Federica Basaglia

The Highest Good and the Notion of the

Good as Object of Pure Practical Reason
In the second chapter of the Analytic in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant in-
troduces the notion of the “good” as an “object of pure practical reason” (KpV
5:57 f.). In the Dialectic, he defines the “highest good” as the “unconditioned to-
tality of the object of pure practical reason” (KpV 5:108.11 f.) and as “the whole
object of pure practical reason” (KpV 5:109.21 f.). These two elements of Kant’s
moral theory have traditionally, and rightly, been connected. In this paper, I in-
tend to point out some fundamental differences between these two elements of
Kant’s moral philosophy – differences which, in my opinion, can help us to bet-
ter understand them.
In order to do so, it is first of all necessary to understand what an “object of
pure practical reason” is. The first and second sections of the paper will serve
this purpose: by taking a closer look at Kant’s response to Hermann Andreas Pis-
torius’s criticism of his conception of a “good will”, which occurs in the Preface
to the Critique of Practical Reason, I will try to clarify the topic of the second
chapter of the Analytic and the definition of “objects of pure practical reason”.
In the third part of the paper, and on the basis of the results of the first and sec-
ond sections, I will compare the notion of an “object of pure practical reason”
with that of the “highest good” in order to underline their essential differences.
I will argue that, despite the similarities and systematic connections between
these two notions – such as, for example, the fact that they both refer to objects
of pure practical reason – there are also crucial differences between them. The
notion of the good presented in the Analytic refers exclusively to what can be
judged to be good in itself (and hence belongs exclusively to morality), whereas
the highest good refers to the realization not only of morality, but also of (empir-
ical) happiness, which, according to the premises of Kant’s moral philosophy, is
not part of morality.

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18 Federica Basaglia

1 Kant’s Reply to Pistorius in the Preface to the Critique of

Practical Reason ¹
In his Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant refers to an objection from
a “truth-loving and acute” critic of his moral philosophy, who complains about
the fact that the notion of the “good” is not the foundation of the practical law in
Kantian theory (KpV 5:8.25–10.2; cf. Sala 2004: 63; Beck 1995: 27; Bittner/Cramer
1975: 16). The critic Kant is referring to is the German parish priest, theologian
and philosopher, Hermann Andreas Pistorius.² In his review of Kant’s Ground-
work of the Metaphysics of Morals, Pistorius opposes the Kantian conception, ac-
cording to which nothing can possibly be called “good” in an absolute and un-
conditional sense except the “good will”. As a matter of fact, what makes a will
good is, according to Kant, not what it might bring about, or its “fitness to attain
some proposed end”, but solely the way it wills: the good will is good in itself
(GMS 4:393.5–394.31).
By contrast, Pistorius holds the view that a coherent and meaningful moral
philosophy should instead start with the notion of what has to be considered
good: only on the basis of this definition can we judge whether a will is good
or not. Pistorius doesn’t mean that “good” is what is commonly accepted to
be good: the moral philosopher, in his opinion, has to investigate the reasons
on the basis of which something is considered good and must decide whether
they are in fact good reasons. What Pistorius finds problematic in Kant’s view
is the definition of “good will” as a will that is good independently of its objects:

“I wish that the author had chosen to discuss above all the general concept of that which is
good, and to determine more closely what he means by this, for we obviously must come to
an agreement on this before we make something of the absolute worth of a good will. […] I
do not see here how one can accept something as being utterly and in an absolute sense
good, or call something good, when in fact it is good for nothing, just as I do not see how
one can accept the idea of an absolutely good will, considered merely in itself. The will should
be considered as good only with respect to some sort of object, not with respect to its principle
or to a law, for the sake of which it acts” (Pistorius, Rezension der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik
der Sitten, 27; third emphasis is mine, my translation).³

 This section and the one that follows draw upon material that was published in Basaglia
. I would like to thank Thomas Höwing for his helpful comments on this paper.
 On Pistorius’s life and works, see Gesang : VII–XLIII.
 I thank Michael Walschots and Carolyn Benson for their great help in translating Pistorius’s
quotations into English.

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The Highest Good and the Notion of the Good as Object of Pure Practical Reason 19

According to Pistorius, if, following Kant, the will were good exclusively in virtue
of the principle or law guiding it, the question whether this principle or law is
good or bad would remain open:

“[…] [T]o establish a will as the good, is it merely sufficient that it act according to some
principle or another, or from respect for some law, be it good or evil? Impossible. It must
therefore be a good principle, a good law, the following of which makes a will good. The
question “what is good?” turns back around, and if we have pushed it back from the
will to the law, then we must answer it in a sufficient way here; i. e. we must eventually
come to some kind of object or to an ultimate end of the law, and we must avail ourselves
of what is material, because for us neither a formal will nor a formal law will suffice” (Pis-
torius, Rezension der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 27; my emphasis, my transla-
tion).

