TEAM CODE: 096

Expedient Resolution of Election Contests

Executive Summary
It is indisputable that the culture of Filipino Time applies, not only in our private lives, but also
in our public life. Our judiciary is not exempt from this - rather our justice system operates daily
in delay. Justice delayed is justice denied, pure and simple. In cases of election protests and
special actions before the Commission of Elections, the lethargy of due process is not only
detrimental to the parties involved but to the public as a whole – it impedes the efficient and
effective delivery of services to the public.

Elections are held in practice of the principles of democracy and duly elected public officials are
revered as the representatives of their community. When election protests are raised contesting
on the results of elections, the protest is filed either in the Commission of on Elections or Ccourts
of Ggeneral Jjurisdiction, depending on the elective position contested. Decisions are appealable
to the COMELEC en banc or the Intermediate Appellate Court Court of Appeals. It is reviewable
by the Supreme Court only when a pPetition offor Review on cCertiorari is filed. While the
protest is decided upon, appealed and then reviewed, the elective office is bereft of its duly
elected official. De facto officers take their
place and the de jure officials are robbed of their given time to serve the public – the will of the
1
people is displaced as it is debated upon in the Commission and the Courts for years. Some
cases even end up as being moot and academic because the contested term of office has already
2
expired. In special action cases, like disqualification cases, when it fails to be resolved before
the elections, unqualified candidates can be elected to office and can be ousted once his
3
qualifications are deemed lacking. The delay in due process causes an injury to the public it
aims to protect.

The nature of election cases, as being time-bound, calls for their immediate resolution by the
Commission on Elections and the Judiciary. The proposed policy is simple – election protests
must be resolved with finality within 3 months of its filing and special action cases must be
resolved with finality a week before the elections.

Keywords: election cases, due process, resolution of election protests

1
Malaluan v Commission on Elections (1996)
2
Malaluan v Commission on Elections (1996)
Expedient Resolution of Election Contests 1
3
Labo v Commission on Elections (1989)

Expedient Resolution of Election Contests 2

 Table of Contents
Executive
Summary.........................................................................................................................................1

Statement of the Problem…............................................................................................................3

Review of Current Policy...............................................................................................................3
Reasons for Policy Change............................................................................................................6
Policy Alternatives…......................................................................................................................9
Recommendation….......................................................................................................................17
Implementation Plan…..................................................................................................................17

References.....................................................................................................................................18
 Statement of the Problem
In Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias, the Supreme Court penned:

It is axiomatic that an election contest, involving as it does not only the adjudication and
settlement of the private interests of the rival candidates but also the paramount need of
dispelling once and for all the uncertainty that beclouds the real choice of the electorate
with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the offices within their gift, is a
proceeding imbued with public interest which raises it onto a plane over and above
ordinary civil actions. For this reason, broad perspectives of public policy impose upon
courts the imperative duty to ascertain by all means within their command who is the real
candidate elected in as expeditious a manner as possible, without being fettered by
technicalities and procedural barriers to the end that the will of the people may not be
frustrated (Ibasco vs. Ilao, et al., G.R. L-17512, December 29, 1960; Reforma vs. De
Luna, G.R. L-13242, July 31, 1958).

For the past elections since our democracy has been restored, the country experienced a fair
share of election contests, assailing errors in the winners proclaimed, from: Santiago vs. Ramos,
Legarda vs. De Castro, Pimentel vs. Zubiri, Malaluan vs. Comelec, Labo vs Comelc. In most of
these cases, the protests took more than three (3) years to resolve because of the complex process
that needs to be undergone, causing problems like: 1) exhaustion of resources for the protestant;
2) prevention of the protestant to run for another elective position; 3) creation of de facto and de
jure officers; 4) loss of years to serve the Filipino people and 5) violation of the principles of
representation in a democracy.

The goal of the paper is to present alternative policies to address the inexpedient disposition of
election contests, including tentative policies to address the effects of the main problem.

