Army Code 71868

ARMY FIELD MANUAL

VOLUME 1 COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS

PART 11

BATTLESPACE
MANAGEMENT

2007

Issue 1.0: November 2007

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Issue 1.0: Nov 07

 PREFACE

APPLICATION THROUGH LEADERSHIP

Although doctrine and Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTPs) provide

practical guidance on the conduct of operations, their publication alone will
not sufficiently add to operational success. Unless soldiers understand
doctrine, are well trained in TTPs and are sufficiently motivated to carry out
their tasks to the best of their ability, their effectiveness on the battlefield,
as individuals or as part of a team, will be limited. It is leadership which
ensures that training is effective and that drills are learned and followed
correctly. It is leadership which drives effective action and motivates
soldiers to give their utmost to achieve the common purpose. It is
leadership which turns the bald statements of fact in this publication into
life saving or battle winning action. And moreover, it is strong leaders who
recognise that doctrine writers do not have a monopoly on wisdom and
adapt and develop this guidance to win in the Contemporary Operating
Environment.

“Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties
accumulate and produce a friction, which no man can imagine exactly who has not seen
war.”

Clausewitz, On War

1. The purpose of this publication is to inform commanders and staffs of the scope and
nature of battlespace management. Much of what is contained here is far from new; the
interaction, coordination and deconfliction of activity by the various staff branches in an HQ
is just plain sense. However, the increasingly complex environment in which today’s Army
must operate and fight and the increasingly diverse and capable equipments which we
have at our disposal make battlespace management an issue which must be clearly
articulated in order that our true capability may be effectively exploited.

2. A generation ago, the potential to create friction which drained tempo was far less.
Many types of equipment simply did not have the power or range to mutually interfere and
the EMS was exploited to a much lesser degree. There was little technology to facilitate
deconfliction of activity in real or near real time, and so considerable risk was accepted.
Contemporary attitudes to risk together with the power and pervasiveness of today’s media,
quite rightly mean that ‘blue on blue’ can no longer be defended as simply an unintended
consequence of warfare. The Army in the 21st Century has the ability, and indeed the duty,
to manage the battlespace so that the risk to life and limb is limited to that posed by the
enemy.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 i

 CONTENTS

VOLUME 1 - COMBINED OPERATIONS

PART 11 - BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT

Page

PREFACE i

CONTENTS ii

CHAPTER 1 THE FUNDAMENTALS

Section 1 The Battlespace 1-1

Section 2 Defining the Battlespace 1-2

CHAPTER 2 BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT

Section 1 Defining Battlespace Management 2-1

Section 2 Components of Battlespace Management 2-2
Section 3 The Principles of Battlespace Management 2-4
Section 4 Levels of Activity and Methods of Control 2-5

Annex A Airspace Control Means and Measures 2-A-1

Annex B Fire Support Coordination Measures 2-B-1

CHAPTER 3 PLANNING

Section 1 Effects Based Approach 3-1

Section 2 Campaign Themes 3-2
Section 3 Functions in Combat 3-3
Section 4 The Core Functions 3-3
Section 5 Plan and Review 3-4

Annex A The Tactical Estimate 3-A-1

Annex B The Combat Estimate 3-B-1

CHAPTER 4 EXECUTION

Section 1 Execute and Evaluate 4-1

Section 2 The Battlespace Management Meeting 4-5
Section 3 Situational Awareness 4-6

Annex A The Battlespace Management Meeting Agenda 4-A-1

Annex B Air Interdiction 4-B-1
Annex C Close Air Support 4-C-1
Annex D Close Combat Attack 4-D-1
Annex E Unmanned Air Vehicles 4-E-1

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 iii

 Annex F GMLRS (U) 4-F-1
Annex G NGS, MLRS, Arty, Mors, 4-G-1
Annex H Ground Manoeuvre 4-H-1
Annex I SF, Recce, STA Patrols 4-I-1
Annex J Battlefield Helicopters 4-J-1
Annex K Electronic Warfare 4-K-1
Annex L Weapon Locating Radar 4-L-1
Annex M Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear 4-M-1
Annex N Combat Search and Rescue 4-N-1
Annex O Combat Service Support 4-O-1

CHAPTER 5 AIR LAND INTEGRATION

Section 1 Counter Land Operations 5-1

Section 2 CAS Command and Control 5-3
Section 3 Recognised Air Picture 5-5
Section 4 Air Defence 5-6

GLOSSARY 6-1

ABBREVIATIONS 7-1

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 iv

 CHAPTER 1

THE FUNDAMENTALS

SECTION 1 - THE BATTLESPACE

1. Battlespace. The battlespace is defined as ‘all aspects of air, surface, sub-

surface, land, space and the electromagnetic spectrum that encompasses the area of
operations’. (JDP 0-01.1)

2. Dimensions of the Battlespace. The six dimensions of the battlespace are land,
sea, air (and space), Electro Magnetic Spectrum (EMS), Computer Generated Space
(CGS) and time. The clear allocation of controlling authority for each dimension is essential
to effective coordination of any activities or effects which take place in more than one
dimension. No dimension should be considered in isolation; the possible implications of an
action in one dimension for one or all of the others must be considered during both planning
and execution.

a. Land. Land Component (LC) forces are but one element that operates in the
land dimension. Maritime (including amphibious), air, Special Forces (SF) and
logistic elements will all, depending on the specific situation, require terrain for
deployment, action or activity. The variety of terrain types and environments into
which the land component may deploy also presents differing challenges for
Battlespace Management (BM). Most activities in the land dimension will affect
some or all of the others.

b. Sea. Maritime and amphibious forces have the ability to reach into the land
dimension either physically or with effects. Operations in the littoral environment
create the most complex BM environment, simply because of the number of
interacting battlespace users from all components. The considerable reach of
maritime assets can have significant effect on the land and air dimensions through
capabilities such as long range strike assets and air defence radars.

c. Air and Space. The air dimension begins at the surface and extends to the
upper operating limit of conventional aircraft; beyond that limit is space. For practical
purposes, the air dimension must be considered when any system which can reach
more than a few metres in altitude is used. Desert Hawk, for example, has an
optimum operating altitude of 60m1. Access to the air dimension is required by all
components since they manoeuvre, fire and communicate through it. Military
operations will often be constrained by civilian airspace control or by unexpected
civilian activity in the Joint Operations Area2 (JOA) or Airspace Control Area3 (ASC-
Area). The all encompassing nature of the air dimension makes the effective

1
On Op HERRICK. Desert Hawk has been used at 300-400ft AGL within a ROZ normally 1000ft AGL and
10km radius.
2
An area of land, sea and airspace, defined by higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force
Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A Joint Operations Area
including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission-specific.
3
The ASC-Area is that area over which the Airspace Control Authority exercises airspace control. It should
never be larger than the JOA, but for eg political, civilian/HN reasons it may be smaller.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 1-1

 coordination of all aspects of its use essential in order to minimise the constraints
imposed on deployed elements.

d. EMS. Managing the EMS is essential as it is both limited in size and

increasingly in demand. It is readily accessible and open to exploitation by friendly
and enemy forces alike. All components have platforms that are increasingly reliant
on EMS exploitation. Loss of control of the EMS, either through enemy action or
lack of coordination, will significantly degrade the capability of any force. The EMS
requires significant coordination through management of issues including allocation
of frequencies and bandwidth, and avoidance of interference. Effective control or
management of the EMS is particularly difficult where it is impossible to control
assets entering or leaving an Area of Operation (AOO)4. To a lesser extent, control
may be more challenging in multinational and coalition operations. Such loss of
control introduces physical and electronic interference problems that can result in the
degradation, failure or complete loss of capabilities. Control of the EMS must
therefore begin at the highest level.

e. CGS. CGS is the structure of computer networks. It enables technology to

be exploited to increase reaction speeds through automation of processes. This
exploitation is achieved through Operational Management of Communications and
Information Systems (OMC) and Information Management (IM). IM and Information
Exploitation (IX) are key enablers for Situational Awareness (SA) and Shared
Situational Awareness (SSA). CGS promotes the efficient use of many capabilities,
but also represents a significant vulnerability if not properly managed. This
vulnerability could be exploited by the enemy either accessing or overloading
systems if IM is poor.

f. Time. The principle function of time in the BM context is to enable the

management of the other dimensions. It must, however, be managed in itself to
ensure uniformity.

SECTION 2 – DEFINING THE BATTLESPACE

3. Defining the Battlespace. All of the components involved in an operation will have
their initial battlespace conditions set by the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ). This
will be promulgated in either a discrete Joint Battlespace Management Force Instruction
Document5 (JBM FID) or a BM Annex to the FID. The document will define key elements of
the battlespace which will be common across the components, ideally for the duration of the
operation. These elements must include constraints imposed by civilian/host nation control
and use of, for example, air, sea and EMS. Once the JOA is defined, authority can be
delegated to components and the architecture of the battlespace further developed. These
parameters must be made available to operational or strategic assets which may be
required to support other operations.

4
An operational area defined by a Joint Commander for Land or Maritime forces to conduct military activities.
Normally, an area of operations does not encompass the entire joint operations area of the Joint Commander,
but is sufficient in size for the Joint Force Component Commander to accomplish assigned missions and
protect forces. AAP-6
5
See Annex A to PJHQ JFOP 2/06 JBM dated 10 Jul 06.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 1-2

4. Initial Battlespace Conditions. Each appropriate datum will be defined in the JBM
FID in order to coordinate any cross component activity and ensure common terms of
reference in the passage of information. Thereafter, it is likely that responsibility for control
of certain volumes of battlespace will be delegated to individual components by the JTFC.

a. Time. The time zones for the JOA will be specified and the time reference
for the operation stated (default is ZULU). The source should also be defined, eg
GPS6.

b. Geographic Datum. The geographic datum will be specified, eg lat/long,

WGRS, MGRS or OSGB7. This specification will also include the height reference,
eg AGL or AMSL8.

c. Geospatial Data. Specific versions of paper maps, charts and digital data
will be mandated.

d. Common Geographic Reference System (CGRS). CGRS is a procedural

measure used to rapidly and clearly define geographical locations. The CGRS in
use will be defined by specifying its point of origin. Any variations to dimensions or
axis labelling must be specified. For more details see Chapter 4, paragraph 4e.

e. Physical Boundaries. The JOA will be defined and an initial volume of

battlespace allocated to the components, including geographical freedoms and
constraints.

f. Component Battlespace Responsibilities. The maritime, land and air BM

responsibilities within the JOA will be specified.

g. Battlespace Spectrum Management. The BSM authority for the use of the
EMS will be defined.

5. Contemporary Operating Environment (COE)9. Use of the battlespace is not

limited to military operations. Within any volume of battlespace there will be a number of
other actors and agencies whose presence and activities are likely to add to the complexity
of operations. Close coordination with Information Operations (Info Ops) staff will provide
much of the data required to define the battlespace beyond the purely military environment.
Info Ops will provide the Basic Psychological Studies (BPS), each of which consists of a
basic country study and a subsequent detailed consideration of potential Info Ops Target
Audiences (TA). This subsequent Target Audience Analysis (TAA) is “the systematic study
of the population and environment of a TA to enhance understanding of a military
psychological environment10”. Within the context of the COE this will allow the identification
of additional BM issues warranting consideration. The six COE variables are physical,
political, economic, human, military and information. The BM implications of these

6
GPS and GMT/UTC are diverging time references: GMT/UTC is corrected for ‘leap seconds’ and GPS is not.
7
World Geographic Reference System, Military Geographic Reference System, Ordnance Survey Great
Britain.
8
Above Ground level/Above Mean Sea Level.
9
Doctrinal Note 07/01.
10
JWP 3-80.1

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 1-3

variables should be established prior to any deployment as they will identify freedoms and
constraints on actions which may be undertaken within a JOA.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 1-4

 CHAPTER 2

BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT

SECTION 1 – DEFINING BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT

1. Definition. BM is defined as, ‘The adaptive means and measures that enable the
dynamic synchronisation of activity’11.

2. Purpose. The purpose of BM is to maximise freedom of action and to minimise

constraints for all battlespace users, while managing and reducing the risk of fratricide.
These three aspects are inextricably linked; increasing the freedom of action of one force
element may impose significant constraints on another while increasing the risk of fratricide.
BM is a G3 function that seeks to ensure the most efficient prioritisation and allocation of
resources in pursuit of objectives. Effective BM is essential to the successful conduct of
operations, across the spectrum of conflict and at all levels. Operations will not be confined
to one point on the spectrum and as a result the tempo and intensity will vary in time and
space. Authority for the detailed coordination and execution of various aspects of BM will
routinely be delegated by the commander, for example to G6 or the Offensive Support
Group12 (OSG), but critical coordination at potentially decisive points in time and space will
remain a function of command. The BM process must ensure the timely coordination of all
aspects of the physical, cognitive or electronic use of the battlespace.

3. Levels of BM. BM is conducted at all levels of operations. While the purpose and
principles of BM remain consistent, the volume and complexity of activities, and thus the
information requirement in terms of resolution and timeliness, vary with both level of
command and specific responsibilities. However, It is essential for commanders and
planners at all levels to ensure that throughout the plan/ review/execute/evaluate cycle, BM
is considered in all applicable dimensions. The various levels are categorised as follows:

a. Level 1. Level 1 BM requires a formation to have the structure, C4I

systems and capacity to plan and liaise across components throughout the JOA.
Clearly, it should also be able to plan, liaise and execute BM within its AOO. BM at
this level is conducted across all six domains. Planning is conducted 48+ hours in
advance of operations, although BM execution can be more dynamic if required.
Typically, only a full divisional HQ or above, or a specialist or augmented brigade
HQ13, has the requisite organic Subject Matter Experts (SME) and resources to be
able to conduct this level of BM.

b. Level 2. Level 2 BM requires a formation to be able to plan, liaise and

execute BM within its AOO. Implicit in this is the requirement to have the requisite
competent personnel and C4I systems to liaise with all assets that are able to have
an effect within the AOO. This level also contributes to the planning process but,
due to the C2 structure and limited C4I capability, inter-component liaison is

11
JDP 3 -70 Study Draft Dated 28 Jul 06.
12
The OSG brings together the offensive support available to a division in order to ensure unity of effort and
purpose in support of the Divisional Commander’s plan, and to minimise potential friction. In HQ ARRC the
OSG is known as the Joint Effects Branch.
13
HQ 16 Air Asslt Bde and HQ 3 Cdo Bde are inherently capable of this level of BM when fully augmented for
independent operations.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 2-1

 conducted through a level 1 BM cell. A brigade headquarters or divisional
headquarters in a low intensity warfighting configuration14, when augmented with an
Air Support Operations Cell (ASOC) or elements thereof (Air Support Element
(ASE)), has the necessary resources to conduct this level of BM.

c. Level 3. Level 3 BM is focussed on the terminal control of effects and is

typically conducted at the tactical level. Although BM is predominantly limited to the
dynamic integration and execution of fires with manoeuvre (including in the air), the
BM implications of tactical activity should still be considered during all stages of
planning and execution. Fire Support Teams15 (FST), Forward Air Controllers (FAC),
Attack Helicopter (AH) crews and Close Support Fire Planning Cells (FPC) are
examples of organisations and individuals capable of this level of BM.

4. Bounding BM. Bounding BM is not straightforward at any level and there is

considerable overlap between the levels described above. Within any individual HQ, BM
should be regarded as an enabler. Like any other enabler, it can produce benefits,
implications and unintended consequences which should be understood by all of the staff
branches concerned. At no stage does the complete BM function become a separate staff
function; at no stage does fighting the battle cease to be a G3 function or planning the
battle a G5 function. BM identifies and avoids or reduces the frictions which would
otherwise slow the tempo of operations. For example, BM includes allocation of terrain
which is defined by boundaries. Defining an allocated area is not the same as allocating it:
it is a G3 function to allocate a piece of terrain to a specific force element. Similarly a
boundary is in itself less important in BM terms than its effect as a coordination and control
measure. BM facilitates the most efficient execution of a given course of action by
identifying, managing and reducing friction.

5. Battlespace Managers. BM staff officers do not carry out an all encompassing

executive staff function, but they do act on behalf of the commander and with his authority.
The impact and effects of BM must be considered routinely in each staff branch throughout
the planning and execution of an operation. It is not the place of a BM group or of a
battlespace manager to decide how to fight or what to do, but rather to support the
decisions already made by the commander or G3 staff on his behalf. There will be
occasions where BM is the key enabler and becomes the focus for a specific activity, such
as the physical clearance of joint fires; however the commander and the G3 Staff remain
responsible for the successful execution of a mission. Similarly, terminal control of fires
cannot take place without BM, but BM is simply an enabler and not the primary activity.