An analysis of morality, according to Pistorius, should start with an analysis of

the concept of “good” (Pistorius, Rezension der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der
Sitten, 33). To do so, the moral philosopher must first consider the question
whether anything exists that is universally, without exception, and in every cir-
cumstance good for feeling and thinking beings like humans. This something –
and not the Kantian good will determined by a merely formal principle – should
be called the “highest and absolute good” (Pistorius, Rezension der Grundlegung
zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 33). For Pistorius, such an absolute highest good is
grounded in the collective nature of human beings and in their universal interest
as rational beings, because something can be good for a human being only if it
accords with both. Through this notion of the highest good, it is finally possible
to develop the highest moral principle and to define a will which acts in accord-
ance with it as good:

“If, through this examination, something is discovered that is universally, without excep-
tion and in every cirtumstance good for feeling and thinking beings, this somenthing
must be called the highest and absolute good. If there is such a highest good, then a col-
lective nature of all rational beings must also exist, in which is grounded a universal inter-
est, for only in accordance with the former and in conformity with the latter can something
be good for such a being at all” (Pistorius, Rezension der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der
Sitten, 33, my translation).

Hence, for Pistorius, in order to define “good” – i. e. the concept of “good” – the
moral philosopher must first investigate the highest object (or final aim) of human
action. Moral investigation should start with an investigation into the highest
good for human beings, i. e. that which human beings should realize, or at
least try to realize, through their actions. Only after having defined the highest
good are we able to establish – in accordance with its definition – whether

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20 Federica Basaglia

other things are good as well. In other words, according to Pistorius, something
is “good” – a good principle of action or a good will – only in virtue of its rela-
tion to the highest good.
In the Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason (KpV 5:8.25–10.2), Kant
claims to answer this objection in the second chapter of the Analytic of Pure
Practical Reason, to which he gives the title “On the Concept of an Object of
Pure Practical Reason”. Accordingly, in the following section, I will present my
analysis of this chapter, in which Kant defines “good” and “evil” as objects of
pure practical reason.

2 The Objects of Pure Practical Reason

Before I turn to the interpretation of the second chapter of the Analytic and at-
tempt to understand what “good” and “evil” as objects of pure practical reason
might be, it is necessary to clarify what an object of practical reason is for Kant.⁴
In fact, Kant does not deliver any precise definition of an “object of the will” or
an “object of practical reason” (the various German expressions Kant uses here
being the following: Gegenstand der Handlung, Gegenstand/Objekt des Wollens,
Gegenstand/Objekt der praktischen Vernunft and Gegenstand des Willens). In
fact, these expressions seem to be equivalent for Kant. They refer generally to
a determination of the faculty of desire by empirical inclinations, or to the em-
pirically determined will.
In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, he explicitly defines an “ob-
ject of the will” as the motivation of the will (Bewegursache, GMS 4:458.16–18) or
its matter (Materie, GMS 4:461.29 f.). Kant explains that we have an interest in the
object of an action when the will is determined to action by empirical inclina-
tions. In the case of an empirically determined action, what moves us to act is
what we want to accomplish through our action, i. e. our purpose; our interest
is a pathological interest in the object of our action stemming from a certain incli-
nation or desire. In this case, practical reason only provides the rule in accord-
ance with which we should act in order to satisfy our need. In the case of moral
action, the motive (Beweggrund) of practical reason is not what we want to ach-
ieve through the action, but the moral law itself; the interest is a practical interest
in the action: we are interested in the action itself, not in its purpose (GMS

 For a more detailed discussion of the literature on the “objects of pure practical reason”, see
Basaglia : –.

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The Highest Good and the Notion of the Good as Object of Pure Practical Reason 21

4:413.26–414.36). In both cases, I think, it can be held that the matter of the will,
its object, is the purpose or end (Zweck) of the action.⁵
In the second Critique, an “object of the will” indicates the “matter” of a
practical principle, which can become the ground of determination (Bestim-
mungsgrund) of the will. Where this occurs, the determination of the will is
non-moral and heteronomous. In cases where the will is not determined by
the object, the determination is a moral, autonomous one.