Review of Current Policy

Stated in the objectives of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, found in Section 3, is “to achieve
just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding
brought before the Commission.”
There are two cognizable election contests: (1) election protests and (2) petitions for quo
warranto. Election contests can only be filed after elections.
Election protests refer to election contests involving the election and returns of elective officials,
be it local or national. The issue in election protests is who obtained the plurality of valid votes
cast (Section 3 (u). 2010 Rules of Procedure for Municipal Election Contests). In election
protests, the validity of ballots can be questioned and a revision of the ballots can be petitioned
for. Election protests can only be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and been voted for the contested elective office.
Petitions for quo warranto refers to an election contest involving the qualifications of an elective
official, on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. The issue
4
in a quo warranto case is whether or not the respondent possesspossesses all the qualifications
5
and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law (Section 3 (v), 2010 Rules of Procedure for
Municipal Election Contests). In contrast to election protests, a verified petition for quo
warranto can be filed by any registered voter.
There are several bodies with the jurisdiction to hear election contests depending on the elective
position contested. These are the Commission on Elections, Regional Trial Courts,
Municipal/City Trial Courts, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal and the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
Local elective positions are covered by the Comelec, the RTCs and the MTCs. The Commission
on Elections have has exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction (Section 3 (2), Article IX-C, 1987 Philippine Constitution). Regional Trial Courts
have exclusive original jurisdiction over contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications involving elective municipal officials (Section 1, Rule 35 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure). The Municipal or City Trial Courts, on the other hand, have exclusive original
jurisdiction over electoral contests involving barangay officials. National elective positions, in
comparison, are covered by their respective Electoral Tribunals as provided for in the 1987
6
Constitution.
The time-limit on the resolution of local election contests are provided for by Article XII of the
Omnibus Election Code. Pertinent Sections are:
Section 257. The Commission shall decide all election cases brought before it within ninety days
from the date of their submission for decision. The decision of the Commission shall become
final thirty days after receipt of judgment;
Section 258. The courts, in their respective cases, shall give preference to election contests over
all other cases, except those of habeas corpus, and shall without delay, hear and, within thirty
days from the date of their submission for decision, but in every case within six months after
filing, decide the same;
Appeals from any decision rendered by the RTC with respect to quo warranto petitions filed in
election contests affecting municipal officers, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Intermediate
Appellate Court within five days after receipt of a copy of the decision. No motion for

4
For qualifications of the President and the Vice-President see Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; for legislative
elective positions see Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; for elective local positions see Section 39 of the Local
Government Code
5
For the list of disqualifications see Section 12, Section 68, of the Omnibus Election Code; Section 40 of the Local
Government Code
6
See Section 17, Article VI and Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
reconsideration shall be entertained by the court. The appeal shall be decided within sixty days
after the case has been submitted for decision.
For election contests filed in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the contests should be decided
twenty months after it is filed (Section 3, RA 1973). The 2013 Senate Electoral Tribunal Rules is
silent on the time cap of the resolution of cases.
There three important matters of procedure currently being covered by existing laws (1)
preferential status of election contests in the courts of general jurisdiction, (2) six months time
cap for the resolution of cases filed in the courts, and (3) twenty months time cap for the
resolution of cases before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
In addition to the procedural facets of existing policy, the financial burden of theof the election
7
contest, specifically those that need revision of ballots, are borne by the protestant.
While election contests are pending decision, there are two effects cognizable by law – (1) the
existence of de facto officers and (2) the consideration of the protestant’s running for elective
office as abandonment of protest.
In Torres vs Ribo, the Supreme Court defines a de facto officer as one who has the reputation of
being the officer he assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point of law. De jure officers,
on the other hand, are those who are considered to be a ‘good’ officer in point of law, meaning
that these are officers recognized by law. Pending election contests creates de facto and de jure
officers, when it is later decided that the protestant is the de jure officer. In good faith, de facto
officers are not accountable to the de jure officer, but when bad faith is proven, emoluments are
conferrable to the de jure officer and they may be held accountable for their decisions as de facto
officers.
In Pimentel vs. Zubiri, Aquillino Pimentel III filed an election protest to the Senate Electoral
Tribunal after the proclamation of Juan Miguel Zubiri as senator after the 2007 Philippine Senate
election. The case spanned for four (4) years, and would have not been resolved if Zubiri did not
resign on August 2, 2011. Within these years, Pimentel III was not able to run for another
position because of the ruling in Santiago vs. Ramos, which states that: “In assuming the office
of the senator, the protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her election protest,
thereby making it moot.” Unlike for non-elective positions wherein acceptance of appointment
for another office is not considered an abandonment of protest, protestants who run for another
position in the span of their protest are considered to have abandoned their protest. With this, and
the very long process time of election contests, protestants are left with no choice but to either
wait for as much as three years until their respective cases have been resolved to be able to serve
in the position they feel that they deserve, or to run for another position, and abandon their
protest due to lack of resources and the need to earn money and feed their families.

