ARMY FIELD MANUAL VOLUME 1 PART 1B

Brigade Tactics

AC 71982
 UNCLASSIFIED

Army Code 71982

(2012)

ARMY FIELD MANUAL

VOLUME 1 COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS

PART 1B

BRIGADE TACTICS

This publication supersedes

AC 71587 (2007)

2012

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

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 PREFACE

‘The commander must decide how he will fight the battle before it begins. He must then
decide how he will use the military effort at his disposal to force the battle to swing the way
he wishes it to go; he must make the enemy dance to his tune from the beginning and
never vice versa.’
Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein

01. All doctrine is written for a purpose, to achieve an effect, and reflects the demands of
its time and its place. Army Field Manual (AFM) Volume 1 Part 1B Brigade Tactics replaces
the 2007 Edition of AFM Volume 1 Part 1 Formation Tactics. Its purpose is to re-frame our
understanding of formation warfighting operations after extensive – predominantly
stabilisation – operations overseas.

02. Brigade Tactics explains and illustrates the tactical actions of a warfighting brigade
operating within a divisional construct. It places these tactical actions in the operating
challenge illustrated in the Future Character of Conflict. This is a complex environment
where formations will operate amongst the people, alongside allies and partners, in the
glare of international scrutiny and opposed by hybrid opponents who may draw on a range
of symmetric and asymmetric methods to contest the battle of wills with UK forces. Agility
of mind, formation tempo, the ability to take calculated risks and responsive capabilities will
all be critical in bringing force rapidly, appropriately and decisively to bear.

03. Future conflict may see operations commence after the deliberate in-load of the
brigade into a theatre and its appropriate preparation. Brigade warfighting may be
conducted after, or concurrent to, other activity across the mosaic of conflict – for example
in the wake of failing peace support activity. But the challenge for the brigade, its
commander, units and staff, may be much more dynamic - a demanding theatre entry
operation where the brigade must fight for the space to build up, or a rapidly emerging
threat that the brigade must defeat in order to re-position and re-focus. In both cases, the
principles contained within Brigade Tactics are relevant but the tactics will need to be
developed from a position of disadvantage and the forces illustrated within may be
generated in a more modular fashion.

04. Brigade Tactics is aimed at brigade commanders, their staff, subordinates and
students at military seats of learning. It explains the operating context of the brigade; its
role within the division; its potential organisational constructs; its operating challenges and
its tactical actions. The emphasis is on ‘how to’ execute brigade tactical activity within the
Army’s tenet of the Manoeuvrist Approach; this is provided in the form of graphical
illustrations, historical vignettes and the ‘top tips’ of contemporary brigade commanders and
staff. The intent is to inform, not constrain, the creative and innovative thinking required to
overcome ‘wicked’ tactical problems.

05. Brigade Tactics draws from ADP Operations and the wider AFM series. It provides
signposts to other doctrine where appropriate, but it has been designed to contain sufficient
stand-alone detail to be used by the brigade staff officer in conjunction with the Staff

i
Officers’ Handbook. Whilst much contained within it pertains to any manoeuvre formation,
specific doctrine should be consulted for specialist air manoeuvre and commando brigades.

06. Doctrine encapsulates our collective wisdom and, to be useful, must be dynamic and
responsive. An army learns by study, by reflection, by gleaning operational lessons – its
own and those of others – and by doing. As we deepen our understanding of brigade level
tactical actions, Brigade Tactics will be revised as appropriate.

ii
 CONTENTS

Preface i
Contents iii

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION TO BRIGADE TACTICS

Conflict and the Brigade 1-1

The Key Tenets 1-3
The Organisation of Land Forces 1-7
The Division 1-7
The Functions of the Division 1-8
Brigade Activity within a Divisional Construct 1-9
Functions of the Brigade 1-11
Brigade Structure and Organisation – the Units 1-12
Allocation of Divisional Assets 1-13
Force Types within the Brigade 1-14
Task Organisation 1-17
The Adversary Perspective 1-18
Annex A Example Brigade Structures 1-A-1

Chapter 2 ORCHESTRATING BRIGADE LEVEL TACTICAL

ACTION

The Doctrinal Frameworks 2-1

The Operational Framework 2-2
The Geographic Framework 2-2
The Tactical Framework 2-3
The Tactical Functions 2-9
Command 2-9
Information and Intelligence 2-15
Firepower 2-19
Manoeuvre 2-21
Protection 2-28
Sustainment 2-34

Chapter 3 OFFENSIVE ACTIONS

The Purpose and Principles of Offensive Action 3-1

Offensive Actions in a Complex Environment – The 3-2
Manoeuvrist Approach
The Ten Types of Offensive Action 3-3
Planning Considerations 3-4
Example Planning Yardsticks 3-11
The Conduct of Offensive Actions 3-11
The Stages of an Attack 3-13
Summary 3-16
The Adversary Perspective 3-17
Vignettes 3-20
Annex A Offensive Actions Summary Sheet 3-A-1
Annex B Offensive Actions Aide Memoire 3-B-1

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Chapter 4 DEFENSIVE ACTIONS

Objectives and Principles of Defensive Action 4-1

Defensive Actions in a Complex Environment – The 4-2
Manoeuvrist Approach
Mobile and Area Defence:
Mobile Defence 4-3
Area Defence 4-4
Stages of the Defence 4-8
Planning Considerations 4-12
The Adversary Perspective 4-22
Delay:
The Purpose and Principles of Delay 4-24
The Conduct of Delay 4-25
Planning Considerations 4-27
Tactical Basing 4-34
Vignette 4-35
Annex A Obstacle Planning 4-A-1
Annex B Control of Demolitions 4-B-1
Annex C Defence Summary Sheet 4-C-1
Annex D Defence Aide Memoire 4-D-1

Chapter 5 STABILISING ACTIONS

The Purpose of Stabilising Actions 5-3

The Brigade Contribution to Stabilisation 5-4
Planning Considerations 5-5
Force Elements for Stabilising Actions 5-11
The Conduct of Stabilising Actions 5-13
Framework Security 5-14
Security Sector Reform and Military Capacity 5-17
Building
Support to the Delivery of Essential Services 5-20
Support to Governance 5-22
Support to Economic Development and 5-24
Reconstruction
Vignettes 5-28
Annex A Stabilising Actions Aide Memoire 5-A-1

Chapter 6 ENABLING ACTIONS

Introduction 6-1
Annex A Reconnaissance 6-A-1
Annex B Security 6-B-1
Annex C Advance to Contact 6-C-1
Appendix 1 Aide Memoire 6-C-1-1
Annex D Meeting Engagement 6-D-1
Appendix 1 Aide Memoire 6-D-1-1
Annex E Link-Up 6-E-1
Appendix 1 Aide Memoire 6-E-1-1
Annex F Relief of Troops 6-F-1

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Appendix 1 Aide Memoire – Relief of Troops 6-F-1-1
Appendix 2 Aide Memoire – Passage of Lines 6-F-2-1
Annex G Withdrawal 6-G-1
Appendix 1 Aide Memoire 6-G-1-1
Annex H March 6-H-1
Appendix 1 Aide Memoire 6-H-1-1
Annex I Obstacle Breaching/Crossing 6-I-1
Appendix 1 Aide Memoire 6-I-1-1

Chapter 7 BRIGADE TACTICS: OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Introduction 7-1

Annex A Captured Persons 7-A-1

Annex B Sites of Cultural and Historic Importance 7-B-1
Annex C Other Actors in the Battlespace 7-C-1
Annex D Training the Brigade 7-D-1

Glossary Glossary-1

Index Index-1

Abbreviations Abbr-1

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 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO BRIGADE TACTICS

0101. Chapter 1 will establish an CONTENTS

understanding of the brigade, its role, its Subject Page
organisational construct and the context
in which it will operate. Conflict and the Brigade 1-1
The Key Tenets 1-3
The Organisation of Land Forces 1-7
0102. Operational complexity dictates The Division 1-7
that British brigades will rarely deploy The Functions of the Division 1-8
independently. Chapter 1 will explain Brigade Activity within a Divisional
the function of the national or multi- Construct 1-9
national division in which the brigade will Functions of the Brigade 1-11
Brigade Structure and Organisation –
operate. Throughout Brigade Tactics, the Units 1-12
the brigade will be illustrated in a Allocation of Divisional Assets 1-13
divisional construct. Force Types within the Brigade 1-14
Task Organisation 1-17
CONFLICT AND THE BRIGADE The Adversary Perspective 1-18

Annex A: Example Brigade Structures 1-A-1

0103. The security challenge suggested
by the Future Character of Conflict 1 is a
demanding one: intractable conflicts in complex battlespace – probably urbanised and
littoral – where threats may be hybrid. A hybrid opponent may draw on a range of
capabilities from conventional to asymmetric. He may operate as a deployed force or a
decentralised network or a combination of both. The threat he poses may be 360 degree
and multi-dimensional, 2 contesting the information and electro-magnetic dimensions as
much as the traditional ones of land and air. He may operate with little consideration for
western law, ethics or proportionality. The conflict in which he struggles may be played out
in the glare of international media with legitimacy – however it is defined – as the vital
ground. Those that oppose him must manoeuvre on a battlefield that modern ISTAR, social
networking, media and communications have made almost transparent.

0104. In seeking security solutions, the UK will draw on a range of levers, national and
international, military through to diplomatic. But as threats emanate from ‘the people’ so
must security solutions ultimately be found amongst them – on land; this may require the
use of UK land forces integrated as required with joint assets, allies, partners and proxies,
host nation governments, other governmental departments and international organisations.
The UK’s most potent tactical land force is the brigade, deployed within a divisional
command structure and acting within a joint and theatre campaign design.

0105. Complex conflicts require a range of military activities, a relationship ADP

Operations 3 refers to as the mosaic of conflict. Activities within the mosaic are not neatly
delineated and a brigade may conduct activities in sequence (warfighting followed by

1
DCDC, Strategic Trends Programme – The Future Character of Conflict (Shrivenham: DCDC, 2009). FCOC
uses 5 Cs to illustrate the future operating environment: Cluttered, Connected, Congested, Constrained and
Contested. A sixth C, Coalition, is arguably also relevant.
2
DCDC, ADP Operations. Manoeuvre has seven dimensions: Maritime, Land, Air, Space, Information,
Electromagnetic and Time.
3
DCDC, ADP Operations (Andover: Army Publications, 2010).

1-1
stabilisation) or more than one activity concurrently (for example, defeating a kinetic attack
in one battlegroup AO whilst delivering peace support across the rest of the brigade area).

0106. The spectrum of potential tasks challenges the brigade but also underlines its
considerable utility. In inter-state war, a deployment may require multiple corps and
appropriate headquarters. In other conflicts, land forces may operate in a much more
independent manner and with fewer supporting enablers. The brigade must therefore be
able to fit efficiently into a well integrated corps/division scheme and yet also operate, for
example in COIN, in a very decentralised way. To meet these demands, brigades are
designed to be versatile and adaptable and to have commanders who are educated to
recognise what is required of them in the particular conflict they are faced with.

0107. A brigade offers a potent combination of command and control, firepower and
manoeuvre across the mosaic. It achieves success through the manoeuvre of its
battlegroups. Brigade ‘Find’ achieves understanding; brigade command and control
determines the tactical actions required and task organises battlegroups accordingly; the
brigade directs and coordinates battlegroup manoeuvre to a position of advantage and
brings their combat power to bear to break enemy will and cohesion. This cycle of activity
may be physical, cognitive or both. Manoeuvre will be multi-dimensional and integrated
where appropriate with military and non-military actors and assets. It will be delivered with
a tempo, initiative and a creative, indirect approach that seeks to surprise and shock those
who would oppose it.

0108. Many of the challenges of modern and future operations – uncertainty, danger,
chance - are enduring. Forces have long been required to comprehend the essence of
their mission, the nuances of the operating context and the very nature of the opponent.
But contemporary brigade operations will place a particular premium on five aspects:

a. Information superiority to out-think and out-know the opponent;

b. Interconnectivity to access combat power from across the force and bring it to
bear precisely and decisively;

c. Agility, to configure the brigade at pace to deliver the mission, taking under
command additional assets as required;

d. Interoperability to work, as directed, alongside joint forces, allies, partners,

and civil agencies; and

e. The quality of its officers and soldiers to provide a decisive edge – in creative
problem solving 4 , in adaptability, in generating the deception that masks intent and
in the moral character to deal with uncertainty, danger and to exploit opportunity.

0109. Brigade Tactics will consider how brigade tactical actions are best conducted to
exploit these considerations.

4
The character, courage, and intellect required to provide a decisive battlefield edge is typified by the lateral,
creative thought outlined in the DCDC Joint Doctrine Note Decision Making and Problem Solving: Human and
Organisational Factors.

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THE KEY TENETS

0110. Unlocking the potential of the brigade to achieve success requires a doctrine that
encourages physical and mental agility and concentrates strength against weakness at a
time of our choosing in order to break the opponent’s will. This doctrine is covered
comprehensively in ADP Ops, Chapter 2 Fighting Power 5 which frames the conduct of all
tactical activity. The two key tenets of this doctrine are the Manoeuvrist Approach and
Mission Command. Exploiting the full capability of the brigade requires that these tenets
be imbued across the formation.

0111. The Manoeuvrist Approach. The Manoeuvrist Approach is an indirect approach

which emphasises understanding and targeting the conceptual and moral components of
an adversary’s fighting power as well as attacking his physical component. Used
successfully, it provides asymmetric advantage over an opponent; this may be physical,
conceptual or both. Influencing perceptions and breaking or protecting cohesion are key
ingredients. Successful exploitation of the Manoeuvrist Approach requires:

a. An attitude of mind that can understand and manipulate human nature to

identify vulnerabilities and points of influence. The manoeuvrist approach is about
‘manoeuvering the mind’ rather than just physical movement.

b. A practical professional knowledge that breeds the confidence upon which

ingenuity, originality, a determination to succeed and a willingness to do the
unexpected are based.

c. A philosophy of command that promotes freedom of action and initiative

based on centralised intent and decentralised execution.

0112. Applying the Manoeuvrist Approach requires the brigade to exercise five skills which
should then be supported by a series of enhancements. The five skills are: understanding
the situation; influencing perceptions; seizing and holding the initiative; breaking cohesion
and will; and protecting cohesion and will.

a. Understand the Situation. The brigade must effectively exploit information,

intelligence, and intuition to achieve understanding; it must understand people and
ground, effects required and outcomes sought. Judgement is required here:
complete certainty is illusionary and the pursuit of it will degrade timely decision
making; that said, brigade combat power cannot be appropriately allocated and
applied if its context is not understood.

b. Influencing Perceptions 6 At its heart, conflict is a battle of wills. Influence

seeks to change perceptions and behaviour through the direct and indirect use of
power. British doctrine regards influence as central to military activity. On
operations, a brigade will exploit direct and indirect power to shift perceptions and
behaviour in the manner required by the brigade mission. The brigade may draw
on manoeuvre, firepower, presence and profile, and special influence methods.

5
ADP Ops pp 2-1 to 2-36.
6
Influence concepts and doctrine continue to evolve; this section is based on The Land Handbook
(Influence), Issue 1 dated Mar 11.

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Success will be best achieved through a combination of means. Two examples
illustrate the point:

(1) In overcoming an enemy threat, the brigade may use manoeuvre and
firepower to defeat the enemy main body, supported by messaging that
undermines enemy morale whilst reassuring allies and the local population.

(2) In a peace enforcement operation, the brigade may manoeuvre to

separate two protagonists and negotiate a ceasefire using the threat of force
to achieve compliance. Brigade messaging will influence both protagonists to
comply but will also protect the legitimacy (legal and ethical) of the brigade’s
actions.

c. Influencing perceptions is a sophisticated art. It requires an understanding of

the target audience, the most appropriate means to influence it and the context in
which that influence must be achieved. In its plans, the brigade must articulate the
influence outcome sought, and determine and integrate the means to achieve it. It
must be able to understand the target, gauge the change on the target, and
mitigate unintended actions – such as collateral damage.

d. Brigade influence assets are force wide. They range from the interaction of
individual patrols, the powerful messaging of successful brigade tactical actions, to
Key Leader Engagement (KLE) and Special Influence Methods.

e. Special Influence Methods (previously referred to as influence activities)

require the synchronisation of a wide range of capabilities that aim to exploit
information, manage perceptions and synchronise ‘the word’ and ‘deed’. Special
Influence Methods include the following tools:

(1) Information Methods. Information Methods (previously termed

Information Operations) are the means by which staff coordinate a number of
tasks designed to have direct influence such as computer network action
and psychological methods.

(2) Deception.

(3) Key Leader Engagement.

(4) Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC).

(5) OPSEC.

(6) Media Communication. Media Communication (previously termed

Media Ops) is an essential part of any commander’s ability to understand and
influence local, regional and UK domestic audiences. It must be coordinated
and synchronised with other influence methods and not viewed as exclusively
‘public relations’, in order to optimise its effect.

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 f. Further information on influence can be found in the Land Handbook
(Influence) 7 . The use of the Influence Cycle is covered in detail in the Staff Officers
Handbook.

ACTION AS INFLUENCE: AFGHANISTAN 2009

‘The campaign in Afghanistan…is principally a battle for people’s minds. This is as much
about managing perception as it is about action. Every action we take has an impact on
people’s minds. This is why influence must be at the centre of everything we do and all our
actions must be judged against whether or not they support the big idea – the [Afghan
Government] is more effective at providing for the needs of the people than the insurgent.’

Lieutenant General Nick Carter 8

g. Seizing and Holding the Initiative. Seizing and holding the initiative lies at
the heart of the Manoeuvrist Approach. The brigade must seek to dictate events;
the brigade commander must make the right assessment, anticipate and then
select, communicate and act on the right choice, all more effectively than his
adversary. Seizing and holding the initiative will require effective brigade
understanding, high levels of tempo across the command, a willingness to take
risks and the ability to manoeuvre brigade combat power to a position of advantage
– conceptually and physically – in order to achieve shock and surprise.

h. Breaking Cohesion and Will. Brigade combat power must be applied to

break an adversary’s will and cohesion. Breaking will and cohesion requires an
understanding of the adversary’s culture, motivations, capabilities and
vulnerabilities to ensure that the most appropriate psychological and physical
means are applied. Effects should applied simultaneously wherever possible,
overmatching the opponent’s ability to respond and resist. The brigade should
seek to induce combinations of:

(1) Surprise. Surprise may be partial but sufficient to instil doubt, delaying an
opponent’s decision or action until it is too late.

(2) Pre-emption. Seizing an opportunity to deny an opponent an advantage

before he can act.

(3) Dislocation. To prevent an opponent from bringing his strength to bear.

Distraction, envelopment, and deep penetration may all assist in dislocating an
opponent’s ability to respond.

(4) Disruption. To selectively break apart and confuse assets that are critical
to the employment and coherence of an adversary’s fighting power.

(5) Shock action. To paralyse and overwhelm an opponent through the

sudden, concentrated application of violence. Shock action is characterised by
concentrations of fire and high tempo manoeuvre.
7
LWDG, Land Handbook (Influence) (R) (LWDG: Warminster, 2011).
8
HQ RC(S) Operating Instructions, September 2009.

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 (6) Destruction. To destroy carefully selected and discrete capabilities thus
enhancing shock and amplify surprise.

(7) Collapse. To generate the progressive or catastrophic collapse of an

opponent leading to an enemy withdrawal or surrender.

(8) Exploitation. To turn the temporary seizure of the initiative and advantage
to battlefield success.

i. Protecting Cohesion and Will. Whilst seeking to overcome an opponent,

the brigade must also protect its cohesion and will. Own vulnerabilities may lie in
the moral, conceptual and physical components of the force. Protective measures
may range from force protection, through maintaining an offensive spirit to
engender confidence to the sustainment of the ethical and legal legitimacy of the
operation.

0113. Enhancing the Manoeuvrist Approach. Uncertainty, danger and the element of
chance in conflict all serve to undermine the confidence and cohesion upon which the
Manoeuvrist Approach depends. The symptoms may be risk aversion, slow procedures,
untimely decision making and ineffective situational awareness. The brigade can enhance
the Manoeuvrist Approach through the following:

a. Simplicity. Well considered, but simple to execute plans, which withstand

the friction and chance of conflict.

b. Flexibility. High levels of organisational and personal flexibility based on

common understanding, training, battle procedure, and enquiring and agile minds.

c. Tempo. The ability to transition between activities more effectively than an

opponent based on timely decision making and slick battle procedure.

d. Momentum. The ability to apply weight and impetus to brigade activity – from
reinforcement to sustainment of effort – to maintain the initiative until it realises
military success.

e. Simultaneity. The ability to overload the adversary through multiple threats

and effects such that he cannot assess, prioritise or respond effectively.

f. The Air Dimension. The integration of air and land power is an important
part of the implementation of the Manoeuvrist Approach. When properly
integrated, air power can help to shape the battlespace, attack the enemy’s
cohesion and will, protect the cohesion and will of the force, and exploit success.

0114. Mission Command. Mission Command is a philosophy founded on centralised

intent and decentralised execution that is particularly suitable for complex, dynamic and
adversarial situations. Like the Manoeuvrist Approach, Mission Command focuses on
outcomes, as it stresses the importance of understanding what is to be achieved, rather
than specifying the ways by which it should be achieved. At the brigade level it will have
the following key elements:

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 a. The brigade commander gives orders in a manner that ensures that his
subordinates understand his intent, their own missions, and the context of those
missions.

b. Subordinates are told what they are to achieve (the task) and the reason why
they are to achieve it (the purpose).

c. Subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions.

d. A brigade commander imposes the minimum level of control possible to avoid

unnecessarily constraining his subordinates’ freedom of action.

e. Subordinates decide how best to achieve their missions, but understand that
they have a fundamental responsibility to act in line with their brigade commander’s
intent. This understanding is based on mutual trust, common training standards, a
common and well-understood doctrine and drills and familiarity with each other’s
likely reactions.

0115. Good inter-connectivity and interoperability will enable the brigade to conduct the
decentralised execution that exploits Mission Command. In empowering subordinates, the
brigade commander will need to consider the challenge of the tactical situation and the
control measures necessary to succeed, the need to remain balanced to respond to the
unexpected and defeat enemy counter moves, and the appropriate balance of risk between
decentralised manoeuvre and protection.

THE ORGANISATION OF LAND FORCES

0116. Complexity of operations in the land environment requires capability to be matched

to requirement through the appropriate task organisation of force elements. Land forces
are structured hierarchically into armies, corps, divisions, brigades, units and sub-units and
offer, at the relevant scale, groupings of capabilities.

0117. On operations, land forces will act within a joint design and subordinate to a theatre
headquarters. The theatre headquarters, which may be multi-national, will take under
command national forces and direct the operational design – the synchronisation of tactical
activities to deliver strategic outcomes.

0118. Within the land tactical force elements, the UK brigade will operate under divisional
command; the divisional level, which may be UK, allied or multi-national, could serve as a
tactical headquarters in its own right, as a land component headquarters or as the core of
the operational level headquarters. Irrespective of its role, a clear understanding of the
inter-relationship between the brigade and divisional level is essential.

THE DIVISION

0119. Brigades are grouped within divisions. Divisions are grouped within a corps, Joint
Task Force (JTF) or theatre framework. The divisional level is the lowest level at which
operational art can be practised and it is also the level at which the UK delivers this in the
Land Environment. Operational Art links tactical actions to meet operational objectives; its

1-7
pinnacle is holding the initiative and maintaining tempo in relation to the opponent. To
achieve this, the division is resourced to plan and execute simultaneous tactical
engagements, whilst at the same time, planning the next set of tactical engagements to
allow operational tempo to be maintained. The division provides the direction, and sets the
conditions for, subordinate brigade activity. This includes the employment or allocation of
forces and assets held at the divisional level.

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE DIVISION 9

0120. To fulfil the tasks required of it a division will:

a. Provide the command space and top cover, whilst managing tactical risk, to
allow brigades and task forces tactical freedom of action;

b. Integrate and usually command joint, contractor-provided, inter-agency and

multi-national capabilities;

c. Plan and execute several tactical engagements at a time in an unlimited

decision / action cycle in space that illustratively could be as large as 2,500 km2;

d. Routinely have command of the enablers that allow manoeuvre to be

executed by more than one formation, sequentially or concurrently, in a conceptual
framework 10 of deep, close and rear (with these terms relating to effect, time and
space, as well as geography) to shape, sustain, protect and enable decisive
operations;

e. Sequence and enable the tactical engagements of brigades and task forces
within the operational framework through the allocation of scarce resources, fires
and enablers, and through the application of the principles of concentration of force
and economy of effort;

f. As the lowest level at which it is managed independently, enable the delivery

of the overall divisional C3I capability within which brigade and task force tactical CIS
manoeuvre;

g. Serve as the core of a multi-national 2 star HQ with both UK and coalition

force elements under command, a Land Component or JTF HQ in certain
circumstances;

h. Sustain several engagements simultaneously, and serve as the link to the

operational line of communication in certain circumstances.

9
Army HQ Directorate of Force Development, Deployable Divisional Headquarters - Concept of
Employment, 3 Apr 12.
10
ADP Operations Chapter 7 establishes an Operational Framework of decisive, shaping, sustaining and
protecting acts as a purposive framework; a Tactical Framework of find, fix, strike and exploit; and a
Geographic Framework of deep, close and rear that can equally be applied conceptually or psychologically.

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BRIGADE ACTIVITY WITHIN A DIVISIONAL CONSTRUCT

0121. A division’s Area of Operations (AO) is a complex multi-layered operating

environment with concurrent activity occurring across all dimensions of the battlespace.
Brigades will be allocated defined AOs for specified time periods; other areas will be
reserved for divisional activity or allocated to assets held at divisional level. Understanding
the interdependence of the brigade-divisional relationship is important. Fig 1-1 shows 1
Mechanised, 7 Armoured, 16 Air Assault and 43 US Brigades deployed within 1 UK
(Armoured) Division’s AO. Some of the battlespace management measures used to control
and deconflict concurrent activities are illustrated. In this example divisional battlespace is
allocated to subordinate brigades as well as divisional assets (sustainment, logistic supply,
Artillery Manoeuvre Areas (AMA) and the Offensive Support Group (OSG)).

Figure 1-1 The Divisional Battlespace.

0122. The activity of subordinated brigades must be directed and sequenced to achieve
the divisional mission. Figs 1-2 and 1-3 illustrate brigade tactical actions in support of a
divisional mobile defence. In this operation, the participating brigades are augmented by
divisional Combat, Combat Support, Combat Command Support 11 and Combat Service
Support capabilities, consistent with supporting the division’s Main Effort. Supporting
brigades may also have units detached to augment other formations.

11
ADP Ops Ch 4 states that ‘Combat Command Support (CCS) elements assist commanders in the exercise
of command. They provide sometimes highly technical communications at each level of warfare; intelligence
and information; force policing; and elements to protect, sustain and move commanders and staffs in
headquarters of several constituent parts.’

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1. Enemy crosses the international border.
2. Recce/covering force observes and engages, eventually withdrawing. 1 Mech Bde
conducts a mobile defence trading space for time and forcing the enemy to concentrate
repeatedly against successive defensive positions.
3. 7 Armd Bde, on the Div Main Effort moves to their Line of Departure. During their move
they are forced to conduct a deliberate crossing of a major water obstacle.
4. A battlegroup prepares an area defensive position in an urban environment.
5. 43 US Bde conducts security actions in the Div rear area.
6. A Battlegroup of 16 Air Asslt Bde conducts stabilisation actions.

Fig 1-2 Brigade Tactical Activity within the Divisional Context: 1 Mech Bde’s
Delaying Action and 7 Armd Bde’s Approach March

1-10
 1. A battlegroup from 1 Mech Bde conducts a feint to deceive the enemy into believing that
the main threat is to their left flank.
2. 7 Armd Bde (on the Div ME) supported by AH regiment and Div fires/OSG attacks into
enemy 2nd tactical echelon’s right flank.
3. The enemy breaks and withdraws in disorder. 7 Armd Bde and 1 Mech Bde prepare to
conduct exploitation and pursuit.

Fig 1-3 Brigade Tactical Activity within the Divisional Context: Attack and
Subsequent Exploitation

FUNCTIONS OF THE BRIGADE

0123. The scale and all arms nature of the brigade provides a potent balance of span of
command, function and combat power. As a guide, brigades:

a. Are capable of concurrently planning a tactical action whilst executing another

within a relatively limited decision/action cycle, dictated by context and activity. In a
complex stabilisation operation, brigade planning may involve detailed, multi-
stakeholder engagement over a protracted timescale. In a dynamic warfighting
action, where tempo is key, brigade planning and battle procedure must be more
rapid. Achieving tempo will require appropriate command and control, with an
emphasis on rapid planning timelines, fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) and the
battlefield circulation of commanders to gauge tactical progress and provide
direction.

b. Execute manoeuvre in space that is generally determined by the range of

organic direct fire and habitually aligned combined Arms and Combat Support

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 capabilities in close combat (typically around 25 km) – recognizing that factors like
population numbers, terrain, mass, intensity and effect have a bearing on space;

c. Enable through task organization and command the manoeuvre of up to four

(five in extremis) points of command;

d. Exercise command within a defined C3I 12 envelope, delivered primarily by

tactical CIS, including Combat Net Radio (CNR) and this has a bearing on space;

e. Are the lowest levels of command where joint and multi-national capabilities
are integrated (recognizing that there are exceptions in certain circumstances);

f. Sustain as a yardstick no more than two tactical engagements thus requiring

five days of supply.

BRIGADE STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION – THE UNITS

0124. Brigade Composition. A brigade typically consists of:

a. A Brigade HQ and Signal Squadron.

b. Brigade armoured cavalry.

c. Up to four battlegroups.

d. Integral CS, CSS and CCS units.

0125. Visualisation of scale is important in considering the brigade’s utility, agility and
potency. A typical armoured brigade comprises approximately 5,000 personnel, some 1000
armoured vehicles and 2,500 support vehicles. In convoy, nose to tail, it will stretch over
12km; in area, with each vehicle parked a few steps apart it will cover 12 football pitches
and an assembly area will typically require around 30 km2 (excluding CS and CSS
elements). In an intense fight a brigade consumes 560 pallets of ammunition a day. Whilst
the brigade offers significant combat power, realising its full utility requires high levels of
interoperability, connectivity and effective direction, coordination and control.

0126. At its heart a brigade is a combination of ground manoeuvre units. It can be

configured to meet the requirements of the task, the mission, the operating environment
and the particular nature of the threat. An illustrative Reaction Force armoured infantry
brigade is shown at Fig 1-4. This structure is used throughout Brigade Tactics to illustrate
tactical actions but is only one possible configuration.

12
Command, Control, Cyber (including EW and SIGINT), and Information.

1-12
 W W

Fig 1-4 An Armoured Infantry Manoeuvre Brigade

0127. Alternative brigade configurations may be more appropriate subject to the operating
environment or a specialist formation role (air manoeuvre/amphibious). Fig 1-5 illustrates a
brigade centred on a heavy protected mobility capability for stabilisation operations. Other
illustrative brigade groupings are detailed at Annex A.

Fig 1-5 Illustrative Brigade Structure for Stabilisation Operations

ALLOCATION OF DIVISIONAL ASSETS

0128. However it is organised, the brigade will be enabled and supported by divisional
assets. These assets may operate under direct command of the division to set the
conditions for brigade activity or they may be grouped to the brigade at specified command
states for specified periods of time. Joint or theatre assets may be requested and
coordinated by the division in support of the divisional plan. Rather than augmentation, the
division may direct that forces are detached from the brigade to support other activity in the
divisional AO. Divisional capabilities that may be grouped to the brigade are below:

a. Manoeuvre Units. Additional manoeuvre units may not be task-organised as

battlegroups prior to being assigned.

b. Aviation. General Service aviation, controlled at divisional level, may be

attached to the brigade for specific tasks (for example with a priority to MEDEVAC).
Attached attack aviation force elements will be supported by an air manoeuvre
planning capability at divisional or brigade level.

c. Joint Fires and ISTAR. Joint fires and ISTAR are matched to the operational
plan by the divisional Commander Royal Artillery (CRA). Brigades will not normally

1-13
 hold close support artillery under command. They can expect to be supported by
an affiliated artillery Tactical (Tac) group headed by the CO of a close support
regiment which is placed OPCON or OPCOM to the brigade and is integral to the
brigade staff. The brigade can also be ‘reinforced’ by the fires of gun groups, which
may or may not be located within and/or moved through the brigade area. A close
air defence battery is likely to be placed TACOM 13 to each brigade to provide route
or point defence.

d. Engineers. Brigades will normally be supported by a close support engineer

regiment. The divisional Commander Royal Engineers (CRE) may allocate
additional squadrons to reinforce the main effort or for specific activities. Engineer
sub-units are usually placed under TACOM or OPCON of the brigade they are
supporting.

e. CIS. Additional CIS systems and access nodes may be supplied to the
brigade from the divisional signal regiment.

f. EW. The brigade signal squadron commander is responsible for EW advice

unless an EW Co-ordination Centre (EWCC) is available. The brigade may benefit
from allocated EW assets as well as national and allied SIGINT resources. Co-
ordination of EW Sig Int (EWSI) activity is undertaken via the EWCC at brigade or,
if present, divisional level.

g. Special Influence Methods. Special influence methods capabilities may be

task organised to the brigade or operate at divisional level in close support of
brigade operations. These include CIMIC and Psyops teams.

h. CSS. Additional CSS assets may be placed TACOM or OPCON of a brigade

to enhance its close support capacity.

i. Provost. The brigade provost company may be reinforced from divisional

assets; for example for the coordination of a long road move.

0129. The division may task other formations to support the brigade if it is on the main
effort; tasks could include the security of routes, assembly areas and FUPs for a brigade
attack.

FORCE TYPES WITHIN THE BRIGADE

0130. Units within the brigade are defined as reconnaissance (armoured cavalry), ground
manoeuvre, air manoeuvre or amphibious forces. To provide combined arms groupings,
the ground manoeuvre units are task organised into battlegroups.

a. Armoured Cavalry. Armoured cavalry is the brigade’s principal manoeuvre

find asset. It can operate mounted to provide a responsive find capability for high
tempo manoeuvre or, dismounted, work alongside HUMINT assets to contribute to
the brigade’s overall understand requirement. As a find force, armoured cavalry
should be carefully integrated within the brigade’s overall find effort.

13
See States of Command, para 0227.

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b. Armoured cavalry may be grouped with Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS),
HUMINT teams, ground sensors, air reconnaissance and manoeuvre support
assets. In complex terrain, armoured cavalry will require mobility, high levels of
protection, 24 hour surveillance capability, networked communications and the
firepower to fight for information as necessary.

c. In addition to their find capability, armoured cavalry units offer the brigade
significant broader utility. As a manoeuvre force, they can operate in intimate
support in certain circumstances, conduct economy of effort operations in the
brigade AO, provide route security, flank security, or form the core of a reserve or
exploitation force.

d. Additional brigade find capabilities, including engineer and electronic warfare

assets, are covered in Annex A to Chapter 6.

e. Ground Manoeuvre Forces. Ground manoeuvre forces can be armoured,

mechanised or light. Manoeuvre brigades will be based on the former.

(1) Armoured Forces. Armoured forces (armour and armoured infantry)

provide the brigade’s principal protected, precision shock action capability.
The brigade should train to generate flexible groupings of armour, armoured
infantry, fire support and manoeuvre support to meet the tactical need.

(2) Mechanised Forces. Whilst unsuitable for direct assault in most

circumstances, mechanised forces can conduct a range of other activities.
They offer high utility in stabilisation operations, infantry mass for complex
terrain and the ability to redeploy forces beyond the contact battle with
adequate protection. The brigade will need to consider how best to manage
the tempo variation between armoured and mechanised forces.

(3) Light Forces. Light forces have significant strategic and operational
mobility, and at unit level, can be transported by air. Attached to the
manoeuvre brigade they can conduct a range of economy of force tasks.
They offer infantry mass in complex terrain but can be easily fixed through a
lack of protection and limited tactical reach.

f. Air Manoeuvre Forces. Air Manoeuvre (AM) is conducted within the land
environment in order to achieve advantage through shaping and sustaining tasks.
It can also provide the decisive act. AM unites attack helicopters, ground, air
assault and airborne forces, support helicopters and fires within a combined arms
and joint framework. A key capability, AM must be integrated with ground
manoeuvre and supporting joint effects. In a divisional construct, a ground
manoeuvre brigade may operate within a divisional AM Concept of Operation
(CONOP) or in conjunction with an AM formation. AM offers a range of capabilities
to find, fix, strike and exploit within its own scheme of manoeuvre with the
additional ability to find/shape/fix an enemy in depth in order to allow ground
manoeuvre close combat operations. AM can also seize key terrain in order to
improve land manoeuvre tempo.

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 g. AM consists of: Close Combat Attack (CCA), providing responsive and
intimate fires in close support; tactical air manoeuvre, which provides the co-
ordinated employment of attack aviation and air assault troops to achieve surprise;
and operational air manoeuvre which seeks to achieve physical and psychological
dominance at range, probably at air assault formation level. CCA, tactical and
operational air manoeuvre operations may involve the following activities:

(1) Airborne task force operations

(2) Pathfinder operations

(3) Air despatch operations

(4) Tactical air landing operations

(5) Reconnaissance

(6) Air assault operations

(7) Airmobile operations

(8) Aviation attack/raid

(9) Aviation manoeuvre

(10) Surface assault and ship to shore within littoral manoeuvre.

(11) Additionally, AM can provide Destruction of Enemy Air Defence (DEAD),

Quick Reaction Forces (QRF), high value target strike and significant
presence/posture/profile effects. 14

h. When AM assets are task organised to a ground manoeuvre brigade, the

brigade will be augmented for AM C2; this may be in the form of an Air Manoeuvre
Planning Team (AMPT) headed by an OF 4/5. In the event that the AMPT is
integrated at the divisional level, the brigade will receive an AM LO.

i. Amphibious Forces. Amphibious forces are able to exploit the deployability

and mobility of air and maritime assets to deliver land and littoral effect. Optimised
to operate from a maritime flank, they provide the brigade commander with:

(1) An inherently scalable and Joint organisation, possessing organic

aviation, CS, CSS and C4ISTAR.

(2) The ability to exploit the maritime flank, being particularly suited to
operating in the littoral where they can be projected ashore tactically with their
vehicles and equipment using a combination of integral surface and aviation
assets without reliance on ports or other Host Nation Support (HNS).

14
AFM Vol 1 Part 12 Air Manœuvre 2007 p 3-1.

1-16
 (3) Rapidly deployable forces able to integrate with additional enablers such
as armoured reconnaissance and armour.

(4) A specialist information exploitation group providing precision for the

force through information superiority.

(5) Self sustainment ashore for up to 28 days without reliance on HNS or an

air bridge.

(6) Political options and operational flexibility based on the ability to transit
300 Nm within 24 hours, thereby threatening 600 Nm of coastline without
commitment.

0131. Units/Battlegroups. The essential building blocks of the brigade’s capability are its
battlegroups, units and specialist sub-units. A unit is the smallest grouping capable of
independent operations with organic capability over long periods, although some sub-unit
groups are capable of doing so for short periods. A unit contains integral CS, CSS and
limited Combat Command Support (CCS) elements.

TASK ORGANISATION

0132. The core structure of the brigade provides a range of capabilities which can be
augmented and adjusted as required. Command and control is a capability in its own right
and the brigade should be routinely prepared to create flexible groupings based on units for
particular tasks. Combined arms groups provide a complementary range of capabilities to
maximise combat power and overmatch a less well-balanced force.

0133. The composition of these groupings will be shaped by the nature of the threat and
the physical environment as well as any specified and likely missions and tasks. A key role
of the brigade commander and his headquarters is to determine the appropriate grouping
for the task from the complete range of sub-units at his disposal. Manoeuvre sub-units
(armoured, armoured infantry and mechanised), fire support companies, and key enablers
(such as fire support teams, other CS, CSS and specialist capabilities) must be force
packaged in the optimal manner. This may include taking under command assets from the
division and, where directed, detaching sub-units to the division or flanking brigades.

0134. Key to any configuration is that the brigade is able to sequence the tactical
framework of find, fix, strike and exploit. The brigade must be ‘balanced’, with sufficient CS
units to support manoeuvre, CSS units to sustain and CCS assets to support the HQ.

0135. Critical to successful task organisation is interoperability. Interoperability is based on

commonality of doctrine, training and equipment. A well worked up brigade with
established procedures that has practised task organisation variations will be well
positioned to exploit this. Where standards of interoperability are lower, tempo of transition
will be reduced and the brigade commander may be required to mitigate operational risk by
additional training, augmentation with enablers, higher force ratios or tighter control
measures. In most cases units will have a level below which they are not routinely task
organised without significant penalty – for example, detaching an infantry platoon for long
periods would leave it without organic combat support and combat service support.

1-17
 THE ADVERSARY PERSPECTIVE

An adversary may present a hybrid threat, a combination of conventional, irregular and

‘high-end’ asymmetric capabilities.

Enemy capabilities may range from conventional forces more potent than the UK’s, perhaps
in certain niche areas, to capabilities neither possessed nor employed by the UK. Enemy
formations, especially if well-trained and commanded, may pose a significant threat, if only
by virtue of mass and a high toleration of casualties. Enemies may choose not to engage
UK forces head to head, avoiding UK superior capabilities, and instead adopt an
asymmetric approach.

An enemy may seek to defeat a UK brigade using the following strategies:

Attack the Will to Fight. The enemy may seek to break the UK’s desire to persist in
combat. This could be achieved by inflicting casualties that public opinion will not tolerate
and avoiding decisive battlefield engagements, thus prolonging the conflict until UK public
support is exhausted and the financial cost becomes disproportionate to the benefits.

Attack Supply Lines. The enemy may seek to constrain the brigade’s manoeuvre by
threatening logistics from the point of entry throughout the brigade area. The more UK
forces have to commit to force, convoy and base protection the less combat power they can
generate.

Employ Light Forces. Dismounted infantry forces may be regular or irregular in nature
and may be equipped with Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS), mortars and
Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMS). They may dress in civilian clothes. They may use
light commercial vehicles and trucks, enabling them to move long distances in short time
periods comparative to armoured forces. Light infantry may be skilled at infiltration.
Whatever such forces may lack in skill they may well compensate for in mass. It is
probable that most enemies can generate large numbers of infantry, in comparison to that
possessed by a UK brigade. This is especially relevant to operations in urban areas and
such forces are a credible threat even if not well equipped. Even a basic scale of Rocket
Propelled Grenades (RPG), Machine Guns (MG) and sniper rifles can present extremely
challenging tactical conditions. Such forces can exist with a relative low logistic footprint
and be extremely hard to detect.

MANPADs and ATGMS. The specific capability of MANPADS and ATGMs will relate to
their technical characteristics, as well as the level of protection possessed by UK equipment
at the time. Both MANPADs and ATGMs are extremely light, portable and may be mounted
on light vehicles that are easy to conceal. They are also becoming increasingly easy to use
and maintain. Both are unlikely to be detected prior to firing.

Mines and IEDs. Mines and IEDs are simple, cheap and easy to manufacture, and
possess a proven high level of effectiveness. There is no functional difference between a
mine and an IED. Both can be command or victim initiated.

1-18
Main Battle Tanks (MBT). Almost all nations possess some armoured forces. Even small
numbers of MBTs skilfully employed still present a significant tactical challenge, especially
in close terrain. MBTs built in the last twenty years possess a capable fire-control system,
and even obsolete MBTs may still present a substantial threat to all UK brigade platforms,
bar CR2. Many MBTs are substantially smaller and lighter than those used by the UK.
They are thus comparatively easy to conceal, especially in an urban area (T-72/80 90/Type
99 only requires a space with 2.2m of height and 3.8m of span for concealment). Some
enemies may well be prepared to commit tank forces with little or no expectation of the
vehicles surviving, because they will balance this against the casualties they expect to
cause.

Artillery. Indirect fire has a proven track record of causing significant casualties. Modern
communications, GPS survey and low-cost hand-held calculators, combined with the
proliferation of affordable UAS, have substantially increased the accuracy and fire direction
capabilities of mortars and artillery. While large calibre self-propelled systems may be easy
to detect, small calibre (<122mm) towed guns and mortars are easier to conceal, move and
sustain. Dependant on range and azimuth requirements, towed guns and mortars can be
fired from within fortified locations and may be hard to locate unless observed during firing.

Rocket Artillery. Rocket artillery systems span the spectrum of 70-107mm man-portable
single shot systems, through ground or truck mounted multi-barrel launchers, to large single
rockets with a range of over 400km. Inaccuracy means that rocket artillery is most effective
when using large volumes of fire onto pre-planned targets. Most rocket artillery is
comparatively simple and cheap to use, requiring only basic operator training. Even longer-
range systems can be highly effective when operated by users specialising in a particular
system.

Air Defence. Enemy AD systems may include pintle mounted GPMG through MANPADs
to highly sophisticated long-range systems. The enemy is likely to target helicopters and
UAS. They may view acquisition of highly capable air defence as a sound investment and
sophisticated training systems may result in highly skilled crews. Vehicle mounted systems
that can rapidly move from hide locations to conduct engagements of opportunity present
an obvious threat. Truck mounted 14.5 or 23 mm cannon present a significant threat to
both aircraft and ground forces.

Field Fortifications. Even enemies with limited capability can gain substantial benefit from
well-built field fortifications. Such fortifications can be constructed with widely available
civilian equipment and material. Most fortified regions or bunker complexes will separate
fighting positions from hides or shelters. Fighting positions may either be semi-prepared
locations making use of available cover or reinforced concrete bunkers carefully
camouflage to avoid detection, including by TI. Tunnels may connect fighting positions and
shelters. Such fortifications may well be constructed within or close to urban areas.

Civilian Population. The civilian population may be a significant enabler for enemy forces,
potentially representing a military capability in its own right. This could range from human
shields, unarmed reconnaissance, mass disorder mobilised by social media through to
sustainment. The enemy may make use of willing or coerced civilians, and may hide
amongst the population without uniform or obvious military equipment. The brigade should
be prepared to encounter civilian populations that are mostly hostile to them. Small brigade
detachments (rebroadcast units, logistic patrols etc) may be particularly vulnerable.

1-19
Note: The vast majority of weapon systems that the UK may face will have characteristics
that are already known and already well understood by those who study them. No weapon
system employed in conflict in the last 30 years was unknown prior to its use, and
technological surprise is rare.

1-20
 ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 1

EXAMPLE BRIGADE STRUCTURES

01A01. The timely and effective task organising of a brigade will allow it to be grouped into
the optimal configuration to match the requirements of the operation. Such requirements
will be driven by, for example, the nature of the threat, the operating environment (complex,
urban, littoral, open rural, desert, forest/jungle etc) and the speed with which the
deployment is required. The composition of the brigade will also include appropriate CS,
CCS and CSS capabilities to match its role as required.

01A02. The following diagrams illustrate a variety of potential brigade groupings, with
each one representing a brigade tailored to meet a specific operational circumstance:

W W

A manoeuvre brigade task organised with a light infantry battalion

A light role brigade

An air assault brigade with integral CS units

1-A-1
 UK

UK UK FR IT
A multi-national light role brigade commanded by a UK 1* headquarters

SS

SS SS SS SS SS SS SS SS
IX ASR

A commando brigade with integral CS and CSS units

1-A-2
 CHAPTER 2

ORCHESTRATING BRIGADE LEVEL TACTICAL ACTION

0201. The aim of this chapter, building on ADP CONTENTS

Operations (ADP Ops), is to consider how brigade Subject Page
tactical activity is orchestrated. This will provide the
basis for an examination of brigade level tactical The Doctrinal Frameworks 2-1
actions in subsequent chapters. The Operational Framework 2-2
The Geographic Framework 2-2
The Tactical Framework 2-3
0202. Chapter 2 will review the doctrinal The Tactical Functions 2-9
frameworks and the tactical planning concepts Command 2-9
outlined in ADP Ops and consider their applicability Information and Intelligence 2-15
to the brigade. It will conclude with an examination Firepower 2-19
Manoeuvre 2-21
of tactical planning considerations appropriate to Protection 2-28
offensive, defensive, stabilising and enabling Sustainment 2-34
actions. Specific planning considerations for each
tactical action are contained in the following
chapters.

THE DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORKS

0203. Success in complex military operations requires the ability to visualise and organise
activity and to understand its relationship in terms of function, geography, time and space.
ADP Ops Chapter 7 outlines the doctrinal frameworks as potential methods to organise
activity that can support planning, course of action articulation or execution. The doctrinal
frameworks are: the Operational Framework, the Geographic Framework and the Tactical
Framework and the Tactical Functions (listed in Fig 2-1 and further amplified in the
schematic at Fig 2-2, below 1). This chapter will consider the applicability of each at brigade
level.

Operational Framework Tactical Framework Geographic Framework

Shaping Tasks Find Deep
The Decisive Act Fix Close
- Engagement Strike Rear
- Exploitation Exploit
Sustaining Tasks
Protecting Tasks
Tactical Functions
Command Firepower Protection
Information and Intelligence Manoeuvre Sustainment

Fig 2-1 Summary of the Doctrinal Frameworks

1
ADP Ops p. 7-9 and 7-18.

2-1
 Fig 2-2 Visualising the Doctrinal Frameworks

THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

0204. The operational framework is principally a method of visualising or defining

operational level activity. The method identifies a decisive act and the protecting,
sustaining or shaping activity that supports it. As an operational tool it may not have a
central role in brigade level planning. However, brigade activity is delivered within a
divisional, theatre or campaign context and the role that the brigade plays within the higher
commander’s plan must be understood. For example, a division may use the operational
framework if it is operating as a Joint Force or Land Component Headquarters. Brigade
operations may deliver, or support, shaping, sustaining, or protecting tasks. They may
equally be the principal or a contributory part of the decisive act. The inter-relationship is
two-way; divisional shaping and sustaining tasks may set critical conditions within which the
brigade will operate and without which success at the brigade level will not be achieved.
Understanding the overall context is critical if the brigade is to comprehend the nature of its
mission and task, its role within the wider divisional effort and exploit – appropriately –
battlefield opportunities within the spirit of Mission Command. The operational framework
tool will assist in this understanding.

THE GEOGRAPHIC FRAMEWORK

0205. The manner in which operations in the land environment relate to each other can be
described geographically in terms of deep, close and rear. These terms may describe a
physical, spatial delineation but they can also be interpreted in a psychological sense. To

2-2
illustrate the latter, ADP Ops identifies a nation’s will to conduct operations as deep with
close conveying a sense of imminent threat; equally, at the tactical level a deep operation
could see a brigade planning to influence an enemy and shape his perceptions prior to the
close operation commencing at H-hr.

0206. In campaign terms, the brigade’s geographical reach is comparatively limited given
its weapon systems and mobility, and its planning horizon is typically short term;
nevertheless, the brigade may find it useful to envisage its activities in terms of deep, close
and rear. The following is illustrative.

a. Deep. In the physical landscape, brigade deep activities could be conducted by

reconnaissance forces or joint fires; in a psychological sense, deep activities could
be defined as longer term influence or intelligence activities that seek a change in
perceptions or greater understanding.

b. Close. Close activities are likely to refer to immediate activities or threats in

time and space. They relate most directly to the physical activities in support of the
contact battle. Close activities are likely to centre on combined arms groupings but
are not restricted to them. Combat support will be required to enable the close
battle, combat service support to sustain it.

c. Rear Operations. Rear operations may refer to a geographical positioning

(behind the contact battle) or a subordinate function such as the brigade level
sustainment effort or force protection. In the context of a 360 degree threat, force
protection is unlikely to be, in any geographical sense, ‘rear area’ security.

0207. The brigade’s subordination to the division and their respective operating ranges and
planning timelines mean that any concept of brigade deep, close and rear must be seen
within the divisional equivalent. Brigade close operations may form part of a divisional
close battle, but they could equally be planned as part of the divisional deep (screen force)
or rear (lines of communication protection). Similarly, divisional deep operations (depth
fires or divisional find) may play a key role in setting the conditions for a brigade close
activity. This is a complex inter-relationship in time and space and the geographic
framework provides a useful tool to understand it.

THE TACTICAL FRAMEWORK

0208. The tactical framework (formerly known as the core functions) consists of find, fix,
strike and exploit. It provides a very effective method of visualising tactical activity that is
applicable to each level of command across the brigade and to all tactical actions.

0209. The stages of the framework are not mutually exclusive. Whilst a force should seek
to transition from find, through fix, strike and then to exploit, the execution of each stage
may consist of sub-executions of them all. For example, a brigade strike operation may
consist of a series of subordinate find, fix, strike and exploits from infantry section level to
battlegroup. Similarly, whilst the focus and emphasis afforded to the find may change
during a brigade operation, its requirement will be enduring.

2-3
0210. Key is that the brigade is able to transition between the stages at the optimum time.
This delivers tempo and offers the best chance of obtaining shock and surprise, turning
tactical advantage to success. Achieving this requires high levels of training and
interoperability, timely decision making, a willingness to exploit opportunity and a
determination to succeed.

0211. Find. The basic function of finding occurs throughout an operation and throughout
the force. Every soldier within the brigade has the capacity to find, every force element
requires a degree of organic find capability. Collectively, in conjunction with divisional and
theatre assets and effective analysis, it provides the brigade’s ability to understand – a vital
first step in the manoeuvrist approach.

0212. The find is central to the successful application of brigade combat power. As such,
in executing brigade tactical actions, it should be viewed as an activity in its own right and
planned accordingly. Considerations at the brigade level are:

a. Planning. Whilst the products of the find are in part intelligence, its criticality
dictates that it should be planned as a G3 rather than G2 function. Coordination and
execution may be overseen by the ISTAR or Fires Cell within the headquarters, but
as it is fundamental to the overall plan it may also be orchestrated by the G3 and G5
Cells under the supervision of the COS and in accordance with the direction of the
brigade commander.

b. Assurance of the Find. The context will govern the assurance required of the
find. It will dictate the resources allocated to the find, including the time available to
develop understanding. In a stabilisation operation, find forces may mature targets
over a lengthy period until a threshold (based on judgement, necessity and ROE) is
reached at which point the target can be prosecuted or exploited. In a warfighting
operation, the decision cycle is likely to be much more rapid and the transition from
find, to fix, and to strike may be time-critical. Decisions to commit may have to and
should be made on less than complete information. Complex operations against a
hybrid opponent may involve both approaches. This must be balanced against likely
enemy deception methods.

c. Composition of the Find Force. The find force is likely to be based on the
light cavalry regiment, augmented by additional find assets (UAS, EW, aviation, air
and engineer reconnaissance). In major combat, consideration could be given to
augmenting the reconnaissance force with armour, armoured infantry, manoeuvre
support and additional sustainment. Where contact with the enemy is expected in
strength and where intelligence must be fought for, the find function could be tasked
to a composite grouping or a manoeuvre battlegroup. In complex, heavily populated
battlespace where identification of a hybrid opponent may be challenging, and
pattern of life and perceptions are central to understanding, dismounted
reconnaissance and HUMINT may be more appropriate. In deciding the appropriate
configuration and tactics, the following will need to be considered:

(1) What are the imperatives that bound the find task that will dictate its
conduct - such as time urgency, level of assurance in information and level of
acceptable risk to the find force?

2-4
 (2) Does the brigade intend to recce by stealth or will the find force have to
fight for information? In extremis, does it need to be able to do both?

(3) What information and intelligence sources are available to support the
find? How are these best commanded or accessed; where will their products be
most effectively fused and exploited?

(4) Is there a conflicting requirement between assets allocated to find and

targeting?

(5) What are the find force’s subsequent tasks once the brigade transitions to
strike? Is it intended to conduct further find to flanks or depth? Will it have a
role in any subsequent exploitation?

(6) What are the most appropriate command and control measures to ensure
that the find function is given the greatest freedom of action whilst ensuring an
effective transition to fix and strike without loss of momentum?

(7) How long must the find force operate and with what endurance – all
weather, 24 hours? What are the implications for force mix, reach and
sustainment?

0213. Fix. The purpose of the fix is to deny an adversary his goals, to distract him and
thus to deprive him of his freedom of action. This may be done physically through
obstacles, blocking forces, EW or by direct or indirect fires. Targets may be the enemy’s
main body, reserves or command and control centres. Fixing may also be done
psychologically, by feints and demonstrations that distract or deter his ability to respond or
by deception that plays to his prejudice, encouraging him to continue a course of action he
believes beneficial but which will ultimately undo him. In the complex operating
environment, successful brigade fixing operations are likely to combine physical and
psychological measures. Social networking, enhanced ISTAR capabilities and a dynamic
hybrid opponent operating amongst the people suggest that the probability of completely
hiding brigade activity is low. What is vital that its intent must be obscured or
misunderstood. ADP Operations identifies four generic methods of fixing:

a. Denial of goals - Through obstacles, surprise, deception and lure.

b. Distraction - Reducing his ability to interfere, for example fixing the enemy
reserve.

c. Deprivation of freedom of action – Through the denial of information or

dislocating his ability to command and control and thus respond.

d. Tactical Methods – By direct and indirect fire, saturation patrolling, overt

surveillance and electronic warfare.

0214. In determining the appropriate fixing activity and force, the brigade will need to
consider:

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 a. Selection of the Fixing Method. The enemy’s intent and his perceived
vulnerabilities must be understood if the appropriate fixing method is to be selected.
This assessment must be done in the context in which the fix has to be conducted.
Is the fixing likely to be deliberate or dynamic? What longevity is required and with
what degree of assurance?

b. Assurance. Most successful fix tasks will require the enemy to comply through
deception or compulsion. Careful thought must be given to the level of assurance of
any intended fixing task and what will constrain it:

(1) In complex, populated terrain, enemy forces may not be fully exposed and
Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Collateral Damage Estimates (CDE) may
prevent or degrade the application of physical fixing by fire.

(2) Consideration must be given to the role the infrastructure in the AO will
play in subsequent activities. For example, in warfighting operations the need to
cross river obstacles in a subsequent strike and exploit may restrict the manner
in which these can be denied to the enemy during the fix; in a stabilisation
operation, the destruction of key infrastructure (such as transport and utilities) to
dislocate an opponent may undermine subsequent security and development.

(3) Fixing methods must be aligned with the influence intent of the divisional or
theatre headquarters with appropriate controls, and where required,
consequence management.

c. Brigade plans will need to consider how best to assess the success of the fix,
how to augment it where required and how to respond to its failure – in part, or
whole. Careful judgement is required; most successful fixes do not render the
enemy immobile, rather they ensure that he is unable to respond effectively to
counter an impending strike.

d. Composition of the Fixing Force. The composition of the fixing force will be
dependent on the nature of the fix required. If the weight of the fix is psychological
operations, the fix may be conducted by the brigade headquarters, coordinating
deception measures which may involve manoeuvre and draw on brigade and higher
level assets where available – EW, PSYOPS, information operations. In a
physically focused fixing action, the fix could be delivered by manoeuvre assets
(such as armour using direct fire), fire support companies and/or counter-mobility
measures (such as obstacles) augmented by joint fires.

0215. Strike. To strike is to manoeuvre and then take direct action to achieve the purpose
of the mission. The strike can be physical, for example the application of combat power at
the point of decision such as a battlegroup attack; it can also be psychological, an
information operation that fundamentally undermines an opposing narrative. In the complex
operating environment, physical and psychological measures are likely to be
complementary. Key considerations at the brigade level are:

2-6
 a. Manoeuvre. A successful strike is dependent on the ability to manoeuvre
brigade forces to a position of advantage relative to the enemy. This is more than
movement and it requires the coordinated and supported positioning of brigade
combat power at the point of decision. Simple, well executed plans that overmatch
the opponent’s ability to respond effectively will be important.

b. The Challenge of the Strike. In a complex environment, the enemy array is

unlikely to be exposed in a manner that permits a single decisive, surgical strike.
Strike forces must have sufficient combat power to operate decisively in close
terrain. They must be balanced and have the ability to re-acquire (find), fix and
strike the opponent as they work through what may be a challenging, populated
battlespace. Complex terrain may fragment the strike force, sapping momentum.
The strike force must have the situational awareness and connectivity to coordinate
decentralised manoeuvre. It must also be able to access brigade combat power
across the strike force and apply it decisively. Critically, it must have the combat
power, reserves and the sustainment to prevail.

c. Composition of the Strike Force. The combat power of the strike must be
massed at point of decision in overwhelming force. Dependent on the nature of the
ground and the threat, the brigade may consider a number of options in relation to
the composition of the strike force:

(1) The strike force may be based on an all arms battlegroup, with additional
armour or armoured infantry as an echelon or reserve. This force will require
organic close reconnaissance, manoeuvre support assets to assist mobility and
provide counter mobility should the strike transition to secure or defend, and
joint fires enablers.

(2) The ground, the nature of the enemy force and its deployment may permit
the heart of the strike to be conducted by joint fires. In this context, ground
manoeuvre may be used to shape the battlespace, to flush out enemy forces
that may then be struck by indirect fire, attack aviation and/or air. This concept
of operations will place a premium on air-land integration, coordination and
control measures and combat identification. Successfully executed it will permit
the ground force to move rapidly to exploit without loss of balance or significant
combat power.

d. Control Measures. Control measures 2 must deconflict movement, integrate

fire and movement and facilitate the local initiative required to exploit opportunity.
Control measures will need to be dynamic enough to cater for the ebb and flow of
battle, such as to an enemy counter attack or the deployment of echelon and follow
on forces.

0216. Exploit. The exploit realises the full benefits of tactical advantage. Exploitation may
be limited to the immediate opportunities of battlefield success – from fresh attacks on a
now unbalanced opponent to the exploitation of seized intelligence; more ambitiously,
exploitation may lead to the pursuit and the defeat or destruction of withdrawing enemy

2
See also paras 0231-0234 in this Chapter, and further detailed in the Staff Officers Handbook

2-7
forces. Historically, in the right context, a remorseless pursuit has delivered the campaign 3.
Opportunities must be sought out and may be fleeting; much depends on the agility of the
brigade and its determination, within the mission and higher commander’s intent, to seize
the initiative. Key considerations are:

a. Planning for Success. Potential opportunities for exploitation must be

considered during the planning phase. This may lead to the generation of a
dedicated exploitation force or the earmarking of assets for this task.

b. Context of the Exploitation. The context of the exploitation will govern its
execution. The freedom of action afforded to the brigade will be informed by the
divisional intent and the divisional AO in which it will be conducted. The nature of
the operating environment will also be important: is exploitation an immediate or
longer term activity? Does the nature of the ground and any threat in depth mean
that extended exploitation risks more than its advantage? What are the respective
merits of physical exploitation (pursuit) and the non-physical (information operations
to reassure friendly populations and allies and demoralise opponents) and how can
they be best combined?

c. Composition of the Exploitation Force. There are a number of potential

options in generating an exploitation force:

(1) Strike Force. The strike force could be tasked to conduct exploitation.
This has benefits in tempo in that the strike force is already in direct contact with
the enemy and has a high level of situational awareness. There are potential
disadvantages: the strike force may have become unbalanced by the conduct of
the strike or degraded by combat. More ambitious exploitation opportunities
may be constrained by the limits of its combat power and sustainability.

(2) Dedicated Exploitation Force. A dedicated exploitation force could be

generated. Options range from armour heavy all arms groupings able to
destroy withdrawing enemy and defeat unexpected resistance to a
reconnaissance regiment augmented with joint fires and/or armour. If available
and reach is important, air manoeuvre forces could be used to seize key
ground/chokepoints in depth to deny enemy routes or to ease the advance of
the brigade. Exploitation could also see the destruction of withdrawing forces
through air and attack aviation.

d. Considerations. Well-judged and well executed, the exploitation may deliver

disproportionate benefits. But consideration must be given to its attendant risks.
Exploitation is a dynamic rather than deliberate activity and the brigade, lacking the
balance and the situational awareness in depth of the original strike, may be
vulnerable to enemy counterattacks. In mitigating these concerns, find assets and
joint fires will be important to identify and degrade enemy counter moves and to
secure exposed flanks. The brigade must also be alive to the risk of culmination
through a loss of combat power and/or a reduction in sustainment. Exploitation is a
demanding activity. Night capability and 24 hour operations will present an
3
Naseby, Dunbar, Jena, Waterloo and Suez 1973 are examples of the benefits of a determined and well
executed exploitation and pursuit.

2-8
 additional challenge of fatigue. An extended exploitation will require echelon forces
to maintain momentum.

THE TACTICAL FUNCTIONS

0217. The chapter will now consider tactical planning considerations, broken down by
tactical function 4, relevant to all tactical actions.

COMMAND

‘Decision making for a commander on operations is very frequently all about seizing
and maintaining the initiative. It is, by definition, a cognitive process, whether
conscious or unconscious. The cognitive method is through process; the unconscious
is intuitive. Both methods have their place: process before a battle; intuition during it.
But intuitive decisions always need the reality check of being tested against time and
space, resources and the environment.

There are those who say that because of the sort of complexity encountered in modern
conflict, intuitive decision making is no longer possible. I believe that the converse is
true, especially if one accepts the contention that war and conflict are not rational. The
commander who surrenders himself wholly to process, or who allows himself to be
deluged by the massive amounts of data available from modern command systems,
and who abandons intuition, becomes a prisoner of that process and therefore of
predictability. Defeating an agile insurgent or terrorist, or dealing with a complex
dispute in a peace support operation, requires a clear head and the ability to see the
essentials.’
Lieutenant General Jonathon Riley

0218. Command in the CJIIM context. Brigade level operations are likely to form part of
a Combined, Joint, Inter-agency, Inter-governmental, Multi-national (CJIIM) effort. Each
relationship will possess a different dynamic resulting, for example, from the difference
between an alliance and a coalition.

0219. The advantages and trade-offs of each construct must be understood and optimised
if unified effort is to be maximised. Command is a capability and command in a multi-
agency, multi-national context must be carefully nurtured. Where tempo and risk is low, the
frictions of multi-nationality – national red cards, language, culture, different procedures –
can be disentangled gradually over a period of weeks and months. Frictions are tolerable,
and tolerable to a low level. By example, multi-national battlegroups operated in both
Bosnia and Basra. Where tempo is higher and risk is greater, tolerance is different and in
these circumstances no operation should be attempted without an extensive period of
integration, wargaming and rehearsals.

0220. The requirements of alliance cohesion, multi-agency cooperation and the need to
protect the legitimacy of the operation will place another essential task upon the

4
Command, Information and Intelligence, Manoeuvre, Firepower, Protection, Sustainment.

2-9
commander. As well as understanding what is going on, communicating with his staff to
solve problems, and communicating his intentions to his subordinates, the commander
must also be prepared to explain his own actions – to his own people, to the enemy, to
allies and partners, to other actors and to the uncommitted through the virtual realm of
communication, faced with a media that is generally at best indifferent and who may apply
different, far higher standards of behaviour to the deployed force than to the enemy.

0221. Multinational Divisions. Depending on the nature of the operation the brigade may
be subordinated to:

a. An allied division, e.g. US or French.

b. A multi-national division.

c. A UK framework division.

d. A UK division.

0222. When working with allied formations, whether divisions or brigades, the UK brigade
staff should consider the following additional factors:

a. Clarity of intent and mutual understanding must be achieved, even where multi-
national partners use English as their first language. Sufficient culturally attuned
liaison officers, orders and communications expressed in clear language, easily
understood and deconflicted SOIs, precision of doctrinal terminology and – where
appropriate – strict adherence to the relevant Alliance (NATO) methodology,
specifically the tactical planning processes, will all assist in achieving unity of
purpose.

b. ‘Red Cards’ and national caveats should be established as early as possible.

c. Identify key inter-operability shortfalls and risks.

d. Confirm critical enabling requirements normally delivered by a UK division.

e. Establish a common information domain and CIS compatibility. 5

f. Establish liaison with flanking formations. When considering sending LOs to

other formations the principle of ‘detach your best’ should apply.

0223. In the event that the UK brigade is serving under a multi-national 2* HQ then
additional staff augmentation may be required to manage UK-specific capabilities (e.g. UK
ISTAR).

0224. Position of the Commander. The commander must consider his position on the
battlefield in relation to his forces, his headquarters and his mission, including his need to
gain understanding, exert influence and make crucial decisions. Options include:

5
For more detail see JDP 6-00 CIS Support to Joint Operations.

2-10
 a. Brigade Main Headquarters. Brigade Main offers high levels of control
through full functionality, staff capacity and connectivity to higher and subordinate
headquarters. It may be poorly positioned to allow the commander to ‘feel’ the
battle or interject personally at the critical moment.

b. Brigade Tactical Headquarters. Brigade Tactical Headquarters (Tac) is a

grouping of command vehicles in which the commander is accompanied by CO
artillery, CO engineers, and G3 Ops. Tac allows the commander to bring his
personal presence to bear as the tactical decision dictates and can in extremis be
dismounted for short periods. Tac offers limited functionality, endurance, lower
levels of protection and – critically – connectivity. For these reasons Tac provides a
good command capability but is a poorer option for control.

c. Brigade Step-Up Headquarters. This C2 configuration establishes a C2 foot

on the ground and permits the teardown and re-deployment of brigade Main. The
brigade can be commanded from Step-Up as it will seek to replicate the key
functions of brigade Main – although not in full and with limited endurance.

0225. Command style is personal but brigade command requires presence on the
battlefield to sense the tactical need and provide direction and leadership; hence, the
brigade commander is likely to spend much of his time visiting other HQs and units.
Brigade staff should anticipate that the commander will often be absent from the HQ and
planning processes and command and control connectivity must be configured to enable,
not constrain, this need. Factors that will influence the commander’s choice of location are:

a. Access to information on which to make timely decisions, including the ability of

the commander to judge the condition and morale of his forces.

b. Communications to points of command. Within technical limitations,

communications systems must be adapted to the needs of the commander, and not
vice versa.

c. Planning and decision-making capability, including Information Management

(IM).

d. Security, including physical protection.

e. Trust based upon the experience of the brigade’s staff, units and liaison officers.

0226. Command States. When receiving additional task organised units, the brigade
commander must understand:

a. Can he use them for any purpose (can he give them a mission)?

b. If the mission (the purpose of their employment) is not within his gift, can he give
them supplemental tasks within their given mission or provide direction on its
execution?

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 c. Can he break up the formation or unit or must he retain its integrity?

d. Are there any caveats or constraints on their use (for example, for hostilities
only, or for use over a specified duration or at a given place)?

0227. Effective task organisation and re-grouping is dependent on relevant and well
understood states of command. Command states may be dictated by the higher
headquarters or directed by the brigade commander to subordinate units. The NATO
definitions 6 of the command states are:

a. Full Command (Full Comd). Covers every aspect of military operations and
administration, and exists only within national services.

b. Operational Command (OPCOM). The authority granted to a commander to

assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, reassign
forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be
deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or
logistics.

c. Operational Control (OPCON). The authority delegated to a commander to

direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or
tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units
concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include
authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned.
Neither does it include administration or logistic control.

d. Tactical Command (TACOM). The authority delegated to a commander to

assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission
assigned by higher authority.

e. Tactical Control (TACON). The detailed and, usually, local direction and
control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks
assigned. A brigade with units TACON will be responsible for:

(1) Coordinating movement.

(2) Providing traffic control.

(3) Allocating real estate/locations.

(4) Providing security and local defence.

If a large number of units are TACON to a brigade the brigade HQ should anticipate
additional demands for liaison, planning and manpower.

6
Care should be taken in the choice and agreed import of these states as they may be interpreted differently
by other Services and allies (particularly the US).

2-12
 f. Under Command for Administration (UCADMIN). The authority delegated to
a commander to command and control all administration for those forces assigned.
When the temporary nature of the command makes it necessary to effect a
complete change of administrative command, a unit or formation may be placed
under administrative command less for certain named matters.

g. Under Command for Daily Maintenance (UCDM). The state of

logistic/administrative command leaves the original formation or unit with full
responsibility for all administration less daily maintenance. Daily maintenance would
include replenishment of combat supplies, evacuation of casualties, the provision of
common user supply items and the repair and recovery of equipment.

0228. Care should be taken to ensure that the command states are fully understood by
other services, allies and partners. Where doubt exists on the employability of a force
element, their superior commander should be consulted.

0229. Battlespace Management (BM). Centralised intent and decentralised execution is

enabled by effective Battlespace Management (BM). Overall responsibility for BM is
retained at the divisional HQ, with specific responsibilities to coordinate the implementation
of the divisional BM plan and the brigade input to it being delegated to the brigade.

0230. The purpose of BM is to maximise freedom of action and minimise constraints for all
battlespace users, while reducing the risk of fratricide. BM concerns the dynamic
integration and execution of fires with manoeuvre. During the planning and execution of
brigade tactical actions the COS is responsible for the coordination of land BM with
assistance from the BM cell. The BM implications of activity need to be considered during
all stages of tactical action planning and execution.