SECTION 2 – COMPONENTS OF BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT

6. Components of BM. Joint BM may be divided as follows:

14
Eg MND (SE) which does not require a full warfighting div structure for Op TELIC or an augmented
mech/armd bde for Op HERRICK.
15
A FST is a tactical grouping with task organised structures, training and equipment required to execute
terminal control of the fires of artillery, mortars, CAS, CCA, NGS and ensuring their coordination and
deconfliction with the manoeuvre elements. Working description only.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 2-2

 a. Air Battlespace Management. Routine ASM within the ASC-Area is likely to
be delegated to a single Airspace Control Authority16 (ACA). The ACA function is
provided through the Joint Airspace Coordination Centre (JACC) which is manned
not only by air staff officers, but also representatives from the other components.

b. Maritime Battlespace Management. There are four aspects of maritime BM:

waterspace management, naval cooperation and guidance for shipping, and
amphibious operations and maritime/land interface.

c. Land Battlespace Management. Unlike the air and maritime environments,

responsibility for the land environment is unlikely to be delegated to a single
component. The Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) is likely to
require a significant proportion of land battlespace simply to deploy his forces.
However, the Joint Force Logistics Component Commander (JFLogCC) will also
require a large amount of real estate and the Joint Force Air Component
Commander (JFACC) is likely to need land space for basing and, possibly, air
defence (AD).17 The requirements of the SF element will be governed by the nature
of the operation.

d. Electromagnetic Spectrum. The joint battlespace manager will routinely

delegate responsibility for the management of the EMS to the JTFHQ Battlespace
Spectrum Manager (BSM). He will produce and implement a battlespace spectrum
management plan to coordinate all spectrum usage across the JOA, allocating areas
of the EMS to component commands while taking specific note of the influence and
needs of host and border nations, international allocations, coalition partners and
non-military participants.

7. Land BM. Land BM is the term which describes BM within the LC. It consists of:

a. Landspace Management. The four aspects of landspace management are

manoeuvre, air defence, Fire Support Control Measures (FSCM), and Airspace
Control (ASC). Landspace management is currently achieved by establishing spatial
or temporal controls of deployed forces in order to coordinate all aspects of their
activities. These controls consist of boundaries, FSCM, defined routes, terrain
allocation and other restrictions to freedoms of action that reduce the risk of
fratricide18, whilst enabling manoeuvre and maximising the use of terrain.
Responsibility for landspace management normally rests with the Chief of Staff
(COS) and is delegated to G5 Plans during planning and G3 Ops during execution.
These staff officers plan and manage the activities that take place within the land
environment, making decisions based on the end state and effects that are to be
achieved, the commander’s guidance and the staff’s awareness of the situation, risks
and battlefield activity.

b. Airspace Management. The Air Component Commander (ACC) will usually

remain the ACA for all airspace within the JOA or the ASC-Area, which will include

16
ACA: The commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control
system in his or her designated area.
17
The JFACC in his role as ACA is also likely, to be nominated as the Air Defence Commander (ADC).
18
The accidental destruction of own, allied or friendly forces. A result of what is colloquially known as a blue
on blue engagement. JWP 0-01.1

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 2-3

 all or most of the Land Component Commander’s (LCC) AOO. The LCC only
controls volumes of airspace within its AOO when ROZ/HIDACZ19 are established.
The LCC, however, controls20 air to surface operations and surface to surface fires
within his AOO. Effective management of the airspace within this AOO is therefore
essential as multiple CCs may be conducting any combination of independent,
synchronised and integrated activities simultaneously in the same volume of
battlespace. The LCC has the means for routine input to airspace control through
Airspace Control Means (ACM) promulgated through the Air Tasking Order21 (ATO),
Airspace Coordination Order (ACO) and Special Instructions (SPINS)22.

c. Battlespace Spectrum Management (BSM). Overall BSM architecture is

defined at the joint level and control of relevant areas of the EMS is delegated to
components. Within the LC the electronic architecture is further defined and
disseminated by using the BSM plan issued through G6 in accordance with SOP/SOI
and much of it is likely to be routine in nature. The allocation of frequencies is
routine, as is the identification of potential mutual interference sources from emitters
such as Weapon Locating Radars (WLR) and UAV data links. Consideration of the
effects of Radiation Hazard (RADHAZ) and High Intensity Radio Transmission Areas
(HIRTA) are also taken into account. BSM must include the early identification and
de-confliction of any Joint, Interagency and Multi-national (JIM) organisations that
work within a formation AOR or the effects of whose equipments may affect the
battlespace. This may include civilian and strategic assets fitted with, for example,
stand-off jammers. The availability of satellites may also have an impact for
specialist communications and data links.

SECTION 3 – THE PRINCIPLES OF BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT

8. Principles. The principles of BM are as follows:

a. Command Led. BM is a core G3 function and should be command led

throughout. Authority can be delegated in order to enable routine coordination and
liaison, but responsibility remains with the commander.

b. Define the Battlespace. The volume of battlespace which a commander is

allocated must be clearly defined across all six dimensions of BM. The
responsibilities within that allocated battlespace must also be clear. This is essential
in order to establish those cross boundary or cross responsibility areas of activity
which may cause friction and therefore to identify where the authority to resolve
potential conflict lies.

c. Shared Situational Awareness. Information Management (IM), information

exchange and SSA are key to conducting effective BM. The level, timeliness and
granularity of the SA which can be created and maintained will define the level of
integration which can be achieved during an operation. At the lowest levels of SA,

19
Restricted Operations Zone/High Density Airspace Control Zone.
20
The word control under these circumstances denotes aircraft control procedures; it does not imply that the
surface force commander has operational and tactical control of the aircraft. AP 3002.
21
The ATO is a detailed document used to task and disseminate to Components, subordinate units and C2
agencies those projected sorties, the capabilities matched to specific targets and planned missions.
22
The ATO combined with the ACO and SPINS provides operational and tactical guidance for air operations.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 2-4

 BM will be limited to procedural methods but with the advent of near real time SSA,
positive control of integrated activity will be possible.

d. Identify the Level and Type of BM. Throughout both planning and
execution the levels of activity at each phase of an operation must be reviewed and
evaluated. This will enable the staff to anticipate the level of BM, from procedural to
positive, which will be required to enable an operation. Additional resources may
have to be allocated for a specific phase of an operation or the complexity of the
activity reduced if BM cannot enable an appropriate level of command and control.

e. Continuous Process. BM activity should be continuous. There are

elements of the battlespace which, once defined, will endure and require only
occasional reviews. However, there will be activity in all dimensions of the
battlespace, particularly during intense periods of operations, where evaluation of
current and future BM requirements must be continuous in order to avoid loss of
tempo.

f. Collaborative Planning. BM is a collaborative process. It is the

responsibility of commanders and staffs at all levels to coordinate activity and ensure
that friction is removed or reduced wherever possible. Planning and execution
should routinely consider BM.

g. Simplicity. Simple BM controls and procedures are easier to manage

dynamically and are less prone to cause confusion or error. Complex BM is
potentially inflexible, increases decision and reaction times and can increase risk.

h. Resilience. BM planning should be resilient in the face of enemy action and

the loss of CIS or communications. Procedural controls and procedures should be
clear and robust to allow operations to continue if positive control is degraded or
fails.

SECTION 4 – LEVELS OF ACTIVITY AND METHODS OF CONTROL.

9. Levels of Activity. The principal function of BM is to coordinate activity in the

battlespace. The closer that activity comes to real time temporal and spatial control, the
more demanding and resource intensive BM will become. Coordination requires forces to
act together to achieve shared objectives. It prevents fratricide and duplication, and
ensures that effects complement each other. The degree of coordination required is
defined by the level of activity being conducted. The levels of activity within BM are as
follows:

a. Independent Activity. Independent activity is coordinated by the most basic

form of BM, where forces are separated in time and/or space. The deconfliction of
activity in this manner avoids fratricide and duplication, but does not promote
synergy.

b. Synchronised Activity. Synchronised activity allows discrete elements of a

force to follow specified Courses of Action (COA), enabling them to conduct a joint
task without fear of unexpected interference and with a controlled level of risk.
Synchronisation is the focusing of resources and activities to produce maximum

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 2-5

 combat power at the decisive time, but it does not take account of space.
Synchronised activity requires a significant amount of staff planning and coordination
and can be heavily dependent on communication systems.

c. Integrated Activity. Integrated activity is at the opposite end of the range

from independent activity. It requires a complete state of mutual awareness and
understanding between two or more elements of a force such that they can conduct
simultaneous activity with impunity in the same portion of battlespace. It typically
requires faster and precise planning, with real time communications and liaison.

Interdependence
Integrated
Activity
Synchronized
Activity
Independent
Activity

Required Shared Situational Awareness

Figure 2.1 – The Range of Interaction

10. Methods of Control23. Land combat can be complex, dynamic and unpredictable
with a large number of force elements concentrated into a small volume of battlespace.
Control of battlespace with a high density of users is essential and BM can be executed in a
number of ways to achieve this.

11. Procedural Control. In its simplest form battlespace can be allocated procedurally,
that is to say volumes of battlespace (electronic or physical) can be allocated by time and
force elements operate within these volumes without constraint. While relatively simple, it
is inflexible and most suited to a situation where all elements of a force can achieve their
aims by conducting independent actions. Activity may be synchronised in time, but not in
space, or vice versa. Procedural control has the advantage of being relatively immune to
disruption.

a. Procedural Airspace Control. The purpose of ASC is to maximise the

effectiveness of military operations by promoting the ability of air, land and maritime
forces to operate in an efficient, integrated and flexible manner with minimal mutual
interference and without undue restraint and risk to friendly forces and neutral air.
Procedural ASC relies on previously agreed and promulgated orders
(ATO/ACO/SPINS) and set procedures (ACM). It is more restrictive than positive
control but is less vulnerable to interference by electronic and physical attack.

23
That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other
organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing
orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated. JWP 0-011.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 2-6

 ROZ TMRR

COORDINATION LEVEL

HIDACZ

x
SAAFR
x x

xx
Figure 2.2 – Procedural Airspace Control Means

b. Land Battlespace Procedural Control. Fire support coordination is used to

coordinate and integrate land, air, and maritime fires to support the manoeuvre
commander’s intent and operations plan. As such FSCM24 are a key part of
managing the land battlespace. Landspace management using boundaries,
ARA/AMAs, routes, phase/report lines, movement orders etc is another aspect of
procedural control. Some aspects of BSM can be conducted procedurally, such as
frequency management, EMCON and some coordination of EW assets.

12. Dynamic Procedural. To allow BM to react to the unexpected (including enemy

action), procedural measures may be developed in order to enable synchronised and
focussed actions which will better achieve the required effect. The dynamic procedural
approach to BM still requires an established architecture based on FSCM/ACM/WCS etc
but presupposes that these measures can be quickly activated and deactivated. This will
enable synchronised activity within the battlespace, with the flexibility to respond quickly to
changing circumstances. The volume of battlespace which this method can effectively
control is finite, as the larger and busier the volume, the less responsive this method of
control can be. The use of GMLRS ‘walls’ is an example of dynamic procedural control. A
wall can be routinely established, but with sufficient planning time planning (1-24hrs) the
trajectory can be calculated to enable aircraft to fly below it. Where a more dynamic
response is required (<1hr) a simple ‘solid’ wall is established; this increases GMLRS
freedom of action but can constrain the use of air. Low latency SSA is essential for the
effective implementation of any such short notice control measures.

24
FSCMs and definitions are at Annex B.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 2-7

 PREPLANNED GMLRS ‘WALL’

IMMEDIATE GMLRS ‘WALL’

x
x x

xx
Figure 2.3 – GMLRS Walls as an Example of Dynamic Procedural Control
13. Active Deconfliction. The automation of the dynamic procedural approach,
through the use of JADOCS25 or JETTS26, enables active deconfliction. This allows the
near real time coordination of all assets to achieve the required effects. This method may
use a mixture of procedural and positive control measures, but is absolutely reliant upon
speed of communication and reaction through automation in order to minimise separation of
activity in both time and space. The level of SSA required to achieve active deconfliction is
high.

14. Positive Control. Positive control is the real time coordination and deconfliction of
activity in the battlespace to enable fully integrated action and maximum freedom of action
by all elements involved. The level of SSA required is extremely high. Positive control
becomes easier at lower levels of BM where the number of participants is low. An FST can
already exercise positive control over manoeuvre and joint effects at the lowest tactical
level, but relies on the appropriate BM being in place to control the battlespace beyond the
FST’s ‘bubble’ and to coordinate and deliver resources to it. The terminal controllers
manage and reduce risk in real time based on their knowledge of factors such as safety
distances.

25
Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System
26
Joint Effects Tactical Targeting System. The first delivered version of JETTS will be known as Interim
JETTS – IJETTS.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 2-8

 ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 2

AIRSPACE CONTROL MEANS (ACM)27

1. Coordination Level (CL)28. The CL is an advisory measure established to increase

the aircrew awareness of conflicts between slow and fast moving aircraft at low level. It is a
procedural method to separate slow and fast moving air traffic (normally fixed and rotary
wing aircraft) by determining a height above ground level below which fast traffic normally
will not fly and above which slow traffic will not normally fly.

2. High Density Airspace Control Zone (HIDACZ). A HIDACZ is airspace of defined

dimensions designated by the ACA in which there is a concentrated employment of
numerous and varied weapons/airspace users. The HIDACZ offers a short term volume of
airspace within which a surface force commander can exercise complete freedom of action
for those whom he specifies eg for AH raids, CAS, air manoeuvre or deception operations.
A HIDACZ may be permanently established, but not activated until specific criteria are met,
or created for an operation or specific aspects of it. Activated HIDACZs will, however,
impact on the operations of assets or forces that are excluded from them.

3. Restricted Operations Zone (ROZ). A ROZ is established in order to reserve

airspace for specific activities in which the operations of one or more airspace users is
restricted (eg refuelling orbits, terminal approach holding areas, landing/drop zones etc).
The ROZ offers a short term volume of airspace, usually smaller than a HIDACZ, reserved
for a single activity eg UAVs or field artillery. Nevertheless, within a ROZ the designated
commander can exercise complete freedom for the specified action. A ROZ may be
permanently established, but not activated until specific criteria are met, or created for an
operation or specific aspects of it. Activated HIDACZs will, however, impact on the
operations of assets or forces that are excluded from them.

4. Temporary Minimum Risk Route (TMRR). A TMMR is a route of defined

dimensions for use by high speed fixed-wing aircraft to route them between Transit Routes
(TR) or the rear of the forward area and their operations area.

5. Standard Use Army Aircraft Flight Routes (SAAFR). SAAFRs are established to
route helicopter traffic in the forward area in direct support of ground operations. They are
established below the CL. SAAFRs may be established by any component. These routes
do not require approval of the airspace control authority.

6. Transit Route (TR). A TR is a temporary corridor of defined dimensions

established in the forward area to minimise the risks to friendly aircraft (including
helicopters) from friendly air defences or surface forces. TRs are bi-directional routes
through areas of forward deployed friendly forces.

7. Base Defence Zone (BDZ). A BDZ is an air defence zone established around air
bases to enhance the effectiveness of local ground based air defence systems. BDZs have
specific entry, exit, and Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) procedures established.

