[G.R. No. 122917.

 July 12, 1999]

BERNARDO vs. NLRC
Facts:
 43 Complainants are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to
1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters
through an agreement called Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers,
which considers the handicapped workers employed under a special employment
program of the bank, for which reason the standard hiring requirements of the Bank
were not applied in their case; that they shall be trained for a period of one month,
after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to
finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate
the contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing
by the employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.
 Far East Bank disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, it maintained
that such arrangement/program was a result of overtures made by some civic and
political personalities to the Bank and that the complainants were hired due to
pakiusap of Arturo Borjal which must be considered in the light of the context of
the Bank’s corporate philosophy to strengthen a corps of professionals trained as
qualified and regular employees who are baccalaureate degree holders from
excellent schools;
 Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because
their task as money sorters and counters was necessary and desirable to the business
of respondent bank. They further allege that their contracts served merely to
preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular
employees;
 Labor Arbiter ruled that the complainants could not be deemed regular employees
under Article 280 of the Labor Code, which was affirmed by the NLRC that gave
due credence to the conclusion that complainants were hired as an accommodation
to the recommendation of civic oriented personalities whose employments were
covered by Employment Contracts with special provisions on duration of contract
as specified under Art. 80 of the Labor Code. The NLRC also declared that the
Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was not applicable, considering the prevailing
circumstances of the case.
 Hence, the petition for certiorari.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers
and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to
1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others
lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More
important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their
positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks
assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled
employee should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a  qualified able-
bodied person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides:
Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment. No disabled person shall be denied
access to opportunities for suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee
shall be subject to the same terms and conditions of employment and the same
compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a
qualified able bodied person.
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the
employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the
rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor
Code.
Respondent argues that petitioners were merely accommodated employees. This fact does not
change the nature of their employment. As earlier noted, an employee is regular because of
the nature of work and the length of service, not because of the mode or even the reason for
hiring them.
The facts, viewed in light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons,
indubitably show that the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular
employees. As such, they have acquired legal rights that this Court is duty-bound to protect
and uphold, not as a matter of compassion but as a consequence of law and justice.

Issue: W/N the complainants shall be considered as regular employees

Ruling: YES. The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with the
Article 80 of the Labor Code which provides:
“Any employer who employs handicapped workers shall enter into an employment agreement with them,
which agreement shall include:
(a) The names and addresses of the handicapped workers to be employed;
(b) The rate to be paid the handicapped workers which shall be not less than seventy five
(75%) per cent of the applicable legal minimum wage;
(c) The duration of employment period; and
(d) The work to be performed by handicapped workers.
The employment agreement shall be subject to inspection by the Secretary of Labor or his duly
authorized representatives.”