“If a rational being is to think of his maxims as practical universal laws, he can think of
them only as principles that contain the determining ground of the will not by their matter
but only by their form. The matter of a practical principle is the object of the will. This is ei-
ther the determining ground of the will or it is not. If it is the determining ground of the will,
then the rule of the will is subject to an empirical condition (to the relation of the determin-
ing representation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure), and so is not a practical law.
Now, all that remains of the law if one separates from it everything material, that is, every
object of the will (as its determining ground), is the mere form of giving universal law” (KpV
5:27.3–14; first and third emphases are mine)

Other passages in the second Critique help us to understand what Kant means
when, in the above-quoted passage, he claims that the will is subject to empirical
conditions when its object is its ground of determination. At the beginning of the
first Theorem, for instance, Kant affirms that all practical principles that presuppose
an object (i.e. a matter) of the faculty of desire as a ground of the determination of
the will are empirical practical principles and cannot function as practical moral
laws (KpV 5:21.14–17).⁶ Moreover, he clarifies: “By ‘the matter of the faculty of desire’
I understand an object whose reality is desired” (KpV 5:21.17 f.). Only a few pages
prior to this, Kant defines a practical rule as “always a product of reason because
it prescribes action as a means to an effect” (KpV 5:20.6–8).
These passages show clearly that for Kant the object of the will is what one
intends to produce through the action, i.e. its end or purpose. Independently of
the morality of the action, human beings need a practical principle, i. e. a rule
given by reason. This rule prescribes the action, which is needed in order to
reach what the will aims at (its object). Thus, the object of the will – the object

 In this article, I use the term “purpose” synonymously with “end” (both of which are a trans-
lation of the German “Zweck”).
 This passage does not contain the term “moral” and instead refers to the “practical”. Howev-
er, it is clear from the use Kant makes of the expression “practical laws” in §§– – in opposition
to “practical rules” (KpV :.–) – that he refers to practical laws, which have a moral qual-
ity: “In a practical law reason determines the will immediately, not by means of an intervening
feeling of pleasure or displeasure, not even in this law, and that it can as pure reason be prac-
tical is what alone makes it possible for it to be lawgiving” (KpV :.–).

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22 Federica Basaglia

of the faculty of desire – is also the object of the practical principle, since the latter
is a rule that reason prescribes to the will in order for it to reach what it aims at.
This object can be what moves us to act, that is, the ground of determination of the
action, as in the case of non-moral (heteronomic) action. In the case of moral ac-
tion, which is autonomous, i.e. only determined by pure reason, the ground of de-
termination is not material, i. e. not the object of the will, but the moral law itself.
Kant, however, does not deny that moral actions also have objects, i.e. that they
serve a material purpose. It is rather that this purpose does not set the action in mo-
tion and is thus irrelevant to its moral quality. In both cases, the will has an object,
which is what we intend to achieve through the action. In the case of an empirically
determined action, the object of the will is at the same time the ground of determi-
nation of the action. Of course, a moral action also has an object, but this object
does not serve as the ground of determination of the action, for in order to be
moral an action has to be determined a priori by the moral law exclusively.
It is relatively easy to understand how an empirical determination of the will
works. The purpose or the end of the action, i. e. a particular object that we in-
tend to achieve through our action, determines the action: we desire something
and we are prepared to act in a manner so as to achieve it. In this case, practical
reason provides us with certain practical rules or principles; that is, it determines
what we should do in order to achieve the end in question.
As Pistorius’s review shows, understanding what the object of a moral action
is and how a moral determination of an action works are more complex tasks.
Kant himself admits that, even if moral actions are not determined by objects,
each and every action – whether moral or non-moral – has an object, i. e. a pur-
pose:

“All the matter of practical rules rests always on subjective conditions, which afford it no
universality for rational beings other than a merely conditional one (in case I desire this or
that, what I would then have to do in order to make it real), and they all turn on the prin-
ciple of one’s own happiness. Now it is indeed undeniable that every volition must also have
an object and hence a matter; but the matter is not, just because of this, the determining
ground and condition of the maxim” (KpV 5:34.7–13; second emphasis is mine).