27
These ACMs are those most often encountered in the land environment. For a complete list see AJP 3.3.5.
28
CL is the correct terminology; however this ACM is sometimes referred to as the Coordination Altitude.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 2-A-1

8. Weapons Engagement Zone (WEZ). A WEZ is airspace of defined dimensions
where the responsibility for engagement rests with a particular weapon system. Some
examples of WEZs include:

a. Fighter Engagement Zone (FEZ). For land based AD, a FEZ is airspace of
defined dimensions where the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally
rests with fighter aircraft.

b. Joint Engagement Zone (JEZ). A JEZ is airspace of specific dimensions

where friendly SAMs and fighters are simultaneously employed.

c. Short Range Air Defence Engagement Zone (SHORADEZ). A

SHORADEZ is airspace of defined dimensions where the responsibility for
engagement rests with short-range air defence weapons.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 2-A-2


FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES (FSCM)
Ser FSCM Definition/Purpose
(a) (b) (c)
1. Fire A line established by the appropriate ground force comd
Supported to ensure coord of fire not under his control but which
Coord Line may affect current tac ops. The FSCL is used to coord
(FSCL) the fires of air, ground or sea wpn systems using any
type of ammo against surface tgts. Supported elms
may attack fwd of the FSCL provided that the wpns
used do not produce effs on or to the rear of the line.
Attacks behind the FSCL must be coord with the
appropriate ground force comd, except those fires which
have been cleared by other measures, such as the NFL,
and require no further coord.
AT THE TIME OF PUBLICATION THE 30 OCT 06 RATIFACTION DRAFT OF NATO FIELD ARTILLERY TACTICAL DOCTRINE - AARTYP-5 HAS DELETED FSSL AND PROPOSED
THE CFL AS DETAILED BELOW
2. Fire Support A line short of which indirect fire systems do
Safety Line not fire except on req or approval of the comd
(FSSL) who estb the line, but beyond which they may
fire at any time without danger to friendly tps.
The FSSL is used to expedite the quick attack
of tgts beyond it by fire supported units (of
higher levels) without the delay of
unnecessary coord but also to guarantee that
no tgts are attacked short of it without coord
with the responsible manoeuvre comd.
A line beyond which conventional, indirect,
3. PROPOSED surface fire support means may fire at any
time within the boundaries of the establishing
Coordinated
Fire Line headquarters without additional coordination.
(CFL). The CFL is used to expedite the surface-to-
surface attack of targets beyond the CFL
PROPOSED without coordination with the ground
Issue 1.0: Nov 07
Estb/Dissemination/Graphical Portrayal
(d)
Estb by the ground comd in coord with the
appropriate tac air comd and other supported elms.
Disseminated through a FSCL msg which is used
to info air bases, ac carriers, arty units and fmns,
NGS ships and interested units/ fmns of the current
FSCL.
The FSCL is shown on maps, charts and overlays
with a solid black line. The abbreviation FSCL and
the estb HQ are written above the line, at the ends,
with the eff DTG immediately below the line.
Normally estb by fmns although it may be estb at BG
level.
Disseminated through manoeuvre and fire support
channels to higher, lower and adjacent manoeuvre and
fire support units.
Shown on maps, charts and overlays with a black dashed
line. The abbreviation FSSL and the estb HQ are written
above the line, at the ends, with the eff DTG immediately
below the line.
Normally estb by div/bde comds although it may be estb
by BG Comd if required.
Disseminated through manoeuvre and fire support
channels to higher, lower and adjacent manoeuvre and
fire support units.
Shown on maps, charts and overlays with a black dashed
ANNEX B TO
CHAPTER 2
Remarks
(e)
When det forces are beyond the FSCL,
appropriate fire coord measures should be estb
around the det forces. Normally only one FSCL
can be in eff at any one time. The FSCL should be
as close to fwd elms as poss, consistent with the
tac sit and its evolution. The FSCL should be easy
to define on a map and easily recognised from the
ground and air.
The FSSL is normally loc as close in as the estb
supported comd desires and should fol, if poss,
well defined terrain features.
The FSSL could be a staright line in front of the
force or a circular line around a force.
The CFL is normally loc as close in as the estbl
supported comd desires and should fol, if poss,
well defined terrain features.
It could be a stretched line in front of the force as
well as a circular line in case the restriction of
indirect fire should be imposed on a certain idea.
2-B-1
 commander in whose area the targets are
located.
4. Free Fire A specific des area into which any wpn system
Area (FFA) may fire without addl coord with the estb HQ.
The FFA is used to expedite fires and to
facilitate the jettison of CAS munitions if ac are
unable to use them on tgt. Estb by a
supported div or higher comd fol coord with
the host nation if appropriate.
5. No Fire Area An area into which no fires or the eff of fires
(NFA) are allowed except when the estb HQ
approves fires (temporarily) within the NFA on
a msn by msn basis, or when an en force
within the NFA engages a friendly force, the
comd may engage the en to def his force.
Estb by a corps or div in concert with a host
nation if applicable.
6. Restricted An area in which specific restrictions are
Fire Area imposed and in which fires which exceed
(RFA) those restrictions will not be del without coord
with the estb HQ. Estb by a manoeuvre bn or
larger ground force or by an independently
operating coy.
7. Restrictive A line estb between converging friendly forces
Fire Line (one or both may be mov) that prohibits all fire,
(RFL) or effs from fires, across the line without coord
with the affected force. The purpose of the
RFL is to prevent fratricide between
converging friendly forces.
8. Airspace A restricted area or route specified for use by
Coord Area friendly ac and estb for the purpose of
(ACA) preventing friendly ac from being fired on by
friendly forces so as to allow the safe op of
hels and ac.
Issue 1.0: Nov 07
line. The abbreviation CFL and the estb HQ are written
above the line, at the ends, with the eff DTG (and any
code name) immediately below.
Disseminated through manoeuvre and fire supported The FFA is loc on identifiable terrain when poss
channels to higher, lower and adjacent manoeuvre and or by grid ref if nec.
fire supported units. The FFA is shown on maps, charts
and overlays as an encircled solid line. The abbreviation
“FFA” is placed within the encircled area fol by the estb
HQ and the eff DTG.
Disseminated through manoeuvre and fire supported The NFA is loc on identifiable terrain where poss,
channels to higher, lower and adjacent manoeuvre and or by grid ref, or as a radius in metres from a
fire supported units. centre pt.
The NFA is shown on maps, charts and overlays as an
area enclosed with a solid line. The enclosed area is
shaded with diagonals. The abbreviation NFA is placed
within the encircled area fol by the estb HQ and the eff
DTG.
Disseminated through manoeuvre and fire supported The RFA is usually loc on identifiable terrain, by
channels to higher, lower and adjacent manoeuvre and grid ref, or as a radius in metres from a centre pt.
fire supported units. The RFA is shown on maps, charts
and overlays as an encircled solid line. The abbreviation
RFA is placed within the encircled area fol by the estb
HQ and the eff DTG.
Estb by the comds of both forces. Disseminated through An RFL is placed on identifiable terrain - usually
manoeuvre and fire supported channels to higher, lower closer to the stationary force.
and adjacent manoeuvre and fire supported units.
The RFL is shown on maps, charts and overlays as a
solid line. The abbreviation ‘RFL’ is placed at the line fol
by the estb HQs. The eff DTG is shown above the line.
Estb by the FSCC ordering its adoption. The ACA is The ACA will be des by timings, grid refs of a
shown on maps, charts and overlays as an area centre line, a width either side of the centre line in
enclosed by a solid line or lines. The abbreviation ACA is metres and a min and max altitude/height in feet.
placed inside the area together with the estb HQ, the min FSCCs must coord with AD comds.
and max altitudes and the eff DTG.
2-B-2
 CHAPTER 3

PLANNING

SECTION 1 - EFFECTS BASED APPROACH

1. Comprehensive Approach (CA). In complex contemporary crises, activities and

effects from a wide range of participants need to be coordinated or, at least, deconflicted.
The military is but one part of the CA which requires the engagement of the full range of
actors. The four principles of CA are: a proactive approach, shared understanding,
outcome based thinking and collaborative working. This is entirely coherent with BM at all
levels.

2. Effects Based Approach (EBA). EBA is, ‘The way of thinking and specific
processes that, together, enable both the integration and effectiveness of the military
contribution within a CA and the realisation of strategic outcomes’. Effects are, ‘Changes
as a result or consequence of actions, circumstances or other causes’29. BM at all levels is
completely coherent with the EBA in that it manages such effects in order to minimise their
impact on the tempo and effectiveness of operations. At lower tactical levels, BM focuses
on the activities being undertaken to ensure they are conducted in the most efficient way.
This is shown in the diagram below.

TACTICAL LEVEL BM

BM IS REQUIRED THROUGHOUT

Figure 3.1 – Illustration of the Requirement for BM from Planning

Operational End State through to Tactical Activity

3. Consequences of Activity. Activities and their consequences have effects both in

the cognitive and the physical domains, the impact being achieved through fires, influence

29
JDN 7/06 dated Sep 06.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 3-1

or a combination of both. The consequences of activity might be intended and desired, but
might be unintended or might not materialise as predicted. EBA requires a continuous
assessment of both the cognitive and physical impact of activity to exploit fleeting
opportunities and to reduce the risk of unintended and undesired consequences. This
precisely describes the purpose of BM.

SECTION 2 –THE CAMPAIGN THEMES

4. The Campaign Themes. The campaign themes within the continuum of operations
and directly related to the spectrum of conflict are: major combat, counter insurgency,
peace support, limited intervention, and peacetime military engagement. For purely
national operations, Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) is an additional category.
BM is a key enabling function within all of these campaign themes and becomes more
important as campaigns are increasingly JIM in nature.

a. Major Combat. Major combat operations may be characterised as the most

demanding type of operations involving frequent, widespread and intense combat.
In such operations BM is essential to enable the focussed application of effects by
multiple users of the battlespace.

b. Counter Insurgency. COIN may be characterised as combat operations

typically conducted below formation level during which levels of activity will vary
significantly. BM remains a key enabler during these operations.

c. Peace Support. The range of activities which can be carried out in the land
environment during peace support operations is significant. There is a clear need for
BM during enforcement operations, but the nature of BM will change as operations
develop into stabilisation. Once there is a safe and secure environment and all other
elements of the comprehensive approach are engaged, BM will become an
increasingly routine function.

d. Limited Intervention. Limited intervention has limited objectives such as the

rescue of hostages or the security of non-combatants. Such operations can be
aggressive in nature, as in, for example, a strategic raid. They are normally intended
to be of short duration and specific in objective and scope. There will be a need for
BM throughout intervention operations and it is likely to be focussed, intense and in a
JIM environment.

e. Peacetime Military Engagement (PME). PME encompasses all military

activities involving other nations that are intended to shape the security environment
in peacetime. Combat is not envisaged, although there is always some possibility of
terrorism against deployed forces. The level of BM required will depend on both the
nature of the operation and the level of control of the environment which a deployed
force may have.

f. Military Aid to the Civil Authorities. MACA (encompassing MACC, MAGD

and MACP30) will require an element of BM for routine coordination and
deconfliction. A deployed force will, however, be working to civil authorities and will
30
Military Aid to the Civil Community, Military Aid to other Government Departments, Military Aid to the Civil
Power.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 3-2

 not control an AOR. Activity levels will be relatively low and the number of users of
the environment limited compared to other operations.

SECTION 3 – FUNCTIONS IN COMBAT

5. The Functions in Combat. At the land tactical level, the six functions in combat
can be used to describe tactical battlefield activities. They represent the practical
expression of the physical component of fighting power.

a. Command. Command is the exercise of military authority by a designated

commander for the planning, direction, coordination and control of a military force.
Control is a supporting means by which command is exercised and regulated, and is
normally the province of the staff. BM is a key aspect to the successful execution of
command and control.

b. Information and Intelligence. Accurate and timely intelligence is essential to

the successful planning and conduct of operations. Coordination of collection assets
across the six dimensions of the battlespace, including IM and IX of the product, is a
function of BM. IM and IX are essential for SA, therefore directly contributing to BM.

c. Firepower. In its broadest sense firepower includes conventional maritime,

air and land delivered munitions, as well as offensive EW assets. Manoeuvre
enhances the potential effects of firepower, and firepower in turn enables
manoeuvre. To maximise the effects which can be achieved by firepower requires
staff to fully understand the requirements of BM and to consider it in all stages of
planning and execution.

d. Manoeuvre. Land manoeuvre embraces ground and air manoeuvre, and

manoeuvre support. It has both spatial and temporal dimensions allowing the
generation of a tempo which is higher than that of the enemy. This denies the
enemy the initiative and forces him to react, thus generating freedom of action. The
coordination of such manoeuvre, particularly with firepower, is a function of BM.

e. Protection. Protection preserves the fighting potential of a force so that it

can be applied at a decisive time and place. It also reduces friendly casualties that
may cause media and political pressure on the operation. Combat ID, essential to
effective protection, has direct relevance to SA and BM. Further, a key role of BM is
to reduce fratricide and thus it can contribute directly to the protect function.

f. Combat Service Support (CSS). CSS elements will be allocated their own
battlespace in which to operate, and BM is therefore a key part of the CSS planning
process. Where CSS HQs are responsible for discrete portions of battlespace, their
staffs must carry out BM.

SECTION 4 – CORE FUNCTIONS

6. The Core Functions. Finding, fixing, striking and exploiting should be conducted
concurrently, or at least achieve seamless transition from one to another. For this to be
possible BM has to be considered and implemented throughout the process.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 3-3

 a. Find. The find function involves a wide variety of manned and unmanned
platforms and the use of numerous electromagnetic systems. It it is likely to be
conducted in a JIM environment. The effective coordination and use of find assets
requires careful planning to consider all six dimensions of the battlespace. Find is
integral to the success of the ISTAR and targeting cycles and BM is a routine and
essential enabler.

b. Fix. How a target is fixed will depend on the nature of an operation but will
involve either influence or fires, be they kinetic or non kinetic. However actions are
brought to bear in order to fix the enemy, the effects required will only be achieved
by managing the battlespace in which they are used. In contemporary operations
the enemy operates in most, if not all, BM domains. Fixing effectively thus requires
agility across all six domains which can only be achieved by carefully planned, timely
and responsive BM.

c. Strike. An effective attack on an enemy will involve the use of far more than
only strike assets. At its simplest strike could be conducted with STA, a weapon
platform and a BDA system. Experience has shown that tactical level strike can
routinely involve operational and strategic joint and multinational systems; a clear
understanding of BM is thus required by all concerned. It may be necessary to
conduct SEAD31 operations simply to manoeuvre platforms and info ops should be
addressed at every stage of an action. This level of coordination will only be
achieved through effective planning which includes comprehensive consideration
and implementation of BM throughout.

d. Exploit. The exploitation of a fleeting opportunity requires audacious, timely

and responsive action. Positive control will maximise a force’s ability to exploit such
opportunities through integrated action.

SECTION 5 – PLAN AND REVIEW

7. Plan, Review, Execute, Evaluate. Command support processes are structured

around four interrelated and dependent activities. These are Plan, Review, Execute and
Evaluate (PREE). It is the responsibility of each staff branch or agency to ensure that BM
is considered throughout the PREE cycle.

8. Initial Planning. Planning activities are the start of the command support process,
notwithstanding the need for analysis and assessment to have taken place to inform the
planning itself. It is during this activity that the commander and his staff conduct their initial
estimate and produce their orders. It is essential that all cells and agencies consider the
implications of any actions on other force elements throughout the planning process.
Sources of friction can be identified and deconflicted early or procedures identified for
potential sources of friction to be managed dynamically if they occur. On occasions this
may simply be the early identification of procedures, linkages and IM/IX requirements for a
particularly intense or complex phase of battle so that they may be swiftly enacted at the
appropriate time.

31
Suppression of Enemy Air Defences. That activity which neutralises, temporarily degrades or destroys
enemy air defences by destructive and/or disruptive means. AAP-6

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 3-4

9. Review. The review function is not always required. In certain circumstance,
especially at the lower tactical levels or where swift action is required, subordinates will be
required to simply execute the given plan. There will, however, be occasions when factors
change and the BM implications should be considered.

10. Planning Activities. There are a number of activities which are integral parts of the
estimate and planning process, but which happen in parallel with the core G3/5 process,
both informing and being directed at various stages. These planning activities include IPB,
targeting, ISTAR and CSS. Any plan which does not include these activities throughout the
process will be inherently fragile. Encompassing all of these is the need to avoid or reduce
friction in order to maximise freedom of action, minimise constraints and reduce the risk of
fratricide. At any stage in the estimate or planning process, when an activity or effect can
be identified in time and space its potential to constrain other activities must be identified.
This should be a routine function within each staff cell, but BM requires visibility across the
HQ to enable G3 to coordinate and enable activity. No planned operation will achieve its
potential tempo if BM is not a key factor considered at every stage. The time taken to
overcome or manage friction during execution, which should have been identified and dealt
with during planning, will directly affect the tempo achieved and possibly the success of the
mission.

11. The Tactical Estimate. BM must be considered routinely during the estimate.
There may be occasions when BM constraints, such as the lack of sufficient C4I to
coordinate activity, reduce the simultaneity which can be achieved in a given course of
action. BM will also allow the levels of risk for some activities to be identified; if sufficient
freedom of action cannot be generated, the ability to focus combat power may be reduced,
adding risk to the operation. BM activity should be conducted within the tactical estimate as
detailed in Annex A.

12. The Combat Estimate. The combat estimate is a tool to allow commanders and
staff to deal with rapid changes of mission in order to generate tempo. It may lack the
rigour of the tactical estimate, but BM must be considered throughout the process in order
to ensure that unforeseen friction does not reduce tempo. BM activity should be conducted
within the combat estimate as detailed in Annex B.

13. Subsequent Planning. BM requires a collaborative planning approach to succeed.

However, there are occasions when individual staff cells or groups should focus on
planning for and delivering their specific capabilities according to the direction given. All
cells must continue to consider BM when this is so: should any element begin to plan in
isolation, it is possible that they will unwittingly limit the freedom of action of other deployed
elements and thereby introduce friction which will reduce tempo until solutions are found.
G3, or an appointed G3 battle manager, must maintain a coordinating role to ensure that
the implications and effects of a given action are considered across the deployed force,
including across boundaries and agencies. It should be relatively straightforward for a
planning cell to identify a potential conflict or source of friction: where the resolution of such
a conflict involves multiple agencies it remains the responsibility of G3/5 to resolve it. It is
essential that cells alert G3 or the appointed SO1/SO2 in order that action can be taken to
manage the relevant BM dimensions as soon as possible. To enable this coordination, BM
meetings should be held as part of the HQ’s routine battle rhythm, but they can be called as
required and as the situation demands.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 3-5

14. Risk. Risk analysis and risk management are part of the estimate and planning
process. Risk should be accepted and BM limitations may mean that risk is unavoidable if
freedom of action is to be maximised. It is essential, however, that where BM identifies risk
or cannot reduce risk that it is at an understood and acceptable level. At all stages where
BM recommendations are made or measures implemented, the risk should be considered
and briefed to the commander. Within BM risk can be taken both by enforcing and by
removing control measures. A plan which is predicated upon the ability to dynamically
manage the battlespace, either using dynamic procedural or active deconfliction
procedures, risks failure if the CIS architecture fails or is inadequate. Equally a plan which
relies entirely upon procedural control will lack flexibility and may fail to generate sufficient
tempo to enable success. At all levels BM has a direct influence on a force’s ability to
reduce fratricide to the absolute minimum; when planning or capability is inadequate, risk
increases.