0231. Land BM. Land BM describes BM within the land component and is split into
Landspace Management (LM), Airspace Management (ASM) and Battlespace Spectrum
Management (BSM). BSM ensures that spectrum is available in time and space to enable
C2, ISTAR and electronic attack. LM is achieved by establishing spatial and temporal
controls on deployed forces in order to co-ordinate all aspects of their activities. LM
includes Fire Support Control Measures (FSCM) and Airspace Control (ASC). FSCM
include:

a. Fire Support Co-ordination Line (FSCL).

b. Co-ordinated Fire Line (CFL).

c. Free Fire Area (FFA).

d. No Fire Area (NFA).

e. Restricted Fire Area (RFA).

f. Restricted Fire Line (RFL).

0232. A selection of Airspace Control Measures are illustrated in Fig 2-3.

2-13
 1. Coordination Level (CL) to separate high (fast) and low
(slow) level air traffic.
2. Standard Use Army Aircraft Flight Routes (SAAFR)
3. Restricted Operations Zone (ROZ)
4. High Density Airspace Control Zone (HIDACZ)
5. Pre-planned GMRLS ‘Wall’
6. Immediate GMRLS ‘Wall’

Fig 2-3 Airspace Control Measures

0233. Control of the Battlespace. A key constituent of BM is control. There are four
control categories and a series of six control measures employed to achieve these.

a. Control Categories.

(1) Procedural Control. Procedural control relies on the implementation of

commonly understood procedures across the brigade for the regulation of
activity within and between force elements. One example is Standard Operating
Procedures (e.g. Fmn SOPs).

(2) Positive Control. Instead of procedural control, a commander may wish

to have positive control in a particular place or on specific elements, for specific
periods of time, e.g. a movement control order.

(3) Dynamic Procedural Control. Dynamic procedural control activates or

deactivates procedural control measures in accordance with the prevailing
tactical requirement, e.g. the use of alternative limits of exploitation.

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 (4) Active De-confliction. Active de-confliction is achievable if the situational
awareness of the brigade and its headquarters has a high degree of confidence.
The brigade HQ can use active de-confliction to minimise separation of activity
in both time and space. This will increase tempo over that which can be
achieved through dynamic procedural control alone.

b. Control Measures. Control measures assign responsibilities, coordinate fires

and manoeuvre, and control activities. Where possible each control measure
should be portrayed graphically and be identifiable physically. They include:

(1) Report lines, phase lines, code words and nick numbers.

(2) Routes, contact and coordination points.

(3) Assembly and engagement areas, objectives and limits of exploitation.

(4) Fire Support Co-ordination Measures (FSCM).

(5) Boundaries, which are imposed in order to prevent fires (both direct and
indirect) or movement into another force element’s AO.

(6) Decision points, named and target areas of interest.

(7) ROE, OPSEC, CBRN measures, emission control and communications

security measures and other battlespace management arrangements.

0234. BM specific to each of the tactical actions is described in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6.

Further detail on BM, including detailed descriptions of the FSCM can be found in AFM, Vol
1, Part 11, Battlespace Management, November 2007,The Staff Officers Handbook and
Land Handbook Formation SOP 3220, October 2010.

INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

‘Key to success in all military operations is the capability to provide the right information,
at the right place, at the right time, to enable the right decision, in order to deliver the
right effect and achieve the right outcome.’
General Sir Nicholas Houghton
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

0235. Understanding. Understanding is required in order to gain and orchestrate

influence. The primary source for building understanding is intelligence, which in turn is
derived from accessing and processing information. Commanders must determine the type
and level of understanding required.

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0236. ISTAR. The commander’s decision making is enabled by a system of systems
collectively known as Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
(ISTAR). 7

0237. ISTAR consists of two elements:

a. Intelligence. Intelligence takes the collected raw data and information,

analyses it and places it into context in order to better understand the tactical picture
and our adversaries’ intent.

b. Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (STAR). STAR

operations, run by G3 staff, are the means by which large tracts of raw data and
information are gathered by multiple platforms and sources.

0238. The primary purpose of the ISTAR process is to answer the Commander’s Critical
Information Requirements (CCIR). The secondary purpose is to answer the Intelligence
Requirements (IR) of other intelligence users. Prompt and regular communication between
G2, G3, G5 and G6 staff branches is necessary to ensure efficient ISTAR processes.

0239. It is the role of Chief ISTAR and his staff to ensure all staff cells work to a single
Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP) that stems from command driven CCIRs.

0240. Role of the Brigade Commander. The commander and his COS 8 should be
continuously engaged in the ISTAR process in order to provide:

a. Direction. The commander must convey his intent and what he wants ISTAR
to achieve for any given phase of an operation. This must include his operational
priorities.

b. Articulation of the Commander’s Information and Intelligence

Requirements (CCIR). The commander must identify his essential requirements in
order to improve his understanding of the operational situation. These may be used
to confirm or deny a particular hypothesis.

c. Arbitrating Asset Allocation. A number of STAR systems and capabilities are

multi-role and/or limited in number. There may be competing demands for their use.
The commander may need to arbitrate to ensure that his priorities are met.

d. Re-Tasking and Re-Direction. STAR assets must adapt quickly to changes in

the operational situation. The commander needs to ensure that when changes to the
mission or the plan are required, he provides appropriate direction to the ISTAR staff.

e. Authorising of Specialist Capabilities. The commander will be required to

authorise the tasking of a number of specialist capabilities owing to their high value,
scarcity, level of command at which they are held or because of sensitivities arising
from the manner of their employment.

7
For further explanations see AFM Vol 1 Pt 3 ISTAR.
8
Or another staff officer if Collection Management Authority has been delegated.

2-16
0241. ISTAR Planning Considerations. ISTAR planning considerations are:

a. Command Driven. Direction of the ISTAR effort and determination of priorities

must stem from the commander’s CCIRs and user IRs, and must support the G2, G3
Ops and G5 Plans staff.

b. Centralised Coordination. The ISTAR process and collection management

must be controlled centrally at each level of command within the brigade,
commensurate with the types and capabilities of collection assets in use.

c. Responsive and Timely. Response times for producing the required

information will be dependent on the collection asset employed which should be
matched to the timeliness of the information required.

d. Accuracy. Information must be filtered, analysed and interpreted to produce

accurate intelligence. Time may be a significant constraint. Under exceptional
circumstances, unprocessed information may be used to support decision making,
however the provenance of information must be made explicit to commanders.

e. Sensor Mix. Capabilities should be allocated to each level of command to

provide flexibility and redundancy.

f. Continuous Coverage. The brigade must strive for continuous coverage in

time, space and across the Electro Magnetic Spectrum (EMS).

g. Multi-Source Approach. A multi-source approach allows information from one

source to confirm, augment or perhaps contradict information provided by another.
This provides resistance to deception and a higher level of confidence in the all-
source intelligence product.

h. Threat from Deception. An enemy will seek to conceal his activities from
brigade ISTAR capabilities, or to deceive the brigade into believing that he is doing
something else. A degree of suspicion must be engendered throughout the ISTAR
process to avoid miscalculation.

i. Interconnectivity/Information Management (IM). Managing information,

particularly time-critical information for targeting purposes, is an important part of the
overall command and staff process. Information and intelligence must be readily
accessible, both for users and for intelligence staff, but it should be controlled to
prevent ‘intelligence overload’. Information and intelligence should always be
pushed down to the lowest possible level, cognisant of national security caveats
when in the multi-national environment.

j. Legal Considerations. A ‘Collection-Intelligence-Decision-Action’ audit trail is

required in order to record why certain assessments were made, or to rebuff
inaccurate accusations if necessary. The use and storage of information must be
conducted in accordance with applicable national and international law. The
potential interaction with host nation law must also be considered.

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0242. Assets. ISTAR assets that may be available to the brigade, both from within its own
resources and from external agencies, include:

a. Ground Manoeuvre Reconnaissance.

b. Aviation ISTAR.

c. Base ISTAR. Base ISTAR comes in three forms (depth, medium and light) and
has a wide range of concepts of employment, from persistent to fleeting,
manned/unmanned or static/mobile. The pivot point for all Base ISTAR is the
capacity of the network that underpins it. The greater the bandwidth and the more
reliable the network the more exploitable are the systems.

d. Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA). The primary role of STA

systems and patrols is to cue fires, but they can also be employed in the information
gathering role. Fire Support Teams (FST), acoustic weapon locating technology,
weapon locating radar as well as electro-optic, thermal imaging, full motion video
and laser technologies can all provide an ISTAR capability.

e. Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). UAS information inputs should be fed to

the lowest tactical level of use.

f. HUMINT/J2X. HUMINT can be information gathered by soldiers talking to local

nationals or commanders engaging with leadership figures. Field HUMINT Teams
(FHT) provide agent/source handlers covertly to gather information and trained
interrogators to carry out tactical questioning or interrogation of Captured Persons
(CPERS) within intelligence exploitation facilities. These activities carry a degree of
military and political risk and are managed by the specialist 'J2X' branch.

g. Electronic Warfare and SIGINT (EWSI). EWSI should be viewed as a single

entity within a 'Single SIGINT Battlespace' (SSB) as the delineation between 'tactical'
and 'strategic' collection is increasingly blurred. The brigade can benefit from
allocated EW assets as well as national and allied SIGINT resources where
appropriate. Co-ordination of EWSI activity is undertaken via the EW Co-ordination
Centre (EWCC) at brigade or, if present, divisional level.

h. Brigade Military Intelligence Company. The brigade will be supported by an

allocated Brigade Military Intelligence (MI) Company whose principal role is to
provide all-source intelligence and deliver the ‘Single Intelligence Narrative’ in
support of commanders’ understanding and decision making. The MI Company is
commonly structured into five elements:

(1) Close Support MI Section. The Close Support MI Section carries out
analysis and provides current intelligence support to the staff.

(2) General Support MI Section/Operational Intelligence Support Group

(OISG). The OISG provides the commander with strategic intelligence inputs.
It comprises specialist intelligence elements (including geo, Defence

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 Intelligence (DI) and imagery). However, links to national HUMINT and SIGINT
specialists are not likely to be made available to a brigade-level OISG.

(3) Battlegroup G2 Support. Battlegroup Intelligence Support Detachments

and Company Intelligence Support Teams provide support to BG and Coy Int
Cells.

(4) Counter Intelligence and Security Section. The Counter Intelligence

and Security Section (CI&Sy Section) provides the commander with advice on
Security Risk Management (SRM), undertakes CI activity and provides CI
advice, and supports OPSEC.

(5) Intelligence Database Management Section. The Intelligence

Database Management Section manages the deployed UK intelligence
repository.

i. Force Exploitation Company. The Force Exploitation Company (FEC) is

responsible for ensuring that the maximum intelligence value is gained from any
operation, through the process of Materiel and Personnel Exploitation (MPE). The
main effort will be the generation of intelligence to answer IRs in support of the
commander’s ICP.

FIREPOWER

0243. Firepower. Firepower destroys, neutralises, suppresses and demoralises. The

application of firepower must be determined by the effect required, not simply by the type
and quantity of weapons immediately available. The delivery of effects may require kinetic
or non-kinetic means, or a combination of both. Planning the use of firepower will include
consideration of the aim, the nature of the target, resource availability, friendly force
locations and the time available, in addition to applying ROE and Collateral Damage
Estimate (CDE) requirements. Firepower consists of more than the terminal effects: without
the organisation, systems and processes outlined below, there would be no ability to deliver
coordinated fire.

0244. Firepower and Manoeuvre. Firepower and movement constitute manoeuvre. Both
must be integrated using a fire plan and are ‘owned’ by the commander. The
responsiveness and flexibility which the application of indirect fire requires is delivered by
close support artillery Tactical Groups (Tac Gps). The contemporary operating environment
will place significant emphasis on the appropriate and precise application of fires, careful
consideration of the effect required and the appropriate task organisation to achieve this. In
complex, populated terrain, fires may be constrained in their ability to support manoeuvre.

0245. Joint Fires. The core roles of Joint Fires are: Strike, Integrate, Find and Protect.
These cannot be viewed in isolation since joint fires are a system of systems, all of which
interact with and affect each other. A single tactical action can involve more than one role.
C-IDF 9 systems such as C-RAM 10 must first Find before they can Protect, which they may

9
Counter Indirect Fire.
10
Counter Rockets Artillery and Mortars.

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do by cuing Strike, which must be Integrated with other activity in the AO. All are
fundamental parts of the effective application of firepower.

0246. Control of Fires. The application of fires is decided (‘commanded’) at the highest
level and controlled at the lowest. The key cells at brigade and battlegroup HQ are the
Joint Fires Cells (JFC) which plan, deliver and integrate lethal and non-lethal fires in the
battlespace; at company level the FST carries out this role. Emergency calls for fire from
untrained observers are requested on all arms means, through a JFC or FST.

0247. Pre-planned close air support and/or air interdiction missions are coordinated
through the Battlefield Coordination Element/Detachment (BCE/BCD) within the air
component Air Operations Centre (AOC) and planned within the Air Tasking Order (ATO).
Immediate air support is sought directly by a FST/TACP through the Air Support Operations
Centre/Air Operations Coordination Centre (Land) (ASOC/AOCC(L)). For further detail
refer to NATO AJP-3.3.2 Close Air Support and Air Interdiction.

0248. Battlespace Management (BM). Effective BM is essential for the conduct of Joint
Fires Integration (JFI). For terminal control, this function is carried out by FST
commanders. In the wider battlespace, JFI is carried out by the appropriate Tac Gp within
the brigade or battlegroup headquarters, which ensures coordination with other staff
branches, either directly or through the BM staff or cell.

0249. Targeting. Targeting at all levels is a command-directed process controlled by the

COS and managed by the G3 staff. It is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets
and matching appropriate kinetic or non-kinetic responses to them, taking into account
operational requirements and capabilities. The targeting process is continuous and relies
on an understanding of the operational environment and targeting priorities. 11

0250. Targeting Cycles. The Land Targeting Cycle of Understand, Decide, Detect,
Deliver, Assess (UD3A) describes the overarching process for use by a tactical HQ and
applies to the delivery of kinetic and non-kinetic effects. A complementary process to this is
the Intelligence/Operations Cycle of Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyse (F3EA), which
enables a hasty targeting process. The bringing together of these two cycles produces the
Tactical Targeting Cycle.

0251. Co-ordination. Targeting requires co-ordinated action among several staff

branches within brigade HQ, including G2 / ISTAR cells, whose key staff will be part of any
formed targeting team. This presence is important as sensors and collection capabilities
under their control may have to be quickly tasked to prosecute potentially fleeting targets.
For further detail refer to Land Handbook Formation SOP 5020, the Staff Officers
Handbook and AFM Vol 1 Pt 3 ISTAR.

0252. Additional Considerations. In order to maximise the full effect of firepower,

commanders should consider the following:

a. Synchronisation. Firepower should be synchronised with other activities in

time, space and the electro-magnetic spectrum.

11
See also the Staff Officers Handbook for a full explanation of the Targeting Cycle.

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 b. Weapon Reach. Joint Fires can be used in both the close and deep battles
and priorities must be clear for each stage of a battle.

c. Target Priority. The targeting process should ensure that the most important
enemy assets are identified so they can be engaged in priority order by appropriate
capabilities.

d. Weapon Selection. Weapon to target matching must be in accordance with

the Laws of Armed Conflict.

e. Command and Control. A robust communications network, with multiple

means of passing information, must be provided to exercise C2 effectively.

f. ISTAR Asset Priority. Priorities will need to be set for ISTAR systems which
are capable of both target acquisition and information collection at different stages of
an operation.

g. Concentration of Assets. Artillery guns and rocket launchers should never

be held in reserve, although a stock of ammunition may be designated as a reserve.
The guns and rocket launchers of a reserve brigade will normally be deployed in
support of first echelon forces.

h. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). Joint Fires often rely upon ISTAR assets
to carry out BDA.

MANOEUVRE

‘The ability to conduct what all armies call ‘combined arms manoeuvre’ is at the heart of an
army’s ability to fight. Manoeuvre is the employment of forces on the battlefield in
combination with fire from a mix of land and air platforms, to prevail against an enemy and
defeat him. Whilst doing so, those forces must also protect themselves from an agile,
mobile and tenacious opponent, probably employing a combination of conventional and
unconventional means. The term ‘combined-arms’ indicates that action is being undertaken
by several ‘arms’ (infantry, aviation, artillery, engineers, air, etc) in a coordinated manner to
achieve a common mission.’

Major General Richard Barrons

Assistant Chief of the General Staff, 28 Feb 11

0253. Manoeuvre seeks to achieve a position of advantage relative to the enemy. In the
operating environment, it is multi-dimensional. The brigade must seek to manoeuvre and
dominate the opponent in all dimensions, from the electro-magnetic through to land. Each
dimension should be exploited to achieve the desired influence outcomes, drawing on the
brigade’s direct and indirect power and undermining the opponent’s will and cohesion.
Brigade manoeuvre and its supporting activity must be carefully integrated and applied in a
manner that exploits the indirect approach; the result will be a multi-dimensional tempo that
achieves battlewinning shock and surprise. By example, a brigade offensive action could

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be supported by air fires in depth, electronic attack to dislocate enemy command and
control and information operations that deceive and demoralize an opponent whilst re-
assuring partner forces.

0254. Forms of Manoeuvre. The principal forms of ground manoeuvre are:

a. Envelopment.

b. Double envelopment.

c. Encirclement.

d. Turning movement.

e. Penetration.

f. Deep penetration.

g. Multiple penetration.

h. Combination of multiple and deep penetration.

i. Infiltration.

0255. Envelopment. Envelopment, as depicted in Fig 2-4, is an offensive manoeuvre in

which the main attacking force avoids the enemy’s principal defensive position to attack
objectives to the rear. Its aim is to concentrate force against the enemy’s weakness, but
will normally require a diversionary or fixing attack (a demonstration or feint) against his
main defensive position to distract it. Speed of movement and the identification of weak
points in the defence are required if the enveloping force is to be able to reach its objectives
in depth. Envelopment may cause the enemy to redeploy or withdraw, cause disruption to
his command and control or logistic systems, or open the way to objectives which he was
trying to defend. It may be undertaken in order to outflank or trap enemy forces, possibly
against a geographical feature. ‘Vertical envelopment’ is the term used to describe Air
Manoeuvre forces being employed as part of an enveloping force.

‘The Combined Force will attack to defeat the insurgents in Nad e Ali (and Marjah),
applying deception and maximum simultaneity using vertical and horizontal envelopment
to dislocate the insurgents, shatter their cohesion, whilst ensuring the population is
protected.’

Op MOSHTARAK – Clear Phase, the Intent.

Commander Regional Command (South) 2010

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 Fig 2-4 Envelopment

0256. Double Envelopment. A double envelopment, as depicted in Fig 2-5, is an

envelopment action mounted on two axes, which aims to outflank an enemy from both
sides, either to force him to abandon his intentions, redeploy or withdraw, or as a prelude to
encirclement, destruction or surrender of the trapped force. As with the envelopment, a
diversionary, or fixing attack against the main defensive positions will normally be required.
The disadvantage of this manoeuvre is the obvious requirement for coordination as friendly
forces meet or converge; the advantage is that enemy action to counter the manoeuvre
dissipates his combat power in two directions.

Fig 2-5 Double Envelopment

0257. Encirclement. If the arms of a double envelopment are strong enough to meet after
trapping a force, or if a single envelopment succeeds in trapping a force against a natural
obstacle and prevents it from breaking out, enemy forces may be neutralised, defeated or
destroyed within the restricting circle. Encirclement, shown at Fig 2-6, may be a costly
action in terms of forces required to seal the circle and the time taken to reduce the fighting
power of the trapped force.

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 Fig 2-6 Encirclement

0258. Turning Movement. In a turning movement the attacking force passes around or
over the enemy’s main defensive area to force him to abandon his position, or divert major
forces to meet the threat. The turning movement aims to make those forces more
vulnerable to attack. The attacking force is organised into a turning force, a main body and
a reserve. The turning force’s manoeuvre causes the enemy to leave his positions. The
main body may initially distract the enemy from the turning manoeuvre. It should
subsequently exploit the success of the turning force. The turning force is normally smaller
than the main body but should be capable of operating independently, beyond the
supporting range of the main body. Either the turning force or the main body could conduct
the decisive action dependent on the tactical situation. This is shown in Fig 2-7.

Fig 2-7 Turning Movement

1. A small attacking force manoeuvres to the front of the enemy position and distracts the enemy from
the turning manoeuvre.
2. The turning force attacks on the right flank, penetrating into the enemy’s rear area and forcing him to
turn to face the new direction of threat.
3. The main body then strikes the enemy’s exposed flank.

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0259. Penetration. Penetration aims to reach the depth of an enemy’s position on one or
a number of narrow axes. Penetration may be necessary in order to achieve any of the
other forms of manoeuvre. The elements of a penetration are shown in Fig 2-8. It has four
variants; deep, multiple, combination and infiltration. All may be combined in the same
tactical action. The aim is to reach the depth of an enemy’s position as rapidly as possible,
preferably without fighting. This requires enemy forces to be bypassed by design, however
there is a risk that the penetrating force may itself be attacked in its developing flanks. The
concern that this might happen may cause forces to move cautiously when boldness is
needed, therefore determination will be required by commanders. Flank protection of the
penetrating force is critical to success, although this can be mitigated by sheer speed and
the fixing of enemy forces, including reserves.

Fig 2-8 Penetration

0260. Deep Penetration. Deep penetration aims either to seize features or to destroy
specific objectives that are deeper inside enemy territory. In doing so it perforates enemy
positions, introduces a force in depth and in doing so causes fear and uncertainty. It may
persuade an enemy commander that he has been defeated, particularly if the objectives
are critical to him, for example withdrawal routes, lines of communication, combat supply
stockpiles or defiles behind his position.

0261. Multiple Penetration. Multiple penetration aims to disrupt and dislocate the
cohesion of a defensive position. It does so by simultaneously presenting the defender with
a number of threats and overloading his ability to respond. It creates multiple opportunities
for surprise and shock. Brigade commanders must balance the risk of dispersal of the
penetration with concentration of force and achieving critical mass.

0262. Combination of Multiple and Deep Penetration. Multiple and deep penetration
can be combined if sufficient forces are available. The effects can be dramatic. Each
penetrating force will normally require at least two elements. The leading element is tasked
to penetrate to the objective or limit of exploitation as rapidly as possible, bypassing
opposition. The second element is tasked to follow the first in order to protect its flanks and
rear. Subsequent elements are reserve or echelon forces. They are tasked to destroy
bypassed enemy forces, take over the lead, or exploit beyond the immediate objective.

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0263. Infiltration. Infiltration is penetration based on movement by stealth of a force into a
position to penetrate. It could initiate the combination described above. It may be used to
occupy an objective in depth, or as a precursor to an attack on such an objective. It may be
along single or multiple lines and is a good option in built-up areas or other complex terrain
where enemy ISTAR may be less effective.

MOVEMENT

0264. Planning. Planning 12 and executing controlled road movement is a G3 Operations

responsibility, normally executed through a Road Movement Order. The brigade
headquarters will normally specify:

a. Responsibilities for the authorisation and control of movement and any special
procedures (e.g. for moves across national boundaries).

b. Movement planning, route details and traffic control.

c. Those battlegroup headquarters required as Regulating Headquarters.

0265. Route Matrix. If the tactical situation allows, a route matrix may be established
within the brigade AO. Routes run to and from the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT)
and are connected by lateral routes. On a given route the ‘up’ direction is towards the
FLOT and ‘down’ is away. Routes have a beginning and an end; between which there can
be multiple Start Points (SP) and Release Points (RelP) which are sequentially numbered.

0266. Route Selection. Routes will be selected on the basis of maps, air photographs,
local knowledge and route reconnaissance. Consideration must be given to:

a. Whether tracked and wheeled vehicles need to be separated.

b. The distances involved.

c. The width of the proposed route.

d. Critical Points (CP) requiring traffic control.

e. Road conditions including hazards such as snow, ice, flooding, craters etc.

f. Defiles that may affect traffic flow.

g. Load capacity, often governed by the bridge Military Load Capacity (MLC).

h. The size and availability of halts and harbours.

i. The availability of detours, particularly around likely air targets.

12
Movement planning is covered in detail in The Staff Officers Handbook.

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0267. Route Matrix Infrastructure. On the route matrix a number of specialist locations
may be positioned such as:

a. Marshalling Area. Possibly adjacent to a point SPOD or APOD for forming

march serials prior to deployment.

b. Convoy Support Centre. May be located along the route for replenishing fuel,
water, feeding and rest.

c. Harbour Areas. Normally positioned near potential air targets, obstacles,

planned detours or SPs and RelPs.

d. Traffic Post. Often co-locating Provost, Medical, ES, Engineer and other
elements.

0268. Assembly Areas. The occupation of an assembly area provides the brigade the
opportunity to prepare for future operations, usually after conducting a march or a
movement between actions.

0269. The relative security of an assembly area allows for reorganisation, the issuing of
orders, receipt and issue of supplies, and maintenance of vehicles and equipment. While in
the assembly area the brigade must still be capable of defending itself against enemy
ground and air attack, requiring a covering force for screen and guard purposes.

0270. A brigade assembly area requires substantial groundspace, dependant on the

environment and operating context this will be around 30 km2. This area will be significantly
larger if all the brigade’s CS and CSS echelons are included 13. For ease of command, it
will usually be split into separate areas for the brigade headquarters, battlegroups, CS and
CSS elements, with the laydown designed in anticipation of the next operation. Each
battlegroup will require an area of around 5km2.

0271. Assembly areas should provide the following:

a. Concealment from air and ground observation.

b. Cover from direct fire.

c. Space for dispersion.

d. Adequate entrances, exits, and internal routes.

e. Good drainage and ground conditions that can sustain the movement of the
brigade’s heaviest vehicles.

f. Terrain masking of electromagnetic signal signatures.

13
In the area of 250 km2. (Source: Staff Officers’ Handbook).

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 g. Terrain that allows the observation of ground and air avenues of approach into
the Assembly Area.

h. Maintenance of communications.

PROTECTION

0272. Protection is the preservation of combat power so that maximum effect can be
achieved at the decisive time and place. This section considers the following potential
protection measures:

a. Deception.

b. OPSEC.

c. Combined Arms Obstacle Integration.

d. Air Defence.

e. CBRN Defence.

f. Combat Identification.

0273. Deception. Deception can assist protection by denying enemy forces intelligence
on the disposition and intent of own forces. Deception is aimed at the adversary’s
commander. The increasing sophistication and proliferation of modern ISTAR systems
make deception more difficult, and non-linear and population centric warfare renders the
battlespace more transparent to intelligence gathering.

0274. Deception is carried out at all levels. At the tactical level deception is normally short
term. Successful deception is based on timely intelligence and the accurate assessment of
the opponent’s likely reactions to a set of circumstances. The commander should consider:

a. Enemy Communications Infrastructure. The deception plan must identify

and analyse the opponent’s communication infrastructure to identify the means
available for the passing of information by the adversary.

b. Physical Terrain. The terrain dictates the complexity of implementing the

deception plan. Open terrain can require ‘display’ techniques such as dummy
installations and equipment and may require more detailed simulation. Deception in
undulating, wooded or urban terrain can make greater use of concealment.

c. Weather. A successful deception plan should be sufficiently flexible to take

advantage of poor visibility. Account should be made of the effect of bad weather on
the information available to the adversary.

d. Human Terrain. The local population can be used as a medium for the
passage of indicators and controlled rumours to the adversary, but they can also,
deliberately or unwittingly, compromise simulated and concealed activities.

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0275. Operational Security (OPSEC). OPSEC denies to others knowledge of the detailed
dispositions, capability, intentions and vulnerabilities of the brigade. It is the process that
gives a military operation the necessary level of security to retain and enable freedom of
initiative and action. The implementation of OPSEC is the responsibility of all commanders
and staff, with the coordination of OPSEC being a G3 function supported by G2. OPSEC
should be a vital part of all planning for brigade operations.

0276. There are three stages to the OPSEC process:

a. Identification of the Essential Elements of Friendly Information. Identify,

from the enemy’s perspective, the critical information of our own forces which the
enemy would wish to know.

b. Development of the OPSEC Estimate. The OPSEC estimate is drawn from

preliminary assessments of what the adversary could know or may have deduced
and the adversary’s capacity to detect and identify the EEFI. It provides the
guidance as to which aspects of the commander’s plan can be disclosed as a
contribution to deterrence or deception and which aspects must be protected.

c. Selection and Application of OPSEC Measures. In the selection of the

appropriate OPSEC measures, the following factors should be considered:

(1) Their contribution to the operation versus any reduction in operational

efficiency in implementing the measures.

(2) The risk to the operation if the measures are not implemented or are
unsuccessful.

(3) The resource implications, including the time factor.

(4) The effect on the indigenous population where the operation is carried
out.

(5) Balancing the risk of information becoming public with the requirement to
work closely with indigenous security forces and get public ‘buy in’ for brigade
tactical actions.

(6) Use of Special Influence Methods and EW capabilities.

(7) In case of possible compromise, plans must be under constant review and
must remain adaptable.

0277. OPSEC measures include:

a. Defensive Measures. Defensive measures counter hostile information

gathering. They include communications security, counter surveillance and
individual security.

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 b. Active Measures. Active measures disrupt or defeat hostile ISTAR capability.
Active measures can include Counter Intelligence (CI) and physical destruction.

c. Presentation of Measures. Consideration must be given to influencing the

adversary’s perception of why OPSEC measures are being taken, disguising the
aim. Activities designed to defeat or destroy a key hostile ISTAR asset could be
incorporated into another operation in order to conceal the real objective.

‘There are no secrets anymore – the key is to have multiple options up your sleeve,
shroud them in deception and play your hand as late as you can.’

Lieutenant General Nick Carter

0278. Combined Arms Obstacle Integration (CAOI). CAOI is the process by which
obstacles and fires are integrated to achieve the commander’s desired effects. The
considerations and planning process for CAOI are described in Annex A to Chapter 4.

0279. Air Defence. Air attack is singularly effective at destroying the cohesion and
freedom of action of military forces. Air defence considerations are vital to commanders at
all levels in a non-permissive environment. At a tactical level, the brigade commander will
have little or no influence over the joint counter air campaign, as most of it is likely to occur
outside his area of influence. He will need to be aware of its status and progress,
particularly if air superiority cannot be maintained. Defensive Counter Air (DCA) operations
will normally include fighters, medium range surface to air missiles and the Land
Component’s organic systems. Air defence will normally be carried out by a combination of
surface to air weapon systems and aircraft, under the overall control of the Joint Force Air
Defence Commander, as part of a layered system. Organic land air defence may also be
necessary to protect critical land infrastructure (e.g. against enemy air manoeuvre and
UAS) and is achieved by:

a. Active AD. Surface to air defence assets will be scarce, therefore the
commander must set his priorities for defence. The systems available will range
from surface-to-air missiles to All Arms Air Defence (AAAD) weapons, such as small
arms, machine guns and vehicle-mounted cannon, and should be deployed as part
of a layered defence. Artillery air defence systems will be employed to provide both
‘area’ and ‘point’ close air defence. Effective C2, particularly in the case of AAAD, is
essential to minimise fratricide and maximise effectiveness.

b. Passive AD. Passive air defence may be achieved through camouflage,

concealment and deception. It is worthwhile disguising the nature of positions that
cannot be completely concealed, as this may frustrate the enemy’s targeting and
force him to employ more ISTAR assets. The need for concealment may require
reduced activity within a position and a judgement should be made on the level of
acceptable risk so that movement is not totally constrained.

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0280. Depending on the operational situation the air threat will extend beyond conventional
aircraft. AD will also be required to provide Counter Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM)
and Counter Indirect Fire (C-IDF).

0281. The proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) presents an increasing threat
to the brigade. UAS, whether as ISTAR or weapon platforms, can vary in size from short
range, lightweight, hand-launched systems to large, long endurance, highly capable armed
aircraft. Such systems have already been widely employed by states and, more recently,
by non-state hybrid actors in asymmetric conflicts. 14 UAS present a particular challenge to
AD due to their small size and difficulty in locating, identifying and engaging.

0282. Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN). CBRN defence refers to
the plans and activities that are intended to mitigate or neutralise adverse effects on
operations and personnel resulting from the use, or threatened use, of CBRN weapons and
devices. It also covers the secondary hazards arising from counter force targeting, or the
release, or risk of release, of Toxic Industrial Materials (TIM) into the environment.

0283. CBRN hazards may emanate from multiple sources in a variety of forms and as a
consequence both of adversary actions and through accidental or incidental causes. In all
cases, CBRN attacks and releases have the potential to disrupt the conduct of operations,
sometimes over wide areas, through their immediate and delayed effects, impacting upon
both the physical (personnel, materiel and terrain) and psychological capacity of the
brigade.

0284. The CBRN threat assessment needs to be constantly reviewed and updated within
the Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE) process. This should scope the form,
likelihood and intent of any potential adversary’s use of CBRN weapons and devices, as
well as the nature and location of any sources of TIM. Counter measures to attack the
enemy will involve the application of conventional techniques such as deception,
camouflage and concealment, to frustrate his targeting and delivery mechanisms. Where
the primary threat derives from the possible use of CBRN devices by non-state actors,
physical security measures will need to be scrupulously enforced. In the case of TIM
sources, the principal response will be one of avoidance, noting that many of these
materials will offer challenges (including explosive, incendiary or corrosive effects) that lie
outside the performance boundaries of standard military CBRN defensive equipments.

0285. After a CBRN attack and following the implementation of previously rehearsed
immediate recovery measures, there will be a need to determine the precise nature of the
event and hence the subsequent behaviour of the hazard. This will be accomplished by
CBRN staff, supported by an increasingly automated warning and reporting structure that
will be able to offer predictions of likely hazard travel and endurance. This advice will allow
the commander to reconsider and, where necessary, revise his plans within a risk
management philosophy that will balance the protection of his forces against the continuing
pursuit of the mission.

0286. The responsibilities and organisation of brigade CBRN staff and further detail on
CBRN planning can be found in AFM Vol 1 Part 5, Operations in CBRN Conditions.

14
Hezbollah deployed a range of UASs in the 2006 Lebanon war.

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0287. Combat Identification. Combat ID is defined as the process of combining
situational awareness, target identification and specific Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures (TTPs) to increase the operational effectiveness of weapon systems and
reduce the incidence of casualties caused by friendly fire. 15

0288. Combat ID needs to be robust enough to cope with fast moving operations and a
less certain battlespace. The component parts of Combat ID include:

a. Situational Awareness (SA). SA is derived from intelligence and identification

information from a variety of sensors and sources, correlating observed activity with
plans, orders and known neutral movements and should be presented on a
continuous basis. When operating in a coalition, consideration must be given to the
coordination of Combat ID between nationalities.

b. Target ID. The aim of target ID is to establish the identification, to a high

degree of confidence, of all targets within the AO (which feeds the first part of the
contemporary targeting process: PID; ROE; CDE; Clearance; Engagement; BDA).
Target ID may be cooperative or non-cooperative and employ active or passive
technologies. Additionally, target ID system outputs may be fused to enhance SA.

c. Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). Technology is unlikely to

provide a complete solution to Combat ID in contact; an element of any combat ID
process must be effective TTPs. TTPs covering Ground-Ground, Air-Ground and
Ground-Air Control Measures must be carefully considered and set out in detail in
mission related orders.

d. Other Factors. Research has shown that Combat ID or ‘friendly fire’ incidents
rarely have a single root cause; a common contributory element is human error. It
must therefore be recognised that humans are fallible; they get tired, frightened,
forgetful, disorientated and make genuine mistakes. The single most effective
method of mitigating this risk is to ensure that training, including situational /
judgemental training, closely represents the operating environment and is as
realistic as possible. It is critical that where possible this training is conducted with
the full range of equipment that the brigade will use on operations.

0289. Operational Safety. Operational safety is a function of command. It is also an

important component of protection. By keeping soldiers healthy, conducting maintenance
and guarding their equipment and supplies against loss or damage, commanders ensure
that morale and fighting power can be maintained. This helps to build the cohesion and
confidence necessary to produce soldiers who can carry out their commander's plans in an
effective manner.

0290. Training for operations requires high levels of realism and the development of a
mindset that will create a battle winning ethos within the force. Commanders planning and
conducting operations must have the confidence to make decisions based on operational
needs and not be dominated by peacetime Health & Safety legislation. This is crucial to

15
JDP 0-01.1 Ed 7 UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions.

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successful combat operations, maintaining tempo, the initiative and ultimately the
preservation of combat (and fighting) power.

0291. Risk. Risk is the probability of an event, the impact of which could be positive or
negative. Risk is therefore neutral, consisting of both threats and opportunities 16. Risk
reflects that element of chance that is integral to the nature of conflict. Successful military
commanders weigh and manage threats and ruthlessly exploit opportunities to deliver
battlefield advantage.

0292. The effective management of risk is critical to successful brigade operations. It

impacts on battlefield operations, military effectiveness, the morale of the force and, where
mandated, legal compliance. Four aspects interact:

a. The Assessment of Risk. In his initial planning, the brigade commander and
his staff must seek to understand the nature of risk present in the forthcoming
operation. Risks may lie in the nature of the mission, the resources allocated, the
potential responses of the opponent and a range of other variables. Risks may be
articulated in the intelligence assessment, in the higher commander’s intent, or in
legal direction and theatre standing orders. The estimate will provide an initial
indication of risks.

b. Understanding the Higher Commander’s Risk Appetite. The broad risks of

the operation understood, the brigade commander must understand the risk appetite
of the divisional and higher headquarters. What freedoms to exploit opportunity does
the brigade have? What at the tactical, operational or strategic level is the tolerance
of casualties? What risks could collectively culminate the brigade action or
undermine a key ally?

c. Managing Risk. The higher command context understood, the brigade

commander should determine how his risks are to be managed. Who owns the risk
(brigade or battlegroup) must be explicit. The probability of a risk occurring and the
severity of its impact should be considered. Positive risks (opportunities) will be
subject to contingency plans with decision points to execute. Negative risks will be
subject to consideration/mitigation:

(1) Tolerate the risk.

(2) Treat the risk.

(3) Transfer the risk.

(4) Terminate the risk.

d. Setting the Risk Appetite. The brigade commander must clearly detail his
appetite for risk across the brigade, the broad scope for initiative to exploit
opportunity, the ownership of subordinate risks and the circumstances in which
decisions on risk should be elevated. In some circumstances his appetite for risk
16
Much of this section is extracted from ADP Ops Chapter 6, pages 6-5 to 6-9, which covers Risk in the
context of command of operations in detail.

2-33
 will be circumscribed by his own higher commander’s direction, duty of care or the
law.

0293. Military success requires the seizure of opportunity and the mitigation of threats to
that success. A poor risk culture will constrain initiative, degrade the force, or hamper it
with process. An effective risk culture will protect the force, its legitimacy, exploit
opportunity, and play to the strengths of mission command. The brigade commander has a
pivotal role in striking the appropriate balance. Further guidance on risk management and
its consideration in the planning process can be found in the Staff Officers Handbook.

SUSTAINMENT

‘…a commander (should) only fight the battle he can sustain.’

General Sir Rupert Smith

0294. Introduction. Land forces and their fighting power need to be sustained. This
includes their deployment from the home base, operations in theatre, redeployment and
recuperation. Sustainment influences the tempo, duration and intensity of all operations. It
includes the sustenance and moral well-being of troops, the maintenance of equipment and
materiel, the provision of expendable commodities and the treatment and replacement of
casualties. It is therefore an integral function, influencing at every stage the planning and
execution of campaigns, operations, battles and engagements. 17

0295. Terminology. The following descriptions apply to the terminology used in doctrine: 18

a. Sustainability. Sustainability measures the capability and resilience of a

force. It reflects ability to maintain the necessary level of fighting power for the
duration required to achieve its objectives, without culmination.

b. Sustainment. Sustainment is the business of maintaining a force by

enhancing and prolonging its capability and resilience. Sustainment includes
logistics, administration and the organisations and resources required to deliver
sustainability.

c. Logistics. Logistics is the art and science of planning and carrying out the
movement and maintenance of forces. 19

d. Support Network. A support network seeks to ensure that resources are

delivered precisely and responsively when required.

17
ADP Ops p. 7-17
18
These are more descriptive than the strict definitions which found in Joint Doctrine (AAP-6 NATO Glossary
of Terms)
19
Logistics comprise the development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, recovery
and disposal of materiel; transport of personnel, acquisition and construction; the maintenance, operation and
disposal of facilities; the acquisition or furnishing of services; and medical and health services.

2-34
 e. Administration. Administration is the management and execution of all non-
tactical military preparation. 20

f. Combat Service Support. Combat Service Support (CSS) is a term often

used to refer to the sustainment of operations in general, but it should be used only
to describe the organisational support provided to combat and other deployed
forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics, by functional groupings.

0296. The Commander’s Role. One of the responsibilities of the commander is to

establish the conditions that allow subordinate commanders to focus their attention on the
operation rather than on support. The commander must identify areas of logistic risk and
recognise their impact on operations. Before operations start, a commander should ensure
that he is able to deploy, sustain and regenerate his force. To do this he has to:

a. Consider the implications of any proposed actions on the levels of support

necessary to maintain combat effectiveness including, casualty rates, consumption
rates, materiel losses, transport resources, repair and maintenance requirements
and construction and development rates.

b. Plan, balance and allocate resources of time, equipment, troops to task and
materiel.

c. Evaluate the risks of enemy action and the security of the line of
communication (LoC) and any possible effect an attack to the supply chain may
create. This should include both the physical LoC (the MSRs) and the virtual (the
CIS systems).

d. Adapt plans to reduce the effect of manpower and/or resource constraints.

0297. Sustainment Risk. Throughout the development of courses of action the brigade
commander and his staff will need to engage with resource specialists in order to assess
the impact and mitigation of a number of related risks to the brigade’s operation:

a. The threat posed by the enemy on the ability to sustain the brigade operation.

b. Positioning of CSS units, balancing the proximity to need and associated

danger from enemy action.

c. Threat to CSS posed by CBRN attack.

d. Potential for CSS to interfere or delay brigade manoeuvre by being too slow or
in the wrong position.

e. Mobility of CSS units, noting that in some cases they may be slower than the
units being supported.

20
Administration includes staff and personnel support; medical support; welfare support; the provision of legal
advice; chaplaincy and pastoral care; and provost support including military police and investigative services.

2-35
0298. The Deputy Chief of Staff. The principal staff officer for logistics within the
brigade HQ is the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS). The DCOS’s responsibilities include:

a. Co-ordination of the sustainment input into the estimate process including

advising the commander of sustainment implications to operations.

b. Devising and owning the Sustainment Plan in conjunction with the tactical
plan and in accordance with higher formation sustainment plans. This will be
promulgated as part of the Brigade Operation Order, which will include the logistic
concept of operations with a designated sustainment main effort.

c. Monitoring the development of the sustainment plan including the tracking of

critical assets and stores and liaison with higher formations.

d. Control of all brigade logistic activities.

e. Forward planning, including anticipation of future requirements for assets and

stores and Logistic Preparation of the Battlefield (LPB) where appropriate.

f. Co-ordination of sustainment led activities (such as BG rehabilitation).

g. Maintenance of the tactical situational awareness of HQ Brigade Support

Group (BSG) and subordinate CSS units.

h. Control of the BSG through CO Logistic Support Regiment (LSR) who

operates HQ BSG and exercises TACON BSG force elements.

0299. The DCOS is supported by his J1/J4 staff in addition to a number of logistic
support advisers. 21

02100. The Brigade Support Group. The sustainment of the brigade is centred on the
BSG. A BSG will be established to coordinate and control the sustainment assets
supporting the brigade. Command of the BSG will be facilitated through the HQ of the LSR
wherever possible. The following units and installations will normally be found in the BSG:

a. Logistic Support Regiment. Its RHQ may form HQ BSG (TACOM) with
appropriate representation from brigade HQ and other BSG units.

b. REME Battalion (-). This consists of battalion HQ, two armoured companies
and a field company. The battalion HQ will be located wherever it can best
influence current and future ES operations.

c. Medical Regiment.

d. RMP CS Company(-).

21
CO Logistic Support Regiment; CO REME Close Support or Force Support Battalion; SO2 ES; CO Medical
Regiment.

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 e. CS Engineer Regiment Headquarters and Support Squadron.

f. CS Artillery Regiment Headquarter Battery.

g. Brigade Logistic RV.

h. A2 Echelons for BGs and Brigade Units.

i. Brigade Field Administration Office (BFAO).

j. Other Units as Required. Any other units task organised to provide

sustainment to the Brigade such as a Role 2 Enhanced Field Hospital.

02101. The size and location of the BSG will depend on the tactical situation and the
ground available. It will normally be in the brigade rear area, 15-25 km behind the FLOT (in
‘conventional’ operations) and can occupy an area as large as 20 km2. It is ideally located
in semi-urban areas, but tactical ‘green’ locations are acceptable. Careful reconnaissance
is required to provide good access, circuits, and cover.

02102. The nature of the distribution of combat supplies and materiel throughout the
brigade AO is dependent on the prevalent threat. In a permissive environment, semi-
autonomous, self-protected movement by troop-sized packets of logistic assets might be
feasible. In more hostile environments logistic assets will need to be formally battle-
grouped to make the best use of the C2 and force protection offered by a deliberately
planned Combat Logistic Patrol.

02103. Overlaid across the activity described above is the ability to augment the
processes using contractor ground and air assets, where feasible, and military air assets
(tactical Air Transport (AT), air despatch or support helicopters).

02104. Principles of Logistics. The principles of logistics apply to all sustainment

activities:

a. Foresight. Foresight is the ability to predict and take or manage risks

potentially affecting the brigade’s freedom of action. Planners should analyse
future activity, forecast likely requirements and confirm that the operational plan is
logistically viable. Users of materiel should anticipate their usage and
communicate expected requirements.

b. Efficiency. Efficiency involves achieving the maximum level of support for

the least logistic effort to make the best use of finite resources, the supply network
and lines of communication.

c. Simplicity. The complexity of sustainment activity demands a robust plan

that is widely understood and that absorbs friction. Simplicity enables plans,
systems and organisations to react effectively to the unforeseen.

d. Cooperation. Cooperation shares logistic and administrative responsibilities

and resources; requiring all elements within a force to interact effectively. It also

2-37
 enables multinational economy of effort, and can be increased by using
indigenous capability and contractor support.

e. Agility. Agility underpins responsiveness and creates the ability to change

direction and vary tempo. It demands a strong command support system which
maintains centralised command of low density, highly specialised resources whilst
allowing decentralised control and execution of operations.

02105. Functional Groupings. There are five main functional groupings in sustainment
organisations. They are Logistic Support, Health Service Support (HSS), Equipment
Support, Administrative Support and Infrastructure Support.

a. Logistic Support. Logistic Support links a deployed force to its sustaining

nodes. The activities of Logistic Support groupings can be explained under three
headings:

(1) Provision of Materiel. Materiel encompasses all items provided

through a support network or a supply chain.

(2) Provision of Movement. Deploying a force and managing the flow of

personnel and equipment into and out of a theatre is a joint activity.

(3) Logistic Support Services. Logistic support services are those

activities not providing materiel or movement. They are wide-ranging and
include health, safety, sanitation and services to support the maintenance of
morale directly.

b. Health Service Support. Having influenced the plan to ensure that it is

medically supportable, the principal task of HSS is to maintain the fighting strength
of the force by preventing disease and other non-battle injuries, and tending to the
sick and wounded. HSS facilities are categorised as:

(1) Role 1. Role 1 provides primary health care, pre-hospital emergency

care and medical evacuation capabilities across the Brigade AO. Unit Aid
Posts (UAP) provide organic Role 1 to combat units and most combat support
units. A combat unit UAP is reinforced by a Medical Troop with additional
treatment and medical evacuation capabilities.

(2) Role 2 Light Manoeuvre. Role 2 Light Manoeuvre (R2LM) facilities are
agile and mobile, conducting triage and advanced resuscitation procedures,
up to damage control surgery. They are usually assigned to high readiness,
air manoeuvre or amphibious forces.

(3) Role 2 Enhanced. Role 2 Enhanced (R2E) is the entry level of

deployed hospital care, providing primary surgery, medical intensive care and
beds with nursing support. It is mobile, agile enough to support contingency
operations and can be redeployed to support manoeuvre formations.

2-38
 (4) Role 3. Role 3 field hospitals provide a modular, deployed hospital
care capability that can be scaled to support brigade or divisional sized
formations. At full scale, a Role 3 field hospital can detach a Role 2(E) to
support manoeuvre overextended distances.

(5) Role 4. Role 4 medical facilities, usually in the home base, receive
patients from operations and then provide access to definitive and specialist
care and rehabilitation.

02106. Equipment Support (ES). The purpose of Equipment Support (ES) is to keep the
required quantity of operational equipment available to the force. This is achieved by
actively managing equipment and equipment components and by maintenance. ES
groupings and staffs are responsible for the command and control of ES elements, the
provision of technical and planning advice to commanders and supporting the delivery and
sustainment of equipment capabilities. ES is underpinned by four principles:

a. Repair Forward. Repair should be conducted as near to the point of failure

as is technically or tactically feasible.

b. Stability. Complex repairs will usually take longer to complete, it is essential

that they are conducted in a location that is secure and will remain static in order
for the repair to be completed.

c. Echelons of ES. The balance of activity between repair forward and stability
requires ES capability to be organised into echelons. Mobile and well protected
assets are integral to battlegroups; progressively less mobile and protected, but
more technically capable assets operate in a more benign environment.

d. C2 at Every ES Echelon. For the output of the ES organisation to be

responsive to the changing requirements placed upon it, effective C2 at every ES
echelon is essential.

02107. Administrative Support. Administrative Support encompasses the activities

required to manage a force effectively.

a. Personnel Support. Deployed forces require routine administration on

operations, just as they do in barracks. Personnel support maintains the terms
and conditions of service that underpin the moral component of fighting power.

b. Staff Support. Staff support provides headquarters with clerical personnel

and information management systems.

c. Welfare Support. The emotional and physical strains of combat and other
military activities can be mitigated by welfare support; enhanced financial
packages; and chaplains offering spiritual, pastoral and moral support.

d. Budget and Finance Support. Budget and finance staff provide financial
management advice, including scrutiny of expenditure, for an operation.

2-39
 e. Civil and Policy Advice. G9 staff provide policy advice to the commander
as he operates along civil-military interfaces.

02108. Infrastructure Support. Infrastructure Support can be explained in terms of:

a. The Operational Estate. The operational estate consists of operational

and indigenous infrastructure. Infrastructure includes fixed installations,
fabrications, physical structures and facilities, including utilities.

b. Infrastructure and Engineering. Infrastructure is built and sustained

through engineering. This engineering is provided by a combination of a military
construction force and contractors.

SUSTAINMENT PLANNING: TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

02109. The CSS Framework. A robust brigade Command, Control and Communication
(C3) framework for the conduct of sustainment activity is essential. This includes the
preparation of a sustainment estimate; assessing the support required for an operation and
identifying risks for the commander’s decision brief. Reliable communications must be
maintained to connect fighting troops to their immediate sustainment assets, especially
CASEVAC, repair, ammunition and fuel supply. This communication is enhanced by the
co-locating of C3 elements from brigade combat and CSS units to maintain effective
sustainment activity.

02110. Time. Preparation time is vital for the successful conduct of sustainment
operations and immediate priorities for sustainment activity, and the priorities for the
employment of scarce logistic resources will often differ from operational priorities. For
example, if preparatory fire for a deliberate attack requires a build up of ammunition stocks
in advance of operational activity, preparation time for this activity is needed.

02111. Opportunity. Sustainment activity achieves its greatest effect when conducted
out of contact with the enemy. The opportunity for replenishment, CASEVAC or forward
repair must be seized either by exploiting a pause in the fighting, or contrived by fighting for
time and space. The brigade CSS framework must be established so that it can respond to
opportunity.

02112. Enemy Interference. The brigade’s sustainment units should be close enough to
support the fighting troops and far enough from the enemy to avoid interference. They
should not be positioned where effort has to be squandered on their protection to the
detriment of other operations. Equally if distances are too great, sustainers cannot be
responsive to the needs of the fighting troops and a delay in resupply may constrain the
brigade’s ability to exploit opportunities. In the COE Lines of Communication (LoC) will be
vulnerable, possibly necessitating additional force protection measures.

02113. Security. The brigade’s sustainment units must be capable of self defence and
mounting local counter-attacks. Ground must be used to protect activity, augmented by
good basic disciplines such as movement drills, movement control and concealment.
Consideration should be given to constituting rear area security forces to provide, air
defence, anti-armour and a mobile defence force. A rear area surveillance plan must

2-40
identify air, CBRN and ground threats and be backed by clear and simple contingency
plans.

02114. Balance. The grouping of sustainment units within the brigade must be kept
under constant review to ensure that the fighting units are best served. Sustainment units
may be attached to combat forces for certain operations, with other sustainment units
remaining in depth. This should be done to increase the agility of combat units, whist
avoiding over-insurance, and ensuring that sustainment units impose minimum drag, due to
their restricted mobility, and remain effective. It is also important to consider the role of
logistics in influence and deception.

02115. Restoration of Combat Power. Rehabilitation is the deliberate restoration of

fighting power to prepare a unit for re-employment. It is a common battlefield activity and it
should be planned and sequenced correctly. Its scale, scope and depth will reflect the
condition of the brigade or unit commencing rehabilitation, the level of fighting power to be
recreated, the time and resources available.

02116. The ‘4Ds’. Small details overlooked in the sustainment planning stage can often
lead to disproportionate failure in execution. The planning process needs to relate the
operational plan to logistic effect, articulating those CSS factors that constrain the
‘operational art’. Sustainment planning centres on a comprehensive analysis of the factors
specific to a theatre or operation. These factors are commonly referred to as the ‘4Ds’:

a. Destination. This covers the environment of the operation. It determines the

pattern of wear on equipment and the physiological demands on troops, and
informs preventative measures.

b. Distance. This is more than just the length of LoCs. It also includes the
threats, capacity and topography that apply to them. This determines the design
of the resupply and evacuation aspects of the support network.

c. Demand. Demand is influenced by the type of force requiring support and its
rates and amounts of consumption. Complicated groupings demand more
complex and varied sustainment concepts. Demand stems from the commander’s
intent and the type of military activity that it leads to, whether steady state, cyclical
or surge.

d. Duration. The duration of the operation and the rate of demand determine
the quantities of personnel and materiel required. The duration of an operation
dictates endurance requirements and the need to rotate or replace equipment and
personnel. A commander should balance the risks of a rapid, lightly supported
operation against those of a better resourced, more deliberate operation that takes
longer to mount.

02117. Sustainment planning must reflect that activity is not constant throughout an
operation. Activity levels shift considerably depending upon the phase and nature of a
particular operation. Key to success is creating the conditions for sustainability through
anticipation and foresight; this requires forward planning, frequently two steps ahead of the
operation.

2-41
02118. HSS Planning. In addition to to the ‘4Ds’, HSS planning must consider the ‘4Cs’:

a. Capability. The mix of medical skills, equipment and advice that are
required to meet the operational plan.

b. Capacity. Capacity is determined by inflow (casualty estimation) to the

healthcare system and outflow from the system (medical evacuation).

c. Convenience. Medical facilities are located to meet the clinical timelines 22,
minimise absence from duty and ensure timely medical advice.

d. Continuity. Continuity is required for both clinical care and clinical

information. It also contributes to the principle of efficiency by striking an optimal
balance between the number of treatment nodes and the continuity of care.

02119. Captured Persons (CPERS). JDP 1-10 Captured Persons (2nd edition, 2011) is
the capstone UK Doctrine relating to all aspects of CPERS planning, handling, treatment
and monitoring and must be followed. During the course of military operations UK Armed
Forces must be prepared to capture, detain or hold individuals for a wide variety of reasons.
The treatment of these individuals is of critical importance, not only from a legal and policy
perspective but also in terms of the legitimacy of the operation. The proper handling and
treatment of CPERS is an essential element of campaign authority, which is itself a
condition for long term success. Additional guidance is contained in Chapter 7.

‘All CPERS must be treated humanely at all times.

All CPERS are entitled to respect for their person, honour and religion.’
JDP 1-10 Captured Persons (2nd edition, 2011)

SUMMARY

02120. Sustainment includes logistics, administration and the organisations and

resources required to deliver sustainability. It is central to fighting power; tactical plans
must remain within the art of the logistically possible and brigade actions must be
sustainable within the means available. Sustainment should be considered as a means to
an end; it supports and enables missions although, occasionally, sustainment may be the
mission itself, for example in humanitarian relief operations. Additional detailed information
can be found in:

JDP 4-00 Logistics for Joint Operations. Edition 3, April 2007.

JDP 4-03 Joint Medical Doctrine, Edition 3.

JSP 886 The Defence Supply Chain Manual.

ADP Operations, Chapter 9, Sustaining Operations.

22
For an explanation of clinical timelines see JDP 4-03, paras 211-212.

2-42
A Med-P-13 (A). NATO Glossary of Medical Terms and Conditions, May 2011.

JDP1-10 Captured Persons

The Staff Officers Handbook

2-43
2-44
 CHAPTER 3

OFFENSIVE ACTIONS

0301. The aim of this CONTENTS

chapter is to consider the Subject Page
purpose, principles, planning The Purpose and Principles of Offensive Actions 3-1
considerations and conduct of Offensive Actions in a Complex Environment -
brigade level offensive actions. The Manoeuvrist Approach 3-2
It should be read in the context The Ten Types of Offensive Action 3-3
of Chapter 1’s overview of the Planning Considerations for Offensive Actions 3-4
Example Planning Yardsticks 3-11
Manoeuvrist Approach and The Conduct of Offensive Actions 3-11
Chapter 2’s consideration of Stages of an Attack 3-13
find, fix, strike and exploit. In Summary 3-16
this chapter the offence is dealt The Adversary Perspective 3-17
with in isolation, however the Vignettes 3-20
brigade may plan and execute Annexes:
other tactical actions A. Offensive Actions Summary Sheet 3-A-1
simultaneously. B. Offensive Actions Aide Memoire 3-B-1

THE PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES OF OFFENSIVE ACTIONS

0302. Purpose. The purpose of offensive action is to defeat an enemy though the use
or threat of force. It requires the enemy to be found, to be fixed, successfully struck and the
situation decisively exploited.

0303. Principles. The principles of offensive action are:

a. Seek surprise.

b. Maintain security.

c. Seize key terrain or targets vital to influencing perceptions.

d. Achieve superiority of fires and other effects.

e. Exploit manoeuvre.

f. Concentrate the effects of force or the threat of force.

g. Plan to exploit success.

h. Keep it simple.

0304. Characteristics. The Characteristics of offensive actions are:

a. Surprise and shock.

b. The seizure and retention of the initiative.

3-1
 c. Agility, by which fleeting opportunities are taken.

d. Superior tempo, through which the intensity and sequence of activities is

maintained to keep the adversary off balance.

OFFENSIVE ACTIONS IN A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT – THE MANOEUVRIST

APPROACH

0305. The outcome of offensive action is to defeat the enemy’s cohesion and will to
resist. This may be achieved by a combination of methods from physically destroying his
means to fight through to messaging to undermine his morale. Key is that the method of
influencing perceptions – a battlegroup strike, joint fires, information methods – is
appropriate to the target, the context and the effect sought.

0306. In the complex operating environment, offensive actions are likely to be

conducted in multiple dimensions concurrently; their inter-relationship with each other, with
the environment and their consequences must be managed. For example, in attacking a
hybrid opponent who is coercing a populated area within a fragile but friendly state, the
brigade will need to consider:

a. An appropriate understanding of the enemy and the context.

b. The enemy’s vulnerabilities and strengths.

c. The effects required to defeat the enemy’s will to resist.

d. The appropriate kinetic and non-kinetic targeting methods.

e. How to exploit opportunity (physical exploitation by manoeuvre through to

messaging to dominate the information space).

f. How to manage the negative consequences, for example, collateral damage.

g. How to sustain own legitimacy, will and cohesion and undermine that of the
adversary through:

(1) Re-assurance of local population.

(2) Re-assurance of host government.

(3) Where appropriate, re-assurance of own government and domestic

population.

(4) Where appropriate, re-assurance of international opinion.

0307. The brigade planning and targeting process must understand, direct and
optimise the effects required within the context of the complex battlespace. The importance
of shaping the narrative of the attack, mitigating its negative impacts and exploiting its
opportunities is likely to be significant. None of this should undermine the brigade’s resolve
to concentrate combat power to overwhelm an opponent.

3-2
0308. Challenges. Conducting offensive actions in a complex operating environment
presents particular challenges:

a. Find. The ability to understand the enemy’s intent and his critical vulnerabilities
may be obscured by his deployment amongst the people.

b. Fix. Enemy vulnerabilities may be dispersed and shielded by civilian

infrastructure.

c. Strike. Complex terrain may serve to weaken the coherence of the attacking
force and expose it to enemy 360 degree counter attacks.

d. Exploit. A networked opponent may be less susceptible to physical exploitation.

Concurrently, the enemy may seek to exploit any misapplication of brigade combat
power through information operations.

THE TEN TYPES OF OFFENSIVE ACTION

0309. Attack. Attack is sub-divided into three types:

a. Deliberate Attack. A prepared attack against a defined and identified objective.

b. Hasty Attack. An attack launched with little preparation and reliant on battle
drills for execution.

c. Counter-Attack and Spoiling Attack. To destroy, defeat or disrupt a potentially

overextended enemy, made vulnerable by his own offensive action. Spoiling attacks
fulfil the same function but have the more limited aim of disruption.

0310. Raid. A raid is a swift penetration of hostile territory, avoiding becoming

decisively engaged, to conduct an activity before conducting a planned withdrawal. A raid
could be conducted to:

a. Secure information.

b. Confuse the enemy.

c. Strike or seize a high value individual or target.

d. Destroy physical positions, equipment or a discrete part of an enemy force.

0311. Exploitation. An offensive action, exploitation is characterised by a rapid

advance against lessening resistance to exploit the opportunity presented by battlefield
success. The purpose is both physical and psychological.

0312. Pursuit. A pursuit aims to catch or cut off a hostile force, with the aim of
defeating or destroying it. It should develop from a successful exploitation.

0313. Feint. The purpose of a feint is to distract an enemy force by seeking combat or
contact such that it requires him to deploy tactically to counter a perceived threat. The

3-3
intent is to influence the enemy into making deployment decisions that support our interests
and not theirs.

0314. Demonstration. A demonstration aims to distract an enemy’s attention without

seeking contact. Both feints and demonstrations can contribute to fixing and should be
designed to have psychological as well as physical effects. Similar to the feint, the intent is
to influence the enemy into making decisions that support our interests.

0315. Reconnaissance in Force. Is used to induce an enemy to disclose the location,

size, strength, disposition or the intention of his force by making him respond to offensive
action.

0316. Ambush. An ambush is a surprise attack by a force lying in wait on a moving or

temporarily halted enemy.

0317. Breakout of Encircled Forces. A breakout constitutes an encircled force taking

offensive action to link up with a main force. The breakout should attempt to surprise the
encircling enemy and force a penetration at a point of weakness using deception, feint and
security. There is considerable advantage in attempting to break out at the earliest
opportunity before the encirclement solidifies.

0318. Infiltration. An infiltration is a penetration into the enemy’s depth using stealth,
either to gain understanding, to achieve influence or to execute another offensive action.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR OFFENSIVE ACTIONS

COMMAND

0319. The Commander. A commander must be bold when planning and conducting
offensive actions and aggressively exploit favourable situations. He should be positioned
so that he can track the development of the battle and provide timely direction balanced
with decentralised execution which will allow subordinates to exploit opportunities as they
arise.

0320. Headquarters. Brigade headquarters should be configured to optimise tempo.

Consideration should be given to its location, any requirement for it to move during the
offensive action and the functionality and communications it requires at each stage.

0321. Battlespace Management. Battlespace Management should be dynamic and

boldly applied in the offence, facilitating and not impeding the attack when it transitions into
exploitation or pursuit.

INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

0322. Current Intelligence Picture. Intelligence will be challenging in offensive actions.

Prior to the attack, the brigade commander will need a current intelligence picture
concerning enemy strengths, positions, capabilities and intentions, especially in relation to
reserves. The commander will need to understand the physical terrain; approach routes,
obstacles, the nature of the objective and of the area beyond the objective and how these
interact in a complex, probably urbanised area. An understanding of the human terrain is
critical, the pattern of human activity, key civilian nodes and centres, opinion formers and

3-4
local leaders and how these will influence and can be shaped by the impending brigade
operation.

0323. Intelligence Requirements. Once the operation has commenced the

intelligence requirements will be similarly demanding. Rapid battlefield developments will
challenge the brigade’s ability to track progress and understand the situation in depth. The
latter is critical if exploitation is to be decisive. Divisional ISTAR collection assets can
support this.

FIREPOWER

0324. Components of Offensive Support. Offensive Support (OS), through the

integrated use of joint fires, supports the delivery of joint effect. When available, indirect
fire, close air support, aviation and offensive Electronic Warfare (EW) should be
incorporated into the plan of attack. Avoiding collateral damage and negative second order
effects in a constrained and congested environment will require careful consideration. Joint
fires may be required to carry out several specific tasks, prior to, during and after the attack,
including:

a. In conjunction with direct fire, fixing and isolating the objective(s) from support
and creating the conditions for the assault.

b. Suppressing, neutralising or destroying direct fire weapons which can engage

assaulting troops.

c. Suppressing, neutralising or destroying indirect fire and air defence systems.

d. Protecting troops from counter-attacks during the reorganisation stage.

e. Preventing enemy reinforcement by targeting in depth.

f. Disrupting the enemy’s capacity to exercise command and control.

0325. Artillery. Artillery may be deployed forward during preparations for the break-in
battle. During the attack it will follow on to maintain supporting fire. ISTAR collection
assets will need to focus on the acquisition and tracking of critical targets and offensive
support systems must be able to strike them as soon as they are located. Due to the
dynamic nature of offensive action target arrays and threats may arise from any direction.

0326. Mortars. Despite their relatively short range, mortars can move rapidly behind
the attacking force and are ideal for close targets, targets on reverse slopes and those in
difficult areas to reach with low angle fire. They are particularly effective in providing smoke
and illumination. They remain integral to their own units providing guaranteed fire support.

0327. Air and Aviation. Air and aviation support can be vital in the conduct of
offensive actions. They provide a favourable air situation for deployment and movement
and can disrupt and destroy enemy forces both in the close battle and at long range. By
attacking or threatening opposing surface targets and providing fire support to offensive
actions, they can prevent the enemy from reinforcing and strengthening his defence. Air
and aviation support will achieve maximum impact when pre-planned, to allow for detailed
integration and coordination between the tactical air and ground units involved. Careful

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thought will need to be given to BM, target identification and combat identification and the
availability and allocation of fire support teams. In a less dense, 360 degree battlespace,
manoeuvre units must have the ability to call in responsive fires to engage rapidly emerging
targets.

0328. Attack Aviation. Attack aviation offers a potent capability in the offence; as a
find, fix, strike or exploit asset. Enabled by an air manoeuvre planning team, it could
provide a fires platform in support of ground manoeuvre. If present in sufficient mass,
attack aviation could provide a manoeuvre force in its own right which could be
battlegrouped with other assets. Additional guidance can be found in AFM Vol 1 Pt 13, Air
Land Integration.

‘If you can knit up the powers of the Army on land and the powers of Air in the sky then
nothing will stand against you and you will never lose a battle.’

Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein

0329. Electronic Attack. Electronic attack has the advantage of requiring less
accurate target locations than lethal fire, it may cause disclosure of information on insecure
channels (a process known as 'herding') and its use may be less restricted by Rules of
Engagement (ROE). The use of electronic attack is subject to control mechanisms, as it
has the disadvantages of being indiscriminate, of potentially denying intelligence and of
highlighting friendly force locations as a result of the electronic signatures that are emitted.
Electronic attack mainly acts to target enemy Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA)
capability and command and control systems. Electronic attack represents a type of non-
lethal fire. It offers the following capabilities:

a. Electronic jamming

b. Electronic neutralisation

c. Electronic deception.

0330. Offensive Cyber Activity. Cyber attack against enemy ISTAR/C2 assets is
currently beyond the organic capabilities of the brigade. Specialist assets may be allocated
to the brigade to deliver these effects.

MANOEUVRE

0331. Sequencing. Manoeuvre seeks to place forces in a position of advantage

relative to the enemy. Combating a dispersed, networked opponent in complex terrain will
present two particular challenges: to determine the specific position of advantage, which
may be cognitive, and the ability to manoeuvre seamlessly to maintain initiative and tempo.
Sequencing, the integration of fires and manoeuvre, the appropriate task organisation of
manoeuvre support, dynamic control measures and agile sustainability will all be important.

0332. Mobility. Whether on the ground, in the air or across water, mobility requires
speed and momentum. These enable a commander to seize the initiative and achieve
surprise in selecting the timing and direction of the attack. Planning considerations for
ground mobility include: route development and clearing, obstacle crossing and breaching

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and movement control. The brigade will allocate manoeuvre support assets to carry out
these tasks, providing direction and priorities to the manoeuvre support commanders who
should be involved in the development of the plan. Leading brigades and units may receive
additional manoeuvre support assets. A more detailed explanation of crossing and
breaching obstacles is found in Chapter 6, Annex I.

‘Manoeuvring, Striking and Protecting. There is an enduring requirement, unchanging in

its essential nature, to manoeuvre across ground, with some form of protection and materiel
support, in order to reach a place from which to strike, including the ability to use firepower,
in order to achieve a decisive condition. To move without organic protection and integrated
firepower in a high threat environment, against a capable hybrid enemy, will result in
defeat.’
Conflict on Land, DCDC, 5 Jul 10

PROTECTION

0333. Principal Components. The principal components of protection in respect to

offensive actions are:

a. Force Protection. Complex terrain, a dynamic battlefield, decentralised

execution and a 360 degree threat will combine to create vulnerabilities. The brigade
will need to consider the balance of risk and advantage in the deployment of small
detachments (find force, CIS nodes, sustainment packages, and exploitation forces)
the movement of which is essential to the execution of the brigade operation.

b. Air Operations. Local air superiority will be essential for offensive actions. All
counter air resources should be integrated to achieve this local superiority in order to
protect ground forces and their freedom to manoeuvre.

c. Air Defence (AD). AD priorities are established during planning. Throughout

the preparatory stage of an attack, AD cover should be given to assembly areas,
approach routes, flank protection and artillery firing positions. Vulnerable points, such
as river crossings, should attract particular priority. During the attack the brigade
should shift AD priority to protecting the attacking force. As the attack progresses, the
protection of reserves and lines of communication will take on increasing importance.
Principal threats could range from enemy combat air, through UAS to long range
rockets.

d. Mobility and Counter Mobility. In offensive actions the brigade will use its
engineer support to maintain the momentum of the attack. This will also protect the
brigade and enhance its survivability. Counter mobility tasks, particularly the
protection of flanks and rapid protection against counter-attacks, are also significant.
Engineers will be required to support attacking forces by any or all of the following
actions:

(1) Breaching, marking or opening own and enemy minefields.

(2) Crossing rivers or other obstacles.

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 (3) Securing flanks by the creation or enhancement of obstacles.

(4) Preparing and maintaining routes for follow up echelons.

(5) Supporting consolidation on the objective by constructing new positions, or

enhancing existing positions and creating obstacles.

(6) Denying routes for enemy counter attack, reinforcement, or withdrawal.

e. Survivability. During offensive actions engineer assistance can be used to

provide field fortifications for reserves and echelon forces waiting in hide areas, or for
assault forces consolidating on an objective.

f. OPSEC. The commander’s concept of operations should determine the

Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI). Appropriate OPSEC measures
should then be applied to counter enemy intelligence acquisition capabilities. The
brigade should determine how an enemy might either wish to gather, or be capable of
gathering, information on friendly forces. This assessment feeds the process which
determines what counter measures could or should be put in place.

g. Deception. Deception plays a significant role in the success of offensive actions

and is a key pillar of information methods. Deception is designed to influence the
enemy into making decisions that work in our interests rather than theirs. For any
deception to be credible it must be properly resourced. Measures might include:

(1) Diversion. A diversionary attack or feint may be effective if executed with

sufficient vigour and determination so that it appears to be the main effort. It
should be aimed at a vital sector of the enemy's defences if he is to be
successfully misled. Other diversionary methods include use of artillery, air,
smoke, illumination, EW, psychological methods and noise.

(2) Demonstration. A demonstration can be used to distract the enemy's

attention without seeking combat. It may include the false movement of ground
or aviation forces and the use of EW to produce false electronic signatures or
radio traffic.