Each matter (i. e. each object, each purpose) of a morally or an empirically deter-
mined action rests on subjective conditions. How should we picture the matter,
i. e. the purpose, of a moral action, which is determined a priori, if the former is
not the determining ground of the action but merely subjective and accidental?
The second chapter of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason discusses exact-
ly this question. Kant’s line of reasoning in these pages has a clearly dualistic
structure. His argumentative strategy rests on the second Critique’s fundamental
distinction between general practical reason and pure practical reason, as the be-

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The Highest Good and the Notion of the Good as Object of Pure Practical Reason 23

ginning of the Preface makes clear. Here Kant distinguishes between a general
use of practical reason, which needs to be “criticized” in order to show that
an a priori moral theory (and in the end morality itself) is possible, and a
pure, a priori use of practical reason. The aim of this work is to “criticize” the
first, in order simply to show that the latter exists, i. e. that the human will
can be determined by pure practical reason alone and can give rise to genuine
moral actions (KpV 5:3.2–13).
That Kant is ultimately referring to this distinction in his chapter on the ob-
jects of pure practical reason is already clear in the very first lines:

“By a concept of an object of practical reason I understand the representation of an object as

an effect possible through freedom. To be an object of practical cognition so understood sig-
nifies, therefore, only the relation of the will to the action by which it or its opposite would
be made real […]” (KpV 5:57.17–21; my emphasis).

The connection between the object of practical reason and the will is clearly un-
derstood in this passage as a causal one. The action is the means by which the
willed object can be produced. Therefore, the “object of practical reason” indi-
cates here what, in the first chapter of the Analytic, Kant called an “object of
the will” (KpV 5:27.6) and a “matter of the faculty of desire” (KpV 5:21.17 f.).
The reason for the different description is, in my opinion, that Kant concentrates
here on the realization of the object, whereas in the previous chapter he intended
to emphasize the determination of the will by the object. I do not think it can be
called into question that what can be realized through an action has to be some-
thing the realization of which is desired before the action is set in motion.
Hence, in my opinion, the object of practical reason is to be understood as
the possible purpose of an action. With this in mind, I think, Kant affirms that
something’s being an object of practical reason hinges on the relation of the
will to the action by which the object or its opposite would be realized: the ac-
tion is the means by which the purpose can be produced. Nothing ensures that
the action will produce the intended effect, but the purpose of the action remains
the same even if the effect is not realized through it. This is why Kant uses the
adjective “possible”: the object of practical reason is the possible effect, and
not the effect of the action as such, because the latter might not coincide with
what was intended.
Once he has clarified what an object of practical reason is in general, Kant
proceeds with the definition of an object of pure practical reason:

“[…] and to appraise whether or not something is an object of pure practical reason is only
to distinguish the possibility or impossibility of willing the action by which, if we had the

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24 Federica Basaglia

ability to do so (and experience must judge about this), a certain object would be made
real” (KpV 5:57.21–5).

Among all the objects of practical reason in general, namely among all possible
purposes that can be achieved through actions, there are some that can be real-
ized through actions that can also be willed in accordance with the moral law,
and hence a priori.
According to my interpretation, the field of general practical reason is the set
of all objects of the will that can possibly be realized through actions. The field of
pure practical reason is the set of those objects of the will that can be realized
through actions that, in addition to being adequate to their purposes, can also
be willed in accordance with the moral law. The object of pure practical reason
is the purpose of an action that conforms to the categorical imperative. The ques-
tion whether a purpose is an object of pure practical reason as opposed to an
object of practical reason in general is therefore determined not by its features
but solely by the fact that the action thought to lead to its realization is deter-
mined exclusively by the moral law and conforms to this law.
Kant concludes by defining the objects of pure practical reason as “good”
and “evil”:

“The only objects of a practical reason are therefore those of the good and the evil. For by
the first is understood a necessary object of the faculty of desire, by the second, of the fac-
ulty of aversion, both, however, in accordance with a principle of reason” (KpV 5:58.6–9).

Summing up, according to my interpretation the objects of pure practical reason

– good and evil – are for Kant purposes of actions that are determined solely by
the moral law.⁷
That Kant defines not just good but also evil as the object of practical reason
(KpV 5:58.7 f.) is not unproblematic. As Kant himself explains, the concepts of
good and evil are “consequences of the a priori determination of the will”
(KpV 5:65.5) and presuppose “a pure practical principle and hence a causality
of pure reason” (KpV 5:65.6 f.). It is easy to understand that pure practical reason
brings about, as the effect of its determination of the will, something which is
good; this is, for Kant, what a moral determination of the will consists in (KpV
5:41.30–8). On the other hand, it is not at all clear how a causal determination
of the will by pure reason might bring about an effect that has to be considered

 On the evolution of the “way of thinking” (Denkart) and the Copernican revolution in meta-
physics, see Brandt : –. On the objects of pure practical reason, see Brandt :
.