15. Summary. BM must be considered throughout the estimate and planning

processes. The effective application of BM requires all cells and agencies to continuously
assess the impact of their current and planned activities on other battlespace users.
Throughout the planning process G5 is responsible for BM, although routine coordination of
aspects of BM can of course be delegated. When a plan is handed to G3 for execution the
responsibility moves with it and BM continues to be a key enabler.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 3-6


ACTIVITY
Establish op context of the tac
problem
Establish op timeframe of the tac
problem
Establish availability of resources
within op’s timeframe
IPB starts.
Stage 2 - Identify and Analyse the Problem
2A Mission Analysis (Conducted by the Comd)
Superior’s Intent.
Specified and implied tasks.
Constraints.
Has the situation changed?
2B Initial Object Analysis (Conducted by the Staff)
Using IPB ident en most
likely/dangerous COA
Examine relative capabilities to
keep planning focussed on en
React to Comd’s Qs fro 2A
Tentative NAIs to ident en COA
Log staff integrated
Stage 3 - Formulation of Potential Courses of Action
Issue 1.0: Nov 07
TACTICAL ESTIMATE
OUTPUT
Stage 1 - Review of the Situation
Warning Order.
Comd’s Initial Conclusions
Planning Guidance to Staff
for COA dev.
Constraints
Points for Clarification
CCIR development
Requests for Information
Focussed Questions to Staff
Staff Tasks
Effects Schematic
Identified Tasks incl ISTAR
Timeline to begin draft synch
matrix.
Poss CCIRs.
Clarification required.
ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 3
BM ACTIVITY
BM must be considered from the outset.
Monitor IPB activity for constraints and
freedoms: terrain; weather effect on
air/space; EMS; en disruptive capability
Monitor initial targeting activity incl Info
Ops Tgts
Ident Component, JIM issues,
connectivity, constraints, freedoms
Ident potential sources of friction in tasks
ident.
Consideration of constraints includes all
6 BM dimensions.
Achievable effects and simultaneity may
be limited by lack of BM capability eg to
manage the Battlespace dynamically
Ident effect of BM constraints eg on
potential tempo
.
Ident en’s capability to disrupt own BM
activities
ISTAR BM requirement: ACM, ESM,
terrain, IM/IX, Info Ops.
Ident potential friction in timeline/
drafting synch matrix.
Ident X bdry issues required to service
CCIRs
Ensure early coord and deconfliction
begins.
3-A-1
 ACTIVITY
Develop own COAs.
Deception and OPSEC.
What does en expect?
How is en action relevant to
our COAs?
How can we use this to our
advantage?
Stage 4 - Development and validation of COAs
Develop and validate COAs.
Synchronise activities across BM
dimensions
Risk analysis for each COA.
Log supportability of each COA.
DSO development informs TAI
selection, implications for Cbt, Cs
and CSS, ISTAR for NAI/DPs.
Analyse COAs: textual,
wargaming and OA
Commander’s Decision and
Development of the Plan
Table 3.2 – BM Activities within the Tactical Estimate
Issue 1.0: Nov 07
OUTPUT BM ACTIVITY
COAs. BM freedoms/constraints
considered for each COA.
Deception Plan to achieve
surprise Ident which COAs can be enabled
by procedural control and which
Ends clear – ways and means
require dynamic control.
emerging.
Is there a key BM vulnerability for
Examination of En/Fr capabilities
the en to disrupt?
interacting with each other across
all dimensions of the Battlespace. Examination of En/Fr capabilities is
BM.
Identify areas of risk
For each COA: Ident BM potential sources of
friction:
Intent Schematic.
ACM, ACMREQ, Jt Fires, ISTAR
Effects Schematic.
Manoeuvre, IM/IX, terrain, x-bdry
Comd’s concept of ops
action/effects, Info Ops.
Draft DSO.
BM vulnerability to en disruption.
Draft Synch matrix.
Synch matrix is core BM business
Stage 5 - COA Evaluation
Ident En/Fr culmination points. Ident COAs which are BM
intensive eg need for FSTs, LOs,
Ident requirement for pauses,
cross bdry activity/effects,
contingency planning etc.
involvement of other agencies.
Mechanisms avail to focus fire and
Ident physical and electronic
manoeuvre.
interfaces to enable COAs.
Mechanisms avail to focus Info
Processes to provide CSS
Ops, Psy Ops, Media Ops EW
Identify areas of risk
Stage 6 - Commander’s Decision
Decision is logical result of Ensure BM measures which have
estimate. been considered are carried
forward and included in direction
Targeting and other boards as
and orders given.
required (level dependent)
Passage of info for Mov Os, O
Gps, probable Msns and Tasks
etc: Warning Order 3.
3-A-2
 ANNEX B TO
CHAPTER 3
THE COMBAT ESTIMATE

ACTIVITY OUTPUT BM ACTIVITY

Question 1 - What are the Enemy doing and why?

IPB. En COA – most likely/most Ident en’s capability to disrupt own BM

dangerous activities
BAE.
PIRs (initial CCIRs/ICP) Early coord and deconfliction begins.
Threat Evaluation.
Initial scope of ISTAR plan Monitor initial ISTAR plan
Threat Integration.

Question 2 - What have I been told to do and why?

Comd’s intent Key Tasks Ident potential sources of friction in key

tasks.
Specified and implied tasks Constraints
Constraints in all 6 BM Dimensions.
Constraints CCIRs
Ident X bdry issues to service CCIRs
Has situation changed?

Question 3 - What effect do I want to have on the en and what direction must I give to develop my
plan?

Comd’s Intent and Direction Intent Schematic Consider BM constraints on each COA
Develop COA Effects Schematic Early coord and deconfliction begins.

Question 4 - Where can I best accomplish each action and effect?

Select COA Draft DSO Achievable effects and simultaneity may

be limited by lack of dynamic BM
Develop CONPLANS
capability.

Question 5 - What resources do I need to accomplish each action and effect?

Resources allocated to tasks
Develop ISTAR Plan
Draft TASKORG
Develop and resource DSO
Confirm ICP
Ident potential friction in resource
allocation.
ISTAR BM: ACM, ESM, terrain, IM/IX.
Consider BM integration of CSS elmns.

Question 6 - When and where do the actions take place in relation to each other?

Coord assets/activity across 6 Synch matrix Synch matrix is core BM business

BM dimensions

Question 7 - What control measures do I need to Impose?

Identify BM required to TM, FSCM, ACM, COMSEC, Q 7 is BM.

enable comd’s plan Combat ID, AD WCS, etc

Table 3.3 – BM Activities within the Combat Estimate

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 3-B-1

 CHAPTER 4

EXECUTION

SECTION 1 – EXECUTE AND EVALUATE

1. Execute. Once the orders are delivered either post review or directly from plan,
execution staff activities start, which includes BM. Critically, G3 staff identify and forecast
changes which may invalidate the original plan and necessitate changes to the conduct of
the operation. In order to ensure that the tempo is not lost, the implications and potential
effects of all changes in planned activity on other elements must be identified and
managed. All cells and agencies should routinely consider BM throughout the execution of
an operation. There will be occasions when BM is most easily addressed through a BM
meeting as part of an HQ’s battle rhythm.

2. Evaluate. Evaluate activities are conducted continuously, throughout execution and

might require a quick estimate to be conducted. The result may be the execution of a
CONPLAN; a FragO to implement a minor or a major change to current ops; or the
invalidation of the current operation and a return to the plan stage. The BM implications of
any change must be considered throughout; tempo will be lost if friction is not reduced as
early as possible. BM meetings provide the opportunity to conduct such evaluation.

3. The Execution of BM. While there may be a clear point where the transfer of a
plan from G5 to G3 represents the beginning of its execution, the reality is that once an
operation has begun PREE activities will happen continuously and simultaneously.
Similarly, BM has to be continuously evaluated as an operation progresses. Some BM
controls or measures can be established and will endure with little or no change, such as
some routes, liaison requirements, CIS linkages or procedures for clearance of fires and
joint fires. Most aspects of BM will however develop and change as a mission progresses;
the tempo will determine whether changes need to be made dynamically or whether
procedural methods are sufficient. Digitisation will significantly improve an HQ’s ability to
execute BM through the tools provided by systems such as BCIP32, JADOCS, JETTS, DII33
and VMF34.

4. Amphibious Operations. Amphibious operations may generate additional BM

complexity during execution. Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) is given specific
authority over all forces within the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA). As such, he requires
control or influence over the AOA Battlespace. If he has the necessary structures, he will
fulfil the role of subordinate Airspace Control Authority (ACA), which conveys responsibility
for issues such as promulgation of an Airspace Control Plan (ACP) and Airspace Control
Orders (ACO). In certain operations, the JFMCC may also be the JFACC. If forces are
required to transit through an AOA, CATF is responsible for coordinating their movements,
though it is preferable that assets not directly involved in the AOA avoid it altogether. The
task is simplified during discrete amphibious operations, compared with those that form one
part of a wider action. There will an increased requirement for liaison where force
interaction is planned within the AOA. At the termination of an amphibious operation,
usually when a force is re-embarked or placed under the control of the JFLCC, the AOA is
32
Bowman, Combat, Infrastructure and Platform BISA.
33
Defence Information Infrastructure
34
Variable Message Formats.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-1

disestablished. At this stage control of the battlespace, and the airspace in particular,
reverts to the arrangements previously in place. For this to be accomplished seamlessly
and without generating added friction it is necessary for the transfer to be carefully planned
and briefed, relying heavily on established Liaison Officers (LOs).

5. BM Enablers. In order to effectively conduct BM during both the planning and

execution of an operation, staff must be fully familiar with the key tools, organisations and
enablers available, in order that they can change or request changes to them as BM is
conducted.

a. Air Operations Coordination Centre (AOCC). The AOCC is the senior

tactical Air Liaison Element (ALE) of the JFACC embedded within the HQ of another
component. The role of the AOCC (L)35 is to coordinate and direct air support to the
land forces in order to integrate air operations with the supported land formation.
The AOCC (L) consists of two parts, the Air Component Coordination Element
(ACCE) and the Air Support Operations Centre (ASOC)36.

b. Battlefield Coordination Detachment (Air) (BCD(A)). The BCD(A) is the

senior tactical land liaison element in the JFACC. Its role and function is therefore
similar to that of the AOCC(L). The AOCC(L) assists with the flow of air information
into the LCHQ and is responsible for requesting land support to the JFACC.
Conversely, the BCD(A) assists with the flow of land information into the JFACHQ
and requests air support from the JFACHQ.

c. ATO/ACO/SPINS. The ATO is a document which allocates air resources to

tasks; the ACO and SPINS are usually issued with the ATO and contain sufficient
BM information to plan the missions. A 72-hour ATO cycle is fairly standard.
Planning begins 48 hours in advance of the execution period to enable the
integration of joint targeting and individual component requirements. The cycle ends
after a 24-hour execution period. An ATO is therefore issued every 24 hours, having
been in planning for the previous 48 hours. While the tasking of aircraft cannot be
completely changed in the last few hours before the execution of an ATO, additional
ACMs or FSCMs can be included in the ACO or SPINS at the latter end of the
planning cycle and during execution when they are issued as changes. The
mechanism for requesting, for example, a ROZ, is to submit an Airspace Control
Means Request Message (ACMREQ). ACMREQs are collated by airspace
managers and then passed to the Airspace Control Authority (ACA) through the
extant chain of command. The ACA is usually JFAC and the POC within JFAC for
LC ACMREQs is the BCD(A). Systems such as JADOCS include a digitised
ACMREQ management facility.

d. Recognised Air Picture (RAP). The RAP is an electronically produced

37
display delivered over Tactical Data Links (TDL). It is compiled from a variety of
sources including primary and secondary radar, and ESM. It covers a three
dimensional volume of interest in which all detected air contacts have been
evaluated against specific threat parameters and recognition criteria and then
assigned an identification category and track number. There will be only one RAP
35
AOCC (Land). There is an AOCC (M) for the Maritime Component.
36
For greater detail see Chapter 5.
37
TDLs are the means which enable near real-time tactical data exchange from which the RAP is produced.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-2

 for the JOA. The RAP is a near real time picture of air activity38. It is produced by
drawing on data that is drawn from as wide a variety of sources as possible39. The
RAP is an essential part of cross component SSA and enables dynamic air land
integration. The RAP is not universally available at the land tactical level40 and its
availability is therefore a key element in determining the level of BM which can be
conducted. Information can be sent from the LC to take advantage of the SA
represented by the RAP allowing dynamic BM to be executed eg to clear fires.
Information can be passed through FACs, TACPs and ALOs.

e. Common Geographic Reference System (CGRS). CGRS is a procedural

measure used to rapidly and clearly define geographical locations for BM. It
provides a common reference between components (boxes can be colour coded to
indicate component ownership41), and simplifies the passage of information; it is not
in itself an FSCM. The CGRS will be defined in the FID. CGRS should be flexible
enough to be used for a variety of purposes, including general locations of friendly
forces, land force manoeuvre boundaries, areas of intended attack, ACM
boundaries, FSCM boundaries, locating the FSCL, ISTAR areas of interest, aircraft
orbits, high threat areas (such as AD threat locations). It is a flexible BM tool which
can be dynamically applied in changing circumstances if the appropriate interfaces
are available.

10 Cell Keypad The CGRS grid is constructed in

9 9 1 2 3
minutes of lat/long from a point of
origin unique for each operation.
8 4 5 6 The size of each square therefore
Quadrant varies according to distance from
7 7 8 9 the equator.
6 NW NE
The grid is divided into boxes with
5 SW SE the following dimensions:

4 CELL: 30 mins x 30 mins lat/long

3 9B9SW KEYPAD: 10 mins x 10 mins

lat/long
2
QUADRANT: 5 mins x 5 mins
1 lat/long

A B C D E F G H I J
Table 4.1 – Example CGRS

f. Kill Boxes. CGRS can be used to quickly define and disseminate the
location of a kill box. There should be no ground forces in or near a kill box; aircraft

38
The latency of the picture will vary according to the sensors and data links available. Link 16 can deliver a
12 second latency. The future UK Land Environment Air Picture Provision (LEAPP) will allow the compilation
of a Local Air Picture with a four second latency.
39
Sensors/sources such as TACC, E3D, SK ASACS, CVS, T42, LEAPP.
40
RAP Tp (Jt GBAD HQ) and AMRAP Tp (16 AA Bde) provide Link 16 connectivity at the land tactical level.
ALES Det (3 Cdo Bde) provides Link 11 SA.
41
Ref JFOP 2/06 JBM. JTFC: Purple. MCC: Yellow. LCC: Green. ACC: Blue. SF: Black. JFLogC: Grey.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-3

 can therefore attack without the need for terminal control. A kill box is a three-
dimensional FSCM used to facilitate the expeditious air-to-surface attack of targets,
which may be augmented by or integrated with surface-to-surface indirect fires. The
primary purpose of a kill box is to allow air assets to conduct interdiction against
surface targets without further coordination with the establishing commander, and
without terminal attack control.

g. FSCM/ACM. FSCM and ACM42 are essential procedural BM tools. They are
disseminated through the normal orders procedure and when linked to systems
which provide situational awareness such as BCIP or rapid cross
component/boundary coordination such as JADOCS and JETTS, they can become
far more dynamic BM tools. It is essential that these means and measures are fully
understood, as they can be restrictive as well as permissive.

h. Staff Products. There are a variety of staff products which are designed to
coordinate or allocate resources in time and space; they are all in effect, BM tools.
During the production of a synchronisation matrix such as an AB545B or an Effects
Guidance Matrix (EGM), staff branches should ensure that in addition to coordinating
combat and combat support activity within the battlespace, potential sources of
friction are identified and eliminated or reduced.

i. Digitisation/NEC. A number of CIS systems are being delivered which

directly contribute to a developing NEC43. Many of these systems include tools or
functionality which directly enable dynamic and flexible BM. BCIP 5 will provide a
significant information sharing capability, which with regularly updated position
reports will make a direct contribution to SSA. JADOCS and JETTS provide tools
such as collaborative planning capability, access to the RAP, access to the ATO and
the ability to deconflict fires across components. DII (Future Deployed) (DII(FD)) will
provide a common system on deployment which will significantly improve Information
Management (IM) information exchange and Information Exploitation (IX). Single
component systems such as RAFCCIS provide secure connectivity across the AC.
The LEAPP capability will produce a Local Air Picture (LAP) which can stand alone if
necessary or receive and contribute to the RAP if available. LEAPP will provide the
LC with the ability to dynamically manage its own airspace or better to control it
within a HIDACZ. BM execution will become far more dynamic and sophisticated as
each of these systems is deployed.

j. Battlespace Spectrum Management (BSM). BSM is the practical

coordination and, where necessary, the deconfliction of all EMS usage within an
operational environment. Spectrum management is a G6 responsibility, executed on
behalf of the G3 branch, which is founded on interpretation of the commander’s
intent and requires the production of an operational BSM plan, inclusive of EMCON
advice, in order to ensure coherent C3I for all functions in combat. BSM must
anticipate, deconflict and ensure the most efficient and operationally effective use of
the EMS between all users; including EW, ECM (FP), ISTAR, CIS and weapons

42
For individual measures/means, see Annexes A and B to Chapter 2.
43
The Joint Data Networks (JDN) Backbone programme will provide the means to connect and transfer real-
time and near real-time tactical data between existing stove-piped tactical data networks from 2012, thereby
being a key development towards SSA and NEC.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-4

 systems. The JRFL44 process is a key element in conducting effective BSM. BSM
must be executed in accordance with the commander’s priorities. BSM is a dynamic
process that must be conducted across the spectrum of conflict and in all types of
operation. In order to achieve this it requires a feedback process to enable the
appropriate action to be taken when a conflict is identified.

k. EW Coordination Cell (EWCC). The EWCC provides a capability for

planning, coordinating, monitoring and directing EW operations. The EWCC is also
the focus for EW liaison as part of the spectrum management process.