7
See Rule 7 of the 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Involving Municipal Elective Officials; Section 7,
Rule 20 of the Comele Rules of Procedure;
 Reasons for Policy Change
Like most laws in the country, the law on electoral contests, as much as it is ideally good, is not
being followed faithfully with regards to the time prescribed for each process involved. This
inexpediency in the resolution of electoral protests is a violation of one’s right to due process,
right to office, and right to vote. The very nature of electoral contests as being time-bound, as the
terms for elective offices are set by law and finite, demands that these contests when raised must
be resolved in the fastest manner possible without injury to the rights of the parties involved and
the electorate’s exercise of their right to vote.

Within the span of three years, which is usually the least amount of time needed for an election
contest to be resolved, a lot may already be lost to the protestant: 1) resources; 2) their
opportunity to run for another position; and 3) their right and opportunity to serve Filipino
people. For the constituents on the other hand, they may be deprived of a leader whom they
voted for, and whom they deserve and trust to lead them, iInstead they may be forced to follow
to a de facto officer, who did not earn their votes nor trust in the first place.

It is essential then to be able to process this sort of electoral contest in an expedient manner,
because it is not only the politicians who are affected, but also the constituents of the country,
whose voices, and choices were supposed to be heard during the election, but instead, were
forced to have a leader whom they did not voted for, just because of errors in the computation of
ballots, and the incapability of the justice system to process electoral contests at a speedy
manner.

With this being said, the focus being on the said inexpediancyinexpediency of the resolution of
several electoral contest cases, the identification of possible key causes were made to uncover a
network of interrelated issues not only in the electoral process. These warning signals are present
even before election periods and post-election debacles. With them coming together,
exacerbating the already worsening situation of electoral contentions, focusing and having a
closer look instead of looking at the bigger picture could prove to be more cost-effective and
efficient.

A. Technology

The employment of the manual system in counting of votes and declaration of results has been
hounded by several issues and concerns. Among these are the occurrence of rampant violence
and other questionable acts such as coercion and intimidation to gain a particular seat in the
government. It was during these times that the election period in the Philippines was considered
as bloody and dirty.

With direct human intervention in the process of tallying and counting individual votes, this
certain step was bound to have a cumulationaccumulation of human errors and worse, to
intentionally manipulate the results. These acts give little to, or even no regard to the sovereign
will of the people to appoint who they think is the one best fit for a certain position.
The many controversies surrounding the manual counting scheme gave rise to proposals, and the
eventual approval of a reformed voting system. Through the implementation of the Republic Act
No. 9369, machines were employed on the 2010 national and local elections for use by voters in
the act of voting as well as in recording and tallying the votes for the determination of the
winning candidates.

The effect of the change has been drastic; the results were already available within a few hours
and in effect, there was also a significant decrease in election-related violence. However, even
with the noticeably positive effects of such shift, issues such as in the security and transparency
in the particulars of the process still arose. These, among other related matters, prompted the
government not to use the PCOS machines for the 2016 local and national elections, but rather
have the vote counting machines instead. There were even talks of reverting back to the manual
process of voting even with questions of legality in place.

Overall, the shift from manual to automated voting has made certain matters more expedient. In
theory, the improvement brought about by the change should also include the revision of ballots
in the case of electoral contests. However, such improvements brought about by the shift of the
electoral method has not yet, as of this time, trickled to the expediency of the resolution of the
electoral contention cases. Such is the electoral protest filed by then Interior Secretary Manuel
Roxas II against Vice President Jejomar Binay after the 2010 Vice Presidential elections. As of
8
2015, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is yet to decide upon the case. Also, with the
COMELEC still not having a final decision with regard to the method to be used in the
subsequent election years, procedures in the resolution of electoral contests cannot be easily
9
amended.

