses increased the probability of Type 1 errors.
Stringent controls were not used based on considerations that, as
this is the first study to investigate automaticity of exercise self-
efficacy and exercise disengagement, it is preferable to maintain
sufficient power to explore potential influences. Future studies
using more stringent controls to replicate and extend these findings
are warranted.
The findings have implications for the design of exercise
interventions. In typical daily life, the ability to exercise regularly is
reliant on accessing one’s self-efficacy to schedule exercise, over-
come and cope with obstacles to exercise amid time constraints.
Interventions might increase their effectiveness if they focused on
training individuals so that they automatically process positive
judgments of self-efficacy (as opposed to common intervention
tasks, such as completing a set number of exercise sessions per
week, which may inadvertently reduce self-efficacy appraisals;
Buckley, 2000). Intervention components aimed at creating
representations of exercise self-efficacy that are self-relevant,
positive and accessible may be more effective in enabling indi-
viduals to make decisions to exercise in time-pressured situations.
331
One approach to achieve this objective builds on intervention
research by Sheeran et al. (e.g., Achtziger, Gollwitzer, & Sheeran,
2008; Orbell & Sheeran, 2002) using implementation intentions
based on an if-then format. These interventions generally include
components to: (1) get individuals to identify typical time pressure
situations in which they have to make exercise decisions (exercise
cues); (2) utilize mental imagery or mental rehearsal techniques to
create and strengthen the association between exercise cues and
positive exercise self-efficacy responses; and (3) get individuals to
practice enacting these sequences in ‘real world’ situations so that
they are internalized as self-relevant. By setting up an effective
contingency between exercise cues and self-efficacy responses,
this approach can increase the representational accessibility of
positive self-efficacy beliefs that could be automatically activated
and processed.
In summary, the study provides evidence that, for individuals
experienced at exercise self-regulation, decisions to schedule,
overcome barriers and cope with competing interests to exercise
goals can be made rapidly in time-pressured situations. For both
experienced and inexperienced individuals, self and other evalua-
tions of exercise self-efficacy are made effortlessly when ‘cogni-
tively busy’ whereas judgments promoting avoidance of exercise
require mental effort. Taken together, these results support the idea
that, speed and effortlessness of processing exercise-related judg-
ments, may have different timelines for demonstrating automa-
ticity (MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988). Efficiency of self-efficacy
judgments that promote exercise has distinct self-regulation
advantages for exercise behavior because it enables these decisions
to proceed when individuals are cognitively busy and when facing
the time-pressured contexts that are typical of daily life.
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