6. Activity Specific BM Measures. The BM measures which the commander or his

staff will enact will vary in practice, if not in principle, depending on the assets and
resources involved. Thus in response, for example, to a ‘Troops in Contact’ (TIC) situation
aircraft can be easily routed through airspace where the hazards have already been
identified and promulgated and handed off to an FAC for terminal control allowing detailed
coordination with the manoeuvre element. The procedures required would be different in
response to a second TIC situation where the effect required could only be delivered by
GMLRS for example. In order to clear GMLRS fires a method is required to clear a
trajectory up to 70km in length, to a maximum altitude of 20km+ of all air users in a matter
of minutes. This has been routinely carried out during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Annex A contains a series of BM issues and considerations which are specific to activities
or weapon systems.

SECTION 2 – THE BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT MEETING

7. The BM Meeting. The BM management meeting is the most effective method of

ensuring that the synergy and coordination which BM delivers is achievable. The meeting
brings together those elements that will require access to the battlespace in order to carry
out their assigned missions. Items under discussion and attendance will depend on the
capabilities available. The level of the HQ will determine how far ahead the group will
consider issues. The purpose of the meeting is to clarify the requirements of each capability
or functional area and to identify potential sources of conflict. That done, BM priorities can
be established either to deconflict or coordinate from within an HQ’s own controlled
battlespace or to request access or control measures where authority lies elsewhere. The
collaborative principle of BM planning requires that this meeting should identify where a
formation or unit’s activity might have cross boundary or inter agency effects or
implications. Such possible friction should then be passed to the appropriate agencies.
Depending on the nature of the operation, the BM meeting will also identify where actions
by OGD or NGO could impact upon operations, if not coordinated in advance.

8. Frequency. The frequency of meetings will be dependent upon the battle rhythm of
a given HQ and the intensity and nature of an operation. The cycle must however be
coherent with that of the ATO/ACO/SPINS if potential friction identified within the LC
volume of airspace is to be managed successfully. Equally, details of any action which may
have a potential, possibly unintended, physical or electronic effect in airspace controlled by
another agency must be passed on in order to be coordinated or deconflcited. The
ATO/ACO cycle is the only cycle with which all components will synchronise their planning
activity in order to manage their own airspace; it is therefore an essential part of

44
Joint Restricted Frequency List

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-5

establishing a BM battle rhythm. Effective synchronisation is more important than a rigid
cycle; ACO and SPINS can be produced more frequently than once every 24 hours if the
tempo of operations demands it.

9. Agenda. The standing agenda will be as per formation or unit SOI/SOPs, but as
BM is a continuous and iterative process, it must inform the PREE cycle at all stages.
Changes to the current plan and future intentions should be examined from the perspective
of individual capabilities in order to coordinate the activities of the deployed force. The
agenda should be structured around current and future operations by capability or function
as this will best allow G3, or the G3 appointed battle manager, to maintain a clear overview.
A suggested agenda, which can be tailored as needed, is detailed in Annex A.

SECTION 3 – SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

10. Situational Awareness, Shared Situational Awareness and BM. Without

SA/SSA, BM is procedural, pedestrian and inflexible. In order to manage the Battlespace
dynamically enough to seize each fleeting opportunity and maximise the freedom of action
of all elements, SA/SSA must be of the highest order. Procedural control relies upon
friendly forces remaining in their own allocated volumes of battlespace thus avoiding the
risk of fratricide and allowing the maximum freedom of action of each individual element.
The risk of human error is accepted, although significantly reduced by GPS and systems
such as Blue Force Tracker (BFT). However, in order to conduct the most dynamic BM (ie
positive control) and allow all systems to operate with minimum constraints, the ability to
reduce risk to absolute minimal levels by near-guarantee of combat ID is required. SSA is
significantly improved by the use of CIS systems such as BCIP 5, JADOCS, JETTS
particularly when they have data links such as Link 16 providing access to the RAP.
LEAPP will also directly contribute to SSA within the LC through the provision of an AP from
organic sensors and Link 16 access to the RAP.

11. Situational Awareness. SA is defined as ‘the understanding of the operational

environment in the context of a commander’s (or staff officer’s) mission (or task)’45. SA
informs decision making. The Battlespace is an increasingly complex and dynamic
environment, where the achievement of SA is challenging. SA is not a mechanical process,
although the effective management and exploitation of information is essential: SA simply
does not exist without military judgment to understand the picture presented. SA is easily
lost and its maintenance is therefore a continuous process.

12. Shared Situational Awareness. SSA is defined as a condition where force

elements achieve a common or at least consistent understanding of both the operational
level context and the prevailing tactical situation46. SSA is enabled to differing levels by
BCIP and JADOCS/JETTS which increase the ability of commanders and staffs to visualise
activity in battlespace. Critically, this allows planned activities to be coordinated and
synchronised to a very high level and promotes agile responses to changing circumstances.
For BM, this allows control means and measures to be modified as rapidly as necessary,
minimising the risk of fratricide and enabling consistently high tempo operations.

45
JWP 0-01.1.
46
Joint HLOC referred to in JDP 3-70 Study Draft.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-6

13. Information Management47. IM is a command responsibility which uses the
application of TTPs to effectively support the acquisition, storage, access, manipulation,
dissemination, presentation and re-use of information and knowledge which leads to their
effective exploitation. Effective IM is essential for effective information exploitation which in
turn directly contributes to SA and therefore BM.

14. Information Exploitation48. Information exploitation includes fusion,

transformation, assessment, analysis and manipulation of information by all staff. It
supports SA, planning, decision making and the coordination of desired effects. This
encompasses the interpretation of information by applying judgement and experience. It is
the aim of the commander and staff to use the information available for decision superiority.
Digitisation will significantly improve both IM and information exploitation and therefore
directly contribute to BM through improved SA.

15. Combat Identification. Combat ID is the process of combining SA, target

identification, specific tactics, training and procedures to increased operational
effectiveness of weapon systems and reduce the incidence of casualties caused by friendly
fire49. It is a key BM enabler because by increasing the speed of target identification and
reducing the risk of fratricide, it increases freedom of action by removing potential friction.
Additionally, it reduces reaction times in kill chains by reducing the time between detection
and identification and therefore in the clearance of fires in order to deliver the desired effect.
16. Special Forces. Special Forces (SF), some recce forces and STA patrols are
examples of force elements whose requirement for OPSEC can be high. Such force
elements often have significant resources allocated to their operations, including specialist
and/or unique equipment that impinges on the battlespace. It is thus essential to establish
an effective level of SSA/visibility of SF activity in order to avoid fratricide.
17. Civilian Agencies. Civilian agencies will operate in many theatres, even when the
risks are significant. Such agencies include OGD, UN, NGOs, HN and private military
companies. Agencies working wholly within a formation’s AOR should, if possible, be
integrated into the battlespace to minimise their risk. It is, however, important that OPSEC
is not prejudiced. Coordination considerations required include ground and air movement,
current and future locations, operations (eg aid distribution) and communications equipment
(compatibility and interference). The level of risk which is acceptable if such agencies are
reluctant to integrate their activities should be determined. G3/5 should submit RFIs to
ensure advanced warning of the entry of a new organisation to the battlespace.
18. Terminal Control. SA is key to successful terminal control, although the volume
of battlespace in which that SA applies to can be limited. Terminal control is an essential
part of BM; the preferred method of control is real time positive control. It consists of the
control of fires, or other assets such as UAVs, by tactical parties usually deployed with the
manoeuvre elements. It is activity conducted with the specific intention of supporting the
manoeuvre elements on the ground. Communications are the key to exercising effective
terminal control particularly where there are multiple assets allocated to an action. Without
communications, positive control is impossible and operations are of necessity planned,
procedural in nature and thus lacking in flexibility.

47
See AFM Vol 1 Part 8 Ch 3.
48
Ibid.
49
JWP 0-01.1

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-7

19. Summary. BM is a core function. It is the commander at each level who retains
responsibility for the battlespace allocated to his unit or formation. The COS at each level
is the designated battlespace manager. The execution of BM is routinely delegated50 and
when this happens, it must be made clear that the BM function operates on behalf of the
commander and with his authority. Experience shows that without such authority the BM
function is less effective in resolving conflicting issues and does not therefore enhance
synergy and operational tempo. BM remains the responsibility of all staff branches within a
HQ, regardless of the level. During the execution of an operation BM should identify and
remove sources of friction which could reduce tempo; periods of intense activity across the
BM domains must be identified during plan and review in order that BM functions and levels
of effort are easily and quickly put in place in order to maintain momentum.

50
BM is routinely delegated to the organic Close Air Defence (CAD) Tac Gps embedded within formation
HQs.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-8

 ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 4

BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT MEETING AGENDA

Ser Cell/Tac Gp Content

(a) (b) (c)

1 COS - Intro.
(or delegated - Scope of meeting in time and phase of operation.
to SO1/ SO2) - Identify stages/phases of current/future ops which will require greatest coord or
dynamic control.

2 G3 Ops - Changes to current plan and future intentions and coord implications.
- Identify periods of highest activity levels next 24/48/72 hrs and acceptable risk
(Combat ID) to manoeuvre elms to estab BM pris.
- Determine phases which need HIDACZ/ROZ for AOR.
- Boundaries, ACM, FSCM issues. Prohibited/Restricted target lists.
- Landspace Management issues. Pris, higher HQ Tps OGD/NGO/HN.
- Identified IM/IX/LO requirements next 24/48/72 hrs.
- OGD/NGO/HN constraints/freedoms.
- Media constraints/freedoms.
- UOR equipment coord and spectrum supportability requirements. BSM.

3 G2 - Update/Assessment of en ability to disrupt BM.

4 Arty Ops (incl - Review FSCL.

Deep) - ARAs/AMAs. Current & planned. Landspace Management and ASM
implications. Hazard areas for manoeuvre elmns.
- Fire Planning. (Key Tgt areas –ROZ?). Trajectory issues? Harassing fire? FSCM
requests/requirements.
- Mechanisms to exercise dynamic control and revert to procedural.
- TST BM issues incl possible Joint Accelerated Targeting.
- Identify periods of highest activity levels next 24/48/72 hrs incl fires, WLR, UAV
and Battlespace affected, risk to other force elmns.

5 ASM - ATO. Air scheme of manoeuvre. Allocation of CAS/AI. Identify periods of max
Air Ops activity including overflights and flanks next 24/48/72 hrs.
ASOC - ACMs next 24/48/72hrs and potential affect on land ops. Possible limitations of
ARA/AMA ROZs, TST/JAT dynamic control procedures.
- ACMREQ 24/48/72hrs. Cfm ATO/ACO/SPINS timelines.
- Issues affecting air C3I/RAP issues eg lack of Link 16 capable ac, availability of
AWACS, AOCC(L) etc
- CSAR. Possible coord required or acceptable risks?
- Possible SF constraints on ops.
- BSM requirements eg signatures of UOR radars.
- OGD/NGO/HN issues.

6 Avn - ACMs in place next 24/48/72hrs to sp ops.

AMPT - ACMREQ 24/48/72hrs to enable ops.
AAPT - Identify periods of max planned activity and possible coord issues.
- Safe routing drills in event of lost comms.
- Possible SF constraints on ops.
- Landspace Management requirements.

7 Engr - Barrier Free/Restricted Areas

- UXO / hazardous waste Restricted Areas
- IED threat areas
- Routes / Mobility Corridors/Obstacles and xing points.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-A-1

 Ser Cell/Tac Gp Content

(a) (b) (c)

- Host Nation Infrastructure

- Restricted Target Areas
- Engr Log issues

8 ISTAR - Non Organic. Planned missions, types of platform and potential products
(freedoms) or friction (BSM? Resource allocation?).
- Potential interference from classified platforms.
- UORs. Freedoms and constraints.

9 STA - UAVs. ACMs, Timings, ARAs: Air/grd hazard. Coord with manoeuvre. BSM.
- WLR. BSM hazard area. EMS profile for ac DAS.
- ASP real estate, base line vulnerability/maintainability
- STA Ptls, insertion, location, extraction, OPSEC and acceptance of risk.

10 CIS - EMS Management. EW, HN, multinational, flanking fmn ‘leakage’ of electronic
effects.
- Real estate.
- UORs.

11 AD - ADA requests.
- WCS changes.
- Multination issues: SIFF/Combat ID. New ac types in theatre.

12 CSS - Real estate.

- Combat ID.
- OGD/NGO freedoms constraints.

13 CBRN - Extant hazard areas for ground and air (ASM, TM, effect of Met).
- HN infrastructure risks – Restricted/Prohibited Tgt recommendations

14 OGD - Constraints implied by Comprehensive Approach.

- Movement by OGD/NGO agencies (ASM, TM)
- Comms requirements.
- UOR equivalents

15 LEGAD - Update on UK ROE – constraint or freedom?

- Multi national constraints. Use of forces. Different ROE

16 COS - Summarise frictions identified and confirm BM priorities to resolve.

(or delegated - Identify dynamic control requirements and limitations on ops if not achieved.
to SO1/ SO2 - Procedural concerns/deconfliction required.
BM) - External Requests required including OGD/NGO/HN/SF.

17 AOB

18 COS (or SO1/ BM direction for next 24/48/72 hrs.

SO2)

Table 4.1 – Generic BM Meeting Agenda.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-A-2

 ANNEX B TO
CHAPTER 4

ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

AIR INTERDICTION

Description
Action to destroy, disrupt, divert or delay the en’s surface potential before it can be used effectively against fr forces, or otherwise achieve its objs and carried
out at such distance from Fr forces that detailed integration of each air msn with the fire and mov of fr forces is not required

Request/Tasking/Control
AI conducted short of the FSCL would probably not happen below div level (bde if it is the highest echelon). Request through DALO/BALO to ASOC (part of
AOCC(L)) or Air Planning Team. Tasked on ATO (Likely to be retasked CAS). AOCC(L) will route ac through ACMs.

BM CONSIDERATIONS

Ensure existing ASM promulgated through the ACO will enable the ac to reach the tgt area – if not amend. RAP.
Air Kill Box using CGRS activated within LC airspace: authorised by LC actioned through AOCC(L).
Tgt info passed to ac through AOCC(L).

Land Msn is AI not CAS because there are no manoeuvre elements near tgt. Coord with SF LO.
Terminal control is by pilot.
Activity is independent.
AD WCS.
Possible unknown OGD/NGO/HN activity in target area will rely on pilot and ROE for deconflcition.

Sea Coord through MCC to CATF. If operating in the Littoral, requires NGS deconfliction. AD radars. AD WCS.

EMS Jammers, AD radar, WLR signatures.

CGS JETTS, JADOCS, LEAPP, RAP

Time Pre-planned is procedural. Deconfliction is in space.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-B-1

 ANNEX C TO
CHAPTER 4

ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

Description
Action by FW/RW vs tgts, requiring detailed integration with actions of fr forces to avoid fratricide and allow targeting guidance.
Type 1 - High risk of fratricide: FAC is required visually to acquire ac and tgt prior to and during wpn release. FAC considers aircraft nose position and
geometry. FAC clears each attack/ tgt.
Type 2 - Reduced risk of fratricide, but FAC controls each individual attack.
Type 3 - Low risk of fratricide. FACs grant wpn release clearance to the aircrew attacking a tgt iaw restrictions set by the FAC.