B. Budgetary Concerns

For the year 2015, the Commission of Elections made a request for an increase of its budget
following the conduct of the upcoming 2016 elections. The requested budget of P16.8 billion is
noticeably larger as compared with the P2.8 billion budget for 2014. A large chunk is allocated
10
for the purchase of new equipment. For the year 2016, COMELEC proposed a budget of P20.3
billion, with P15.6 billion finally being approved by the Department of Budget and Management.
In particular, the budget allocation in the proposed budget of the COMELEC for the Personnel
Services amounts to P2.84 billion. However, with the approved budget in the National
Expenditure Program, the allocation for the personnel services in particular was decreased

8
Punay, Edu. “Binay asks PET to junk Mar’s poll protest.” philstar.com.
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2015/06/19/1467541/binay-asks-pet-junk-mars-poll-protest (accessed April 15,
2016)
9
See Omnibus Election code Article XXI - Election Contests
10
Rappler.com. “Comelec’s proposed 2015 budget jumps to P16.8B.” Rappler. www.rappler.com/nation/66080-
comelec-proposed-budget-2015 (accessed April 15, 2016)
instead to P2.065 billion. Personnel services include per diems, wages, overtime pay, honoraria
11
and insurance and hazard pay.
Such allocations for the employees have significant impact to the overall performance of an
employee. Increases in salary and other benefits serve as motivation for an employee to perform
well on his or her job. Receiving compensation to which a personnelpersonnel feels to be equal
to the workload being demanded from would contribute to feelings of accomplishment from a
completed task. However, in the case Comelec COMELEC employees, they were not given the
wage increase they are seeking amidst the upcoming workload brought about by the elections,
though the agency was given a relatively huge budget. According to the Comelec COMELEC
Employees Union (CEU), an increase in the salaries is also necessary to counter the continuing
increase in the day
12
to day expenses.

This problem is not only evident in the COMELEC, but also with other related offices connected
with the resolution of election contest cases such as the appropriate courts for the positions
contended with. Not having the appropriate salaries and corresponding benefits could possibly
demotivate employees, resulting to in underperformance and therefore, the drawn-out and
overdue decisions.
C. Volume of Cases
A large quantity of election cases, particularly those relating to election contests, are being filed
for immediate resolution. However, with the inexpediency of how decisions are being studied,
investigated, and finally decided upon, there are contentions which fall to become being moot
and academic due to the petition being prayed for has already lapsed. Such cause includes the
lapse of the term of the position being contended upon.
The volume of cases to be resolved, with a large influx coming in the period immediately after
the release of election results, places a burden to the deciding bodies. As such, electoral contests
to be decided upon continue to pile up on top of pending cases. Even with the maximum period
set by the Omnibus Election Code with regard to passing a decision, this was rarely, if at all,
being followed, as reflected by cases reaching years before passing appropriate judgment. Thus,
instead of obtaining an immediate response, the appellant is instead forced to wait, else risk
having the appeal invalidated.
The challenge now is to create an alternative policy for the expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of election protests and disqualification cases without
compromising the right to due process.

11
Reyes, Ernie. “Comelec seeks P20.3B, gets P15.6B for 2016 polls, regular programs.” Interaksyon.com.
interaksyon.com/article/117355/comelec-seeks-p20-3b-gets-p15-6b-for-2016-polls-regular-programs
(accessed April 15, 2016)
12
Crisostomo, Sheila. “Comelec employees seek pay hike.” philstar.com.
http://www.philstar.com:8080/metro/2015/08/11/1486726/comelec-employees-seek-pay-hike (accessed April 15,
Expedient Resolution of Election Contests 8
2016)

Expedient Resolution of Election Contests 9

 Policy Alternatives

I. Time
Election contests have been characterized as time- sensitive, hence, it’sits need to be
expediently resolved. The proposed alternative policy targeting the time aspect of the
problem is simple. All electoral contests, be it electoral protest or petition of quo
warranto, must be decided within 90 days of its filing in the proper agency, court or
tribunal. Extensions for the revision of ballots may be allowed up to the extent of 30
days. Appeals must run for only 60 days and when a petition for certiorari is filed with
the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court must decide within 60 days of its filing.