(3) Counter Surveillance. Deception cannot be achieved without effective

counter surveillance measures to impede hostile surveillance.

“‘Stonewall’ Jackson aptly expressed this in his strategic motto, ‘Mystify, mislead,
and surprise’. For to mystify and to mislead constitutes ‘distraction’, while surprise
is the essential cause of ‘dislocation’.”

Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart

h. CBRN Defence. An assault against an enemy equipped with chemical weapons

is difficult and hazardous. If a chemical hazard exists or is anticipated as the result of
defensive fire, the reorganisation should make arrangements for decontamination.
The dress state must balance protection against degradation caused by Individual
Protective Equipment (IPE) and the associated loss of momentum.

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 i. Electronic Counter Measures. If Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) are
being employed they must be fully integrated in order to avoid the possibility of
fratricide. Coalition partners must be included in this integration.

SUSTAINMENT

0334. Coordination. The sustainment challenge in offensive actions is to maximise

opportunities for the brigade to keep the initiative and retain balance, whilst unbalancing the
enemy. In offensive actions exploitation may necessitate swift re-supply. The sustainment
concept should be designed with this in mind. The Deputy Chief of Staff in the Brigade
Support Group, or brigade Main HQ, will coordinate sustainment assets to:

a. Sustain forward units.

b. Clear MSRs.

c. Evacuate casualties, equipment and Captured Persons (CPERS).

d. Prepare and establish sustainment bases.

e. Undertake rear area security.

0335. Considerations. When planning offensive actions sustainment planners should

consider:

a. Providing sufficient embedded CSS assets to enable combat units to operate

with maximum freedom from formal re-supply during the planned mission. This would
include embedded close support ES assets at BG level to maintain momentum
through the quick repair of battle winning equipment and HSS assets to ensure the
rapid treatment and clearance of casualties from the BG.

b. Ensuring combat force elements and echelons are carrying maximum supplies to
ensure self sufficiency for as long as possible.

c. The forward positioning of brigade level CSS elements to ensure that combat
and CS forces have the necessary support to maintain momentum.

d. Use of 2nd or 3rd line assets to top up unit assets, thus leaving unit F and A
Echelons fully stocked.

e. Maintaining CSS stocks on wheels wherever possible.

f. That many CSS assets have limited mobility and protection compared to the
assets they are supporting.

g. Extending and maintaining control over dedicated supply routes.

h. Priorities for replenishment are likely to be ammunition and then fuel.

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 i. Planning in anticipation of exploitation, reorganisation and subsequent
operations.

j. Vulnerability of CSS assets to enemy counter attack and from by-passed enemy.

0336. Functional Groupings of Sustainment Assets. Logistic, medical and

equipment support will be critical to sustaining offensive actions. Particular emphasis
should be placed on the following:

a. Logistic Support. To offset the strain on the transport system, the commander
must consider pre-positioning supplies and support facilities forward. This may
include specialist facilities such as Forward Arming and Refuelling Points (FARP).
Large volumes of ammunition and fuel have to be moved forward during an offensive
action. Flexible plans are needed to make best use of limited routes and transport
assets.

b. Medical Support. The structure and laydown of medical assets and treatment
facilities, as well as Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) capability, will dictate the
evacuation plan however:

(1) Medical assets should be employed as far forward as possible in order to

meet and, if possible, reduce clinical timelines. This will often require medical
assets to provide intimate support throughout offensive actions.

(2) Since medical units are normally not held in reserve, plans must be flexible
and take account of the possible requirement for HSS for an exploiting force.

c. Equipment Support. To maintain the force effectively, repairs must be carried

out as close to the point of failure or damage as is tactically and technically feasible.
Active use of recovery assets will keep obstacles and routes clear in addition to
minimising the risk of losing equipment to enemy counter attack. Denial of equipment
should be a last resort. The requirement for Equipment Support (ES) units to move
will reduce productivity. Greater distances generated by offensive actions may require
the reinforcement of ES capabilities and the forward positioning of spares with
manoeuvring forces.

d. Provost Support. In the offensive, provost support will operate in a Close

Support (CS) role with forward combat elements, particularly at defiles and breaches.
Priorities are likely to include:

(1) Route and traffic control (including control of stragglers and refugees), to
ensure the minimum loss of time and momentum.

(2) The handling and movement of CPERS including data capture and logging.

e. Host Nation Support. In offensive actions there may be a requirement to

arrange and coordinate Host Nation Support (HN Sp) and liaison with Non
Governmental Organisations (NGO), especially in order to deal with displaced persons
or refugees. HN or other actors may be able to assume responsibility for the control of
civilian movement; provost and sustainment assets will usually be required to support

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 this activity. The handling of displaced persons must be undertaken with an
awareness of how this is perceived by wider audiences.

PLANNING YARDSTICKS

0337. A UK combined arms brigade is a potent combination of combat power. The

planning yardsticks below illustrate the scale of a brigade offensive action. Full planning
data is contained in the Staff Officers Handbook:

a. Frontage. At its greatest extent a brigade attack frontage could be 7km. In

most circumstances, the requirement to concentrate combat power will require
frontages in the order of 1–3 km, dependant on the nature of the attacking force and
terrain. In broad terms an armoured battlegroup will assault on a frontage of 1km per
squadron, whereas a light infantry battalion will assault on a frontage of 250m per
company. 1

b. Reach. The reach of brigade fires (155mm AS90) to prosecute depth targets
and support exploitation is in the order of 20km. Divisional assets and air can
strike/shape beyond the brigade area of operations.

c. Rates of Advance. Rates of advance are dependent on the ground and

strength of enemy resistance. Illustrative rates of advance under intense resistance
are:

(1) Go. 600m/hour.

(2) Slow Go. 500m/hour.

(3) No Go. 150m/hour.

d. Duration. A brigade has an immediate sustainability of 5 days. Operations

beyond this duration will require re-supply if the brigade is not to culminate.

THE CONDUCT OF OFFENSIVE ACTIONS

GROUPING IN OFFENSIVE ACTIONS

0338. General. The standard groupings for brigade offensive action are:

a. Reconnaissance Force.

b. Assault Force.

c. Flank Protection/Security Force.

d. Echelon Force.

e. Reserve.

1
Source: Staff Officers Handbook

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0339. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance is critical to successful manoeuvre. In
offensive actions, the commander may decide to base the plan for manoeuvre on the
concept of ‘reconnaissance pull’. The intelligence obtained should pull the main body
toward and along the line of least resistance. This enables the brigade to seize the initiative
and increase its agility. Reconnaissance should determine:

a. Routes.

b. Enemy strengths and dispositions.

c. Defensive gaps.

d. Other actors in the battlespace.

0340. Other Reconnaissance Tasks. Other tasks for reconnaissance forces in

offensive actions include:

a. Maintenance of Momentum. Once the initial reconnaissance of the enemy and

his positions is complete and the results reported, responsibility reverts to close
reconnaissance forces. Brigade reconnaissance assets will move on into the enemy’s
depth to locate reserves, artillery groups, headquarters, routes and supplies. To
maintain tempo it is important for reconnaissance assets to continue to advance and
look for information.

b. Exploitation. In the event of a successful attack or fleeting opportunity, brigade

reconnaissance can spearhead a rapid exploitation, maintaining contact with the
enemy’s withdrawing forces, providing target information and control of fires, in order
to generate disruption and damage.

c. Operational Security. Reconnaissance forces can screen or guard brigades, to

provide flank protection, Operational Security (OPSEC) and allow the main assault
force to consolidate.

0341. Assault Force. The nature of the task and the objectives will be a decisive
factor in determining the strength and type of combat forces required to strike the enemy
and the organisational structure that will be adopted for the action.

0342. Security. Forces may be required for security tasks such as flank protection,
base security and the covering of gaps between units. These elements not only protect the
main body of the force, but can secure operating bases, fix by-passed enemy forces and
support units in areas to the rear of attacking echelons. Flank protection and base security
forces may be supported by the creation or enhancement of obstacles by integral engineer
assets and the use of specific ISTAR capabilities.

0343. Reserve. Uncommitted forces need to be held in reserve to deal with the
unexpected, to maintain the momentum of the attack and to exploit success when the
opportunity is presented. Commanders may need to increase the size of an assaulting
force to allow it to constitute its own integral reserve. Once the original reserve has been
committed, another one should be constituted, otherwise the commander risks losing the
initiative. The size of a reserve will require careful judgement. In war fighting, a reserve
needs to be large enough to be effective (generally no less than 1/6th of a brigade’s combat

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element). However the commander must be careful not to hold too large a proportion of the
brigade in reserve, otherwise he may fail to deploy the full power of his forces. In less
demanding operations, the reserve may be no more than a manoeuvre sub-unit.

0344. Echelon. Unlike a reserve, an echelon force will have a distinct mission. The
exact details of the task may not be known, but their purpose is part of the commander’s
intent.

STAGES OF AN ATTACK

0345. Stages. An attack can be divided into a number of distinct, but closely related,
stages. They are unlikely to be distinct to the participating force elements. The stages are:

a. Battle Preparation.

b. Shaping.

c. The Approach.

d. The Assault.

e. Exploitation.

0346. Battle Preparation. While commanders and staff are planning an action, the
forces involved will be conducting battle preparation. The extent of preparations will
depend on the task and the time available.

0347. Shaping. During the preparatory stage, a commander will aim to shape the
enemy as well as the physical and human environments by creating or preserving the
conditions for a successful attack. The commander will seek to influence the perceptions of
a variety of general and specific target audiences whilst grouping, preparing and positioning
his own forces. Shaping may be conducted using fire and manoeuvre, as well as a range
of non-lethal activities that may include deception, psychological methods, media
communication, key leader engagement and perhaps activities in the cyber domain if the
capabilities are allocated at brigade level. Such activities will often be aimed at weakening
the will of the enemy whilst concurrently reassuring the local population and garnering the
support of their leaders. Shaping may also include alterations to the physical environment,
such as the breaching of obstacles or the denial of infrastructure. Preliminary actions will
normally take place while tactical planning is being carried out. These will include
preliminary movement to position the force either in or near assembly areas depending on
the timings and preliminary deployment, with the elements of the various combat and
combat support forces coming together in the assembly area and task organising for battle.

0348. The Approach. During the approach from the assembly areas it is important to
maintain security for as long as possible. All available routes should be used to achieve
maximum speed and dispersion. This may include the use of air manoeuvre assets. Other
factors to consider include:

a. Passage of Lines. It may be necessary to attack through friendly elements

already in contact with the enemy. They will remain in position until their fire has been

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masked or they are no longer required. This action is explained in greater detail in
Chapter 6, Annex F.

b. Crossing the Line of Departure. All timings are based on the time troops cross
the Line of Departure (LD). It will normally be crossed in tactical formation. In cases
where a passage of lines is involved, the LD may be the Forward Line of Own Troops
(FLOT).

c. Deployment Formations. During the approach it is essential to gain ground by

advancing swiftly. Every effort should be made to neutralise enemy observation by
using concealed approaches and supporting fire. The formation adopted by attacking
troops when crossing the LD will depend on the ground, distance from the enemy,
expected enemy resistance, the time available, the presence of indigenous non
combatants and the scale of offensive support. There is a requirement for well
practised and clearly understood battle drills.

d. Advance to Contact. The approach might involve an advance to contact.

Detail on the advance to contact may be found in Chapter 6, Annex C. The following
groupings will usually be adopted:

(1) Covering Force. Usually reconnaissance forces, including engineer

reconnaissance, supported by offensive support assets.

(2) Advance Guard. An advance guard or forward detachment is task

organised to be strong enough to overrun minor opposition and should be
capable of fixing a stronger force.

(3) Main Body. The main body comprises the bulk of the force, which will
enter into contact once the main opposition has been fixed.

(4) Rear Guard. The rear guard is usually a similar sized organisation to the
advance guard, but could be smaller depending on the threat. Its main function
is to protect the main body from a rearward threat.

e. Security. The threat assessment will suggest if the flanks need protecting and
by what size and type of force. Options available may include brigade
reconnaissance, aviation, armour, counter mobility assets and fires (organic and joint).

f. Infiltration. Infiltration can either be planned or opportunistic and is applicable

across all categories of military activity. Opportunistic infiltration is more likely to
achieve decisive surprise, but requires rapid reaction and initiative at all levels. Under
favourable conditions, infiltration can be used for reconnaissance, attacks in depth,
and the capture of specific terrain features, individuals or intelligence, or the disruption
of communications. Planned infiltration requires accurate intelligence, while the
movement and assembly of forces by stealth among enemy positions is time
consuming. Planning for infiltration has to be detailed and coordinated closely with the
overall plan of attack. Deviation from infiltration plans is difficult to coordinate once
movement has begun. Link up plans or plans to extricate the force should also be
prepared.

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 (1) Pre-planned Infiltration. Within the area of infiltration, the controlling HQ
designates an area of operations that will be used for infiltration by stealth.
Infiltration routes will be planned along with control measures such as
checkpoints and phase lines, as a means of reporting the progress of the action
and of coordinating fire with the movement of the infiltrating units.

(2) Opportunistic Infiltration. Conversely, opportunistic infiltration relies on

minimal planning, rapid movement once opportunities are identified, highly
decentralised control and considerable initiative within the overall commander's
intent. It requires boldness but will be extremely effective if skilfully executed.

0349. The Assault. The more static and prepared the enemy’s defence, the more
detailed and deliberate the attack will need to be and the larger the force committed. The
assault can be divided into three generic phases: The Break-In, the Fight Through and
Bypassing.

a. The Break-In. The attack should be organised in depth, on a narrow front, with
the leading forces only concentrating when they come into contact with the enemy.
Firepower should be used to isolate objectives from each other. Once the break-in is
achieved, the attacking force should extend laterally from the main thrust. Doing so
will produce an ever widening penetration, increasing difficulty for the enemy and
providing more opportunities for exploitation. The enemy should not be allowed time to
react. The momentum has to be maintained, seeking to exploit success, although the
force should avoid becoming over-extended and vulnerable to counter-attack.

b. The Fight Through. Once the break-in is made, it is vital to maintain pressure
on the enemy, not only when assaulting initial objectives but also when moving
towards objectives in depth. When resistance is encountered, leading elements,
supported by fire, should attempt to defeat or destroy the enemy as rapidly as
possible, seizing opportunities to reinforce and exploit success, preventing the enemy
from regaining his balance. Reserves should be kept available and positioned for
commitment if required. As the attack progresses, the enemy may react with offensive
support, counter attacks or try to break contact and withdraw. Whatever his actions,
organising the attack in depth allows forces not in close contact to defeat the enemy’s
counter attacks or to exploit his withdrawal.

c. Bypassing. Commanders must give clear direction on bypassing policy.

Bypassing enables the maintenance of momentum. Typically, a commander will allow
the bypassing of forces two levels down. The defeat of bypassed forces will normally
fall to follow-on forces. Bypassing will have different implications depending on the
operating environment. Against a conventional, symmetric threat it may be
appropriate to by-pass formed enemy units to achieve an objective in depth which is
either time or mission imperative. In complex terrain, where operations are conducted
amongst the people, neat delineations in the battlespace may not be relevant. A
hybrid opponent operating in an urban landscape may need to be contained rather
than bypassed or immediately defeated.

0350. Exploitation. As the enemy’s resistance weakens, the offence moves into its
final stage, exploitation:

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 a. Conduct. Exploitation is the seizure of opportunity created by previous activity
and is generally characterised in the attack by a rapid advance against lessening
resistance. The aim is to retain the initiative by preventing the enemy from
reorganising his defence or from conducting an orderly withdrawal. The key to
success is speed. Any delay will allow the enemy to regroup and counter-attack, or to
establish positions in depth. Once exploitation has begun, momentum should be
relentlessly maintained. Experience shows that this will usually require forceful action
by the commander who has to be determined to drive the exploitation forward.
Exploitation creates confusion and apprehension throughout the enemy command,
reducing his capability to react and lowering his morale. This may in itself be decisive.
Exploitation should not just be focused on the enemy as there may be significant
exploitation opportunities through the use of information activities aimed at influencing
other target audiences, such as the indigenous population and security forces, as well
as key leaders.

b. Axes. Exploitation should be conducted on as broad a front as possible,

preferably on at least two axes, with the forces on each axis capable of independent
action. Use of aviation, air and air mobile troops to attack or cut off the enemy in
depth will increase the tempo of the exploitation.

c. Reorganisation and Consolidation. At the appropriate moment, consolidation

and reorganisation should be conducted. This must not detract from the advantages
of remorseless exploitation. The commander will need to judge what forces should be
allocated to the pursuit and where enemy resistance, the limit of exploitation, brigade
balance or the higher commander’s intent, requires the brigade to consolidate.

d. Pursuit. The pursuit aims to take advantage of the shattering of an enemy’s

cohesion and it may develop from a successful exploitation as the enemy attempts to
disengage. Its primary objective is the destruction of the enemy, although a terrain
objective may also be given. At the same time as the pursuit is being conducted,
enveloping forces should attempt to sever the enemy‘s withdrawal routes.

e. Exploitation and Encirclement. The aim of encirclement is to cut off an enemy

in a specific area, with a view to destroying him or forcing his surrender. It often
results from exploitation or pursuit when the pursuing force overtakes the enemy and
blocks his escape.

SUMMARY

0351. Once an offensive action is launched, flexibility and speed in the employment of
combat power are paramount. Offensive actions have to be executed vigorously, exploiting
any favourable developments and reallocating resources to areas where there appears to
be an opportunity for success. Momentum must be maintained in order to keep the enemy
off balance and the attack should not be delayed in order to align units or adhere rigidly to a
plan. Momentum may be a more important factor than secure flanks at this stage.

0349. Few offensive actions develop as planned and commanders must seek to turn
unexpected successes to their advantage and to cope instantly with reverses. Flexibility
demands simple plans, fire support, well positioned engineers, uncommitted reserves close
at hand and a sustainment plan flexible enough to support the action. Each discrete action
should not be viewed as an entity, but as part of the continuous process to break the

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enemy’s cohesion – a sequence of find, fix, strike and exploit. The opportunity to influence
should be maximised such that commanders and their staffs need to understand the effects
that a planned offensive action is likely to achieve, both positive intended effects, as well as
potential negative effects. These effects may not just influence the enemy, but other
audiences whose support for our operational or campaign objectives is essential.
Fundamentally, the application of the manoeuverist approach and mission command should
be imbued across the force.

THE ADVERSARY PERSPECTIVE

In defence the enemy will seek to defeat our will and ability to conduct the attack. He may
do this through physical defence, information methods or a combination of both. He will
exploit all opportunities and levers to protect his vulnerabilities and exploit ours. In extreme
circumstances he may lose the physical encounter but seek to win the ultimate narrative.

The defender will attempt to influence the brigade, allies, partners and the civil population
by all available means and throughout all the dimensions of the action. This will not be
confined to the duration of the action but will form part of a longer effort to disrupt, or even
prevent, the brigade from carrying out its offense. The enemy will aim to:

• Disrupt preparations for any attack by setting conditions in the defensive area that
will:
- Undermine any perception of the attacking forces legitimacy.
- Mobilise and polarise the local population.
- Deter an attack.

• Exploit messaging and the media to:

- Enhance deterrence.
- Sustain their own legitimacy.
- Exploit any negative consequences of the brigade’s action; for example collateral,
or even just the risk of collateral, damage.

• Attack and isolate vulnerable logistic, information and virtual networks.

• Cause disproportionate losses to undermine our will to prevail.

During the brigade’s offensive action the enemy will seek to deny the brigade identifiable
targets to strike, while retaining the ability to do the same. Simply put, the enemy will
attempt to force the brigade into conducting an advance to contact and a hasty attack,
rather than a well prepared deliberate attack. Throughout the action the enemy will seek to
disrupt the brigade across all tactical functions:
Find. The enemy will seek to remain hidden, by methods that defeat UK ISTAR
technologies and TTPs, while also being able to detect and track the brigade. The aim of
the observation and tracking will be to enable effective striking. Skilful observation will be
effective, continuous and coherent. This may be done by:
• Regular reconnaissance forces, possibly using AFVs and Combat Net Radio (CNR).

• Unarmed civilians communicating via cellular-phones, e-mail, or even CNR,

signalling maybe even as basic as whistles and/or flags.

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 • Covert OPs, which may be nearly impossible to detect, via their use of remote
cameras and effective concealment.

• Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS).

Fix. Fixing will be designed to slow the progress of the brigade and deny freedom of
action, especially in terms of manoeuvre. The enemy will also seek to destroy, defeat or
neutralise reconnaissance forces and disrupt their communications. Critical to effective
fixing is bringing the attack force to a halt to enable more effective strikes. Methods may
include:
• Anti-personnel and anti-tank minefields (buried, surface laid or scattered) as well as
victim and command initiated IEDs.

• Barbed-wire entanglements concealed within vegetation or between or within

buildings.

• The use of broadband jamming to disrupt communications and GPS.

• Harassing direct and indirect fire including use of chemical weapons and suicide
attacks.

• The use of well prepared ‘fortified zones’, often difficult to detect and exploiting the
subterranean dimension. A contemporary example is shown at Fig 3-6.
Strike. Striking will be intended to surprise, shock and be decisive. It may well be
conducted in terms of a surprise attack on a moving force. Engagement ranges will be
predicated on striking a balance of decisive action and remaining hidden, in order to
conduct subsequent engagements. These methods may include:
• Light weapons and ATGM from civilian buildings and/or extremely well concealed
bunker positions with ‘spider hole’ firing positions.

• Main battle tanks cued into firing positions from hides.

• Mortar, artillery and multi-barrel rocket fire cued by observation.

3-18
 Fig 3-1 - Contemporary Defensive Positions
Hezbollah Bunkers and Hides, Lebanon 2006

Exploit. Exploitation will occur when the enemy has gained freedom of action from
decisive striking. Exploitation normally requires the retention of a substantial reserve force.
Methods may include:
• Infiltration back into previously cleared abandoned defensive positions or urban
areas.

• Launching of counter attacks and pursuits.

• Breaking clean to previously established defensive positions.

• Attacks on supply routes and HQs.

3-19
 VIGNETTES

OFFENSIVE ACTION IN A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT

THE SECOND BATTLE OF FALLUJAH, 8-16 NOVEMBER 2004

At 1900 on 8 November 2004 two US Marine Corps Regimental Combat Teams (RCT) of
the 1st Marine Division (1 MARDIV) and two attached US Army Armoured Battalions
launched the assault phase of Operation Al FAJR in Fallujah. This was an attempt to regain
control of the city from a force of insurgents prior to national elections scheduled for early
2005. By this time 80% of the population of 250,000 had left the city, leaving behind 4500
insurgents.

1 MARDIV planned the operation in four phases:

• Phase 1: Preparation and Shaping
• Phase 2: Enhanced Shaping
• Phase 3: The ‘Operation’
• Phase 4: Transition

Phase 1

Preparation and shaping activities began in September and carried on for six weeks
through October as 1 MARDIV conducted an information and psyops campaign to reduce
the perceived legitimacy of the insurgents and to drive a wedge between the population and

3-20
the insurgents. This included targeting of high value targets, use of joint fires, raids, feints
and vehicle check points.

The Marines built Camp Fallujah to the southeast of the city for supply and training. They
built up a 15 day supply of ammunition, fuel, food and other supplies. This forward
positioning of assets was a key to success as it meant that the Marines were less
vulnerable to supply shortages caused by insurgent interdiction of their lines of
communication.

Phase 2

Enhanced shaping started on 7 November as Coalition forces took up blocking positions to

the south and east of the city securing bridges and entry points. The Marines used snipers,
raids and feints to keep the insurgents under pressure. The Iraqi 36 Commando Battalion
secured the city hospital which was kept operating throughout the battle. This further
deceived the insurgents into believing that the assault would come from the south and kept
them unbalanced, such that they started moving some of their men towards the south which
revealed their locations, tactics and techniques.

Phase 3

For the main assault General Natonski, Commander of 1 MARDIV gave a simple and clear
mission:

Attack to destroy the anti-Iraqi forces in Fallujah to establish legitimate local control.

The RCTs and armoured battalions broke deep into the city from the north by making two
breaches in the railway embankment and the city wall. It was discovered that insurgents
had dug tunnels, usually between mosques and schools, designed as escape routes, but
which also allowed fighters to rapidly reinforce areas under attack by coalition forces.
Different rates of advance between marine and army units created problems of
coordination. This was caused by the speed of the armoured advance not being matched
by the marines requirement to clear the city building by building. There were also problems
with communications, coordinating close air support and sharing of intelligence.

After two days of fighting, coalition forces controlled 70 percent of the city including the
mayor's office, several mosques and the commercial centre. Targeted airstrikes continued
with laser-guided bombs targeting buildings that held insurgent forces. U.S. troops and
Iraqi security forces then secured the key neighbourhood of Jolan in the north-western part
of the city having faced less resistance than expected. Likewise, US forces also saw a lack
of resistance by insurgents as they captured and crossed Fallujah's main east-west
highway. However, US units in the south western neighbourhoods of Resala and Nazal met
with more determined resistance.

On 10 November, CENTCOM announced that US and Iraqi forces had seized the Al Tawfiq
Mosque, the Hydra Mosque and the Muhammadia Mosque in one of the largest battles in
Fallujah. The Muhammadia Mosque held strategic significance because insurgents were
using it as a command centre and bunker. A convention centre across the street from the
mosque was also captured along with numerous weapons, munitions, and IED-making
material.

3-21
By 13 November, coalition forces had achieved control of most of the city, and were
conducting house-to-house clearing operations. On 16 November 2004, it was announced
that Fallujah was secure, although there were still sporadic instances of insurgent activity.
This enabled 1 MARDIV to move to the final phase, transition.

Phase 4

1 MARDIV had anticipated the need for transition to stabilisation and therefore had avoided
targeting key infrastructure such as bridges, the electricity grid and water supply. Teams
began to clear away the rubble and defuse unexploded ordnance before the population
were allowed to return to the city. The marines and reconstruction teams were able to
utilise the large amounts supplies built up before the operation. The local populace was
allowed to return six weeks after the assault with each citizen was given $2500 as
compensation.

The principles of offensive actions demonstrated during Operation AL FAJR included:

Surprise

This was achieved because the deception effort and the enhanced shaping unsettled the
insurgents convincing them that the attack would come from the south where in reality it
was planned to break-in from the north west.

Security

During Phase 2, Enhanced Shaping, security was achieved by securing bridges and other
entry points into the city.

Superiority of Fires

Superiority of fires from a 155mm artillery barrage prior to the assault allowed the marines
and armour to advance into the city before the insurgents had time to recover and man their
defences. Using the guns of the M1 tanks, buildings containing insurgents were collapsed
and the marines could also call on CAS if required.

Exploit Manoeuvre

The RCTs were able to adjust their plans to take advantage of the rapid advance of their
attached armour although this required careful coordination due to the slower advance of
the marine infantry and the danger of leaving the armour’s flanks exposed.

Concentrate Effects

The marine RCTs and their attached armour concentrated their initial assault on two large
breaches made in the city walls at the start of the operation allowing the armour to
spearhead the assault.

Exploit Success

Success was exploited by the immediate transition to stabilisation using already allocated
resources including money, construction teams and pre-positioned building materials.

3-22
THE BATTLE FOR ORTONA
ITALY 1943

3-23
The Battle for the Italian port of Ortona took place over approximately one week in
December 1943 and formed part of the Eighth Army's offensive against the German ‘Winter
Line’ defences east of the Apennine mountains. Aside form its importance as a port, Ortona
was a key command centre for the German Army and was defended by the Luftwaffe’s 1st
Parachute Division.

By the end of November 1943 Allied troops had successfully crossed the River Moro and
the 1st Canadian Division were preparing for an assault on Ortona. On 20 December the
2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade cleared the approaches and took up positions on the
outskirts of the town catching the German defenders by surprise. This advance had been
made possible using support from the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade and a heavy smoke
screen to cover the flanks.

The following day the Loyal Edmonton Regiment, along with the Seaforth Highlanders of
Canada and armour support began to advance into the town. Good progress was made
until momentum was lost when the tanks were withdrawn that night.

The Brigade commander then divided the town into sectors and assigned one to each
battalion to clear. In a move to reduce pressure on the Canadians fighting in Ortona, 1st
Canadian Infantry Brigade was then moved into position northwest of the town to cut off the
German supply routes and provide flank protection. There followed two days of heavy
fighting with the Canadians fighting house by house and room by room to take the town.
They proved the use of vertical envelopment using mouse hole charges to blow holes in the
roofs of the houses and then fighting down through them. The infantry were assisted by
direct fire from 17 Pounder anti-tank guns which proved more effective than indirect artillery
in the narrow alleyways. The town was not bombed during the attack since many of the
civilian population had remained and also to protect the port installations.

By 26 December the Canadians were in control of two thirds of the town and the Germans
began their withdrawal, leaving the Canadians in full control of Ortona by 28 December.

Many of the principles of offensive actions were demonstrated by the Canadian action at
Ortona:

Surprise

Surprise was initially achieved when the Loyal Edmontons overran German positions on the
outskirts of the town in order to secure the line of departure.

Security

Flank protection was achieved initially by laying smoke on the landward flank and later by
deploying 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade to the northwest of the town to cut off German
reinforcements.

Superiority of Fires

The Canadians achieved superiority in artillery, armour and divisional anti-tank weapons
(the formidable 17 Pounders).

3-24
Exploit Manoeuvre

The Germans had constructed the town’s defences to channel the attacking forces up the
main thoroughfare into several squares which were to be killing zones. Once this was
identified, the Canadian infantry then outflanked these defences by manoeuvring through
buildings.

Concentrate Effects

The Canadian’s combined use of direct fire and vertical envelopment proved very effective.

Further Reading

Zuehlke, M, Ortona: Canada's epic World War II battle. (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre
1999)

3-25
 DELIBERATE ATTACK
THE BATTLE FOR PORT STANLEY, 11-14 JUNE 1982

In 1982 Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. The British government took the decision
that if diplomatic means could not achieve the unconditional withdrawal of Argentine forces,
then military force would be used to compel their expulsion. Diplomacy failed, and in May
1982 British ground forces landed on East Falkland.

The British breakout from their beachhead at San Carlos was dominated by the capture of
Goose Green by 2 PARA on 28-29 May. At the same time, 3 PARA and 45 Cdo thrust
eastwards across the interior of East Falkland to close in on the main Argentinian defences
around Port Stanley. The Argentinian commander, General Menendez, was convinced that
the attack on Goose Green was a deception. He believed that the British would mount an
amphibious assault on Port Stanley and had therefore deployed the majority of his 10,000
troops in defensive positions on the surrounding high ground. His plan was to make the
advancing British fight attritional battles in worsening wintry conditions, forcing the British to
negotiate as casualties mounted.

The Argentinians underestimated the speed of the British advance. By the end of May, 3
PARA and 45 Cdo had covered much ground unopposed and had established themselves
close to the high ground north of Port Stanley. More significantly, elements of Special
Forces (SF) and 42 Cdo had been lifted by helicopter to occupy the summit of Mount Kent -
a short distance from Port Stanley. By 5 June the remainder of 42 Cdo had moved onto
Mount Challenger and British reinforcements consisting of the whole of 5 Infantry Brigade,
had opened up the southern route through Fitzroy and Bluff Cove. By 11 June, an arc of
British troops were poised to attack the main enemy positions. In support were 5 batteries
each with 6 x 105mm light guns, with 1,200 rounds per gun. Their flanks were protected by
Royal Navy warships.

Major General Jeremy Moore, commander of the British Land Forces, planned a two phase

3-26
assault to seize the hills to the east of Mount Kent and to force the Argentinians to fall back
on Port Stanley. On the night of 11/12 June, 42 Cdo began the offensive by manoeuvring
around Mount Harriet, approaching the defenders from the East and hitting the enemy from
their rear. The position was captured after systematic trench to trench fighting.
Concurrently, 45 Cdo seized Two Sisters, slightly to the North. However, it was 3 PARA
further to the north on Mount Longdon who faced the worst fighting of the night. Losing the
advantage of surprise early in the attack, they went through a protracted close quarter
battle, which was finally resolved at dawn.

Major General Moore had intended to follow up immediately but was delayed until the
following night by the need to bring up more supplies. 2 Scots Guards approached Mount
Tumbledown silently. However, the Argentinians realised the British intentions and the
Scots Guards soon found themselves involved in close combat. Their objective was not
captured until dawn on the 14 June. 2 PARA cleared Wireless Ridge after an attack using
significant naval gunfire support, two field batteries, a machine gun platoon and the 76mm
guns from the Blues and Royals reconnaissance vehicles. Port Stanley was now exposed.
As 1/7 Gurkha Rifles took Mount William and the Welsh Guards, supported by attachments
from 40 Cdo, seized Sapper Hill, the Argentinians withdrew. By 2100 on 14 June, the
Argentinians had surrendered.

Surprise

The 42 Cdo insertion to the East of Mount Harriet completely surprised the enemy by
attacking from an unexpected direction. Their presence was only discovered when they
were within 100m of the Argentinians. However 3 PARA lost the element of surprise when
a soldier stepped on a mine during the advance to contact.

Security

Flank security was achieved by inshore patrols of naval warships.

Seizing of Key Terrain

The seizure of the mountains around Port Stanley achieved the key influence outcome of
persuading the Argentinian garrison to surrender.

Superiority of fires

The British forces were able to achieve superiority of fire power for the final offensive using
close air support, artillery and naval gunfire support as well as the organic firepower from
mortars and Milan. However, towards the end of the offensive ammunition stocks were
running dangerously low.

Exploit Manoeuvre

Argentinian cohesion and the will to fight were steadily drained by the high tempo and
success of the rapid British manoeuvring.

Concentrate Effects

The combined, concurrent use of joint direct fire from close air support, artillery and naval

3-27
gun support and indirect fire assets on Wireless Ridge proved decisive.

Exploit Success

The defeat of the Argentinian forces on the mountains surrounding Port Stanley enabled a
rapid advance leading to the surrender of all Argentinian forces on the island

Further Reading
Hastings, M, Jenkins, S, The Battle for the Falklands. (New York: Norton.1984)
Middlebrook, M, Operation Corporate: The Story of the Falklands War, 1982, (London:
Penguin Books Ltd, 1985)

3-28
CHAPTER 3 SUMMARY SHEET: THE CONDUCT OF A GENERIC OFFENSIVE ACTION

1. BATTLE PREPARATION AND APPROACH 2. THE ASSAULT

1. Brigade reconnaissance 1. Brigade reconnaissance
secures the LD for the Fixing screens forward.
Force. It finds enemy
locations, hands over to the 2. The Fixing Force sets the
Fixing Force battlegroup and conditions for success of the
engages the enemy with Enveloping Force through a
OS. demonstration or feint. It
prepares to exploit into the
2. The Fixing Force enemy 2nd Echelon.
battlegroup advances to and
occupies its FUP and LD. 3. The Enveloping Force
defeats the enemy and
3. The Enveloping Force seizes objectives / vital
battlegroups advance to, ground.
secure and occupy their LD.
4. The Reserve battlegroup
4. The Reserve battlegroup remains prepared to assist
moves into position and the fixing action or to
prepares to support the reinforce the Enveloping
Fixing Force or Enveloping Force.
Force as necessary.

3. EXPLOITATION AND PURSUIT GENERIC BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT

1. Brigade reconnaissance 1. The Brigade’s boundaries
continues to screen forward. are RFLs.

2. The Fixing Force 2. Report Lines act as CFLs

penetrates into the enemy (on order).
Main Defensive Area and
prepares to exploit into the 3. CFLs S,T and U
enemy 2nd Echelon / (activated on order) assist in
Reserve. coordinating the action of
the Enveloping Force.
3. The Enveloping Force
defeats the enemy 2nd
Echelon and Reserves and
prepares to pursue within
limits of exploitation.

4. The Reserve battlegroup

prepares to reinforce the
Enveloping Force, to defeat
enemy 2nd Echelon /
Reserves, or to exploit (an
ideal task for AH).

3-A-1
OFFENSIVE ACTIONS: AIDE MEMOIRE
Purpose: To defeat the enemy through the use of Stages of the Attack: Types of Offensive Action Grouping in Offensive Actions
or threat of force. Battle Preparation: • Attack Deliberate/Hasty/ Reconnaissance
Principles: • Physical preparation of participating FEs. Counter/Spoiling • Critical to successful manoeuvre. Recce pull?
• Surprise Shaping: • Infiltration • Maintenance of momentum
• Security • Create / preserve conditions for a successful attack. • Exploitation • Exploitation
• Seize key terrain or targets • Influence perceptions of a range of audiences. • Pursuit • OPSEC
• Superiority of fires • Use of fires, manoeuvre, deception, information • Reconnaissance in Force Assault Force
• Exploit manoeuvre methods, • Demonstration • Type, structure and strength dependent on
• Concentrate effects KLE, cyber. • Ambush tasks and objectives size/capacity
• Plan to exploit success • Preliminary movement / deployment, log replen. • Breakout of Encircled Forces Security
• Simplicity The Approach: • Raid • Flank protection, base security, coverage of
• Forward passage of lines? • Feint gaps
Applying the Manoeuvrist Approach in • Security, concealment, attack formations. Forms of Manoeuvre • Fix by-passed en
Offensive Actions • Advance to contact? • Envelopment • Support units to the rear of attacking
• Understand context The Assault: • Double Envelopment echelons
• Seize and retain the initiative • Break In – once achieved, extend laterally. OS Main • Encirclement Reserve Force
• Influence perceptions Effort? • Turning Movement • Uncommitted force to deal with unexpected
• Break enemy cohesion and will through: surprise, • Fight Through – maintain pressure, bypassing? • Penetration • Maintain momentum and exploit success
pre-emption, dislocation, disruption, shock action Positioning of reserves. - Deep Penetration Echelon Force
and destruction, leading to collapse and Exploitation: - Multiple Penetration • Designated for a subsequent phase or
opportunities for exploitation. • Seizure of opportunity created by previous activity. - Combination of Multiple and phases
• Protect own will and cohesion • Consolidate objective – pass fresh troops through. Deep penetration • Unlike a reserve, an echelon force will have a
• Enhancements: simplicity, flexibility, tempo, • Speed essential – reduce enemy ability to react. • Infiltration mission
momentum, simultaneity. • Be ready to conduct pursuit or encirclement.

Planning Considerations Firepower (continued) Protection cont.

Command
• Consider all kinetic and non-kinetic means of achieving
influence including: fires, manoeuvre, posture, presence, profile,
deception and other special influence methods
• Boldness – exploit favourable situations
• Decentralise control – enable reaction to events
• Bde HQ – establish forward to facilitate C2 and comms
• Position of Commander – Main/Tac HQ
• Control measures - liaison
Information and Intelligence
• CCIRs: enemy - strengths, positions, capabilities, reserves,
intent
• Physical terrain – routes, obstacles, going
• Human terrain – as offensive transitions into stabilising
• Maintenance of IPE important as action develops
• Active management of STAP adjusted for threat, day, night and
weather
• EW – disclosure of information on insecure enemy channels
• Resource ME force elements with ISTAR assets
Firepower
• Use of kinetic and special influence methods appropriate to
target
• Consideration of negative second order effects on local
population, host nation and other actors.
• Collateral damage considerations
• Coord of guns, mors, air and avn
• Needs to be available across the entire attack frontage
• Needs to be able to switch to support ME if needed
• Rapid engagement – FSTs need to be forward
• BM – confusing FSCM picture likely as battle develops
• BDA.
• Prioritisation of targeting and fires required.
• Requirement for preparatory fire?
• Withhold OS to achieve surprise?
• Arty ammo plan
• EW – Jamming, neutralisation, deception. Focus on enemy
STA and C2 nodes
Manoeuvre
• Is air manoeuvre an option for part of the force?
• Engrs - route development. Prioritise allocation of Engr
manoeuvre support assets to BGs
• Effects – TURN, BLOCK, FIX, DISRUPT
• Obstacle crossing and breaching
• Sequencing of manoeuvre
• Movement control
• Firepower as an enabler – transient firepower effects
Protection
• Local air superiority as a minimum
• Establish AD priorities – assembly areas, approach routes,
flank protection, AMAs
• Allocation of flank security FEs
• Obstacle creation or enhancement to provide flank security
• Obstacle protection on the objective – effects required
• OPSEC - counter enemy intelligence acquisition
• Implementation of plausible, resourced deception plan
• Counter surveillance measures
• CBRN protection measures
• Measures to combat ECM fratricide
Sustainment
• Embed sustainment assets to maximise re-supply freedom
• Combat FEs carry maximum supplies at start
• Log - forward positioning of assets, flexible transport plans
• Prioritise ammunition and fuel
• Anticipate exploitation requirements including route selection
• ES – forward repair, forward positioning of spares,
eqpt denial authority
• Med – MEDEVAC plan, HSS plan to exploiting force
• Provost – CS role with forward combat FEs
• Route and traffic control, CPERS handling
Key Planning Yardsticks:
• Armd/Mech Bde attack frontage: 7 km maximum, 1km per
Armd Sqn in the Assault
• Bde Assembly Area 30km2. 250km2 including BSG
• Armd/Mech Bdes opposed rates of advance:
- Intense resistance, go – 600m per hour
- Intense resistance, slow go – 500m per hour
- Intense resistance, no go – 150m per hour
3-B-1
 CHAPTER 4

DEFENSIVE ACTIONS

0401. The aim of this chapter is to

explain brigade defensive actions. It will CONTENTS
Subject Page
consider the objectives, principles and
conduct of mobile and area defence Objectives and Principles of Defensive Actions 4-1
followed by an examination of delay. Defensive Actions in a Complex Environment –
The chapter will provide a short section The Manoeuvrist Approach 4-2
on the use of fixed tactical bases.
Mobile and Area Defence:
Mobile Defence 4-3
0402. Defensive actions achieve Area Defence 4-4
success by defeating or deterring a Stages of the Defence 4-8
threat, thereby setting the conditions for Planning Considerations 4-12
subsequent, usually offensive, tactical The Adversary Perspective 4-22
actions. The Manoeuvrist Approach is Delay:
as applicable to defensive actions as The Purpose and Principles of Delay 4-24
offensive actions. The Conduct of Delay 4-25
Planning Considerations 4-27
0403. A brigade may conduct a
Tactical Basing 4-34
defensive action due to strategic/ Vignette 4-35
operational direction, weakness relative
to the enemy, or to secure key or vital Annexes:
terrain. Regardless of the purpose, the A. Combined Arms Obstacle Integration 4-A-1
B. Control of Demolitions 4-B-1
brigade must always seek to retain the C. Generic Defensive Action Summary Sheet 4-C-1
initiative and launch offensive action D. Defensive Action Aide Memoire 4-D-1
when the opportunity permits; an
effective defensive action followed by a
counter attack has often proved decisive on the battlefield.

OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF DEFENSIVE ACTIONS

0404. The Objectives of Defensive Actions. The objectives of defensive actions are:

a. To gain time.

b. To increase the enemy’s vulnerability by forcing him to concentrate his forces.

c. To wear down his offensive capability.

d. To fix the enemy as a prelude to offensive operations elsewhere.

e. To retain key or vital ground.

f. To provide a secure environment from which to conduct Stabilising actions.

0405. The Principles of Defensive Actions. The Principles of Defensive Actions are:

a. Offensive Action.
4-1
 b. All Round Defence.

c. Depth.

d. Mutual Support.

e. Concealment and Deception.

DEFENSIVE ACTIONS IN A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT – THE MANOEUVRIST

APPROACH

0406. Brigade defensive actions are relevant across the mosaic of conflict; they could,
however, take many forms. A brigade may be required to counter a conventional force
seeking to conduct a linear type offensive into the brigade area which must be shaped and
defeated; alternatively, the brigade may have to defend against an asymmetric threat
operating within the brigade area; or it may face a combination of both. Irrespective of the
threat the Manoeuvrist Approach is critical to success. The brigade must protect critical
vulnerabilities, understand the enemy and context, fight to regain the initiative and break
enemy will and cohesion. Defensive actions do not negate the need to achieve shock and
surprise.

0407. The complexity of the operating environment will challenge the execution of brigade
defensive actions. Large, cluttered, urban areas will test the brigade’s ability to understand,
command and control. The presence and movement of civilians will hamper the brigade’s
redeployment at speed or its application of fires against enemy penetration. The nature of
an intervention may require the brigade to disperse forces to secure/re-assure partners,
host government and infrastructure which will create vulnerabilities and mitigate against
concentration of force. In complex terrain, the brigade cannot be strong, or even present,
everywhere and it will need to consider how situational awareness is maintained in areas
where forces are not physically located.

0408. Success will require imaginative and robust brigade defence plans, the integration of
find, fires and manoeuvre at the point of decision, information superiority and an inter-
connectivity and responsiveness across the brigade that allows combat power to be
accessed and applied decisively. All this will need to be achieved in an environment
exposed to enemy reconnaissance, the media, and social networking where deception and
concealment must be subtle yet creative.

0409. Influencing Perceptions. Brigade influence outcomes must defeat the adversary’s
cohesion and will to attack. Key is that the method of defence – battlegroup holding
operation, joint fires, targeting method – is appropriate to the target, the context and the
effect sought. The brigade will need to consider:

a. An appropriate understanding of the enemy and the context.

b. The adversary’s vulnerabilities and strengths.

c. The effects required to defeat the enemy’s offensive spirit.

4-2
 d. The appropriate kinetic and non-kinetic targeting methods.

e. How to exploit opportunity (physical exploitation by manoeuvre through to

messaging to dominate the information space).

f. How to manage the negative consequences of the defence, for example,

collateral damage.

g. How to sustain own legitimacy, will and cohesion and undermine that of the
adversary through:

(1) Re-assurance of local population.

(2) Re-assurance of host government.

(3) Where appropriate, re-assurance of own government and domestic

population.

(4) Where appropriate, re-assurance of international opinion.

MOBILE AND AREA DEFENCE

0410. There are three principal types of defensive action: mobile defence, area defence
(with combinations of both) and delay. The type of defence employed will be dependent on
the circumstances and the mission; in many defensive actions, a combination of mobile and
area defence will be required in order to defeat the enemy.

MOBILE DEFENCE

0411. Purpose. Mobile defence seeks to defeat an enemy’s attack through manoeuvre
and offensive action. It combines a fixing force, that denies the enemy freedom of
manoeuvre, and a striking force that counter-attacks him. The balance between these two
forces depends upon the mission, the ground and relative capabilities. A mobile defence
may be selected by design: it may play to the brigade’s strengths and exploit the potency of
its striking capability; it may, however, be forced on the brigade by necessity in that the
brigade may lack the combat power to dominate an extensive area through area defence.

0412. Conduct of Mobile Defence.

a. Fixing Force.

(1) Concept of Operations. In mobile defence, the fixing force must have the
ISTAR, combat power and the mobility to find the enemy, draw him in and
remain in contact without becoming overwhelmed before the strike is launched.
In its engagement, the fixing force will seek to degrade the enemy, shape his
movement and reduce his ability to anticipate and respond to the strike by
destroying reconnaissance and command and control assets.

(2) Composition. In close terrain, the fixing force could be based around an
armoured infantry battlegroup augmented with manoeuvre support for
4-3
 mobility/counter mobility and joint fires. In more open terrain, the fixing
engagement may need to be more mobile and the force package might contain
armour and reconnaissance elements.

b. Striking Force.

(1) Concept of Operations. The purpose of the strike force is to destroy or

defeat the enemy through offensive action. It is the decisive act. It will need to
be cued onto the appropriate point in the enemy’s mass. The strike should be
part of offensive action throughout the depth of the enemy's force; this depth may
be in the order of 25-50km, beyond the brigade area of operations and requiring
close integration with the divisional battle.

(2) Composition. The strike force must contain sufficient combat power to
prevail and the brigade commander will need to economise combat power
elsewhere to concentrate it at the point of decision. The strike may not
overwhelm the enemy in a single blow and the brigade should be prepared to
conduct a series of ‘find-fix-strike and exploits’ to work through the enemy mass
or complex terrain. The strike force is likely to be based around an armoured
battlegroup with armoured infantry for close terrain, supported by manoeuvre
support and joint fires. It will require ground reconnaissance and ISTAR to find
the enemy, to reacquire enemy forces as necessary and to respond to enemy
countermoves. If available, attack aviation would prove a potent element of the
strike force.

0413. Considerations. In mobile defence, the brigade will seek to decisively defeat an
attacking enemy. The brigade should exploit the Manoeuvrist Approach, masking its
dispositions and intent, attacking unexpectedly with great strength, supported by integrated
fires, against an enemy distracted and dislocated by the fixing force. Successfully delivered
it will achieve overwhelming shock and surprise. Key considerations are:

a. That the brigade fixing force has sufficient combat power to contain the enemy;

b. That the brigade has sufficient understanding to select the appropriate point
and time of committal for the strike;

c. That the brigade has sufficient freedom of movement to deliver the strike force
to its target;

d. That the brigade strike force has sufficient combat power to defeat the enemy
array and turn strike to exploit.

0414. The conduct of a Mobile Defence is illustrated in the summary sheet at Annex C.

AREA DEFENCE

0415. Purpose. The purpose of an area defence is to secure ground and deny it to the
enemy. It combines a covering force to find the enemy and commence his early
dislocation, a ground focused defence matrix (main defensive position) to defeat him in
depth and local reserves to counterattack any penetration and exploit opportunity. Unlike a
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mobile defence, the counter attack may not be the single decisive act and success may lie
in the sustained attrition of the enemy throughout his depth.

0416. Conduct of Area Defence.

a. Covering Force.

(1) Concept of Operations. The brigade covering force will seek to

understand the enemy’s purpose and deceive him, shape his movement, and
dislocate his forces. Dependent on relative strengths and ground, the covering
force may force the enemy to prematurely deploy to attack, separate his infantry
from armour, strike his command and control assets, and undermine his will and
cohesion. The covering force will be most effective if it is afforded operating
depth. Its efforts must be closely integrated with the divisional deep battle and
its battle handover to the main defensive position carefully coordinated.

(2) Composition. The covering force could be based on the reconnaissance

regiment augmented with counter mobility assets, joint fires and ISTAR. Air and
aviation are likely to be of great utility. Dependent on the ground and context,
armour and armoured infantry could be task organised to the covering force,
fighting a delay battle from a series of secondary or alternate positions. ISTAR
and joint fires should be used to identify and strike enemy groupings and key
assets in depth.

b. Main Defensive Area - Area Defence Force.

(1) Concept of Operations. The area defence force will be deployed to hold
ground, using a matrix of defensive positions and small mobile reserves.
Defensive positions should be sited to dominate key and vital ground. They will
channel, block or defeat enemy movement by fire or counter attack. Area
defence positions should be located in sufficient strength, and with mutual
support, to prevent enemy penetration or their defeat in detail.

(2) Composition. Area defence forces will be based on armoured infantry or

armoured battlegroups. Battlegroups will be task organised with: ISTAR to take
up the battle from the covering force and find enemy penetrations; manoeuvre
support for mobility/counter mobility; joint fires to break up target arrays and
sufficient reserves to defeat enemy breakthroughs and exploit enemy reverses.

c. Reserves.

(1) Concept of Operations. Reserves may be held at brigade level and/or

within the area defence battlegroups. Their purpose is to defeat any enemy
breakthrough and counter attack to regain the initiative or to exploit opportunity.
Counter attack options should be considered, planned and rehearsed before
battle but may need to be launched rapidly to counter unforeseen threats once
the engagement commences. Counter attacks may lack a comprehensive
understanding of the enemy or the time to be fully balanced. High tempo, a
willingness to seize the initiative when the opportunity arises, and the rapid
application of force will be key to achieving shock and surprise.
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 (2) Composition. Reserves are likely to be organic to the area defence
battlegroups. They may be based on groupings of armoured infantry platoons or
armoured troops and are unlikely to exceed sub-unit strength. They could be
augmented by combat engineering and their counterattack should be supported
by joint fires. Where availability and endurance permits, attack aviation could
provide a potent counter attack force. Given the responsive nature of the
reserves role and their limited combat power, additional counter attack forces
may have to be generated from across the defensive force at short notice as the
battle develops.

0417. Considerations. Key considerations of the area defence are:

a. Concentration of Force versus Economy of Effort. An area defence

concentrates brigade combat power in specified defensive positions that are key or
vital to the mission; it requires the brigade to economise in other parts of its area of
operations. This may create undefended or weakly defended space in which enemy
forces can manoeuvre and penetrate. Consideration needs to be given to how this
space can be understood and enemy forces within it shaped and struck. This will be
particularly challenging in complex terrain which may mask enemy movement and
frustrate the ability of strike assets to prosecute targets within it.

b. Retaining the Initiative. An area defence risks the enemy retaining the
initiative, fixing the defensive positions and defeating them in detail. A hybrid
opponent may seek to mass rapidly against an isolated defensive position, or
asymmetrically attack it, without exposing his forces to a lengthy approach in which
they can be struck. He may also seek to interdict the freedom of movement of the
brigade covering force and reserves, blocking manoeuvre routes in depth.
Notwithstanding its ground focus, the brigade area defence plan must exploit all
opportunities – physical and cognitive – to deceive and frustrate the enemy, expose
his vulnerabilities and strike them, vigorously exploiting any enemy setbacks.

0418. Planning Yardsticks. To illustrate the scale of a brigade defensive action example
planning yardsticks are given below. Full planning data is contained in the Staff Officers
Handbook.

a. Frontage. A brigade in defence can be in the region of 15km and to a depth of

25km depending on the situation, environment and the force density required for the
mission. A brigade delay action may take place across a frontage of 30km.

b. Reach. The reach of brigade fires to prosecute depth targets and support the
defence or delay is in the order of 20km. Divisional assets and air can strike/shape
beyond the brigade area of operations.

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 AREA DEFENCE – THE APPROACH

Fig 4-1 Area Defence – Phase 1

Ground is held absorbing the enemy into a framework of static mutually supporting positions.
Emphasis on the retention of terrain. Area defence will not necessarily destroy the enemy and will
require a subsequent strike action. Area defence may be part of a larger overall mobile defence or
delaying action. Some degree of enemy penetration should be expected.

1. Covering Force: Deployed to observe, engage delay and deceive the enemy. Covering force
will break clean, withdraw through or around the main defensive and may form a mobile reserve for
subsequent employment.

2. Main Defensive Area: The area where the main defensive battle will be fought. Most of the
defending force will be deployed to hold ground with the commander seeking to destroy the enemy
by fires and local counter attacks.

3. Mobile Reserve: Gives the commander freedom of action to deal with anticipated and
unexpected developments by reinforcing, blocking and counter attacking.

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 AREA DEFENCE – THE BLOCK AND COUNTER ATTACK

Fig 4-2 Area Defence – Phase 2

The enemy is drawn into the main defensive framework where he is engaged by a combination of
interlocking fires from the battle group defensive positions and the counter attack action of the
mobile reserve.

MOBILE AND AREA DEFENCE: STAGES OF THE DEFENCE

0419. Defence can be divided into four distinct, but closely related, stages:

a. Shaping and battle preparation.

b. Approach.

c. Block.

d. Counter attack.

0420. Shaping and Battle Preparation.

a. The commander and staff will continue to plan the operation while the brigade
shapes the environment and influences the enemy. The brigade must take full
advantage of the time available to prepare the defence, possibly increasing the time
available by using some of the force to delay the enemy while defensive positions
are prepared. Preparations should take place concurrently at all levels and include:

(1) Reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance.

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 (2) Shaping the environment using terrain and man-made obstacles.

(3) Establishing liaison between flanking and subordinate formations.

(4) Continuous refinement of the defensive plan through war-gaming.

(5) Rehearsals if time permits.

b. The shaping of the environment includes influencing key groups and

individuals who may be vital to the compliance and assurance of the local
population. This can be achieved by conducting a range of non-lethal activities
involving posture, presence and profile, as well as information activities and Key
Leader Engagement (KLE).

c. Counter ISTAR. Successful defensive action requires the destruction or

neutralisation of enemy ISTAR capability (for example by the use of Close Air
Defence (CAD) against Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)), deception, or the use of
EW). Plans should be made for its early destruction throughout the battlespace
while avoiding the premature disclosure of key elements of the defensive position.
Success against enemy ISTAR will help to maintain the security of reserves, achieve
surprise in offensive action, and protect command and logistic infrastructures.
Measures that can be taken against enemy ISTAR include:

(1) A screen or guard force forward of the Main Defensive Area (MDA) to
destroy, neutralise or disrupt enemy ISTAR.

(2) Effective camouflage and deception (false fronts and dummy positions)
are particularly important once enemy ISTAR has achieved a degree of
penetration. Special care needs to be taken to protect the security of
formation reserves and high value targets.

(3) An aggressive patrol programme should find, identify and destroy

enemy reconnaissance.

(4) Offensive action against enemy EW/SIGINT.

(5) Effective AD to destroy enemy UAS

d. Counter Intelligence. Counter Intelligence (CI) involves those activities

concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile
intelligence organisations, or by individuals engaging in a range of activities that are
counter to our interests. CI investigations are carried out by the CI Section of the
Brigade Military Intelligence Company. Threats could range from specialist
intelligence through to disaffected indigenous forces or locally employed civilians.

e. Operations in Depth. If an enemy commander has freedom to use his

supporting echelons, it may be possible for him to deploy sufficient combat power to
achieve superiority at the point of contact and overcome the most determined
defence. The brigade will need to prevent the enemy from massing combat power

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 on forward positions by attacking the enemy early, in depth and focussing on
subsequent echelons.

f. Siting. Defensive positions should be chosen with care. They should

possess a natural strength, sited on reverse slopes or, in complex terrain, locations
offering cover from direct enemy observation and fire. The defender should avoid
obvious features and positions that are predictable and easy to engage. Defended
positions should be regarded as a firm base from which the local area is dominated
by aggressive patrolling, ISTAR and direct fire. Such positions provide pivots for
mobile forces operating between them. Positions should be sited ‘2 down’ in order to
enable the coordination required to conduct a defensive action, particularly an area
defence. This means the brigade commander needs to site down to company level.

g. Strong Points. Consideration needs to be given to the creation of strong

points. A strong point is a fortified defensive position and a concentration of combat
power that cannot be easily overrun or bypassed without the expenditure of much
time and force. It will be located on terrain critical to the defensive operation or that
which must be denied to the enemy.

h. Obstacles. The skilful use of natural and man made obstacles will increase
the chance of success in either mobile or area defence. The purpose of obstacles is
to enhance the commander’s plans by canalising the enemy and denying him the
freedom of manoeuvre he requires to gain and maintain the initiative. Key principles
are:

(1) Obstacles should be planned at the highest level but executed at the
lowest level.

(2) Obstacles contribute to the commander’s chosen effect. They must not
hinder friendly force manoeuvre.

(3) Obstacles must be covered by observation and fire.

0421. The Approach.

a. During the approach, the brigade commander should aim to blind, harass and
delay the enemy as far forward as possible using a mobile covering force, to give
depth to the defence. Maximum destruction should be inflicted on the enemy so that
he is dislocated when he arrives at the MDA. The brigade should ensure that it does
not lose contact with the enemy and layered find assets will need to be positioned in
depth to maintain situational awareness; redundancy will be required to compensate
for ISTAR assets lost during the enemy’s advance.

b. Whilst the brigade intent will be to shape enemy movement to conform to its
defensive plan, the brigade must be alert to early indicators that it has failed to
achieve this. The timely committal of counter attacks, spoiling attacks and fires will
be essential to counter an enemy that is threatening to break through, turn or defeat
a brigade defence.

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 c. In certain circumstances, a brigade may act as the covering force for a division.
The brigade must understand how the covering force will relate to the main defensive
battle and how it will shape the actions of the higher formation. For example, if a
covering force causes too much attrition it may cause the enemy to stop and defend
short of the defensive area, potentially jeopardising a subsequent strike and
undermining the defensive plan.

0422. The Block.

a. General. Blocking the attacker’s thrust is critical to defensive action and

essential to regaining the initiative. The aim of the block is to check the enemy
advance with a combination of defensive positions, obstacles and mobile reserves.

b. Battle Handover. The covering force will need to withdraw through gaps in the
main defensive position which must be controlled, guarded and subsequently denied
to the enemy. The brigade must ensure that it has the ISTAR coverage and fires in
depth to assist the covering force break clean and facilitate the main defensive
position to take up the battle. Well understood and robust battlespace management
will be essential at this critical and potentially confusing point in the battle.

c. Once the covering force has completed its rearward passage of lines and
handover of the battle to the main defence force, the brigade commander should
consider its subsequent employment. The covering force is unlikely to be ready for
commitment immediately; therefore it may be designated as the reserve once it has
been reconstituted.

d. Conduct of the Block. The enemy is likely to concentrate his attack on one or
more axes, organising his attack in depth and reinforcing success. An enemy with
motivation, combat power and the initiative may significantly penetrate the defensive
area. In this event, the defence must respond rapidly to halt leading echelons and
delay and disrupt follow-on echelons, prior to defeating them. Battlegroup and sub-
unit commanders, isolated by fire and the passage of the enemy, should continue to
execute their missions in accordance with the brigade commander’s intent, seeking
to counter-attack where possible.

0423. The Counter-Attack.

a. General. Depending on the relative strength of the enemy and the depth of his
assault, the attack may culminate, pause or expose a vulnerability; this may the
moment that the defence, in part or whole, transitions to offensive action. This is a
crucial command decision as reserves will be committed to battle.

b. Conduct. A counter-attack largely follows the conduct of the offence.

However:

(1) The plan must be simple and quick to execute. Forces for this task
may be held in depth or may have to be drawn rapidly from other less
committed areas of the defence.

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 (2) Task organised groups should be committed from the line of march,
avoiding the risk of the enemy identifying the assembling force.

(3) The counter-attack should be supported by joint fires that are targeted
against the enemy’s key capabilities, both in the close and deep battle. The
intent should be to sever and defeat the enemy’s leading elements, which
may have achieved some degree of penetration, from their main body at a
time when they are most vulnerable. Once achieved, the success must be
exploited in depth, supported by ISTAR and joint fires, including Close Air
Support (CAS) and where available Attack Helicopters (AH).

(4) Logistic arrangements for the defence must include the provision of
sufficient ammunition and fuel to support counter-attacks. The ability to
exploit from a successful counter attack to a more general offensive will be
dependent in part on logistic agility and capability to support and maintain a
rapid transition.

(5) Irrespective of pre-planning and rehearsal, the counter attack is likely

to be launched into an uncertain and rapidly developing situation. Intelligence
may be less than comprehensive, and combat power degraded. Timeliness
and resolve may be the critical factors for success. Given the ebb and flow of
battle, the brigade must be able to generate additional reserves and launch
potent counter attack irrespective of enemy action.

c. Spoiling attacks. A reserve may be tasked to conduct a spoiling attack to

prevent or delay an enemy offensive action. Spoiling attacks are normally launched
against enemy forces forming or assembling for an attack and can be carried out by
ground combat forces, fire support, aviation or a combination of all three. Spoiling
attacks are usually conducted against opportunity targets with the objective of
destroying enemy personnel and equipment rather than securing terrain. They
should not be conducted if the loss or destruction of the force jeopardises the ability
of the reserve to accomplish its primary defensive mission. Mobility of the force
available for the spoiling attack should be equal to or exceed that of the enemy force.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

COMMAND

0424. General. The commander must create a situation that forces the attacker to depart
from his plans. This applies to the point of contact and wherever the enemy can be
engaged throughout the depth of the area of operations. The inculcation of an offensive
spirit, self-confidence and effective risk taking across the force will be essential.

0425. Synchronisation and Integration. Defensive actions require the integration and
synchronisation of assets to maximise the combat power of the brigade. The commander
will designate the Main Effort; in mobile defence this will be the striking force and in area
defence it will be the defence covering the enemy’s main avenue of approach.

0426. Familiarity with Area of Operations. The commander must seek to gain every
advantage offered by the environment in which his forces must operate. Geo and
4-12
intelligence staff should identify through Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE)
the key features that could be used by friendly or enemy forces. The commander’s arms
advisors and subordinate commanders should, at the very least, recce any key terrain and
vital ground.

0427. Mobile Defence. In mobile defence, command of the striking force should lie with
the strike mission commander with control retained by the brigade commander. The
brigade commander must provide the striking force commander with details of the decisive
point, objective or engagement area(s) that show where he intends the striking force to
destroy enemy capability. He should also provide details of the anticipated size and
composition of the penetrating enemy force. A reserve should also be retained under the
control of the brigade commander.

0428. Area Defence. In area defence, battlegroup commanders will normally exercise a
greater degree of autonomy than in a mobile defence. Battlegroup commanders will fight
their engagements within their own areas of operation while the brigade commander retains
a reserve to assist the most threatened area or strike the enemy if the opportunity arises.

0429. Coordination.

a. Cohesion is critical in successful defensive actions. The defence has to be

planned as a whole and carefully coordinated to maximise the effectiveness of
individual force elements; this is why commanders site defensive positions two levels
down; i.e. the brigade commander sites company positions. Failure of the defence
frequently coincides with a loss of cohesion. To achieve a breakthrough, the enemy
will try to attack along a defender's boundaries. Cohesion between neighbouring
units is key, further complicated if they are shared by different nations. Tasking of
reserves should include missions to restore or maintain cohesion along boundaries.
Maximum coordination is achieved and maintained by:

(1) An understanding of the superior commander’s intent and concept of

operations.

(2) An understanding of responsibilities between flanking formations and

the envisaged concept for the conduct of the defence in their areas.

(3) Care in selection of boundaries so that these do not sit on likely enemy
axes of advance or increase the problem of coordination.

(4) Selection of coordination points astride the boundary.

(5) Exchange of information and intelligence.

(6) Exchange of liaison teams.

(7) Planning for mutual support.

b. Commanders at every level must ensure that the brigade defensive plan is
properly coordinated with flanking units as well as within their own command. This

4-13
 coordination is best done by liaison on the ground. The following aspects need
coordination:

(1) Screens, guards and ISTAR arrangements.

(2) Obstacle and demolition plans.

(3) Defensive fire and illumination plans.

(4) Air defence.

(5) Options for mutually supporting reserves.

(6) Boundaries.

(7) Communications.

(8) Routes and lines of communication; both planned and reserve options.

(9) Sustainment.
0430. Headquarters.

a. In a defensive action, the brigade main headquarters is likely to be located

towards the rear of the brigade area. The commander may deploy his tactical
headquarters forward, to personally influence and direct operations, or he may fight
the battle from main headquarters where situational awareness and understanding is
greater.

b. Main headquarters should focus on monitoring progress, forwarding information

and support requests, coordinating supporting units and planning for future
operations. Rear operations headquarters (HQ BSG or the LSR) and the DCOS in
the brigade main headquarters should anticipate future sustainment requirements
and ensure that the logistic support can sustain an intense defensive battle and is
able to support a transition to the offensive.

c. In defence, headquarters are likely to be more static than in the offence. They
should be located in hardened areas or protective terrain in order to reduce their
physical and electronic signatures. Headquarters must be able to relocate rapidly
and frequently in order to survive; an alternate headquarters should be ready to take
over the battle at any time.

0431. Communications. Good communications are prerequisites for a successful

defence. Electronic emissions prejudice security and should be minimised before
engagement starts within the constraints of the system, except for the purpose of
deception.

0432. Battlespace Management. In defensive actions, Battlespace Management (BM) is

crucial and must be dynamically applied in the various phases of the battle.

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0433. Consideration must be given to other divisional level assets that may be operating in
the brigade’s battlespace. This will include significant real estate given over to Artillery
Manoeuvre Areas (AMA) and congestion on routes resupplying them. Routes may have to
be maintained to enable rearward passage of lines, and assembly areas may need to be
provided for divisional combat support assets.

0434. Fire Support Co-ordination Measures (FSCM) form a key part of BM in defensive
actions. FSCM involves measures for the covering force action, the main defensive battle,
striking the enemy, as well as the transition into exploitation and pursuit. As the battle
undergoes this transition, so will the BM picture need to develop. BM measures in a
defensive action are illustrated in the summary sheet at page 4-D-1.

INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

0435. Accurate intelligence is essential to success. Detailed IPE and threat integration
should identify likely enemy routes of advance and courses of action. In contrast with
intelligence supporting the offence, the intelligence picture in defence will generally be more
accurate. Complete understanding of the enemy’s intentions is unlikely, so it is vital to
continue to acquire information and intelligence as the battle develops, and to continuously
review any intelligence assessment. The Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
(CCIR) should include the enemy’s:

a. Axis of advance.

b. Strengths.

c. Dispositions.

d. Likely intentions.

e. Identification and location of key equipment, units, personnel and reserves.

0436. The brigade will need to layer and integrate its ISTAR coverage; this may combine
reconnaissance forces, EW, HUMINT, and static surveillance systems (mast mounted
cameras through to aerostats).

FIREPOWER

0437. General. The effectiveness of the defence is reliant on targeted, integrated and
planned fires in order to have maximum effect at the right time and place, making use of all
available target acquisition systems and with the relevant BM measures in place. Offensive
support considerations include:

a. Engage the enemy early to disrupt the cohesion of his attack, reduce his
information gathering capability and his ability to mass combat power.

b. Screen friendly movements.

c. Integrate fires with the obstacle plan.

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0438. Firepower should be concentrated to support the main effort:

a. Mobile Defence. The main effort in mobile defence will be the striking force.
If the striking force is operating beyond artillery range, the commander must move
artillery forward, incorporate it into the striking force or use a different joint fires
asset, such as precision fires or air delivered munitions. Joint fires assets should be
used to offset any lack of manoeuvre capability in the striking force and must be able
to rapidly transfer fire support from the fixing force to the striking force.

b. Area Defence. In area defence, fire support is likely to be concentrated on

supporting that part of the defence covering the enemy’s main avenue of approach.

0439. Components of Offensive Support.

a. Artillery. Artillery is a powerful weapon in slowing and neutralising an enemy

attack. In defence artillery can:

(1) Shape the battlefield and the enemy.

(2) Attack enemy forces in depth before they are committed to battle.

(3) Reinforce the main effort.

(4) More specific tasks include:

(a) Separate attacking enemy armour from dismounted infantry.

(b) Attack enemy artillery and forward air defence elements.

(c) Attack enemy engineer assets if he must cross obstacles.

(d) Cover barriers, gaps and open areas.

(e) Neutralise or isolate enemy forces that have penetrated the

defensive area and impede the movement of enemy reserves.

b. Mortars. Mortars should be integrated into the defensive fire plan, normally in
direct support of the main defensive force. They are particularly effective in providing
smoke and for use against close targets.

c. Air. Support to defensive actions is similar to that required to support offensive

actions. Air is most effective when targeted against enemy forces concentrated in
depth preparing for an attack, or advancing along lines of communication. Close air
support may be the only means of providing the level of fire support needed to
counter strong enemy attacks.

d. Aviation. Attack aviation provides commanders with highly mobile, flexible and
precise combat power, either as combat support to the striking force, or as a striking
force in its own right. Attack aviation can also be used as a mobile reserve, where its
speed and agility will enable it to fulfil a range of tasks which include counter
4-16
 penetration, the provision of reinforcing fires, plugging gaps in the MDA and
exploiting success both in the covering force area and in depth. In an air manoeuvre
capacity, attack aviation battlegroups may manoeuvre and strike decisively on an
exposed enemy or one written down by the ground defensive battle.

e. Electronic Warfare (EW). The defending force may be able to employ EW

resources to disrupt and confuse the advancing enemy, for example jamming and
deception against reconnaissance elements, command and fire control nets.

MANOEUVRE

0440. Mobility and Counter Mobility. The covering force, strike or counter strike element
of a defensive action will require manoeuvre. By manoeuvring, the commander can
concentrate combat power, creating a favourable force ratio in order to defeat the enemy.
By combining movement with fire, defending forces are able to make the best use of ground
and cause attrition on the enemy while avoiding destruction by enemy fire. It follows that
mobility and counter mobility are key aspects of both area and mobile defence. Detailed
consideration should be given to ensuring that while friendly forces (reserves or the striking
force) are able to move around freely, enemy mobility is restricted, his momentum slowed
and he is channelled into the areas chosen by the commander as part of the defensive
plan.

0441. Combined Arms Obstacle Integration. Effective use of terrain to support the
commander’s plan may require the creation and enhancement of man made and natural
obstacles. The process of integrating such obstacles, with observation and fires is known
as Combined Arms Obstacle Integration (CAOI), the details of which are in Annex A.