Request/Tasking/Control
PRE PLANNED Requests through the CofC to AOCC (L). Tasked through ATO. Either scheduled so ac is in the tgt area at a TOT or On Call with assets on
ground/deck or airborne alert.
IMMED CAS Request which diverts ac from another task or airborne alert, or scrambles them from a ground-alert posture. Requested as a result of a
developing situation where the need for pre-planned CAS had not been anticipated/allocated. Requests are sent via the Tactical Air Request Net (TARN) to
the AOCC or to the Air Liaison Officer (ALO).
E CAS CAS without qualified controller. Aircrew have wpn release auth and decide attack profile. Initiator unlikely to have comms to speak direct to ac or
have the codes for authentication. May talk to the FAC via the Manoeuvre net, the MFC/FOO/ BC, or with FAC on Tactical Air Request Net (TARN).

BM CONSIDERATIONS

Air Ensure existing ASM promulgated through the ACO will enable the ac to reach the tgt area – if not amend. ASOC coord the airspace requirements
and liaises with the TACP(ALO) to ensure CAS missions deconflicted with other airspace users and ground manoeuvre. If a ROZ/HIDACZ is
estab covering tgt area, the ac will not enter it until contact is estab with FAC. If executed within CGRS addl ACM/FSCM may be required.

Land Type 1 must have qual FAC. Untrained obs act as eyes for FAC for Type 2 or 3. OSG/Fire Sp HQ cells must ensure ac safe in relation to arty etc.
In terminal area controller (FAC/FOO) is responsible for BM separation of ac and arty/mors/small arms etc. ECAS STOP, STOP, STOP

Sea If operating in the Littoral, requires NGS deconfliction. AD radars. AD WCS.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-C-1

EMS Coloured Smoke, Fluorescent Marker Panels, Signal Mirror, Lights/IR/Laser. Freqs/call signs for non-FACs for the passage of E-CAS requests
must be distributed during the orders process along with any chain of command that is to be followed when submitting an E-CAS request.

CGS JETTS, JADOCS, LEAPP, RAP, BCIP

Time With FST deconfliction is real time positive control

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-C-2

 ANNEX D TO
CHAPTER 4

ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

CLOSE COMBAT ATTACK

Description
CCA is fire support provided by Battlefield Helicopters (BH) in close proximity to friendly forces. It is mainly executed by Attack Helicopters (AH) and is
tasked through the LC chain of command.

Request/Tasking/Control
TYPE A CCA is where the air to ground effects and fire and movement of AH is controlled by the supported tactical commander on the ground, in his AO.
The qualified (ground) observer is responsible for selecting the target, preventing fratricide, and ensuring that the effects requested are within the ROE.
TYPE B CCA takes place within the AO of a ground tactical commander but within an area, which has been temporarily allocated as an Aviation Free Fire
Area (FFA) and in which no friendly forces are positioned. Aviation then has freedom to fire and manoeuvre and deliver effects against targets within the
allocated area. The aircrew are responsible for target identification and all aspects of weapons delivery.
The CCA call for fire through FPC, FDC, or FSCC or be rebro through LO. Secure Voice Rebroadcast (SVR) required for comms between BOWMAN and AH
radios. The SVR is provided to ground units who require direct comms with AH.
Key planner and controllers are JEC, OSG, AAPT and AMPT.

BM CONSIDERATIONS

Air Avn Manoeuvre Area (AVMA). Grid box system. Segment system. Concentric circles.

Land Terrain may be required for FOB FARP etc. this will be alloc by TM at appropriate level.
Type B is procedural control conducting independent activity in a defined volume of battlespace, usually an AVMA. CGRS.

Sea CCA may be by MC assets. Coord through MCC/CATF. AH could operate from Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) or Landing Platform Dock
(LPD).

EMS Lights/IR/laser.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-D-1

CGS JETTS, JADOCS, LEAPP, RAP

Time Type A positive control by obs.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-D-2

 ANNEX E TO
CHAPTER 4

ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

UNMANNED AIR VEHICLES

Description
BM is vital for multiple platforms to be flying at the same time, at different heights/altitudes, in different parts of the battlespace and repeatedly transitioning
between flight levels, this will add a greater level of complication to airspace management and coordination.

Request/Tasking/Control
UAVs will usually be grouped to the G2 Branch (or the OSG) but capability tasked iaw comd’s pri. Capability will be commanded at the highest level and
controlled at the lowest. UAVs may be grouped down to BG/Coy level. Tasking is through tac gp which is also responsible for BM.

BM CONSIDERATIONS

Air ACM – ACMREQs submitted if sufficient time available though airspace manger to AOC; short notice tasks will require more dynamic control.
ROZ launch/rcy UAV may have exclusive air routes. ‘Racetrack’/loiter pattern required to observe NAI
Operating alts vary: Px 2000m AGL, WKPR 15000ft AMSL, DH 150m AGL. A UAV ROZ can be estab above the CL to avoid conflict with RW.
Planned activity on ATO/ACO. Small size and low RCS make UAVs a potential hazard for fast jets.

Land Terrain require for launch and recovery – ARAs, AD given an appropriate, restrictive WCS.
For mini UAVs coord with manoeuvre elmns in area.
CGRS
Sea UAVs (including TUAV) may be launched from LPH/CVS.

EMS EW or poor BSM can significantly affect the comms and data links and/or navigation systems that provide the ability to control the AV, provide the
sensor downlink or comms with manoeuvre arm or other airspace users. JTDS data links. Lost comms drills must be identified.
CGS JETTS, JADOCS, LEAPP, RAP

Time

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-E-1

 ANNEX F TO
CHAPTER 4

ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

GMLRS (UNITARY)

Description
GMLRS (U) (Unitary) is a blast/fragmenting unitary warhead triggered by PD or delay fuze. Onboard GPS/INS (Inertial Navigation System) will provide approx
2 m CEP at ranges from 15 to 70 km. Fired from MLRS M270 B1 (12 rockets) and in future LIMAWS (R) (6 rockets). Both platforms can fire single or multiple
rockets. Max vertex height 22 km AGL.

Request/Tasking/Control
JEC, OSG CoC, fire sp

BM CONSIDERATIONS

Air ROZ may be established around firing and target areas.

AOC responsible for establishing ACM such as trajectory ‘wall’ which will be enforced by AOCC(L). <1hr solid ACM min 1km wide, length GT,
height up to 20km+. Pre-planned (1 -24hrs) ‘gate’ under trajectory may be planned. Pre-planned 24+hrs ATO.
CAS may be restricted to ground forces below traj

Land Real estate – ARAs/AMAs. If ROZ used, avoid establishing on whole ARA/AMA.
CGRS

Sea In extremis GMLRS could be fired form LPH/LPD.

EMS Missile guidance is GPS/INS - no in flight link to launcher.

CGS JETTS, JADOCS, LEAPP, RAP

Time Control is dynamic procedural – linkages must be established in advance. ACM in place for min possible time.

NOTE: Dimensions of ‘wall’ will vary.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-F-1

 ANNEX G TO
CHAPTER 4

ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT, MLRS, ARTILLERY, MORTARS

Description
LC organic fire support. MLRS M77 (Bomblet) 11.5 to 32 km, AT2 (SCATMIN) 11.5 to 39 km, max alt 13km AGL. ‘Fired in ripples’ of up to 12 rkts. 155mm
L20 ERBS max rge 29.2Km, max alt High Angle -18,589m AGL, max alt Low Angle - 12,718m AGL. 155mm L15 HE max rge 24.9 Km, max alt High Angle -
15,171m AGL, max alt Low Angle 9,078m AGL. 105mm range 17.2km max alt 7500m AGL . 81mm mors range 5.6km max alt 11000ft AGL. All systems
6400mil shooting.
MC. NGS. Various wpns eg max rg 27000m.

Request/Tasking/Control
Requested through fire sp CoC: MFC, FOO,FST, NGFO, BC, FPC, FSCC. Clearance of fires at FSCC (bde) or delegated to observer. Clearance cross
component may require JADOCS/JETTS. Coord/deconfliction with manoeuvre arm is terminal control. NGLOs may be used for liaison.

BM CONSIDERATIONS

Air ROZ possible over firing position out to max range above max alt. May constrain use of CAS. If aval, FST responsible for coordination of
assets/tac groups.

Land Coord with manoeuvre elements. TST/JAT procedures will have BM implications. RW coord. LO requirement.
CGRS

Sea Coord of fire with CATF or LC. LO requirement.

EMS Cross component comms

CGS JETTS, JADOCS, LEAPP, RAP

Time FST, NGFO, MFC, FOO, BC exercise real time positive control.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-G-1

 ANNEX H TO
CHAPTER 4

ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

GROUND MANOEUVRE

Description
Primarily BGs, but for BM all elements must be considered as ground manoeuvre requiring coord/deconfliction. Manoeuvre is the employment of forces on
the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect of the enemy in order to accomplish
the mission. Exercising effective and flexible control over fast-moving elements enables better concentration of effort and synchronisation of combat power
should follow.

Request/Tasking/Control
Through deployed CoC.

BM CONSIDERATIONS

Air ACM take deployment into account. Jt fires in sp of manoeuvre elmns must be coord/deconflicted.

Land Deconflict with other ground forces using boundaries (terrain allocation), time slots (moves). Integration/coordination with RW/FW. Engr
tasks/planning/Int: UXO, obs, IED threat, barrier restricted areas. Coord moves/activity of CSS elmns lacking comms/BFT etc.

Sea Littoral manoeuvre is likely to involve both avn and surface movement in concert with fires.

EMS Use/allocation of freqs. IM/IX.

CGS Blue Force Tracker

Time High tempo will require responsive BM system able to impose/lift BM measures dynamically.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-H-1

 ANNEX I TO
CHAPTER 4

ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

SF/RECCE/STA PTLS

Description
Light forces can conduct direct attacks, collect intelligence and provide terminal guidance and attack control for attacks. They are particularly useful against
concealed valuable enemy targets or those hidden close to no-strike targets.

Request/Tasking/Control

BM CONSIDERATIONS
There should be no friendly ground forces within or manoeuvring into established kill boxes; however, should circumstances require otherwise
Air
(eg long-range reconnaissance patrols, SF teams, etc), then NFAs must be established to cover those forces, or the kill box must be closed.

Beyond FSCL CGRS boxes (colours for CCs) may be used to protect mobile or sensitive ops: may be reduced to NFAs once troops static.
Sy may require acceptance of risk to deployed elms to enable strike.

Land Sy may require acceptance of risk to deployed elms to enable strike.

Sea 3 Cdo Bde Recce Force may have elmns deployed in or near NAI/TAIs. Liaison with CATF is essential.

EMS Specialist comms may require specific EMS access.

CGS

Time

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-I-1

 ANNEX J TO
CHAPTER 4

ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

BATTLEFIELD HELICOPTERS

Description
BH have cross-component utility can operate under a variety of C2 arrangements. In high intensity war fighting operations, elements can be task organised
within land or amphibious force formations, in order to provide organic manoeuvre and support. However, for lower intensity enduring operations, experience
has shown that more effective and efficient helicopter provision may be facilitated when all BH are task organised within a Joint Helicopter Force (JHF)
structure. The endorsed roles for Attack Helicopter (AH), Battlefield Reconnaissance Helicopter (BRH) and Support Helicopter (SH) are shown below:
Offensive action, control and direction of firepower, command support, ISTAR, tactical mobility (including Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR) and Forward
Aeromedical Evacuation (FAME)).

Request/Tasking/Control
Command of BH will normally be held at component level. In order to remain flexible and reactive to short notice tasking for a 24hr period, BH aircraft are
often held on strip alert within the ATO rather than given specific mission numbers.

BM CONSIDERATIONS

Air Helos will normally operate below the CL but additional ASM will normally be required. Routing. Lost comms drills.

Land Deconflict with fires. Routine traffic routes

Sea Commando Helicopter Force (CHF) is an independent unit within the JHC. Liaison required through MCC/CATF.

EMS For ac with DAS, jammers, AD radar, WLR signatures.

CGS BFT/Helicopter Asset Tracking System (HeATS)

Time

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-J-1

 ANNEX K TO
CHAPTER 4

ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Description
Electronic Warfare (EW) is a military discipline whose aim is to provide military action that exploits EM energy to provide situational awareness, deliver
offensive and defensive effects and dominate the EMS. It is broken down in to the following three subdivisions.

Electronic attack: use of EM energy for offensive purposes. Electronic defence: use of EM energy to provide force, area or platform protection and to ensure
effective friendly use of the EMS. Electronic surveillance: use of EM energy to provide situational awareness and intelligence.

EW is achieved by use of the following measures or procedures.

Electronic Warfare Support measures (ESM): “EW actions taken to search for, intercept and identify EM emissions and locate their sources for the purpose of
immediate threat recognition. Electronic Counter Measures (ECM): “EW actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the EMS, through the
use of EM energy”. Electronic Protection Measures (EPM): “EW actions taken to ensure effective friendly use of the EMS despite the adversary’s use of EM
energy”.

Request/Tasking/Control
Assets coord through an EWCC located within J/G3 at fmn level. Some capabilities eg Local EW Team (LEWT) may be task organised to BG for specific ops

BM CONSIDERATIONS

Air Use of strategic assets with own EW capability eg B52, Nimrod, Rivet Joint.

Land Coord with Fires/IO/G2/influence/counter command activity/G6 for JRFL. Coord with radars WLR/AD/Surveillance and UAVs Protect STA
capability through ESM and avoidance of electronic fratricide.

Sea In littoral ops LC and MC must coord assets. Y Sqn (EW) is generally available in a Lit M op and its activity should be coord through CATF.

EMS EW CC link to SIGINT (COMINT and ELINT). BSM. Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) (potentially to incl coalition and OGD frequencies of
interest). LEWT secure all-informed EW net with air EW assets, for maximum position fixing capability / TST opportunities.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-K-1

CGS Protect IM/information exchange/information exploitation

Time Deconflict activity by time if necessary ie accept risk at decisive points only. Ensure coord LAND Y / L Hrs and ATO fixed timings.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-K-2

 ANNEX L TO
CHAPTER 4

ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

WEAPON LOCATING RADARS

Description
COBRA. G band wpn loc (WL) radar capable of loc guns, mors and rkts. A mobile, solid state, phased array radar mtd on a DROPS veh. Scanned arc is
4800 mils. Secondary roles are adjustment of guns and mors, detection of jammers and radar registration.
MAMBA. G band WL radar capable of loc guns, mors and rkts. A mobile, solid state, phased array radar mtd on a Haglund Bv 206. Scanned arc is 1600
mils. Secondary roles are adjustment of guns and mors, detection of jammers.

Request/Tasking/Control
WL btys will usually be grouped to OSG. Task/control though OSG.

BM CONSIDERATIONS

Air Radar signatures included in DAS software. Can be incl as fixed ground locs in RAP – Link 16/11 ac will be able to ident. HIRTA.

Land Terrain allocation: potential HVT to en. ARAs. May need multiple areas depending on EW threat.

Sea

EMS Coord with EW effort. Frequency alloc coord with HN. Frequency alloc coord with UAVs. WLR/UAV mutual interference. HIRTA.

CGS

Time

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-L-1

 ANNEX M TO
CHAPTER 4

ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

CBRN

Description
Difference in effectiveness/hazards of CBRN weapons (fully engineered) and CBRN devices (ad hoc construction). CBRN threats/hazards may be military,
industrial, deliberate and accidental. Persistent and non-persistent. Immediate and long term effects. Some hazards are subject to effects of met eg wind
and therefore move with minimal predictability. Potential to contaminate water and food sources.

Request/Tasking/Control
CBRN cells in HQ across components. CA may require SCIAD or addl reach back assistance.

BM CONSIDERATIONS

Air Use off ACM for hazard areas eg ROZ –must be monitored for changing met conditions. Changes to ACMs for routing. Limits to CAS provision.
CA – allocation of ac for medical/humanitarian ops

Land Whilst it is likely that BH will not be placed in a dirty environment, CHF maintains the ability to continue to operate in such an environment until a
natural pause allows decontamination to take place. Helicopters and their crews are especially sensitive to the effects of CBRN attacks.
Define acceptable risk of fighting dirty. Decontamination of terrain and vehs/eqpt. Ident and marking hazard areas will require coord with other
ops. Los of tempo.
Info Ops - Impact of long term risks.
CA – allocation and coord of resources for medical/humanitarian ops.

Sea Use of ACM for hazard area. CA – allocation and coord of resources medical/humanitarian ops.

EMS Possible EO/IR/TI interference. EMP effects on Comms/CIS and SSA.

CGS CIS to disseminate changing threat. Info ops.

Time Potentially unpredictable real time moving hazard; real time BM controls required.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-M-1

 ANNEX N TO
CHAPTER 4

ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE

Description
CSAR is the recovery of isolated personnel in distress, from an environment in which a threat is posed by hostile interference, who are trained and equipped
for CSAR. CSAR is amongst the most time sensitive of operations. After four hours on the ground the chance of recovering a survivor in combat is
historically less than 20%.

Request/Tasking/Control
Location and authentication of personnel required before CSAR committed. SPINS contain CSAR tasking/authorisation procedures.

BM CONSIDERATIONS

Air Tasked on ATO, but ensure SPINS incl CSAR annex effective ACMs or implement dynamic control where possible.

Land Rapid response is critical; coord with fires essential. Risk may be accepted. Sy of HLS.