II. Continuance of Election Protest

The violation of the right to be elected inherent in the existing law, of those who have
pending election contests, should be addressed as a matter of policy. Protestants should
be allowed to run for elective office even when their case is pending decision. Until the
expeditious resolution of election contests is ensured by law and practice, the right to be
elected must be protected.

III. Compensation and Incentives

An identified root of the problem is the underperformance of employees, officials, judges
and lawyers in the disposition of election contests. To address this, proper compensation
must be ensured and if possible, good performance be incentivized. In the existing policy,
the financial burden of electoral contests is carried by the protestant, which should not be
the case. We propose that the financial burden be carried by the Government, except the
attorney fees of the protestant. Overtime work, when necessary to resolve the contest
within the time limit, will be compensated with apt overtime pay and should be
incentivized with either bonuses and/or additional leaves, such as compensatory day-offs.

IV. Preferential Disposition

As is with the existing provision on the preferential disposition of election contests before
the trial courts, so should it be with the Electoral Tribunals and the Supreme Court.
Election contests should be given preference over all other cases, except those of habeas
corpus.

V. Penalizations
Those who are found to be impeding the process of the resolution of election contests
should be penalized for their actions.
 Root of the Main Proposed Policy
Problem

Procedure All electoral contests must be decided within 90 days of its

filing. Appeals must run for only 60 days and when a
petition for certiorari is filed with the Supreme Court, the
SC must resolve it within 60 days of its filing.

Abandonment of Protestants must be allowed to run for elective office even

Protest when their case is pending decision.

Manpower For the expedient resolution of cases, concerned employees

of the COMELEC and the Trial Courts will be
compensated and incentivized to work within the time limit
provided by the current law or the proposed procedural
alternative policy.

Petitions pending Preferential disposition of electoral contests in the Supreme

in the Supreme Court
Court

Lack of sanctions Penalization of those found to be impeding the expedient

resolution of electoral contests

Policy Evaluation Criteria

Goal: to make the process of electoral contests in the Philippines, both in the national and local
level, more efficient

Objective: to reduce the losses incurred by the stakeholders due to slow resolution of
electoral contests
Criterion 1 – Effectiveness
Measures:
1. Ease of processing [the degree of how simple the process of electoral
contest would be]
2. Time needed [the number of hours/days/years needed to resolve the
electoral contest]

Criterion 2 – Financial Feasibility

Measure:
1. Budget [availability of budget for implementation]

Criterion 3 – Socio-Economic Feasibility

Measures:
 1. Outcomes [socio-economic benefits provided to stakeholders]
2. Externalities [positive externalities]

Criterion 4 – Political
Viability Measures:
1. Perception of the Constituents [view of constituents of the
government]

Evaluation of Alternatives
A. Scenario Writing

I. All electoral contests must be decided within 90 days of its filing. Appeals must
run for only 60 days and when a petition for certiorari is filed with the Supreme
Court, the SC must resolve it within 60 days of its filing.

In terms of effectiveness, this policy would ideally be effective, under the measures
of simplification and amount of time needed to resolve a contest, since it directly
manipulates the time factor, which is one of the most vital parts of the issue.
However, like most laws and policies in the country, it should not be forgotten, that
the time allotted in the processing of cases or even documents in the government
is not always being followed, in fact, most of the time, it is seldom not observed.

In terms of financial feasibility, the government has money to pay for the
implementation of this policy as it only entails hiring additional personnel so
that work can be divided into more people. However, its capacity to pay for it
their services depends on how much it prioritizes the policy.

In terms of socio-economic impact, the policy would most likely become effective in
reducing the socio-economic losses incurred by the stakeholders: 1) for the
protestors, a faster processing time of protest means the faster they can serve the
country, and get their due salary if they win, or if they lose, the faster they can opt to
run for another position; 2) for the Filipino voters, this means the faster their voices
and votes would be heard, as they were denied that because of the initial error; and 3)
for the government, this means the lesser they have to pay the de facto officer, for the
service he rendered and the de jure officer, for the back wages he deserves.

Moreover, the policy would also have a political impact as the speedy processing of
electoral contests would make the constituents trust in the Philippine justice
system, thus strengthening their faith and loyalty in to the government.