Succeeding events and the enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons), however, justify the application of Article 280 of the Labor Code.
[G.R. No. 124617. April 28, 2000]
PHILIPPINE AEOLUS AUTOMOTIVE UNITED CORPORATION vs. NLRC
Facts:
 Petitioner Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation (PAAUC) is a
corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, petitioner Francis
Chua is its President while private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez was a company
nurse of petitioner corporation until her termination on 7 November 1994;
 In October 1994, a memorandum was issued addressed to Cortez requiring her to
explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against her for throwing stapler
at the Plant Manager, William Chua, losing the amount of P1,488.00 entrusted to
her and for asking a co-employee to punch-in her time card when she was not
actually present. Subsequently, another memorandum came for her failure to
process the ATM applications of her 9 co-employees with the Allied Bank
Corporation. Then, the last memorandum came informing her of her termination
from the service effective 7 November 1994 on grounds of gross and habitual
neglect of duties, serious misconduct and fraud or willful breach of trust;
 In December 1994 private respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for
illegal dismissal, non-payment of annual service incentive leave pay, 13th month
pay and damages against PAAUC and its president Francis Chua.
 Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding the termination of Cortez as valid and
legal, at the same time dismissing her claim for damages for lack of merit.
 On appeal to the NLRC, public respondent reversed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and found PAAUC guilty of illegal dismissal of private respondent Cortez.
The NLRC ordered petitioner PAAUC to reinstate respondent Cortez to her former
position with back wages computed from the time of dismissal up to her actual
reinstatement. Hence, this petition.
Issue: (1) W/N Cortez was indeed illegally dismissed;
(2) W/N Cortez is entitled to moral and exemplary damages
Ruling: (1) YES. The Supreme Court, in a litany of decisions on serious misconduct
warranting dismissal of an employee, has ruled that for misconduct or improper behavior to
be a just cause for dismissal (a) it must be serious; (b) must relate to the performance of the
employees duties; and, (c) must show that the employee has become unfit to continue
working for the employer.
In order to consider it a serious misconduct that would justify dismissal under the law, it must
have been done in relation to the performance of her duties as would show her to be unfit to
continue working for her employer. The acts complained of, under the circumstances they
were done, did not in any way pertain to her duties as a nurse. As regards the third alleged
infraction, i.e., the act of private respondent in asking a co-employee to punch-in her time
card, although a violation of company rules, likewise does not constitute serious misconduct.
Firstly, it was done by her in good faith considering that she was asked by an officer to
perform a task outside the office, which was for the benefit of the company, with the consent
of the plant manager (at that time she was doing an errand for one of the company's officers,
Richard Tan, and that was with the permission of William Chua). Secondly, it was her first
time to commit such infraction during her five (5)-year service in the company. Finally, the
company did not lose anything by reason thereof as the offense was immediately known and
corrected. All above-mentioned requirements prescribed by law and jurisprudence are
wanting in the case at bar.
(2) YES. On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, the NLRC ruled that private
respondent was not entitled to recover such damages, questioning if there was indeed such
harassment, considering that there were no complaints from her during the 4-year period.
The gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment is not the violation of the employee's
sexuality but the abuse of power by the employer. Any employee, male or female, may
rightfully cry "foul" provided the claim is well substantiated. Strictly speaking, there is no
time period within which he or she is expected to complain through the proper channels. The
time to do so may vary depending upon the needs, circumstances, and more importantly, the
emotional threshold of the employee. 
In determining entitlement to moral and exemplary damages, we restate the bases therefor. In
moral damages, it suffices to prove that the claimant has suffered anxiety, sleepless nights,
besmirched reputation and social humiliation by reason of the act complained of.  Exemplary
damages, on the other hand, are granted in addition to, inter alia, moral damages "by way of
example or correction for the public good" if the employer "acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner."
In this case, anxiety was gradual in private respondent's five (5)-year employment. It began
when her plant manager showed an obvious partiality for her which went out of hand when he
started to make it clear that he would terminate her services if she would not give in to his
sexual advances. Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced "superiority" which is
enough to dampen an employee's spirit in her capacity for advancement. It affects her sense
of judgment; it changes her life. If for this alone private respondent should be adequately
compensated. Thus, for the anxiety, the seen and unseen hurt that she suffered, petitioners
should also be made to pay her moral damages, plus exemplary damages, for the oppressive
manner with which petitioners effected her dismissal from the service, and to serve as a
forewarning to lecherous officers and employers who take undue advantage of their
ascendancy over their employees
Note:
As to the first charge, respondent Cortez claims that as early as her first year of employment
her Plant Manager, William Chua, already manifested a special liking for her, so much so
that she was receiving special treatment from him who would oftentimes invite her "for a
date," which she would as often refuse. On many occasions, he would make sexual advances -
touching her hands, putting his arms around her shoulders, running his fingers on her arms
and telling her she looked beautiful. The special treatment and sexual advances continued
during her employment for four (4) years but she never reciprocated his flirtations, until
finally, she noticed that his attitude towards her changed. He made her understand that if she
would not give in to his sexual advances he would cause her termination from the service;
and he made good his threat when he started harassing her. She just found out one day that
her table which was equipped with telephone and intercom units and containing her personal
belongings was transferred without her knowledge to a place with neither telephone nor
intercom, for which reason, an argument ensued when she confronted William Chua
resulting in her being charged with gross disrespect.
G.R. No. 114337 September 29, 1995
NITTO ENTERPRISES vs. NLRC
Facts:
 Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum
products, hired Roberto Capili sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist,
molder and core maker as evidenced by an apprenticeship agreement for a period of
six (6) months;
 Sometime in August 1990, Capili who was handling a piece of glass while he was
working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was
treated at a nearby hospital. Later that same day, after office hours, Capili entered a
workshop within the office premises which was not his work station, where he
operated one of the power press machines without authority and in the process
injured his left thumb;
 On the following day, Capili was asked to resign. Thereafter, Capili executed a
Quitclaim and Release in favor of Nitto Enterprises for and in consideration of the
sum of P1,912.79. Consequently, Capili filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
payment of other monetary benefits before the NLRC;
 Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissal was valid on the grounds of gross negligence
resulting to injury not only to himself but also to his fellow worker, and for
handling machines without authority and proper training. However, the NLRC
reversed the said decision. Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued commanding
Capili to proceed to Nitto Enterprises’ place for reinstatement or at the option of the
former by payroll reinstatement. MOR denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and
Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously
give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.
Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national
apprenticeship program through the participation of employers, workers and government and
non-government agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of
apprentices." To translate such objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLE to any
apprenticeship program has to be secured as a condition sine qua non before any such
apprenticeship agreement can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship
programs and agreements cannot be debased.
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no
force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the
DOLE, private respondent's assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery
boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a
regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code.