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The Highest Good and the Notion of the Good as Object of Pure Practical Reason 25

evil. I will not discuss Kant’s problematic definition of evil as an object of pure
practical reason here, which would require a much more detailed analysis of his
conception of moral evil;⁸ instead, I will concentrate on the notion of good as a
concept of pure practical reason.
The second chapter of the Analytic is rightly considered one of the most con-
fused and unclear parts of the Critique of Practical Reason (cf. Torralba 2009:
215): in trying to make sense of it, we cannot always count on a coherent use
of terms or a straight line of argument. In his analysis of the “Concept of an Ob-
ject of Pure Practical Reason”, in fact, Kant sometimes refers to “the concept of
the object of pure reason” (KpV 5:57.17, 58.10, 60.37, 62.37–63.1) and sometimes to
the “object itself” or to the “Good in itself” (KpV 5:58.6 f., 60.13 f., 62.8), without
distinguishing clearly between the object and its concept. Nonetheless, it is in
my opinion clear that, given his definition of the objects of pure practical reason,
Kant clarifies his understanding of the concept “good” in this chapter.⁹
The beginning of the second chapter of the Analytic states, in fact, that the
“concept of an object of practical reason” is the “idea of an object as a possible
effect of freedom” (KpV 5:57.17 f.). Hence we can deduce from this definition that
the concept of an object of pure practical reason is the idea of an object as a pos-
sible effect of an a priori determination of the will. In other words, according to
Kant, the concept of the good quite generally refers to a determination of the will
solely by the moral law: the good can only be something we aim at or realize
when our will is determined by the moral law (cf. KpV 5:62.8–18, 62.36–63.4).
After he defines the objects of pure practical reason, Kant explains why he
believes, contra Pistorius, that the strategy of first defining the moral good and
then deriving the moral law from the former fails to provide a solid foundation
for a coherent theory of pure morals. If the moral law were to derive from what
we think the good is, as Pistorius suggests, rather than the concept of the good’s
deriving from the moral law, the good would simply be an object that determines
the moral will.
According to Kant, any determination of the will by purposes we want to
achieve represents a material determination of the will (cf. KpV 5:21.14–31). A
material determination of the will – i. e. a determination of the will by an object
– can also take place where the object in question is not empirical, as occurs, for

 On the problematic question about the possibility of acting immorally out of freedom, see Ba-
saglia : – and Brandt : –.
 I thank Pauline Kleingeld for interesting remarks on the difference between “good” as the ob-
ject of practical reason and the concept of “good”, which she provided in her comments on my
paper.

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26 Federica Basaglia

example, when what determines our action is the will to conform to the idea of
moral perfection (cf. KpV 5:39.5–41.28).
Furthermore, according to Kant, any object that determines the will is some-
thing that causes some kind of pleasure. Hence, in the case of the moral law’s
deriving from the notion of good, this “good” would indicate the existence of
something that promises pleasure and thus determines the causality of the sub-
ject to realize it. It follows from this that, since it is impossible to know a priori
what causes us pleasure or pain, the ground of determination of the will would
depend on experience and could thus not be a moral (a priori) ground. In this
case, the judgement concerning what is morally good and evil would be a
mere matter of experience (related to a faculty which Kant calls the “feeling of
pleasure and displeasure”) rather than a matter of morality. The maxims we
could formulate according to these notions would concern merely means-ends
relations: the good would be a mere “good-for-something-else”, not an absolute
moral good (KpV 5:58.10–62.35).
In short, Kant thinks that if the moral law were derived from the notion of
good, the foundation of morality would be empirical, which would completely
contradict the Kantian project of a pure, a priori morality. This would be the
case if the moral law were derived, as Pistorius suggests, from the idea of the
highest good. This concept would refer, according to Kant, to an object – the
final aim of human actions – and would represent a material ground of the de-
termination (Bestimmungsgrund) of the will.
All this is well summarized in the following passage:

“In this appraisal of what is good and evil in itself, as distinguished from what can be
called so only with reference to well-being or ill-being, it is a question of the following
points. Either a rational principle is already thought as in itself the determining ground
of the will without regard to possible objects of the faculty of desire (hence through the
mere lawful form of the maxim), in which case that principle is a practical law a priori
and pure reason is taken to be practical of itself. In that case the law determines the
will immediately, the action in conformity with it is in itself good, and a will whose
maxim always conforms with this law is good absolutely, good in every respect and the su-
preme condition of all good. Or else a determining ground of the faculty of desire precedes
the maxim of the will, which presupposes an object of pleasure or displeasure and hence
something that gratifies or pains, and the maxim of reason to pursue the former and avoid
the latter determines actions only mediately (relatively to a further end, as means to it), and
such maxims can in that case never be called laws but can still be called rational practical
precepts” (KpV 5:62.8–26).