II. Protestants must be allowed to run for elective office even when their case is
pending decision.
 In terms of effectiveness, this policy would not touch on the simplification of the
process nor the amount of time needed to resolve an electoral contest. Rather, it
would directly reduce the losses of the protestors. The negative part of which is that
it does not solve the root causes of the problem, rather the only the surface ones.

In terms of financial feasibility, the implementation of this policy has no monetary

implications in the part implementing party.

In terms of socio-economic impact, the policy would most likely become effective in
reducing the socio-economic losses incurred by the protestors, but not all the
stakeholders: 1) for the protestors, being allowed to run for another position while
the electoral contest waits decision, means access to wages for the other position they
would assume, and opportunity to serve the Filipino people; 2) for the Filipino voters,
this means that they get more choices for the elections, and an increased opportunity
to vote for the best candidate for the position the protestor is running, but would be
denied of the right for their true votes to be heard; and 3) for the government, the
socio-economic impact of this policy is dependent on what other position the
protestor would assume. If the protestor would assume a lower position, the policy
would have a positive economic impact to the government as they would pay lower
salary to the elective official. However, if otherwise, the government would have to
pay a higher salary to the elective official.

Unlike the first policy, the political impact of this specific policy may be the loss of
faith of the Filipino people to the electoral system, stating that candidates do not
have “paninindigan” and would just serve at any position as long as they can earn
from it.

III. For the expedient resolution of cases, concerned employees of the COMELEC
and the Trial Courts will be compensated and incentivized to work within the
time limit provided by the current law or the proposed procedural alternative
policy.

In terms of effectiveness, this policy would ideally be effective, under the measure
of amount of time needed to resolve a contest, since it indirectly manipulates the
time factor, by encouraging and motivating concerned employees to process
electoral contests efficiently. However, unlike the first policy, this policy does not
resolve the concern of complexity in the process of electoral contests.

In terms of financial feasibility, the money needed for the implementation of the
policy would be provided by the national government, specifically CSC, as in the
case of Performing Based Bonus and other incentives. With this, it could be said that
the capacity of the government to pay for the implementation of this policy is
dependent on the prioritization of the administration.
 In terms of socio-economic impact, the policy would most likely have the similar
impact as the first policy, i.e. reducing the socio-economic losses incurred by the
stakeholders, since the motivation of personnel through incentives indirectly
encourage faster processing of electoral contests. Thus, 1) the protestors, may
immediately serve the country, and get their due salariesy if they win, or if they lose,
the faster they can opt to run for another position; 2) the Filipino voters’ voices and
votes would be heard, as they were denied that because of the initial error; and 3) the
government, has to pay the de facto officer, for the service he rendered and the de jure
officer, for the back wages he deserves, only lesser than when the process is
prolonged.

Moreover, unlike the first policy, the political impact/s of this policy does not only
focus on harnessing the trust and loyalty of the constituents through speedy
resolution but also through the positive externalities of the incentives given the
staff, such as increased GDP, due to wealth or income effect.

IV. Preferential disposition of electoral contests in the Supreme Court

In terms of effectiveness, this policy would ideally be effective, under the measures
of simplification and amount of time needed to resolve a contest, since it
indirectly manipulates the time factor like the third policy. And unlike the first policy,
this time simplification and time efficiency has more chance of being realized as it
is not just direct imposition of time requirement but an imposition of priority.

In terms of financial feasibility, the implementation of this policy has no monetary

implications in the part implementing party.

In terms of socio-economic impact, the policy would most likely have the similar
impact as the first policy and third policy as all three policies aim for the speedy
processing of electoral contests. Thus the socio-economic impact of this policy would
be:1) the protestors, may immediately serve the country, and get their due salariesy if
they win, or if they lose, the faster they can opt to run for another position; 2) the
Filipino voters’ voices and votes would be heard, as they were denied that because of
the initial error; and 3) the government, has to pay the de facto officer, for the service
he rendered and the de jure officer, for the back wages he deserves, only lesser than
when the process is prolonged.

Moreover, the policy would also have a political impact as the speedy processing of
electoral contests would make the constituents trust in the Philippine justice
system, thus strengthening their faith and loyalty in the government.