0442. Reserved Demolitions. Critical to the conduct of the defensive battle may be the
use of reserved demolitions. These allow movement of friendly forces over obstacles which
can then be denied to the enemy at a time of the commander’s choosing. A reserved
demolition may be a bridge prepared for destruction, a lane through a minefield or a defile
prepared for explosive demolition or closure. Friendly forces can use the crossing at will,
but when appropraite can swiftly destroy it and deny it to the enemy. This allows the
commander to place his forces in a position of advantage relative to the enemy. Training
commanders, staff and troops in the employment of the reserved demolition is essential, as
failure to execute the demolition correctly can be catastrophic for friendly forces and
subsequent stabilising actions. Guidance on reserved demolitions is at Annex B to this
Chapter.

PROTECTION

0443. General. Protection preserves the fighting potential of a force against an attacker
who, at least initially, is likely to have the initiative. In defensive actions protection
considerations include:

a. Mutual support.

b. All round defence.

c. Use of terrain.
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0444. Use of Engineers. There will seldom be sufficient engineer resources to meet
demand, and the commander must therefore set priorities. Engineers should be task
organised, with elements grouped with the brigade reconnaissance elements, others
integrated with manoeuvre forces, supporting sustainment or allocated to route
improvement. The latter includes replacing close support bridges with logistic bridges,
expanding obstacle breaches, and other tasks 1 to support the whole force. Engineering is
manpower, equipment and materiel intensive. Consideration must be given to providing
sufficient time and lift to position the necessary resources. In a mobile defence the first
priority is likely to be on mobility, followed by counter mobility operations. Obstacle plans
must be coherent between adjacent formations and units to ensure that enemy forces are
not deflected onto areas of weakness in the defence which could be exploited or expose
adjacent formations to attack from unexpected directions. Key engineer tasks cover
counter-mobility, mobility and survivability:

a. Counter-Mobility Tasks. Engineers can undertake a variety of counter-

mobility tasks during defensive operations. These include:

(1) Preparing barriers, including minefields, route denial and wiring to

restrict the enemy’s mobility and cause him casualties. In combination with
combat forces they should contribute decisively to reducing the enemy’s
offensive potential.

(2) Demolitions.

(3) Occupying and controlling terrain or chokepoints that dominate likely

enemy avenues of approach.

(4) Improving natural obstacles and denying routes.

b. Mobility Tasks. During preparations for defensive operations, engineers will

recce, improve and open routes for use during battle. GS engineers will undertake
route opening and maintenance, allowing the passage of a unit or formation,
construct CPERS holding areas and Displaced Persons (DP)/refugee camps, as well
as maintain crossing sites once secured by F echelons. Engineers will also conduct
area support operations such as EOD, search and the provision of power and water.
During the main defensive battle , mobility tasks include:

(1) Maintenance and improvement of routes as the defensive position is

subjected to fire from the enemy. The deployment of assault bridging and
track-way. Engineer heavy equipment may be necessary.

(2) Maintaining the mobility of a delaying force by improving and

maintaining routes in order that it can avoid decisive engagement. This may
include the selection and preparation of water crossing sites, gap crossing,

1
Life support (accommodation, water etc), making safe damaged structures, protective structures, support to
influence operations, reconstruction and development, etc.

4-18
 route development, obstacle clearance, search and counter mine / IED
operations.

(3) Engineers will be required in support of offensive operations to

overcome obstacles produced by the enemy. Dismounted close combat will
require specialist engineer support, particularly for movement through
buildings and the rapid removal of booby traps, mines and IEDs.

(4) Reconnaissance of routes and positions.

(5) Improving existing route and traffic flow.

c. Survivability. Engineers will need to advise and help with the preparation of
defensive positions and clearance of fields of fire (particularly in built up areas). In
delaying operations, forces will move frequently and therefore have little time to
prepare extensive field fortifications. If possible, a number of alternative positions on
successive lines should be prepared. Engineer assistance will increase the number
of positions that can be prepared. The avoidance of detection and destruction will
require frequent movement and rapid digging. Survivability can be enhanced by the
use of concealment, deception, dispersion and fortification. Engineer force
protection tasks include:

(1) Field Fortifications. The use of plant to assist in the preparation and
construction of fortifications such as trenches, command post shelters,
artillery fire positions and anti-tank weapon and armoured vehicle positions.

(2) Protection of Combat Supplies. Combat supplies in particular should

be protected against blast, fragments, incendiaries and CBRN contamination.
By giving advice on the selection of the most suitable storage sites, the need
for engineer support can be considerably reduced.

(3) Camouflage, Concealment and Deception. Major positions, facilities

and operational sites may require special camouflage stores and measures
provided by engineers. Deception measures may include camouflage,
decoys and the construction of dummy positions which must be carefully
planned and coordinated within the framework of the tactical plan and real
positions.

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 PREPARATION FOR DEFENCE

‘Hezbollah’s robust and hardened defences were the result of six years of diligent work,
beginning with the Israeli withdrawal from the region in 2000. Many of the command
bunkers designed and built by Hezbollah engineers were fortified, and a few were even
air-conditioned. The digging of the arsenals over the previous years had been
accompanied by a programme of deception, with some bunkers being constructed in the
open and often under the eyes of Israeli drone vehicles or Lebanese citizens with close
ties to the Israelis. With few exceptions, these bunkers were decoys. The building of
other bunkers went forward in areas kept hidden from the Lebanese population. The
most important command bunkers and weapons-arsenal bunkers were dug deeply into
Lebanon’s rocky hills, to a depth of 40 metres.’ 2

0445. OPSEC. OPSEC is managed by G3 Ops who analyse the commander’s concept of
operations to determine the essential elements of information to be protected from
exploitation by enemy intelligence.

a. Deception. The commander should use deception to influence the enemy’s

perception. By using false fronts, concealment, dummy positions and electronic
warfare, the enemy can be given a false impression of the exact location of the main
defensive positions and friendly forces, inducing him to waste effort and resources in
the wrong place. Deception can be used to divert the enemy's attention from the
true direction and timing of counter attacks, causing him to deploy his reserves away
from positions where they could influence the battle. Deception is especially
important once enemy reconnaissance has achieved a degree of penetration.
Special care needs to be taken to protect the security of reserves and targets of high
value. Deception must be resourced and sufficient forces should be allocated to
deception operations to make them credible to the enemy. If they are not, and the
enemy sees through the deception, the commander has wasted forces that could
have been used elsewhere.

b. Security. The brigade will need to conduct security operations to protect its
freedom of action by reducing its vulnerability to hostile acts, influence or surprise.
This will protect forces in the main defensive area, allow them to deploy and move to
meet enemy attacks, prevent the delivery of enemy indirect fire against these forces
and help to deceive the enemy as to the location of the main defensive position.
Deception operations should be planned to produce surprise, cause indecision and
delay enemy actions. Security is aided by taking maximum advantage of darkness
and limited visibility and by taking measures to cover the relocation of troops.
Security is also improved by decoy positions, maintaining normal radio traffic
patterns and artillery fire. Rehearsals of armoured strike or reserve counter attacks
may be tracked, and should be incorporated into any deception plan. Additional
measures include:

(1) Feints and demonstrations.

2
Alastair Crooke and Mark Perry, How Hezbollah Defeated Israel, Part 1:Winning the Intelligence War, Asia Times Online, 2006.
4-20
 (2) EW and Psychological Methods measures.

(3) EMCON.

0446. CBRN Defence. The commander may have to consider the need to implement
CBRN protective measures; this will be driven by the perceived capability held by the
enemy. If the enemy unexpectedly stops his attack, or withdraws troops deployed forward,
it could be indicative of his imminent use of CBRN weapons. Troops, including flank units
threatened by a potential strike, should be warned and the commander will have to decide
whether his force should continue to hold, disperse, or close with the enemy. CBRN
attacks on defiles or reserve demolitions will complicate the passage of forces through
them. Consideration is to be given to the decontamination of such forces in order to avoid
spreading contamination to new positions. Chemical attacks on withdrawing troops or
civilians could have a psychological effect out of proportion to the casualties inflicted.
Before deciding to move the commander should consider:

a. How long the hazard is likely to persist.

b. The effect of any moves on operational plans.

c. The need to decontaminate before occupying a new position.

d. The spread of contamination caused by moving.

e. The impact on the unit of continuing to operate in full or partial IPE.

0447. Air Defence (AD). AD is key in defensive operations in order to preserve fighting
power, protect freedom of manoeuvre and deny information and intelligence to the enemy.
AD protects point targets (HQs and vulnerable points such as reserve demolitions),
defensive formations and likely avenues of advance and manoeuvre routes. AD threats
include rockets, UAS and enemy rotary and fixed wing aircraft.

0448. Protection in COIN Operations. Forces operating from static base locations,
usually as part of stabilisation and development, will need to follow the principles for
protection. They may be able to employ a range of technical capabilities (such as
unattended ground sensors, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and acoustic shot detection
sensors) that will contribute to their security and the protection of the force.

SUSTAINMENT

0449. Planning. The commander’s intent must be clearly understood so that sustainment
priorities can be established and sustainment activities planned to ensure that adequate
support is provided. Defence stores may take time to deliver; they should be requested at
the earliest opportunity to avoid delaying preparations. Sustainment activities must look
beyond the defensive action in order to be prepared to support subsequent offensive
actions. A great deal of foresight is required to enable advanced sustainment planning,
which will bring vital flexibility to the brigade’s future operations. Understanding the higher
commander’s future intentions and COAs is crucial. The main sustainment considerations
in defensive actions are:

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 a. Maintaining a Robust Support Network. The forward sustainment loop
should be able to restore combat power of the forces engaging an attacking force.
Casualties will require evacuation rearward.

b. Regular Re-supply. Combat units should be resupplied regularly to ensure

maximum sufficiency in the event of enemy action disrupting replenishment and to
allow for offensive action should the opportunity arise.

c. Forward Dumping. Forward dumping of stocks prior to operations should

occur to shorten the resupply loops during the operation. Due to the risk of losing
stores to enemy action, ground dumped stores are usually spread over a wide area
and are held in high quantities, which requires additional resource to move the stores
to the ground dumped location. This is likely to be more difficult in contemporary and
future conflict environments where freedom of movement may be severely restricted.
Forward dumping is less appropriate in mobile defence.

d. Recovery. In area defence, recovering equipment to forward repair facilities

will minimise interference with tactical operations and maximise productivity, as well
as reduce the quantity of equipment lost to the enemy. Although some recovery
assets may be organic to BGs, it is unlikely that they will be sufficient for the task,
thus requiring reinforcement from the REME battalion. Recovery is planned and
coordinated at brigade level.

e. Security. Sustainment facilities should be positioned in secure areas to avoid

interference and gain protection.

f. OPSEC. Sustainment movements should not compromise OPSEC and must

be included in deception plans.

0450. Positioning. Sustainment facilities are usually further to the rear in a more secure
area than in offensive operations to avoid interfering with tactical action and to obtain a
degree of protection. A compromise may have to be made, however, between being far
enough forward to maintain the required support, and far enough back to avoid being
overrun by a sudden break through. This assumes a linear battlespace however, as the
battlespace becomes more congested, cluttered and contested, the definition of a ‘rear
area’ that implies security becomes more difficult to accept. Each situation will be different
as traditional rear areas on occasion become the front line. Planners, therefore, need to
take the 360 degree nature of the threat into consideration when assessing force protection
requirements. Finally, the amount of time required for sustainment facilities to pack up and
move needs to be taken into consideration when siting them. Medical facilities will have to
be positioned in accordance with clinical timelines.

0451. Denial. During defensive operations the enemy will occasionally be in a position to
threaten our equipment and supplies. Commanders should therefore consider removal or
denial as necessary. Denial should only be considered as a last resort, and only as
authorised by ROE (denial is a discreet ROE serial). The brigade commander should issue
direction regarding the denial of battle winning equipment, which may require a local
commander to gain authority prior to such denial.

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 THE ADVERSARY PERSPECTIVE

Enemy offensive operations may range from a conventional thrust based on armoured or
light forces delivered in great strength to asymmetric attack on key infrastructure, brigade
units or local populations. A hybrid opponent may combine both, seeking to overwhelm the
brigade by attacks across the spectrum integrated with special influence methods designed
to undermine the brigade’s legitimacy, morale, or the support it enjoys from the population
in which it is operating.

The enemy will seek to influence the brigade along with allies, partners and the civil
population by all available means and throughout all physical, information and cognitive
dimensions. This will not be confined to the duration of the action but will form part of a
longer effort to disrupt, or even prevent, the brigade from carrying out an effective defence.

Non-kinetic activity will aim to undermine preparations for the defence by exploiting
messaging and the media to set conditions in the defensive area that will:

• Challenge the legitimacy of the defending force.

• Mobilise and polarise the local population, endeavouring to isolate the brigade
from the population and, if possible, use them to hinder the preparation and
conduct of the defence.

• Sustain their own legitimacy.

• Exploit any actual or potential negative consequences of the brigade’s action; for
example the displacement of local civilians, the destruction of local infrastructure
and collateral damage.

• Undermine the defending force’s will and cohesion, potentially isolating units,
allies and partners through the use of targeted messaging.

Enemy offensive actions will almost certainly be predicated on finding and striking the
brigade’s equipment and personnel. The enemy may be assisted by its access to large
numbers of troops (mass) and a high toleration of casualties.

To counter the brigade’s defensive actions, including, screening, withdrawal, and rearward
passage of lines, the enemy may seek to emphasise the attrition of the brigade over gaining
or recovering terrain.

The enemy are likely to advance into areas that either threaten or interdict supply lines.
Enemy offensive action may be characterised by raiding activity, including prisoner
snatches, ambushes and attacks on isolated outposts. Throughout the action the enemy
will seek to disrupt the brigade across all tactical functions:

Find. The enemy is likely to only attack where he has good situational awareness and
knows the location of UK forces; either so he can strike them or so that he can manoeuvre
into a position of advantage, unchallenged by UK forces. Un-armed civilians conducting
reconnaissance, on foot or in civilian vehicles, will probably be used.

4-23
Fix. The enemy will seek to fix the brigade by threatening flanks to interdict the MSRs or
administration areas, and using light infantry/irregular forces to conduct ambushes and
raids within the Brigade Area. Fixing may also be enabled by extensive artillery
preparation. The aim of effective fixing is to deny the attacking brigade the ability to conduct
effective manoeuvre and supporting sustainment functions.

Strike. Effective strikes are probably going to require massed forces gaining proximity to
the brigade using either infiltration or speed of manoeuvre. The enemy will attempt to avoid
detection before striking simultaneously across the brigade area. To achieve this they will
try to:

• Minimise their signature. Light infantry/irregular forces represent a specific threat

in terms of dismounted infiltration in close proximity to the brigade, especially in
the urban environment.

• Manoeuvre using civilian four wheel-drive vehicles capable of covering 5-600km

during hours of darkness. These vehicles are extremely hard to detect in close
terrain and the urban environment.

• Harass using low signature indirect fire systems (mortars, 107mm MBRL) which
can be infiltrated into an area prior to an attack and then used en-mass.

• Use close terrain and urban areas to mask forces massing for attack, maximising
use of sub-terrain bunkers, tunnels and hides.

Exploit. Enemy exploitation is likely be aimed at seeking an opportunity to create more

casualties, or to disengage to preserve the force. It could also focus on publicity generated
to recruit, encourage aggression and undermine political will.

DELAY

0452. The following section will consider the purpose, principles and conduct of a delay
action.

THE PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES OF DELAYING ACTIONS

0453. Purpose. The purpose of a delaying action is to slow an enemy’s advance in order
to allow other actions to take place. The period of delay required will be specified. In
executing a delaying action, a brigade may be able to exploit manoeuvre and trade space
for time; in more limited circumstances, the brigade may conduct a hard fought defensive
action to delay enemy progress/penetration until a certain period.

0454. Delaying actions can be conducted as follows:

a. Delay from Alternate Positions. A complete element of the delaying force

disengages from position one and moves rearwards through an occupied second
defensive position to establish a third defensive position behind the second. This
process is repeated as required as elements engage to delay, disengage and move
rearwards ‘leapfrogging’ the next defensive position.
4-24
 b. Delay from successive Positions. Elements of a delaying force disengage
from position one and move to the rear to organise position two. Subsequently the
elements which have remained in contact fight to the rear to join position two.

0455. Delay can also be achieved by forces in the enemy’s depth. Forces are directed to
attack the enemy’s depth having been given a route or sector to interdict. This type of
delay operation is dependent on the nature of the terrain and the possession of the
necessary air, attack aviation and / or indirect fires to carry out strikes in depth.

0456. Delaying actions can be conducted independently or within other types of operation;
often they precede a defensive action as a covering or guard force action. Enabling actions
will be involved, the most likely being a rearward passage of lines. A brigade may be
tasked to conduct a delaying action as part of a divisional plan in one of the following
circumstances:

a. As a covering force for defending or withdrawing main bodies.

b. The advance guard or covering force when encountering superior forces.

c. An economy of force operation conducted to fix or contain an enemy attack on

a less critical avenue of approach.

d. As a manoeuvre, involving deception, to set up a counter attack.

e. As a fixing force in mobile defence.

0457. Principles. The principles of delaying operations are:

a. Simplicity.

b. Manoeuvre.

c. Offensive Action.

d. Deception.

THE CONDUCT OF DELAY

0458. Stages of a Delay. Although a delaying action does not fit neatly into a series of
stages there are separate, though linked, actions:

a. Shaping and battle preparation.

b. Delaying action.

c. Breaking contact.

0459. Shaping and Battle Preparation.

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 a. Organisation. Delay normally commences on a line given in the mission and
extends rearward to a line where responsibility for the enemy is passed to another
force, or to a line where the type of action changes (normally a planning line or battle
handover line). Forces will usually be assigned lateral boundaries and unit and
brigade frontages will tend to be larger than in the defence, allowing greater
manoeuvre. The commander of the delaying force should decide which parts of the
assigned area he will use for his operation, which parts he may abandon earlier than
others, and which need only be monitored.

b. Battle Procedure. Sufficient time should be allocated to:

a. Establish the task organisation.

b. Carry out reconnaissance.

c. Select positions.

d. Select and prepare obstacles, barriers and dummy positions.

e. Carry out preliminary movement.

f. Coordinate with adjacent units.

g. Conduct combat service support plans.

0460. The Delaying Action. The delaying force will generally consist of three elements:

a. Screen. The screen will normally consist of light cavalry supported by ISTAR
and joint fires. Aviation, fire support company assets and snipers may be task
organised if available. The screen’s task is to provide early information on the
location, strength and movement of the enemy. It must avoid becoming involved in
the fighting, but every opportunity to cause delay and inflict casualties (acting in the
role of a guard force) should be exploited.

b. Delaying Forces. Delaying forces will usually consist of armoured and

armoured infantry forces supported by manoeuvre support, joint fires, and aviation
assets. The delay force will exploit long range fires, holding positions, obstacles,
surprise counter attacks and deception to dislocate and degrade the enemy and
impose delay.

c. Local Reserves. Reserves should be available to support forward positions,

assist the extraction of delaying forces and destroy weak enemy forces that may
have infiltrated through the delaying force. Opportunities are most likely to occur
when the enemy has just crossed an obstacle or is temporarily separated from
follow-up troops.

0461. The dynamic nature of a delaying action requires a high level of situational
awareness and close coordination to ensure:

a. That the delaying force is not outflanked or isolated.

4-26
 b. That mutual support between elements of the delaying force is achieved.

c. That specific phases of the delay commence and conclude at the optimum
time.

d. That an effective handover occurs between the delaying force and those forces
conducting subsequent tactical actions (defence) without significant loss to the
delaying force, loss of contact with the enemy or confusion and vulnerability in the
brigade.

0462. Breaking Contact.

a. Troops withdrawing from a delay position must try and break contact with the
enemy. This can be achieved by withdrawing through a position occupied by
another unit, the application of fires to suppress or neutralise the enemy or by
suddenly breaking off the engagement when the enemy is unbalanced and unable to
immediately follow up. Judging the correct moment to withdraw from each position is
crucial to achieving maximum delay. Counter attacks may be necessary to achieve
disengagement.

b. If the delaying operation is followed by another tactical action, the delay force
will be required to handover the battle, if not handover to an observer is essential.
This will occur on the handover line. In a defensive action, elements from the main
defending force may have to be deployed as far forward as the handover line.
Indirect fire support from both the delaying and defending forces must be capable of
reaching this line. The enemy should be given as little indication as possible of the
intention to disengage. The rearward passage of lines must be planned and
coordinated in detail and executed rapidly. As a minimum the withdrawing force
must provide its planned withdrawal routes and times, regular Situation Reports
(SITREP) and liaison elements to the rearward defensive force (see Chapter 6
Annex F – Rearward Passage of Lines).

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

COMMAND

0463. Considerations. Delaying actions are difficult, not least because they take place in
unfavourable conditions when the enemy has the initiative. They require simple plans,
rapidly executed and agility in planning and manoeuvre. The following considerations
apply:

a. Planning should be centralised and coordinated, execution must be

decentralised.

b. A delaying action requires a series of handovers as elements of the delaying

force pass through or around one another. Detailed planning, coordination and
easily understood control measures are essential.

4-27
0464. Command Considerations. When conducting a delaying action the commander
should consider:

a. Method of Delay. The decision to conduct a delay from alternate or

successive positions will be derived from the commander’s estimate. Factors for
consideration are given in Table 4.1 below:
Method of
Use When Advantages Disadvantages
Delay
AO is narrow. Allows positioning in depth. Requires more coordination.
Delay from
Forces are sufficient to be Allows more time for Requires passage of lines.
Alternate
split between different rehabilitation. Less concentration of force
Positions
positions. Increases flexibility. and fire.
Limited depth to the delay
AO is wide.
Delay from Masses fires of all available positions.
Forces available are
Successive combat elements on a single Less time to prepare each
insufficient to be spread
Positions engagement. position.
between positions.
Less flexibility.

Table 4.1 — Advantages and Disadvantages of Delay Techniques

b. Independent Action. Delaying forces need to be mobile, balanced and

capable of independent action. They must be able to find, delay the enemy,
withdraw to the next delaying position and provide their own reserve.

c. Depth. A delaying force should make use of the depth of the area assigned,
and make every effort to attack the enemy in his depth. If there is an opportunity,
friendly forces could be positioned to attack the enemy’s flank or rear along his most
likely approaches.

d. Understanding. The commander is unlikely to have a detailed understanding

of all the enemy’s dispositions, particularly in an environment of frequent and rapid
change. He should ensure he has well organised reconnaissance, uninterrupted
communications and as strong a reserve as possible.

e. Freedom of Action. The commander should ensure that he maintains his

freedom of action by deploying the forces available to him in a way that requires the
enemy to repeatedly deal with unexpected situations. He should focus on destroying
the enemy's cohesion by targeting C2, reconnaissance and obstacle crossing
capabilities without becoming committed.

f. Decision Points. A delaying force must not become decisively engaged nor
withdraw too early otherwise the full effect of the delaying action will not be achieved.
A key consideration will be the point at which a delaying force disengages and
withdraws to the next position. The criteria relating to each decision point needs to
be determined, understood and communicated.

0465. Control Measures.

a. Battlespace Management. BM is critical to the success of a delaying action.

The movement of troops through friendly locations, often in unfavourable conditions,

4-28
 has the potential to be chaotic and confusing. Commanders must have a sound BM
plan to ensure the safe and efficient manoeuvre of ground forces. This must be
wargamed.

b. Handover Line. Effective control at the handover line is vital. This will
ensure that the enemy is unaware of any break clean and is not presented with an
opportunity to break through and undo the defence. The break clean line will have
some or all of the following characteristics:

(1) It should be forward of the feature from where the enemy can first
engage the next defensive position with observed fire. It should be situated
so that any crossings or defiles used by the force breaking contact can be
protected.

(2) It should be in an area that can be defended.

(3) Good lateral routes should exist behind the handover line to allow the
use of alternative entry points.

(4) The line should be easily identifiable on the ground.

(5) It should be sited to enable maximum fire, both direct and indirect, from
moving and in place forces, to be applied as the handover takes place. This
will help to ensure that there is no break in operations against the enemy and
provide protection for the delaying forces as they hand over the battle.

c. Other Measures. Other control measures are covered in Land Handbook

Formation SOPs: SOP 3220 Battlespace Management Annex A.

0466. Morale. A delaying operation is a challenging and dynamic engagement. It may be

conducted in conditions of enemy air and ground superiority. The threat to the morale of
the delaying force may be significant. In protecting the will and cohesion of the brigade, the
commander should consider the following measures:

a. Exploit aggressive action where appropriate using all available resources.

b. Explain to all ranks what is happening and why. Failure to understand the
commander’s intent can lead to rumour and alarm, particularly in the rear, which can
easily be aggravated by minor enemy activity.

c. Maintain a viable and functioning logistic and medical support system. The
abandonment of logistic stocks must be carefully controlled and kept to a minimum.

d. Have an efficient movement control system.

INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

0467. General. A continuous flow of information is vital to success in delaying operations.

A brigade should track the enemy, determining its size, axes and routes of advance. Of

4-29
particular significance will be intelligence concerning the enemy's rate of advance and his
assessed intentions.

0468. Information Requirements and Collection. When the delaying force is under
significant pressure, a balance will be required between the preservation of collection
assets, the value of the information they might gather and their potential use in other roles
such as security, protection of flanks and gaps between the main elements of the delaying
force.

FIREPOWER

0469. General. The offensive support requirements in delaying actions are similar to those
of the defence. Manoeuvre in combination with direct, indirect and joint fires ensures that
the enemy can be harassed without decisive engagement. The delaying force should use
manoeuvre and fire to disengage, moving to new positions when the enemy concentrates
superior forces. Phase lines should be used to coordinate the movement of forces and fire
support. Orders can be given to fill gaps or to adjust the control lines should there be a
danger of a breakthrough. Deliberate targeting of specific elements of the attacking
formation will aid the main defensive battle by destroying the enemy’s combined arms
integrity and damaging his cohesion. Enemy reconnaissance, C2 facilities and air defence
should be considered as priority targets.

0470. Electronic Warfare. The delaying force may be able to employ EW resources to
disrupt and confuse the advancing enemy, for example jamming and deception against
reconnaissance elements, command and fire control nets. These actions will greatly assist
in supporting disengagement, counter attacks and relief of troops in contact. Assets from
higher formations will be required to ensure that continuous EW activity can be carried out
while the delaying force is conducting its action.

MANOEUVRE

0471. Manoeuvre can be enhanced by:

a. Reconnaissance of routes and positions by commanders.

b. Improving existing route and traffic flow.

c. Use of combat support mobility assets to maintain and improve routes.

d. Use of well rehearsed drills and SOPs.

e. Positioning air defence and security forces at critical choke points.

f. Evacuating refugees early or restricting their movements to routes not required

by the delaying force.

g. Evacuating casualties and recovering surplus supplies early.

0472. Counter Mobility. Counter mobility can be improved by:

4-30
 a. Occupying and controlling terrain or choke points that dominate likely enemy
avenues of approach.

b. Improving natural obstacles, denying routes and covering them with fire.

c. Employing joint fires in order to slow the enemy’s rate of advance, channel
forces for targeting, degrade his C3, cause attrition across his force (particularly at
choke points) and attack his will and cohesion.

d. Conducting spoiling attacks to keep the enemy off balance and to force him to
react to our attack.

PROTECTION

0473. The protection considerations for the delay are the same as those for defensive
actions covered previously in this chapter.

SUSTAINMENT

0474. General. The sustainment considerations for the delay are not significantly different
from those for mobile defence described earlier. The following additional points should be
noted:

a. Only essential sustainment assets with sufficient mobility and protection should
be located in the delaying force’s area. Other sustainment elements and stocks
should be evacuated.

b. Rearward movement of sustainment resources should be closely integrated

with the overall plan to ensure continuity of support to units, survivability in transit,
readiness in position to undertake refurbishment action and possible integration into
any deception.

c. Refurbishment, including replenishment, as an integrated package should be

available and readily accessible to the delaying force as soon as they have broken
contact with the enemy.

d. Planning should occur in anticipation of the next tactical action (offensive,

defensive, stabilising or enabling activities as appropriate) for which the delaying
operation has shaped the battlefield.

e. The recovery plan is key to ensure that choke points on exfiltration routes are
kept clear.

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 DELAY FROM ALTERNATE POSITIONS

Fig 4-3 Delay From Alternate Positions

Forward elements of delaying force in the initial delay position A disengage and move to C to
organise the next position.

Force elements in B continue the action as C is being prepared and at the appropriate moment
disengage to move to D to organise this position.

Force elements in position C then continue the action as D is being prepared.

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 DELAY FROM SUCCESSIVE POSITIONS

Fig 4-4 Delay From Successive Positions

Elements of the delaying force disengage and move rearwards to organise the next position. The
bulk of the force will remain in contact to conduct the delaying action.

The delaying force breaks clean at the appropriate moment and moves to the new position to
continue the action.

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 TACTICAL BASING

0475. Static, tactical bases are used to support a continuous and effective security
presence. They are mainly used in enduring COIN operations but also have wide utility for
other military activities.

0476. Tactical bases will be established if it is assessed that they offer sufficient tactical
advantage over vehicle and dismounted operations. On an enduring operation they are the
hubs around which forward operations are conducted. In comparison, main bases are sited
for strategic purposes such as theatre entry whereas the locations of tactical bases are
determined primarily by tactical considerations. Some bases are established to provide
indirect support to operations such as communications nodes or to control border-crossing
points. Others are required to establish the essential framework for security operations. In
COIN and stability operations, this latter category is used to achieve the following
operational effects:

a. Secure the population.

b. Establish a stabilising presence.

c. Create local influence.

0477. Planning of tactical bases should be grounded in human terrain analysis and the
effects, both intended and unintended, of the tactical base upon the human terrain. Within
these considerations the principles of defence apply well to the conduct of tactical base
operations and should be used as a ‘handrail’ throughout the planning and conduct of these
operations. There are ten types of tactical base, the first three are general and the
remainder specialist:

a. Forward Operating Base.

b. Patrol Base.

c. Checkpoint.

d. Border Crossing Point.

e. Fire Base.

f. Forward Arming and Refuelling Point.

g. Observation Post.

h. Communications Site.

i. Embedded Camp.

j. Logistic Base.

4-34
0478. Further detail can be found in Part C to AFM Volume 1 Part 10 COIN.

VIGNETTE

BRIGADE AREA DEFENCE: Battle of Imjin River, 22-25 April 1951

4-35
On the 1 April 1951, 29 Independent Infantry Brigade, part of the UN forces defending
South Korea, moved to dominate the commanding ground along the 38th Parallel and the
Imjin River, 30 miles north of Seoul. They occupied a frontage of approximately 13,000
yards astride one of the historic approaches to Seoul. Three battalions were forward: 1
Glosters on the left, 1 Northumberland Fusiliers (1NF) on the right and the Belgian
Volunteer Battalion north of the River Imjin blocking the most likely avenue of approach for
a Chinese attack. 1 Royal Ulster Rifles (1RUR) were in reserve, deployed behind 1NF. 29
Bde was supported by the 4.2 inch mortars of 170 Independent Mortar Battery RA, the 25
Pounder guns of 45 Field Regiment RA and the Centurion tanks of 8th Hussars. There was
no medium or heavy artillery available.

Prior to 20 April, patrols had dominated the ground north of the Imjin river with little or no
contact with the Chinese. It was expected the communist thrust would happen elsewhere.
29 Bde did not expect to be occupying their position for long, therefore little attempt had
been made to wire or mine their positions.

The Battle of Imjin River began on 22 April 1951. The first contact between British and
Chinese forces was made when small parties of Chinese advanced to the UN and ROK
front line. Initially British forces managed to fend off early attempts to cross the Imjin.
However, in spite of heavy fire from the Glosters' A Company, by late evening large
numbers of Chinese forces were crossing the river en masse. Near the river X company 1
NF was forced to withdraw when it was discovered that the Chinese had already
established themselves on high ground overlooking the rest of the battalion. Despite 1NF
counter-attacking they were unable to dislodge the Chinese from the top of the hill.
Simultaneously the Belgian battalion withdrew from north of the river to new positions to the
rear of 1 Glosters and 1NF.

By dawn on 23 April it was clear that the Chinese had successfully penetrated the UN lines.
After a lull in the fighting, during which the Chinese reorganised, 1 Glosters were once
again attacked. In the early hours of 24 April, in the face of heavy fire, they had to withdraw
from their position and re-form on Hill 235. Simultaneously 1NF withdrew to fresh positions
800 yards to their rear.

If the Chinese had achieved a breakthrough in the initial stages of their assault, it would
have threatened the stability of the UN line. The defensive action by 29 Bde allowed UN
forces in the area to conduct an orderly withdrawal to the ‘No-Name Line’, a defensible
position north of Seoul, where the Chinese were halted.

This action illustrates the following principles of defence:

All Round Defence: It was not possible to obtain all round defence due to the wide
brigade frontage and the nature of the terrain. Since 29 Bde had not expected to be in
position for long they had not built sufficient obstacles or protection to prevent Chinese
infiltration.

Depth: Depth was achieved by the redeployment of 1RUR as brigade reserve and further
enabled by a Belgian battalion coming under command 29 Bde.

4-36
Mutual Support: The ground forces suffered through the initial non-availability of close air
support and medium artillery, especially since the long frontage prevented the companies
from providing each other with mutual support with direct fire weapons.

Further Reading
Farrar Hockley, A, Official History: The British Part in the Korean War Volume II (London:
HMSO, 1995)

4-37
4-38
 ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 4

COMBINED ARMS OBSTACLE INTEGRATION

‘The first thing to do is to get all the units to realise the value of obstacles and how they may
save their lives; at present they regard them as some curious black magic the sappers play
with and which is a great nuisance to everyone.’

Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein

04A01. Combined Arms Obstacle Integration (CAOI) is an all arms approach to obstacle
planning. It ensures the effective combination of direct fire, indirect fire and manoeuvre,
engineer effort and ground to meet the commander’s aim.

PLANNING PRINCIPLES

04A02. The commander states what effect he wants to have on the enemy in a specific
area, whilst retaining freedom of movement for own forces.

04A03. The terrain and natural obstacles are considered. Man-made obstacles,
observation and weapon systems are superimposed and integrated to achieve the required
effect.

04A04. In a deliberate defence, major obstacles are planned at the highest level using a
map but must be confirmed in detail on the ground by units. In hasty defence it may be
necessary to decentralise planning down to company/squadron level to allow timely
defensive preparations when no comprehensive high level plan has yet been made. All
demolitions must be controlled in accordance with the procedures outlined in Annex B to
this chapter.

04A05. Planning Responsibilities.

Action in Conflict Remarks

Staff/Arm Duties
Before During After
G2 Int Develop Understand Keep IPE current Consolidate Handover
and issue higher intent all records of to another
IPE and IPE for formation
constraints handover or for post
including the conflict
host nation action
G3 Ops Set policy Coordinate Monitor CAOI and Handover of
for development STAP. Anticipate plans as
Obstacle of CAOI ways to strike and required to
Planning exploit by Host Nation
manoeuvre using or other
crossings, gaps formation
and lanes.

4-A-1
 Arms Confirm Make own Conduct Some
plan and plans and operations making obstacles
integrate coordinate use of CAOI. Use are built by
STAP and RE guides for non RE 1
CAOI. Build passage of
obs as reqd obstacles
Engineers Advise Build RE Maintain CAOI Handover all For
and build Obstacles both for mobility records of demining
obstacles and C mobility. obstacles and other
Create space as tasks
required.

OBSTACLE POLICY AND PLANNING – NORMANDY 1944

The Balance Between Counter Mobility and Mobility. In the Allied bridgehead, 51
Highland Division of 1 Corps had laid a large tactical minefield to defeat a German counter
attack. The subsequent British offensive Operation GOODWOOD by 8 Corps (three
armoured divisions) was launched from 1 Corps area. Their assembly and deployment
were significantly delayed due to the minefield. Had several minefield gaps and covert
lanes been built in from the start this delay would have been reduced, allowing better
concentration of force by all arms.

The Case For No Minefields. In post-war interviews of two opposing commanders from
Operation GOODWOOD the British attacker suggested the German defence would have
gained more by laying minefields to cause great confusion. The successful German
commander disagreed. He wanted maximum manoeuvre and to be free of the confusion
that minefields can bring. Additionally, the German higher command felt the natural and
man made obstacles were enough for their mobile defence.

04A06. Obstacles are classified as existing or reinforcing:

a. Existing Obstacles. Existing obstacles can be subdivided into natural (rivers

and swamps) or man made (canals, ditches, steps, patterned and scatterable
minefields 2 , craters, felled timber or abatis and wire fences).

b. Reinforcing Obstacles. Reinforcing obstacles enhance existing obstacles and

are classified as tactical or protective:

(1) Tactical Obstacles. Part of a brigade plan and designed to reduce the
enemy’s ability to manoeuvre whilst not hindering ours. These are built by
engineers.

1
Described in detail in Military Engineering Vol 2 All Arms Guide to Field Engineering 2010
2
The UK is a signatory to the 1997 Ottawa Convention which prohibits the use of anti-personnel land mines. It
currently has no stocks of anti-tank mines, scatterable or otherwise. However, allies and adversaries may not
be signatories to the Convention and may possess and use mines.

4-A-2
 (2) Protective Obstacles. Designed and constructed by all arms units to
assist in local close-in protection.

04A07. A Target Area of Interest (TAI) designates the area in which a commander wishes
to achieve a tactical effect. It will be allocated to a manoeuvre commander who, with
supporting engineers, will site obstacles which, when combined with observation and
weapon systems, will achieve the desired effect. Obstacles will be linked (referenced) to
the TAI they are designed to support. Thus, the obstacle group, shown below, supports the
turn effect required of 20 Armd Bde's TAI 003 (TAI 20/003). Part of the mission statement
for an engineer unit or subunit might well be a task defined only as: ‘TAI 001, 002, 003’. No
further order should be required as the effect is made clear by the graphic and the edges of
the TAI marked on the map indicate the area in which the all arms commander wishes to
achieve that effect. The engineer, taking account of any barrier restrictions in that area,
integrates his own planning with the subordinate unit concerned to achieve the required
effect in the TAI, back-briefing the manoeuvre commander as necessary.

T A I 2 0 /0 0 3

Figure 4-A-1 Obstacle / TAI Linkage

04A08. Target. Commanders and their staff must understand which element of the
enemy force is being targeted so that obstacles can be designed and sited appropriately.

04A09. Location. Obstacle location is a vital component of obstacle intent because it ties
the obstacle effect and the target into the scheme of manoeuvre. Commanders and their
staff must understand the relative location of obstacles to ensure that the desired effect
occurs at the right place.

04A10. Obstacle Effects. These are the effects that a specific obstacle group is required
to have on the enemy, in order to support the commander’s tactical intent; they are to:
disrupt, turn, fix, or block. A combination of effects may be required to achieve the overall
intent. These effects are described in detail in subsequent paragraphs.

04A11. Disrupt. Disruption is designed to break up the enemy, reducing his tempo,
slowing his rate of advance and encouraging the premature commitment of his breaching
assets. It should also create an element of surprise and uncertainty, by deceiving the
enemy as to the exact location of the MDA. The effect of disruption is illustrated in Figure
4.A.2.

4-A-3
 Figure 4-A-2 The Disrupt Effect

04A12. Turn. Turning aims to divert an enemy towards ground of our own choosing or
towards an alternative Avenue of Approach (AA). This effect is developed by placing a
series of obstacles, combined with direct and indirect fires, that encourage bypassing in the
direction desired. At the start of the turn, obstacles should tie into restrictive terrain and
should appear more complex than those in the direction of the turn. The enemy force
should bounce off successive obstacles in the desired direction. Commanders may use the
turn effect on the flanks of killing areas. The turn effect is shown in Figure 4.A.3.

Figure 4-A-3 The Turn Effect

04A13. Fix. The intention of fixing is to slow an attacker within a specified area; normally
a killing area. It is used to give formations time to detect, acquire, target, and destroy
enemy forces throughout the depth of the killing area using air, aviation, and direct and
indirect fire. The fix effect is shown in Figure 4.A.4.

4-A-4
 Figure 4-A-4 The Fix Effect

04A14. Block. A blocking effect requires complex obstacles to stop an attacker along a
specific AA, thus assisting in his complete destruction in a killing area. Commanders may
use the blocking effect to close an AA which leads out of a killing area, in order to ensure
the maximum destruction of the enemy force in the killing area. The block effect is shown
in Figure 4.A.5.

Figure 4-A-5 The Block Effect

04A15. Obstacle Resources. The timely availability of resources is critical. Early

planning increases the chance of stores being available when the engineers move into the
area. An accurate assessment of resource requirements is made through battlefield area
evaluation within the IPE. This is based on linking the obstacle effects required by the
commander to the width of the AAs. A resources matrix may be constructed by engineer

4-A-5
staff to provide an estimate of the resource requirement, and, if necessary, to assist in
determining priorities.

OBSTACLE CONTROL MEASURES

04A16. Commanders use obstacle control measures to delegate authority and to express
their intent. Effective use of obstacle control measures ensures that brigade commanders
do not constrain subsequent formation manoeuvre. These control measures are areas
designated as zones, belts and groups.

04A17. Restrictions could include limiting the types of obstacles used, controlling timings
(eg not before or not after times), or restricting the employment of certain types of
obstacles. Subordinate commanders may impose additional restrictions but cannot relax a
higher commander’s restrictions.

04A18. Obstacle Zones. Obstacle zones are usually controlled at divisional level. They
may be identified by alpha-numeric letter designations. They do not normally include an
obstacle effect graphic.

04A19. Obstacle Belts.

a. Zones may be sub-divided into obstacle belts, where the employment of

obstacles will normally be controlled at divisional or brigade level. Obstacle belts
within each zone are numbered and are normally given an obstacle effect graphic.
More than one obstacle belt may be assigned to a unit, but where possible obstacle
belts should not cross unit boundaries.

b. Battlegroup commanders must only place obstacles within obstacle belts

designated by their controlling headquarters. Although obstacle belts limit the area
authorised for obstacles, they still allow battlegroup commanders the latitude to
develop detailed obstacle plans based on reconnaissance and detailed battlegroup
planning.

04A20. Obstacle Groups.

a. Obstacle groups are one or more obstacles grouped together to provide a

specific obstacle effect. The battlegroup commander designates obstacle groups to
ensure that sub units place individual obstacles in accordance with his intent.

b. Unlike obstacle zones or belts, groups are not areas; they are specific locations
for actual groups of obstacles. Commanders show obstacle groups using obstacle
effect graphics which establish the relative locations of individual obstacles on the
ground. The graphic indicates the anchor points to existing terrain and the general
line of the obstacle placement. In almost all circumstances the location of an
obstacle group graphic shall reflect the location of the all arms TAI on the decision
support overlay.

c. Obstacle groups are planned within the limits of the battlegroup’s obstacle
emplacement authority (zone or belt). Obstacle groups may, however, be used by

4-A-6
 higher formations to define specified aspects of the commander’s intent eg
designating a bridge as a reserve demolition.

OBSTACLE RECORDING AND NUMBERING

04A21. Once an obstacle effect for a selected group has been specified, staff and
subordinate commanders can begin planning the detailed design of obstacle groups and
the detailed siting of individual obstacles in each group. When the obstacle plan has been
agreed, responsibility for the emplacement of each obstacle will be delegated, normally to
engineers. Each planned obstacle must be assigned a unique obstacle number for
command and control reporting. Allocation of obstacle numbering is normally controlled by
formation engineer staff who will also maintain a record of the status of all obstacles.
Figure 4-A-6 is a summary of obstacle control measures and numbering.

4-A-7
 Emplacement
Obstacle Control Authority Obstacle Graphic Examples
Measure
From To

OBSTACLE
Letter ZONE
Force Designation
Corps

Zone Corps Div OBSTACLE A OBSTACLE

EFFECT BELTS
Div Bde (Optional, 1
but not
normal)

Number
3
Designation
Corps Div 2
Belt Div Bde
OBSTACLE
Bde BG EFFECT
(Optional,
but normal)

OBSTACLE GROUPS
Letter in an obstacle belt
Designation

Div Bde
3
Group Bde BG
A
BG Coy/
Sqn B C

Restrictions Incorporated into Examples:

the emplacement no buried mines; obstacle free; no SCATMIN;
authority SCATMIN short delay only; reserve obstacle; etc

Figure 4-A-6 Obstacle Design and Numbering

4-A-8
 ANNEX B TO
CHAPTER 4

CONTROL OF DEMOLITIONS

04B01. A number of key terrain features are likely to be critical to the movement of a
brigade. These features may include bridges, routes or minefield lanes that must be denied
to the enemy until they are no longer of use to the brigade. Closure of such features will
require a preliminary or reserved demolition. Because the implications of mistakes are
potentially catastrophic, the orders concerning all aspects of demolitions must be simple,
clear and easily understood. Commanders and staffs must be fully conversant with all
aspects of the operation.

TERMINOLOGY

04B02. Authorised Commander. The authorised commander is the commander who

has the authority to order the firing of a demolition. He may delegate this authority to a
subordinate commander, in which case the subordinate becomes the authorised
commander.

04B03. Preliminary Demolition Target. A preliminary demolition is a target, other than a

reserved demolition target, which is earmarked for demolition and can be executed
immediately after preparation, provided that prior authority has been granted.

04B04. Reserved Demolition Target. A reserved demolition is a target for demolition,

the destruction of which must be controlled at a specific level of command because it plays
a vital part in the tactical or strategic plan, or because of the importance of the structure
itself, or because the demolition may be executed in the face of the enemy.

04B05. Demolition Guard. A demolition guard is a force positioned to ensure that a

demolition is not captured or sabotaged by an enemy before it has been successfully fired.
The demolition guard commander is responsible to the authorised commander for the
operational command of all troops on the demolition site including the demolition firing
party.

04B06. Demolition Firing Party. A demolition firing party is technically responsible for a
demolition. It is normally an engineer party and is required for preliminary as well as
reserved demolitions.

04B07. Documentation. Orders for the firing of all demolition targets are recorded on an
AF W9811. These forms are prepared by the authorised commander's staff and contain
orders and coordinating instructions for the demolition guard commander and the firing
party commander. They also contain procedures for the delegation of authorised powers.

PROCEDURES

04B08. The authorised commander, having made his plan, will select those demolition
targets which he wishes to be reserved and those which he considers to be preliminary.
The list of targets is then passed to subordinate formation commanders, who may select
further demolitions to suit their own tactical situations. These extra targets are normally
subject to the approval of the authorised commander.

4-B-1
04B09. Preliminary Demolitions. Three options are available to the authorised
commander for firing preliminary demolitions:

a. Immediately after preparation, provided that political clearance has been given.

b. Upon receipt of a code from higher formation.

c. By delegating the order to fire to a subordinate commander. The authorised

commander may also include in the AF W9811 the proviso that the demolition may
be fired on the initiative of the firing party commander if the enemy is in the act of
capturing the demolition.

d. In order to fire preliminary demolitions there must be direct communications

between the firing party and the engineer commander, who will pass down the
authorised commander's order to fire. It is the responsibility of the engineer
commander to ensure that communications are provided and maintained.

04B10. Reserved Demolitions. More detailed instructions are required in the case of
reserved demolitions and will be issued on AF W9811. A number of points must be borne
in mind when completing AF W9811:

a. Demolition Guard. A demolition guard must be provided to ensure the

security of a reserved demolition. The size and composition of the guard will be
decided by the authorised commander, who will also issue orders to the demolition
guard commander on AF W9811.

b. Firing the Demolition. Two options are available to the authorised

commander for firing the demolition: the demolition may be fired upon receipt of a
code, or by delegation of the order to fire to a subordinate commander. He may also
add the proviso that the demolition be fired without the receipt of a code if the enemy
are in the act of capturing the demolition. Once the demolition is fired, the demolition
guard commander should sign the AF W9811 and return it to the authorised
commander. He and the firing party commander are also required to report the
success or otherwise of the demolition.

c. Communications. It is the responsibility of the authorised commander to

provide and maintain communications between himself and the demolition guard
commander. In practice this is often best achieved by the use of a personal liaison
officer with suitable communications. Delegation of authorised powers from one
commander to another should not take place until the latter has established his own
communications with the demolition guard commander.

04B11. Changes of State. Demolitions are normally prepared to state 1 (safe).

Preliminary demolitions are normally changed to state 2 (armed) immediately before firing.
Reserve demolitions are normally changed to state 2 (armed) some time before the
anticipated time of firing in the interests of ensuring prompt reaction when firing is ordered.
Changes of state must be ordered by the authorising commander.

04B12. Time to Fire. Changes of state take time to implement and there may also be a
time delay between receipt of the order to fire and the actual firing of the demolition. Such
timing delays must be passed to the authorised commander by the demolition guard

4-B-2
commander and the allowances must be made by authorised commanders to allow
adequate time for orders to be put into effect.

CONCLUSION

04B13. Procedures for the firing of demolitions must be clearly understood by

commanders, staffs and parties at the demolition sites. They are quite straightforward
provided that correct staff procedures are followed. NATO standardisation agreements are
to be enforced and will be particularly relevant when demolitions may involve forces of
different nations. In all cases, the provision of suitable liaison and communications will be
of vital importance.

4-B-3
4-B-4
CHAPTER 4 SUMMARY SHEET: THE CONDUCT OF A GENERIC DEFENSIVE ACTION
1. PREPARATION
1. The Covering Force Finds
the enemy. It continues to
observe, engage, delay and
deceive before breaking clean
and withdrawing via a RPOL. It
subsequently forms part of the
Strike Force, Reserve or
conducts rear area security.
2. In the Main Defensive Area
the minimum force is allocated
to fix and shape enemy
penetration within the TAIs.
3. The majority of the Brigade’s
combat power – as much as
2/3rd – constitutes the Strike
Force.
4. A Mobile Reserve is
constituted; to exploit, pursue or
to deal with unexpected tasks.
5. Offensive Support covers
gaps in the MDA, as well as
fixing, shaping and dislocating
enemy forces in the TAIs.
3. EXPLOITATION
1. The enemy main body is
destroyed in TAI Tiger. The
remnants disengage and
withdraw from the battlespace.
The Brigade Strike Force
exploits forward to take
advantage of the enemy’s
dislocation.
2. The Reserve pursues the
enemy with the intention of
cutting his line of withdrawal.
2. THE BLOCK AND COUNTER ATTACK
1. Having been shaped by
obstacles and fires, enemy
lead elements penetrate the
Brigade MDA. This enemy 1st
Echelon is destroyed in TAI
Leopard by the Fixing Force
and Offensive Support.
2. At the same time, the
enemy main body, following
the lead element, enters TAI
Tiger.
3. The Brigade Strike Force
manoeuvres at the critical
moment to engage the enemy
main body in TAI Tiger.
4. The Brigade Mobile
Reserve (based on the
withdrawn Covering Force)
remains uncommitted.
5. Offensive Support fires
separate the enemy echelons,
shaping them for Defeat by the
Strike Force.
GENERIC BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT
1. CFLs Stag, Caribou and Elk
are activated as the enemy
advances. As a CFL is crossed
by the withdrawing Brigade
Covering Force, the battlespace
forward of the CFL becomes a
Free Fire Area.
2. TAIs Tiger and Leopard
become FFAs when activated.
3. Brigade locations in the MDA
and in the rear area are marked
as Restricted Fire Areas.
4. CFL Severn and Clyde are
activated during the Brigade
Strike Force attack.
5. The Brigade’s boundaries are
RFLs.
4-C-1
DEFENSIVE ACTIONS AREA AND MOBILE DEFENCE: AIDE MEMOIRE
Purpose: Defeat or deter threat. Protect force and / or ground.
Set conditions for offensive/stabilising actions.
Principles:
• Offensive action.
• All round defence.
• Depth.
• Mutual support.
• Concealment and deception.
Applying the Manoeuvrist Approach
• Understand context
• Protect own cohesion and will – seize and retain initiative.
• Break enemy cohesion and will through surprise, pre-
emption, dislocation, disruption, shock action, and destruction.
• Exploitation of opportunities.
• Enhancements: simplicity, flexibility, tempo, momentum,
simultaneity.
Types of Defensive Actions:
Mobile Defence:
• Aim is to defeat the enemy.
• Own mobility greater than or equal to enemy.
• Greater depth – less mutual support.
• Fix with minimum force - strike with maximum force.
• Strike at decisive point in battle (time and space).
Area Defence:
• Aim is to deny ground to enemy.
• Own mobility is generally less than the enemy’s.
• Mutually supporting positions – less depth.
• Defend (Fix) with maximum force.
• Interlocking and / or overlapping fire.
• Mobile Reserve for local counter attacks.
Force Element Groupings:
• Covering Force: deployed to observe, engage, intercept,
delay, disorganise and deceive the enemy during his advance.
• Fixing / Defending Force: may be less than 1/3rd of combat
power in Mobile Defence. May be more than 2/3rd of combat
power in Area Defence.
• Striking / Counter Attacking Force: Mobile Defence – a self
sufficient combined arms grouping providing maximum combat
power. Area Defence – counter attacks should be local and
limited to preventing further enemy penetration, or for re-taking
lost Vital Ground.
• Reserves: Mobile Reserve to deal with unexpected tasks.
Once committed a further Reserve must be constituted.
Area of Operations:
• Covering Force Area (CFA): Extends forward of the Main
Defensive Area.
• Main Defensive Area (MDA): Where the decisive defensive
battle is to be fought.
• Rear Areas: Extend from rear of MDA to Bde Point of Entry
(POE).
Objectives:
• Gain time.
• Increase enemy vulnerability by forcing him to concentrate.
• Wear down enemy’s offensive capacity.
• Fix enemy as a prelude to own offensive action.
• Retain Key Terrain or Vital Ground.
• Provide a secure environment in order to conduct stabilising
actions.
CONDUCT:
Shaping and Battle Preparation:
• Time needed to prepare defence.
• Synchronisation and integration – max combat power.
• Liaison with flanking formations.
• Refine defensive plan – wargaming.
• Rehearsals – time permitting.
• Influence key groups.
• Tackle enemy ISTAR capabilities.
• Counter threats to security.
• Attack enemy in depth – Jt Fires.
• Siting of defensive position.
• Site force elements two levels down (Coy/Sqn).
• Consider consequences of forward / reverse slope siting.
• Strong points and obstacles.
The Approach:
• Use Covering Force to impose delay and gain info on en.
• Support with OS / Jt Fires.
• Dislocate and inflict maximum casualties.
• Deceive enemy as to MDA position.
• Do not become decisively engaged.
• Likely to be a BG task.
• Composition will vary depending on enemy, terrain,
mission and available forces.
The Block:
• Checks enemy advance.
• Essential to regaining the initiative.
• Covering Force withdraws through gaps in defences (RPOL).
• Battle handed over to Fixing / Defending force.
• Covering Force (or elements) may become Reserve.
• Prepare for some level of enemy penetration.
• Isolated FEs should continue mission in line with intent.
Counter-Attack:
• Culminating Point – transition to offensive action.
• Designated Reserve needs to be protected and mobile.
• Simple plan – quick to execute.
• May be conducted from line of march.
• Support with Jt Fires.
• Sever enemy lead FEs from main body.
• CSS must allow sufficient ammo and fuel for c-attacks.
• CSS – constraint to offensive transition.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS:
Command
• Consider all kinetic and non kinetic means of influence, including fires,
manoeuvre, PPP, deception and other special influence methods.
• Vital Ground and Key Terrain.
• Mobile Defence – Bde Comd retains control of strike mission.
• Area Defence – greater autonomy to BGs, Bde Comd controls reserve.
• Liaise / co-ord with flanking units and formations – boundary cohesion.
• Posn of Comd. Main likely to be in rear of MDA, deploy Tac?
• Defence Plan – screens, guards, ISTAR, obs and dems, DF tasks, AD,
boundaries (multi national?), comms, routes, LoC.
Information and Intelligence
• IPE – enemy strs, CoG, key capabilities, reserves, intent, axis of advance, likely
COAs. Physical terrain – likely routes, obstacles, going.
• ISTAR focus – approach avenues, en strength/weakness and gaps.
• Active management of STAP adjusted for threat, day, night and weather.
• EW – disclosure of information on insecure enemy channels.
Firepower
• Use of kinetic and special influence methods appropriate to target.
•Coord of guns, mors, air and avn. Tgt prioritisation.
• Plan fires to max effect – engage early or withhold to achieve surprise?
• Integrate fires with obstacle plan and KAs/TAIs.
• Air and AH – depth tasks?
• Mobile Defence – move guns forward to support Covering Force / Strike Force?
• Area Defence – concentrate guns on en avenues of approach.
• Negative kinetic second order effects on local population, HN and others.
• Collateral Damage considerations.
• EW – Jamming against enemy recce, C2 and fire control nets.
Manoeuvre
• Mobility tasks (route maintenance / improvement, gap crossings).
• Counter mobility tasks (barriers, route denial, dominate chokepoints).
• Use of natural terrain, creation or enhancement of obstacles.
• Reserved Demolitions.
• Mobile Defence – manoeuvrability of strike force (plus requirement for a Mobile
Reserve)
• Area Defence – local counter attacks and spoiling attacks.
• Reserves maintained to counter enemy penetration.
Protection
• Cover gaps with surveillance and indirect fire.
• Prepare positions for enemy attack from any direction.
• Prepare positions at night.
• Use engrs to improve survivability.
• AD, CBRN protection, ECM fratricide?
• OPSEC measures to counter enemy intelligence acquisition.
• Deception – resourced and credible. Camouflage, concealment.
Sustainment
• Comd’s intent will drive sustainment priorities.
• Request defence stores early.
• Look ahead – prepare for subsequent offensive actions.
• Re-supply frequently – ensure maximum sufficiency.
• Forward dump stocks (but not in Mobile Defence – risk of loss).
• Recovery and forward repair of equipment.
• Med assets – site to achieve clinical timelines.
• Force protection of CSS elements / 360 degree threat environment.
• Equipment denial – policy and authority. 4-D-1
 CHAPTER 5

STABILISING ACTIONS

‘I cannot envisage a conflict where there will be no role for stabilisation operations, but
equally stabilisation is highly likely to involve combat.’ 1
General The Lord Dannatt GCB, CBE, MC, DL

0501. Stabilising actions are bespoke CONTENTS

tactical methods that contribute to the Subject Page
overarching, civilian led discipline of
stabilisation 2 and are the main focus of The Purpose of Stabilising Actions 5-3
The Brigade Contribution to Stabilisation 5-4
military led stability operations. 3 However, Planning Considerations 5-5
stabilising actions are carried out at all Force Elements for Stabilising Actions 5-11
levels, in all environments and are The Conduct of Stabilising Actions: 5-13
planned continuously and conducted Framework Security 5-14
concurrently with offensive and defensive Security Sector Reform and Military
Capacity Building 5-17
actions. Thus the stabilising or Support to the Delivery of Essential Services 5-20
destabilising impact of all tactical actions Support to Governance 5-22
need to be carefully considered and Support to Economic Development and
balanced throughout. As with all military Reconstruction 5-24
activity, the Manoeuvrist Approach – Vignettes 5-28
indirect, creative, placing strength against Annex A: Stabilising Actions Aide Memoire 5-A-1
weakness, and with an emphasis on
understanding – is key.

0502. Brigade stabilising actions will be conducted within a divisional framework. The 2*
headquarters will provide the command experience and staff capacity to deal with the
significant complexity and inter-agency nature of stabilising actions, allowing the brigade to
concentrate on tactical delivery. The particular challenges of stabilisation may see
considerable additional functionality devolved to the brigade; influence, civil effect,
additional intelligence, stabilisation and cultural advisors may all be task organised. The
brigade headquarters will need to reconfigure to integrate and optimise these assets. The
sub-division of function and task between brigade and division will vary depending on
context. A historical example is shown here:

Extract From CG MND (SE) Directive to Brigade Commanders, Oct 2004

‘I am not certain that at present, the divisional level of command is operating properly. I
have a sense that, because of the understandable pressures of day-to-day life, the division
is concerning itself overmuch with the affairs of brigade commanders, and insufficiently with
its own business. In my view, every level of command must add value to an operation. If it
does not do so, it should be removed. As far as the divisional level is concerned, this is the
lowest level at which deep, close and rear operations are organised; and the lowest level
1
Speech at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference in June 2008.
2
Defined as: ‘The process that supports states which are entering, enduring or emerging from conflict in order
to prevent or reduce violence; protect the population and key infrastructure; promote political processes and
governance structures, which lead to a political settlement that institutionalises non-violent contests for power;
and prepares for sustainable social and economic development.’ JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: The
Military Contribution (DCDC, November 2009).
3
Defined as: ‘Military operations which contribute to order, security and control to set the conditions to allow
the primacy of non-military and indigenous organisations to develop accountable institutions and mechanisms
of government.’ AFM Vol 1 Part 9 Stability Operations.

5-1
which plans and conducts high-tempo operations simultaneously. The order of battle is
irrelevant: if an organisation does this, it is de facto a division.

In this theatre, therefore, the divisional level will concern itself with the following tasks; and
if necessary the HQ will be reordered to do so:

• Planning, resourcing and coordinating the effort to restructure the Iraqi Security
Forces, and in particular their C4I architecture.
• ISTAR and targeting at divisional level.
• Divisional level joint and combined operations, whether kinetic or otherwise.
• Coordinating and resourcing brigade operations, including the identification and
committal of reserves.
• Coordination with higher political and military authorities in Baghdad and at home,
including matters of logistics, communications and administration.
• Future plans, and contingency plans.
• Information operations.
• Media operations.
• Synchronisation of military operations and information with the development of
essential services and the economy.
• Divisional rear operations.

I intend to synchronise our effects on the security line of operations with other effects using
live CCIRs to drive the collection plan, and thus the divisional targeting process.

By deduction, therefore, brigades or Provincial commands should concern themselves with:

• Intelligence gathering.
• The overwatch, training, supervision and mentoring of Iraqi Security Forces.
• Security operations.
• As required, surge operations to restore law and order.
• C4 (as previously defined) with non-governmental organisations, civil ministries,
donors, reconstruction agencies, and contractors.
• Border security, until relieved by Iraqi forces.
• Infrastructure security until relieved by Iraqi forces.
• Local and own national media operations.’

0503. In a single battlespace, the brigade may be required to deliver support to

governance, development and reconstruction, whilst simultaneously conducting offensive
actions. However, the brigade may also be required to carry out stabilising actions in order
to prevent conflict and/or the disintegration of a failing state. Stabilising actions carried out
by the brigade will be central to supporting wider national aims.

0504. Not all stabilisation activity will involve the military, however, for most military
interventions stabilising actions will be a necessary and implicit task. When specifically

5-2
carrying out stability operations the brigade will be resourced and organised to do so,
including being supported by a wide range of specialists. However, stabilising actions may
form part of a mission focussed on the spectrum of tactical actions and the brigade must be
prepared to take the lead and often develop innovative solutions when conducting
stabilising actions in the absence of stabilising resources and specialist staff.

0505. This chapter adheres to and extracts from the guidance laid out in JDP 3-40 Security
and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution, which provides the UK’s over-arching national
doctrine. For greater guidance and detail on the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
(TTPs) required refer to AFM Vol 1 Part 9 Tactics for Stability Operations and AFM Vol 1
Part 10 Countering Insurgency.

THE PURPOSE OF STABILISING ACTIONS

0506. State failure or instability will be one of the dominant, defining features of future
conflict and can usually be characterised by:

a. An absence of human and national security.

b. Stagnation of the formal economy and the growth of informal and often illegal
economic activity.

c. A lack of accountable governance and failure of the rule of law.

0507. Where any or all of the above elements exist it can result in the people withdrawing
support for the governing authorities, the existing political settlement being contested,
society fracturing and a competition, often involving violence, ensuing. Each situation will
be different and understanding the drivers and dynamics of the particular conflict will be
vital. It is this understanding that should drive any response.

0508. The primary purpose of stabilising actions is to contribute to the wider discipline of
stabilisation which aims to enable civilian, military and Host Nation (HN) actors to deliver a
‘political settlement’. This settlement lies at the heart of a stable state and is achieved
through balancing the conflicting relationships between the HN government, the wider
population and the competing elites. This is referred to as the ‘Key Conflict Relationship’. It
may be between identifiable sides, or more likely a kaleidoscope of indistinct groups with an
array of motivations, goals and tactics.

CAUSES OF INSTABILITY

Threats to the stability of a state can result from many forms of irregular activity:

• A violent battle for political power by clearly identifiable sides, or more frequently an
array of indistinct groups with diverse goals, methods, motivations and allegiances (as in
Angola, Burundi and Sudan).

• External influences by neighbouring states, instability spilling across borders or global

terrorist organisations endeavouring to undermine stabilisation efforts (as in Afghanistan).

• Natural disasters or wide-scale criminality leading to a failure of the current

government to protect and/or provide for its people (as in Somalia).

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Countering these threats will be central to the stabilisation effort.

0509. The brigade will rarely work in isolation; through joint action the brigade contribution
must influence the environment setting the conditions for non-military and indigenous actors
to carry out their roles. The brigade is a facilitator in a lengthy and complex process that
involves many actors and requires a thorough understanding of the local, regional and
international political environment. Campaign continuity is key to success.

THE BRIGADE CONTRIBUTION TO STABILISATION

Fig 5-1 The Stabilisation Model: The Military Contribution 4

0510. The Stabilisation Model (Fig 5-1) details three overlapping areas of progress that
underpin successful stability operations; security, governance and development. The three
areas are inextricably dependent upon each other, with good governance, rule of law and
development contributing to the delivery of security as well as being reliant on its presence.
The model also details stabilising actions that may be required in each area and the level of
the brigade’s contribution dependant on the permissiveness 5 of the environment. The tasks
listed are not exclusive but serve as examples of the myriad of actions that may be required
at brigade level and below.

0511. The brigade will set the security conditions and usually lead on aspects of Security
Sector Reform (SSR) and Military Capacity Building (MCB) in all environments. Security

4
JDP 3-40 (DCDC, November 2009).
5
The permissiveness of the environment is the extent to which personnel, military and civilian, international
and indigenous are able to operate effectively in the area of operations. It will vary between different actors,
with some being better able to operate than others, and between activities.

5-4
will be a significant factor where there is a violent insurgency or contest for power in the
country. It will be less so where instability has at its root a political or economic problem
which has not yet been exploited by those who might profit from insecurity.

0512. Civilian state and non-state institutions have responsibility and lead on: governance;
engagement and reconciliation; police and justice sector reform; restoration of basic
services and infrastructure; economic and financial development; and longer-term social
and infrastructure development. However, in non-permissive environments, some of these
may require support from the brigade in order to begin to demonstrate the potential effects
and benefits of governance and development. In the worst case scenario the brigade may
have to take rapid responsibility for delivery to arrest the downward spiral of state fragility
within the brigade AO. It is important to engage multi-agency support from the outset and
aim to hand over responsibility for delivering activities within these Lines of Operation (LoO)
as soon as possible.

WHY ARE WEAK AND FAILING STATES A THREAT?

Weak and failing states are now as great a threat to UK national interests as strong states
(i.e. traditional security threats). States today are faced with a multitude of transnational
threats that emanate from both state and non state actors with their roots in state failure.
These threats include – terrorism, transnational crime, weapons proliferation (including
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), regional instability and the spread of disease
and epidemics. Such states are safe havens that provide fertile breeding grounds for terror
networks, as they are not in control of their own territories and people and suffer from a
vacuum of authority that terrorist, criminal groups or insurgents can fill.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

COMMAND

0513. When conducting stabilising actions all brigade action should be designed to
contribute towards influencing the key conflict relationship between the host nation
government, competing elites and the wider population, and shaping the eventual political
settlement. The commander may also need to shape domestic audiences, key regional
leaders and populations, coalition partners, diasporas and broader international opinion.

0514. All activity, military and civilian, kinetic or non-kinetic has an influence. To achieve
the desired outcome, the commander must establish the effects necessary to exert
influence, then derive the activities required to realise those effects.

0515. Competing Narratives. In order to achieve civil/military unity of effort when

conducting stabilising actions there should be a narrative agreed between all actors. Ideally
this is distilled from the national/strategic level, but if not the brigade should agree its own
and ensure all force elements and partners work together to demonstrate it. The narrative
should support local and/or national governance and not the role of the brigade. The
commander may become engaged in a battle of competing narratives with adversaries who
have already recognised the strategic importance of influencing public perceptions, will use
increasingly sophisticated methods and may have a significant cultural advantage.
Understanding is critical to the development of the brigade narrative, which must remain
sensitive to the external environment and competing narratives.

0516. Messaging. The brigade should seek to use established channels for messaging.
Where these are absent or insufficient, the brigade will need to build relationships with the

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population in order to establish viable channels. Messages delivered by foreign spokesmen
typically lack credibility and, regardless of content, are not as well received as those from
familiar, trusted sources.

0517. The Integrated Approach. Stabilising actions require a range of activities to be

conducted simultaneously by different actors. The integrated approach is a broad cross-
governmental, multi-agency and often Multi-National (MN) coordinated approach to
planning. It requires proactive engagement, shared understanding, thinking based on
outcome rather than input, and collaborative working.

0518. Where possible, the commander must incorporate all empowered stabilisation
focussed actors into the brigade planning process to maximise unity of effort and the effect
derived from a integrated approach. Joint training with Other Government Departments
(OGD) prior to deployment can mitigate some of the risks. It is important to remember that
the brigade will not always be at the centre of activity, other actors may already be
established and have extant plans – it may be more effective to determine how the brigade
can fit into and bolster existing programmes. The brigade headquarters may provide the
physical means to enable a broader integrated approach due to its resources and integral
security.

0519. Working With Partners. The brigade in isolation will lack the resources and skill
sets to ultimately deliver stabilisation. Success can only be delivered by working
collaboratively through a range of other actors including MN, OGDs, Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGO) and the HN. Together these form a complex environment. Many of
these organisations have different mandates, timelines, modus operandi and caveats to the
brigade. The ability to build consensus and work in collaboration with the other actors,
particularly the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) if present, are essential qualities of
the brigade commander and his staff 6 . When working in a coalition, understanding the
military culture, policy goals, political caveats and operational strengths and limitations of
allies will have a significant impact on the character and conduct of brigade operations.

0520. Stakeholder Analysis. In order to identify the framework of empowered actors with
whom the commander can engage, a simple stakeholder analysis should be conducted.

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS CHECKLIST

WHO are the relevant actors? Who are the predominant interlocutors with whom I need to
interact in order to enable holistic planning and to deliver coherent execution?

WHAT are their motivations? What is their mandate and constraints?

WHY are they involved? What are their specific interests and objectives? How may they be
affected and what are their likely responses?

SO WHAT does their involvement mean to me?

• What can I expect to leverage from them and what are they likely to want to leverage
from me?
• What steps do I need to take to integrate them into, or exclude them from, my
process? What must I do?

6
This is core business for the Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) staff.

5-6
 • How can discipline be imposed on their engagement (e.g. who is the lead interlocutor
with each player)?
JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution

0521. Influence Matrix. The individuals indentified by the stakeholder analysis, along with
the assessment of their power and influence, should feed the brigade influence matrix. The
influence matrix drives all activity and tactical actions should be based on changing the
power and influence of these individuals to further the brigade narrative and plan.

INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

0522. Understanding. Success in delivering stabilising actions depends upon a thorough

understanding of the operating environment and the dynamics and drivers of conflict. It
ensures that timely, appropriate measures are developed to influence competing elites and
the wider population. It is essential to develop a good understanding of the relevant
society, its history and culture, the origins of conflict, demographics, political dynamics,
influential power structures, regional influences and the complex mix of actors (civil,
military, criminal etc) involved. Indigenous actors will hold an advantage in understanding
and our ability to gain and maintain the initiative will in part rely on our ability to adjust or
improve our understanding quickly in response to the environment.

0523. The Bde MI Coy is responsible for producing the Single Intelligence Narrative (SIN)
which forms the nucleus of understanding. Other stakeholders can then add their insight
and foresight to this SIN in order to generate understanding, examples include Foreign
Area Officers (FAO), deployed Cultural Advisors (CULAD) and Locally Employed Civilians
(LEC) can provide invaluable advice and the skills to decode and understand cultural
nuance. Important insights can also be gained by establishing strong channels with MN
partners, OGDs, IOs, possibly some NGOs and from open source material. Indigenous
Security Forces (ISF) should also be mentored and developed as good sources of
information.

0524. ISTAR. Units conducting stabilising actions will have a broader range of
responsibilities than in a warfighting operation and will require much more focussed ISTAR
support from the brigade; biometric data capture and Materiel and Personnel Exploitation
(MPE) will be crucial when operating 'amongst the people'. As with any type of operation, a
detailed ISTAR estimate, regularly updated, will form the basis of determining what ISTAR
assets are required.

0525. Maintaining Situational Awareness (SA) and knowing when and how to act to
achieve the desired effect is critical. For stabilising actions the brigade must balance the
ISTAR effort between collection for immediate targeting and that for longer-term intelligence
to develop understanding. The G2 staff will also need to develop trend and link analysis, 7
with a focus on a wide range of actors.