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The Highest Good and the Notion of the Good as Object of Pure Practical Reason 27

3 “Good” as Object of Pure Practical Reason and the

“Highest Good”
As we have seen, Kant introduces the notion of the good in the second chapter of
the Analytic as an object of pure practical reason. In the Dialectic of Pure Prac-
tical Reason, he defines the “highest good” as the “unconditioned totality of the
object of pure practical reason” (KpV 5:108.11 f.) and as “the whole object of pure
practical reason” (KpV 5:109.21 f.). Thus, it cannot be doubted that the analysis of
these two notions – “good” as object of pure practical reason, and the “highest
good” – gives us the opportunity to clarify what kind of role objects play in Kant-
ian (traditionally considered a formal) ethics.¹⁰
Accordingly, these two elements of Kant’s moral theory have been connected
in the secondary literature (cf. Watkins 2010: 158 f.; Sala 2004: 142 f., 236). The
way Kant himself defines them seems to suggest this connection: indeed, both
notions refer to an object of pure practical reason. Moreover, as we saw
above, the notion of good introduced by Kant in the second chapter of the Ana-
lytic indicates the purpose of moral actions. In the context of the theory of the
highest good, Kant explicitly defines the highest good as the supreme end of
the will (KpV 5:115.9–11; 134.8–13).
Instead of concentrating on these well-known connections, I intend to point
out some central differences between these two elements, which, in my opinion,
can help us to understand them better.
As we have seen, in the Preface, Kant explains that he intends to respond to
Pistorius’s criticism in the second chapter of the Analytic by giving an account of
good and evil as the objects of pure practical reason. As mentioned above, Pis-
torius holds the view that a coherent moral theory should have as its starting
point the concept of the highest and absolute good as the ultimate end of the
moral law (Pistorius, Rezension der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 33).
Kant mentions his theory of the highest good just once in this chapter –
which contains his reply to Pistorius – almost at the end of the chapter. Referring
to the objects of pure practical reason, Kant makes use of notions such as “ab-
solutely good” (KpV 5:62.16), “good in every respect” (KpV 5:62.17 f.) and “good
in itself” (KpV 5:62.8), but it seems to me that he tries in this chapter to avoid
establishing a parallel between “good” as an object of pure practical reason
and his concept of “the highest good”.

 On the problematic relation between eudaimonism and teleology in Kant’s ethics, and on the
discussion of this topic in the literature, see Oggionni .

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28 Federica Basaglia

In the last few pages of his analysis of the objects of pure practical reason, Kant
seems to turn directly to Pistorius and expresses sympathy for his criticism: he ad-
mits that his method of defining the concept of good in the Critique of Practical Rea-
son might sound paradoxical: instead of first defining the concept of good and then
deriving the moral law from it, he defines the good only after having formulated the
moral law and only in the light of that law (KpV 5:62.36–64.5). As we have seen
above, Kant proceeds in this way because he views any object that determines
the will as something we desire because we expect to gain pleasure from it, be it
intellectual or physical. In other words, he views it as something that, in some
way or other, relates to our feelings rather than reason. In this way, if a moral de-
termination of the will is possible, it must be explainable in terms of an a priori law
of reason rather than an object that we desire.
Pistorius’s criticism provides Kant with the opportunity to clarify a crucial
point in his theory: he explains that this note about his paradoxical method re-
veals “the occasioning ground of all the errors of philosophers with respect to
the supreme principle of morals” (KpV 5:64.7–9).¹¹ Moral philosophers have tra-
ditionally focused on finding an object of the will in order to make it the matter
and foundation of the moral law. Independently of what they took this object to
be – happiness, human perfection, an object of moral sense or of God’s will – it
could only serve as the foundation for a heteronomous principle of the will (KpV
5:64.6–25). Hence, when Pistorius suggests that Kant should begin his examina-
tion of the highest moral principle with an investigation into the highest good,
he commits the same kind of mistake as that made by previous moral philoso-
phers. For Kant, this mistake is particularly evident in ancient moral philosophy.
Ancient moral philosophers, Kant explains, concentrated on the definition of the
highest good, making it the ground of the determination of the moral will. At this
point, Kant mentions his concept of the highest good, which he will present in
the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason:

“The ancients revealed this error openly by directing their moral investigation entirely to
the determination of the concept of the highest good, and so of an object which they intend-
ed afterwards to make the determining ground of the will in the moral law, an object which
can much later – when the moral law has first been established by itself and justified as the
immediate determining ground of the will – be represented as object of the will, now de-
termined a priori in its form; and this we will undertake in the Dialectic of pure practical
reason” (KpV 5:64.25–34; second and third emphases are mine).