V. Penalization of those found to be impeding the expedient resolution of electoral

contests
 In terms of effectiveness, this policy would ideally be effective, under the measure
of reducing the amount of time needed to resolve a contest, since it indirectly
manipulates the time factor like the first, third and fourth policy. However,
recognizing the lack of teeth of the Philippine law, the realization of this policy
may be compromised.

In terms of financial feasibility, the government has capacity to pay for the
implementation of this policy as it only entails hiring additional personnel,
whose work would focus on penalties. To be able to minimize expenses, these
newly hired personnel need not be full-time, rather contractual.

In terms of socio-economic impact, the policy would most likely have the similar
impact as the first, third, and fourth policy as all four policies aim for the speedy
processing of electoral contests. Thus the socio-economic impact of this policy would
be: 1) the protestors, may immediately serve the country, and get their due salary if
they win, or if they lose, the faster they can opt to run for another position; 2) the
Filipino voters’ voices and votes would be heard, as they were denied that because of
the initial error; and 3) the government, has to pay the de facto officer, for the service
he rendered and the de jure officer, for the back wages he deserves, only lesser than
when the process is prolonged.

However, unlike the other three process speeding policies, this policy has
negative social and political impacts. As a policy imposing penalties, this policy
might have little social acceptability, while at the same time garnering negative views
for the government, especially at moments when it is noticeable that people merely
escape the penalty even if guilty.

B. Cost-Benefit Analysis: Effectiveness, Financial Feasibility, Socio-Economic Feasibility, and

Political Viability

The factors of each alternative are given a weight of -1, 0 or +1 wherein:

-1 = additional cost
0 = neutral/no change
+1 = benefit/savings

The total scores of each alternatives are summed up. The alternative with the highest score will
be considered the best alternative.

I. All electoral contests must be decided within 90 days of its filing. Appeals must
run for only 60 days and when a petition for certiorari is filed with the Supreme
Court, the SC must resolve it within 60 days of its filing.

a. It simplifies the processing of electoral contests.

b. It speeds up the processing of electoral contests.
c. Probability of realization of the maximum days is low
 d. It entails costs for hiring of new personnel
e. Capacity to pay depends on prioritization
f. It provides the protestor faster time to serve the country
g. It allows the protestor to immediately be compensated for the error, either through
back wages, if case is won, or the opportunity to immediately run for another
position
h. It provides justice to the votes of the Filipino people
i. It cuts monetary expenses of the government with regards to salary of the de facto
and de jure officers
j. It strengthens the faith of the people to the government

II. Protestants must be allowed to run for elective office even when their case is
pending decision.

a. It does not simplifies the processing of electoral contests

b. It does not speeds up the processing of electoral contests
c. It does not entail costs for implementation
d. It provides the protestor faster time to serve the country
e. It allows the protestor to immediately be compensated
f. It provides Filipino voters more options for the new position the candidate would
run for
g. It does not provide justice to the votes of the Filipino people
h. It may cut the monetary expenses of the government with regards to salary of the
de facto and de jure officers, when the position the protestor assumes is lower or
i. It may increase the monetary expenses of the government with regards to salary
of the de facto and de jure officers, when the position the protestor assumes is
higher
j. It weakens the faith of the people to the government

III. For the expedient resolution of cases, concerned employees of the COMELEC
and the Trial Courts will be compensated and incentivized to work within the
time limit provided by the current law or the proposed procedural alternative
policy.

a. It does not simplify the processing of electoral contests

b. It speeds up the processing of electoral contests
c. It entails costsfor implementation
d. Capacity to pay depends on prioritization
e. It provides the protestor faster time to serve the country
f. It allows the protestor to immediately be compensated for the error, either through
back wages, if case is won, or the opportunity to immediately run for another
position
g. It provides justice to the votes of the Filipino people
 h. It cuts monetary expenses of the government with regards to salary of the de facto
and de jure officers
i. It strengthens the faith of the people to the government
j. Entails positive economic externalities