Issue: W/N the mere signing of the apprenticeship agreement already established an
employer-apprentice relationship

Ruling: The law is clear on this matter. Article 61 of the Labor Code provides:
Contents of apprenticeship agreement. — Apprenticeship agreements, including the
main rates of apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the Minister of Labor
and Employment. The period of apprenticeship shall not exceed six months.
Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates below the legal minimum
wage, which in no case shall start below 75% per cent of the applicable minimum
wage, may be entered into only in accordance with apprenticeship program duly
approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The Ministry shall develop
standard model programs of apprenticeship. (emphasis supplied)

In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent
was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of
"care maker/molder." On the same date, an apprenticeship program was prepared by
petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. However, the
apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of
approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was
enforced the day it was signed.

Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law.
It is mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice
shall be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the
Minister of Labor and Employment.

G.R. No. 93666             April 22, 1991

Prior approval by the DOLE of the proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION and EARL TIMOTHY CONE vs. HON.
condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into. RUBEN D. TORRES
DOLE issued Alien Employment Permit in favor of petitioner Earl Timothy Cone, a United
States citizen, as sports consultant and assistant coach for petitioner General Milling
Corporation. Thereafter entering into a contract of employment whereby the latter undertook
to coach GMC's basketball team.
Private respondent Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines ("BCAP") appealed the
issuance of said alien employment permit to the respondent Secretary of Labor who, issued a
decision ordering cancellation of petitioner Cone's employment permit on the ground that
there was no showing that there is no person in the Philippines who is competent, able and
willing to perform the services required nor that the hiring of petitioner Cone would redound
to the national interest.
Petitioners are now before the Court on a Petition for Certiorari, alleging that:
perform the services for which the alien is desired." The permissive language employed in the
Labor Code indicates that the authority granted involves the exercise of discretion on the part
of the issuing authority. In the second place, Article 12 of the Labor Code sets forth a
statement of objectives that the Secretary of Labor should, and indeed must, take into account
in exercising his authority and jurisdiction granted by the Labor Code:
Art. 12. Statement of Objectives. –– It is the policy of the State:
a) To promote and maintain a state of full employment through improved
manpower training, allocation and utilization;
c) To facilitate a free choice of available employment by persons seeking work in
conformity with the national interest;

1. Respondent Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion when he revoked d) To facilitate and regulate the movement of workers in conformity with the
petitioner Cone's alien employment permit; and national interest;

2. Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor e) To regulate the employment of aliens, including the establishment of a
Code is null and void as it is in violation of the enabling law as the Labor Code registration and/or work permit system;
does not empower respondent Secretary to determine if the employment of an alien
would redound to national interest.
Petitioners have very recently manifested to this Court that public respondent Secretary of
Labor has reversed his earlier decision and has issued an Employment Permit to petitioner
Petitioner GMC's claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer's prerogative, has no Cone.
legal basis at all. Under Article 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an
alien must first obtain an employment permit from the Department of Labor. Petitioner
GMC's right to choose whom to employ is, of course, limited by the statutory requirement of Moreover, assuming that an alien employment permit has in fact been issued to petitioner
an alien employment permit. Cone, the basis of the reversal by the Secretary of Labor of his earlier decision does not
appear in the record. If such reversal is based on some view of constitutional law or labor law
different from those here set out, then such employment permit, if one has been issued, would
The provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations requiring alien appear open to serious legal objections.
employment permits were in existence long before petitioners entered into their contract of
employment. It is firmly settled that provisions of applicable laws, especially provisions
relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into contracts. ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for certiorari for lack of
merit. Costs against petitioners.
The Labor Code itself specifically empowers respondent Secretary to make a determination
as to the availability of the services of a "person in the Philippines who is competent, able and
willing at the time of application to perform the services for which an alien is desired." 3

In short, the Department of Labor is the agency vested with jurisdiction to determine the
question of availability of local workers. The constitutional validity of legal provisions
granting such jurisdiction and authority and requiring proof of non-availability of local
nationals able to carry out the duties of the position involved, cannot be seriously questioned.

