WHERE THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH
give the same directly to the latter’s lawful wife as
Republic vs Yahon
Respondent filed for a TPO against her husband Sgt.
Yahon, to w/c the court granted.
Sgt. Yahon appeared during the pre-trial but failed to
secure a counsel nor file an opposition/ answer to the
petition.
Respondent manifested that yahon refused to give her
spousal support and continued making threats and
physical abuse on her person.
- A permanent protection order was issued by
the court against the husband.
- 4k a month spousal support and 50% of his
retirement benefits.
 petitioner emphasized its position that the AFPFC
cannot be directed to comply with the TPO without
violating its right to procedural due process.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
P appeals to CA
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
praying for the nullification of the aforesaid orders and
decision insofar as it directs the AFPFC to
automatically deduct from S/Sgt. Yahon’s retirement
and pension benefits and directly give the same to
respondent as spousal support, allegedly issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Respondent filed her Comment with
Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction,
manifesting that there is no information as to whether
S/Sgt. Yahon already received his retirement benefit
and that the latter has repeatedly violated the TPO,
particularly on the provision of spousal support.
Upon perusal of the respective pleadings filed by the
parties, the Court finds meritorious private
respondent’s application for the issuance of an
injunctive relief. While the 36-month lump sum
retirement benefits of S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon has
already been given to him, yet as admitted by
petitioner itself, the monthly pension after the
mentioned retirement benefits has not yet been
released to him. It appears that the release of such
pension could render ineffectual the eventual ruling of
the Court in this Petition.
In this petition, the question of law presented is
whether petitioner military institution may be ordered
to automatically deduct a percentage from the
retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel, and to
spousal support in compliance with a protection order
issued by the RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262.
A protection order is an order issued by the court to
prevent further acts of violence against women and
their children, their family or household members, and
to grant other necessary relief. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm,
minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate
the opportunity and ability to regain control of their
life.  The protection orders issued by the court may be
13
a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or a Permanent
Protection Order (PPO), while a protection order that
may be issued by the barangay shall be known as a
Barangay Protection Order (BPO). 14
Petitioner argues that it cannot comply with the RTC’s
directive for the automatic deduction of 50% from
S/Sgt. Yahon’s retirement benefits and pension to be
given directly to respondent, as it contravenes an
explicit mandate under the law governing the
retirement and separation of military personnel.
The assailed provision is found in Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1638,  which states: Section 31. The
15
benefits authorized under this Decree, except as
provided herein, shall not be subject to attachment,
garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever;
neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to
any third person: Provided, That if a retired or
separated officer or enlisted man who is entitled to
any benefit under this Decree has unsettled money
and/or property accountabilities incurred while in the
active service, not more than fifty per centum of the
pension gratuity or other payment due such officer or
enlisted man or his survivors under this Decree may
be withheld and be applied to settle such
accountabilities.
A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is
that money in the hands of public officers, although it
may be due government employees, is not liable to
the creditors of these employees in the process of
garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue
of its sovereignty may not be sued in its own courts
except by express authorization by the Legislature,
and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to
permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another
reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long
as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of
the Government, belong to the latter, although the
defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific
portion thereof. And still another reason which covers
both of the foregoing is that every consideration of
public policy forbids it.
23
We disagree.
Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term
"employer," which includes in its coverage the military
institution, S/Sgt. Yahon’s employer. Where the law
does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether
private or government.
It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for
spousal and child support, is a support enforcement
legislation.  
1âwphi1
Appellant also questions the appreciation of the
circumstances of minority and relationship as basis for
the imposition of the death penalty. He contends that
an adopting parent is not included within the purview
of qualifying relationships under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code. Assuming arguendo that an
adopting parent may be construed as similar to a
parent, appellant argues that the term "adopting
parent" must be given a definite and technical
meaning in that the process of adoption must first be
undertaken and a judicial decree to that matter must
have been issued.
the Court of Appeals correctly declared, thus:
As to the other counts of rape (Criminal Cases Nos.
03-082 to 03-260) imputed against accused-appellant,
We find him not guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
the testimony of AAA was merely based on general
allegations that she was raped by the accused-
appellant on the average of three (3) times a week
from February 1999 to 15 October 2002. AAA’s bare
statement is evidently inadequate and insufficient to
prove the other charges of rape as each and every
charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime and
that each of them must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. On that score alone, the indefinite testimonial
evidence that the victim was raped three times a week
is decidedly inadequate and grossly insufficient to
establish the guilt of accused-appellant therefore with
the required quantum of evidence.
the Court of Appeals correctly declared, thus:
As to the other counts of rape (Criminal Cases Nos.
03-082 to 03-260) imputed against accused-appellant,
We find him not guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
the testimony of AAA was merely based on general
allegations that she was raped by the accused-
appellant on the average of three (3) times a week
from February 1999 to 15 October 2002. AAA’s bare
statement is evidently inadequate and insufficient to
prove the other charges of rape as each and every
charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime and
that each of them must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. On that score alone, the indefinite testimonial
evidence that the victim was raped three times a week
is decidedly inadequate and grossly insufficient to
establish the guilt of accused-appellant therefore with
the required quantum of evidence.
In both rape incidents, the trial court applied Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code in imposing the
penalty of death, which was later modified by the
Court of Appeals to reclusion perpetua pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9346. Article 266-B provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime
of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
"l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim;
xxxx
The Court of Appeals appreciated the qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship in imposing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It relied on the
established fact that AAA was still a minor when she
was raped and on the stipulated fact that appellant is
her guardian. One of the instances wherein the crime
of rape may be qualified is when the victim is a minor
AND the accused is her guardian. At this point, we
cannot subscribe to this interpretation and hence, we
hold that the Court of Appeals erred in considering the
qualifying circumstance of relationship.
Further, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the
correct construction of a word or phrase susceptible of
various meanings may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is found
or with which it is associated.87 Section 31(c) of R.A.
No. 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of
relationship between the perpetrator and the victim
which will justify the imposition of the maximum
penalty, namely when the perpetrator is an
"ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral
relative within the second degree of consanguinity or
affinity." It should be noted that the words with which
"guardian" is associated in the provision all denote a
legal relationship. From this description we may safely
deduce that the guardian envisioned by law is a
person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This
relationship may be established either by being the
ward’s biological parent (natural guardian) or by
adoption (legal guardian). Appellant is neither AAA’s
biological parent nor is he AAA’s adoptive father.
Clearly, appellant is not the "guardian" contemplated
by law.