 “[D]en veranlassenden Grund aller Verirrungen der Philosophen in Ansehung des obersten
Prinzips der Moral” (KpV :.–).

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The Highest Good and the Notion of the Good as Object of Pure Practical Reason 29

In my opinion, these lines can also be read as an answer to Pistorius. Kant ap-
pears to explain to his critic that his account in the Dialectic articulates the only
way the concept of the highest good, as the object of the moral will, can find a
place in a moral theory. Once it is established that the pure moral law is the high-
est principle of morality and is justified as the direct ground of the determination
of the moral will, the “highest good” can be straightforwardly defined as the ob-
ject of the will determined a priori by the moral law.
In the above passage, Kant clarifies the difference between the notion of
“good” as object of pure practical reason (presented in the second chapter of
the Analytic) and the “highest good” as it is introduced in the Dialectic (KpV
5:108.11 f.). Here Kant makes explicit that what Pistorius wished to be the foun-
dation of each moral theory (and of morality), namely the highest good, can be
treated only in the context of the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason, not in the An-
alytic. This clarification is very important when it comes to understanding the
difference between “good” as object of pure practical reason and the “highest
good”. The two different parts of the Doctrine of Elements – the Analytic and
the Dialectic – deal with different problems concerning the doctrine of morals.
As Kant states very clearly in the Introduction to the Critique of Practical Reason:

“We shall therefore have to have a Doctrine of Elements and a Doctrine of Method for it [i. e.
for the Critique of Practical Reason, F.B.]; and within the former as the first part, an Ana-
lytic, as the rule of truth, and a Dialectic, as the exposition and resolution of illusion in
the judgements of practical reason” (KpV 5:16.18–20; trans. modified).

The task of the Analytic is to unfold the principles and concepts of the pure theo-
ry of morals, whereas the Dialectic deals with the illusions created by pure prac-
tical reason when it seeks the unconditioned condition for its judgements and
decisions.¹²

 Cf. Beck : , . The result of my analysis is roughly in line with the interpretations
that Michael Albrecht and Ottfried Höffe have proposed. According to Albrecht, whereas the An-
alytic in the Critique of Practical Reason works out the concept of the moral “ought” and proves
that the moral law is the “determining ground” of the moral will, the Dialectic searches for the
“unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason” (KpV :.–), without mak-
ing it a determination of the will (Albrecht :  f.; cf. Düsing : ; Zobrist : ).
Otfried Höffe has recently stressed the same distinction, pointing out that Kant has already treat-
ed the topic of the Dialectic in the Canon of the Critique of Pure Reason (Höffe : ). In the
Canon the topic of the Analytic of the Critique of Practical Reason is presented as the answer to
the purely practical question “what ought I to do?”, whereas the topic of the “Dialectic” is pre-
sented as the answer to the question “what may I hope?”, which is both practical and theoretical
(KrV A ff./B ff.; cf. Beck : –).

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30 Federica Basaglia

In his review of the Groundwork, Pistorius inquired into the notion of the
good (derived from the notion of the highest good) as the foundation of the high-
est moral principle and as the condition for every judgement concerning what is
morally good. Kant’s answer in this regard is very clear and straightforward:
there is no such thing as a highest good guiding our moral judgement (of
moral principles, maxims, actions, etc.) or our moral deliberation. What we
might call, in our moral judgements and deliberations, “the good in itself”
(KpV 5:62.8) can only be the object of pure practical reason (KpV 5:58.6 f.) as a
“consequence of the a priori determination of the will” (KpV 5:65.5 f.).
Kant further clarifies the difference between the two notions in the Dialectic,
where he defines the highest good as “the unconditioned totality of the object of
pure practical reason” (KpV 5:108.11 f.) and as “the whole object of pure practical
reason, that is, of a pure will” (KpV 5:109.21 f.). The highest good is the supreme
object of the will (KpV 5:115.9–11) and its realization and promotion (KpV
5:109.24 f.) is the supreme end of the moral will.
Here it is crucial to notice that the expression “realization and promotion”
refers not merely to the realization of virtue, but also to the realization of the
whole of the highest good, i. e. of both virtue and happiness (KpV 5:110.22–31).
What Kant means by “happiness” is expressed clearly in the paragraph on the
postulate of the existence of God:

“Happiness is the state of a rational being in the world in the whole of whose existence ev-
erything goes according to his wish and will, and rests, therefore, on the harmony of nature
with his whole end as well as with the essential determining ground of his will” (KpV
5:124.21–5).¹³

It seems clear to me that, at least in the Critique of Practical Reason, happiness is

understood by Kant as empirical happiness (cf. Düsing 1972: 33 f.; Albrecht 1978:
51 f.; Förster 2002: 180), to which skillfulness, health and even wealth and pros-
perity belong (KpV 5:93.15–19; cf. KpV 5:25.12–20).¹⁴
In my opinion, the supreme condition of the highest good – i. e. virtue – can
certainly be understood, with Watkins, as the coherent and systematic unity of
the plurality of the objects of practical reason which belong to our moral actions,

 “Glückseligkeit ist der Zustand eines vernünftigen Wesens in der Welt, dem es im Ganzen
seiner Existenz alles nach Wunsch und Willen geht, und beruht also auf der Übereinstimmung
der Natur zu seinem ganzen Zwecke, imgleichen zum wesentlichen Bestimmungsgrunde seines
Willens” (KpV :.–).
 For a different interpretation of this issue see: Zobrist : – and Oggionni .

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The Highest Good and the Notion of the Good as Object of Pure Practical Reason 31

such as “helping somebody in need” or “telling the truth”¹⁵ (cf. Watkins 2010,
158). Hence, the connection between the notion of “good” as an object of pure
practical reason and the “highest good” is clearly strong. The highest good is
in part (maybe for the most part) the totality, the unconditioned condition of
all good objects of volition (cf. Watkins 2010: 160).
The crucial point in Kant’s theory, which marks the essential difference be-
tween “the good in itself” as an object of pure practical reason and “the highest
good”, is that, as a matter of fact, the possession of the summum bonum consists
for Kant not only in being virtuous, but also, and at the same time, in being happy
in exact proportion to our virtue. Hence, as an object of pure practical reason,
the highest good clearly differs from the notion of good in the second chapter
of the Analytic. The former is the single and supreme end of the moral will
and consists in the realization of both virtue and (empirical) happiness. The lat-
ter refers to the various purposes of moral actions. The notion of the good pre-
sented in the Analytic refers exclusively to morality – to what, on the basis of
the moral law, can be judged to be good in itself. The highest good refers to
the realization not only of morality but also, although it is proportioned to mor-
ality, of empirically understood happiness.

References
Albrecht, Michael 1978, Kants Antinomie der praktischen Vernunft, Hildesheim: Olms
Basaglia, Federica 2009, Libertá e Male Morale nella Critica della Ragion Pratica di Immanuel
Kant, Roma: Aracne
Beck, Lewis White 1960, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason,
Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press
Bittner, Rüdiger/Cramer, Konrad (eds.) 1975, Materialien zu Kants “Kritik der praktischen
Vernunft”, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp
Brandt, Reinhard 2007, Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant, Hamburg: Meiner
Brandt, Reinhard 2010, Immanuel Kant – Was bleibt?, Hamburg: Meiner
Düsing, Klaus 1971, “Das Problem des höchsten Gutes in Kants praktischer Philosophie”,
Kant-Studien 62, 5–42
Förster, Eckart 2002, “Die Dialektik der reinen praktischen Vernunft (122–148)”, in: Otfried
Höffe (ed.) 2002, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 173–86
Gesang, Bernward 2007, “Einleitung”, in: Bernward Gesang (ed.) 2007, Kants vergessener
Rezensent. Die Kritik der theoretischen und praktischen Philosophie Kants in fünf frühen
Rezensionen von Hermann Andreas Pistorius, Hamburg: Meiner, VII–XLIV

 Under the condition that we help somebody and tell the truth out of duty, i. e. that our will is
determined solely by the moral law.

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32 Federica Basaglia

Höffe, Otfried 2012, Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Eine Philosophie der Freiheit,
München: Beck
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filosofía moral de Kant, Hildesheim/Zürich/New York: Georg Olms
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Highest Good”, in: Andrews Reath/Jens Timmermann (eds.) 2010, Kant’s Critique of
Practical Reason. A Critical Guide, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 145–67
Zobrist, Marc 2009, “Kants Lehre vom höchsten Gut und die Frage moralischer Motivation”,
Kant-Studien 99, 285–311

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