Sea CSAR may be MC.

EMS Comms in flight.

CGS LAP. RAP.

Time Considerable risk may be accepted as time is critical.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-N-1

 ANNEX O TO
CHAPTER 4

ACTIVITY AND PLATFORM SPECIFIC BM PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Description
CSS encompasses medical support, provost support, personnel support, logistic support, equipment support, logistic engineering support and the civilian
resources provided to formations. Delivery of this capability represents significant activity throughout the battlespace by units and organisations controlled by
a variety of agencies and HQs.
SA of the CSS environment is difficult, with the lack of a BFT, although this will in part be offset by BOWMAN.
Contractor delivered CSS (to the deployed force or as part of the comprehensive approach) adds an additional SA complexity.

Request/Tasking/Control
Log bde HQ, CSS HQ (normally based on RLC tpt regt), HQ BSG.
G1 – Provost support, personnel support.
G4 – Log sp, ES, med sp, infrastructure engineering.

BM CONSIDERATIONS

Air Combat ID, routes, ACM, FSCM, ROE.

Land Combat ID, routes, ACM, FSCM, ROE. SA where CSS crosses bdys must be addressed.

Sea

EMS Limited comms, SA, use of BFT.

CGS Constraints on the deployability of J1/J4 IOS bearer system requires IS specialist be involved in BM real estate allocation, especially in BSG and
FSG.

Time

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 4-O-1

 CHAPTER 5

AIR LAND INTEGRATION

SECTION 1 – COUNTER LAND OPERATIONS

1. Counter Land Operations. Counter land operations are conducted by air forces
and their purpose is to gain and maintain a desired degree of control of the battlefield by
targeting fielded enemy ground forces and the infrastructure directly supporting them1. In
order to achieve decisive effects, the use of air and ground forces must be fully
coordinated. Such coordination represents the most frequently exercised aspect of BM.
There are three basic elements to counter land operations:

a. Air Interdiction (AI). AI is action to destroy, disrupt, divert or delay the

enemy’s surface potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or
otherwise achieve its objectives and carried out at such distance from friendly forces
that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly
forces is not required. AI is usually conducted beyond the FSCL and the implications
for BM at the land tactical level are limited. It is, however, possible to conduct AI
short of the FSCL in which case BM tools such as CGRS and kill boxes2 may be
used.

b. Close Air Support (CAS). CAS is action by fixed and rotary wing aircraft
against hostile targets which requires detailed integration of each air mission with the
fire and movement of friendly forces for fratricide avoidance and targeting guidance.
CAS takes place in the land battlespace. It requires routine BM activity often of a
procedural nature in planning, and real time dynamic BM during execution.

c. Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (SCAR). SCAR involves an

attack/tactical recce aircraft operating deep, well away from friendly forces and
possibly within a kill box, searching an area for targets and then coordinating attacks
by other aircraft. SCAR is conducted beyond the FSCL and therefore implications
for BM at the land tactical level are unlikely.

2. CAS. CAS is air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to
friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and
movement of those forces3. CAS provides ground or amphibious forces with firepower in
offensive and defensive operations, by day and night, to destroy, suppress, neutralise,
disrupt, fix or delay enemy forces in close proximity to friendly ground forces. Reliable and
interoperable communications with the supported force are essential features in the CAS
environment.

3. CAS Employment Methods. CAS can be pre-planned, immediate or emergency.

Each of these requires BM to be carried out at various levels. While CAS is being
conducted there may still be a requirement to clear fires. An FST can do this in his own
target area, but other fires may also require clearance. CAS should be fully understood by
BM practitioners.
1
AP 3002 Air Warfare dated Apr 06.
2
For greater detail on CGRS and Kill Boxes, see Ch 4.
3
JWP 0-01.1.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 5-1

 a. Pre-Planned CAS. Pre-planned CAS occurs when the ground commander
anticipates the need for and requests CAS for specific operations. Requests for pre-
planned CAS are submitted through the chain of command to the AOCC. The
BCD(A) is key to this process as the land element in the JFAC. Where the request is
given sufficiently high priority, air assets will be tasked to provide CAS. Pre-planned
CAS requests must be submitted with sufficient lead time (normally no less than 24
hours prior to the Time Over Target) to allow the mission to be planned and for the
publication of appropriate details in the relevant ATO. Pre-planned CAS can be
scheduled or on call.

(1) Scheduled. Scheduled CAS puts the CAS assets over the area of the
battlefield where they are needed most at a pre-planned Time on Target
(TOT) and where the need for CAS has been established in advance.

(2) On Call. On call CAS involves putting CAS assets on ground/deck or

airborne alert during a period where the need for immediate CAS is foreseen.

b. Immediate CAS. Immediate CAS is any request which diverts aircraft from
another task or airborne alert, or scrambles them from a ground-alert posture.
Immediate CAS may be requested as a result of a developing situation where the
need for pre-planned CAS had not been anticipated or allocated. All immediate CAS
requests are sent via the Tactical Air Request Net (TARN) to the AOCC or to the
ALO who has been allocated CAS aircraft available for tasking. If the request is
accepted, the ASOC or ALO will either divert pre-planned CAS or forward the
request to the Air Operations Centre (AOC). If required the ACC may need to
redirect other air missions to cover the higher priority CAS needs.

c. Emergency CAS (E-CAS). E-CAS is the use of CAS without a qualified

controller where the aircrew have the weapon release authority and decide on the
attack profile. E-CAS is executed by military personnel who are not FAC trained but
find themselves in an emergency situation where CAS is required and where no FAC
is available to take responsibility for the control and coordination of the mission. The
manoeuvre force commander will be required to authorise personnel to conduct E-
CAS and will need to consider this during his planning and force preparation.

4. Close Combat Attack (CCA). CCA is fire support provided by Battlefield

Helicopters (BH) in close proximity to friendly forces. It is mainly executed by Attack
Helicopters (AH), and tasked through the land component chain of command.

a. Type A CCA. In Type A CCA, the air to ground effects and fire and
movement of AH is controlled by the supported tactical commander on the ground, in
his AOO. The qualified (ground) observer is responsible for selecting the target,
preventing fratricide, and ensuring that the effects requested are within the ROE.

b. Type B CCA. Type B CCA takes place within the AOO of a ground tactical
commander but within an area which has been temporarily allocated as an Aviation
Free Fire Area (FFA) and in which no friendly forces are positioned. Aviation then
has freedom to fire and manoeuvre and deliver effects against targets within the
allocated area. The aircrew are responsible for target identification and all aspects

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 5-2

 of weapons delivery (including ROE, fratricide prevention and collateral damage
limitation).

SECTION 2 – CAS COMMAND AND CONTROL

5. Joint Force Commander (JFC). The JFC will apportion available air assets to
Component Commanders according to their assessed needs and targeting priorities. The
JFC usually tasks the ACC with allocating air assets on his behalf.

6. Air Component Commander (ACC). The ACC allocates air assets to the AOC to
accomplish specific missions, including CAS.

7. Air Operations Centre. The AOC is responsible to the ACC for the planning,
tasking and execution of specific missions, including CAS. Planning activity focuses on the
development and production of the ATO. Execution activity consists of executing the ATO
and managing any dynamic changes to tasking as a result of immediate requests for
support. In Coalition and Alliance operations the AOC is called the Combined Air
Operations Centre (CAOC). The AOC also caries out the following tasks:

a. The AOC tasks flying units to conduct specific missions, some of which will
involve providing CAS, through the ATO. SPINS complement the ATO by providing
the strategy, operational constraints, tactical procedures and ROE to be followed
during the execution of the mission.

b The AOC coordinates the execution of its mission with its liaison elements,
known as the Tactical Air Ground System (TAGS), located throughout the Land
Component Commander’s (LCC) chain of command.

8. Tactical Air Ground System. The TAGS consists of the following:

a. Air Operations Coordination Centres (AOCC)4. The AOCC is the senior

tactical Air Liaison Element (ALE) of the JFACC embedded within the HQ of another
Component5. The UK AOCC(L) consists of two parts, the Air Component
Coordination Element (ACCE) and the Air Support Operations Centre (ASOC), each
of which has a specific role:

(1) ACCE. The ACCE represents the JFACC in the JFLCHQ.

(2) ASOC. The Air Support Operations Centre (ASOC) is the primary
agency responsible for the coordination of Close Air Support (CAS) and other
air users (helicopters, UAVs etc) in direct support of the JFLC and is in effect
the Current Operations Cell within the AOCC. A scaled down version of the
ASOC can be deployed to tactical level HQs depending on the circumstances
– this smaller ASOC is called an Air Support Element (ASE).

4
The USAF, RAAF, and NoAF still use the term ASOC in place of the AOCC. The UK’s ASOC is part of the
AOCC(L).
5
There is a AOCC(Land) for the Land Component and a AOCC (Maritime) for the Maritime Component.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 5-3

 b. Air Liaison Officers (ALO). ALOs are permanently assigned to, and located
at, division and brigade HQs. The Divisional Air Cell6 consists of personnel whose
duties include acting as the ground commander’s primary advisor on all aspects air
power, and planning and executing CAS in accordance with his guidance and intent.
They also provide ASM input to the BM solution, control and coordination of TACP
(FAC)s, A2 input, advice on, and coordination with, AT/SH/Air ISTAR. The BALO
performs a similar function at brigade level, with assistance from a TACP (FAC) and
the Divisional Air Cell.

c. Tactical Air Control Party (TACP). A TACP7 is an operational element of

the TAGS. It provides air liaison and advice to ground forces and the capability to
control aircraft. TACPs can operate at division, brigade and battalion/battlegroup
levels; they are either TACP (FAC) or TACP (MAOT8).

(1) TACP (FAC). The TACP (FAC) is a team of four personnel

commanded by a qualified FAC, which provides advice to commanders on the
capabilities and limitations of fixed-wing aircraft, AH (in the absence of an
Aviation LO or AMPT9), and air delivered weapons. The TACP (FAC) assists
in the planning and detailed integration of CAS with ground manoeuvre and,
when required, provides the primary terminal attack control for CAS through
its two integral FACs. TACP (FAC)s are established within every regular bde
and formation recce regt.

(2) TACP (MAOT). The TACP (MAOT) is a team that consists of

personnel trained in helicopter handling. The MAOT advises surface
commanders on the employment of Support Helicopters (SH). It can be
deployed to conduct command and control of SH operations. MAOT
personnel are not qualified to control CAS aircraft.

d. FAC. An FAC is a qualified individual who, from a forward position on the

ground or in the air, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support
of land forces. An FAC operating from the air is known as an Airborne FAC
(AbFAC)10. A number of combat and combat support units are established for FACs
in addition to the TACP (FAC)s already mentioned. Selected personnel such as
FOOs, Observation Post Assistants (OPA), formation reconnaissance personnel,
Army Air Corps (AAC) pilots and some specialist infantry and reconnaissance
personnel are trained to perform the duties of an FAC in addition to their primary
role. These personnel are known as secondary or other FACs.

6
Shortly to be renamed the Divisional Air Staff.
7
The term TACP has become associated in the army with the TACP(FAC) to differentiate an FAC in the
primary role (a TACP(FAC)) from a secondary FAC who has other primary responsibilities but who is also
FAC qualified.
8
Mobile Air Operations Team.
9
Air Manoeuvre Planning Team. See AFM Vol 1 Part 12 – Air Manoeuvre.
10
The US uses the term FAC Airborne (FAC-A) for fixed wing combat aircraft in the FAC role (A10/F16/F18
ETC).

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 5-4

 SECTION 3 – RECOGNISED AIR PICTURE

9. Recognised Air Picture. The RAP is generated by the ASACS organisation. Data
from a variety of sensors is compiled to produce a track based AP. In order to produce a
RAP, all tracks must be recognised. Data from identification systems (such as Identification
Friend or Foe (IFF)) and non-sensor information (ATO/ACO) is collected, processed and
associated with tracks in order to determine their identity, and the RAP is then
disseminated.

10. Air Surveillance and Control System (ASACS). ASACS organisations have the
capability to enable 24-hour air surveillance coverage and weapons control within the Joint
Operations Area (JOA). They also provide Tac Air C2 defined11 as, “the ability to conduct
real-time tactical control of the airspace that includes sensor fusion of surface and air
platforms, provision of integrated surveillance, ASM and weapons control. Tactical
command functions associated with Tactical Battle Management Functions12 (TBMFs) can
be conducted after delegation from higher authority”. In order to execute Tactical Air Battle
Management within its AOR, an ASACS unit needs to produce a RAP within its AOR and
conduct tactical control of assigned weapons.

11. Land Environment AP Capabilities. The current land environment AP provision is

via Link-1613 / Link-11A14. Link-16 as a system provides access to the air, surface and
theatre missile tactical pictures to inform the planning and execution capabilities of
formation headquarters15. It provides a source of information to enhance Situational
Awareness (SA), allow for dynamic reaction to air activity and assist with combat ID
between air and ground systems. It provides commanders with a high degree of decision
support in a fast changing environment, allowing exploitation of any tactical advantage as
presented, whilst anticipating enemy activity through the observation of real time
movement. Link-16 provides the ability to contribute to time sensitive targeting through the
employment of digital information exchange to reduce sensor-to-shooter delay. The three
deployable organisations within the current ORBAT are:

a. Recognised Air Picture Troop (RAP Tp). The RAP Tp provides a Link-16
capability in order to receive and input16 information to the RAP. The RAP Tp system
comprises two major elements: the Joint Tactical Information and Distribution System
(JTIDS) Link Vehicle (JLV), and the Distributed Situational Awareness Picture (DSAP)
equipment which allows the RAP to be viewed.

b. Air Manoeuvre RAP Flight (AMRAP Flt). AMRAP Flt provides a rapid,
digital exchange of tactical information between 16 AA Bde and other Link-16 fitted

11
Air Warfare Centre definition.
12
JWP 3-63. TBMFs give the AD commander the tool by which to allocate/resume these tasks to/from
subordinates. The general principle is that TBMFs should be delegated early enough to that level from which
they can be executed most effectively to guarantee the fastest reaction time and highest efficiency. Where
necessary, TBMFs may be restricted by unit, area or by time. Delegated functions may be reassessed or
reassumed by higher authority at any time.
13
Provided by the RAP Tp (OPCON Jt GBAD HQ) or AMRAP Flt (OPCON 16 Air Assault Bde).
14
Provided by the ALES Det (OPCON 3 Cdo Bde).
15
“The RAP capability will be a significant enhancement to the ability of Headquarters to manage the
Battlespace.” Op TELIC – RAP Tp POR, 7 AD Bde/4920 dated 11 Jul 03.
16
The input is limited.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 5-5

 platforms within a network. The AMRAP system comprises two major elements: the
JTIDS Links Crates (JLC) and the DSAP. AMRAP comprises one JLC and 3 DSAPs.

c. Autonomous Link Eleven Detachment (ALES Det). ALES provides 3 Cdo

Bde with a receive-only Link-11A capability. The ALES Det is manned by four other
ranks and consists of two Link-11 systems, a main and step up, each mounted in a
BV206. It is deployed within the Air Defence Coordination Cell (ADCC) element of HQ
3 Cdo Bde and is capable of receiving RAP/LAP from numerous sensors including all
RN FF/DD, LPD, CVS, AWACS, Merlin Mk1 and both the Type 45 Air Defence
Destroyer (T45) and Carrier Vessel Future (CVF) on entry to service.

SECTION 4 – AIR DEFENCE

12. Joint Air Defence. Because AD has tasks across all components and operates in
all of the dimensions of the battlespace there are significant BM implications. AD and air
operations should be as fully integrated as possible from the outset since maximising the
freedom of action of one automatically constrains the other. The AD Plan (ADP) is
produced at the joint level and designs an integrated and layered defence using the AD
systems (less VSHORAD) of all components. The ADP contains elements of BM through
Tactical Battle Management Functions (TBMF) which deal with issues such as ID authority,
engagement authority, WCS, and emission control. TBMFs can delegate BM authority to
AD systems in the LC.

13. Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD). BM issues are very clear when conducting
planning for the integration of GBAD with air operations. Maximising the freedom of action
of aircraft necessarily constrains GBAD in order to avoid fratricide. GBAD units should,
however, be free to engage enemy air assets to be fully effective. ACM should therefore
assist with the identification of friendly or neutral aircraft and should not overly constrain
GBAD operations or make the systems vulnerable to attack. GBAD operation should not
unnecessarily delay air operations by creating lengthy route structures or complex combat
ID procedures. Access to the RAP is currently provided to the GBAD BCP/FCC by the RAP
Tp; from 2010 this will be done by LEAPP. The RAP is not available at each GBAD
platform, but such access to the RAP is essential to maximise the utility of the system
through early warning, identification and the ability dynamically to change WCS.