0526. Communications. In stabilisation there will be much demand for high capacity
communications and sophisticated databases and information tools. The CIS to enable this
may be ‘Commercial Off The Shelf’ (COTS) and thus less mobile and rugged than that for
other actions. There must be a balance of CIS to also allow for offensive actions with highly
mobile, simple and rugged CIS.

7
For further information see The Company Operational Intelligence Support Handbook.

5-7
0527. Human Terrain. An understanding of the Human Terrain (HT) is essential to
conduct stabilising actions and must underpin the planning, conduct and measurement of
influence. HT is the social, political and economic organisation, beliefs and values and
forms of interaction of a population. At the operational and tactical level it refers to
identifying the ‘who, what, where and when’ and with its linguistic, ideological, tribal,
sectarian and ethnic features can be highly complex.

0528. HT subject matter expertise can be provided by, among others, CULADs who may
be embedded in the headquarters and the PRT. Brigade G2 staff will build up and maintain
a thorough understanding of the HT in order to provide sufficient detail to:

a. Select the key target audience.

b. Assist targeting (both physical and psychological).

c. Identify vulnerabilities.

d. Select the means of influence and maximise effect.

e. Understand the effects that our actions may have on the selected target
audience.

0529. Measures Of Effectiveness. Measures Of Effectiveness (MOE) assist in

determining mission success and can be used to inform decision making and allocation of
resources. Stabilising actions need to be monitored in order to ensure their intended
influence is being achieved and to reduce the impact of unintended consequences. This is
particularly important as the results are often subtle and easily reversible. A key MOE
when conducting stabilising actions is to measure and track the changing influence and
power of individuals identified in the stakeholder analysis and targeted through the
influence matrix.

0530. The commander should integrate MOE throughout all phases of an operation.
Stabilising actions do not lend themselves readily to linear planning or to conventional
monitoring of activities and outputs. A more flexible and adaptive approach is required to
measure the outcomes and impacts of activities and the extent to which they contribute to
overall objectives. This could include the evaluation of MOE assessments conducted by
non-military empowered actors within the brigade AO (when brigade staff are unable to
capture their own data). MOE will often be dictated by a higher headquarters.

FIREPOWER

0531. Brigade tactical actions will be highly visible and should be focussed on achieving
influence effect that support the agreed narrative and overall campaign strategy. There will
often be a requirement to combine stabilising and offensive actions, however the emphasis
should not be the decisive defeat of the enemy so much as the requirement to make him
irrelevant. Fires and manoeuvre achieve psychological as well as physical effects, however
it is likely to be the psychological effects on specific target audiences, rather than physical
attacks on capability, that will be the lasting and decisive elements in stabilisation.

0532. Targeting. Targeting is key to ensuring the correct effect is achieved against a
target, be that kinetic or non-kinetic, as part of the commander’s plan. Targeting should be
considered against enemy forces and the local population and a targeting plan formulated
to implement the commanders direction. At all times the targeting process outcomes must
be coherent with the information methods plan. It may be that to have the desired effect on

5-8
an insurgent a kinetic strike is required. Where this is the case every measure must be
taken to ensure Collateral Damage (CD) is avoided and an information operation must
support this. Any kinetic strike must comply with the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) as well
as national and coalition Rules of Engagement (RoE) and Targeting Directives (TD) and
must be supported by appropriate information methods.

0533. The commander must ensure all soldiers have a clear understanding of the
consequences of using force during stabilising actions in complex crises, particularly during
the transition between warfighting and operations limited to self defence. All feasible
precautions must be taken to minimise Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) and CD to civil
infrastructure which may generate adverse perceptions and undermine the legitimacy of
brigade actions.

0534. Wider Legal Implications. When conducting stabilising actions the commander and
staff need a detailed knowledge of the laws that govern their actions and the legal
implications in complex crises. Legal issues should be considered as a factor in estimates
and legal guidance will need to be included in orders and briefings. When working closely
with ISF it is important to be aware they may be subject to different ROE and wider legal
obligations under HN law. Brigade personnel must ensure that ISF adhere to these legal
obligations and report any transgressions in line with UK and theatre policy.

PROTECTION

0535. Force Protection. Stabilising actions require the brigade to operate ‘amongst the
people’ in order to improve security, support the growth of governance and enable
development. Force Protection (FP) is a key enabling activity to sustain operational
effectiveness and generate freedom of action. A failure of FP at the tactical level can result
in casualties, which may have a disproportionate impact at the political or military strategic
level. However, balance is required. Becoming risk averse could isolate or fix the brigade
with a resultant loss of agility and offensive spirit, making it increasingly vulnerable.

0536. Threat Assessment. The commander must conduct a detailed threat assessment
in order to determine a range of measures to counter the identified threats. These
measures will comprise a balance of proactive or offensive means, and reactive or
defensive means depending on the severity of the threat. In a MN and multi-agency
environment, this process is complicated by varying levels of acceptance of risk and
differing approaches to FP. The commander may also have to consider the FP of OGDs,
NGOs and IOs in order for them to continue to be effective. Coordinated planning is
essential to providing a coherent approach, including appropriate battlespace management.

0537. Battlespace Management and Air Land Integration. When conducting stabilising
actions, Battlespace Management (BM) and Air Land Integration (ALI) will be complex.
However the process of de-confliction is no different from other military actions. The BM
plan must be integrated throughout the planning process and incorporated into the ACO
where necessary. It must be rigorously wargamed and FSCM/ACM be promulgated as
early as possible.

0538. Specific guidance on FP is provided in AJP 3.14 Allied Joint Doctrine for Force
Protection and JDP 3-64 Joint Force Protection.

SUSTAINMENT

0539. Logistics are a critical planning factor in determining the commander’s freedom of
action, particularly as stabilising actions are likely to take place within a state with weak or

5-9
inadequate infrastructure. The logistic architecture will be shaped by a wide variety of
factors that may be outside of the commander’s control. Early logistic decisions will have a
long lasting impact on the commander’s plan, the structure of the force and the conduct of
brigade actions, and can prove very difficult and costly to change later on.

0540. Opportunities to generate wider and enduring stabilising effect can be achieved by
aligning military logistic planning with the longer-term needs of the HN. To be successful it
will require a clear understanding of national, inter-agency, MN, NGO and HN development
goals. These initiatives will be subject to considerable friction and brigade solutions will
need to have inbuilt agility and redundancy.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

‘Security Transitions are the progressive transfer of security functions and responsibilities
between actors in order to reach a durable level of stability for the host nation that is not
dependant on a significant operational international military contribution.’
JDN 6/10 Security Transitions

0541. Security Transition. Once the brigade has achieved an acceptable level of security
and public order, the commander should consider moving to an ISF lead. This will be a
political as well as security judgement. There are at least two options: transition from the
brigade to an indigenous military security lead; or transition direct to a civil (police) lead, i.e.
police primacy. Police primacy should be the ultimate goal as it can bolster the perception
of progress and reinforce the impression of hostile groups as criminals rather than freedom
fighters. It demonstrates the HN government’s commitment to governing through the rule of
law. However, police primacy will often be un-achievable until relatively late in the
campaign and may even be an alien concept in some societies. Security transitions are
often periods of high risk and uncertainty for the brigade, which if enacted prematurely can
be counter-productive.

0542. Each security transition is unique, however there are common approaches, principles
and risks applicable to planning or implementing transition that will contribute towards
lasting stability in the brigade and wider AO. Further detailed information can be found in
JDN 6/10 Security Transitions.

0543. Campaign Continuity. Stabilisation will often be a protracted affair. To ensure

enduring success the brigade must build on its successes in a cumulative manner and
avoid mistakes of the past. Tactical commanders must adopt a mindset that acknowledges
that success will not necessarily occur on ‘their watch’ but as part of the longer term
campaign plan and should concentrate on creating the foundations on which their
successors can build and improve.

FORCE ELEMENTS FOR STABILISING ACTIONS

0544. In order to carry out stabilising actions, the brigade may need to adapt individual and
unit roles, composition, equipment, operating procedures and training. If the initial
deployment of the force is on the basis of a contingent intervention operation which then
transitions to a stability operation (e.g. Iraq 2003 – 2004), then the force may have to adapt
in contact. Commonality of CIS and a shared information environment must be sought
despite challenges such as security clearances. As the operational context evolves, the
force must remain responsive to the ever changing demands of the operational
environment.

5-10
0545. The initial composition of the brigade and its options for adaptation should be one of
the major tasks to fall out of the commander’s analysis. A typical brigade composition to
conduct stabilising actions is likely to contain the following generic elements:

a. Integrated Headquarters. The brigade headquarters structure is likely to

require adjustment and, as a minimum, will need to integrate a number of liaison
officers, multi-agency partners and staff such as stabilisation, policy or cultural
advisors. There is likely to be an increased emphasis on G5 and G3/5 and in areas
of limited permissiveness, the brigade headquarters may need to host other
government departments and agencies. The aim must be to promote coherence
across civil and military activity. Full integration may only be necessary in the most
complex of tasks and even then may be difficult to achieve. Exchanging empowered
planning staff or simply collocating headquarters are viable alternatives in less
demanding scenarios.

b. Framework Forces. Framework forces enable and conduct the bulk of the
routine security operations. They will largely be focused on securing key
installations, locations and population centres.

c. Strike Forces. Strike forces are used to disrupt and defeat the insurgent, often
in depth. Although these brigade strikes are usually kinetic, they should also be
supported by special influence methods.

d. Surge Forces. Surge forces are deployed to reinforce framework forces in

order to achieve specific effects. They can be based over the horizon or in-country.

e. Capacity Building Forces. Capacity building forces are made up of brigade

specialists who should have a deep cultural understanding of the local population
and will need to build robust working relationships with them. They may also deliver
combat enabling capabilities, such as air and medical support that ISF lack.

f. Joint/Multi National Enablers. Joint enablers, are those elements that move,
sustain, maintain and support the brigade. These often prove to be a very large
proportion of a stabilisation force and the requirement for joint enablers should not be
underestimated.

0546. Indigenous Security Forces. ISF are an essential part of effective security. The
commander should engage with his ISF counterparts in order to capitalise on their
knowledge of the ground and close links with the local population. During the Develop
phase in particular, the use of ISF by the brigade may assist with harnessing consent
amongst the local population. ISF culture and operating procedures will be different to our
those of the brigade and early participation in joint training will help enhance interoperability.

SPECIALIST STABILISATION ELEMENTS

0547. Stabilisation Unit. The Stabilisation Unit (SU) reports to a tri-department

management board made up from the FCO, DFID and the MOD; staff however can come
from across government or from the private sector. Its mission is to co-ordinate and
support cross-government stabilisation, planning and execution. It provides manpower and
support to enable the deployment of:

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 a. Stabilisation Response Teams. These joint military and civilian teams, have
expertise tailored to the operational environment, and are able to rapidly deploy
anywhere an integrated UK response is required. Activities may range from
assessing an emergent crisis, building governance capacity to post conflict
stabilisation and the brigade should be prepared to integrate/facilitate where
necessary.

b. Provincial Reconstruction Teams. PRTs are civil-military organisations

designed to operate where the freedom of access for civil agencies is constrained,
usually delivered by a single nation. The principal role of a PRT is to support
indigenous local government in the realisation of their own HN priorities. PRTs had
three objectives when introduced in Afghanistan: to improve security; extend the
authority of the government; and to promote reconstruction. The approach was later
introduced into Iraq. There is no single model.

c. Stabilisation Advisors. Stabilisation Advisors (STABAD) are experienced

civilian specialists who, working with other key actors including host nation
authorities, help shape a bespoke stabilisation plan for their area of responsibility.
They will advise the military at many levels from 2* HQ down to BG commanders and
are responsible for enabling the delivery of the civilian LoO within the overall
stabilisation plan.

d. Thematic Specialists and Advisers. The SU also hosts the Civilian

Stabilisation Group (CSG), a 1000 strong pool of civilian experts able to rapidly
respond to demand for stabilisation expertise anywhere in the world.

ROLE OF A STABILISATION ADVISER

‘I work alongside the Afghan Government and 3 Para to help bring ‘everyday’ services to
the Afghan communities in my area: schools, clinics, justice, policing.... things we take for
granted in the West. They barely exist in my area. In some communities they have never
existed. But once people have access to these types of services they see just how
valuable they are - and this increases their wish to see the back of the Taliban and the
assistance that the Afghan government can provide. 3 Para have been working since early
October to push the Taliban out of parts of the district so that the Afghan government can
regain control and provide services to the community.

So it's a real mix: advising on the development and stabilisation aspects of military
operations, managing projects, helping resolve local disputes, advising the governor and
his staff, consulting with local elders, coordinating our local team, briefing senior military
and political officials, planning community events… never a dull moment.’
British STABAD based with 3 PARA at Patrol Base Shazad
Northern Nad-e Ali District, March 2011

0548. Military Stabilisation Support Group. The Military Stabilisation Support Group
(MSSG) is the specialist defence unit that enables and delivers specialists, capable of
providing stabilisation support to all deployed divisional, brigade and BG headquarters.

a. Stabilisation Planning Team. MSSG provides Stabilisation Planning Teams

(SPT) to divisional, brigade and task force headquarters and/or relevant civilian
organisations such as PRTs. SPTs provide the commander with G3 and G5
stabilisation planning and assessment advice. They are also likely to provide

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 leadership of deployed MSSTs and a reachback capability to the MSSG enabling
component. The SPT should integrate into the HQ at the earliest opportunity during
Mission Specific Training (MST).

b. Military Stabilisation Support Teams. Military Stabilisation Support Teams

(MSST) support deployed brigades, BG headquarters and sub-unit headquarters
and/or other groupings such as PRTs. MSSTs work to the SPT but deliver in direct
support of the STABAD in areas where civilians are unable to work effectively or
where there is a benefit in the military doing so. The OC of the MSST will provide
military stabilisation expertise to the local military commander (usually the BG
commander). The MSSTs primary focus is delivering stabilisation effect through
encouraging, enabling and persuading local elites, government authorities and the
population to reach an agreed view on governance, security, education and
economic and infrastructure redevelopment.

c. Thematic Specialists. MSSG Functional Specialists are members of the

regular or reserve Armed Forces who provide expertise to support specific projects
where relevant civilian expertise is either unavailable or unable to gain adequate
access to the project due to the security situation.

THE CONDUCT OF STABILISING ACTIONS

‘Military Assistance to Stabilisation and Development now formally recognises that the
Armed Forces should plan and conduct operations to help stabilise and reconstruct in those
locations where the security situation is too difficult to allow civilian agencies to work
alone.’ 8
Baron Hutton of Furness
when Secretary of State for Defence

0549. Stabilising actions are planned continuously and carried out concurrently with the
other tactical actions and are unlikely to have substance without consisting of some
offensive, defensive and enabling actions. Stabilising actions are bespoke tactical methods
for implementing Military Assistance to Security and Development (MASD), although they
could feature to degrees in all the military activities.

0550. There are three overlapping areas that underpin successful stability operations;
security, governance and development. In order to contribute to this a brigade may be
responsible for all or a proportion of the delivery of interrelated groups of stabilising actions:

a. Provision of security, further subdivided into:

(1) Framework security.

(2) Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Military Capacity Building (MCB).

b. Support to the delivery of essential services.

c. Support to governance, economic development and reconstruction.

FRAMEWORK SECURITY

8
Secretary of State for Defence 2008-2009 speaking in the House of Commons, June 2009.

5-13
0551. Success in achieving security is a precursor to enabling all the other LoO to flourish.
The early establishment of a secure environment and a degree of law and order following
military intervention provides a permissive environment for external and civil actors to
operate.

0552. The Role of the Brigade. The brigade will contribute to the provision of security
usually on behalf of the HN government. This may range from advice, military assistance
and training, SSR, offensive actions to contain or deter, or a full-scale intervention to
combat a violent insurgency.

0553. In the latter case, the brigade will need to engage in offensive actions to suppress
the insurgent, to wrest the initiative from him in order to dictate terms, and to demonstrate
the HN government’s authority. However, offensive action carries the risk of military and
civilian casualties and the insurgent may deliberately target the population and through
violence and intimidation try to dissuade the population and international community from
supporting the government’s efforts.

0554. Tactical Bases. Static, tactical bases are used to support a continuous and effective
security presence. Tactical bases will be established when the command decision is made
that they offer sufficient tactical advantage over relying solely on vehicle and dismounted
operations. They are the hubs around which forward operations are conducted on an
enduring operation. Main bases are sited for strategic purposes such as theatre entry,
whereas the locations of tactical bases are determined primarily by tactical considerations.
Some bases are established to provide indirect support to operations such as
communications nodes or to control border-crossing points. Others are required to
establish the essential framework for security operations. In COIN and stability operations,
this latter category is used to achieve the following operational effects:

a. Secure the population.

b. Establish a stabilising presence.

c. Create local influence.

0555. Establish Human Security. 9

a. Protect Population and Key Assets. Winning the contest for human security
is fundamental to the development of HN government authority and, ultimately
security of the state. The commander can employ a range of techniques including:

(1) Static protection of key sites e.g. market places and refugee camps.

(2) Persistent security in areas secured and held e.g. intensive patrolling and
check-points.

(3) Population control e.g. curfews and vehicle restrictions.

(4) Improving freedom of movement.

b. Establish Secured Areas. By providing secured areas the brigade will isolate
the adversary from the population. Securing key areas helps to support economic

9
Human Security is characterised by: freedom from persecution, want and fear; adequate provision of
essential commodities to sustain life; broader environmental security; and the protection of cultural values.

5-14
 activity, enable major infrastructure projects and encourage effective governance and
the rule of law. Once the situation allows, such areas should be consolidated and
expanded. Support to local governance and development, together with initiatives
that generate local employment and economic growth, will be critical to maintaining
security and stability.

c. Border Forces. Effective border control is essential to combat regional

criminality and the movement of foreign fighters, weapons and supplies. The brigade
may be tasked to patrol borders and mentor customs, immigration and border control
agencies.

d. Provide Humanitarian Assistance. On occasion the brigade may need to

facilitate or provide emergency shelter, medical or food aid within the limits of their
capacity. However, the brigade should only undertake such assistance in close
consultation with the FCO and DFID, or with IOs working through these
departments. 10

0556. Countering Adversaries. Direct military action against adversaries is likely to be a

central component of the brigade contribution to the wider stabilisation campaign. In this
case, setting the conditions for a negotiated political settlement may entail breaking the
ideological, financial or intimidatory links within and between different adversarial and
belligerent groups, as well as between them and the local population. Considerations will
be:
a. The Use of Offensive Actions. Offensive actions in support of stabilising
actions must be used with considerable care and only to directly reinforce the
conditions of achieving the desired political outcome. It should seek to minimise
CIVCAS and CD to civil infrastructure or risk undermining the broader influence
effort. Where adversaries choose to fight amongst the people the challenge for the
brigade is to create the opportunity to use force decisively and minimise collateral
risk. Often the threat of offensive action will achieve the required results.

b. Actions to wrest the initiative from insurgents, may result in a fierce contest for
the initiative, freedom of movement, authority, the provision of security and the
popular support of the local people in areas of symbolic, political, economic and
security significance. Sometimes the more force used the less effective it is, an
action that kills five low-level adversaries is counterproductive if CD leads to the
recruitment of fifty more. The commander should consider that offensive actions
designed to secure an area may displace adversaries to a new safe haven where
they can regroup and strike where the brigade, HN government and agencies are
less able to respond. In some circumstances it may be better not to strike but to
disrupt their activities and gather intelligence for later decisive actions.

‘In wars among the people, if you are using a lot of firepower, you are almost certainly
losing.’
General Sir David Richards

c. Money for Security Effect. Money is a key tool to both enable and magnify
the delivery of immediate security effects and can produce a positive influence
outcome. Money can be used by the brigade for direct security programmes such as
the funding of indigenous forces, or indirect consent-winning initiatives such as the
settling of specific grievances before they become sources of disaffection and

10
The UN “Oslo Guidelines” state that provision by the military must only be as a last resort.

5-15
 resentment. The commander should try to ensure that accounting procedures placed
upon the use of money reflect his needs i.e. it is readily available for use in
accordance with his spending priorities.

d. Tensions can exist between the military’s desire to use money to buy short term
consent and the longer term vision of OGDs and NGOs. At the brigade level the use
of money should be coordinated through the STABADs in order to ensure that it is
line with the longer term vision. The effectiveness of money can also be limited by
the HN’s capacity either to provide competent contractors to carry out required work
and/or the ability to absorb large amounts of cash without distorting the local
economy or leading to corruption. In Afghanistan cash for works programmes
proved successful in gaining local consent as the security bubble was expanded,
however, care must be taken to ensure that all spending benefits the expansion of
governance and does not create a dependency culture.

e. The Use of Detention. Arrest, detention, trial and imprisonment will ideally be
conducted by the HN judicial system. However, when the HN government lacks an
effective police force, an independent judiciary or a penal system with the capacity or
resolve to be effective, it may be necessary for the brigade to conduct military
detention operations. A well-coordinated screening and interrogation mechanism
can have the added bonus of providing a valuable source of actionable intelligence
and a direct channel to the adversary. This enables more precise targeting and
stimulates the perception of progress, restraint and legitimacy. Control and
supervision of all types of captured persons is manpower intensive and procedurally
complex. It is critical that all brigade personnel are familiar with current prisoner
handling and detention policy and those directly involved are properly trained and
supervised. The penalties for failing to look after captured persons correctly can be
severe and the publicity generated can result in a strategic reverse. If necessary,
additional training and support should be sought from the chain of command prior to
deployment. For further guidance see JDP 1-10 2nd Edition Captured Persons.

0557. Key Leader Engagement. Key Leader Engagement (KLE) is recognised as an

important element of the targeting process and needs to be synchronised at brigade level
with fires, manoeuvre and other special influence methods in order to achieve the required
effects. KLE is predominantly conducted to gain information or influence behaviour and is a
key enabler of human terrain analysis. The Commander will usually engage directly with
the perceived key leader of the intended target audience. However, low level commanders
on patrols will be involved in routine community engagement on a daily basis. At brigade
level, KLE mission analysis and planning should be conducted by the Information Methods
staff or a designated KLE staff officer. For further information refer to AFM Vol 1 Part 10
COIN Annex A to Chapter 8 and the Land Influence Handbook, March 2011, Section 11.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND MILITARY CAPACITY BUILDING

0558. National stability relies on effective governance and economic opportunity which is
underpinned by the existence of an effective security framework. Societal conflicts create
ideal conditions for the proliferation of predatory armed groups, criminal networks and an
increase in opportunistic crime. In addition, the population’s experience of state security
forces can be extremely negative. For the stabilisation campaign to succeed it is, therefore,
essential for the brigade to show progress towards a security sector that is effective,
legitimate, transparent, just, accountable and subject to the rule of law.

0559. Security Sector Reform (SSR) is likely to be a core task in countries emerging from
conflict but may also make a significant contribution to conflict prevention in fragile or failing

5-16
states. The brigade contribution may range from providing temporary training teams to
rebuilding whole areas of defence and national security.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

0560. The security sector (security forces, police and justice) delivers a fundamental
function of government and are a cornerstone of state sovereignty. SSR is the overall (and
largely political) process by which effective indigenous security structures are developed.

0561. The Role of the Brigade. The precise scope and nature of military support provided
by the brigade will vary according to the level of reform required and the security
environment. The brigade will require an SSR cell in order to carry out the level of planning
and liaison required with the HN and OGDs.

0562. The brigade contribution to SSR is likely to focus on Military Capacity Building
(MCB), however, other tasks may include:

a. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). Significant armed

groups or a disproportionately large military have the potential to destabilise a state
threatening its security. While some of these groups could be put to work on behalf
of the state to generate mass and bolster local security, other groups will require
inclusion in an arms management programme and their members re-trained and
reintegrated back into civil society. Its aim is to ensure that combatants, and their
weapons, are taken out of the conflict and provided with a transition package so that
they do not seek to return to arms. While DFID and the UN may offer DDR
expertise, there is no universal model. Each situation is unique. DDR is not just a
technical military activity, but a political process with economic and social
consequences. The commander should consider:

(1) Disarmament initiatives may encourage a local arms trade.

(2) Early disarming may leave a security vacuum which may be filled by new
combatants. It may change factional security balances, setting conditions for
reprisals.

(3) Ex-combatants who are detained in encampments can create unrest.

Funded re-integration programmes (such as jobs and skills training) may be
required to prevent militia leaders from re-forming their groups.

(4) Providing means to monitor and evaluate progress.

b. Initial Generation and Management of Indigenous Forces. The condition

and suitability of existing ISF should be assessed before a decision is made to
generate new forces. The commander should ensure training teams establish basic
support structures parallel to operational training, as the operational capability of
local forces is likely to reflect the quality of basic administration: pay, feeding and
equipment husbandry.

c. Support to the Judicial Sector. In many developing states, the primary

sources of justice are traditional ones. These include tribal elders, religious
authorities and informal local courts administering long-held rules and customs.
Brigade reinforcement of the judicial system is an important stabilising action. During
the initial stages of a campaign, the brigade may be required to identify local key
leaders and any informal justice mechanisms in order to incorporate them into the

5-17
 reform process. The brigade may also be required to begin the refurbishment or
reconstruction of facilities, possibly including court houses and prisons, or at least to
provide security.

d. Developing Indigenous Police Services. The brigade may need to lead on

police basic training, leaving specialist training, such as evidence handling and
forensic investigation, to other specialists. The responsibility for on-going internal
security should ideally be provided by a demilitarised police force with a mandate for
law enforcement and strong links to the judiciary. Ideally, this sees the creation of a
community-based police service in the brigade AO, with a clear separation between
the roles of the HN police and the military. Police primacy for internal security should
remain an aspiration, however, community policing models assume consent which is
unlikely to be achievable in the midst of violent conflict. Therefore, the policing
model must be realistic.

e. Support to the Indigenous Health Sector. Health provision is often an

emotive subject and if access is reduced or controlled in favour of different groups it
may become a destabilising influence. Supporting indigenous health provision may
therefore be an important stabilising function. A comprehensive health needs
assessment at anything above village or district level is a time consuming and
technical task. Ideally this should be conducted by indigenous health professionals
with assistance from civilian agencies, but HSS should be prepared to assist if
requested.

MILITARY CAPACITY BUILDING

0563. Stabilising a state depends on transferring the responsibility for security to ISF.
Trained ISF lower the profile of intervening actors, reinforce the security capacities of the
state and help connect the government with its people. In contrast, sectarian or poorly
disciplined forces may fuel the conflict. In an era when Britain and other allied nations have
fewer forces than in the past, investment in developing and working with ISF is essential in
order to attain the critical mass which population protection demands.

0564. The Role of the Brigade. MCB is the generic term used to describe the training,
mentoring, monitoring and enabling of ISF by the military. It is an essential activity in
setting the conditions for the drawdown and extraction of UK armed forces from operational
theatres and is expected to be an enduring requirement for future operations. The
generation and subsequent training of ISF should be conducted in a coordinated manner
with broader SSR initiatives (see above). The development of structures (HN MOD down),
oversight mechanisms and policy will usually fall to other actors, however, the brigade may
be required to contribute as these functions are developed.

0565. For the brigade, building up ISF, both police and military, through training, mentoring,
partnering and embedding requires different skills and force structures from conventional
activities. This requires detailed planning at the force design stage and hard choices may
have to be made between allocating troops for concurrent ISF capacity-building and
framework security tasks. However, building up and training ISF will be necessary to
generate the force mass ultimately required for successful transition and overwatch. Care
should be taken to ensure that ISF units are not over-faced before they are demonstrably
capable. A particular challenge is retaining situational awareness and will be a risk to
successful re-engagement.

0566. MCB works best when it is framed, planned and conducted ‘by, with and through’ the
HN. This means working with the local culture and its norms to find ways which both

5-18
reinforce and support the HN government’s legitimacy. It includes the following formula of
overlapping tasks: 11

a. Inward Investment. Depending on poverty levels and the effects of conflict,

the new indigenous security structure will require inward investment. Advice and
training will be meaningless without equipment, bases and other resources being
made available. The establishment of the new sector’s credibility and confidence
depends on outward perceptions of change; this is expensive, but cannot be
avoided.

b. Training. ISF should be individually and collectively trained by the brigade at

secure and well-resourced centres, using the train-the-trainer model whenever
possible. They should not be exposed to the population until they are effective
enough to inspire confidence. Training should be based on considered, cultural
understanding of the audience, rather than on a template.

c. Mentoring. Once deployed on operations, the ISF should be mentored. This

requires a subtle blend of encouragement, advice and compulsion, emphasising
independence and confidence and playing down dependency. Brigade mentoring
teams should be small, self-sufficient and agile. They should be capable of living
and fighting alongside indigenous forces. Their subordinate role is to provide their
own force with situational awareness and assessments of conditions.

d. Partnering. Once the ISF is confident and capable of independent operation

with brigade support, the relationship should change further, to one of partnering.
This might involve the provision of niche capabilities, joint operations with the ISF in
the lead, or brigade units or individuals working alongside or even subordinated
within an indigenous chain of command.

e. Transition and Overwatch. Over time, brigade partnering elements can

withdraw to a position of overwatch, inside or outside the theatre, in support of the
independent ISF, following a transition of responsibility and power. However, rapidly
raising ISF of low quality and with little oversight or accountability mechanisms is
likely to undermine the legitimacy of MCB, can easily lead to an abuse of power and
lead to the requirement to re-engage.

0567. Mentoring and partnering will place additional requirements on Operational Security
(OPSEC), therefore mechanisms for ensuring appropriate levels of OPSEC are maintained
are critical. MCB is covered in detail in Chapter 10 of AFM Vol1 Pt10 Countering
Insurgency.

SUPPORT TO THE DELIVERY OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES

0568. Sustainable security is dependant on the provision of adequate access to essential

services, such as food, water, sanitation, shelter and medical care. The more demanding
the physical environment and the more destructive the fighting, the more the lack of these
services will be felt. A lack of essential services will be exploited by adversaries and will
create discomfort, tension and disorder. It may also cause the migration/movement of large
numbers of people, which can pose a threat to security and restrict freedom of movement.

0569. The Role of the Brigade. The brigade may be required to contribute in the early
stages of an operation, or subsequent periods where the security situation deteriorates and
11
ADP Ops (DCDC, November 2010).

5-19
civil agencies are unable to deliver. The nature and size of the military contribution will
vary, in some circumstances it may be appropriate to focus brigade engineer effort on
restoration of services for the population at the expense of provision of facilities for brigade
personnel. The ability to provide essential services demonstrates visible signs of progress
and effective local governance and the two should be linked where possible.

0570. The brigade contribution may be optimised in supporting local and international
humanitarian and development organisations to expand their access to the population.
Where these agencies cannot operate, the brigade contribution could include:

a. Repair of roads, railways and waterways.

b. The restoration of airfields, harbours and ports.

c. The provision of essential services (sewers, water, electricity, waste disposal).

d. Restoration of essential health, public buildings and services (hospitals, schools

and clinics).

0571. Restoration Planning. The brigade should undertake restoration planning early, as
part of the comprehensive planning process in the absence of appropriate civilian agencies.
An overall assessment of the HN’s infrastructure should be made and used to focus brigade
and civil resources to best effect in support of the overall stabilisation effort. Short term,
quick-win solutions should be aligned with long term objectives and resources identified and
allocated to conduct both. Provision should also be made for the brigade to hand over
responsibility for restoration tasks to appropriate civil actors or HN institutions as soon as is
practicable. Where present the PRT, STABAD or MSSG stabilisation staff will provide
expertise. The HN should be involved as early as possible in the planning of work and the
allocation of priorities, with HN personnel employed wherever possible. Where suitable
structures exist, local government should lead on local projects, supported by the brigade.
Prioritisation and expectation management is essential. Unsustainable projects should also
be avoided.

0572. Targeting. The restoration of essential services can contribute directly to

improvements in the security situation. However, the way in which stabilising projects are
carried out must optimise the stabilising effects, and not purely focus on the most efficient
or effective way to achieve the tangible outcome. Restoration activity will have an influence
and should be fully integrated into the targeting process. Care must be taken not to appear
to favour certain areas or groups, which may spark resentment and accusations of
partiality. During conflict phases, expert advice from military engineers must contribute to
the targeting process in order to lessen the impact of offensive actions on critical
infrastructure in order to:

a. Avoid, where possible, targeting infrastructure that will be required to restore

the nation in the post combat phase.

b. Minimise the long term damage to any infrastructure that must be targeted in
order to achieve a required effect during offensive actions.

c. Protect infrastructure that will be required to restore the nation in the post
combat phase that might be vulnerable to other threats during combat operations.

0573. Short term gains will need to be balanced against long term objectives and the
influence on the perceptions of local population should be considered. Special influence

5-20
methods should support restoration projects and may be required to produce a remedial
effect where critical infrastructure has been damaged as a result of military action or to
manage expectations when quick repairs are not achievable.

0574. Coordination of Activity. Brigade restoration activity must be coordinated with the
efforts of civil actors and in line with long term strategic objectives. The process of
comprehensive and integrated planning and coordination should continue at the operational
and tactical level. CIMIC staff will play a role in this process. Military engineer staff will be
involved in this process along with other subject matter experts, such as the military
medical services.

0575. Funding. Ideally funds for restoration activity should be made available from a
single source at the national level and channelled to HN institutions as they develop their
capability and capacity. Restoration activity must be adequately resourced. The
mechanism for obtaining funds for restoration activity must be understood. Financial
authority must be delegated to the appropriate level to ensure that sufficient funds can be
used in a timely manner to achieve desired effects.

0576. Use of Local Expertise and Labour. Brigade engineers, specialist engineer units
and volunteer reserve personnel may be used but commanders should mobilise, facilitate
and utilise local resources and skills where possible. The aim is to work with and through
HN and civilian structures, rather than around them. In order to set the conditions for long
term success and the eventual transfer of responsibility to HN institutions, indigenous
personnel should be involved in problem solving and decision making from the outset.
Institutional capacity should be developed alongside technical ability and planning
processes (prioritisation of tasks, securing of funds etc) linked to governance activities.
Wherever possible local labour should be used on reconstruction projects in order to boost
local economies and provide legitimate means of income to the local population.
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes (see below) may be
linked to reconstruction projects to provide employment opportunities for ex-combatants.

0577. Transition Management. Where the brigade has been obliged to undertake activity
normally carried out by civil actors there will be a requirement to hand over responsibility,
either by province or nationwide, to HN institutions or other appropriate civil actors (IO or
NGO). Depending upon the situation (capability and capacity of HN institutions, security
etc) the time required for the transition process will vary. It should be a conditions-based
activity and decisions to conduct a transfer of responsibility should be linked to other
relevant lines of operation (for example Governance). Special Influence Methods should
exploit opportunities to highlight progress and the effectiveness of legitimate HN institutions.

SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE

0578. Stability results from both a political settlement and an effective, representative
government. The ability to govern and be seen to govern fairly and consistently helps to
reduce grievances, promote social stability and marginalise adversarial groups.

‘At Combined Force level, extension of governance was achieved most easily where the
combination of governance, security and development were well integrated and the
security situation was stable enough to permit regular engagement between the
governance actors and the people…’

Commander 4 Mechanised Brigade Op HERRICK 12, 2010

5-21
0579. The Role of the Brigade. Where possible governance activities should be
implemented by civilian actors and enabled, only where necessary, by the brigade. The
military contribution to governance will depend on the level of security and in non-
permissive environments where civilian access is limited the brigade may be drawn into
those areas of governance essential for early progress. Civilian expertise must be
integrated into planning through reachback/reachout or by in-theatre governance advisors
and responsibility handed over as soon as practicable.

0580. Good governance may be characterised by inclusivity, accountability, transparency,

efficiency, legality, equity and decency. However, a realistic immediate aim would be to
support steps towards good enough governance. This could be defined as the ability of the
HN government to balance the priorities of powerful elites with opportunity for the wider
population to influence the development of their community, hold leaders to account and
with the provision of basic security, administrative and service delivery tasks on a sustained
basis.

0581. Building On Local Capacities. Governance tasks should seek to build on the
foundations of existing capacity, however informal or unsubstantial. By building on existing
structure the expansion of governance is more like to succeed than a system imposed by
outsiders. This may mean the brigade carrying out much of the planning and delivery while
ultimate responsibility lies with the local authorities. There may be a requirement for the
commander to focus heavily on supporting key governing actors and this may take up a
large proportion of his time.

GOVERNANCE CAPACITY BUILDING GUIDELINES FOR THE MILITARY COMMANDER

Consult Widely. Take an inclusive approach and work with a broad spectrum of
indigenous actors. It is dangerous to pick or empower winners, not least due to the risk of
misjudging the ability of local elites to gain the confidence of the population.

Foster Local Ownership. Prioritise that which people really want according to their
circumstances (e.g. demands will differ between urban and rural areas), and avoid supply-
driven initiatives dominating the agenda. Encourage locals to take the lead.

Look Beyond the State. Important capacities exist outside state institutions to fill gaps in
the short term: in civil society; tribal groups; religious organisations; and the private sector.
Even when formal state institutions strengthen they are likely to remain a source of local
influence and parallel capacity.

Balance Effort. Improved stability requires a balance of effort between capacity building
initiatives and those activities that are aimed at stopping the violence.

Aim for Transition from the Start. Plan for transition to international civilian or HN
government agencies to help manage local expectations and maintain momentum for
indigenous self-reliance. Transition planning should be based on realistic benchmarks
being met, balanced with time imperatives.

JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution

0582. All brigade activities must strengthen the HN government and reinforce its legitimacy
with the people. Typical tasks may include:

5-22
 a. Support Development of Local Governance. The brigade can help establish
effective governance at the local level even when the security situation precludes a
civilian lead. Establishing local councils will help to empower the population. They
will also help local people devise local solutions to problems and help the population
and community leaders to build skills in community decision making. All parties learn
to resolve conflicts transparently and peacefully. At the local level, support should be
provided for the organs of the state (ISF/Police) to help them build consent with the
local population. Effective cooperation between state and non-state systems should
be supported.

b. Dispute and Conflict Resolution. The brigade may be involved in facilitating

negotiations that assist communities to connect with the government. These can
include:

(1) Providing a secure environment for negotiations.

(2) Direct and regular engagement with key elites and government authorities.

(3) Settling disputes, for example over land or property seizure.

(4) Public outreach and information programmes.

(5) Enforcing ceasefires and support to transitional justice arrangements.

c. Supporting Elections. The ability of the HN government to run fair and secure
elections is an important indicator of stability and should be implemented by the HN
government where possible. The brigade may be required to provide security for the
civilian agencies that administer the election process and the wider community in
order to enable maximum participation. Where possible security for elections should
be provided by ISF, preferably police, supported and reinforced where necessary by
the brigade. If elections are held too early they may provoke an increase in violence.
The commander should assess their likely impact on security and advise the HN
government and international agencies accordingly.

d. Countering Corruption. Corruption undermines confidence in the state,

impedes the flow of aid, concentrates wealth in the hands of a minority and can be
used by elites to protect their positions and interests. It also contributes to wider
crime and instability. In some cultures, certain levels of what may be considered
corrupt practices will be perfectly normal in the eyes of the indigenous population;
bribery, embezzlement, fraud and extortion are universally considered corrupt, while
nepotism, patronage and preferred client systems are less clear. Local customs
should guide the assessment. A good understanding of the local population (Human
Terrain) is essential in order to judge what is acceptable and what is not.

SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION

0583. Widespread poverty can be both a cause and effect of conflict, and needs to be
addressed as part of a comprehensive approach to stabilisation. While aid relieves poverty
in the short term, only sustained economic growth can reduce it in the long term. Although
security and governance reform remain priorities, early attention to economic growth
increases the likelihood of success. 12
12
Collier P, Hoeffler A, & Soderbom M (2007) Post-Conflict Risks. Centre for the Study of African Economics,

5-23
0584. The Role of the Brigade. In a permissive environment, the brigade contribution to
economic and infrastructure development should be minimal, limited to maintaining the
security necessary for others to operate and move freely. In less secure environments, in
which civilian agencies are unable to deploy or have not yet arrived, the brigade may be
requested to initiate specific, high priority, localised development tasks as part of the
integrated campaign plan. The commander should, where feasible, use local knowledge,
skills, manpower and materials as well as link local development initiatives to national
priorities, programmes and structures. The military presence will have a significant impact
on local economies and the advice of civilian specialists will be vital.

0585. DFID is responsible for managing the British Government’s aid to developing
countries. At the operational level it will require cooperative implementation planning or
pre-deployment training. At the tactical level it could involve the secondment of DFID
development advisers into deployed military headquarters or the military execution or
support of DFID funded and led projects.

0586. In addition to DFID, there could be an array of development organisations

represented in theatre, all with highly individual aims and objectives. The commander will
need to build relationships with the more significant of these organisations. He should
assess the potential effects these projects could have on stability within the region, as well
as the potential effects of his own security operations on current or planned development
projects. The commander should seek to synchronise and coordinate his activities with
those of the HN and development agencies, ideally within a single integrated theatre plan.

0587. In identifying suitable development areas, care has to be taken to avoid distorting
local markets while ensuring that the deliverables are transferable to the local economy
following redeployment of the force.

0588. The brigade may be required to carry out the following tasks:

a. Stabilising the Economy. Economies cannot stabilise until levels of violence

begin to fall allowing local people to re-establish normal patterns of economic life.
Once areas have been secured, they have the potential to become important centres
of economic recovery and the commander should be aware of the impact that
security has. The commander should also recognise the need to overturn illegal
activities, such as corruption, and the threats and risks posed to local producers.
Reducing illegal activity can be achieved through opportunities to develop alternative
livelihoods. When a brigade and other agencies occupy an area they stimulate
economic recovery through increased demand for goods and services as well as
targeted development initiatives. Where feasible, some of the money spent on
supplying and sustaining the force should be used to develop in-country capacity
where military and HN needs align. The brigade must be careful not to undermine
monetary policy by, for example, making large cash payments in foreign currency
and instead reinforce currency stabilisation initiatives by making payments to
contractors in the local currency at local rates.

b. Generate Employment. Improvements in employment prospects not only help

raise people out of poverty but may support an emerging political settlement by
bolstering support for HN government authorities while reducing the pool of
frustrated under-employed young men from which adversaries can readily recruit.
Therefore, activities which stimulate economic growth and generate employment

Department of Economics, University of Oxford, UK.

5-24
 may be crucial to stability. In some circumstances, the commander, in concert with
other agencies, may consider sponsoring large-scale employment programmes –
cash for work programmes – as a temporary solution to mass unemployment. This
will provide low wage job opportunities for unskilled workers whilst minimising
interference with more traditional and profitable sectors. Such initiatives, however,
should be translated into sustained employment prospects based on traditional
transactions amongst the local population. In many conflict areas the agricultural
sectors are central to the well-being of the population. The commander may be
required to ensure safe access from the farm gate to market and security for local
consumers. In some circumstances, direct assistance to producers will be required
to accelerate both the recovery of agricultural and fisheries production, and the
repatriation of the displaced rural population. When hiring local labour and issuing
contracts care should be taken to minimise potentially disruptive effects on local
labour markets, in particular, pay scales. The brigade should seek to avoid creating
large disparities in wages between that which can be earned on the local market or
working for the HN government and that which is possible working for international
forces and agencies. It is particularly important to get this right with respect to
security force wages. Local personnel working for international forces should not
make more money than those working for the indigenous army or police.

c. Address Economic Drivers of Conflict. Development initiatives, where

possible, should be designed directly to confront the economic and political drivers of
conflict. This adds complexity to typical development activities, which do not usually
need to consider conflict dynamics. The commander should develop an
understanding of the drivers of societal conflict and be an advocate for those
development activities that best address the causes of local instability. Development
must not reinforce divisions. If inequality or discrimination are central to the conflict
then development activity should be broadly based; with an assessment taken
across the whole community, and not just on those to whom the measures are being
applied. A perception that development is being distributed unequally may lead to
resistance from aggrieved local groups. Care must also be taken not to legitimise
the cause of competing factions and adversaries or allow funds to be
misappropriated.

d. Reconstruction. Infrastructure is fundamental to economic recovery. The

brigade contribution to infrastructure development is likely to be an enabling one.
However, in environments where civilian agencies are absent or unable to move
around freely, the military may need to implement critical infrastructure reconstruction
tasks themselves. Early progress will have a direct effect on the success of the
campaign.

QUICK IMPACT PROJECTS

0589. Where conditions preclude development, local measures to reinforce security effect
may be possible through Quick Impact Projects (QIP). QIPs are characterised as short-
term, small-scale, low cost and rapidly implemented initiatives that are designed to deliver
an immediate and highly visible impact, generally at the tactical level. QIPs need to sit
within a clear strategic framework and should support longer-term development and
influence efforts. Their primary purpose is to facilitate political and economic progress and
attempt to generate confidence in, if not consent for, the HN government. They are also
important in order to maintain momentum.

0590. In non-permissive environments, where it is deemed that the project is critical for
early stabilisation and cannot wait until the security situation improves, the brigade might

5-25
implement QIPs. In more permissive environments, they will only be implemented by the
brigade where there is a capability gap that cannot be filled by another actor or where the
brigade possesses particular specialist skills.

0591. Accessing Funding for QIPs. Where PRTs exist, much of this activity will be
planned, funded and implemented by development agencies coordinated through the PRT.
In other circumstances however the commander needs to understand the various sources
of funding himself in order to capitalise on opportunities for QIPs as they arise. This
involves understanding the purpose of different funds, the regulations governing their use,
the basis on which funds are allocated and how he may be able to rapidly access them.
The MSST or STABADs can provide specialist advice. Given the often lengthy funding
process, QIPs must be defined by their influence on the population not their impact on the
operational tour.

GUIDELINES FOR THE EFFECTIVE USE OF QUICK IMPACT PROJECTS

To help the commander balance short and long-term imperatives and avoid unintended
consequences:

• Influence. Ensure that there is a strategy for communicating the positive benefits of the
project, that politically significant communities are included and that key leaders are
engaged. Use the project to promote understanding, if not reconciliation, across sectarian
divides and shape the emerging political settlement.
• ‘Do No Harm’. Ensure that the project is conflict-sensitive and avoids creating or
exacerbating conflicts, jealousies or rivalries by the selection of beneficiaries.
• Participation. Ensure that the host community and local government are involved in
planning, design and delivery.
• Efficiency. Ensure resources are used in the most efficient and cost effective way and
that the project is not diverting resources from more important ones.
• Timeliness. Ensure that the project will be implemented or completed in a time frame
relevant to the commander’s overall campaign.
• Sustainability. Address recurrent costs associated with the project.
• Coordination. Ensure the project coheres with national priorities and is coordinated with
the activities of other relevant actors.
• Delivery. Ensure that the most appropriate agency delivers the project, favouring local
expertise and civilian agencies whenever practicable.
• Monitoring and Evaluation. Ensure there is a plan for assessing the project’s
effectiveness as well as its impact on the overall conflict dynamics.

Stabilisation Quick Impact Projects, Stabilisation Unit (2009), London.

5-26
 VIGNETTES

NON REGULAR MILITIAS – IRAQ 2005

The Anbar Awakening (AA) began in early 2005, when Sunni tribes near the Syrian border
started to resent the influx of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to their area, and the resultant
competition in their lucrative smuggling operations, and decided to resist. Sensing the
potential threat, AQI opened its own campaign of murder and coercion against them, and
the tribes turned to the Multi-National Force (MNF) for help. The Government of Iraq (GOI)
initially withheld its support, and by September the tribes had been overwhelmed.

In 2006 Coalition forces succeeded in co-opting tribal leaders, who had been alienated by
al-Qaeda’s extremist ideology and brutal tactics and threatened their business activities.
They also turned some formerly passive supporters, as well as some former insurgents, into
active supporters of the counterinsurgency effort. They convinced tribal leaders to recruit
young men, mostly Sunni-Arabs, and to form volunteer security forces around the country.

The new alliance with Sunni tribes began in mid 2006 in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar
province, where Sheikh Abdul Sattar Buzaigh al-Rishawi, also known as Abu Risha,
spearheaded the Awakening Movement to rid the area of al-Qaeda militants. Abu Risha
struck a deal with US forces in which he provided recruits for a local security force in
exchange for US assistance in building and securing police stations in the Ramadi area.
The deal proved successful, and the US trained hundreds of local volunteers. Security in
Ramadi gradually improved. This was duplicated elsewhere and the Awakening Movement
spread across the country. By spring 2008, the local volunteer forces, now called Sons of
Iraq (SoI), were present in nearly two thirds of Iraqi provinces.

It was clear that the short-term goal of the SoI programme was achieved. In most areas in
which they operated, security and stability increased. The programme complemented the
operations of Coalition and Iraqi forces, allowing them to accomplish far more then they
could otherwise have been able to on the security front. As the security situation improved,
far fewer SoI recruits were needed to maintain stability and US forces began to transition
the members to other professions in the private and public sectors.

Enduring Lessons

• The value of gaining support of tribal leaders and recruiting indigenous forces to
assist in providing security when countering an insurgency. Not only does this provide
employment for otherwise unemployed young men but tribal elders can provide
considerable intelligence for the security forces.
• The increase of intelligence provided by the tribal forces enabled the USMC forces in
the province to accurately focus its operations against AQI.
• MNF cooperation with the tribes convinced influential Imams that MNF were no
threat to their tribal way of life or religious freedom, thus increasing cooperation to
remove AQI from the area. They were seen as partners.
• The danger of training and arming local militias is a risk which must be carefully
considered. They will always support the side with whom they perceive their interest
lies.
• Transition to civilian employment must take place once the security situation has

5-27
 stabilised, to prevent members of local militias returning to crime and terrorism.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SECURITY: EAST TIMOR 1999

Following a referendum on independence from Indonesia, violent clashes, instigated by a

suspected anti-independence militia, sparked a humanitarian and security crisis in the
region. On 15 Sep 1999 UNSC Resolution 1296/1999 authorised the establishment of a
multi-national force to restore peace and security in East Timor. International Force East
Timor (INTERFET) was created and led by Australia.

There were multiple and diverse threats to the population and security forces, including
various hostile elements (opposing militia factions) to the deteriorating environmental
conditions in an already poor nation. An Australian led force achieved security for the
protection of the local population, firstly through an initial presence and the threat of
discriminate force and secondly through active engagement with the people at every level.
Initially extensive patrolling in force cleared the capital and other areas of militia. The
decision was taken to use armour as an integral part of the force, despite it going against
the conventional wisdom of staying in direct contact with the population in stabilising
operations. The INTERFET forces found that not only did the tracked vehicles increase
their mobility in difficult terrain but that the militias were overawed and dispirited by the
presence of armour. Once initial security was established, frequent and visible patrolling
served to reassure the population, who then cooperated with the force to isolate and control
the militias. Key Leader Engagement (KLE) initiatives under-pinned the credibility of the
security force to do its job.

From the first day of deployment, INTERFET forces were confronted with civil tasks. One of
the requirements of the UN mandate for the force was to provide assistance to UNAMET
(United Nations Mission in East Timor), but as UNAMET was not empowered with any
authority for the territory or population, and given the complete dissolution of the Indonesian
administration, government effectively did not exist in the territory. INTERFET forces
detained suspected militia members but there was no legal process to adjudicate their
suspected crimes, nor prisons. Scenes of murder and torture were discovered, and in the
tropical conditions forensic work had to be hurriedly undertaken in order to record the
evidence. INTERFET’s capability to perform these important tasks depended largely upon
ad hoc arrangements.

Enduring Lessons

Overall the Australian military strategy pursued during the East Timor intervention was a
success. Security was rapidly established and the East Timorese population did not sustain
any collateral damage. In occupation the security force developed good relations with the
population, and successfully transferred responsibility to the UN.

Many problems were overcome on the basis of goodwill, however, in more demanding
circumstances, the vacuum of authority may have proved a contentious issue. If there had
been significant complaints regarding the conduct of the force in discharging the civil duties,
the coherence of the coalition might have been placed under strain.

5-28
 TRAINING THE SIERRA LEONE ARMY

Rebuilding the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) necessitated a start from a very low base. The
British recognised that rebuilding the Sierra Leone armed forces as an accountable
instrument of democratic power was a vital part of nation building that would lead to the
defeat of the RUF.

The SLA had a low reputation amongst the people of Sierra Leone because of its
participation in a series of military coups. It therefore needed to raise its reputation amongst
the civil population from where it was recruited. The most difficult part of the operation was
the development of leaders both at NCO level and officer level as most of the officer corps
was either dead or in exile. All ranks involved in the delivery of training had to operate within
the spirit of mission command because of the number of SLA being trained. Sergeants
were effectively acting as company commanders and some privates as platoon
commanders.

The British Army Short Term Training Teams (STTT) established a series of six week
infantry training programmes to train the SLA. By September 2001 8500 SLA soldiers had
completed the course. In January 2002 the SLA was combined with the Sierra Leone Air
Force and Navy to become the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF).

In 2002, following the end of the war and the start of disarmament of the rebels the
International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) took over the training with a
mission to develop the RSLAF into a democratically accountable, effective and sustainable
force to fulfil the security tasks required by the Sierra Leone Government 13 . IMATT
completed the training of a 14,000 strong army, now reducing to 8,500, and a small naval
contingent. In 2004 Sierra Leone opened the Africanus Horton Armed Forces Academy
with training assisted by IMATT.

13
Jane’s World Armies Sierra Leone 2010

5-29
 CHAPTER 5 STABILISING ACTIONS: AIDE MEMOIRE Planning Considerations
Purpose: To contribute to the wider discipline of stabilisation which aims to enable Command: Protection:
civilian, military and Host Nation (HN) actors to deliver a ‘political settlement’. ƒ Influence: competing ƒ Stabilising actions require
narratives and messaging. operating ‘among the people’.
Stabilising Actions: Are to be planned continuously and conducted concurrently with
ƒ Integrated approach. ƒ Consider what is an
Offensive and Defensive actions. They can be divided into:
ƒ Carry out stakeholder analysis. acceptable level of risk.
Framework Security ƒ Working with partners. ƒ Retain agility and offensive
spirit.
Security Sector Reform and Military Capacity Building
Information and Intelligence: Firepower:
Support to the Delivery of Essential Services ƒ Develop deep understanding ƒ Psychological effects on target
of operating environment – audiences, rather than physical
Support to Governance, Economic Development & Reconstruction including human terrain. attacks on capability, are likely to
ƒ Focussed ISTAR. have lasting and decisive effect.
ƒ Integrate MOE throughout all ƒLimit collateral damage
Stability Operations are defined as: phases of an operation. ƒ Thoroughly understand and
‘Military operations which contribute to order, security and control to set the conditions apply ROE.
to allow the primacy of non military and indigenous organisations to develop Sustainment: All military action should be
accountable institutions and mechanisms of government.’ assessed by its contribution
ƒ Consider opportunities to align
military logistic planning with towards influencing the
longer term needs of host nation. ‘Key Conflict Relationship’
Security Principles Of Stabilisation: ƒ Joint ventures require visibility, (Host Government, competing
• Primacy of Political Purpose. To drive the planning and conduct of the campaign. cooperation and inbuilt agility. elites and wider population)
• Understand the Context. A shared understanding provides a basis for focused and
coordinated action. Framework for Stabilising Actions:
• Focus on the Population. To promote human security and support for the political settlement. Shape – Secure – Hold - Develop
• Foster Host Nation Governance. HN ownership of, and responsibility for, security and
stabilisation requires the development of sufficient governance, authority and indigenous
capability.
• Unity of Effort. The collective contribution of all actors is required and must be coordinated to
ensure unity of effort.
• Isolate and Neutralise Adversaries. Make them irrelevant.
• Exploit Credibility to Gain Support. UK forces must be perceived to be both legitimate and
credible locally (especially amongst opinion-forming elites), regionally and with UK audiences.
• Prepare for the Long Term – Perseverance and Sustainability. The stabilisation of a failed
or failing state will take a long time. Demonstrate resilience in the face of short-term setbacks.
• Anticipate, Learn and Adapt. Adversaries will adapt in complex, uncertain and dynamic
operating environments; so must the UK forces. Elements of a Stable State
5-A-1
5-A-2
 CHAPTER 6

ENABLING ACTIONS

0601. Chapter 6 aims to summarise enabling CONTENTS

Subject Page
actions. Enabling actions link and facilitate
tactical actions – predominantly offensive and Enabling Actions 6-1
defensive actions. Many of the enabling actions
have significant similarities or overlaps in format. Annexes:
Success lies in well understood drills and
A. Reconnaissance 6-A-1
procedures, applied intelligently. B. Security 6-B-1
C. Advance to Contact 6-C-1
0602. Enabling actions are fully described in the D. Meeting Engagement 6-D-1
following annexes: E. Link-Up 6-E-1
F. Relief of Troops 6-F-1
G. Withdrawal 6-G-1
a. Annex A - Reconnaissance. H. March 6-H-1
I. Crossing and Breaching Obstacles 6-I-1
b. Annex B - Security.

c. Annex C - Advance to Contact.

d. Annex D - Meeting Engagement.

e. Annex E – Link-Up.

(1) Link-up of a moving force with a stationary force.

(2) Link-up of two moving forces.

f. Annex F - Relief of Troops.

(1) Relief in place.

(2) Forward passage of lines.

(3) Rearward passage of lines.

g. Annex G – Withdrawal.

h. Annex H - March.

i. Annex I - Crossing and Breaching Obstacles.

6-1
6-2
 ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 6

RECONNAISSANCE

06A01. Reconnaissance is defined as a mission CONTENTS

undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other Subject Page
detection methods, information of importance to the
Purpose and Principles 6-A-1
brigade mission. Information sought could range Planning Considerations 6-A-2
from an adversaries location, route availability, to the The Adversary Perspective 6-A-4
perceptions of a local population. Reconnaissance Vignettes 6-A-6
forces may have to fight for information.

06A02. Detailed information may be found in AFM Vol 1 Part 3 Intelligence Surveillance
Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR).

PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES

06A03. The key principle of reconnaissance is that the information delivered must be:

a. Timely.

b. Accurate.

c. Relevant.

d. Of an assured quality.

06A04. Brigade Reconnaissance Forces. Potential brigade reconnaissance forces are:

a. Armoured Cavalry Regiment. The Armoured Cavalry regiment can operate

as a reconnaissance asset but also as a manoeuvre force able to conduct a range
of additional tasks such as route protection and screening.

b. Close Reconnaissance. Ground manoeuvre battlegroups are established

with reconnaissance platoons and troops to provide close reconnaissance. The
information gained will inform the brigade common operating picture. Close
reconnaissance forces could also be tasked to meet brigade level intelligence
requirements.

c. Engineer Reconnaissance. The primary focus of engineer reconnaissance is

mobility and counter mobility, conducting reconnaissance of the terrain.

d. RMP Reconnaissance. RMP can assist in route reconnaissance to confirm

the suitability of a route before it is activated.

06A05. Additional Reconnaissance Assets. The following may also be tasked to

support the brigade:

6–A–1
 a. Brigade Reconnaissance Force (BRF). This divisional level force is based in
lightly protected vehicles and is able to operate dismounted. It has utility in
manoeuvre and longer term, HUMINT-orientated, understand tasks.
Consideration needs to be given to its comparative lack of protection. 16 Air
Assault Brigade and 3 Commando Brigade possess organic specialist patrols
groups (Pathfinders and Brigade Patrols Troop respectively).

b. Long Range Patrols. Long range patrols from Special Forces, 5 Regiment
Royal Artillery and the Honourable Artillery Company may be tasked to provide
intelligence and enduring covert surveillance; they can also provide target
acquisition and assess post-action effectiveness.

c. CBRN Reconnaissance. Units performing CBRN reconnaissance can

confirm or deny the presence of contamination and can identify agents or material.
CBRN reconnaissance is an all arms task with individual units and battlegroups
having CBRN reconnaissance responsibilities. The RAF Regiment possesses a
specialised CBRN point recce capability that may be provided to assist.

d. Tactical Air Reconnaissance. Air reconnaissance is an integral part of the

reconnaissance and wider ISTAR network.

e. Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). A highly flexible asset well suited to a

variety of roles in support of the reconnaissance and overall ISTAR requirement,
UAS must be capable of carrying a suitable payload. Large UAS may require a
prepared surface or runway.

f. Aviation Reconnaissance. Army aviation can provide a highly effective,

manned reconnaissance and attack capability for manoeuvre forces.

g. Electronic Warfare (EW) Reconnaissance. EW can provide information on

enemy intent and actions. Light EW teams can deploy within a reconnaissance
grouping, or larger sensors can be dispersed along a static or mobile baseline. In
addition to EW, specific survey capability maybe deployed to assess usage of the
electromagnetic spectrum.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

COMMAND

06A06. Direction. Reconnaissance is a command driven activity.

06A07. Battlespace Management (BM). A number of FSCM/ACM may need to be used

depending on the reconnaissance task. Reconnaissance conducted within the immediate
vicinity of other forces, or short of the FSCL, could use a Coordinated Fire Line (CFL) or a
No Fire Area (NFA), while reconnaissance conducted in greater depth could be contained
within an Ops box. There will be a requirement to manage FSCM/ACM more dynamically
where reconnaissance elements conduct a passage of lines for deployment or
redeployment.

6–A–2
06A08. Communication. Reconnaissance activity requires a sound communications
plan. Sufficient data capacity is required to facilitate operations over distance, the rapid
transmission of reconnaissance product and to sustain a high level of situational
awareness.

INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

06A09. Brigade reconnaissance forces may be supported by divisional assets.

Information may also be drawn from theatre or strategic sources – such as SIS and GCHQ.
The challenge for the brigade is to obtain sufficient fused intelligence (the product of
analysed information) to support brigade decision making, and cascade it to battlegroups to
meet the demands of brigade activity and tempo.

FIREPOWER

06A10. Joint Fires. Whilst reconnaissance may be conducted in stealth there is a

requirement to integrate joint fires in support of the reconnaissance force. Strike assets
must be in range and available to deliver support. Armour or armoured infantry may be
grouped with the reconnaissance force to act as a reserve or overwatch force depending on
context and threat.

06A11. Tactical Groups (Tac Gps). Reconnaissance forces should have artillery Tac
Gps task organised to them. As a minimum they will include Fire Support Teams (FST)
who will integrate and deliver Joint Fires. Mini Unmanned Aerial Systems (MUAS) may be
grouped to reconnaissance force elements to provide additional integral short range find
capability.

06A12. Offensive Support (OS). Some elements of OS may be used to support the
reconnaissance task. These could be STA patrols and UAS, FSTs, Weapon Locating
Radar (WLR), and Acoustic Weapon Locating (AWL). FSTs contribute to the find function
using visual and electronic means. WLRs have an EW detection capability, albeit limited
both in detection range and functionality, able to passively detect transmissions and
conduct electronic jamming. AWL detects acoustic events allowing other reconnaissance
and wider ISTAR assets to be cued, including within the urban environment.

MANOEUVRE

06A13. Ground Manned Reconnaissance. Whether mounted or dismounted, ground

manned reconnaissance is largely resistant to technical deception and can provide a 24
hour all weather capability. Ground manned reconnaissance can overcome many of the
challenges presented to airborne ISTAR, such as sensor shadow in complex terrain.

06A14. UAS. Speed and endurance allow UAS to manoeuvre quickly around the
battlespace and be easily re-tasked, day or night. As they are unmanned, UAS can be
used on high risk tasks. Adverse weather may affect their employment and the quality of
product that they can deliver. UAS fields of view are narrow and not necessarily optimised
for wide area search; therefore they need to be cued onto NAIs.

06A15. Aviation. Aviation can typically operate out to 100 km and loiter for 40 minutes in
the target area. Aviation is vulnerable to a wide range of threats and adverse weather will

6–A–3
degrade performance. Consideration must be given to the protection/risk balance of
ingress and egress routes when operating aviation over uncleared or unobserved ground.

06A16. Tactical Air Reconnaissance. Whilst offering significant capability and reach, air
assets are adversely affected by weather and visibility.

a. Product. The product includes verbal reports, written reports, imagery and ‘live
feed’ FMV. Imagery will require analysis, usually at a Reconnaissance Intelligence
Cell (RIC), which will be part of the Air Component ISTAR architecture.

b. Request. To request air reconnaissance it will be necessary to consult the

Brigade Air Liaison Officer for advice.

06A17. Further detail on air reconnaissance can be obtained from AFM Vol 1 Part 13 Air
Land Integration (ALI).

PROTECTION

06A18. Vulnerability. Ground reconnaissance assets maximise their protection by stealth

and dispersal. They have a self protection capability but in complex terrain against a hybrid
opponent, reconnaissance assets operating beyond a manoeuvre battlegroup may be
vulnerable to sudden and unforeseen attacks. Consideration needs to be given to options
for reinforcement, evacuation and how best to optimise their access to responsive fires.

06A19. Combat Identification. The difficulty of identifying small, possibly isolated groups
will increase the risk of fratricide. Effective communications, good situation awareness and
robust control measures are critical.

SUSTAINMENT

06A20. Endurance and reach are dependent on effective sustainment. This may be
provided by ground or aerial re-supply. Mounted force elements require detailed planning
for Log DPs, MEDEVAC and ES. The sustainment plan must be fully developed including
rear loops or the allocation of support responsibility to other BGs.

6–A–4
 THE ADVERSARY PERSPECTIVE

The enemy’s aim will be to prevent the UK brigade from discovering and/or misleading
them as to their locations, intentions and movements. They will do this by remaining below
the detection threshold of the brigade’s reconnaissance force and UK ISTAR assets. Two
enemy actions are likely, and these may well be combined.

• Concealment – conducted with the aim of not being detected by a relevant sensor
or activity.

• Deception – an activity specifically conducted to mislead the UK brigade as to the

enemy’s locations, intentions and movements.

Concealment usually occurs at little cost. A determined enemy will always aim to conceal
military activity using weather or light conditions, or by having the patience and skill to
sustain long periods of inactivity. The use of civilian vehicles or clothing is concealment,
not deception.

Deception requires plans, manpower and resources and is conducted with the specific
intention of misleading the UK brigade using measures such as:

• False or empty defensive positions.

• Heating devices to generate TI signatures.
• False minefields or IEDs.
• False signals and communications traffic.
• Media interviews.
• Re-directing refugees and media away from areas to generate interest in those
areas (which may have no significance at all).
• Informants (HUMINT) who may be either passive or active participants in the
deception.

Deception requires activity and resources, therefore it will always be aimed at getting the
UK brigade to conduct an activity that benefits the enemy and harms the UK. Such activity
may involve:

• Luring the UK brigade into an area suitable for engagement.

• Directing attention away from an ongoing action.
• Unmasking guns or weapons.
• Enticing the UK brigade into engaging a target or location containing civilians or an
activity protected by the Geneva Conventions.

6–A–5
 VIGNETTES

BURMA 1942

By 1942 the Japanese in Burma were gaining good intelligence from their Burmese
supporters and their own reconnaissance troops. This enabled them to openly advance
along roads and tracks which they knew were being observed by the limited Allied
reconnaissance units. When duly reported, this caused the Allied commanders to
believe that this was the means of Japanese advance. However, this was a Japanese
deception which exploited allied preconceptions of conducting manoeuvre in the
Burmese jungle.

In reality Japanese movement was far removed from such road bound constraints. They
employed fast moving, lightly equipped, flanking forces that could move rapidly through
the jungle to outflank and defeat allied positions.

6–A–6
 OPERATION EAGLE’S SUMMIT
AFGHANISTAN 2008

In July 2008, 16 Air Assault Brigade

was given the task of transporting a
new turbine to the hydroelectric
complex at Kajaki in Northern
Helmand in an operation called OP
EAGLE’S SUMMIT or OP OQAB
TSUKA. The task of transporting
the components of the turbine fell to
13 Air Assault Support Regiment,
Royal Logistics Corps (RLC).

The turbine was to arrive by air into

Kandahar before being escorted
along Highway 1 by Canadian
forces and handed over to the
British. It would then travel between
Lashkar Gah and Gereshk along
Route 611, a broad rutted track
which ran alongside the Helmand
River’s green zone and was natural
territory for the Taliban to set up
ambushes or plant Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Nonetheless Route 611 was
considered to be the only practical route.

During the planning of EAGLE’S SUMMIT the brigade

planning staff searched for alternative routes through
the sparsely populated desert that lies outside the
green zone, although aerial reconnaissance had
failed to identify any.

While the operation was being planned, 16 Brigade’s

Pathfinders were deployed on a ten day patrol tasked
with assessing local attitudes to ISAF and to gather
information on narcotics production. They were then
tasked to carry out a reconnaissance of the districts
of Malmand, Wushtan and Ghorak, situated due east
of Sangin. During this subsequent task the
Pathfinders discovered a track through the Ghorak
pass and by questioning travellers on the route it was
discovered that it rejoined the 611 about 8 kms
before Kajaki.

The track was hard and being used by heavy goods vehicles. Further recce by experts
from 13 Regiment RLC and 9 Squadron RE confirmed that the route would be suitable for
the convoy and less susceptible to ambush and IEDs due to the open country, although this

6–A–7
would not be the case for the last 8 kms where the track rejoined the 611. It was named
‘Route Harriet’ and the decision was made to use this route for the convoy. Concurrently a
deception plan would be put into operation to convince the Taliban that the convoy would
only use Route 611.

On OP EAGLE’S SUMMIT, ground reconnaissance enabled the discovery of an alternate

route, thus adding considerably to the security and protection of the convoy.

The recce and discovery of an alternate route for the convoy illustrates the following
principles of reconnaissance:

Accurate: The information discovered was accurate, the further route recces added to the
accuracy and enabled detailed planning to be completed

Relevant: The information was very relevant to the operation to move the turbine to the
Kajaki Dam. Its relevance enabled detailed planning both for the move and for a deception
plan to be formulated.

Time spent in reconnaissance is seldom wasted.

Further Reading

Bishop, P, Ground Truth 3 Para: Return to Afghanistan. (London: Harper Press, 2009)

6–A–8
 ANNEX B TO
CHAPTER 6

SECURITY

06B01. Security is defined as the CONTENTS

condition achieved when designated Subject Page
personnel, information, materiel, activities
and installations are protected against Purpose and Principles 6-B-1
Planning Considerations 6-B-2
espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorism Conduct 6-B-3
and other threats, such as organised crime, Determining the Enemy Surveillance Threat 6-B-5
as well as against loss or unauthorised
disclosure. 1 Within the Manoeuvrist Approach, security is a key element of protecting own
will and cohesion while denying enemy understanding.

06B02. Security can be broken down into:

a. Physical Security. Physical security is the organised system of Force

Protection (FP) measures instituted and maintained across all the military activities
within the AO. This includes the employment of force elements to act as a screen or a
guard for manoeuvre forces during offensive actions, as well as measures to protect
static locations, routes and individual platforms.

b. Operational Security (OPSEC). OPSEC relates to measures that preserve the

secrecy of current actions and future plans.

06B03. Further details may be found in JDP 3-64 Joint Force Protection, JSP 440 The
Defence Manual of Security and AFM Vol 1 Part 4 Counter Surveillance, OPSEC and
Deception.

PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES

06B04. The UK approach to security is based on risk management coupled with a

framework of measures that balance proactive and reactive capabilities. The principles of
managing security risk include:

a. Hazard and threat assessment, the basis for risk analysis and management and
the selection of FP measures.

b. Risk analysis and management, which enables the development of a plan to

counter and mitigate the problems identified in the hazard and threat assessment.
Further information on risk may be found in Chapter 1 and ADP Ops Chapter 6.

c. Coordination and integration measures, which must be fully coordinated across

components and multi-national elements.

1
JDP 03, Security in the Contemporary Operating Environment.

6-B-1
 d. Flexible measures which must be able to respond to changing circumstances
and provide the brigade commander with resilience to meet the unforeseen.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

06B05. The Multi-National (MN) Environment. On contingent operations overseas, the

UK is likely to work as part of a MN coalition. National contingents typically have different
attitudes to risk, which will shape their approach to FP. When framing FP measures,
commanders and their staff may need to take account of these varying approaches with
regard to any other nations that are working as part of a UK brigade.

06B06. The Multi-Agency Environment. The UK is likely to work alongside multiple

agencies, including a range of civilian organisations. If an effect relies on actions that can
only be delivered by civilian organisations, success may hinge on the FP provided to them.
FP within a multi-agency environment may be a force multiplier or a constraint.

06B07. Host Nation. A host nation may conduct FP activities, such as guarding critical
infrastructure or protecting Main Supply Routes (MSR). Indigenous Security Forces (ISF)
may be involved in FP activities.

06B08. Media. Any error in the FP risk management process can be magnified by the
media to the detriment of our own forces. A loss of credibility can potentially lead to a
reduction in the deterrent effect that a force possesses. Erosion of reputation and credibility
increase the risk that a force will be subject to attack.