IV. Preferential disposition of electoral contests in the Supreme Court

a. It simplifies the processing of electoral contests

b. It speeds up the processing of electoral contests
c. Probability of realization is high
d. It does not entail costs for implementation
e. It provides the protestor faster time to serve the country
f. It allows the protestor to immediately be compensated for the error, either through
back wages, if case is won, or the opportunity to immediately run for another
position
g. It provides justice to the votes of the Filipino people
h. It cuts monetary expenses of the government with regards to salary of the de facto
and de jure officers
i. It strengthens the faith of the people to the government

V. Penalization of those found to be impeding the expedient resolution of electoral

contests

a. It does not simplify the processing of electoral contests

b. It speeds up the processing of electoral contests
c. Probability of realization of being penalized is low
d. It entails costs for hiring of new personnel
e. It provides the protestor faster time to serve the country
f. It allows the protestor to immediately be compensated for the error, either through
back wages, if case is won, or the opportunity to immediately run for another
position
g. It provides justice to the votes of the Filipino people
h. It cuts monetary expenses of the government with regards to salary of the de facto
and de jure officers
i. It may not be as accepted socially
j. It may generate negative perceptions of the government
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 Alternative 4 Alternative 5
1A 1 2A 0 3A 0 4A 1 5A 0
1B 1 2B 0 3B 1 4B 1 5B 1
1C -1 2C 0 3C -1 4C 1 5C -1
1D -1 2D 1 3D -1 4D 0 5D -1
1E -1 2E 1 3E 1 4E 1 5E 1
1F 1 2F 1 3F 1 4F 1 5F 1
1G 1 2G -1 3G 1 4G 1 5G 1
1H 1 2H 1 3H 1 4H 1 5H 1
1I 1 2I -1 3I 1 4I 1 5I -1
1J 1 2J -1 3J 1 4J 5J -1
TOTAL 7 TOTAL 4 TOTAL 7 TOTAL 8 TOTAL 1

Recommendation

From the five (5) alternatives, the one that garnered the highest score, with a score of 8 based on
the provided evaluation criteria, is alternative 4, or the preferential disposition of electoral
contests in the Supreme Court. Alternatives 1 and 3 tied at second best alternative, with a score
of seven (7), while alternatives 2 and 5 received the two lowest scores with a score of 4 and 1
respectively.

Implementation Plan

The preferential disposition of local electoral contests in the Supreme Courts, does not entail a
detailed implementation plan as the policy is that of giving priority to these cases before the
Supreme Court. For the purpose of an implementation plan the policy alternative recommended
will be implemented along with the proposed 60 days- time limit for the review of the Supreme
Court.

Number of Days
Procedure
(maximum)
Turnover of complete records of case or specified parts thereof to the
10 days Supreme Court from the COMELEC, Court of Appeals and Trial
Courts
20 days Exchange of briefs, replies and motions
5 days Hearing before the Supreme Court and Oral Arguments
Given for the deliberation of the Court, where in a decision must be
25 days
reached
 References
Omnibus Election Code
Local Government Code
1987 Philippine Constitution

2013 Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal

2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Involving Municipal Elective Officials

Comelec Rules of Procedure

Malaluan vs Commission on Elections. G.R. No. 120193. 1996

Labo vs Commission on Elections. G.R. No. 105111. 1992

Torres vs Ribo. No. L-2051. 1948

Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias. G.R. 24583. 1966

Pimentel vs Zubiri. G.R. 178413. 2008

Crisostomo, Sheila. “Comelec employees seek pay hike.” philstar.com.

http://www.philstar.com:8080/metro/2015/08/11/1486726/comelec-employees-seek-pay-hike
(accessed April 15, 2016)

Punay, Edu. “Binay asks PET to junk Mar’s poll protest.” philstar.com.
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2015/06/19/1467541/binay-asks-pet-junk-mars-poll-protest
(accessed April 15, 2016)

Rappler.com. “Comelec’s proposed 2015 budget jumps to P16.8B.” Rappler.

www.rappler.com/nation/66080-comelec-proposed-budget-2015 (accessed April 15, 2016)

Reyes, Ernie. “Comelec seeks P20.3B, gets P15.6B for 2016 polls, regular programs.”
Interaksyon.com. interaksyon.com/article/117355/comelec-seeks-p20-3b-gets-p15-6b-for-2016-
polls-regular-programs (accessed April 15, 2016)