14. Maritime Air Defence. Aircraft carriers and Type 42 Destroyers provide an AD C2
capability which should be included in BM planning when operating in the littoral
environment or where there is a maritime/land interface. This AD C2 capability includes
AD/AAW17 coordination facilities and specialist personnel, long range air warning radars
with supporting EW suites, aircraft control facilities including fighter controllers and
comprehensive CIS and data link facilities for IM/IX with other AD ships, AWACS and the
land based ASACS.
15. Summary. Effective air land Integration is essential for the conduct of joint
operations and BM is a fundamental part of achieving this. BM in this area spans all levels
from joint planning to terminal control. There are cross component CIS issues such as
access to the RAP, although this will improve with capabilities such as JADOCS, JETTS,
LEAPP and DII(FD). Aspects of air land integration such as CAS and AD will be seriously
constrained if BM is not considered throughout the PREE cycle.
17
AD in the maritime environment is referred to as Anti Air Warfare.

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 5-6

 GLOSSARY

The source for the terms and their definitions used in this Glossary is indicated in
parentheses.

Agency
A distinct non military body which has objectives that are broadly consistent with those of
the campaign. (JDP 0-01.1)

Air Interdiction
Air operations conducted to destroy, neutralise, or delay the enemy’s military potential
before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance
from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement
of friendly forces is not required. (AAP-6)

Air Manoeuvre
Those operations primarily within the land scheme of manoeuvre, seeking decisive
advantage by the exploitation of the third dimension by combined-arms forces centred
around rotary-winged aircraft, within a joint framework. (JDP 0-01.1)

Airspace Control Authority

The commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the
airspace control system in his or her designated area. (AAP-6)

Amphibious Objective Area

A geographical area, delineated in the initiating directive, for purposes of command and
control within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious task force.
This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious task
force’s mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air and
land operations. (AAP-6)

Amphibious Operation
A military operation launched from the sea by a naval and landing force embarked in ships
or craft, with the principal purpose of projecting the landing force ashore tactically into an
environment ranging from permissive to hostile. (AAP-6)

Area of Operations
1. At the operational level, the geographical area defined by the operational level
commander within his JOA in which a commander designated by him (usually a component
commander) is delegated authority to conduct operations.
2. At the tactical level, a geographical area, defined by lateral and rear boundaries, which is
assigned to a commander by a higher commander. Within these boundaries the
commander has the authority to conduct operations in order to execute his mission. (JDP 0-
01.1)

Augmentation
The temporary increase in unit establishments, either by redistribution of existing manpower
(regular or civilian) or by call out of selected Reservists to meet Directed Operational
Military tasks and specified other activities that cannot be achieved within peacetime
establishments. (JDP 0-01.1)

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 6-1

Barrier Restricted Area
An area declared by an authorised commander where manoeuvre of friendly forces must
not be hindered by barriers. Restrictions imposed may include a complete ban on the
emplacement of obstacles in certain areas for specified periods. AAP-6

Battlegroup
A battlegroup is a tactical grouping, usually with armour and infantry under command,
based on the HQ of an armoured regiment or infantry battalion, normally armoured or
mechanised, or possibly on an armoured reconnaissance or aviation regiment. (JDP 0-
01.1)

Battlespace
All aspects of air, surface, sub-surface, land, space and the electromagnetic spectrum that
encompasses the area of operations. (JDP 0-01.1)

Battlespace Management
The adaptive means and measures that enable the dynamic synchronisation of activity.
(JDP 3-70)

Close Air Support

Air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which
require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.
(AAP-6)

Combat Identification
The process of combining situational awareness, target identification, specific tactics,
training and procedures to increase operational effectiveness of weapon systems and
reduce the incidence of casualties caused by friendly fire. (JDP 0-01.1)

Command
1. The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination,
and control of military forces.
2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the
purpose of bringing about a particular action.
3. A unit, group of units, organisation or area under the authority of a single individual.
4. To dominate an area or situation.
5. To exercise command. (AAP-6)

Component Commander
1. A single service or functional component commander at the third level of the NATO
military command structure.
2. A designated commander responsible for the planning and conduct of a maritime, land,
air, special or other operation as part of a joint force. (AAP-6)

Components
Force elements grouped under one or more component commanders subordinate to the
operational level commander. (JDP 0-01.1)

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 6-2

Composite Air Operations
Air operations interrelated and/or limited in both timescale and space where units differing
in type and/or role are put under a single package commander to achieve a common,
specific objective. (JDP 0-01.1)

Control
1. That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate
organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses
the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be
transferred or delegated.
2. In mapping, charting and photogrammetry, a collective term for a system of marks or
objects on the earth or on a map or a photograph, whose positions or elevations, or
both, have been or will be determined. (AAP-6)

Course of Action
In the estimate process, an option that will accomplish or contribute to the accomplishment
of a mission or task, and from which a detailed plan is developed. (AAP-6)

Datum
Any numerical or geometrical quantity or set of such quantities which may serve as
reference or base for other quantities. Where the concept is geometric, the plural form is
‘datums’ in contrast to the normal plural ‘data’. (AAP-6)

Doctrine
Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of
objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. (AAP-6)

End state
The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which
indicates that the objective has been achieved. (AAP-6)

Environment
The surroundings in which an organisation operates, including air, water, land, natural
resources, flora, fauna, humans, and their interrelation. (AAP-6)

Expeditionary Operation
The projection of military power over extended lines of communications into a distant
operational area to accomplish a specific objective. (AAP-6)

Fire Support Coordination Line

Within an assigned area of operations, a line established by a land or amphibious force
commander to denote coordination requirements for fires by other force elements which
may affect the commander’s current and planned operations. The fire support coordination
line applies to fires of air, ground or sea weapons using any type of ammunition against
surface or ground targets. The establishment of the fire support coordination line must be
coordinated with the appropriate commanders and supporting elements. Attacks against
surface or ground targets short of the fire support coordination line must be conducted
under the positive control or procedural clearance of the associated land or amphibious
force commander. Unless in exceptional circumstances, commanders of forces attacking
targets beyond the fire support coordination line must coordinate with all affected

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 6-3

commanders in order to avoid fratricide and to harmonise joint objectives. Note: in the
context of this definition the term ‘surface targets’ applies to those in littoral or inland waters
within the designated area of operations. (AAP-6)

Fratricide
The accidental death or injury which occurs when friendly forces engage their own forces
believing either them, or their location, to be an enemy target. (JDP 0-01.1)

High Density Airspace Control Zone

Airspace of defined dimensions, designated by the airspace control authority, in which there
is a concentrated employment of numerous and varied weapons/airspace users. (AAP-6)

Host Nation
A nation which, by agreement:

a. receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or

transiting through its territory;
b. allows materiel and/or NATO organisations to be located on its territory; and/or
c. provides support for these purposes. (AAP-6)

Host-nation Support
Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO
and/or other forces and NATO organisations which are located on, operating on/from, or in
transit through the host nation’s territory. (AAP-6)

Humanitarian Disaster Relief Operation

Operations where the primary mission of a deployed force is to relieve human suffering.
HDR operations are conducted in an entirely benign posture (except for essential force
protection) and are normally conducted in support of the coordinating humanitarian agency.
(AAP-6)

Information Management
Integrated management processes and services that provide exploitable information on
time, in the right place and format, to maximise freedom of action. (JDP 3-70)

Insurgency
An organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of
subversion and armed conflict. (JDP 0-01.1)

Joint
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at
least two services participate. (AAP-6)

Joint Airspace Control Cell

A joint cell with appropriate representation from the components and, if applicable, host and
coalition nations, to provide the Airspace Control Authority with the capability to plan,
coordinate, integrate and regulate airspace control within the Joint Operations Area. (JDP
0-01.1)

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 6-4

Joint Airspace Coordination Centre (JACC).
The agency coordinating the use of the ASC-Area through ACM to be published in an ACO.
(AJP 3.3.5)

Joint Enablers
Operational activities that do not have an end unto themselves and are unlikely to be
discrete lines of operation in achieving the end state. Their principle purpose is to enable
other activity to take place. (JDP 3-70)

Joint Fires
Joint Fires is defined as kinetic attack coordinated or directed at the operational level by the
JTFC/NCC. (JDP 0-01.1)

Joint Force
A force composed of significant elements of two or more Services operating under a single
commander authorised to exercise operational command or control.
(JDP 0-01.1)

Joint Operations Area

An area of land, sea and airspace, defined by higher authority, in which a designated Joint
Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific
mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope
and geographic area, is contingency/mission-specific. (JDP 0-01.1)

Joint Operations Picture

The total set of shared information on a particular operation, or Joint Operations Area,
available through a secure information environment on CIS networks to support situational
awareness and decision making by UK commanders, and to facilitate information sharing
with allies and partners. (JDP 0-01.1)

Joint Task Force Commander

The operational commander of a nominated joint force. (JDP 0-01.1)

Joint Task Force Headquarters

A purely national deployable joint headquarters of variable size commanded at the
operational level by a Joint Task Force Commander. (JDP 0-01.1)

Liaison
That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to
ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (AAP-6)

Main Effort
A concentration of forces or means, in a particular area, where a commander seeks to bring
about a decision. (JDP 0-01.1)

Mission Analysis
A logical process for extracting and deducing from a superior’s orders the tasks necessary
to fulfil a mission. (JDP 0-01.1)

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 6-5

Mission Command
A style of command that seeks to convey understanding to subordinates about the
intentions of the higher commander and their place within his plan, enabling them to carry
out missions with the maximum freedom of
action and appropriate resources. (JDP 0-01.1)

Multinational
Adjective used to describe activities, operations, organisations, etc in which forces or
agencies of more than one nation participate. (AAP6)

Non-combatant Evacuation Operation

An operation conducted to relocate designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign
country to a place of safety. (AAP-6)

Operational Art
The orchestration of all military activities involved in converting strategic objectives into
tactical actions with a view to seeking a decisive result. (JDP 0-01.1)

Operations Security
The process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive
or active means, to deny the enemy knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities
and intentions of friendly forces. (AAP-6)

Operations Support Activities

Operational activities that, being capabilities or techniques likely to be essential to
achievement of the end state, have an end unto themselves. They will usually, but not
always, form specific lines of operation and are underpinned by Joint Enablers.
(JDP 3-70)

Peace Support Operations

An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in
pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace.
Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement,
peacekeeping, peacebuilding and/or humanitarian operations. (AAP-6)

Positive Control
In air traffic control within NATO, a method of regulation of all identified air traffic within a
designated airspace, conducted with electronic means by an air traffic control agency
having the authority and responsibility therein. (AAP-6)

Procedural Control
A method of airspace control which relies on a combination of previously agreed and
promulgated orders and procedures. (AAP-6)

Recognised Air Picture

An electronically produced display from primary and secondary radar, and ESM sources
covering a three dimensional volume of interest in which all detected air and surface
contacts have been evaluated against specific threat parameters and then assigned a
recognition category and track number. (JDP 0-01.1)

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 6-6

Recognised Land Picture
The fullest achievable agreed level of identification and tracking of all land surface contacts
in the area of interest. The Recognised Land Picture is normally associated with the
Recognised Air Picture of the same area. (JDP 0-01.1)

Recognised Maritime Picture

The fullest achievable agreed level of identification and tracking of all surface and sub-
surface contacts in the area of interest. The Recognised Maritime Picture is normally
associated with the Recognised Air Picture of the same area. (JDP 0-01.1)

Situational Awareness
The understanding of the operational environment in the context of a commander’s (or staff
officer’s) mission (or task). (JDP 0-01.1)

Special Forces
Troops who are selected, trained and organised to special levels and are usually employed
in pursuit of strategic objectives. (JDP 0-01.1)

Standard Operating Procedure

A set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a
definite or standardised procedure without loss of effectiveness. The procedure
is applicable unless ordered otherwise. (AAP-6)

Time Sensitive Targets

Time sensitive targets (TST) are those targets requiring immediate response because they
represent a serious and imminent threat to friendly forces or are high payoff, fleeting targets
of opportunity. In practice, TSTs are specific target sets designated by the JTFC. (JDP 0-
01.1)

Waterspace Management
In naval warfare, a system of procedures for the control of antisubmarine weapons to
prevent inadvertent engagement of friendly submarines. (AAP-6)

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 6-7

 ABBREVIATIONS
A
ABFAC Airborne Forward Air Controller ALO Air Liaison Officer
ACA Airspace Coord Area AMA Artillery Manoeuvre Area
ACMREQ Airspace Control Means Request AMPT Air Manoeuvre Planning Team
ACA Airspace Control Authority AMRAP Air Manoeuvre Recognised Air Picture
Flt Flight
ACC Air Component Commander AMSL Above Mean Sea Level
ACM Airspace Control Means AOO Area of Operations
ACO Airspace Coordination Order AOCC Air Operations Coordination Centre
AD Air Defence AOCC (L) Air Operations Coordination Centre
(Land)
ADA Air Defence Area/Air Defended Area AP Air Picture
ADP Air Defence Plan ARA Artillery Reserved Area
AGL Above Ground Level ASACS Air Surveillance and Control System
AH Attack Helicopter ASC-Area Airspace Control Area
AI Air Interdiction ASOC Air Support Operations Centre
ALE Air Liaison Element ASP Advanced Sound-ranging Programme
ALES Det Autonomous Link Eleven Detachment ATO Air Tasking Order
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

B
BC Battery Commander BDZ Base Defence Zone
BCD (A) Battlefield Coordination Detachment BGT Blus Force Tracker
(Air)
BCIP Bowman, Combat, Infrastructure and BH Battlefield Helicopter
Platform BISA
BDA Battle Damage Assessment BSM Battlespace Spectrum Management
C
CA Comprehensive Approach COA Course of Action
CAS Close Air Support COIN Counter insurgency.
CBRN Chemical Biological Radiological Combat Combat Identification
Nuclear ID
CCIR Commander’s Critical Information CSAR Combat Search and Rescue
Requirements/Requests
CGS Computer Generated Space CSS Combat Service Support
CGRS Common Geographic Reference
System
D
DII(FD) Defence Information Infrastructure DSAP Distributed Situational Awareness
(Forward Deployed) Picture
E
EBA Effects Based Approach EGM Effects Guidance Matrix
E-CAS Emergency CAS EMS Electro Magnetic Spectrum
F
FAC Forward Air Controllers FSCL Fire Sp Coord Line
FEZ Fighter Engagement Zone FSCM Fire Support Safety Line
FID Force Instruction Document FSSL Fire Support Coordination Measures
FFA Free Fire Area FST Fire Support Team
FPC Fire Planning Cell
G
GMLRS Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System GBAD Ground Based Air Defence
H
HeATS Helicopter Asset Tracking System HIMEZ High Altitude Missile Engagement Zone
HIDACZ High Density Airspace Control Zone HN Host Nation

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 7-1

 I
IM Information Management IX Information Exploitation
IFF Identification Friend or Foe IPB Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlespace/Battlefield
J
JACC Joint Airspace Control Centre (Cell) JIM Joint, Interagency, Multinational
JADOCS Joint Automated Deep Operations JLC JTIDS Link Crates
Coordination System
JBMFID Joint Battlespace Management Force JLV JTIDS Link Vehicle
Instruction Document
JETTS Joint Effects Tactical Targeting JOA Joint Operations Area
System
JEZ Joint Engagement Zone JTFHQ Joint Task Force Headquarters
JFCIS Joint Force Communications and JTIDS Joint Tactical Information and
Information Systems Distribution System
L
LAP Local Air Picture LLTR Low Level Transit Route
LEAPP Land Environment Air Picture LOMEZ Low Altitude Missile Engagement Zone
Provision
M
MACA Military Aid to the Civil Authorities MAGD Military Aid to Government
Departments
MACC Military Aid to the Civil Community MGRS Military Geographic Reference System
MACP Military Aid to the Civil Power MRR Minimum-Risk Route
N
NFA No Fire Area NGFO Naval Gunfire Forward Observer
NGO Non Governmental Organisation
O
OGD Other Government Department OSG Offensive Support Group
OMC Operational Management of OSGB Ordnance Survey Great Britain
Communications and Information
Systems
P
PME Peacetime Military Engagement PREE Plan Review Execute Evaluate
R
RAP Recognised Air Picture RFI Request for INformation
RAP Tp Recognised Air Picture Troop RFL Restrictive Fire Line
RFA Restricted Fire Area ROZ Restricted Operations Zone
S
SA Situational Awareness SH Support Helicopters
SAAFR Standard Use Army Aircraft Flight SHORADEZ Short Range Air Defence Engagement
Route Zone
SCAR Strike Coordination and SPINS Special Instructions
Reconnaissance
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defences SSA Shared Situational Awareness
T
TACP Tactical Air Control Party TIC Troops in Contact’
TACPMAOT Mobile Air Operations Team TM Terrain Management
TAGS Tactical Air Ground System. TMRR Temporary Minimum Risk Route
TARN Tactical Air Request Net
TBMF Tactical Battle Management TOT Time on Target
Functions
U
UAV Unmanned Air vehicle UOR Urgent Operational Requirement
W
WCS Weapon Control Status WGRS World Geographic Reference System
WEZ Weapons Engagement Zone WLR Weapon Locating Radar

Issue 1.0: Nov 07 7-2