06B09. Influence. Physical security actions, for example the FP posture, are likely to
have significant influence on key audience groups within the brigade AO. Consideration
needs to be given to challenging negative perceptions of those activities, as well as
countering the potential effects of enemy activities. Such opportunities should be identified
early and incorporated into the planning process.

06B10. Counter Intelligence (CI). CI forms a crucial element of security and is

concerned with identifying and countering the threat posed by hostile intelligence services,
organisations or individuals engaging in a range of activities including terrorism, espionage,
sabotage, subversion, extremism and other non traditional threats. CI investigations seek
to neutralise threats or exploit opportunities by the identification of individuals who may be
trying to target our capabilities – such as locally employed employees. CI advice in the first
instance should be sought from the CI & Sy Section of the Bde MI Coy.

06B11. Cyberspace. Computer Network Defence (CND) is a critical element of FP.

06B12. Information Assurance. There are technical and procedural methods of assuring
information (such as cryptography or media accounting). These must be enforced at all
levels to reduce the risk to information security.

6-B-2
 CONDUCT

FORCE PROTECTION

06B13. Force Protection contributes to the physical and moral components of fighting
power. The commander must decide on acceptable risk levels that balance FP with the
brigade’s tactical effectiveness. Factors for consideration include:

a. Military.

(1) Movement.

(a) Protected mobility including Electronic Counter Measures (ECM).

(b) Minimum number of vehicles in a convoy.

(c) Minimum number of personnel per vehicle.

(d) The firepower required per vehicle.

(e) Use of alternative transport such as SH.

(f) ISTAR coverage.

(g) Battlespace Management to facilitate cross boundary movement, as well

as the integration and control of fires.

(2) Dress.

(a) Individual Protective Equipment (IPE).

(b) Body armour.

(c) Carriage of ECM.

(3) Secure Bases/Forward Operating Bases.

(a) FP engineering and infrastructure.

(b) Protected accommodation, from direct and indirect fire.

(4) Response to contact and Quick Reaction Forces (QRF).

(5) Rules of Engagement (ROE) for MN and indigenous troops.

b. Civilians. Recognition and understanding of Private Security Contractors (PSC),

Local Nationals (LN), civil contractors and Non Governmental Organisations (NGO),
including ROE.

6-B-3
 c. Infrastructure. The likelihood and effects of industrial hazards.

06B14. Area and Movement Control. Area and movement control enhances security
and Shared Situational Awareness (SSA), as well as helping to stabilise the environment.
Control methods to be considered include:

a. Patrolling.

b. Refugee movement and control.

c. Curfew.

d. Route and convoy protection, including Vehicle Check Points (VCP).

e. Cordon and search actions.

f. Enforcement of out of bounds areas.

g. Separation of hostile forces.

h. CPERS handling.

06B15. The movement of detached force elements (communications nodes, logistic

elements, liaison teams) within the brigade area requires particular consideration. These
elements may lack sufficient organic force protection. Methods to protect them may vary
from attaching force protection parties, route or area protection, through to high levels of
situational awareness and the ability to react to threats. Clear, robust procedures for
battlespace management and movement control are essential.

OPSEC

06B16. OPSEC protects friendly force information and intentions, preventing the enemy
from deducing our intentions. OPSEC is covered in detail in Chapter 2, though defensive
measures relating to the following should be considered during planning:

a. Camouflage and deception.

b. Emission control.

(1) Communications security.

(2) Radar.

(3) Telephones, including private mobile phones and Personal Data Assistants
(PDA).

(4) Internet, including the private use of e-mail, blogs and chat rooms.

(5) Media.

6-B-4
 (6) Discussing operational matters in insecure areas or mail.

c. Information.

(1) Access control to restricted areas.

(2) Media control.

(a) Laptops and PDAs.

(b) Memory sticks.

(c) Cameras, including still and movie digital cameras privately used in
conjunction with mobile phones, PDAs and the internet.

(3) Control of classified documents.

d. Vetting, control and access of locally employed civilians.

DETERMINING THE ENEMY SURVEILLANCE THREAT 2

06B17. Counter Surveillance and Intelligence Preparation of the Environment

(IPE). The more that is known about the threat the easier it is to counter. Surveillance
sensors are unlikely to be deployed in such numbers that they will be able to cover the
entire battlefield all of the time. The enemy surveillance threat can be determined from the
IPE process. (See Staff Officers Handbook):

a. Step 1 – Battlespace Area Evaluation (BAE). BAE will identify potential

mobility corridors and avenues of approach. The surveillance threat will be greater in
these areas, as the enemy are likely to concentrate their STAR resources there.
Terrain and climatic factors should also be considered, identifying potential dead
ground and weather conditions that will affect the performance of enemy STAR
systems. Human terrain analysis will assist in the identification of likely enemy
HUMINT threats.

b. Step 2 – Threat Evaluation. Basic intelligence data will identify the enemy’s
STAR capabilities; their types and performance characteristics. This information is
integrated with his assessed doctrinal Courses of Action (COA) and used to deduce
the opponent’s doctrinal surveillance plan.

c. Step 3 – Threat Integration. The results of the battlespace area evaluation and
threat evaluation are integrated to identify how the enemy’s doctrine will be shaped by
the battlespace and then turned into practice. This in turn will enable the probable
STAR deployment and areas of coverage to be identified. These can be displayed
graphically. It should be borne in mind that the enemy will have conducted a similar

2
Extract from AFM Vol 1 Part 4 Counter Surveillance, OPSEC and Deception

6-B-5
evaluation and will doubtless deploy ground recce patrols to cover gaps between
other STAR assets. It will, however, guide the development of the counter
surveillance plan and enable the commander to prioritise the brigade’s counter
surveillance measures.

6-B-6
 ANNEX C TO
CHAPTER 6

ADVANCE TO CONTACT

06C01. An advance to contact is CONTENTS

conducted in preparation for a subsequent Subject Page
offensive action, such as an attack; the
advance ends when the main body is Purpose and Principles 6-C-1
Planning Considerations 6-C-1
positioned for that action in accordance Conduct 6-C-3
with the commander’s plan. Planning for The Adversary Perspective 6-C-6
an advance to contact should anticipate Vignette 6-C-7
the possibility of a meeting engagement Appendix 1: Summary Sheet
occurring during the advance. and Aide Memoire 6-C-1-1

PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES

06C02. Purpose. The purpose of the advance to contact is to gain or re-establish

contact with the enemy under the most favourable conditions for the main force. By
seeking contact in a deliberate manner the advance to contact seizes and maintains the
initiative, a key step in the Manoeuvrist Approach.

06C03. Principles. The principles of an advance to contact are:

a. Anticipate actions that may occur and the subsequent requirement for fire
support and manoeuvre when contact is made.

b. Obtain accurate information on enemy forces at the earliest opportunity.

c. React quickly and boldly whilst applying constant pressure to the enemy.

d. Momentum of the advance must be maintained, outflanking and bypassing

enemy forces for subsequent clearance by follow on forces if necessary.

e. Flexibility, initiative and freedom of action at all levels.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

06C04. Command. Commanders should be well forward so they can influence the battle
and make the most of fleeting opportunities. Distances and rapid movement may strain
normal command arrangements; so the following should be considered:

a. Command responsibilities for each route of advance must be clear.

b. Command relationships between force elements that are task organised

together must be established before the action starts.

c. Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs) are best suited to an advance to contact, but

in their absence commanders should consider their higher commander’s intent
and take appropriate action.

6-C-1
 d. HQs may have difficulty keeping up with the advance; step-up groups should
be given priority in the order of march. Extensive use will need to be made of
liaison parties.

e. To maximize freedom of action, Battlespace Management (BM), particularly

Fire Support Control Measures (FSCM) / Airspace Control Measures (ACM) must
be managed as dynamically as possible. There may be a requirement for a
Restricted Fire Line (RFL) between elements of the force and a Coordinated Fire
Line (CFL) beyond the covering force.

06C05. Information and Intelligence. The commander will seek to find the enemy’s
main positions, centre of mass, reserves and a location where contact may be established
with favourable conditions.

06C06. Manoeuvre. Rapid movement towards the enemy, maintaining balance and
momentum is likely to achieve surprise, fixing the enemy and setting conditions for a
decisive action. The brigade must:

a. Advance on more than one axis allowing combat power to be deployed well
forward. This will maintain balance and flexibility.

b. Ensure subordinate commanders act boldly to support the commander’s

intent, in order to surprise the enemy, keep him off balance and exploit success.

c. Destroy or neutralise enemy protective elements without slowing the main

body. Provision needs to be made for flank protection.

06C07. Firepower. OS must respond rapidly and effectively when required. It should be
capable of fixing or neutralising elements of enemy resistance that the commander
decides to bypass as well as being able to provide support to lead combat forces.
Particular consideration should be given to:

a. Find. Find assets must be able to exploit joint fires, either through Fire
Support Teams (FST) or through Joint Fires Cells (JFC), as rapidly as possible.
This will fix the enemy and enable friendly manoeuvre. There may be a
requirement to find and strike the enemy’s indirect fire systems in order to protect
the manoeuvre elements, with appropriate prioritisation of targets as necessary.

b. Strike. Systems must be able to support manoeuvre elements when contact

is made. Depending on the distance and terrain involved leap-frogging of fire
units or deployments from the line of march will be required. The former will
guarantee immediate fires, although not all guns or launchers will be available.
The latter will allow all fire units to keep up with an advance, but there will be a
delay in delivering fires as they will have to come into action before they can
engage the enemy. A key role of the artillery commander is to understand when
and what proportion of assets to order into action, in order that maximum
firepower is available when contact is made.

6-C-2
 c. Allocation of Joint Fires. The availability of assets to support the covering
force, advance guard, main body and flank / rear guards must be considered. It
is unlikely that joint fires assets will be guaranteed to any of these elements, but
will instead be allocated to support the ME, or troops in contact and then
reallocated as the battle develops. Joint fires assets will be allocated according
to the effect required, therefore it may be sufficient to be able to allocate AH or
CAS to the rear and flank guards in order to concentrate surface to surface fires
forward in support of the covering force, advance guard and main body.

d. Electronic Warfare (EW). Electronic surveillance will detect, locate and

provide intelligence on the enemy. When in contact with the enemy, the EW
emphasis may switch to electronic attack (specifically electronic jamming,
neutralisation and deception) in order to disrupt and degrade the enemy's
command and control systems.

06C08. Protection. Protection considerations include:

a. Flanks. Protection of an exposed flank can be achieved by remaining

balanced and retaining a reserve capable of counter attacking if necessary. The
use of light cavalry and aviation force elements should be considered.

b. Operational Security (OPSEC). Measures aimed at protecting the

commander’s plan and thus preventing the enemy from understanding our
intentions need to be considered.

c. Close Air Defence (CAD). When there is an air threat, the use of CAD must
be considered in detail. Where the enemy has Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)
or AH capable of short range engagements, the deployment of CAD fire groups
within manoeuvre elements may be necessary. During an advance to contact
there may also be a requirement to secure key points such as bridges on MSRs,
using CAD assets.

06C09. Sustainment. An advance to contact tends to move away from existing

sustainment stockpiles, requiring more mobile logistics. Focus should be on the delivery
of ammunition and fuel, as well as the recovery of casualties and damaged battle winning
equipment. Artillery ammunition poses a particular problem. Artillery units carry integral
ammunition stocks however these may be quickly depleted. A specific planning
consideration is the re-supply of artillery ammunition. The amount of lift required and the
congestion of MSRs will make this difficult if it has not been pre-planned.

CONDUCT

06C10. Force Elements. The subsequent mission that the advance to contact positions
the brigade for, in particular the anticipated employment of combat forces, dictates the
positioning of units in the formation. As a general guide the formation will be configured as
follows:

a. Covering Force. A reconnaissance screen will be deployed to find the

enemy as part of a covering force, whose role is to obtain information about the
enemy and to influence the course of the battle by identifying routes and probing

6-C-3
 obstacles. The covering force may be provided by the higher formation in a
larger advance.

b. Advance Guard. An advance guard is used to expedite the movement of the

main body and provide its frontal security, as well as maintaining contact with the
covering force. Armour should lead in open country with infantry leading in close
country, while engineer and OS capabilities should be integrated.

c. Main Body. The main body contains the bulk of the brigade’s capability
organised into combined arms groupings to optimise flexibility. The brigade
commander will need to decide the position of the main body relative to the
advance guard and covering force.

d. Flank and Rear Guards. Flank and rear guards screen the main body from
observation or surprise attack and should be capable of defeating minor enemy
forces. This can be achieved by using elements from the light cavalry as well as
AH. OS capabilities should be available to support.

06C11. Covering Force Action. The covering force will be grouped with
reconnaissance leading the advance. Axes should be allowed to develop as the action
unfolds so that success can be exploited. Possible covering force tasks are:

a. Find and exploit any gaps and determine possible routes for enveloping or
bypassing.

b. Conduct deep penetration to disrupt the enemy and seize key terrain.
Integral engineer support will be required to make safe any demolitions.

c. Locate and determine the strength of enemy positions.

d. Obtain information on routes, obstacles and terrain.

06C12. Advance Guard and Main Body. The positioning of the advance guard and the
main body will depend on the number of routes available. The grouping within the main
body should be sufficiently flexible to allow elements to:

a. Take over the advance guard role.

b. Change routes to bypass enemy positions or to utilise better routes.

c. Deal with any enemy that has been bypassed or is holding up the main force.

06C13. Flank and Rear Guards. Flank guards normally travel on routes parallel to the
main body, while the rear guard follows the main body. Flank protection may be provided
by a neighbouring brigade. These forces must be able to:

a. Defeat minor enemy forces.

b. Identify and delay an enemy approach until other forces can react.

6-C-4
06C14. Action on Contact:

a. Speed, manoeuvre and initiative may overcome the enemy before they can
react. The sequence of action might be as follows:

(1) The covering force destroys enemy forces that can interfere with the
movement of the main body and contains those that it cannot destroy.

(2) Elements of the main body may be committed to defeat or destroy

pockets of resistance contained or bypassed by the covering force.

(3) The commander monitors the progress of the leading and engaged
combat forces and commits forces from the main body as necessary in order
to maintain momentum.

b. Enemy positions should be outflanked where possible. The commander

should indicate if enemy positions are to be bypassed and cleared by follow-on
forces, or destroyed by leading elements. If the enemy has established a
defence too strong or wide to be outflanked, an attack needs to be mounted to
force a gap.

06C15. Bypassing Policy. In setting his by-passing policy, the commander must
consider the imperative of the mission (particularly in time), the cost in time and resources
of defeating isolated enemy elements, and the risk posed by their continued survival.

06C16. Routes. Once routes have been cleared and opened they need to be secured.
Different routes may be needed for combat forces and logistic traffic, and for rearward
movement of casualties and logistic vehicles. Consideration also needs to be given to the
management of both stragglers and civilians including possible refugees and displaced
persons.

06C17. Air Manoeuvre (AM). AM elements achieve surprise and maintain momentum
by being deployed ahead of the covering force to seize key terrain. The ground force can
link-up and continue the advance without conducting an action that may slow momentum.
AM forces should not be deployed against targets too far in depth as the force may be lost
before link-up is achieved. Airborne forces can be employed in a similar manner.

06C18. Pursuit. The timely launching of sufficient forces in pursuit of a disrupted or

defeated enemy can turn the enemy's withdrawal into a rout. The commander needs to
select deep objectives and clearly reiterate his intent. The keys to success are:

a. Speed.

b. Maintenance of momentum.

c. Contact with the enemy.

d. Concentration on the Main Effort (ME).

6-C-5
06C19. Risk may be accepted on the flanks and with CS, CSS and CCS. The
commander should:

a. Be aware of the danger of overreaching.

b. Seek information on the enemy.

c. Retain a reserve.

06C20. Transition. The advance to contact ends when an objective is achieved, usually
with the force having established contact with the enemy under favourable conditions, or
when enemy action requires the deployment and coordinated effort of the main body.

THE ADVERSARY PERSPECTIVE

An ‘out-faced’ adversary will generally aim to avoid contact with the UK brigade, or might
wish to lure it into a position of disadvantage for a counter attack or ambush, matching his
strength against any perceived weakness.

In the absence of clear information about adversary locations and intentions the UK
brigade may decide to advance to contact with the aim of closing with the enemy, gaining
a position of advantage and striking or fixing. The enemy will therefore aim to retain the
initiative to engage or move as they see fit in order to avoid this.

The enemy will aim to remain un-detected while constantly reporting on the location of UK
forces. While the advance may wish to bypass or avoid built-up areas, centres of
population and complex or close terrain, enemy forces will use this ground as firing points
to draw the brigade in.

The enemy’s preferred form of engagement may well be ambushing. The range and type
of engagement will best leverage their weapon’s specific characteristics:

• Long range direct fires to fix, demoralise and cause attrition.

• Short range direct fires to destroy.
• Indirect fire in support of both.

When the enemy does engage, it may well be from multiple directions including the rear.
The enemy may well have forces detailed to conduct cut-off actions to prevent UK forces
from withdrawing or reinforcing. This may include the emplacing of IEDs or mines.

The enemy may use their light dismounted elements and the agility of civilian-type vehicles
to withdraw soon after any engagement has begun, so that we ‘hit them where they are
not’.

6-C-6
 VIGNETTE

ADVANCE TO CONTACT: BEDA FOMM

5-7 FEBUARY 1941

Following the successful capture of Bardia and Tobruk in January 1941, the Italian 10th Army
formed a block on the coast road to Benghazi at Derna. General Sir Richard O’Connor ordered
a brigade from 6 Australian Division to fix the Italians whilst 7 Armoured Division were to conduct
an advance to contact across the desert with the objective of cutting the coast road south of
Benghazi. 6 Australian Division were then to force the Italians along the coast road into the trap.

7 Armoured Division had only 50 Cruiser tanks and 200 light tanks left, and many of these were
in need of repair and maintenance. Air reconnaissance revealed the beginning of an Italian
retreat leading O’Connor to bring forward his advance before adequate stocks could be built up.
The advance, led by 4 Armoured Brigade, started with only two days food and water, just enough
to reach the coast road.

The first 50 miles were very hard going and many tanks broke down. However, the terrain then
improved and the speed of the advance increased allowing lead elements of motorised infantry
and artillery to block the Italian’s escape route at midday on the 5 February. This block was then
reinforced and 4 Armoured Brigade attacked the retreating Italians to the north during the
afternoon.

During 6-7 February the Italians made a number of attempts to break out but with insufficient
strength. Hemmed in by the Australians to the north the Italians made one final attempt to
breakthrough with some 30 tanks but they were stopped by artillery and anti-tank guns.

Unable to break out to the north the remains of the Italian 10th Army surrendered. 25,000
prisoners were taken together with 100 medium tanks and 100 guns.

The advance to contact to Beda Fomm illustrates the following principles:

6-C-7
Anticipate actions and the subsequent requirement for fire support and manoeuvre when
contact is made: 7 Armoured Division anticipated that the Italians would attempt to break
through their block at Beda Fomm and prioritised the need for fire support to break up the
numerically superior Italian formations.

Obtain accurate information on enemy forces at the earliest opportunity: Air

reconnaissance identified the Italian retreat and enabled O’Connor to send 7 Armoured Division
across the desert to cut them off at Beda Fomm.

React quickly and boldly whilst applying constant pressure to the enemy: 7 Armoured
Division was able to move speedily despite having to take logistic risk in so doing.

Momentum of the advance must be maintained, outflanking and bypassing enemy forces
for subsequent clearance by follow on forces if necessary: O’Connor’s rapid advance to
contact balanced the requirement for speed with tactical and logistic risk and caught the Italians
by surprise. His arrival on the coast road to cut off the Italian army was a major factor in
influencing them to surrender.

Flexibility, initiative and freedom of action at all levels: 7 Armoured Division advance was
characterised by superior tempo and speed of execution and resolution that enabled them to
advance at speed to cut off the Italian 10th Army. This was aided by a sound plan which
maximised the effect of their superior mechanised and armoured forces.

Further Reading

Playfair, ISO, Stitt GMS , Molony CJC and Toomer, SE, History of the Second World War United
Kingdom Military Series: Mediterranean and Middle East: Vol 1 (Uckfield: Naval and Military
Press 2004)

Pitt B, The Crucible of War: Western Desert. (London: Jonathon Cape, 1980)

Wavell’s Dispatches, Operations in the Middle East from 7th February, 1941 to 15th July, 1941.
Wavell's Official Despatches, (London, London Gazette: (Supplement) no. 37638, 1946.) pp.
3423–3444

Mackesy, K Beda Fomm: Classic Victory. (New York: Ballantine Books,1971).

6-C-8
THE CONDUCT OF A GENERIC ADVANCE TO CONTACT: SUMMARY SHEET AND AIDE MEMOIRE
PREPARATION
Preparation:
1. Brigade in Assembly
Area.
2. A nominated battlegroup
secures LD. Unit advance
parties guide movement into
FUP, preceded by a FPOL.
3. Gun groups deploy early.
4. CS engr sqn with
Advance Guard provides
manoeuvre support.
5. Remainder of engr regt is
grouped with the Main Body.
Conduct:
1. The Covering Force finds
enemy main positions/centre
of mass. Speed, persistent
contact and acceptance of
greater risk will determine its
grouping and deployment.
2. The Advance Guard
expedites movement of the
Main Body, provides frontal
security and maintains
contact with the Covering
CONDUCT AND BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT
Force.
3. The Main Body contains
the bulk of the Brigade’s
combat power.
4. Flank/Rear Guards
screen the Main Body from
observation and attack; a
task suited to Lt Cav as well
as AH / avn. They should
be capable of dealing with
minor enemy forces.
5. BM – successive CFLs
are activated ahead of the
Covering Force. The
Brigade’s boundaries are
RFLs; a CFL may be
imposed on open flanks.
Application of the
Manoeuvrist Approach
• Understand context
• Seize and retain initiative
• Influence perceptions
• Break enemy cohesion and
will on contact through surprise,
pre-emption, dislocation,
disruption, shock action and
destruction - leading to enemy
collapse and exploitation
opportunities.
• Protect own will and
cohesion.
• Enhancements: simplicity,
flexibility, tempo, momentum,
simultaneity.
Purpose:
To gain or re-establish contact
with the enemy under the most
favourable conditions. Specific
aims may include:
• Destruction of minor enemy
elements.
• Seizing Vital Ground or Key
Terrain (physical or human).
• Seizing and maintaining the
initiative.
• In preparation for subsequent
tactical actions.
Principles:
• Anticipation – requirement
for fire support and further
manoeuvre post-contact.
• Accurate info on enemy.
• React quickly and boldly.
• Maintain momentum.
• Maintain freedom of action.
Stages of the Advance to
Contact:
• Planning and preparation.
• Preliminary moves.
• Covering Force action.
• Advance Guard and Main
Body action.
• Transition to other phases /
actions.
Tasks:
Covering Force.
• Ideal task for lt cav / armour.
• Find enemy.
• Find and exploit gaps.
• Penetration.
• Information on:
- Routes.
- Obstacles.
- Terrain.
Advance Guard.
• Security for Main Body.
• Close behind Covering Force.
• Fixes the enemy – armour
lead in open country, infantry in
close country.
Main Body.
• Bulk of Brigade’s cbt power.
• Reacts to Advance Guard’s
dispositions / rate of advance.
• Replenish / reinforce
Advance Guard.
• Strike to defeat / destroy
enemy.
Flank / Rear Guard.
• Ideal task for Lt Cav, AH,
Avn.
• Security of flanks and rear.
• Capable of defeating minor
enemy or delaying enemy until
Main Body can react.
Planning Considerations:
Command
• Kinetic and non kinetic
influence means including fires,
manoeuvre, PPP deception and
other special influence methods
appropriate to tactical action.
• Positioning of HQ /
commanders.
• Comms parties well forward.
• Use of FRAGOs / oral orders.
• Use of flexible BM.
Information and Intelligence
• Accurate and timely int.
• Find enemy main positions.
• Find enemy centre of gravity.
Firepower
• Use of kinetic and special influence
methods appropriate to target
audiences
• Negative second order effects on
population, HN and others.
• Collateral damage considerations.
• Targeting.
• Gun group movement.
• Arty ammo re-supply plan.
Manoeuvre
• More than one axis of advance.
• Keep enemy off balance –
deception
• Keep main body moving
•Protection
• Flanks and rear.
• OPSEC.
• AD.
Sustainment
• Mobile supply solution.
• Ammo, fuel, MEDEVAC.
• Recovery of battle winning
vehicles.
If the Advance Develops into a
Pursuit:
• Comd clearly reiterates intent.
• Keys to success:
- Speed.
- Maintenance of momentum.
- Maintain contact with enemy.
- Concentrate on ME.
• Additional control measures.
• Avoid forward passage of lines.
• Clear BM measures that maximise
flexibility but do not cause
unnecessary delay.
• Greater degree of risk may be
accepted with CS, CSS and CCS and
on flanks.
• Comds should:
- Be aware of overreaching.
- Seek information on enemy.
- Retain a Reserve.
By-Passing:
• Clearly stated policy.
• By-passed positions will need to be
suppressed, fixed and dealt with by
designated forces later.
6-C-1-1
6-C-1-2
 ANNEX D TO
CHAPTER 6

MEETING ENGAGEMENT

06D01. A meeting engagement occurs CONTENTS

where opposing forces meet unexpectedly Subject Page
whilst manoeuvring. The engagement may
Purpose and Principles 6-D-1
occur during any of the tactical actions; for Planning Considerations 6-D-2
example, an exploitation force during an The Adversary Perspective 6-D-4
attack may meet an enemy reserve. Vignette 6-D-5
Success lies in gaining the initiative as Appendix 1: Summary Sheet 6-D-1-1
rapidly as possible by fixing the adversary
and manoeuvring assertively. The force with the most effective decision-action cycle is
likely to prevail. A qualitative superiority in ISTAR assets and consequent improved shared
situational awareness could be expected to reduce the likelihood of a meeting engagement
in the future.

PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES

06D02. Purpose. The meeting engagement could occur when:

a. Encountering the enemy on the march.

b. Engaging the enemy reserve during an attack (after a break through).

c. When counter-attacking.

06D03. Principles.

a. Seize and retain the initiative through speed of action and firepower.

b. Rapid adjustment of existing plans.

c. Anticipation of enemy intent and manoeuvre.

d. Balanced force element groupings.

e. Rapid concentration of force.

f. Quick passage of orders.

g. De-centralised command.

h. Well practised drills to block, manoeuvre and attack.

i. Flank protection.

06D04. Characteristics. Meeting engagements are characterised by insufficient

information, chaos and confusion. The commander must quickly determine the enemy’s

6-D-1
strengths and dispositions and seize the initiative. Forces are likely to be committed to the
battle incrementally and from the march.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

06D05. Command. Commanders need to consider the potential of a meeting

engagement whilst conducting other actions and plan accordingly. Challenges to command
in a meeting engagement may be:

a. Limited and potentially unclear information on enemy strengths and intentions.

Own forces situational awareness will also be impaired.

b. Impaired C2 – Elements of own forces HQs may be moving or operating with

reduced functionality (step-up).

06D06. Information and Intelligence. ISTAR planners should try to anticipate potential
meeting engagements and be prepared to respond to rapidly changing information
requirements.

06D07. Firepower.

a. General. A meeting engagement will occur between two forces executing

existing plans. An OS plan will need to be in place to ensure that assets are
available to support the manoeuvre being carried out. The unexpected contact may
require an immediate re-tasking of those assets. This will include surface to surface
strike platforms and Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) systems, who may
only need to change arcs of fire or observation, as well as Unmanned Aerial
Systems (UAS) for which the response time will be determined by sensor range and
flight time from their original tasks. Close Air Support (CAS) will be able to deliver
highly responsive joint fires in this situation as will AH, although the latter may be
constrained by transit times.

b. OS. The speed with which OS can react will be determined by the speed of
response of the Fire Support Teams (FST). FSTs must carry out two tasks
immediately:

(1) Acquire and attack targets in accordance with extant Battlespace

Management (BM) measures, in order to fix the enemy and gain time and
freedom of manoeuvre for our own forces.

(2) Plan, integrate and deliver (including changes to BM) the fires required
to support and enable the chosen course of action ordered by the brigade
commander in response to the meeting engagement.

c. Shared Situational Awareness (SSA). It is likely that initial SSA will be

poor and that additional threats may exist or develop on the flanks, as the enemy is
likely to react aggressively to the unexpected contact. OS assets are able to
manoeuvre their effects across the battlespace (within range constraints), without
having to manoeuvre platforms. Some of those OS assets that are able to conduct
‘find’ tasks may therefore be re-directed in order to acquire targets that will be

6-D-2
 engaged and fixed by joint fires. A key role of the artillery commander will be to
prioritise fires to meet the manoeuvre commander’s intent.

d. Battlespace Management. Given the initial lack of SSA post contact, it will
be important to maximize the freedom of action of other Joint Fires assets in the
battlespace. The locations of friendly forces should be known sufficiently accurately
to place a Coordinated Fire Line (CFL) in front of the advancing force, thus allowing
the engagement of targets in depth by assets controlled by higher HQs. A dynamic
approach to BM will be necessary as the battle develops.

e. EW. Once forces are engaged, electronic attack can be utilised to disrupt and
degrade enemy Command and Control (C2), ISTAR and fire support communications.

06D08. Manoeuvre.

a. In a meeting engagement there will initially be little information on the enemy

and limited time to respond. Forces must manoeuvre with appropriate balance and
protection to be able to re-align to the new threat.

b. The brigade must seek to fix the adversary by using the maximum combat
power available. Fixing the enemy will gain time to prepare for an offensive or
defensive action.

06D09. Protection. Protection of an exposed flank can be achieved by remaining

balanced and retaining a reserve capable of counter attacking if necessary. The use of
recce force elements and any attached AH should be considered. When there is an air
threat, the use of CAD must also be considered. Where the enemy has UAS or AH capable
of short range engagements, the deployment of CAD fire groups within the manoeuvre
elements may be necessary.

06D10. Sustainment. If a meeting engagement has developed from an advance to

contact, the force is likely to be moving away from existing sustainment stockpiles,
therefore the sustainment capability must be sufficiently agile to quickly adjust to rapid
changes in plans. It is also important that the commander understands any constraints that
may limit his freedom of manoeuvre. Focus should be on the delivery of ammunition and
fuel, as well as the recovery of casualties and damaged battle winning equipment. A key
consideration is the re-supply of artillery ammunition.

6-D-3
 THE ADVERSARY PERSPECTIVE

The enemy will aim to take advantage of the uncertainty and the ambiguity of the conditions
inherent to meeting engagements in much the same way as the UK brigade might.

The enemy may gain advantages from:

• Better information as to the precise nature of the terrain; especially river fording
sites and the condition of trails or tracks in forest areas.

• Better information from the civilian population.

• Being prepared to abandon mobility to adopt hasty defensive positions in built up

areas.

• Greater agility due to lighter dismounted loads and the use of civilian vehicles.

• Denying the UK brigade clearly identifiable military or signature equipment.

The enemy may well not view the meeting engagement from the same perspective as a UK
commander. Moreover the enemy may not be aware that a meeting engagement has
occurred or is developing.

Thus the enemy may seek to concentrate their forces on whatever elements of the brigade
they have identified to ensure UK casualties and decisive engagements, regardless of the
traditional concepts of wishing to manoeuvre to a position of advantage and to attack the
flanks and rears of a moving force.

6-D-4
 VIGNETTE

Battle of Quatre Bras - 16 June 1815

Quatre Bras was a small hamlet on a crossroads on the main Charleroi to Brussels road
intersected by the Namur to Nivelles road. Its significance was due to its location on
Napoleon’s left flank whilst he engaged Marshal Blucher’s Prussians at Ligny. On 15th
June Marshal Ney’s light cavalry had conducted a reconnaissance of Quatre Bras and
found it to be unoccupied. However, instead of occupying the hamlet as ordered by
Napoleon, he delayed doing so and halted for the night.

By the following morning Dutch infantry supported by a battery of horse artillery had
occupied the village. Lancers of the Imperial Guard Light Cavalry, scouting ahead of Ney’s
left wing, came across these Anglo-Dutch troops and were driven off by weight of fire.

Following this skirmish the French tried to determine the strength of the forces opposing
them around Quatre Bras. Ney acted cautiously because he did not know if this small force
was acting independently or as a decoy for the bulk of Wellingtons Anglo-Dutch army. This
failure to exploit numerical superiority led to Ney missing an opportunity to drive a wedge
between Wellington and the Prussians.

At 1400hrs on the 16th June Ney attacked the defenders, driving them out of the
surrounding farms and woods. The arrival of the British 1st Guards Division allowed a
counter attack, although this led to heavy casualties. The battle petered out at 2100hrs with
the French being forced to retreat.

The Battle of Quatre Bras was a tactical draw. Wellington was prevented from reinforcing

6-D-5
Blucher and, on learning of the Prussian defeat at Ligny, the coalition army was forced to
retreat back towards Brussels. Napoleon followed, and they met again two days later at
Waterloo.

The Battle illustrates the following principles of a meeting engagement.

Seize and retain the initiative through speed of action and firepower: Marshal Ney’s
caution and failure to occupy Quatre Bras to set up a blocking position between
Wellington’s coalition army and their German allies meant that he was unable to seize the
initiative to achieve a decisive defeat against Wellington.

Rapid adjustment of existing plans: The coalition was able to adjust plans and rapidly
reinforce Quatre Bras.

Anticipation of enemy intent and manoeuvre: The coalition forces realised that
Napoleon was intent on driving a wedge between Wellington’s Anglo-Dutch army and the
Prussians.

Rapid concentration of force: The Chief of Staff to the Prince of Orange, Major General
Rebeque, realized the danger posed by the French to Quatre Bras and ordered a rapid
reinforcement of the Coalition forces there.

De-centralised command: The rapid reinforcement of Quatre Bras was done in the
absence of the Prince of Orange and Wellington on the initiative of his Chief of Staff.

Further Reading
Hamilton-Williams D, Waterloo New Perspectives: The Great Battle Reappraised (London:
Arms and Armour Press 1995)

6-D-6
Generic Meeting Engagement: Summary and Aide Memoire
Stage One Stage Two
Stage 1 Purpose: A Meeting Engagement occurs Planning Considerations:
1. Unexpected contact when opposing forces meet by accident
Command
with enemy occurs. while manoeuvring, often during an
• Anticipation of action.
Recce / Covering Force advance to contact. Our future superior
• Consider all kinetic and non kinetic
establishes enemy size ISTAR and resulting SSA are expected to
means of influence including, fires,
and intentions. reduce the likelihood of a Meeting
Engagement. manoeuvre, PPP, deception and
2. Bde Comd decides other special influence methods.
to fix enemy using the Principles: •Comds need to be well forward –
leading Main Body • Seize the initiative. best placed to achieve SA.
battlegroup. • The plan may need rapid adjustment. • Little information on enemy – clear
• Anticipation of enemy intent. sitreps needed.
3. The remainder of the
• Balanced force groupings. • Moving HQ reduces effectiveness.
Main Body prepares to
• Rapid concentration of force. Information and Intelligence
envelope the enemy’s
• Quick passage of orders. • Acute requirement for information.
flank.
• De-centralised command. • Brigade reconnaissance may have
• Well practised drills. to fight for information – balance
Stage 2
• Flank protection. between accuracy and timeliness.
4. The leading Main
• Information = initiative.
Body battlegroup Application of the Manoeuvrist Firepower
deploys to fix enemy. Approach • Requirement for special influence
5. The remainder of the • Understand context methods as well as kinetic methods?
Main Body deploys to • Seize and retain initiative on contact • Unintended second order effects
envelop the enemy • Influence perceptions on local population, HN, others.
from a flank. AH • Break enemy will and cohesion through • Collateral damage considerations.
protects the enveloping surprise, pre-emption, dislocation, • FST responsiveness determines
force during the flanking disruption, shock action and destruction, speed of Jt Fires response.
manoeuvre (not leading to collapse & exploitation. • Weight of fire critical.
shown). • Protect own will and cohesion. • Dynamic BM measures.
• Enhance by simplicity, flexibility, tempo, • Target / fires priorities.
6. Jt Fires isolate the momentum, simultaneity. • Electronic attack – jamming.
enemy by separating
Characteristics: Manoeuvre
his leading echelon
• Lack of information. • Rapid commitment of cbt power.
from follow on forces.
• Lack of time. • Deploy reconnaissance early.
7. Brigade • Chaos and confusion. • An ideal use for AH.
reconnaissance moves • Enemy is likely to react aggressively. Protection
beyond the enemy, and • The comd with the most effective • Remain balanced.
continues to Screen decision-action cycle is likely to prevail. • Flank security – enemy trying to
forward and prepare for envelop you.
exploitation. End States: • Retain a Reserve for exploitation.
• Continue advance. • An ideal use for AH.
• Adopt hasty defence. • Air threat - deployment of CAD.
• Allow follow on forces through. Sustainment
• Post engagement opportunities. • Dynamic CSS – respond rapidly to
changing situation.
Battlespace Management: • Understand and manage the
• Reduced SSA is likely following contact consequences of any exploitation.
with enemy. • Priorities - ammo, fuel, MEDEVAC
• A dynamic approach to BM will enhance recovery of battle winning equipment.
freedom of action of Jt Fires assets. • Critical – artillery ammo.
• Coordinated Fire Line (CFL) forward of
the advancing force.
6-D-1-1
6-D-1-2
 ANNEX E TO
CHAPTER 6

LINK-UP

06E01. The link-up is an enabling CONTENTS

action where forces join up in enemy
controlled territory. It is the Subject Page
establishment of contact between
two or more friendly units or Purpose and Principles 6-E-1
Planning Considerations 6-E-1
formations that may have the same Conduct 6-E-4
or differing missions. In a link-up The Adversary Perspective 6-E-5
action it may be necessary to Vignette 6-E-6
destroy the enemy between these Appendix 1: Link-up Summary Sheet 1 6-E-1-1
forces before contact can be Appendix 2: Link-up Summary Sheet 2 6-E-2-1
established. A typical example is a
link-up between ground and air manoeuvre forces in which the former relieves the latter.
The link-up may be planned at the outset of an action or it may become necessary during
the course of an action.

PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES

06E02. A link-up will be conducted to:

a. Join an attacking force with a force inserted in the enemy’s rear area, such as
an air manoeuvre or infiltration force.

b. Complete the encirclement of an enemy force.

c. Relieve or assist the break-out of encircled forces.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

06E03. Command. When forces link-up there will be particular problems that require the
appointment of a single commander. This procedure will also be required when there is a
significant difference in the size of the two forces taking part in the action. Where this is the
case, the commander should be designated beforehand and in sufficient time to enable
necessary planning to occur. The time or conditions under which command is assumed
must be clear. Key factors to consider include:

a. Mission. The mission to carry out a link-up should always be given in the
context of a subsequent mission for the forces involved. It will normally state the
location or the route where the link-up will take place and the time.

b. Planning for a link-up should consider:

(1) The coordination of manoeuvre forces involved.

(2) Communications.

6-E-1
 (3) Command relationships.

(4) Control measures.

c. Battlespace Management (BM). In link up actions, the risk of fratricide is

high, therefore effective and simple control measures will be essential in order to
minimise this risk. Such control measures would include:

(1) Axis of advance or boundaries for the link-up.

(2) Objectives to be held and/or captured by each of the forces taking part.

(3) The locations where the link-up will occur between the two forces.

(4) Timings.

(5) The use of Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM), specifically

Restricted Fire Lines (RFL) and No Fire Areas (NFA).

d. Communications and Liaison. When a force is encircled, face to face

liaison will be difficult, but some form of liaison must take place. A robust liaison plan
is essential that should include details regarding liaison teams, passwords, visual
identification signs, reference points and common contact frequencies.

06E04. The enemy will need to be influenced by a deception plan to mask the intent of a
link-up action. Since a link-up occurs within enemy territory, there are opportunities for
wider influence throughout the course of the action, for example:

a. Consideration must be made of the human terrain and the impact that a link-
up action will have on groups in the area, such as the indigenous population. The
sudden presence of forces in their vicinity may impact on allegiances and erode
support for the enemy.

b. Consideration should be given as to how bypassed or encircled enemy

positions should be dealt with once link-up has been achieved. These present
opportunities for further exploitation.

06E05. Information and Intelligence. Link-up forces will need intelligence on enemy
dispositions and strengths, as well as friendly force locations, equipment types and
markings, particularly if the enemy uses similar weapons or equipment.

06E06. Firepower. The planning of fires to support a link-up should include consideration
of the following:

a. The effective application of the principle of commanding artillery at the highest

level and controlling at the lowest, will facilitate any link up action. This will allow the
higher HQ to retain SSA of the fires battles of both forces, ensuring that there are no
gaps in the battle and that there is unity of purpose. The separate forces must
control their own Joint Fires assets to fight their own contact battles, but their deep
battles will rapidly overlap as they converge.

6-E-2
 b. The appropriate FSCM and Airspace Control Measures (ACM) must be
selected and implemented effectively. A RFL would be an appropriate FSCM
between converging forces. Where there is an encircled force, the battlespace is
likely to be more complex requiring a combination of control measures, although the
specific measures used will depend on the situation. Example FSCM are shown
graphically in the summary to this Annex.

c. Detailed planning is required to ensure that the control of fires by Surveillance

and Target Acquisition (STA) assets, including Fire Support Teams (FST), are
integrated and synchronised where possible. This must include the ability to
maintain a coherent Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan (STAP) during the link-
up in order to ensure that no enemy forces avoid detection. The handover of the
fires battle should take place at the lowest level, including individual targets being
handed over between Fire Support Teams (FST).

d. Coordination of deployed Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD)/Close Air

Defence (CAD) systems will also be necessary.

e. Employment of Close Air Support (CAS) and Attack Helicopters (AH) in the
area between the forces must be carefully controlled as they approach the area of
the link-up.

f. Employment of EW has to be coordinated carefully in order to avoid mutual

interference and duplication of tasks. The focal point for this coordination is the
electronic warfare control centre.

06E07. Manoeuvre. Link-up actions are generally offensive in nature. Armoured forces
are often most appropriate as a link-up force, especially where there is a requirement for
overwhelming firepower and mobility. Clearing routes and obstacles is essential to
maintain tempo.

06E08. Protection. The measures taken to protect forces will focus on physical
protection and Operational Security (OPSEC):

a. Air Defence. Measures are required to ensure that AD elements do not

engage friendly aircraft supporting the link-up units. Coordination with air and
aviation is essential.

b. Mobility and Counter Mobility. Link-up actions may require coordination of

engineer activity, especially where the in-place force has created a defensive
position which needs to be breached by the mobile force.

c. Combat Identification (Combat ID). Robust measures are required to

minimise the fratricide risk.

d. OPSEC. Measures aimed at protecting the commander’s plan and thus

preventing the enemy from understanding our intentions need to be considered.

6-E-3
06E09. Sustainment. Considerations are similar to those for offensive actions.
Additional supplies maybe required for the in-place force.

CONDUCT

06E10. Link-Up of a Moving Force with a Stationary Force. When one force moves to
link-up with a stationary force the following procedures are necessary:

a. The link-up should be conducted as quickly as possible to reduce the enemy’s

opportunities to react.

b. Link-up points should be where the axis of advance of the moving force
intersects with security elements of the stationary force.

c. Effective BM.

d. The mobile force in a link-up may have to conduct a rapid advance to contact.

e. When the link-up is made, the moving force will join the stationary force or
pass through it, or around it, to attack the enemy. If they join up for subsequent
actions a single commander must be designated.

06E11. Link Up Two Moving Forces. Link-up between two moving forces is normally
undertaken to complete the encirclement of an enemy force.

a. Primary and alternate link-up points are established on the boundaries where
the two forces are expected to converge.

b. Effective BM.

c. Reconnaissance elements should seek to identify and locate the other force
as quickly as possible.

d. Leading elements of each force should be able to communicate with each

other on a common frequency.

6-E-4
 THE ADVERSARY PERSPECTIVE

The enemy will attempt to prevent elements of the UK brigade from conducting a successful
link-up, or ensure that they only succeed at considerable cost.

It should be assumed that the enemy will be aware that a link-up is required.

The enemy will aim to fix both the in-place and the relieving force to reduce their potential
for manoeuvre and to gain better positions from which to inflict casualties.

Enemy fixing actions might include:

• Use of mines or IEDs, which will have to be rapidly laid or emplaced.

• Indirect fires including chemical munitions.

• Denial and disruption of all communications.

• Use of MANPADS and LLAD to threaten UK air assets.

• Actions directed at mobility kills on vehicles to force dismounted action.

If the enemy can successfully fix the in-place force for little effort, then it can concentrate
decisive action on the relieving force, viewing the defeat of the relieving force as being
inherent and necessary to the defeat of the in-place force.

The more pressure the enemy can place on the relieving force, the more the morale of the
in-place force will suffer. The key to this will be the enemy’s ability to prolong the action,
while preserving and maintaining their own ability to keep the engagement going.

The enemy may seek to defeat a UK brigade link-up action where the terrain allows:

• One or two constrained routes along which the relieving force must move.

• Little or no possibility to move between routes.

• High ground overlooking the in-place force.

• Obstacles such as rivers or wadis that constrain both forces options for manoeuvre.

6-E-5
 VIGNETTE

The Relief of Bastogne, December 1944

The goal of the December 1944 German offensive was the harbour at Antwerp. In order
to reach this objective - before the Allies could regroup and bring their superior air power
to bear - German mechanized forces had to seize the road network through eastern
Belgium. Because all seven main roads in the Ardennes converged on Bastogne, control
of this small town was vital to the plan. The Germans besieged US forces in the town
from 20–27 December until the Americans were relieved by elements of General George
Patton's 3rd Army.

3rd Army had marched 120 miles from the Saar and launched its counter attack on 22
December. The linkup of the two forces broke the siege of Bastogne and was one of the
decisive points in the ‘Battle of the Bulge’.

From 0600hrs on 22 December, the three Combat Commands of the 4th Armoured
Division fought their way toward Bastogne by three separate routes from their assembly
areas north of Arlon. They met intense resistance and suffered heavy losses in men and
tanks.

6-E-6
It took them four days of bitter fighting in appalling weather conditions to break the ring of
German units encircling the 101st Airborne Division. They finally linked up with the 101st
on 26 December bringing with them 40 truckloads of supplies. Concurrently, on Boxing
Day, two of the divisions from Patton’s army drove the besieging enemy back towards
Wilze.

Repeated German attacks had failed to take the town and their encirclement was finally
broken, though some days would pass before the US lines to the south were again secure
and several weeks of fighting would ensue before the siege of Bastogne was completely
lifted.

Further Reading
Ambrose, SE. Band of Brothers. (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1992)
Ellis L,F, History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Military Series, Victory in the
west Vol ii The Defeat of Germany (London HMSO 1968).
Macdonald, CB, The Battle of the Bulge (London: 1984).

6-E-7
6-E-8
Generic Link-Up Between Moving and Stationary Forces: Summary and Aide Memoire Aim:
• To join a moving force with a stationary force, usually in enemy controlled territory.
• Typically this action is a link-up between ground and AM or other light forces.
• The moving (Linking) force has considerations similar to those applicable in an Offensive Action

Purpose:
• To join an attacking force with a force inserted in the enemy’s rear.
• To relieve encircled forces.

Application of Manoeuvrist Approach

Stage 1
1. An air manoeuvre force is inserted into
enemy rear area as part of a wider tactical
plan.
2. A ground manoeuvre brigade advances
towards this In-Place Force. Speed is critical
in order to minimise enemy reaction time and
the force may have to conduct a rapid advance
to contact.
3. Appropriate FSCM prevent fratricide.
Combat ID critical at link up points. Forces
may be from different nations within a coalition.
Stage 2
1. Link-up points are created and manned at
the intersections of the Link-Up Force axis of
advance with security elements of the In-Place
Force.
2. Forces converge, locate and identify each
other. Link-Up Force reconnaissance makes
contact with In-Place Force security elements.
Lead elements of both forces should be in
communication. Link-Up Force may pass
through or around In-Place Force to attack the
enemy.
• Understand context.
• Influence perceptions.
• Seize and retain initiative - break enemy cohesion and will via surprise, pre-emption, dislocation,
disruption, shock action, and destruction. Leading to collapse and exploitation.
• Protect own will and cohesion.
• Enhancements: simplicity, flexibility, tempo, momentum, simultaneity.
Command:
• Consider kinetic and non kinetic means of
achieving influence – fires, manoeuvre, PPP,
deception and other special influence methods.
• A single commander should be designated.
• The Link-Up mission must be viewed in the
context of the subsequent mission for the forces
involved.
• Robust coordination of the 2 manoeuvre
forces must occur, through a liaison plan, sound
communications and appropriate control
measures.
Information and Intelligence:
• CCIRs - Enemy locations, CoG, strengths,
capabilities, reserves, intent, equipment types,
markings.
• Terrain – routes, going, obstacles.
• Ongoing / updated IPB.
• Care in tasking friendly forces EW.
• Resource ME with ISTAR.
Firepower:
• Use of kinetic and special influence methods
appropriate to target audiences in area of
tactical action.
• 2nd order effects – local population, HN.
• Collateral damage
• Targeting priorities.
• Separate forces control own Jt Fires to fight
respective contact battles.
• Deep battles will overlap with convergence –
coordination.
• Co-ordinating HQ retain SSA.
• BM: FSCM/ACM.
• EW coordination to avoid clashes.
• Handover of fires during battle.
Manoeuvre:
• Armoured forces most appropriate –
firepower and protected mobility.
• Engrs – route development, allocation of
assets.
• Movement control.
• Use of firepower for transient effect.
• Breaching of friendly force obstacles at link-
up?
Protection:
• Combat ID critical – fratricide risk.
• Prevent EW fratricide / clash.
• Counter surveillance measures.
• Plausible, resourced deception plan.
• CBRN.
• Flank security.
• RAS in contested territory.
Sustainment:
• Link-Up Force to cater for requirements of
stationary In-Place force as well.
• Ammo, fuel, casevac, eqpt recovery.
• Anticipate requirements of subsequent
mission.
• Use of forward sustainment bases.
• Protected logistics / resupply in contested
territory.
6-E-1-1
Generic Link-up Between Two Moving Forces: Summary and Aide Memoire

Stage One Aim:

• To join two or more moving forces, usually in contested territory.
• Considerations for both forces are similar to those of Offensive Actions.

Purpose:
• To complete the encirclement of enemy forces (as in the double envelopment of the enemy’s
main defensive position).

Application of Manoeuvrist Approach

• Understand context.
• Influence perceptions.
• Seize and retain initiative - break enemy cohesion and will via surprise, pre-emption, dislocation,
disruption, shock action, and destruction. Leading to collapse and exploitation.
• Protect own will and cohesion.
• Enhancements: simplicity, flexibility, tempo, momentum, simultaneity.

Command: Firepower (continued):

• Consider kinetic and non kinetic means of • Co-ordinating HQ retain SSA.
achieving influence – fires, manoeuvre, PPP, • Control of STA / FSTs.
deception and other special influence • BM: FSCM/ACM.
methods. • EW coordination to avoid clashes.
• A single commander needs to be designated
prior to the action.
Manoeuvre:
• Link up mission in context of subsequent
• Armoured forces most appropriate – firepower
mission for forces involved.
and protected mobility.
• Robust coordination of both manoeuvre
• Engrs – route development, allocation of
forces must occur, through a liaison plan,
assets.
sound communications and appropriate control
• Movement control.
measures.
• Use of firepower for transient effect.
• Obstacle breaching at link up points.
Information and Intelligence:
• CCIRs - Enemy locations, CoG strengths,
capabilities, reserves, intent, equipment types, Protection:
markings. • Combat ID critical – fratricide risk.
• Terrain – routes, going, obstacles. • Prevent EW fratricide / clash.
• Ongoing / updated IPB. • Counter surveillance measures.
• Care in tasking friendly forces EW. • Plausible, resourced deception plan.
• Resource ME with ISTAR. • CBRN.
Stage Two • Flank security.
Firepower: • RAS in contested territory
Stage 1 • Use of kinetic and special influence methods
Sustainment:
1. Both moving forces quickly advance to minimise the enemy reaction time. appropriate to target audiences in area of
• Ammo, fuel, casevac, eqpt recovery.
2. Primary and alternate link-up points established on boundaries where two forces tactical action.
• Anticipate requirements of subsequent
expect to converge. Lead elements of both forces should be in communications. • 2nd order effects on local population, HN and
mission.
3. Effective FSCM required due to a high risk of fratricide. Phase Lines activated in others.
• Use of forward sustainment bases.
turn as CFL. Fires from converging forces need tight control. Formation boundary • Collateral damage considerations.
• Protected resupply / logistics in contested
acts as RFL. Combat ID critical at link up points as forces may be from different • Targeting priorities.
territory.
nationalities within a coalition. • Separate forces control own Jt Fires to fight
Stage 2 respective contact battles.
4. Reconnaissance elements of both forces make contact and move outwards into • Deep battles will overlap with convergence –
position to screen against enemy counter attack. coordination.

6-E-2-1
 ANNEX F TO
CHAPTER 6

RELIEF OF TROOPS

06F01. The relief of troops occurs when CONTENTS

one force takes over the actions or activities Subject Page
of another. There are three types of relief
action: Characteristics 6-F-1
Relief in Place
Purpose 6-F-2
a. Relief in Place (RIP). A RIP is Planning Considerations 6-F-3
an action where all or part of an Conduct 6-F-7
outgoing force is replaced by an Forward Passage of Lines
incoming force. Purpose 6-F-7
Planning Considerations 6-F-8
Conduct 6-F-12
b. Forward Passage of Lines Rearward Passage of Lines
(FPOL). A FPOL is an action in Purpose 6-F-12
which an advancing force attacks Planning Considerations 6-F-13
through a unit, the in-place force, Conduct 6-F-16
which is in contact with the enemy. The Adversary Perspective 6-F-17
Appendix 1: RIP Summary 6-F-1-1
Appendix 2: RPOL/FPOL Summary 6-F-2-1
c. Rearward Passage of Lines
(RPOL). A RPOL is an action in
which a force moving to the rear, the withdrawing force, passes through a unit, the
in-place force, occupying a rearward defensive position.

06F02. These three actions are described in order to provide a structure and sufficient
detail for brigades conducting relief of troops actions, either as a subordinate formation or
as the controlling HQ for a battlegroup relief/passage of lines.

CHARACTERISTICS

06F03. In all relief of troops actions, the in-place force is required to prepare for, brief and
accommodate the needs of the relieving force in order to maintain continuity and sustain
effect. There should be no loss of operational capability.

06F04. Relief is undertaken in order to sustain the overall level of combat power. Inherent
in these actions is the transfer of responsibility for a subsequent tactical action. The
requirement is that this transfer should take place while maintaining the required level of
operational capability.

06F05. During any relief action there is a period when congestion increases the
vulnerability of the forces involved. The possibility of confusion is significant. Two parallel
command systems will be operating in one area at the same time.

06F06. Conditions. These actions are undertaken when forces:

a. Are unable to continue a mission or have accomplished their mission.

b. Are required for actions in another area.

6-F-1
 c. Are due for rotation to avoid exhaustion.

d. Are not suitable to accomplish the new task.

06F07. Mission. The mission will be determined by the commander's intent, the types of
action the committed force has been engaged in, the enemy’s anticipated course of action
and the type of forces involved.

06F08. Interoperability. A relief action may involve two forces of differing nationalities.
The additional risk of confusion and fratricide may necessitate the following:

a. Language differences may require the increased use of guides as well as

special communications arrangements.

b. Control of fire support will require special liaison.

c. Security considerations may have an impact. The protective marking of certain

systems and documents may mean that they cannot be shared with foreign
nationals, which will have implications for joint planning.

06F09. OS. During the planning of all three types of relief actions, the handover of the OS
battle between the two forces will be a critical activity.

RELIEF IN PLACE

PURPOSE

06F10. A RIP is an action in which all or part of a force is replaced by an incoming force.
The incoming force assumes the mission of the relieved force, within the same boundaries
and, initially, with a similar disposition. RIPs can be hasty or deliberate and, when started,
should take place as quickly as possible. The action should take place when the enemy is
least able to interfere with it, possibly at night or during reduced visibility. There are two
types of RIP:

a. Deliberate. In a deliberate RIP incoming and outgoing forces will need to:

(1) Exchange plans and liaison personnel.

(2) Conduct briefings and detailed reconnaissance.

(3) Publish written orders.

b. Hasty. A hasty RIP is rapidly planned and executed. Liaison personnel are left
by the outgoing force to assist with the coordination of a hasty relief. Force elements
remain with the incoming force until plans are fully coordinated.

06F11. Timings. Sufficient time should be given for a detailed handover of essential
information including:

6-F-2
 a. Current tactical situation and intelligence assessment.

b. Current orders and plans, including the deception plan.

c. Organisation of the area and location of facilities and routes.

d. The sustainment plan.

e. Sequence of relief.

f. Location of other units that will not be replaced.

g. Timings, in particular the time of command transfer.

h. Details of the intelligence collection plan.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

06F12. Command. The outgoing commander is responsible for the defence of the
position until command passes, and both commanders should be collocated throughout the
action. The incoming commander will assume command of all elements of the outgoing
unit which have not yet been relieved. At brigade level the transfer of command normally
occurs when two or more battlegroups have been relieved.

a. Close coordination is essential. It is simpler to relieve from back to front,

however this may not be achievable if forward units have sustained heavy
casualties. The superior headquarters should stipulate the following details:

(1) The timeframe for the action to be conducted.

(2) Designation of control lines and routes.

(3) Arrangements for liaison, reconnaissance and advance parties.

(4) Fire support.

(5) Tactical air support of land actions, including aviation tasks.

(6) Deception plans and Operational Security (OPSEC).

(7) Air Defence (AD) and Airspace Control Means (ACM).

(8) Sustainment plans including criteria for handover of equipment, combat

supplies and medical support.

b. Communications and Liaison. G6 staff should be involved early in the

planning process to ensure there is effective liaison and communications between
the two forces. The communications plan needs to support any deception plan.

6-F-3
 c. Continuity. A RIP may have significant continuity implications, especially in
stabilising actions. The force being relieved may have been able to build and exploit
important relationships with key target audiences in their Area of Operation (AO),
which risk being negatively affected by the relief. A key planning task for the
incoming force, in conjunction with the in-place force, is to ensure the continuity of
those relationships. The training and partnering of Indigenous Security Forces (ISF)
must continue as their development is likely to be critical to future stability and
security.

06F13. Information and Intelligence. The relief of the intelligence staff will require
coordination to ensure that there is full handover of information and no interruption to the
intelligence, targeting and ISTAR cycles. When relief begins, there will have to be early
and close coordination between in-place and relieving ISTAR assets to avoid disruption to
the collection plan.

06F14. Firepower.

a. Artillery. The artillery Tactical Group (Tac Gp) with the in-place force will
control the OS battle until handover. Key matters that require consideration during
handover include:

(1) Named Areas of Interest (NAI) / Target Areas of Interest (TAI), marked
and adjusted targets, as well as all extant and planned Battlespace
Management (BM) measures, such as Fire Support Coordination Measures
(FSCM) and Airspace Control Means (ACM).

(2) There is a requirement to maintain a coherent Surveillance and Target

Acquisition Plan (STAP) during handover. Liaison and early collocation are
important and both forces must be clear at what point control of the OS battle is
to be handed over.

(3) The in-place force will provide fire support to the relieving formation or
unit. If the relief is for the purpose of continuing an attack, both formations’ OS
resources are likely to remain in support. Artillery units would not normally be
relieved at the same time as combat troops.

(4) Incoming artillery units should avoid positions that have already been
located by the enemy and, if possible, those that have previously been
occupied. Weapons of the in-place formation should remain in position until the
end of the action. Until the change of command is designated, all artillery
should remain under the control of the outgoing commander.

b. Air and Aviation. Best effect will be achieved when Close Air Support (CAS)
and aviation capabilities are fully integrated with surface to surface capabilities.

c. Electronic Warfare (EW). EW assets will support the deception plan, as well
as continuing to provide intelligence on the enemy.

6-F-4
06F15. Manoeuvre.

a. Movement. A balance must be struck between speed, reduction in capability

and the possibility of detection due to congestion. In deciding which method to
employ, the superior commander should consider:

(1) The subsequent mission of the outgoing unit or formation.

(2) The state of the outgoing unit or formation, its equipment and personnel.

(3) The subsequent mission of the incoming unit or formation.

(4) The capability of the enemy to detect and interfere with the relief and the
need for a reserve to counter any interference.

(5) Terrain.

(6) The need to vary the pattern of reliefs.

(7) Any necessary exchange of equipment.

(8) The capability of the outgoing unit to maintain a coherent defence.

(9) Combat support troops should not normally be relieved at the same time
as combat troops.

b. Advance Party. The force should designate an advance party that infiltrates
forward to avoid detection and maintains a low profile. The advance party will
normally consist of the forward HQ of the incoming force and should collocate with
the HQ of the force being relieved.

c. Allocation of Routes. Careful route planning and strict traffic supervision and
control are essential. The movement and control plan should consider:

(1) Marches in opposite directions should occur on separate roads.

(2) Lateral movements should be avoided.

(3) Common use of transport allocated by the superior HQ, if available.

06F16. Protection.

a. Air Defence (AD).

(1) The concentration of units during relief actions will increase vulnerability to
air attack and may require additional resources or an adjustment of the air
defence posture.

6-F-5
 (2) The two primary tasks for air defence units are likely to be support to the
relief of forward committed forces and an increased coverage over the main
relief routes.

b. Air. Distinct from the effects achieved by CAS, local air superiority should
deliver the opportunity to neutralise the enemy CAS threat, thus reducing the
vulnerability of ground forces during periods when congestion cannot be avoided.
This will require detailed BM measures.

c. Engineers. The handover of barriers to the relieving force will be a primary

engineer task. Engineers may be required to assist with survivability and mobility
tasks for the incoming force. Engineers from both forces have to be given sufficient
notice and time to carry out a detailed handover. The information should include:

(1) Barrier plan and related documentation.

(2) Engineer information and data.

(3) Crossing plans.

(4) Field fortification and other plans.

d. Security and Deception. The force being relieved should initiate a plan for
deception and OPSEC when warned that a relief is to take place. Deception should
include the continuation of normal activity including patrol patterns, vehicle traffic and
communications. After the relief has been completed artillery adjustment should be
avoided. Once begun, relief actions are vulnerable to enemy spoiling attacks.

e. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN). In a CBRN

environment the following factors have to be considered:

(1) Any contaminated areas should be given up and incoming troops should
not draw on contaminated supplies.

(2) Liaison should establish the location and type of any contamination and
seek to integrate warning and alarm systems for the incoming and outgoing
formations.

06F17. Sustainment. During a relief action, the in-place formation should assist with
casualty treatment and evacuation, vehicle recovery, fuel and ammunition. A force taking
over responsibility for further actions should be fully replenished. The superior commander
may direct that the forces being relieved hand over stocks that are not required for their
subsequent mission. The sustainment plan should include consideration of:

a. Responsibilities for casualty treatment and MEDEVAC.

b. Transfer of CPERS (iaw JDP 1 -10 - Captured Persons).

c. Unactioned support bids.

6-F-6
 d. The movement of sustainment units.

e. Use of transport by incoming and outgoing formations.

f. Details of Host Nation Support (HNS).

g. Use of installations.

h. The recovery and route clearance plan for relieving and relieved troops.

CONDUCT

06F18. Once planning is complete, the execution of the relief can be decentralised,
although still supervised by the initiating headquarters. Commanders and their staff need
to supervise:

a. Timings and movement of subordinates.

b. Coordinating joint use of transport.

c. Traffic control.

d. Current actions.

e. A constant surveillance and intelligence collection capability.

f. A coordinated AD plan involving air, aviation and AD resources.

g. The availability and notice to move of reserves.

06F19. Time needs to be allowed for reconnaissance and early planning. Security is vital
to minimise the enemy threat and detailed planning will minimise the potential for confusion
at certain stages of the action. A deception plan is essential and will involve normal
behaviour being maintained. The plan for the relief should be simple and the action should
be conducted as quickly as possible.

FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

PURPOSE

06F20. A Forward Passage of Lines (FPOL) is an action in which a force advances or

attacks through another force. The in-place force must provide the relieving force with as
much assistance as possible including tactical and logistical support. A FPOL will be used
when:

a. An attack is to be continued with fresh or more suitable forces.

b. The force to be relieved is closely engaged with the enemy.

6-F-7
 c. The relieving force has to take possession of suitable terrain in order to
continue the battle.

d. A breakout force moves through a bridgehead force.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

06F21. Command. The overall command and control of the action should be exercised
by the superior headquarters of the forces involved. The superior commander will
designate the force to be relieved and the mission of the advancing force.

06F22. The advancing force will normally collocate its forward or main HQ with the
forward or main HQ of the in-place force. All levels of command should exchange liaison
personnel. Responsibilities will be split between the superior HQ, the in-place force HQ
and the forward moving HQ, although the plans of the force passing forward take priority.
Detailed responsibilities include:

a. Controlling Headquarters.

(1) Overall plan including timings, provision of fire support, AD and BM issues
including control lines, routes, RVs and FSCM.

(2) Arrangements for liaison, reconnaissance and advance parties.

(3) Deception plans, including EMCON, EW and restrictions on forward

reconnaissance.

(4) Tactical air support of operations, including aviation.

(5) Traffic control plan.

(6) Sustainment including criteria regarding re-supply and handover of

equipment, combat supplies and medical support.

b. In-Place Force.

(1) Intelligence regarding the enemy, as well as the physical and human
terrain.

(2) Coordination of reconnaissance.

(3) Liaison.

(4) Security of the LD.

(5) Selection, security and maintenance of routes forward and to the LD within
boundaries.

(6) BM within boundaries, in particular the allocation of terrain for the

incoming force.

6-F-8
 (7) Traffic control within boundaries.

(8) Provision of AD cover up to the LD and forwards of it if possible.

(9) Guides.

(10) Fire support until the pre H-hour fire plan starts, then the provision of fire
support while still in range.

(11) Replenishment of the advancing force within boundaries after the move
forward, especially fuel.

c. Advancing Force.

(1) Provision of forward HQs, to be collocated with HQs of the force in

contact. There should be representatives from G2, G3, artillery, engineer and
G1/G4 staffs.

(2) Timings for the move forward and control of movement.

(3) Agreement with the existing force for the provision of artillery areas,
concentration/assembly areas, forming up points and any other terrain related
BM issues.

(4) LOs to subordinate HQs or units of the in-place force.

(5) Assistance with traffic control.

d. Timings. Detailed timings within the guidelines set by the superior commander
should be included in the warning order. Time has to be allocated for:

(1) Planning at formation and subordinate levels.

(2) Movement and co-location of command elements.

(3) Movement of reconnaissance, advance parties and combat support

elements.

(4) Issue of orders and battle procedure.

(5) Movement of the main body.

e. Command and Control. The overall command and control of the action
should be exercised by the superior headquarters of the forces involved.

(1) The commander of the advancing force assumes responsibility for the
conduct of the action beyond the LD at H-hour. Clear command and control
responsibilities are essential to the successful passage of lines as, for a period,
two parallel commands will be operating in the same area.

6-F-9
 (2) The force being relieved comes under command of the advancing force
commander when the advancing force crosses the LD, or earlier if specified
and remains under command of the advancing force commander as long as it
is able to provide fire support from its position.

f. Communications. The communications plan should support the deception

plan. G6 staff should be involved early in the planning process to ensure there is an
effective liaison and communications plan between the two forces.

06F23. Information and Intelligence. Liaison from back to front is essential at all levels
and must be started early. The advancing force must be able to exploit the intelligence
held by the in-place force. Once the forces overlap, the advancing force must be able to
allocate tasks to the in-place force’s ISTAR assets until all its own assets are in position.
The higher level ISTAR staffs should prioritise and ensure that their collection assets are
able to support the action.

06F24. Firepower. FPOL firepower planning considerations are similar to those for
offensive actions where surface to surface, air and aviation capabilities have been
integrated and the appropriate BM, in particular FSCM, is in place. These considerations
can be found in Chapters 2 and 3. As there are two forces involved in the same
battlespace, particular consideration should be given to the following:

a. Fires assets of the in-place force will support the advancing force. After
responsibility for the battle is passed to the advancing force, its staff will coordinate
all fire support. The fire support assets of the in-place force may be used until the
passage of lines is complete, which would allow the advancing fire support assets to
move forward and support the continuation of the advance or attack.

b. Fires staffs of both forces will need to agree on the allocation of artillery areas
for advancing force assets. These should be far enough forward to support the
advance without redeployment during critical stages of the battle, but not in positions
that have been located by the enemy. The shift in the control of Offensive Support
(OS) should pass to the advancing force once the pre H-hour fire plan has started.

c. EW will support the deception plan as well as continuing to provide intelligence

on the enemy. Electronic jamming may also assist in fixing the enemy. The EW
plan will need careful coordination at the Electronic Warfare Control Centre.

06F25. Manoeuvre. When the advancing force begins the passage of lines, its units
should be able to move straight into the advance or attack without halting. This will require
coordination best provided by the superior HQ hosting a short conference prior to the action
in order to identify the key items of information needed to successfully enable the FPOL.
Support from the in-place force will end when manoeuvre elements of the advancing force,
including reserves, have moved out of direct fire range. Combat support assets may be
tasked to remain in support until redirected by the superior HQ.

06F26. Protection.

6-F-10
 a. The passage of lines should take place in unoccupied areas such as along the
boundaries between units of the in-place force. This reduces the vulnerability of a
unit passing directly through the occupied positions of another unit while it is in
contact with the enemy.

b. AD. The requirements for AD of both forces have to be coordinated as the

concentration of units during the action increases vulnerability to air attack.

c. Air. Local air superiority should deliver the opportunity to neutralise the enemy
CAS threat, thus reducing the vulnerability of ground forces during periods when
congestion cannot be avoided.

d. Engineers. Clearance and maintenance up to the LD are the responsibility of

the in-place force. The in-place engineers need to provide a detailed barrier briefing
down to unit level. The advancing force should, however, be prepared to maintain
routes and position equipment accordingly.

e. Provost. Route reconnaissance, signing and control as required.

f. Security and Deception. The approach by advancing forces should be carried

out at night. If a daylight move is unavoidable, the provision of AD assets is vital to
the security of the moving force. Normal behaviour should be continued, while time
spent stationary in forward areas should be kept to a minimum.

06F27. Sustainment.

a. Support for the advancing force will be provided by the in-place force and
includes the following:

(1) Full replenishment before crossing the LD, particularly fuel. This may be
carried out in the advancing force’s concentration area by the in-place force’s
BSG.

(2) Evacuation of casualties and CPERS.

(3) Refugee control.

(4) Use of water points and medical facilities.

(5) Route and traffic control.

(6) Recovery of disabled vehicles and equipment, although assistance may

be required with the recovery plan.

b. The Artillery Resupply Plan. When an action includes an offensive fire plan,
there will be a requirement for detailed ammunition planning. If artillery weapons
are subsequently to advance with only the ammunition that the units can carry on
wheels, pre-positioned stocks will be necessary for the fire plan. The movement
plan for the passage of lines must include the volume of traffic that will be required
to move the ammunition.

6-F-11
 c. The Medical Plan. The in-place force should be able to provide support after
the attack has been launched. The advancing force will normally assume full
responsibility forward of the LD.

CONDUCT

06F28. General.

a. The in-place force will provide security for the advancing force. Movement
from the rear, through the in-place force, should be completed as a single fluid
movement in order to avoid congestion.

b. Advancing force indirect fire support may be deployed in the in-place force’s
area prior to the arrival of the combat units.

06F29. Routes. A brigade with tracked vehicles will need:

a. Two or three routes for tracked vehicles.

b. A separate route for wheeled vehicles.

06F30. Grouping. Regrouping should be carried out before the move forward. The
advancing force will be organised so that its mission can be executed after the forward
passage of lines.

06F31. Order of March. The order of march will generally be reconnaissance elements,
CS units (moving early to support the move of the combat units) followed by the combat
units.

06F32. Forward Assembly Area. A forward assembly area may be necessary for the
replenishment of vehicles, rest for crews and any final orders on regrouping.

06F33. Summary. A forward passage of lines requires careful planning, coordination and
a clear understanding of the split of responsibilities. Liaison is vital if confusion and
congestion are to be avoided. The provision of maximum fire support to the advancing
force will be crucial to the success of the action.

REARWARD PASSAGE OF LINES (RPOL)

PURPOSE

06F34. RPOL is an action in which one force moves rearwards through the defensive
position of another force that is possibly in contact. This action is different from a
withdrawal in that one force passes through another. A RPOL may be conducted:

a. As part of a delaying action.

b. As a means of changing the type of force facing the enemy.