Petitioners apparently suggest that the Secretary of Labor is not authorized to take into
account the question of whether or not employment of an alien applicant would "redound to
the national interest" because Article 40 does not explicitly refer to such assessment. The G.R. No. 118978 May 23, 1997
second paragraph of Article 40 says: "[t]he employment permit may be issued to a non- PLDT vs. NLRC
resident alien or to the applicant employer after a determination of the non-availability of a
person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of application to
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, for a fixed period (Nov-April).
Thereafter, on two fixed-period (June-July and July-August) employments, private respondent's
services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner. And pursuant to their Reliever Agreement,
her services were terminated.
September that same year, Private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner company as a
probationary employee, which covered 150 days. In the job application form that was furnished her
to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was
single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.
It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two successive
reliever agreements (June and July). When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, it
sent to private respondent a memorandum dated requiring her to explain the discrepancy.
Respondent stated that she was not aware of the policy regarding married women at the time, and
that all along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. Private respondent was dismissed
from the company which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal,
coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondent, awarding her reinstatement, plus payment of the
corresponding back wages and COLA, as she was a regular employee, illegally dismissed by
petitioner. And that she had been discriminated against on account of her having contracted
marriage in violation of company rules. NLRC affirmed said appealed decision, with modification
that she deserved to be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature of her acts
which should not be condoned.
Ruling
This brings us to the issue at hand; Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason
of the marriage of a female employee.
Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee of
protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required, as a condition sine qua
non prior to severance of the employment ties of an individual under his employ, to convincingly
establish, through substantial evidence, the existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with
the services of such employee, one's labor being regarded as constitutionally protected property.
Further, an employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and best business judgment, all
aspects of employment, "from hiring to firing," except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those
which may be provided by law. 20
In the case at bar, petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any
woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against,
discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.
Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account
of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved
principally because of the company's policy that married women are not qualified for employment
in PT & T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
Verily, private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT & T could not
be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly
because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was
practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for
fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of
employment, it should not be simulated. 24 It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by
the employee and not on the employer's caprices. 25 Furthermore, it should never be used as a
subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified. 26
Indeed, petitioner glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful policy against married women, both
on the aspects of qualification and retention, which compelled private respondent to conceal her
supervenient marriage. It was, however, that very policy alone which was the cause of private
respondent's secretive conduct now complained of. It is then apropos to recall the familiar saying
that he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
Finally, petitioner's collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that she supposedly
misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to dismiss her from employment, is
somewhat insincere and self-serving. Concededly, private respondent admitted in the course of the
proceedings that she failed to remit some of her collections, but that is an altogether different story.
In fact, it was merely agreed that private respondent execute a promissory note to refund the same,
which she did, and the matter was deemed settled as a peripheral issue in the labor case.
On the other hand, her earlier stints with the company as reliever were undoubtedly those of a
regular employee, even if the same were for fixed periods, as she performed activities which were
essential or necessary in the usual trade and business of PT & T. 28 The primary standard of
determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the activity performed by
the employee in relation to the business or trade of the employer. And as she had been dismissed
without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent. 30 
However, as she had undeniably committed an act of dishonesty in concealing her status, albeit
under the compulsion of an unlawful imposition of petitioner, the three-month suspension imposed
by respondent NLRC must be upheld to obviate the impression or inference that such act should be
condoned. It would be unfair to the employer if she were to return to its fold without any sanction
whatsoever for her act which was not totally justified..
In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by petitioner PT
& T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social
institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation. 42 That it must be
effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory
conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively required. ON THE
FOREGOING PREMISES, Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs
against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 94951. April 22, 1991
APEX MINING COMPANY vs. NLRC
Facts:
 Sinclitica Candido was employed by petitioner Apex Mining to perform laundry services
at its staff house located in Davao del Norte. One day, while she was attending to her
assigned task and she was hanging her laundry, she accidentally slipped and hit her back
on a stone. As a result of the accident she was not able to continue with her work. She
was permitted to go on leave for medication. Her immediate supervisor offered her the
amount of P 2,000.00 which was eventually increased to P5,000.00 to persuade her to
quit her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to return to work. Petitioner did not
allow her to return to work and dismissed.
 Candido filed a request for assistance with the DOLE. The Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision ordering Apex Mining to pay the complainant P55,161.42 comprising the salary
differential, emergency living allowance, 13th month pay differential and separation pay.
 Unsatisfied, Apex Mining appealed to the NLRC, which was denied. Motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue: W/N Candido should be treated as a mere househelper or domestic servant and not as a
regular employee of petitioner.

Ruling: NO. Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms
"househelper" or "domestic servant" are defined as follows:
The term "househelper" as used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic servant"
and shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and about
the employer's home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the
maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort
and enjoyment of the employer's family.

The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who is
employed in the employer's home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of
the employer's family.

The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundrywomen working in staffhouses

of a company, like petitioner who attends to the needs of the company's guest and other persons
availing of said facilities. By the same token, it cannot be considered to extend to then driver,
houseboy, or gardener exclusively working in the company, the staffhouses and its premises.

While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or
laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in
their circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the family while in the
latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or
any other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the
premises of the business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the company or
employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.

She is, therefore, entitled to appropriate relief as a regular employee of petitioner. Inasmuch as
private respondent appears not to be interested in returning to her work for valid reasons, the
payment of separation pay to her is in order.