6-F-12
 c. When terrain can be abandoned.

d. As a means of relieving a force unable to continue with its mission.

e. As part of a withdrawal action.

06F35. Movement to the rear is likely to be more difficult than in a FPOL because:

a. The desire for speed and lack of troops could make detailed liaison,
reconnaissance and recognition of friendly forces difficult.

b. If the withdrawing force has been in action, its soldiers may be disorganised
and fatigued.

c. The enemy may be pressing hard.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

06F36. Command. The responsibilities of the various headquarters are:

a. Controlling Headquarters. Planning the RPOL by the controlling

headquarters (divisional HQ if the units involves are brigades and brigade HQ if
the units involved are subordinate battlegroups) will determine:

(1) The location of the receiving position.

(2) Task organisation and mission of the receiving forces.

(3) The time by which the receiving force is to be ready.

(4) BM, in particular control lines (including the handover line), areas where
the withdrawing force will assemble or deploy and the allocation of sufficient
routes for the withdrawing force.

(5) The liaison plan.

(6) The responsibility for the activation and closure of barriers and reserve
demolitions.

(7) The passage of command during the conduct of actions and new
command relationships.

(8) Communications, identification and recognition signals.

(9) The subsequent employment of the withdrawing force.

b. In-Place Force.

6-F-13
 (1) Plans have to be coordinated for the in-place force to fire in support of the
withdrawing force. The in-place force may need to occupy artillery positions
forward of their main position to maximise range.

(2) The in-place force must physically show and mark all obstacles and the
routes and gaps through them to the withdrawing force. They should also be
prepared to provide guides and check points to enable tight control of
movement and progress reporting.

(3) Control of all traffic to the rear of the handover line is the responsibility of
the in-place force.

(4) Traffic and straggler control of the withdrawing force will normally be the
responsibility of the in-place force.

(5) Lateral routes will be required in case transit routes become blocked at
certain points, as well as to allow commanders to see activity across the whole
frontage.

(6) Where critical recovery and casualty evacuation assets are in short
supply, they may need to move between main routes.

c. Withdrawing Force.

(1) The withdrawing force requires information regarding routes, obstacles

and fire support, while the in-place force requires information on the enemy.

(2) Planning has to include mutually agreed day and night recognition
measures for withdrawing forces including passwords, visual and audio
signals.

(3) There should be no non-essential pauses by the withdrawing force in

order to avoid congestion.

d. Passage of Command. The passage of command during the action will be

determined by the superior HQ. The commanders and HQ staff conducting the
action should be collocated. Lower level commanders may also benefit from
being collocated.

e. Control. The higher headquarters will stipulate:

(1) Timings for the action.

(2) Designation of control lines and routes.

(3) Arrangements for liaison, reconnaissance and advance parties.

(4) Fire support.

(5) Tactical air support of land actions, including aviation tasks.

6-F-14
 (6) Deception plans.

(7) Airspace control orders.

(8) AD priorities.

(9) Sustainment priorities including criteria for handover of equipment,

combat supplies, and medical support.

f. Communications. The communications plan should support the deception

plan. G6 staff should be involved early in the planning process to ensure there is
an effective liaison and communications plan between the two forces.

g. Liaison. Early liaison is essential at all levels. LOs from the withdrawing
force, equipped with reliable communications, should be located with the in-place
force. The rearward passage of lines is further facilitated if the boundaries of the
in-place and withdrawing forces align, though this is not always achievable.

06F37. Information and Intelligence. A rearward passage of lines poses challenges for
ISTAR. The withdrawing force may already have good knowledge of routes, having
previously moved over the ground across which it is withdrawing. However, it may need to
rely on the in-place force for route information, thus allowing it to concentrate on the enemy.
The superior headquarters’ intelligence staff will need to assist in the coordination of both
forces, as well as de-conflicting priorities and ensuring that their collection assets are able
to support the action. The collection plans of both forces should be mutually supporting.

06F38. Firepower. In a RPOL, the applicable planning considerations will be similar to

those for a withdrawal, where surface-to-surface, air and aviation capabilities have been
integrated and the appropriate BM, particularly FSCM, are in place. These considerations
can be found in Chapter 2 and Chapter 6, Annex G. Similar to the RIP and the FPOL, as
there will be two forces in the same battlespace, the following require particular
consideration:

a. Artillery. The withdrawing force’s artillery may need to stay in the forward
area to provide maximum support for the subsequent battle. The in-place force
artillery may need to deploy forward of the main position to maximise range to
support the withdrawing force. The in-place force must be able to observe and lay
down fire forward of the handover line to facilitate the break clean of the
withdrawing force.

b. EW. EW will support the deception plan as well as continuing to provide

intelligence on the enemy. Electronic jamming may also assist in fixing the
enemy. The EW plan will need careful coordination at the Electronic Warfare
Control Centre.

06F39. Manoeuvre. The withdrawing force should be organised for disengagement. The
in-place force should be organised to carry out its mission as soon as it assumes
responsibility for action against the enemy. As already highlighted, the superior HQ may
hold a short conference to identify key items of information.

6-F-15
06F40. Protection.

a. Air Defence. The in-place force should extend AD cover over the withdrawing
force area.

b. Air. Local air superiority should deliver the opportunity to neutralise the
enemy CAS threat, thus reducing the vulnerability of ground forces during periods
when congestion cannot be avoided.

c. Engineers. Route maintenance and counter mobility tasks will be a priority.

The successful firing of reserved demolitions may be critical to the success of the
action.

d. Security and Deception. Movement should be at night or in reduced

visibility. Deception measures, including the continuation of normal patterns of
activity, should be taken.

e. CBRN Defence. Withdrawing units should be monitored for contamination.

Decontamination may be required.

06F41. Sustainment. Non-essential sustainment units should withdraw early to reduce

subsequent congestion, as should casualties, CPERS, non-essential vehicles, equipment
and supplies. The in-place force should be prepared to assist with medical evacuation,
vehicle recovery and replenishment, also providing Equipment Casualty Collection Points
(ECCP) as required.

CONDUCT

06F42. The withdrawing force should commence withdrawal when the enemy is least able
to interfere, though this may not always be possible, achieving a clean break forward of the
handover line. Vulnerability to enemy attack is reduced by conducting movement at night
or in conditions of poor visibility as well as selecting points of passage that pass around the
flanks of the in-place force and by designating release points well to the rear. The
withdrawing formation must have priority on an adequate number of routes to ensure its
rapid movement through the defended area.

06F43. The in-place force must be in position to carry out its task when it assumes
command. Forward elements covering the handover line must be strong enough to
conduct a temporary defence until the rearward passage of lines is complete. It may be
necessary for elements of the withdrawing force to be placed under operational control of
the in-place force.

06F44. The commander of the withdrawing force is responsible for identifying the last of
his forces as it withdraws through the in-place force and for reporting his force clear of the
handover line. The change of responsibility is reported by the in-place commander.

06F45. Summary. A RPOL is difficult to execute well. If withdrawing forces are not well
balanced and well supported by the in-place force, an alert enemy may be able to outflank
or overrun formations and units. To be successful the action requires:

6-F-16
 a. Careful planning and reconnaissance.

b. Clear direction and orders.

c. Sound command and control measures.

d. Early liaison.

e. A clear plan for changeover of command – known to both forces.

THE ADVERSARY PERSPECTIVE

Of all the Relief of Troops actions it is the Rearward Passage of Lines (RPOL) that presents
an enemy force with the clearest opportunity for gaining the initiative. The enemy may seek
to outflank or overrun the withdrawing forces and exploit any confusion or lack of control
during the action. An alert enemy with capable ISTAR may be aware that the tactical
conditions require the brigade to conduct a RPOL. However, as in a withdrawal, they
should not be aware of when the action will take place unless they are in close contact or
pursuit. They may also be aware that once the RPOL is complete they could be faced with
a new formation which may be better suited to the conditions, thus their intent may be to
defeat or destroy the withdrawing force before becoming decisively engaged by new
defensive positions. During the RPOL the enemy will:
• Attempt to confirm that the action is a Rearward Passage of Lines, as this may lead
to them being more cautious in their actions when compared to a withdrawal.
• Seek to identify withdrawal routes, potential reserved demolitions and the likely
locations and capabilities of new defensive positions.
• Apply indirect fire throughout the depth of the defence and rear area, in particular
aimed at disrupting identified and potential choke points, withdrawal routes, artillery
positions and reserves.
• Disrupt C2 by both indirect fire and EW.

6-F-17
6-F-18
CONDUCT OF A GENERIC DELIBERATE RELIEF IN PLACE: SUMMARY SHEET AND AIDE MEMOIRE
1. Preparation and Battlespace Management
Preparation and Battlespace Mgt Purpose Characteristics Deliberate Relief:
1. Commanders and HQs co-located early. An action in which all or part • Transfer of operational • Exchange plans & LOs
2. Relieving Brigade in FUP. In-Place of a force is replaced in a responsibility for a combat • Detailed recce
Force assists Relieving Force with CSS sector by an incoming force. mission. • Written orders
prior to relief taking place, using assets that It is undertaken in order to • Maintain required level of Hasty Relief:
have withdrawn early. Relieving Force sustain a force’s overall level operational capability. • Oral orders – LOs to
should be fully replenished prior to the of combat power. • Congestion. stay behind
action starting. Principles: • Confusion. Essential Info:
3. Inbound route – Advance parties and • In-Place force is required to • Hasty / deliberate. • Tac sit & Intsum
LOs will infiltrate forward avoiding detection. prepare for, brief and • Take place as quickly as
Firepower
Strict traffic control applies with marches in accommodate needs of possibly.
• Kinetic and special
opposite directions taking place on different relieving force prior to RIP. • Take place when enemy least influence methods, 2nd
routes (also avoiding lateral movement). • Maintain continuity and able to interfere – night.
order effects.
Route improvement by Engrs may be sustain effect • Mission will be determined by • Collateral damage
required along with a recovery plan. Route • No loss of momentum or Comd’s intent.
• In-place tac groups
security provided by In-Place Force. operational capability
Planning Considerations control till handover.
4. Outbound route to be taken by In-Place
• Incoming guns
Force.
Applying the Manoeuvrist Command positioned prior to RIP.
5. Incoming guns positioned prior to relief.
Approach • Influence – continuity of • In-place guns support till
6. Normal routine observed.
• Understand context. relationships with key TAs end of action.
7. CFL applied directly in front of FEBA.
• Influence perceptions. essential in stabilisation.
Fires minus of this line require coordination. Manoeuvre
• Protect own cohesion and will. • Training continuity with
8. Boundaries by default act as RFL. • Balance – speed versus
• Seek to seize and retain ISF.
9. A further RFL is applied between the detection.
initiative. • Use of kinetic means,
incoming and outgoing forces. • Route planning.
• Enhancements: simplicity, fires, manoeuvre, PPP
flexibility, tempo, momentum. and special • Traffic control – separate
influence methods. routes for incoming and
2. The Relief in Place 3. End State • Superior HQ directs and outgoing forces.
Produces plan. Details: • Avoid lateral movement.
The Relief in Place - Time frame. • Cbt and CS elements not
1. Relieving Force - Routes. relieved at the same time.
moves to relieve the In- - Control lines. • Common use of superior
Place Force. - Liaison. HQ transport.
2. Relief may take place - Reconnaissance.
simultaneously or may be - Advance parties. Protection
staggered. Balance - OS and Joint Fires. • Congestion.
between speed and the - BM – FSCM. • AD, CBRN, flanks.
risk of detection. - BM – terrain mgt. • Forward areas, routes.
3. Point of transfer of - Deception plan. • Detailed obstacle
authority agreed by - OPSEC. handover.
mutual consent. - Conduct at night? • OPSEC - normal activity.
- AD.
End State - Sustainment plan. Sustainment
1. Relieving Force now In- - Comms plan. • In-place force assists
Place. - Handover of command. with replenishment prior to
2. Previous In-Place RIP.
Force withdraws using Info and Intelligence • Stock handover?
outbound routes. • No interruption to • CPERS transfer?
3. Previous In-Place guns ISTAR cycles and • HNS?
continue to provide collection plan. • Use of transport.
support till end of action. • EW – enemy • Use of installations?
information disclosure.
6-F-1-1
6-F-1-2
GENERIC FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES (FPOL) – SUMMARY SHEET AND AIDE MEMOIRE
• Real estate de-confliction with In-Place Force.
Purpose Command
• Own movement control.
The FPOL is an action in which a force advances or attacks through another force. • Consider kinetic and non kinetic means of achieving
• Assist with traffic control.
The In-Place Force provides the advancing / relieving force with tactical and logistic influence – fires, manoeuvre, PPP, deception and other
• HQ assumes command beyond LD.
support. special influence methods
Information & Intelligence
Controlling HQ directs and produces plan covering:
It is conducted when: • Exploit in-place intelligence.
• Timings.
• An advance is to be continued with fresh or more suitable forces. • Collection continuity.
• Fire support.
• The force being relieved is closely engaged with the enemy. Firepower
• Routes.
• The Relieving Force must take possession of suitable terrain in order to continue • Use of kinetic and special influence methods
• RVs.
the advance. appropriate to target audiences. Consider negative
• Control lines.
• A Breakout Force moves through a Bridgehead Force. second order effects (local population, HN) and collateral
• Liaison.
damage.
• Reconnaissance.
Applying the Manoeuvrist Approach • In-Place Jt Fires assets support the Advancing Force.
• Advance parties.
• Understand context • Handover of control of OS to Advancing Force when
• ISTAR.
• Seize and retain the initiative post FPOL pre H-hr fire plan has started.
• BM.
• Influence perceptions. • Allocation of AMAs to Advancing Force guns.
• AD.
• Break enemy cohesion post FPOL – surprise, pre-emption, dislocation, disruption, • Ammo sustainment plan.
• Deception.
shock action and destruction. Exploit opportunities. • EW – deception, locating, jamming.
• CAS and AH.
• Protect own cohesion and will. Manoeuvre
• Movement control and sustainment.
• Enhancements: implicitly, flexibility, tempo, momentum, simultaneity. • Advancing Force does not halt.
• Hosts short FPOL conference?
• In-Place Force support stops when Advancing Force is
In-Place Force:
out of direct fire range (but OS continues support).
• Int.
• FPOL ideally through unoccupied In-Place Force areas
• Reconnaissance coordination.
(boundaries).
• LD security.
• Separate routes for tracks and wheels.
• Routes to LD.
Protection
• Traffic control.
• AD.
• AD up to and forward of LD.
• In-Place Engineers provide detailed barrier brief.
• Guides.
• Continue normal routine.
• Forward Assembly Areas.
• Carry out at night or low visibility?
• Fire support till pre H-hour fire plan.
Sustainment
• Fire support whilst in-place guns still in range.
• In-Place Force supports Advancing Force with full
• Replenishment of the Advancing Force.
replenishment:
Advancing Force:
- Ammo and fuel.
• Takes priority.
- HSS.
• Co-locates its Forward HQ with the In-Place Force HQ.
- MEDEVAC.
• Conducts liaison with subordinate HQs.
- CPERS and refugees.
- Route and traffic control.
- Equipment recovery.

1. The Advancing Force moves from its Concentration Area into an Assembly Area within the In-Place Force’s rear
area. Full replenishment should take place before the Advancing Force crosses the LD.
2. Advancing Force Forward HQ co-locates with In-Place Force HQ.
3. Battlegroups of the Advancing Force move forward into FUPs, using unoccupied ground in the In-Place Force area.
4. When FPOL has commenced, the Advancing Force should be able to move onward without halting. Security of LD
is the responsibility of In-Place Force.
5. CFL applied in front of the Advancing Force; a fresh CFL is imposed as the advance continues.
6. Boundaries act as RFL.

6-F-2-1
GENERIC REARWARD PASSAGE OF LINES (RPOL): SUMMARY SHEET AND AIDE MEMOIRE
Purpose Planning Considerations • Prioritise collection effort and de-conflict.
An RPOL is an action in which one force, possibly in contact, moves rearwards Command • Both forces ISTAR plans mutually supporting.
through the defensive position of another. It may be conducted: • Consider kinetic and non kinetic means of achieving Firepower
• As part of a delaying action. influence – fires, manoeuvre, PPP, deception and other • Use of kinetic and special influence methods
• To change the type of force facing the enemy. special influence methods. appropriate to target audiences. Consider negative
• When terrain can be abandoned. Controlling HQ: second order effects and collateral damage.
• To relieve a force unable to continue its mission. • Receiving location. • Similar to the withdrawal.
• As part of a withdrawal action. • Recce and liaison. • In-Place OS may need to deploy forward.
• Timings, control lines (incl Handover Line). • Need to fire forward of Handover Line to enable
An RPOL is likely to be more difficult than FPOL:
• ISTAR. break clean.
• Friendly forces recognition.
• Fire support. • Withdrawing force guns may need to stay forward
• Withdrawing force may be disorganised and fatigued.
• AD priorities. to support subsequent battle.
• Enemy may be pressing hard.
• CAS and AH. • Ammo re-supply plan.
Applying the Manoeuvrist Approach • Barrier and Reserve Demolition responsibilities. • BM.
• Understand context • Deception. • EW – deception, location, jamming.
• influence perceptions • Change of command. Manoeuvre
• Protect own cohesion and will - Seize and retain initiative with covering force. • Combat ID. • Withdrawing force organised for disengagement.
• Break enemy cohesion – surprise, pre-emption, dislocation, disruption, shock • Comms. • Has route priority.
action and destruction. Exploit opportunities. • Routes and movement control. • Commander IDs and confirms when last FEs are
• Simplicity, flexibility, tempo, momentum, simultaneity. • Sustainment. through.
• Hosts short RPOL conference? Protection
In-Place Force: • AD – cover withdrawing force.
• Guns forward? • Firing of Res Dml.
• Control of fire support. • Engineers - detailed barrier brief.
• Establish and mark – routes, obstacles, gaps. • Normal routine.
• Traffic control - check points, guides, lateral routes. • Carry out at night, low visibility?
• Med support and CASEVAC. Sustainment
• Equipment recovery. • Early MEDEVAC
• Replen. • Non essential assets withdraw early.
Withdrawing Force: • In-place force replen – priority ammo and fuel.
• Int provision. • In-place force sets up ECCP.
• LOs to in-place force early.
Information and Intelligence
• Superior HQ co-ord of both forces ISTAR.

1. In-Place Force in defensive position. Prepared to take over the battle from the withdrawing Covering Force at
the Handover Line. May need to conduct a limited offensive action up to the Handover Line.
2. Withdrawing Force moving to conduct RPOL. Does not stop during RPOL and has route priority.
3. Covering Force action – delaying the enemy and preventing them from interfering with the RPOL. Hands battle
over to In-Place Force.
4. Ideally the withdrawing Force will pass around the flanks of the In-Place Force, though this may not always be
possible.
5. Break Clean Line well forward of Handover Line. If possible, conduct RPOL at night or low visibility. OS to aid
break clean.
6. A Co-ordinated Fire line (CFL) would be applied in front of the Covering Force. Fresh CFLs may be imposed as
the covering force withdraws.
7. Boundaries act as RFL.

6-F-2-2
 ANNEX G TO
CHAPTER 6

WITHDRAWAL

06G01. A withdrawal occurs when a CONTENTS

commander seeks to disengage from the enemy, Subject Page
although contact may be maintained through
means such as indirect fire, reconnaissance or Purpose and Principles 6-G-1
surveillance. Withdrawal should be conducted to Planning Considerations 6-G-2
Conduct 6-G-5
minimise interference by the enemy and to Vignette 6-G-8
preserve fighting power, particularly the physical
and moral components. The ability to transition Appendix 1:
rapidly to offensive or defensive actions should Summary Sheet and Aide Memoire 6-G-1-1
always be retained.

PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES

06G02. The order to withdraw will not normally be given by a commander without direction
from a superior commander. A withdrawal may be conducted for the following reasons:

a. If the force is threatened by defeat.

b. If an objective is achieved and there is no further requirement to maintain

contact.

c. To avoid battle in unfavourable tactical circumstances.

d. To draw the enemy into an unfavourable posture.

e. To conform to the movements of adjacent friendly forces.

f. To allow the use of the force or parts of the force elsewhere.

g. If the force can no longer be sustained.

06G03. The principles of withdrawal actions are:

a. Control.

b. Simplicity.

c. Security.

d. Offensive Action.

e. Flexibility.

6-G-1
06G04. Retirement. A retirement is a movement, out of contact, by a force away from the
enemy. It is conducted in a similar manner to the march (see Annex H) and, although out
of contact, the force will be vulnerable to enemy OS and interdiction.

06G05. Withdrawal in Contact. A withdrawal will usually be conducted in contact after a

tactical reverse. This is a difficult action to undertake and will require robust leadership and
firm discipline to avoid a withdrawal becoming a rout. It should be regarded as a
manoeuvre to create a more favourable situation before resuming offensive actions.
Delaying tactics may be needed to allow forces to fight their way rearwards. The greater
the mobility and the longer the range and weight of firepower, the easier it will be for the
brigade to conduct the withdrawal successfully.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

06G06. Command.

a. General. If the withdrawal takes place in contact with the enemy the
commander’s primary planning concerns will be:

(1) To ensure a clean break.

(2) To retain a coherent frontage by deploying strong covering troops.

(3) To safeguard withdrawal routes.

(4) To maintain balance throughout the action.

b. Key Success Factors. Success will depend on the maintenance of morale,

tight control and secrecy. The commander should plan to continue offensive
action.

c. Morale. Morale is a key component of fighting power; therefore every

opportunity must be taken to sustain it. For example:

(1) Commanders should remain forward.

(2) All ranks need to be kept informed of the purpose of the action and the
true situation.

(3) Good administrative arrangements must continue, especially the

evacuation of casualties.

(4) Offensive action should be conducted whenever possible.

d. Battlespace Management. Planned control measures in the withdrawal are:

(1) Liaison parties should precede withdrawing troops to assist with control
and identification.

(2) Routes and axes should be identified.

6-G-2
 (3) Report and phase lines.

(4) Traffic control measures including:

(a) Recovery and engineer plans.

(b) Arrangements for refugees, using the HN where possible.

(5) Check points.

(6) Fire Support Co-ordination Measures (FSCM).

(7) Timings for critical phases or sequences.

(8) The control of reserved demolitions.

e. Communications. The Emission Control (EMCON) policy must balance the

desired effect on the enemy with the brigade’s command and control
requirements.

f. Influence. It is essential that the enemy does not become aware that a
withdrawal is taking place until the point at which interference would have little or
no effect. Hence the need for a deception plan aimed at misleading the enemy as
to the brigade’s intent. Control of refugees may be an important factor, which will
require a plan that ensures key withdrawal routes are kept clear. This plan may
require appropriate intervention from withdrawing forces to channel refugees onto
designated routes, coupled with information methods, as well as host nation
support if applicable.

06G07. Information and Intelligence. A continuous flow of accurate information on the

enemy is vital. The intelligence staff will initially focus on monitoring indicators that the
enemy has identified the withdrawal. An overt ISTAR posture should be maintained as an
aid to deception.

06G08. Firepower. The type of withdrawal will determine the OS requirement. Where a
break clean is required, the use of OS will be critical in order to fix the enemy and allow it to
take place. The distances to be covered in the withdrawal will determine the complexity of
the OS plan. When the break clean can be supported with fires from the new positions, the
task is straightforward. If there is a requirement for an intermediate position for surface to
surface systems, the task becomes more complex. The point at which OS assets move to
the new position must be considered in terms of fire support provided to the withdrawing
force, the additional traffic on routes and the requirement to have assets in place to support
manoeuvre elements as they occupy their new positions. It may be necessary to rely
significantly on CAS and AH to deliver sufficient weight of fires when withdrawing in contact
or with the enemy in pursuit, but planning must include the degrading effects of poor
weather on such systems. If the withdrawal is planned to be out of contact and ‘silent’, the
above considerations remain extant as there will be a need to implement them if the
withdrawal is compromised. The planning of fires to support a withdrawal should include
consideration of the following:

6-G-3
 a. Locations and tasking of STA assets including Tactical Groups (Tac Gps) in
order to cue and control fires. This must include maintenance of a coherent
Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan (STAP) throughout, which will be achieved
by leapfrogging platforms and observers, leaving anchor observers in place for as
long as possible and the use of air and aviation where possible. Seamless handover
of the battle between observers will be a key factor in achieving success.

b. Firepower will continue to enable manoeuvre by fixing the enemy and denying
freedom of action. This may be achieved through continuous attack of the enemy in
depth, using dynamic targeting and existing targeting priorities as part of the
Targeting Cycle. This will include targeting routes and choke points in order to delay
the enemy.

c. Selection of appropriate Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM) and

Airspace Control Means (ACM) will be essential. In particular, the initial location and
movement of the Coordinated Fire Line (CFL), to conform to the movement of the
withdrawing force, will give maximum freedom of action to strike assets controlled by
higher headquarters.

d. Obstacles must be covered by fire, but for indirect systems this also requires
them to be observed. For the obstacle/barrier plan to be effective it must be
supported by observation and fires.

e. Delivery of fires as part of a deception plan.

f. The use of smoke to conceal movement or limit target acquisition, particularly

at choke points or vulnerable points which the enemy may have under observation.

g. Detailed ammunition planning in order to allow the early withdrawal of the

maximum number of logistic vehicles.

h. EW assets will be key to executing the deception plan, and disrupting enemy
C2.

06G09. Protection. Enemy interference should be minimised. The covering force must
ensure it has an effect on the enemy. Commanders should also consider the other
components of protection:

a. Air Defence. Defence against enemy aircraft will be critical, particularly at

choke points.

b. Mobility and Counter Mobility. Engineers will be heavily committed in a

withdrawal and obstacles will often delay the attacker longer than any other action.

c. Survivability. Engineer support should be allocated to assist with the

preparation of the new main position and any intermediate positions.

d. Security. The enemy may have the initiative in both ground and air; therefore
withdrawal may have to take place in darkness or under limited visibility.
Operational Security (OPSEC) is vital to avoid discovery. Routine in defence
should continue as normal for as long as possible, as well as the usual pattern of

6-G-4
 communications. Artillery may engage targets forward of the positions being
abandoned to provide cover.

06G10. Sustainment. The sustainment plan must support the withdrawing force and
prevent the capture of stocks by the enemy. Ammunition re-supply must be guaranteed.
All non essential elements should be filtered back as early as possible. Recovery of vehicle
casualties should occur early in the withdrawal and the recovery plan must ensure that
choke points are kept clear. A key element of the maintenance of morale will be an
effective medical evacuation plan.

CONDUCT

06G11. Procedure.

a. Grouping and Tasks. Normal organisations should be retained as far as

possible. Regrouping during the action should be avoided and particular attention
should also be paid to:

(1) Surprise and deception.

(2) The maximum use of cover and concealment to achieve protection.

(3) Allocation of routes and an appropriate traffic control system.

b. Positions. A withdrawal may be direct to a new main position, or through an

intermediate position. The decision will depend on distance, force strength, state
of the enemy and the time needed to prepare a new position. A rearward passage
of lines will be required in order to check the enemy at the intermediate position.

(1) Intermediate Positions. Should be:

(a) Strong enough to force the enemy to deploy and undertake time
consuming preparations for an attack.

(b) Far enough from the main defensive position and each other to force
the attacker to move his artillery to engage them.

(2) New Main Position. Early preparation of the new main position will have
to be balanced against the need for security, as well as work on any
intermediate positions, especially as there is likely to be a shortage of
available troops. Reconnaissance parties and engineers not required for the
counter mobility plan must deploy to the new position before the withdrawal
begins.

c. Timings. There are two key timings:

(1) No Rearward Movement Before Time. Except for normal traffic and
reconnaissance parties.

6-G-5
 (2) Deny Until Time. The position has to be denied to the enemy until this
time. This timing will form the basis of the withdrawal plan.

d. Coordination. For fire support coordination, other timings include the time at
which troops may start withdrawing and the time by which all troops must be clear
of a selected rear phase line.

e. Sequence of Withdrawal. The sequence of withdrawal will be:

(1) Reconnaissance parties and all non-essential vehicles and equipment.

(2) Covering troops take up station behind the position and reserves move to
selected locations.

(3) Sub units on the position withdraw through the covering troops. Rear
elements may pull out first leaving forces deployed forward until last, if a clean
break is achievable.

(4) Covering troops disengage once the main body has withdrawn. If the
enemy launches a strong attack against them, they will continue their covering
task with a delaying action.

(5) If the covering force cannot disengage or prevent the enemy from closing
in on the main body, it must be reinforced by elements from the main body, or
other available force elements. If the covering force has disengaged, it will
follow the main body and continue to provide security.

(6) This sequence is repeated at each intermediate position. The withdrawal

is terminated when the force is ready to assume its next task.

f. Hasty Withdrawal. In the worst case a withdrawal may have to be conducted

without adequate warning and battle procedure will have to be streamlined. The
commander must aim to maintain the integrity of his front. The sequence is:

(1) The commander quickly selects a position to the rear that he will hold. All
troops not committed to the immediate battle move there and prepare a hasty
defence.

(2) Troops in contact will fight back through the new position to selected
assembly areas immediately behind it, where control will be re-established.
Covering troops or reserves will probably not be available.

g. Battlefield Shaping. The brigade and its higher HQ will attempt to shape the
battlefield to support the withdrawing force, using measures that improve the
mobility of friendly forces and impair enemy mobility. These include:

(1) Reconnaissance of routes and positions if time permits.

(2) Improving existing route and traffic flow.

6-G-6
(3) Use of well rehearsed drills and SOPs.

(4) Protection or observation on withdrawal routes at vulnerable defiles.

(5) Evacuating refugees or restricting their movements to routes not required

by the withdrawing forces.

(6) Evacuating casualties, recoverable supplies and surplus supplies early.

(7) Occupying and controlling terrain or choke points that dominate likely
enemy avenues of approach.

(8) Improving natural obstacles and covering them with fire.

(9) Employing Joint Fires to slow the enemy’s rate of advance, channel
forces for targeting, degrade his C3, cause attrition across his force
(particularly at choke points) and attack his will and cohesion.

(10) Conducting spoiling attacks to keep the enemy off balance and deny him
momentum.

6-G-7
 VIGNETTE

WITHDRAWAL FROM KYAUKSE

48 INFANTRY BRIGADE 29 APRIL 1942

During the 1942 retreat from Burma to India, 48 Brigade, part of 17th Indian Division, was
ordered to hold Kyaukse; a small town sitting on the Zawgyi river whose tactical importance
was due to both the Rangoon to Mandalay road and railway running through it.

48 Brigade relieved the 96th Chinese Division on 26 April, with orders to hold the town until
1800 on 29 April. The Brigade consisted of four understrength Ghurkha battalions, 7th
Hussars, a troop each from 414 Field Battery RHA and 95 Anti-Tank Battery RA, one
battery of Indian artillery and a company of Bengal Sappers. They were to hold the town
against two Japanese divisions and an armoured regiment advancing from the south.

In anticipation of the eventual withdrawal the three bridges in the town were quickly
prepared for demolition.

On the evening of 28 April the Brigade was attacked by the Japanese but managed to hold
them off. At 1400 on 29 April the Brigade Commander gave his final orders for the
withdrawal. The plan was very simple: Zero hour was to be at 1800 and coincide with the
blowing of the main road bridge (the railway bridge having already been demolished). The
infantry battalions were to start thinning out 30 minutes before this and the forward
positions abandoned at Zero hour. Ten minutes later the vacated forward positions were to
be shelled.

Two tanks remained on the far side of the river to cover the withdrawal of the forward
battalions, after which they would cross the one remaining bridge to the west which would
be blown behind them. The withdrawing battalions were to pass through a control point
manned by the depth infantry battalion before embussing.

The action at Kyaukse worked flawlessly. Although the withdrawal was conducted under
enemy fire British casualties were only three killed and seven wounded, at the time
Japanese casualties were estimated at 200 killed.

The withdrawal from Kyaukse demonstrated four principles of a withdrawal action:

Control: The withdrawal was controlled by precise timings and the use of control points.

Simplicity: The Brigade Commander’s plan was simple, so it worked well despite
interference by the Japanese.

Security: Whilst some positions were disclosed by a Japanese spy, in particular the
location of the Brigade HQ, which lead to accurate shelling in the hours before the
withdrawal, the withdrawal itself was not compromised.

Offensive Action: Offensive action was taken by the artillery shelling the abandoned
forward positions and by the aggressive use of tanks on the far side of the river to cover the
infantry’s withdrawal from their forward positions.

6-G-8
Further Reading:
Grant, LI, Tamayama, K, Burma 1942: the Japanese Invasion, (Chichester: The Zampi
Press 1999)

Slim, W, Field Marshal , Defeat into Victory, (London: The Reprint Society 1956)

6-G-9
6-G-10
GENERIC WITHDRAWAL: SUMMARY SHEET AND AIDE MEMOIRE
Stage 1
Stage One
1. The Covering Force moves to the
rear of the Main Defensive Position.
Reconnaissance, preparation parties,
guides and certain CSS assets, as
well as engineers not required
forward, have already withdrawn to
the new position.
2. Remaining engineers improve
obstacles to counter enemy mobility.
3. Jt fires assets move into position,
in order to be available to fix enemy
and enable break clean. Intermediate
gun positions prepared.
4. Force elements to the rear will
withdraw first followed by force
elements on the forward edge of the
position, moving along reconnoitred
and controlled routes.
5. CFL initially imposed in front of
defensive position – moved back as
the withdrawal proceeds.
6. The Brigade’s boundaries are
RFLs.
Stage 2
Stage Two
1. The withdrawn force is now in its
new defensive position following a
successful break clean.
2. Guns move by battery to
intermediate positions and continue
to fix enemy in conjunction with other
Jt Fires assets. Fires are called for
by FSTs with the Covering Force.
3. The Covering Force withdraws via
intermediate positions, continuing to
seize opportunities to slow the
enemy advance. Covering Force,
including guns, will need to conduct
a RPOL as they approach and then
enter the new defensive position.
4. Report Lines are imposed in
sequence to act as CFLs.
Purpose:
A withdrawal may be conducted for the
following reasons:
• If a force is threatened by defeat.
• if an objective is gained and there is no
requirement to maintain contact.
• To avoid battle under unfavourable
circumstances.
• To draw the enemy into an
unfavourable situation.
• To conform to movements of adjacent
forces.
• To allow the use of the force elsewhere.
• If the force can no longer be sustained.
Principles:
• Control.
• Simplicity.
• Security.
• Offensive Action.
• Flexibility.
Forms of Manoeuvre
• Retirement – a movement out of contact
(preferable).
• Withdrawal in contact – more usual
after a tactical reverse.
Positions
• Withdrawal may be direct to a new
position.
• Withdrawal may be via intermediate
position(s) - strong enough to force the
enemy to deploy and far enough back
such that enemy needs to move his
artillery.
Applying the Manoeuvrist Approach
• Understand context
• Influence perceptions
• Protect own cohesion, while seeking
opportunities to break enemy cohesion –
surprise, pre-emption, dislocation,
disruption, shock action and destruction.
• Exploitation of opportunities.
• Enhancements: simplicity, flexibility,
tempo, momentum, simultaneity.
Key Timings
• No Rearward Movement Until time (less
reconnaissance, guides, preparation
parties etc)
• Deny Until time
Key to Success – Maintenance of
morale, tight control and secrecy.
Planning Considerations:
Command
• Consider kinetic and non kinetic means
of achieving influence – fires, manoeuvre,
PPP, deception and other special
influence methods
• Robust leadership.
• Morale critical – reason for withdrawal
fully understood.
• Commanders remain forward.
• Achieve a clean break.
• Coherent frontage.
• Retain offensive spirit.
Information and Intelligence
• Continuous int about enemy.
• Indicators that withdrawal identified.
• Overt ISTAR posture.
• ISTAR activity aids deception.
Firepower
• Use of kinetic and special influence
methods suitable to target audiences.
• Negative second order effects on local
population, HN and others.
• Collateral damage considerations.
• Fix enemy to enable break clean.
• Allocation of FSTs.
• Targeting (deep).
• Requirement for intermediate gun
positions.
• FSCM.
• EW assets key to deception.
Manoeuvre
• Designated withdrawal routes.
• Traffic control.
• Engineers - enhance mobility.
• Reserved demolitions.
• Counter enemy mobility.
• Requirement for intermediate positions.
Protection
• AD cover – priority to fwd area / routes.
• Engineers – obstacle creation and
improvement.
• Withdraw when enemy least able to
interfere.
• Safeguard withdrawal routes.
• OPSEC – tight control and secrecy.
Sustainment
• Prevent capture of stock.
• Ammo re-supply (arty stocks critical).
• Equipment recovery plan.
• CASEVAC plan (morale critical).
6-G-1-1
6-G-1-2
 ANNEX H TO
CHAPTER 6

MARCH

06H01. A march is an enabling action CONTENTS

conducted to move a force efficiently to its place Subject Page
of tactical employment. During a march units
should be prepared to come into contact with the Purpose and Principles 6-H-1
enemy, but not expect to do so. Planning Considerations 6-H-2
Conduct 6-H-5
Vignette 6-H-7
06H02. The march is distinct from tactical
movement, in which units move in battle Appendix 1:
formations and are either in contact with, or Summary Sheet and Aide Memoire 6-H-1-1
expect to meet, an adversary. When planned
and conducted efficiently, a march adds tempo
to operations. This requires regulation when carried out at brigade level, which is often
conducted by reconnaissance troops due to their mobility and capacity for communications.

PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES

06H03. The purpose of a march is for the force to reach its destination in the best possible
condition to execute its subsequent mission; the disciplined conduct of the march, while
important, remains secondary to the success of that mission.

06H04. Column Length and Speed. Forces marching under single command and on a
single route form a ‘march column’. Long march columns should be subdivided into ‘march
serials’, which should not exceed the strength of a battlegroup or major unit. The ‘rate of
march’ is the average speed at which forces are expected to move, excluding halts.

06H05. Routes. Whenever possible, multiple routes should be used. This will shorten the
duration of the move, reduce vulnerability to enemy air attack and reduce the length of time
that routes are unavailable for other movement. Lateral routes enable march serials to be
switched between axial routes in the event of congestion or blockages. Routes have a
single beginning and end, but may have multiple numbered start points and release points
from where packets may be directed to enter or leave the controlled road move. The route
towards the FLOT is expressed at the ‘up route’ and away from the FLOT as the ‘down
route’.

06H06. Harbour Areas. Harbour areas will be identified along the route, particularly near
the beginning and end, where march serials can leave the route:

a. In the event that it becomes blocked or impassable.

b. To allow changes to the traffic density or order of march.

c. To give way to priority traffic.

d. To avoid congestion at a defile.

6-H-1
 e. To move at low density into congested areas such as refuelling points.

06H07. March Discipline. Deviations from routes, timings and speeds will interfere with
other movements. Unexpected interruptions should be dealt with and reported accordingly.
Changes should not interfere with the overall movement plan. Traffic control support is
highly desirable.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

06H08. General. Marches require careful planning, with the most important factors being:

a. The commander’s intent and mission to be executed after the march.

b. The time available and the distance to move.

c. The organisation of the move, including troops involved and movement control
measures.

d. The order of march, which will be dependent on the planned employment of

the force after the move.

e. The number of routes and their capacity, or availability of sectors.

f. The enemy situation:

(1) Gaps between and within march serials depend upon tactical
considerations, particularly the air threat.

(2) If the situation is likely to change during the march, assembly areas along
the route should be identified, so that the order of march can be changed,
interrupted, or redirected.

(3) As enemy contact may occur during the march, the commander should
anticipate and plan for a meeting engagement.

g. The relative mobility of the force.

h. Terrain, weather conditions, and possible Chemical, Biological, Radiological

and Nuclear (CBRN) hazards.

i. Other movement, including civilian traffic.

j. The ability to maintain and repair routes and other lines of communication.

06H09. Command.

6-H-2
a. Responsibilities. The moving force normally provides its own movement and
traffic control although in-place forces and the host nation may provide external
support.

b. Orders. The commander ordering the march should specify:

(1) Destinations.

(2) Routes or sectors.

(3) Speeds and halts.

(4) Task organisation, including attachments for the march.

(5) Road clearance times and restrictions.

(6) Staging and assembly areas along the route.

(7) Waiting and rest areas (including refuelling and maintenance areas).

(8) Support from other units.

(9) Counter-surveillance control measures.

(10) Special reporting requirements.

c. Subordinate Orders. Subordinate commanders executing the march will

issues orders to include:

(1) The Start Point (SP) /Release Point (RelP) and other check/control points.

(2) Order and rate of march.

(3) Reconnaissance and any guard forces.

(4) Air Defence (AD) during the move.

(5) Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM) and restrictions.

(6) Traffic control.

(7) Sustainment plans.

(8) Liaison and communications.

(9) Rest periods.

(10) Any supplementary information concerning the movement organisation.

6-H-3
 d. Warning Orders. Units will be given maximum advance notice of a move in a
warning order. It should contain:

(1) The anticipated mission.

(2) The earliest time of departure and location of the SP.

(3) Routes, task organisation and the order of march, reconnaissance,

advance forces, traffic control, and sustainment plan.

06H10. Information and Intelligence. Information may be obtained by:

a. Timely reconnaissance of the route and destination. UAS can be used to

provide surveillance of the route, providing both early warning and adding to SSA.
UAS can also be use to cue strike, to conduct Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)
and to conduct exploitation following contacts. Any such use of UAS should be as
part of an integrated ISTAR plan.

b. Liaison with the forces occupying the area, with national authorities if
appropriate and any movement control agencies.

c. Specialist route reconnaissance, to which engineers, CBRN elements, or RMP

may be assigned.

06H11. Firepower. It is unlikely that all surface to surface systems will be able to provide
coverage for the whole route. Provision should be made for guns to move as part of the
march, deploying on orders to deliver fires if required. Close Air Support (CAS)/Attack
Helicopter (AH) should be able to provide more responsive strike in such circumstances,
but planning must include the degrading effects of poor weather on such systems. Fire
Support Teams (FST), with integral Forward Air Controllers (FAC) and Joint Fires Cells
(JFC) will move with their affiliated manoeuvre elements, continuing to provide liaison
advice and specialist communications. Their presence will allow the integration of fires and
manoeuvre as required along the route. Planning should consider how to support those
force elements which do not routinely have FSTs task-organised to them. Options include
static FST positions for overwatch of key points or areas, use of aviation to increase the
reach of FSTs and a march-specific FST laydown to produce wider but less dense
coverage.

06H12. Manoeuvre. Reconnaissance and maintenance of routes are key engineer tasks.
Engineer plant and materiel may have to be pre-positioned, however engineer preparations
must not betray the movement of manoeuvre brigades.

06H13. Protection. Movement requires protection and may include screens or guards to
protect open flanks, advance and / or rear guards, as well as AD. AD may be able to cover
a route as part of an area defence task, but if this is not so consideration must be given to
tasking AD assets to defend the route or key points along it.

06H14. Sustainment. Forces must be replenished before a march and should replenish
at every opportunity on route. If moving into a combat action, the last halt must allow for
rest, vehicle repair and replenishment.

6-H-4
 a. Medical. Health Service Support (HSS) along the route is required. The
medical plan should not impinge moving units.

b. Recovery. A vehicle recovery plan will be needed coupled with support to

crossings and choke points.

c. Convoy Support Centres. For long moves, convoy support should be

located at halt locations to provide rest, feeding, servicing and refuelling facilities.

d. Provost. Routes and harbour areas will normally be signed and regulated,
particularly at defiles, by the use of traffic posts and road patrols.

06H15. Additional Considerations.

a. Battlespace Management (BM). Where a march turns into another type of

tactical action, such as a meeting engagement, principles and planning issues
articulated in previous chapters will still apply. The key planning consideration for
a march is BM. The complexity of the BM solution put in place will depend on the
level and nature of the threat, as well as the number of other actors in the
battlespace. Units moving along a route will not own any battlespace and may be
transiting the operational areas of other force elements (including other
nationalities), or through populated areas with or without effective governance.
The route could be designated a Restricted Fire Area (RFA) with specific ‘actions
on’ to maximise freedom of action in the event of a contact, while also providing
restrictions to minimise the risk of fratricide.

b. Influence. The nature of the modern, non-linear battlespace means that a 360
degree threat exists, which is particularly prevalent in populated areas where such
perils are not clearly identifiable. A key consideration is to dissuade the enemy
from attacking force elements on the line of march. This may be achieved by
adopting the appropriate posture, presence and profile, conveying a message of
overt capability and willingness to use aggressive action if necessary. A march
may need to transit through, or close to, a populated area. Any potentially
detrimental consequences need to be identified during planning, as indigenous
population support is likely to be critical to future actions.

CONDUCT

06H16. Movement to the Start Point. Unit commanders are responsible for the
movement of their units to the SP. It is from this point that units commence movement in
their designated sequence and at the speed ordered.

06H17. Actions During the Move. Unit commanders should be prepared for:

a. Reconnaissance. The commander of a march column is responsible for

additional reconnaissance along the route.

b. Contact with the Enemy.

6-H-5
 (1) If the force makes contact with the enemy unexpectedly, the principles of
the meeting engagement apply. The commander of the force must consider
the higher commander’s intent and attempt to out manoeuvre the enemy.

(2) Minor attacks must not delay the march. They should be dealt with by a
small reaction force that must deal with the situation quickly and then rejoin the
moving force.

06H18. Priorities.

a. Priorities for marching units will be established by the higher commander.

b. The HN may designate routes on which military movement has priority over
civilian traffic. On non-military routes, civilian traffic should be dealt with by local
police or by the movement control organisation to help prevent an unacceptable
delay.

06H19. Release Point. Higher level control arrangements cease at the release point.
Units and brigades will usually move from release points to an assembly area.

6-H-6
 VIGNETTE

45 CDO RM AND 3 PARA MARCH ACROSS EAST FALKLANDS

On 27 May 1982, as 45 Commando Royal Marines (45 Cdo) prepared to march across East
Falkland, their Commanding Officer wrote in his diary:

‘We have to fight and win three victories; against the enemy, against the appalling terrain
and weather, and against our own logistic inadequacies’ 1

3 Commando Brigade had been planning to break out from San Carlos Bay and then
advance 40 miles across East Falkland to Mount Kent, which was the key to the hills
around Port Stanley. This was in the wake of the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor with its three
Chinook helicopters and other much needed stores on board.

The Brigade Commander planned to leave a screen to cover the Argentinian base at Goose
Green. However London, in need of some good news, ordered him to carry out a raid on
Goose Green. This task was allocated to 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment (2 PARA)
whilst 3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment (3 PARA) and 45 Cdo were to march on foot
across the inhospitable terrain of East Falkland to Teal Inlet. There was no alternative
given the lack of helicopters.

45 Cdo and 3 PARA left San Carlos Bay moving slowly over the hills and streams of East
Falkland, they covered about 13 miles on the first day. They were accompanied by
Scorpion and Scimitar armoured reconnaissance vehicles, as well as a few BV 206 tracked

__________________
1
 Hastings, M and Jenkins,S, The Battle for the Falklands, (London: Book Club Associates 1983) p.235 

6-H-7
vehicles which carried each unit’s heavy weapons and ammunition.

On 29 May, 45 Cdo reached the little settlement at Douglas where they were able to rest.
They set off again on the morning of 30 May and reached their objective at Teal inlet that
evening.

3 PARA had arrived on the afternoon of the 29 May and departed on the evening of the
following day to secure Estancia house, a cluster of farm buildings, at the foot of Mount
Kent which they achieved on the evening of the 31 May.

Meanwhile on 30 May CO 42 Cdo was flown forward with one of his companies to capture
the summit of Mount Kent which they found unoccupied. This positioned 3 Cdo Bde for its
final operations with 5 Bde against the hills defending Port Stanley.

Further Reading
Hastings, M, Jenkins, S (1984). The Battle for the Falklands. (New York: Norton)
Middlebrook, M.(1985) Operation Corporate: The Story of the Falklands War, (London:
Penguin Books Ltd,)

6-H-8
GENERIC MARCH: SUMMARY AND AIDE MEMOIRE Purpose:
• A March is conducted in order
to move a force efficiently to its
place of tactical employment so
that it arrives in the best possible
condition to execute its mission.
• March discipline is secondary
to the successful completion of
the mission.
• Forces should be prepared to
come into contact with the
enemy.
Traffic Control:
• Multiple Start Points.
• Multiple Release Points.
• Up and down routes.
• Possible route signing.
• Traffic Posts.
• Pointsmen at Control Points.
• Road Patrols.
• Planned detours.
• Unplanned detours.
Movement Control:
• Route recce.
• Movement Table.
• Positive / Negative reporting.
• Harbour Areas.
• Route cards.
Manoeuvrist Approach
• Understand context
• Influence perceptions
• Protect own cohesion and will
• Seize and retain initiative if
required to do so – exploit
opportunities
Planning Yardsticks:
• Provost Company can sustain 9
x Traffic Posts and sign 150 km of
route in 10-15 hrs.
• Brigade and BSG pass time at
20kph with 100m gaps is 288
minutes.
• Brigade and BSG column length
with 20m gaps is 16km.
Planning Considerations:
Command:
• Consider all kinetic and non kinetic means of
influencing perceptions – fires, manoeuvre, PPP,
deception and other special influence methods.
• The units moving should have been given
detailed orders for the Mission they will be
required to execute at the end of the march.
• The units moving should understand their
responsibilities – eg, they provide their own traffic
control.
Information and Intelligence:
• Integrated ISTAR plan.
• Use of UAS for route reconnaissance.
• Enemy situation continually updated.
• Specialist route reconnaissance elements –
Engineer, CBRN, RMP.
Firepower:
• Use of special influence methods appropriate to
target audiences.
• Consider second order effects on local
population, HN and possible collateral damage
from kinetic methods.
• BM.
• Systems unlikely to cover entire route.
• Offensive Support can deploy as required or
move within column.
• Available CAS?
• Anchor / overwatch FSTs.
Manoeuvre:
• Movement restrictions.
• Engineer route maintenance.
• Pre-position engr assets.
• Use of cross country routes.
Protection:
• Covering Force.
• Flank Guards.
• AD route protection.
Sustainment:
• MEDEVAC and vehicle recovery plans.
• Convoy Support Centres.
• Traffic regulation.
6-H-1-1
6-H-1-2
 ANNEX I TO
CHAPTER 6

CROSSING AND BREACHING OBSTACLES

06I01. The breaching and crossing of CONTENTS

obstacles normally occurs during Subject Page
offensive actions, but may also be
necessary during defensive and enabling Obstacle Crossing 6-I-1
actions to maintain freedom of movement. Purpose and Principles 6-I-2
Planning Considerations 6-I-5
Irrespective of the type of action, crossing Conduct 6-I-11
and breaching obstacles can be Breaching Actions 6-I-13
complicated activities that require Purpose and Principles 6-I-13
extensive planning, rehearsal and Planning Considerations 6-I-13
specialist capabilities. They also have a Conduct 6-I-14
Crossing Other Obstacles 6-I-15
significant impact on tempo, The Adversary Perspective 6-I-15
manoeuvrability and the security of the Vignettes 6-I-16
force. Appendix 1: Summary Sheet
and Aide Memoire 6-I-1-1
06I02. In this Annex crossing and
breaching at the brigade level are considered in turn. Each action is explained in generic
terms. It aims to provide sufficient structure and detail for a brigade conducting a crossing,
or breaching, where the brigade HQ is acting as the controlling headquarters for the action.

OBSTACLE CROSSING

06I03. An obstacle is a natural or man-made restriction to movement that requires special

engineer capabilities or munitions to overcome it. A coordinated series of obstacles is
known as a barrier. Avoidance should be the primary aim, though in many instances this
will not be possible. If an obstacle cannot be avoided, opportunities to find a location where
an unopposed crossing can be conducted should be sought. Again, this will not always be
possible, which may mean an opposed crossing against an enemy in a strong defensive
position. Reconnaissance is important to confirm the terrain and the enemy forces
defending the obstacle. Obstacles likely to prove the greatest impediment to movement are
rivers, canals and minefields, including concentrated IED belts and areas where there is a
perceived IED threat. Breaching minefields and IED belts is dealt with in the Breaching
Actions section on page 6-I-13. Other obstacles that will slow down movement include:

a. Rough, soft or marshy ground and terrain covered by snow.

b. Craters and ditches.

c. Vertical steps and steep slopes.

d. Contaminated areas, whether due to CBRN strike, or to industrial

contamination.

e. Extended wire entanglements.

f. Debris, including collateral damage from weapons.

6-I-1
 g. Existing and reinforced obstacles including craters, mines, landfalls and
avalanches.

h. Artificially induced flooding and inundation.

06I04. Types of Crossing and Breaching. There are four different types of crossing
and breaching actions:

a. Hasty. A hasty crossing or breaching usually takes place from the line of
march, with little preparation, using resources immediately available to the
brigade, or resources that are close at hand. A hasty crossing should always be
considered with the intent of either crossing unopposed, or crossing before the
enemy has been fully able to prepare his defensive position. Brigades may be
expected to conduct hasty crossings/breaches using their own integral capabilities.

b. Deliberate. A deliberate crossing or breaching requires the application of a

thorough process involving reconnaissance, detailed planning, extensive
preparations, rehearsal and specialist engineer equipment. A deliberate crossing
is conducted because of the complexity of an obstacle, the strength of the
opposition, or when a hasty crossing or breaching has failed.

c. Assault Breaching. The assault breach allows a force to penetrate an

enemy’s obstacles and defeat him. Assault breaching provides a foothold in an
enemy defence position to enable exploitation.

d. Covert Breaching. The covert breach is conducted by dismounted forces in

conjunction with an infiltration. It is carried out to achieve surprise and to minimise
casualties.

PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES

06I05. The purpose of an obstacle crossing is to project combat power across a natural
or man-made obstacle while ensuring maintenance of momentum and retention of the
initiative. The following paragraphs are set in the context of crossing major water obstacles
such as rivers and canals, though the principles and procedures are similar for the crossing
or breaching of other obstacles.

06I06. Maintenance of Momentum. The key principle of obstacle crossing/breaching is

the maintenance of momentum. Movement across an obstacle must be strictly controlled in
order to avoid congestion, with a consequent reduction in tempo, as well as to establish a
sufficiently strong force on the other side of the obstacle to defeat any enemy counter-
action. Maintenance of momentum is essential during the crossing, requiring speed, a
flexible crossing plan and rapid exploitation.

06I07. Other principles include:

a. Surprise.

b. Security.

c. Deception.

6-I-2
 d. Redundancy.

e. Simplicity.

f. Command and control.

06I08. Water Crossing Actions. A water crossing consists of a series of overlapping

stages:

a. Overwatch. Providing security, initially to the reconnaissance of the obstacle

and subsequently to the assault.

b. Assault. To gain a lodgement on the far side of the obstacle. This stage is
not required for an unopposed crossing. The assault may be conducted by
boating, swimming, fording or airlifting a force across the obstacle.

c. Build Up. Intended to extend the lodgement into a bridgehead. During this
phase sufficient crossings will be developed to support the move forward.

d. Consolidation. A firm base is established to provide the required degree of

security and space for the move forward.

e. Exploitation. The breakout and exploitation must be conducted as soon as

the tactical situation allows, balancing risk against maintenance of momentum.

06I09. The Crossing Location. The crossing location will be divided into three different
areas; the crossing area, the crossings and the bridgehead:

a. Crossing Area. If the tactical situation or the nature of the obstacle requires
it, the brigade commander will order the creation of a crossing area, containing a
number of crossings. Key factors are as follows:

(1) The depth of the crossing area will depend on the size of the water
obstacle and the terrain.

(2) The near and far boundaries should be positioned within the closest
lateral routes approximately 3km from the water or on easily recognisable
terrain features that run parallel to the water obstacle.

b. Establishing a crossing area confers the following advantages:

(1) It allows the flexibility to switch traffic from one crossing to another
within the crossing area and prevents a build-up of friendly forces near the
obstacle.

(2) It gives the engineers the freedom to shift equipment from one crossing
to another.

(3) Control is made easier. An entry line will be established where control
of movement and ground is delegated to the crossing area HQ.

6-I-3
 c. Crossings. Individual crossings within the crossing area should possess the
following natural or engineered features:

(1) The number of crossings established is normally twice that required by

the desired traffic flow, thus creating the required level of redundancy.

(2) Cover from observation.

(3) Routes to and from crossings with the required classification and
capacity, including lateral routes.

(4) Waiting areas.

(5) Sufficient space for the establishment of a bridgehead.

(6) Locations for direct and indirect fire support force elements.

(7) Assembly areas located some distance from the obstacle. Assembly
areas should be dispersed, have good routes to the crossings, as well as
cover and concealment.

d. Bridgehead. A bridgehead should have the following characteristics:

(1) Defensible terrain of sufficient extent where the enemy cannot

seriously interfere with the crossing action.

(2) Sufficient crossing and movement facilities to avoid congestion.

(3) A base for the continuation of the overall action.

06I10. Brigade Manoeuvre Elements. The forces conducting a crossing will consist of
an in-place force on the near side of the obstacle, a bridgehead force and a breakout force:

a. In-Place Force. The in-place force will provide fire support during the
crossing. It is responsible for the defence of the obstacle and the home bank.
The bridgehead and breakout forces will conduct a forward passage of lines
through the in-place force.

b. Bridgehead Force. The manoeuvre element of the bridgehead force consists

of an assault echelon and a main body. Its mission is to seize and control ground
in order to permit the continuous embarkation, crossing and landing of troops and
materiel. It will also provide the manoeuvre space needed for subsequent actions.
It is responsible for the defence of the far bank.

(1) Assault Echelon. The assault echelon is tasked to gain the lodgement,
preventing enemy observation and fire so that crossings and equipment can
be prepared and operated to bring the main body and breakout force to the far
side with minimum interference.

(2) Main Body. The main body of the bridgehead force conducts the build
up, the seizure of objectives on the bridgehead line and consolidation.

6-I-4
 c. Breakout Force. The breakout force is tasked with the continuation of the
action. This may be an additional task for the bridgehead force. If not, a further
forward passage of lines will be required.

d. Engineers.

(1) Engineers will enable the bridgehead force to cross the obstacle.
Engineer reconnaissance assets will need to be attached to the leading
elements of the brigade and bridging capability should be placed at the
appropriate point in the brigade order of march. Engineers may be required to
prepare obstacles to protect the flanks of the crossing force.

(2) Elements committed to secondary tasks should be drawn from forces not
involved in the crossing, or subsequent actions, as these forces will require
their own engineers for the assault, as well as tasks in and beyond the
bridgehead.

(3) A crossing action may be restricted by the amount of specialised

equipment available. Additionally, engineers will be required to support
echelon forces.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

06I11. Command.

a. Clear Command and Control. The need for clear command and control is
paramount in all water crossing actions. The basic requirements are:

(1) A crossing control organisation with clearly defined responsibilities.

(2) A movement control organisation.

(3) A command and control network that provides the necessary secure
voice, situational awareness and information required by the commander.

b. Commanders.

(1) Overall Commander. Overall command will normally be exercised by

the brigade commander. He has control of the crossing action and will issue
the crossing plan. This will include:

(a) The composition of forces needed on the far side of the obstacle and
their missions.

(b) The movement plan and crossing rate.

(c) Selection and allocation of crossing areas, individual crossings,

assembly areas, waiting areas and deployment routes.

(2) Bridgehead Force Commander. Much of the detailed planning and

coordination for the crossing is likely to be delegated to the Battlegroup (BG)

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 that is being tasked as the bridgehead force, though the final responsibility for
the action will remain with the brigade commander.

(3) Engineer Commander. The engineer commander will most likely be the
commanding officer of the brigade’s close support engineer regiment. Each
level of command in a water crossing action will have an engineer who is
responsible for the technical aspects of execution. This includes:

(a) Advice on all engineer matters including the selection of individual

crossings, the allocation of engineer capability, the selection of waiting
areas and water safety.

(b) Ensuring there is an engineer communications network operating.

(c) Assigning crossing commanders.

(4) Crossing Commander. Individual crossings will each have a

commander who is normally an engineer. He will have the following
responsibilities:

(a) Develop and maintain the crossing, including entrances and exits.

(b) Construct, operate and maintain the means of crossing.

(c) Movement across the water including orders to troops during the
crossing.

(d) Advice to the waiting area controller on movement to his crossing.

(e) All technical aspects of maintaining the survivability of his crossing

and crossing equipment.

(5) Waiting Area Controllers. To ensure that vehicles crossing the obstacle
are within the capability of the crossing equipment, engineers are located in
waiting areas. They assist provost and movement control personnel and
dispatch vehicle packets to appropriate crossings.

c. Headquarters.

(1) Controlling Headquarters. The commander for a major crossing action

may establish a controlling headquarters. The controlling headquarters is
likely to be the brigade main headquarters or a forward brigade headquarters.
The following elements will be represented:

(a) Operations/security (air and ground defence).

(b) OS.

(c) Movement control.

(d) Engineers.

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 (e) Sustainment, communications, EW and liaison elements.

(2) Crossing Area Headquarters. Normally the crossing area headquarters

is the headquarters of the BG that is tasked to be the bridgehead force, though
it might be one of the other BG headquarters. This is a decision the overall
commander will make and will depend on the tactical situation. The crossing
area headquarters will be responsible for:

(a) Security. Routes, harbours, marshalling areas, home bank, attack

positions, Line of Departure (LD) and, eventually, bridgehead objectives
on the far side.

(b) Movement Control. Strict movement control will avoid vulnerability

due to congestion.

(c) Terrain Control. Control is essential to manage the demand for

terrain near the crossing.

(d) Crossing Support. Engineer crossing support may include assault

boats, swim sites, ferries and bridges. Sustainment support should also
be provided.

(3) Movement Control Organisation Headquarters. For a deliberate

crossing, a Movement Control Organisation (MCO) is required to coordinate
movement to and from crossings and is likely to be provided by the brigade’s
transport and provost units. The MCO headquarters will be co-located with the
headquarters of the overall commander. Sector movement control
headquarters will be co-located with each subordinate BG. The
responsibilities of the MCO are:

(a) Advise the overall commander on all aspects of movement control.

(b) Establish a movement control communications network.

(c) Conduct route signing and provide movement control posts.

(d) Establish assembly areas and waiting areas.

(e) Control movement from the assembly area across the obstacle and
into the bridgehead.

d. Liaison.

(1) The overall commander must keep the engineer commander informed of
intentions and plans, allowing the engineer commander to make his estimate,
conduct his battle procedure and advise on matters related to the crossing.

(2) When a force is required to conduct a move, controlled and supported by

another authority (command or nation), this force must liaise as early as
possible at its respective level of command within that authority. The purpose
of this liaison is to exchange relevant documents and to be briefed on the
movement control organisation, including:

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 (a) Organisation and procedures of any water crossings.

(b) Reporting details for movement and for water crossings.

(c) Status of convoy commanders and drivers of isolated vehicles.

(3) Communications. Three communications nets are key to the action and
should be based on existing unit and formation communications:

(a) Tactical command net.

(b) Movement control net

(c) Engineer command net.

e. Battlespace Management (BM). Terrain management will be essential due

to the number of force elements converging on a relatively small area. Congestion
must be avoided at the crossings, therefore the control of real estate, the
positioning of assembly areas and waiting areas, as well as the control of arriving
force elements requires robust consideration. Examples are shown graphically at
Annex A.

06I12. Planning Factors. Any obstacle can be overcome with sufficient time and
resources, however both are likely to be in short supply. Commanders should aim to seize
crossings or minefield gaps intact, or force the crossing before the enemy expects it.
Bypassing an obstacle is often expeditious, though it may result in being canalised into the
enemy’s intended killing areas. If obstacles cannot be bypassed, seek to achieve surprise
and overcome them in places where the enemy least expect. The following need to be
considered:

a. Tactical Factors.

(1) To maintain momentum there is likely to be a requirement for multiple

crossings, providing:

(a) Concealment.

(b) Good approaches.

(c) Suitable ground for deployment of direct fire support on the friendly
side and of bridgehead defences on the enemy side.

(2) Confirm if the obstacle is defended. Crossing or breaching must be

preceded by the suppression of enemy fire and obscuration. The breach or
crossings may need to be secured by force, requiring adequate fire support
and AD cover.

(3) The far side bridgehead should be large enough to be defended and used
to launch break-out forces.

(4) Commanders should also be aware of the vulnerability of such actions to

CBRN attack.

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 b. Technical Factors. The fewest possible crossings will allow the concentration
of engineer resources and the retention of reserves against equipment casualties
or failure. The suitability of individual crossings will be based on:

(1) Access for large engineer equipment.

(2) Obstacle width.

(3) River bank and bed profile, as well as current.

(4) Going and soil structure for mine ploughs or hand breaching.

c. Surprise. Surprise must be considered from the outset, leading to decisions

regarding:

(1) Timing. A daylight action may only be possible for a hasty crossing. A
deliberate crossing will ideally be mounted at night or in poor visibility.

(2) Noisy or Silent. A noisy crossing may be possible if there is sufficient

fire support and the crossing can be made before the enemy can react. A
compromise approach is to conduct a silent crossing until either surprise is
lost, or until a predetermined moment is reached.

(3) Deception. A deception plan should be prepared to confuse the enemy’s

understanding of the actual crossing, thus affecting his perception as to when,
where, how and if a crossing will take place. The following deception
measures might be employed:

(a) Moving signature equipment up by day through a flanking formation,

before switching them laterally at night.

(b) Overt reconnaissance of other crossings.

(c) Simulation of crossings away from the actual crossing area.

(d) Routing of sustainment and engineer traffic via deception routes by

day.

(e) Use of a deception fire plan.

(f) Use of an EW plan.

06I13. Information and Intelligence.

a. Accurate and timely intelligence will:

(1) Confirm the existence and nature of any obstacles.

(2) Confirm whether obstacles are defended, leading to deductions regarding

enemy strength, dispositions and intent.

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 (3) Identify the presence of other parties in the obstacle area, such as an
indigenous population, leading to deductions with regard to effects required
and how they should be handled.

(4) Prompt the commander to decide to bypass or mount a hasty or

deliberate action.

b. Engineer reconnaissance will provide terrain analysis leading to information on

routes, going, approaches and the obstacle itself.

c. Terrain information is also required for assembly area locations, hides, artillery
areas and Ammunition Control Points (ACP).

06I14. Manoeuvre. Crossing actions rapidly absorb combat power and initially split the
formation across the obstacle, making the employment of a tactical reserve difficult. Attack
Helicopters (AH) offer a flexible and responsive option for an initial covering force during the
assault stage of the action. AH can also act as a flexible reserve.

06I15. Firepower.

a. Artillery. The general principles to be applied to the planning of an obstacle

crossing are the same as those for offensive of defensive actions, except in the
immediate vicinity of the obstacle itself. This applies equally to the considerations
that surround BM and the application of appropriate Fire Support Control
Measures (FSCM). Specific planning considerations are as follows:

(1) The order of march for crossing the obstacle must include Fire Support
Teams (FST) as a priority. The force will be vulnerable while massing
sufficient combat power on the far bank and fires will be key to providing
protection. The ability to deploy FSTs in overwatch or anchor positions on the
home bank may affect the priority, but FSTs must cross early.

(2) There may be a requirement for a Restricted Fire Line (RFL) between
elements of the force crossing the obstacle, as well as a Coordinated Fire Line
(CFL) pertaining to the assault echelon of the bridgehead force. This will need
to be dynamically managed as initial lodgements are expanded outwards into
the bridgehead and as the breakout from the bridgehead takes place.

(3) Targeting remains essential to attacking and fixing the enemy in depth in
order to prevent him massing forces and fires against the bridgehead. The
targeting cycle will allow the process to begin early and to be fully integrated
into the obstacle crossing phase of an action.

(4) Smoke may be used as part of a fire plan for concealment of the
crossings, thus creating a desired level of limited visibility. This will require
significant amounts of smoke ammunition to sustain guns and mortars
specifically allocated to the task. Sustainment planning must consider the
early movement of ammunition in order to keep routes clear for the crossing
action itself.

(5) Fires may be required as part of a deception plan. Consideration must be

given to ammunition requirements and the availability of fires assets for such

6-I-10
 tasks. Planning must include the reallocation of assets from the deception
plan in order to support the main effort.

b. EW. The EW effort will initially be focused on the use of electronic surveillance
to provide intelligence on the enemy. Electronic attack may be used to support the
main action (including the use of electronic deception).

c. Aviation. In addition to autonomous manoeuvre, aviation can be used to

provide close support fires and direction for other OS assets.

06I16. Protection.

a. Air. As it may be possible to achieve only local air superiority for a limited
period, the time and location of the crossing area should be carefully coordinated
with air support.

b. AD. Although each force is responsible for its own AD, the overall commander
must ensure AD protection for the crossings and the routes to them.

06I17. Sustainment.

a. Medical Support. The movement control plan must include casualty

evacuation arrangements. Casualty evacuation assets should be established on
each side of the obstacle and there may be a need to deploy a medical holding
facility on the far side. Support helicopters should be considered for casualty
evacuation.

b. Provost Support. Traffic control will be vital to prevent congestion. RMP and
RE need to establish a close liaison at the crossings.

c. Logistic Support. The assault echelon must be self-sufficient in combat

supplies as they will be temporarily separated from the logistic support chain.
Provision must be made for early replenishment, particularly ammunition and fuel.

d. Equipment Support. Repair and recovery resources must be included in the

movement control plan and move early to ensure that routes, particularly choke
points, are kept open.

CONDUCT

06I18. A water crossing action is usually conducted in three stages:

a. Assault Stage.

(1) The assault echelon establishes a lodgement on the far side to eliminate
enemy direct fire and observation. This lodgement is achieved either by:

(a) Infiltration.

(b) Boating, swimming or fording.

(c) Air manoeuvre.

6-I-11
 (2) The assault echelon crosses the obstacle, with support being provided by
the in-place force on the home bank, through whom a passage of lines will
have been completed. This support will include direct and indirect fire support,
as well as the protection of crossings from air attack and from attacks along
the obstacle by divers, vessels, mines or drifting objects.

b. Build Up Stage.

(1) Once the assault echelon is across the obstacle and on their intermediate
objectives, the tactical commander will order the crossing area into effect. At
H-hour, engineer bridging equipment will leave the engineer RV and move to
the water obstacle to construct the crossings. Movement control elements
complete their deployment to control the move of the bridgehead force’s main
body across the obstacle.

(2) Once a crossing is detected by the enemy, it becomes extremely

vulnerable. Bridging equipment may have to be dispersed at short notice and
alternative means and crossings may have to be used. Fire support should be
used to obscure the crossing.

(3) Once across, main body lead elements pass through or around the
assault echelon to secure the bridgehead final objectives. Once these have
been secured, the bridgehead is established.

c. Consolidation Stage. An extension of the build up stage. Pockets of

resistance are eliminated and the remainder of the main body and breakout force
assault elements are moved across the obstacle. Crossings are improved and
preparations are made for the breakout and continuation of the action.

06I19. Crossing during Delaying Actions. A brigade conducting a water crossing

during a delaying action, or a withdrawal, may be faced with a far greater problem than that
facing a force moving forwards. Much will depend on whether the delaying force is in close
contact with the enemy and whether sufficient bridges still exist over the obstacle. In
general, such a crossing action will follow the stages described below:

a. Relief Stage/Relief Action. Units not required to support the battle should be
withdrawn over the water obstacle as early as possible. Maximum use should be
made during this stage of existing bridges.

b. Delaying Stage/Delaying Combat. The delaying stage represents the

assault stage in reverse. The forces engaged on the enemy bank are withdrawn
under cover of supporting fire from the home bank, coordinated by the overall
commander. By the end of this stage, all bridges should have been withdrawn,
dismantled or destroyed.

c. Withdrawal Stage. During the withdrawal stage, obstacles to hinder enemy

movement on both sides of the water crossing are improved or activated. The last
vehicles are withdrawn by ferries or on pontoons. These are protected by an
infantry screen supported by indirect fire. The last troops swim or are transported
by boat, helicopter or any other available means.

6-I-12
 BREACHING ACTIONS

PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES

06I20. A breach is a tactical task in which any means available are employed to break
through or secure a passage through an enemy defence, obstacle, minefield, or
fortification. 1 The purpose of a breaching action is to project combat power across a
defensive barrier while ensuring the maintenance of momentum and the initiative. The
principles, approach and execution of a breaching action are similar to that of a crossing
action, although such obstacles will produce some significant and unique problems.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

06I21. The following factors should be considered when planning a breaching action:

a. Reconnaissance. For breaching to be successful, the minimum information

required is the minefield depth, its front and rear edges and details of enemy
weapons covering the minefield, though in the case of an IED belt this may not be
fully possible. The task of determining the boundaries of a minefield is an all arms
responsibility. The physical reconnaissance within a minefield is an engineer
responsibility.

(1) Locating Minefields. Reconnaissance and surveillance techniques, as

well as information obtained from maps, terrain analysis and other sources,
enable forces to determine likely mined areas and IED belts. The use of
reconnaissance forces, supplemented by engineer reconnaissance, should
provide timely guidance on minefield and IED locations.

(2) Minefield Composition. It may not always be necessary to determine

the exact composition of a minefield, particularly if a combination of explosive
breaching and other methods is used. It is advantageous to determine the
composition prior to breaching it, given the wide variety of mines and fuses
available and particularly if a deliberate action is to be conducted.

b. Breaching. Breaching may be conducted by hand, by mechanical, electrical,

or explosive means, or by using a combination of techniques. Once lanes are
established they should be marked.

c. Breaching from the March. A brigade may attempt to breach from the march
using integral resources. Very little reorganisation of the assault echelon should
be required and developed SOPs should enable breaching to commence with little
or no orders being given. Engineer support will come from resources on hand.
The scope of engineer support can include reconnaissance, provision of advice,
as well as the breaching, proving, marking and maintenance of lanes. Seizure of
minefield lanes or an opportunity for a hasty breaching must be exploited. If this
fails, a deliberate breaching will be necessary.

d. Deliberate Breach. If a breach cannot be conducted from the march, or if the

obstacle is too complex to be crossed using resources to hand, deliberate
_____________________
1
JDP 0-01 Edition 7.

6-I-13
 breaching must be attempted. The resultant loss of momentum must be accepted
as more time will be required for reconnaissance, planning and the build-up of
necessary resources. Engineer and EOD support to the deliberate breach are
likely to be extensive. Timely and accurate intelligence is required to determine
the extent and composition of the obstacle and hence the structure of the
breaching force. This normally consists of infantry, armour, engineers, OS and
close air support. Support will include:

(1) Detailed reconnaissance of the obstacle to determine locations of mine

rows and types.

(2) Provision of engineer advice to commanders.

(3) Provision of specialist capabilities (such as EOD) to assist in the conduct

of the breach.

(4) Proving, marking and maintenance of lanes.

e. Additional Considerations. In many cases, an IED belt in the modern non-

linear battlefield will be laid in close proximity to the local population. This will
have implications with regard to breaching and how it is conducted, given the
potential for negative consequences. Conversely, the proximity of the IED belt to
the local population provides opportunities for the brigade to exploit and strive to
alienate the enemy from the local population.

CONDUCT

06I22. When executing a breaching action the following factors should be considered.

a. For enemy obstacles, reconnaissance should include the breaching of a patrol

path or lane through the minefield.

b. If the enemy situation allows, dismounted troops should cross the obstacle and
establish a lodgement on the far side, although this may not always be possible.
In either case, it will be necessary to form a breaching force to open lanes for
personnel and vehicles of the assault echelon.

c. If the minefield has been prepared by friendly forces, it should be crossed

using existing gaps or lanes, or newly breached lanes.

d. Once lanes are open, traffic control posts at both ends of the lanes are
required. Recovery posts should be established at the approaches to all lanes
and on both sides of the minefield.

e. With the assault echelon across the minefield and secure, engineers should
complete their preparation of breaching sites, to include marking. Movement
control elements complete their deployment to control the movement of the main
body across the minefield. Complete clearance of barriers requires a considerable
amount of time and resources, therefore can usually only be justified if actually
necessary.

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06I23. Sustainment. Sustainment considerations for breaching actions are similar to
those required for water crossing actions, though the scale of support tends to be lower.

06I24. Command and Control. The level of command for breaching actions is likely to
be lower than for a water crossing. Minefield breaching may involve a number of
independent, simultaneous actions each with its own commander, whereas a water
crossing is a centralised action. The breaching commander is the commander who has the
tactical responsibility for actions in that area.

CROSSING OTHER OBSTACLES

06I25. The considerations that apply to the conduct of other obstacle crossings are
similar to those for water crossing actions and minefield breaching. The major difference is
normally one of scale. Therefore, the crossing of other types of obstacles is conducted at
lower tactical levels. The tactical commander must ensure that appropriate specialist
support is available to maintain mobility. This is particularly true if breaching a concentrated
belt of IEDs, where specialist EOD assistance will be vital.

THE ADVERSARY PERSPECTIVE

Opposed obstacle crossings, in particular water crossings, are potentially the most
dangerous and difficult of brigade actions to conduct. If the axis of advance is predictable
then the enemy is likely to anticipate probable crossing points (by consideration of
approach routes, banks, currents, crossing distances etc) and cover these by direct and
indirect fire. He may also identify potential assembly areas and routes to the crossings.
During the crossing action the enemy will attempt to:

• Destroy any established crossings/remaining bridges by reserved demolitions.

• Disrupt the assault force by direct and indirect fire as they cross the obstacle.
• Use air defence to disrupt any air manoeuvre forces attempting to seize a
bridgehead by vertical envelopment.
• Attack crossings by direct and indirect fire.
• Attack the assembly areas by indirect fire.
• Attempt to sever all links between a bridgehead and the forces waiting to cross.
• Destroy the bridgehead force at the earliest opportunity in a counter-attack before it
has become established.
• Disrupt the forces waiting to cross should they bunch on the obstacle.
• Disrupt C2 of the crossing by attacking identified C2 nodes, including use of EW.

6-I-15
 OBSTACLE CROSSING FROM AN ADVERSARY PERSPECTIVE:
RIVER RAPIDO, JANUARY 1944

During the allied campaign in Italy in January 1944 the US 36th Texas Division were tasked
with crossing the River Rapido. This obstacle formed part of the German ‘Gustav line’
which, together with Monte Cassino, controlled entry into the Liri Valley.

However, effective IPB by 15 Panzer Division had identified the likely route of US advance
and, more importantly, potential crossings. These were then covered by artillery and
emplaced heavy machine guns. The Germans had also mined the allied bank, cut down
trees to provide wider fields of fire and strung barbed wire along the river banks.

The resulting disruption to the US assault meant that attacking battalions were unable to
cross the river in sufficient numbers to seize a bridgehead and those that succeeded in
getting across were soon defeated by counter attack.

VIGNETTES

DELIBERATE CROSSING: OPERATION NEPTUNE

43 WESSEX DIVISION CROSSING THE SEINE
25-28 AUGUST 1944

By August 1944 the Allies had consolidated their beachheads in Normandy and were
advancing across France. German resistance in the Falaise pocket had finally ended, with
some 70,000 German troops either killed or captured and the remaining German forces in
full retreat across the River Seine.

The Plan

On the evening of 22 August 1944, 43 Wessex Division (43 (W)

Div) was ordered by HQ 30 Corps to force a crossing over the
River Seine at Vernon and to form a bridgehead of sufficient depth
to allow the remainder of 30 Corps to pass though.

The mission to assault across the river was given to 129 Infantry
Brigade supported by the divisional engineers. The leading
battalions were 4th Battalion Somerset Light Infantry (4 Som LI) on
the left and 5th Battalion the Wiltshire Regiment (5 Wilts) on the
right. 1st Battalion the Worcester Regiment (1 Worcs) were the
follow up battalion and 4th Battalion the Wiltshire Regiment (4
Wilts) were the reserve. Once the crossing was secured, the divisional engineers were to
build a Class 9 Bridge followed by 7th Army Engineers building a Class 40 Bailey Bridge.

The Assault

At 1845 on 25 August, the artillery of 94 Field Regiment RA fired a 15 minute barrage onto

6-I-16
the north bank of the Seine. Tanks and mortars along the river front opened up with
supporting fire. At 1900, the guns of 94 Field Regiment and 4.2 inch mortars of the 8th
Battalion the Middlesex Regiment (8 Mx) started laying a smoke-screen for the assaulting
troops as 5 Wilts and 4 Som LI began their move across the river in assault boats followed
by DUKWs.

However, misinterpretation of aerial photographs had led

to the depth of the river being badly misjudged. As a
result some of the assault boats grounded mid-river and
only a small number of 5 Wilts were able to make the
north bank. 4 Som LI had reached an island close to the
north bank, but were now faced with a narrow channel
on the enemy side which, although the photographic
experts had stated was dry, turned out to be liquid mud.
1 Worcs were then tasked to cross on foot using the
partially destroyed road bridge.

At first light on 26 August, elements of all three

battalions were across the river, although Vernonnet and
the high ground that dominated the far bank and the crossing was still not completely clear
of German forces. By that evening, 129 Brigade was firmly established on all its objectives.
4 Wilts had followed 1 Worcs across the damaged bridge and the high ground had been
occupied. The Class 9 Bridge was complete and work on the Class 40 bridge had started.
The follow up brigade, 214 Infantry Brigade, was also across the river.

During the next day the bridgehead was steadily enlarged. By 28 August all three brigades
of 43 (W) Div were across and the bridgehead had been enlarged to an 8000 yard
perimeter, ensuring that the bridges were out of range of German artillery. This allowed 11
Armoured Division to subsequently conduct a forward passage of lines to continue the
allied advance across France.

The 43 (W) Div operation illustrates the following principles of obstacle crossings:

Surprise: The Germans considered Vernon as a likely crossing point, however surprise
was achieved through deception and concealment. The crossing was concealed by a
combination of fires, smoke and timing. The short preparatory barrage only gave the
Germans 15 minutes warning and the use of smoke hid the actual assault. The crossing
was timed so that smoke would be available, if necessary, until last light.

Deception: Vernon had been occupied by the US Army and the Germans had grown
accustomed to seeing reconnaissance elements of 12 US Army in the town. In order not to
raise any indications of an impending assault, the British concealed all crossing equipment
and, to convince the Germans that no significant action was imminent, only wore US
combat clothing in the crossing area. Deception was aided by the lack of enemy
reconnaissance capability due to overwhelming Allied air superiority.

Security: Security was maintained by stringent orders that no British troops were to be
seen on the river bank prior to the assault. Security in Vernon was allocated to a full
squadron from 43 Reconnaissance Regiment.

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Redundancy: Sufficient resources in the form of DUKWs, storm boats and bridging
equipment were allocated to allow for losses.

Command and Control: Command was exercised by Commander 129 Brigade. Control of
Vernon was allocated to one squadron of 43 Reconnaissance Regimentt and then 4 Wilts.
Control of traffic was given to 8 Mx. Communication was boosted by an extra allocation of
radio sets and the laying of line along the approach routes.

Further Reading

British Army of the Rhine Battlefield Tour: 43 (W) Division Assault Crossing of the River
Seine 25 – 28 August 1944.

Delaforce, P, The Fighting Wessex Wyverns: From Normandy to Bremerhaven with the
43rd Wessex Division (London: Sutton Publishing,1994)

Essame, H, The 43rd Wessex Division at War 1944-1945, (London: Clowes, 1952)

OBSTACLE BREACHING (OUTSIDE DELIBERATE INTERVENTION):

NORTHERN IRELAND 1972
OPERATION MOTORMAN

Operation MOTORMAN was the biggest British military operation since the Suez Crisis of
1956. Prior to the operation 4,000 extra troops were brought into Northern Ireland, bringing
the available forces up to almost 22,000 soldiers aided by a further 5,300 soldiers from the
locally recruited Ulster Defence Regiment. In addition several Centurion Armoured Vehicle
Royal Engineers (AVRE) demolition vehicles were used. These were the only tanks to be
deployed operationally by the Army in Northern Ireland during the Troubles.

The tanks had been transported to Northern Ireland on board the amphibious landing ship
HMS Fearless, and, in order to avoid adverse wider opinion, were operated with their
demolition guns pointed to the rear, covered with tarpaulins.

The operation began at 0400 on 31 July and lasted for only a few hours. In the ‘no-go
areas’ sirens were sounded by residents to alert others of the incursion. The British Army
used bulldozers and the Centurion AVREs to smash through and dismantle the barricades,
before flooding the no-go areas with troops in armoured vehicles. The Provisional IRA and
Official IRA were not equipped to battle such a large force and did not attempt to hold their
ground.

In Belfast, the operation was far more elaborate than in Londonderry. It involved eleven
battalions that moved into ten districts. Not all were no-go areas, but the heavy army
presence prevented any outbreak of trouble. In some cases local people helped the Royal
Engineers to dismantle the barricades. Some arrests were made, but no gunmen or

6-I-18
bombers were engaged. Smaller operations were carried out in Lurgan, Armagh, Newry
and Coalisland.

At the end of the day the AVREs were re-embarked on Fearless. The security forces,
suffered no casualties and had reasserted their right to go anywhere in the province. As a
military operation MOTORMAN remains a rare case of breaching action in support of
Military Aid to the Civil Authorities, however it employed principles applicable to deliberate
breaching actions in all military activities:

Operation MOTORMAN illustrates the following principles of obstacle breaching:

Surprise: The appearance of the AVREs on the streets took the IRA completely by
surprise. They had been alerted to the possibility of a major operation, due to the build up
of troops in the province, but had not anticipated the appearance and use of such potent
vehicles.

Security: Concealing the movement of such obvious signature equipment was a particular
challenge which involved HMS Fearless embarking the AVREs onto Landing Craft
Mechanised (LCM) which then had to sail 25 miles to disembark the vehicles in
Londonderry. Concealment was achieved by conducting the move at night with the LCMs’
cargo hidden by tarpaulins, aided by deteriorating weather which reduced visibility to
around half a mile.

Redundancy: The large numbers of extra troops and vehicles brought into the province
allowed for some redundancy and a reserve.

Simplicity: Operation Motorman was a simple plan, destroy the barricades and flood the
province with a heavy army presence to prevent any outbreak of trouble.

Further Reading

An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland prepared under the direction of the
Chief of the General Staff. 2007.

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6-I-20
THE CONDUCT OF A GENERIC DELIBERATE OBSTACLE CROSSING: SUMMARY SHEET
1. Overwatch And Assault
Overwatch and Assault
1. Recce / Covering Force
reaches the water obstacle
and sets up overwatch.
2. Lead battlegroup becomes
the In-Place Force and
occupies the near bank –
provides support for
Bridgehead Force. The
remainder of the Brigade
moves to Assembly Areas.
3. Bridgehead Force Assault
Echelon crosses river and
establishes initial lodgements,
covered by In-Place Force
and Jt Fires. Crossing may
be conducted by boat,
fording, swimming and / or
aviation.
3. Exploitation
Exploitation
1. Breakout Force exploits
beyond the Bridgehead Line.
2. In-Place Force continues
to provide security for the
remainder of the Brigade as
it crosses in turn.
2. Crossing And Bridgehead Development
Crossing and Bridgehead
Development
1. Establishment of Crossing Area
ordered.
2. In-Place Force continues to hold near
bank.
3. Remainder of Brigade held in
Assembly Areas.
4. Crossing Area activated.
5. Engrs called forward to commence
crossing construction.
6. Remainder of Bridgehead Force
cross and expand lodgements into
bridgehead.
4. Battlespace Management
Battlespace Management
1. CFL Trout is activated plus of the far
bank of the river during overwatch and
deployment of In-Place Force to allow
conventional, indirect, surface fire support
to fire at any time without additional
coordination.
2. Report Lines beyond the river line will,
when activated, also act as CFL.
3. When the Assault Echelon reports that
it is crossing Report Line Wolf, Report
Line Badger is activated as a CFL.
4. The CFL gets pushed out further as
the Main Body of the Bridgehead Force
consolidates position and establishes the
Bridgehead Line.
5. Restricted Fire Areas (RFA) are
applied as required around own force
locations.
6. The Brigade’s boundaries are RFLs.
6-I-1-1
CROSSING AND BREACHING OF OBSTACLES: AIDE MEMOIRE

Planning Considerations

Principles: Commanders: Command: Protection:

• Maintenance of Momentum. • Overall Comd. • Obstacle – bypass / cross / breach. • Consider AD, flanks, CBRN, OPSEC.
• Surprise. • Bridgehead Force Comd. • Intact existing crossings, gaps? • Protection priorities.
• Security. • Engineer Comd. • Influence opportunities in area of crossing / • Use night/reduced visibility.
• Deception. • Crossing Comds. breaching – fires, manoeuvre, PPP, deception • Obstacles to protect bridgehead and
• Redundancy. • Waiting Area Controllers. and other special influence methods. crossings.
• S implicity. • Hasty / deliberate.
• C2. HQs: • Cross where enemy least expects. Sustainment:
Types: • Controlling HQ. • HQ roles. • Principles of sustainment
• Hasty. • Crossing Area HQ – usually the • Deception plan – noisy / silent. in the advance apply.
• Deliberate. Bridgehead Force HQ. • Population proximity. • Assault Echelon fully supplied – replen
• Assault Breaching. • Movement Control HQ – RMP Coy. • Exploitation opportunities – negative early on far bank.
• Covert Breaching. effects? • Priorities – ammo, fuel.
Comms & Liaison: • Host nation implications. • Arty ammo plan – smoke?
• The key relationship between the Overall • Information activities – appropriate to target. • Establish MEDEVAC assets on both
Applying the Manoeuvrist Approach
• Understand context Comd and the Engineer Comd is critical. banks ASAP.
• Seek to maintain initiative • Tac Comd net. Information and Intelligence: • ES – repair forward and
• Influence perceptions • Movement Control net. • Enemy. keep choke points open.
• Protect own cohesion and will during • Engineer Comd net. • Physical terrain.
crossing / breaching and in wider context. • Nature of obstacle (engr reconnaissance).
• Break enemy cohesion on far bank and Key Features of Battlefield Geometry: • Defended? Planning Yardsticks:
beyond – surprise, pre-emption, dislocation, • Crossing area. • Human terrain.
• Bridging – 50% reserve
disruption, shock action, destruction. • Entry line.
• Breaching – 100% reserve
• Exploit opportunities • Release line. Firepower: • Titan Class 70 – 24.5m in 3 minutes
• Enhancements: simplicity, flexibility, • Crossings. • Use of kinetic and special influence • ABLE Class 70 – 30m in
tempo, momentum, simultaneity. • Alternate crossings. methods appropriate to target audiences. 40 mins (50 mins night)
• Assembly Areas. • Consider second order effects on local • MGB Class 70 - 29m in
Force Elements: • Waiting Areas. population, HN and others 1.5 hrs (Field Troop), 2 hrs at night
• In-Place Force. • Control Points. • Collateral damage considerations. • M3 Troop – Class 85, 100m bridge in
• Bridgehead Force: • Lodgements. • FSTs cross early. 30-60 mins. 1-2 hrs at night (plus bank
- Assault Echelon. • Bridgehead Line. • Targeting priorities. prep).
- Main Body. • Preparatory fires? • Python lane - 360 x 8m in
• Breakout Force. • Smoke – screening task (heavy ammo 25 mins (up to 4hrs prep time)
• Engineers – key enablers. usage).
• Deception fires.
Stages: • EW – Jamming / deception.
• Overwatch.
• Assault. Manoeuvre:
• Build-up. • Assault Echelon crossing.
• Consolidation. • Air Manoeuvre?
• Exploitation. • Manoeuvre support assets priority:
- Bridging / breakout.
- Route development post breakout.

6-I-1-2
 CHAPTER 7

BRIGADE TACTICS: OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

0701. Chapter 7 aims to provide the

reader with some wider considerations for CONTENTS
Subject Page
the conduct and planning of brigade activity.
It supplements earlier content with Brigade Tactics: Other Considerations 7-1
considerations of the Law of Armed Conflict
(LOAC) 1 , other actors in the battlespace and Annexes:
brief notes on training the brigade against
A. Captured Persons 7-A-1
the operating context articulated. B. Sites of Cultural and Historic Importance 7-B-1
C. Other Actors in the Battlespace 7-C-1
0702. These considerations are D. Training the Brigade 7-D-1
described in the following annexes:

a. Annex A - Captured Persons.

b. Annex B – Sites of Cultural and Historic Importance.

c. Annex C – Other Actors in the Battlespace.

d. Annex D - Training the Brigade.

1
For detailed guidance on LOAC see JSP 383 Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict and JSP
381 Aide-Memoire on the Law of Armed Conflict.

7-D-1
7-D-2
 ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 7
CAPTURED PERSONS

07A01. Introduction. JDP 1-10 Captured Persons is the capstone UK doctrine

publication for all captured persons (CPERS) activities. It provides clear guidance on
command and staff responsibilities, planning, reporting and monitoring requirements, and
treatment standards. All training and planning activities must be consistent with JDP 1-10.

07A02. CPERS. The term CPERS covers all individuals who are captured and held by
UK Armed Forces on operations overseas whether prisoners of war, internees or detainees.
Irrespective of the category, UK and international law requires that all CPERS must be
treated humanely.

07A03. Responsibility and Governance. Chapter 4 of JDP 1-10 sets out the
responsibilities of the staff and the governance arrangements for the provision of oversight
and surety of the CPERS handling process. CPERS handling requires firm command,
leadership and a strong commitment to treating individuals humanely. The commander’s
expression of intent and an instilled ethos of individual and collective responsibility, backed
up by firm discipline, can deter destructive behaviour. Commanders must ensure that all
personnel under their command are fully aware of the obligations to treat CPERS humanely
and of the prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment including the Five
Prohibited Techniques. These prohibitions must be stated in the operational directives and
regulations and in unit standing orders.

THE FIVE PROHIBITED TECHNIQUES

07A04. The Five Prohibited Techniques must never be used as an aid to tactical
questioning or interrogation, as a form of punishment, discriminatory conduct, intimidation,
coercion or as deliberate mistreatment. They are:

a. Stress Positions. Any physical posture which a CPERS is deliberately

required to maintain will be a stress position if it becomes painful, extremely
uncomfortable or exhausting to maintain.

b. Hooding. Placing a cover, including a sandbag, over a CPERS’s head and

face. HOODING IS PROHIBITED AT ANY TIME, FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE.

c. Subjection to Noise. Holding a CPERS in an area where there is

unnecessary excessive noise.

d. Deprivation of Sleep and Rest. Depriving a CPERS of the minimum

requirement of sleep and rest.

e. Deprivation of Food and Water. Depriving a CPERS of the minimum

requirement of food and water.

7-A-1
 THE ADVERSARY PERSPECTIVE: CAMPAIGN LEGITIMACY

Mistreatment of CPERS aids the adversary’s propaganda campaign, undermines the

credibility of the UK mission, strengthens the resolve of the enemy, and supports the
enemy’s recruiting aims.

KEY ACTIVITIES

07A05. Training and Selection of Personnel. Chapter 5 of JDP 1-10 sets out
responsibilities for training and selecting personnel who will conduct CPERS activities. As
a key skill, every individual in the UK Armed Forces must be aware of the minimum
standards that apply to CPERS handling.

07A06. Planning. Chapter 6 of JDP 1-10 lists key planning considerations and staff
responsibilities during the estimate process. It also explains how CPERS activities affect
operations and describes the CPERS handling process from point of capture to release.
Early CPERS planning enables the brigade to maintain operational tempo in addition to
reducing the risk of improper treatment or abuse. Commanders should seek specialist
staff, policy and legal advice at the earliest stages of planning.

07A07. Point of Capture. An individual becomes a CPERS at the point of capture or

when a member of the UK Armed Forces deprives the individual of his liberty on transfer to
UK Armed Forces by another state or non-state actor. The individual remains a CPERS
until the point of release or transfer by the UK Armed Forces. Chapter 7 of JDP 1-10 sets
out the actions to be carried out at the point of capture.

07A08. Humane Treatment. It is both an individual and a command responsibility to

ensure that all CPERS are treated humanely in all circumstances and at all times. Chapter
2 of JDP 1-10 sets out minimum treatment standards, prohibited acts, and guidance on
CPERS control.

07A09. Administration. CPERS activities require sufficient qualified administrative and

detention personnel. CPERS records must be maintained to ensure that treatment
standards are being met and to fulfil other legal and policy obligations. JDP 1-10 contains
documentation required throughout the handling process.

07A10. Reporting. All alleged abuses of CPERS by UK or other armed forces must be
immediately reported both through the chain of command and separately to the Service
Police. All abuses by UK Armed Forces must be thoroughly investigated by the Service
Police, and where appropriate, disciplinary action must follow. Chapter 13 of JDP 1-10
covers action to be taken upon an adverse incident or allegation of abuse involving CPERS.

RISK MITIGATION

07A11. The following figure depicts risk involved along the CPERS handling chain, and
mitigation and oversight measures available to militate against those risks.

7-A-2
 Mitigating Measures
Point of
• Oversight by chain
Capture
of command
• Well trained soldiers
• Use of Service police
• Fast onward movement
of CPERS

Unit
Holding
Mitigating Measures Area Governance
• Nominated commander
and Oversight
• SOPs
by Chain of
• Well trained soldiers
Command,
• Use of Service police
Supported by
or Unit Custody Staff
Legal Adviser
• Fast onward movement
and Force
of CPERS
Provost
Marshal
Collecting
Point

Mitigating Measures Intelligence

• Separate chain of and
command for detention Exploitation
and exploitation Facility
• SOPs
• Use of Military Provost
Staff CPERS
• Dedicated and trained Holding
CPERS handlers Facility

Highest Risk Medium Risk Lower Risk Lowest Risk

Fig 7-A-1 CPERS Risk, Mitigation and Oversight

7-A-3
7-A-4
 ANNEX B TO
CHAPTER 7

SITES OF CULTURAL AND HISTORIC IMPORTANCE

07B01. Introduction. Sites of cultural and historic importance are areas where
inappropriate behaviour by UK forces can undermine campaign legitimacy and wider
influence efforts. Enemy forces may use such sites as firing points, bases or depots in the
belief that they will not be targeted. They may also use them to prompt inappropriate action
by UK forces in order to provide opportunities for their own Influence effort. The dilemma
posed in such circumstances is the need to avoid the alienation of the population whilst
confronting the enemy.

07B02. Understanding. It is essential that the location and reasons for significance of
cultural sites within an AO are understood. Where appropriate, sacred sites should be
considered in the IPB process. As a guideline the following should be considered:

a. Location. In addition to the location of the site the importance of the area as a
whole should be understood.

b. Reason for Significance. There is a need to understand the unique aspects

of sites. For example whether a site is significant at a local, national or global level.

c. Behaviour. Rules and practices regulating entry and behaviour (for example
carrying weapons, using force and shedding blood are strictly prohibited within a
mosque).

d. The impact of desecration. Acts of desecration may remove the sanctity of

the site and prompt the use of force to defend it or to avenge the desecration.

e. Calendar. There may be particular religious festivals, times of the month etc
which would impact on military activity in the vicinity of the site (e.g. large numbers of
pilgrims present or auspicious dates).

07B03. Consultation with Religious Leaders. Religious leaders may not be willing
collaborators with security forces but they are likely to help with providing information that
will avoid damage to sacred sites. They should be consulted in order to gain a detailed
understanding of the significance of the site and the implications of military operations in
and around it. They will understand rules of behaviour and may be able to determine
acceptable compromises. Religious leaders will have an influence on public opinion and, if
not consulted or involved, may hamper the efforts of the brigade.

07B04. Conduct of Operations. The following guidelines may assist with planning and
conducting operations in and around cultural and historic sites:

a. Avoid significant religious festivals.

b. Time operations to avoid unnecessary offence to religious sensitivities (prayer

times, holy periods etc).

7-B-1
c. Balance the anticipated gains of kinetic operations against the wider effect on
public opinion.

d. Consider the use Indigenous Security Forces to enter sacred sites with foreign
troops providing secure entry, cordons etc.

e. Involve local religious leaders as far as practicable.

f. Conduct remedial action. Restoration work (most likely by contractors) or some

means of compensation for damage may be required.

g. Consider cordon operations and negotiation to facilitate a peaceful solution

when the enemy is known to be in a sacred/religious site.

h. Support all activity concerning sacred sites with a campaign to shape

perceptions prior to, during and subsequent to operations.

7-B-2
 ANNEX C TO
CHAPTER 7

OTHER ACTORS IN THE BATTLESPACE

07C01. Introduction. At the tactical level the brigade may require interaction with a
number of civil organisations. The degree of co-operation and co-ordination between the
brigade and these organisations will vary depending on the type of operation.

07C02. In broads terms civil organisations are categorised as: 1

a. Other Government Departments. Generally operating above brigade level,

Other Government Departments (OGD) may become involved in the management of
crises; the most critical OGDs are the Cabinet Office, the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development
(DFID). DFID works with a wide range of implementing partners in the civil sector
and may work with armed forces to facilitate the efficient delivery of humanitarian
assistance, or to promote a secure environment (for example, security sector reform)
so that economic, social and political development can take place.

b. International Organisations. International Organisations (IO) are established

by intergovernmental agreements and include the various United Nations (UN)
organisations and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
The UN Development Programme (UNDP) administers and coordinates most
developmental technical assistance. The UN Office for the Co-ordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) is likely to be responsible for co-ordinating the
activities of relief agencies including the UN High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP).

c. International Committee of the Red Cross. The International Committee of

the Red Cross (ICRC) is responsible for operating the Central Tracing Agency
(maintaining records of prisoners of war, inspecting their camps and providing relief),
providing humanitarian assistance to the civilian population and for monitoring the
protection of cultural property. It also works to settle disputes and help states to
comply with the law of armed conflict. Parties to any conflict are under a legal
obligation to give ICRC all possible facilities to enable it to carry out its humanitarian
functions. As far as possible, similar facilities should be granted to national Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

d. Non-Governmental Organisations. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO)

encompass a wide range of organisations with varying mandates, roles and
priorities. Many may be willing to co-operate with the military, through the exchange
of information and the co-ordination of resources, when working towards a common
purpose. Others, especially those providing humanitarian assistance or protection to
vulnerable populations, will be constrained by their mandate or principles as to the

1
This section is based on an extract from JDP 3-90 Civil-Military Co-operation which should be consulted for
further information.

7-C-1
level of co-operation they are willing to have with the military. Establishing
mechanisms for cooperation is essential. The existence and utility of NGOs is
acknowledged in Article 71 of the UN Charter. They fall into one of two categories:

(1) Mandated. A mandated NGO has been recognised officially by the lead
IOs in a conflict or crisis and is authorised to work in the affected area.

(2) Non-Mandated. A non-mandated NGO has no official authorisation but

may be sub-contracted by an IO or a mandated NGO. In other cases they obtain
funds from private donors. There are examples of non-mandated NGOs created
to support certain factions in a conflict, often as a means to deliver external
support. Contact with such NGOs should be avoided or handled with caution as
it may undermine campaign authority and obstruct the mission.

e. Donor Organisations. Donors may include national agencies such as DFID or

the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and international
bodies such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. As these organisations may
control much of the funding for humanitarian, reconstruction and developmental
activities, they will have an important role in long term planning.

f. Contractors and the Commercial Sector. Contractors are becoming an

increasingly common feature in operational theatres where they deliver a range of
support services such as logistics, training and reconstruction. Commercial
organisations are likely to be established in the crisis region or become engaged in
the early stages of emergency relief and post-conflict reconstruction. Indigenous
businesses may be a useful source of information, as well as playing a critical role in
the reintegration of demobilised armed forces into society. External commercial
organisations may provide investment thereby creating opportunities for the local
population.

g. Private Security Contractors. Private Security Contractors (PSC) are often

engaged to provide services such as area security, close protection, escort and
guard duties. The activities of PSCs may complement or hinder the brigade mission.
Provided they take no direct part in hostilities, the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)
affords PSC personnel protected civilian status. Positive engagement with PSCs
may influence and moderate their behaviour and may offer advantages such as
access to intelligence.

h. Local Authorities and Populations. Commanders should develop an

understanding of traditional laws and customs as they apply to civil communities and
should incorporate local perceptions of security and need into their planning, gaining
insight from existing local solutions. Liaison should be established as early as
possible with government and non-governmental authorities and with local
representatives, without whose co-operation the military mission is unlikely to
succeed.

i. Dislocated Civilians. Crisis and conflict may lead to the unwilling movement
of civilians from their homes. Specific terminology to describe such people includes:

7-C-2
(1) Internally Displaced Persons. Any person who has been forced to flee
their home as a result of conflict, internal strife, systematic violation of human
rights, fear of such violation, or natural or man-made disasters, and who has not
crossed an internationally recognised state border.

(2) Refugees. Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being

persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside his or her home country and is unable
or unwilling to seek the protection of his country or return to it.

7-C-3
7-C-4
 ANNEX D TO
CHAPTER 7

TRAINING THE BRIGADE

07D01. The aim of this section is to provide those responsible for brigade training with a
short set of considerations to assist in matching training to the operating environment and
conduct of operations described throughout this AFM.

07D02. A force cannot be ready for operations until it has undergone robust and realistic
collective training in testing conditions set by its higher headquarters or a training
organisation. Field training exercises provide the most realistic preparation for operations
since they are the only effective method of replicating frictions inherent in land operations.
Planners should design training to replicate likely operational scenarios and should
consider:

a. The Nature of the Adversary. ‘Enemy’ forces should reflect the hybrid nature
of modern adversaries. This should not just be limited to combat capabilities,
equipment and tactics but also to the enemy’s use of special influence methods,
including information methods, and civilian populations. 360 degree and multi-
dimensional threats should be replicated where possible.

b. Replicating complex environments. Exercises should endeavour to reflect

the complexity of the ‘5C’ operating environment 1 , in terrain and climate similar to the
anticipate area of operations. Inclusion of multi-national and wider CJIIM actors will
assist in reflecting the added complexity of modern operations.

c. Influence. Exercising should include all forms of influence, including Special

Influence Methods.

d. The Divisional Context. The divisional context should be reflected in

scenarios, with appropriate divisional assets assigned, or simulated, to the brigade.

e. Transitioning Between Military Activities. Brigade training should reflect the

conduct of operations throughout the mosaic of conflict, with battlegroups practicing
all tactical actions whilst transitioning between military activities as necessary. The
brigade will need to become comfortable with configuring and re-configuring
battlegroups, testing and developing interoperability with other brigade, as well as
divisional, assets.

1
Congested, Cluttered, Contested, Connected and Constrained

7-D-1
7-D-2
 GLOSSARY

Active Air Defence: Direct defensive action taken to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of
hostile air action. It includes such measures as the use of aircraft, air defence weapons,
weapons not used primarily in an air defence role and electronic warfare. See also air
defence. (AAP-6)

Administrative Authority: A commander vested with those aspects of command that are
concerned with administration. (JDP 0-01.1) See Command, Command and Control
Relationships.

Adversary: A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which
the use of force may be envisaged. (AAP-6)

Air Defence: All measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action.
See also active air defence; passive air defence. (AAP-6)

Air Liaison Officer: A tactical air force or naval aviation officer attached to a ground or naval
unit or formation as the advisor on tactical air operation matters. (AAP-6)

Air Manoeuvre: Those operations primarily within the land component scheme of
manoeuvre, seeking decisive advantage by the exploitation of the third dimension by combined
arms forces centred around rotary wing aircraft, within a joint framework. (JDP 0-01.1)

All Arms Air Defence: The low level air defence of a unit using small arms (i.e. personal and
section weapons of a calibre of less than 20 mm) and capable of target engagement to a
height of 4500 ft AGL. (NATO)

Area of Influence: A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of

influencing operations, by manoeuvre or fire support systems normally under his command
and control. (AAP-6)

Area of Interest: That area of concern to a commander relative to the objectives of current or
planned operations, including his areas of influence, operations and/or responsibility, and
areas adjacent thereto. (AAP-6)

Area of Operations: An operational area defined by a joint commander for land or maritime
forces to conduct military activities. Normally, an area of operations does not encompass the
entire joint operations area of the joint commander, but is sufficient in size for the joint force
component commander to accomplish assigned missions and protect forces. Related terms:
area of responsibility; component command; joint operations area. (AAP-6)

Artillery Manoeuvre Area: An area within which artillery is authorised to deploy but which is
not reserved for its exclusive use. (AAP-6)

Asymmetric Threat: A threat emanating from the potential use of dissimilar means or
methods to circumvent or negate an opponent’s strengths while exploiting his weaknesses to
obtain a disproportionate result. (AAP-6)

Glossary -1
Attrition: The reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by loss of personnel and
materiel. (AAP-6)

Battle Damage Assessment: The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the
application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a pre-determined objective. (AP
3000)

Battlespace: All aspects of air, surface, subsurface, land, space and the electromagnetic
spectrum that encompass the area of operations. (JDP 0-01.1)

Breach: A tactical task in which any means available are employed to break through or
secure a passage through an enemy defence, obstacle, minefield, or fortification.. (JDP 0-
01.1)

Campaign: A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic

objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and
air forces. (AAP-6)

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC): CIMIC, one of the Special Influence Methods, is a

military activity, supported by a dedicated staff, which interfaces with civilian actors, whether
indigenous or international.

Close Air Support (CAS): Air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to
friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and
movement of those forces. (AAP-6)

Coalition: An ad-hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.
(JDP 0-01.1)

Combat Arms: Combat elements that engage the enemy directly; they fight, typically
employing direct fire weapons.

Combat Effectiveness: A measurement of the ability of a unit to carry out its assigned
mission, role or function. (JDP 0-01.1)

Combat Identification (Combat ID): The process of combining situational awareness, target
identification, specific tactics, training and procedures to increase operational effectiveness of
weapons systems and reduce the incidence of casualties caused by friendly fire. (JDP 0-01.1)

Combat Intelligence: That intelligence concerning the enemy, weather, and geographical
features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of combat operations. (AAP-6)

Combat Power: The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military
unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time. (AAP-6)

Glossary -2
Combat Service Support (CSS): The support provided to combat forces, primarily in the
fields of administration and logistics. (AAP-6)

Combat Support (CS): Fire support and operational assistance provided to combat
elements. (AAP-6)

Combined: Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations, in which

elements of more than one nation participate. (AAP-6). [The term ‘multinational’ is preferred
within the UK and Allied joint communities.]

Combined Arms: Application of several arms, such as infantry, armour, artillery and aviation.
(JDP 0-01.1)

Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters (CJTF HQ): A CJTF HQ is a deployable,

multinational, multi-service HQ of variable size, tailored to the mission and utilized by
COMCJTF to exercise command over the entire CJTF. While it is recognized that a CJTF does
not exist until activated, the term CJTF HQ denotes a HQ composed of a nucleus, sourced
from a CJTF parent HQ, plus necessary augmentation, support elements, and equipment to
achieve and maintain full operational capability. (NATO)

Command:

The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination
and control of military forces.

An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the
purpose of bringing about a particular action.

A unit, group of units, organization or area under the authority of a single individual.

To dominate an area or situation.

To exercise command. (AAP-6)

Command and Control (C2): The processes through which a commander exercises
command (whether full or operational or tactical command) or operational or tactical control to
organize, direct and coordinate the activities of the forces allocated to him. The structures and
systems through which these processes are exercised. A command, control, (communications)
and information system (C3I) is an integrated system comprising doctrine, procedures,
organizational structure, personnel, equipment, facilities, and communications, which provides
authorities at all levels with timely and adequate data to plan, direct and control their activities.
(AJP-01)

Command and Control Relationships:

Full Command (FULL COMD) The military authority and responsibility of a commander
to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and
administration and exists only within national services. (AAP-6)
[No multinational commander will therefore have Full Command over forces assigned to
him by other nations.]

Glossary -3
 Operational Command (OPCOM) The authority granted to a commander to assign
missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to
retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the commander deems
necessary. (AAP-6)
[It does not include responsibility for administration or logistics.]

Operational Control (OPCON) The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces

assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are
usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or
assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate
employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include
administrative or logistic control. (AAP-6)

Tactical Command (TACOM) The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks

to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher
authority. (AAP-6)

Tactical Control (TACON) The detailed and usually local direction and control of
movement and manoeuvre necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (AAP-
6)

Commander’s Intent: A concise expression of the purpose of the campaign or operation, the
desired results and how operations will progress towards achieving the desired end-state. At
the tactical level, the Commander’s Intent should be focused on the effect that he wishes to
achieve on the enemy. (JDP 0-01.1)

Component Commander: A designated commander responsible for the planning and

conduct of a maritime, land, air, special or other operation as part of a joint force. (AAP-6)

Comprehensive Approach: Commonly understood principles and collaborative processes

that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation.
(BDD (3rd Edition).

Computer Network Operations: Consist of Computer Network Attack (CNA), Exploitation

(CNE) and Protection (CNP)) seek to gain access to computer networks to disrupt, deny,
degrade or destroy their capability, or alternatively to intercept and utilise their capability, whilst
protecting the capability of the JTF. Success in this aspect is directly proportional to the
adversary’s dependence on such systems. JDP 0-01.1 Ed 7.

Concept of Operations: A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a
commander in order to accomplish his mission. (AAP-6)

Conflict Prevention: A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil,

and – when necessary – military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and take
timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. (AAP-6)

Contractor/Contractors on Deployed Operations. Contractors on deployed operations

(CONDO). A generic term relating to all civilian contracted personnel deployed in support of
military operations. Such personnel could be deployed in support of a variety of contracts,

Glossary -4
including Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM), Contractor logistic Support (CLS) and
CON LOG. JDP 0-01.1 Ed 7.

Control: That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate
organizations, or other organizations not normally under his command, which encompasses
the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be
delegated. (AAP-6)

Counter-attack: Attack by a part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force,
for such specific purposes as regaining ground lost or cutting off or destroying enemy advance
units, and with the general objective of denying to the enemy the attainment of his purpose in
attacking. In sustained defensive operations, it is undertaken to restore the battle position and
is directed at limited objectives. (AAP-6)

Counter-Insurgency (COIN): Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological,

and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency. (AAP-6) See Military Activities.

Culminating Point: An operation reaches its culminating point when the current operation
can just be maintained but not developed to any greater advantage. (JDP 0-01.1)

Cyberspace: Describes the global domain within the information environment consisting of
interdependent networks of information technology and infrastructures, including
communications, media, data exchange and processing utilising significant bandwidth. ADP
Ops 0425

Deception: Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or

falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (AAP-6)

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR): The process by which

combatants and their weapons are taken out of the conflict and provided with a transition
package so that they do not seek to return to arms again.

Disruption: Use of force to shatter the cohesion of a military formation and prevent it from
functioning effectively in combat. (JDP 0-01.1)

Echelon:

A subdivision of a headquarters, i.e., forward echelon, rear echelon.

Separate level of command. As compared to a regiment, a division is a higher echelon, a

battalion is a lower echelon .

A fraction of a command in the direction of depth, to which a principal combat mission is

assigned; i.e., attack echelon, support echelon, reserve echelon.

A formation in which its subdivisions are placed one behind another, with a lateral and

Glossary -5
 even spacing to the same side. (AAP-6)

Echelon Force: In land operations, a force not committed initially, but whose committal is vital
to the success of the superior commander’s mission. See also Reserve.

Electronic Warfare: Military action to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum encompassing:

the search for, interception and identification of electromagnetic emissions, the employment of
electromagnetic energy, including directed energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the
electromagnetic spectrum, and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces. (AAP-6)

Electro-Optics: The technology associated with those components, devices and systems
which are designed to interact between the electromagnetic (optical) and the electric
(electronic) state. (AAP-6)

Emission Control (EMCON): Selective control of emitted electromagnetic or acoustic energy.

The aim may be twofold:

To minimise the enemy’s detection of emissions and exploitation of the information so

gained,

To reduce electromagnetic interference thereby improving friendly sensor performance.

(AAP-6)

Enabling Activities: Tactical activities that link, support, or create the conditions for
offensive, defensive and stability operations.

End-State: The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation,
which indicates that the objective has been achieved. (AAP-6)

Environment: The surroundings in which an organization operates, including air, water, land,
natural resources, flora, fauna, humans, and their interrelation. JDP 0-01.1 Ed 7.

Expeditionary Forces: Forces projected from the home base (i.e. UK) capable of sustained
operations at distance from that home base. (JDP 0-01.1)

Expeditionary Operations: The projection of military power over extended lines of

communication into a distant operational area to accomplish a specific mission. (AAP-6)

Exploitation:

Taking full advantage of success in battle and following up initial gains.

Taking full advantage of any information that has come to hand for tactical or strategic
purposes.

An offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack and is designed to

disorganise the enemy in depth. (AAP-6)

Glossary -6
Field Fortification: An emplacement or shelter of a temporary nature which can be
constructed with reasonable facility by units requiring no more than minor engineer supervisory
and equipment participation. (AAP-6)

Fighting Power: The ability to fight, consisting of a conceptual component (encompassing the
thought process involved in producing military effectiveness); a moral component (the ability to
get people to fight) and a physical component (the means to fight), measured by assessment
of operational capability.

Final Protective Fire: An immediately available prearranged barrier of fire designed to impede
enemy movement across defensive lines or areas. (AAP-6)

Fire Plan: A tactical plan for using the weapons of a unit or formation so that their fire will be
coordinated. (AAP-6)

Fire Support: The application of fire, coordinated with the manoeuvre of forces, to destroy,
neutralize or suppress the enemy. (AAP-6)

Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL): Within an assigned area of operations, a line
established by the appropriate Ground Force Commander to ensure the coordination of fire not
under his control, but which may affect current tactical operations. (AAP-6)

Fires: The effects of lethal and non-lethal weapons. (US JP 1-02 quoted in JDP0-01.1)

Force Elements: Combat, Combat Support (CS), Combat Service Support (CSS) Combat
Command Support (CCS)

Force Protection: A process which aims to conserve the fighting potential of a deployed
force by countering the wider threat to all its elements from adversaries, natural and human
hazards, and fratricide. (JDP 0-01.1)

Force/Unit Definitions:

Battlegroup: A battlegroup is a tactical grouping, usually with armour and infantry under
command, based on the HQ of an armoured regiment or infantry battalion (normally
armoured or mechanized) or possibly on an armoured reconnaissance or aviation
regiment. (JDP 0-01.1)

Unit: The smallest grouping capable of independent operations over long periods. It
contains integral command support and combat service support elements.

Sub Unit: Sub division of a unit (e.g. squadron, battery, company).

Forming-Up Place (FUP): The last position occupied by the assault echelon before crossing
the line of departure. Also called ‘attack position’. (AAP-6)

Glossary -7
Forward Air Controller (FAC): A qualified individual who, from a forward position on the
ground or in the air, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support of land
forces. (AAP-6)

Forward Arming and Refuelling Point (FARP): An installation in the combat zone to arm and
refuel helicopters.

Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA): The foremost limits of a series of areas in which
ground combat units are deployed, excluding the areas in which covering or screening forces
are operating, designated to coordinate fire support, the positioning of forces, or the
manoeuvre of units. (AAP-6)

Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT): A line which indicates the most forward positions of
friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time. (AAP-6)

Forward Mounting Base (FMB): A base (also deployed operating base) established within
the operational area, to support operations at forward operating bases. It will be resourced to
a greater level than a forward operating base, including C2, logistics and administration
support elements.

Forward Operating Base (FOB): A base (also deployed operating base) established within
the operational area to support tactical operations. It will be resourced to provide minimum
services commensurate with sustaining the required level of air effort.

Fragmentary Order (FRAGO): An abbreviated form of an operation order, issued as

required, that eliminates the need for restating information contained in a basic operation
order. It may be issued in sections. (AAP-6)

Fratricide: The accidental destruction of own, allied or friendly forces. A result of what is
colloquially known as a ‘blue on blue’ engagement. (JDP 0-01.1)

Gap: In land mine warfare, an area within a barrier, free of obstacles and not exposed to the
effects of mines, whose width and direction allow a friendly force to pass through in tactical
formation. (AAP-6)

Guard: A security element whose primary task is to protect the main force by fighting to gain
time, while also observing and reporting information. (AAP-6)

Hand-Over Line: A control feature, preferably following easily defined terrain features, at
which responsibility for the conduct of combat operations is passed from one force to another.
(AAP-6)

Harassing Fire: Fire designed to disturb the rest of the enemy troops, to curtail movement
and, by threat of losses, to lower morale. (AAP-6)

Helicopter Assault Force (HAF): A task organisation combining helicopters, supporting

units, and helicopter-borne troop units for use in helicopter-borne assault operations. (AAP-6)

Glossary -8
Human Environment: The psychological, cultural, social and other human attributes of a
target audience which populate or impact upon a given area of interest. This environment
transgresses the traditional boundaries of adversaries, national forces and civilians because
the hybrid opposition draws its forces from all of these categories. From Land Handbook
(Influence) (R) AC71951 p 1-3

Human Terrain: The social, political and economic organisation, beliefs and values and
forms of interaction of a population. (Footnote: Defence Cultural Capability Working Group
2009)

Humanitarian Assistance: Support provided to humanitarian and development agencies, in

an insecure environment, by a deployed force whose primary mission is not the provision of
humanitarian aid. Should the deployed force undertake such humanitarian tasks, responsibility
should be handed over/returned to the appropriate civilian agency at the earliest opportunity.
(JDP 0-01.1)

Humanitarian Operations: An operation specifically mounted to alleviate human suffering

where responsible civil actors in an area are unable or unwilling adequately to support a
population. It may precede, parallel or complement the activities of specialized civil
humanitarian organizations. (JDP 0-01.1)

Improvised Explosive Device (IED): A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner

incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals and designed to
destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally
devised from non-military components. (AAP-6)

Influence: Influence is an outcome - a result of activity - rather than an activity in itself. It is

achieved when perceptions and behaviour are changed through the use of power; directly or
indirectly. (ADP Ops).

Information Methods. Information Methods (previously termed Info Ops), one of the Special
Influence Methods tools, is the primary coordinating function for all the tools and techniques
delivering ‘influence’ effects within the commander’s plan with the exception of fires and
manoeuvre.

Insurgency: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government

through the use of subversion and armed conflict. (AAP-6)

Interoperability: The ability of Alliance forces and, when appropriate, forces of Partner and
other nations to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned
missions and tasks. (AAP-6)

Intervention: A campaign or operation with limited objectives, involving the entry of another
state where opposition is expected. (JDP 0-01.1)

Intelligence: The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign
nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential

Glossary -9
operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the
organisations engaged in such activity. (AAP-6)

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB): In land operations, a command and staff
tool which allows a systematic and continuous analysis of the threat and the battlefield
environment to be carried out and presents results in a graphical format.

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR): The

coordinated acquisition, processing and dissemination of timely, accurate, relevant and
assured information and intelligence which supports the planning and conduct of operations,
targeting, and integration of effects, and enables commanders to achieve their goal throughout
the spectrum of conflict. (JDP 0-01.1)

Interdict (interdiction): Actions to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy before he can
effect friendly forces.

Joint: Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations in which elements
of at least two services participate. (AAP-6)

Joint Fires: Joint Fires is defined as kinetic attack coordinated or directed at the operational
level by the JTFC/NCC. (JDP 3-00)

Joint Force: A force composed of significant elements of two or more Services operating
under a single commander authorized to exercise operational command or control. (JDP 0-
01.1)

Joint Operations Centre (JOC): A joint agency normally set up at army/air force tactical
group headquarters and organized for the purpose of exchanging information and for the
coordination of the combat effort of the air forces in air support of ground operations. (JDP 0-
01.1)

Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC): The operational commander of a nominated joint
force. (JDP 0-01.1)

Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQ): A purely national deployable joint headquarters
of variable size commanded at the operational level by a Joint Task Force Commander. (JDP
0-01.1)

Key Leader Engagement (KLE):

Key Terrain: Any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked
advantage to either combatant. (AAP-6)

Glossary -10
Lead Nation: A lead Nation is one which assumes lead responsibility for the planning and
execution of an operation, particularly retaining ownership of the Campaign Plan and
Information Operations. (JDP 0-01.1)

Levels of Warfare:

Strategic: The level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or
multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to
achieve them. (AAP-6)

Operational: The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned,
conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of
operations. (AAP-6)

Tactical: The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed
to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units. (AAP-6)

Limited Intervention: Those operations that have limited objectives such as the rescue of
hostages, security of non-combatants or re-establishment of law and order. (JDP 0-01.1)

Littoral Region: Coastal sea areas and that portion of the land which is susceptible to
influence or support from the sea.

Logistic Support: The sustainment of forces through provision of materiel including

acquisition, control and distribution; provision of movement of personnel and materiel; and
provision of logistic support services.

Logistics: The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of
forces. (AAP-6)

Main Effort: A concentration of forces or means, in a particular area, where a commander

seeks to bring about a decision. (JDP 0-01.1)

Main Supply Route: The route or routes designated within an area of operations upon which
the bulk of traffic flows in support of military operations. (AAP-6)

Manoeuvre: To seek to get into a position of advantage in respect of the enemy from which
force can be threatened or applied. At the operational level such manoeuvre should be
directed towards a decisive point or directly at the centre of gravity. (JDP 0-01)

Manoeuvre Support: Those activities, primarily military engineer actions, which contribute to
shaping the battlespace to enable strategic, operational and tactical freedom of manoeuvre
across the continuum of operations.

Manoeuvrist Approach: An approach to operations in which shattering the enemy’s overall

cohesion and will to fight is paramount. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the
unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality, is combined with a ruthless determination
to succeed. (JDP 0-01.1)

Glossary -11
Measure of Effectiveness: This is a numerical quantity, typically an output from an
operational Analysis model, selected as a primary indicator of the performance of a force or
system. Losses, exchange ratios (i.e. enemy losses divided by own losses), ground lost, and
delay caused to an attacker are commonly used MOEs.

Media Communication. Media Communication (previously termed Media Ops), one of the
Special Influence Methods tools, is an essential part of any commander’s ability to understand
and influence local, regional and UK domestic audiences. It must be coordinated and
synchronised with other influence methods and not viewed as exclusively ‘public relations’, in
order to optimise its effect.

Military Activities: There are six general military activities that take place as part of operations
in the land environment and are used in doctrine to aid understanding and examination of the
wide range of activities potentially conducted by land forces. They are:

Deliberate and Focused Intervention

Military Assistance to Stabilisation and Development

Counter-Insurgency

Peace Support

Peacetime Military Engagement and Conflict Prevention

Home Defence and Military Aid to the Civil Authorities

Military Aid to the Civil Authorities: The collective term given to the three types of
operations which may take place in a civilian environment, i.e. MACC, MACM and MACP.

Military Aid to the Civil Community: The provision of unarmed military assistance to the
country at large: in time of emergency such as natural disasters and major emergencies; to
provide more routine assistance for special projects or events of significant social value to the
civil community in the creation and development of local community projects; and of individual
assistance by full-time attachment to social service or similar organisations. (IJDP 02)

Military Aid to the Civil Ministries: The use of unarmed Servicemen on urgent work of
national importance, to maintain essential services and supplies, most usually (but not
uniquely) when they are disrupted by industrial dispute. The Servicemen act under military
orders and any protection needed is provided by the civil police.

Military Aid to the Civil Power: The provision of military assistance (armed if appropriate) to
the Civil Power in its maintenance of law, order and public safety using specialist capabilities
or equipment, in situations beyond the capability of the Civil Power. (IJDP 02)

Military Aid to Other Government Departments: Assistance provided by the Armed

services on urgent work of national importance or in maintaining supplies and services
essential to the life, health and safety of the community. (IJDP 02)

Glossary -12
Military Capacity Building: The generic term used to describe the training, mentoring,
monitoring and enabling of indigenous security forces by the military.

Mission: A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.
One or more aircraft ordered to accomplish one particular task. (AAP-6)

Mission Command: A style of command that seeks to convey understanding to subordinates

about the intentions of the higher commander and their place within his plan, enabling them to
carry out missions with the maximum freedom of action and appropriate resources. (JDP 0-
01.1)

Mobility: A quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to
place while retaining the ability to fulfil their primary mission. (AAP-6)

Mosaic of Conflict: An illustrative means by which conflict can be visualised as a mosaic: a

conflict environment – shaped by drivers – in which military activities of different categories
take place, concurrently in time and space, with elements of them occurring in most scenarios.

Multinational: Adjective used to describe activities, operations, organizations etc in which

forces or agencies of more than one nation participate. (AAP-6)

Mutual Support: That support which units render each other against an enemy, because of
their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent
capabilities. (AAP-6)

National Contingent Headquarters: The national HQ deployed alongside a CJTF HQ, or

another multinational theatre HQ, for the purposes of executing national command over UK
deployed forces. (JDP 0-01.1)

Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO): An operation conducted to relocate

designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety. (AAP-6)

Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO): A voluntary, non-profit making organisation that is

generally independent of government, international organisations or commercial interests. The
organisation will write its own charter and mission and does not necessarily have an official
status or mandate for its activities.

Objective: A clearly defined and attainable goal for a military operation, for example seizing a
terrain feature, neutralizing an adversary’s force or capability or achieving some other desired
outcome that is essential to a commander’s plan and towards which the operation is directed.
(AAP-6)

Operation: A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or
administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement,
supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or
campaign. (AAP-6)

Glossary -13
Operational Art: The orchestration of all military activities involved in converting strategic
objectives into tactical actions with a view to seeking a decisive result.

Operational Framework: A means of visualizing operations and aiding coordination, the

framework is used to describe how the missions of subordinates relate to each other by time,
space, function and purpose. It should be primarily viewed in terms of the purpose of the
forces involved: what is considered will be decisive, and how other actions relate to that by
shaping conditions or sustaining the force. It is most commonly used in the description of
courses of action, and hence concepts of operations.

Operational Level of War: The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are
planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas
of operations. (AAP-6)

OPSEC. OPSEC, one of the Special Influence Methods tools, is defined as ‘the discipline which
provides a military operation or exercise an appropriate level of security using active and passive
means, to deny a target decision-maker knowledge of Essential Elements of Friendly Information
(EEFI).

Passage of Lines: An operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another
force’s combat positions with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy.
AAP-6

Peace: A condition that exists in the relations between groups, classes or states when there is
an absence of violence (direct or indirect) or the threat of violence.

Peacebuilding: A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil and –

when necessary - military means, to address the underlying causes of conflict and the longer
term needs of the people. (AAP-6)

Peace Enforcement: A peace support operation conducted to maintain a ceasefire or peace

agreement where the level of consent and compliance is uncertain and the threat of disruption
is high. (AAP-6)

Peacekeeping: A peace support operation following an agreement or ceasefire that has

established a permissive environment where the level of consent and compliance is high, and
the threat of disruption is low. The use of force by peacekeepers is normally limited to self
defence. (AAP-6)

Peacemaking: A peace support operation, conducted after the initiation of a conflict to secure
a ceasefire or peaceful settlement, that involves primarily diplomatic action supported, when
necessary, by direct or indirect use of military assets. (AAP-6)

Peace Support Operations: An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and
military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to
restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking,
peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and/or humanitarian operations. (AAP-6)

Glossary -14
Penetrate: Break through the enemy's defence and disrupt his defensive system. In land
operations, the breaking through of the enemy’s defence and disrupting the defensive system
(AAP-6A)

Permanent Joint Headquarters: The HQ of the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) located at
Northwood in North London. All UK joint operations are commanded through the HQ, with the
in-theatre commander reporting to the Joint Commander at PJHQ.

Permissive Environment: An environment where those effectively in control of the area of

operations have given their permission for the operation to proceed within the intended area of
operations.

Phase: A phase is a discrete and identifiable activity along a Military Line of Operation in time
and/or space that allows for the reorganisation and redirection of forces as part of the superior
commander’s plan.

Phase Line: A line utilised for control and co-ordination of military operations, usually a terrain
feature extending across the zone of action. (AAP-6)

Pre-Emption: To pre-empt the enemy is to seize an opportunity, often fleeting, before he

does, in order to deny him an advantageous course of action. (JDP 0-01.1)

Principles of War: The Principles of War are guides to action and fundamental tenets
forming a basis for appreciating a situation and planning, but their relevance, applicability and
relative importance change with circumstances. They are:

Selection and Maintenance of the Aim

Maintenance of Morale

Offensive Action

Security

Surprise

Concentration of Force

Economy of Effort

Flexibility

Cooperation

Sustainability

Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs): Those intelligence requirements for which a

commander has an anticipated and stated priority.

Glossary -15
Psychological Operations (PSYOPS): Planned psychological activities designed to
influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives.
(AAP-6)

Quick Impact Projects: Activity undertaken by the military within the civil environment, in
support of the mission. Quick Impact Projects are characterised by the need to create an
immediate effect, they can shape local perceptions, and they should contribute to the
achievement of a more secure environment.

Rate of March: The average number of miles or kilometres to be travelled in a given period of
time, including all ordered halts. It is expressed in miles or kilometres in the hour. (AAP-6)

Rear Area: For any particular command, the area extending forward from its rear boundary to
the rear of the area of responsibility of the next lower level of command. This area is provided
primarily for the performance of combat service support functions. (AAP-6)

Rear Echelon: Elements of a force which are not required in the objective area. (AAP-6)

Rear Operations: Operations which establish and maintain our own forces in order to
generate the freedom of action to allow for the conduct of close and deep operations.

Rearward Passage of Lines (RPOL): In land operations, a force effecting a movement to the
rear passes through the sector of a unit occupying a defensive position.

Reconnaissance: A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection

methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to
secure data about meteorological, hydrographical or geographic characteristics of a particular
area. (AAP-6) See Surveillance

Reconnaissance in Force: An offensive operation designed to discover and/or test the

enemy’s strength or to obtain other information. (AAP-6)

Reconnaissance Pull: In land operations, the process by which the enemy’s vulnerabilities
and weaknesses are identified and, where appropriate, developed and exploited in order to
maximise the effect of our combat power in shattering the enemy’s cohesion.

Relief in Place: An operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is
replaced in an area by the incoming unit. The responsibilities of the replaced elements for the
mission and the assigned zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit. The
incoming unit continues the operation as ordered. (AAP-6A)

Release Point: In road movements, a well-defined point on a route at which the elements
composing a column return under the authority of their respective commanders, each one of
these elements continuing its movement towards its own appropriate destination. (AAP-6)

Glossary -16
Rehabilitate: Process, usually in relatively quiet areas, of units and individuals recently
withdrawn from combat or arduous duty, during which units recondition equipment and are
rested, furnished special facilities, filled with replacements, issued replacement supplies and
equipment, and generally made ready for employing into further operations. The process
during which units recondition equipment and are rested, furnished special facilities, filled up
with replacements issued, issued replacement supplies and equipment, given training. (JDP 0-
01)

Reorganisation: In land operations, the internal distribution of personnel and equipment in a

formation or unit to render it battleworthy again, albeit at a reduced size. Formation/unit
integrity remains.

Reserve: A force held to counter unforeseen situations or to impact on future events. (AAP-6)

Reserved Demolition Target: A target for demolition, the destruction of which must be
controlled at a specific level of command because it plays a vital part in the tactical or strategic
plan, or because of the importance of the structure itself, or because the demolition may be
executed in the face of the enemy. (AAP-6)

Retain: A tactical task to occupy and hold a terrain feature to ensure it is free of enemy
occupation or use.

Roulement: The rotation of personnel or units in the front line with those in reserve in order
to maintain the fighting effectiveness of the forces engaged in an operation. (JDP 0-01.1)

Route Reconnaissance: Reconnaissance along a specific line of communications, such as

road, railway or waterway, to provide new or updated information on route conditions and
activities along the route. (AAP-6)

Rules of Engagement (ROE): Directions for operational commands that set out the
circumstances and limitations under which armed force may be applied by UK forces to
achieve military objectives for the furtherance of UK government policy. ROE are thus issued
as a set of parameters to inform commanders of the limits of constraint imposed or of freedom
permitted when carrying out their assigned tasks. They are designed to ensure that any
application of force is appropriately controlled. (JSP 398)

Scheme of Manoeuvre: A short general description of the manoeuvre of subordinates in

space and time. (LWC)

Signature Equipment: Any item of equipment which reveals the type and nature of the unit or
formation to which it belongs. (AAP-6)

Simultaneity: Element of campaign and operational design that seeks to disrupt the
decision-making process of the enemy commander by confronting him with a number of
problems simultaneously. (JDP 0-01.1)

Situational Awareness: The understanding of the operational environment in the context of

the commander’s (or staff officer’s) mission (or task). (JDP 0-01.1)

Glossary -17
Span of Command: The number of subordinate organisations given to one commander to
command directly. It is determined by the overall size and spatial deployment of the forces
that a commander has to direct.

Special Influence Methods: (previously Influence Activity) The synchronisation a wide range of
capabilities that aim to exploit information, manage perceptions and synchronise ‘the word’ and ‘deed’.
The aim of special influence methods is to achieve effects against the will and understanding of a
complex variety of actors whether hostile (adversaries), neutral (indigenous populations and civilian
agencies) or friendly (allies). The four tools are: CIMIC, Media Communication, OPSEC and Information
Methods.

Standing Patrol: A patrol which will be of a strength decided by the commander allotting the
task. Its task maybe recce, listening, fighting, or a combination of these. It differs from a recce,
fighting, or listening patrol, in that, having taken up its allotted position, it is not free
to manoeuvre in the performance of its task without permission. (AAP-6)

Strong Point: A key point in a defensive position, usually strongly fortified and heavily armed
with automatic weapons, around which other positions are grouped for its protection. (AAP-6)

Supported Commander: A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task
assigned by a higher authority. (JDP 0-01.1) A commander having primary responsibility for all
aspects of a task assigned by a higher NATO military authority and who receives forces or
other support from one or more supporting commanders. (AAP-6)

Supporting Commander: A commander who provides a supported commander with forces

or other support and/or who develops a supporting plan. (AAP-6)

Surveillance: The systematic observation of the aerospace, surface and sub-surface areas,
places, persons or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means. (AAP-6)

Sustainability: The ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the
duration required to achieve its objectives. (AAP-6)

Sustainment: The combination of logistics, administration, resources and organization to

deliver sustainability.

Sustainment Reach: The limit at which a force can assure sustainment.

Synchronization: The focusing of resources and activities to produce maximum combat

power at the decisive time. (JDP 0-01.1) Synchronization differs from simultaneity as the
purpose is to achieve decisive coincidence of the effects of activities rather than the activities
themselves.

Tactical Actions: The Tactical Actions in the land environment are divided into offensive,
defensive and stability operations which, together with enabling activities, describe all military
activity undertaken during a campaign. These actions are often taken concurrently and the
balance between them varies from one operation to another and over time.

Glossary -18
Tactical Framework: (Formerly the Core Functions) A conceptual framework used for the
visualization and conduct of operations.

Find: To locate, identify and assess the enemy’s intentions.

Fix: To deny the enemy his goals, to distract him and to deprive him of freedom of
action.

Strike: To manoeuvre and then take direct action to achieve the purpose of the mission.

Exploit: To seize the opportunity to achieve a higher commander’s objective, or fulfil

some part of his intent, directly.

Tactical Functions: (Formerly Functions in Combat) An analytical tool for commanders and
staffs which provides a complete description of everything that military organizations do prior
to, during, and after operations, as a list of functions

Command: The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction,
coordination and control of military forces. (AAP-6)

Information and Intelligence: Information – Unprocessed data of every description

which may be used in the production of intelligence. (AAP-6)

Firepower: The amount of fire which may be delivered by a position, unit, or weapon
system. (AAP-6)

Manoeuvre: Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination

with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect of the enemy in
order to accomplish the mission. (AAP-6)

Protection: The means of preserving the fighting potential of a force so that it can be
applied at a decisive time and place.

Sustainment: The support provided to combat forces, primarily in the fields of

administration and logistics. (AAP-6)

Tempo: The rate or rhythm of military activity relative to the enemy, within tactical
engagements and battles and between major operations. It incorporates the capacity of the
force to transition from one operation of war to another. (JDP 0-01.1)

Terrain Analysis: The collection, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of geographic

information on the natural and man-made features of the terrain, combined with other relevant
factors, to predict the effect of the terrain on military operations. (AAP-6)

Theatre of Operations: A geographical area defined by the military-strategic authority which

includes and surrounds the area delegated to the operational commander within which he will
conduct operations – known as the joint operations area. (JDP 0-01.1)

Glossary -19
 U
Understanding: The ability to place knowledge in its wider context in order to allow effective
decision making. (JDP 04)

Vital Ground: Ground of such importance that it must be retained or controlled for the success
of the mission. (AAP-6)

Withdraw: Disengage from the enemy when in contact with the enemy. (JDP 0-01)

X, Y, Z

Glossary -20
Glossary -21
 INDEX

Subject Paragraph

Advance Guard 0348d(2)

Advance to Contact 06C12a-b

Advance to Contact 0348d, Annex C to Chap 6

- Introduction 06C01
- Purpose and principles 06C02
06C03a-e
- Planning Considerations
- Command 06C04a-e
- Information and Intelligence 06C05
- Manoeuvre 06C06a-c
- Firepower 06C07
- Find 06C07a
- Strike 06C07b
- Allocation of Joint Fires 06C07c
- Electronic Warfare 06C07d
- Protection 06C08a-c
- Sustainment 06C09
- Conduct
- Force Elements 06C10a-d
- Covering Force Action 06C11a-d
- Advance Guard and Main Body 06C12a-c
- Flank and Rear Guards 06C13a-b
- Action on Contact 06C14a-b
- Bypassing Policy 06C15
- Routes 06C16
- Air Manoeuvre 06C17
- Pursuit 06C18a-d
06C19a-c
- Transition 06C20a-c
- Advance to Contact Aide Memoire and Summary 6-C-1-1
Sheet

Air
- Superiority 0333b
- Offensive actions 0327,0333b
- Defensive actions 0439c
- Air Space Control Measures 0233
- Air Land Integration (ALI) 0539-0540
- Relief in Place 06f14b
06F16b
- Forward Passage of Lines 06F26c
- Rearward Passage of Lines 06F40b

Index - 1
 - Withdrawal 06G08

Air Defence (AD) (also see Close Air Defence) 0279

- Offensive actions 0333c
- Defensive actions 0447
- Relief in Place 06F16a (1-2)
- Forward Passage of Lines 06F26b
- Rearward passage of Lines 06F40a
- Withdrawal 06G09a
- Crossing and Breaching Obstacles 06I16b

Air Manoeuvre forces

- Advance to Contact 06C17
- Forces 0135e

Ambush 0316

Amphibious forces 0135g

Approach, The
- Offensive action 0348a-f
- Defensive action 0419b, 0421

Area Defence 0415, 0428

- Firepower 0438b

Artillery ( Also see Fire Power and Offensive

support)
- Offensive action 0325
- Defensive action 0439a
- Relief in Place 06F14a (1-9)
- Rearward Passage of Lines 06F38a

Assault, the 0349a-c

Assault Force
- Offensive actions 0338a
0341

Assembly Areas 0268

Attack 0309
- Deliberate 0309a
- Diversionary 0333f(1)
- Hasty 0309b
- Stages 0345

Index - 2
Aviation
- Attack 0328
- Offensive actions 0327
- Defensive actions 0439d
- Relief in Place 06F14b
- Withdrawal 06G08
- Crossing and Breaching Obstacles 06I15c

Axis
- of advance 0350b

Battlegroups 0136

Battle Handover 0422b

Battle Preparation
- Offensive action 0346
- Defensive action 0419a, 0420
- Delay 0455a, 0456

Battlespace Management (BM) 0229, 0248

- Air Space Control Measures 0321
- Defensive actions 0432, 0433, 0434
- Delaying actions 0462a
- Offensive actions 0233
- Land BM 0231
- Link Up 06E03c
- Meeting Engagement 06D07d
- Reconnaissance 06A07
- Stabilising Actions – BM and ALI 0539, 0540
- Withdrawal 06G06d, 06G08c
- March 06H16a
- Crossing and Breaching Obstacles 06I11e

Block
- Defensive action 0419c, 0422

Breaching Actions (Also see Crossing and 06I20-06I24

Breaching Obstacles)

Breaking contact
- Delaying action 0459

Index - 3
Break in, the 0349a

Breakout of encircled forces 0317

Brigade, the
- Activity within a divisional construct 0121-0123
- Allocation of divisional assets 0128-0129
- Manoeuvre units 0128a
- Aviation 0128b
- Joint fires and ISTAR 0128c
- Engineers 0128d
- EW 0128e
- Influence 0128f
- CSS 0128g
- Provost 0128h
- Area of operations (AO) 0126
- Augmentation by divisional Cbt, CS, CSS and 0127
CCS
- Composition 0124-0126
- Conflict and the Brigade 0103-0109
- Functions 0123a-f
- Force types 0130a-g, 0131

- Task Organisation 0132-0135

Bypassing
- Offensive actions 0349c
- Advance to contact 06C15

Captured Persons (CPERS) 02119

- Use of Detention During Stabilisation Actions 0558e
- Captured Persons (Intro) 0702, 0703
- Responsibility and Governance 07A01
- The 5 Prohibited Techniques 07A04a-e
- Key Activities 07A05-07A10
- Risk mitigation 07A11

CBRN 0282
- Offensive actions 0333h
- Defensive actions 0446a-e
- Relief in Place 06F16e(1-2)
- Rearward Passage of Lines 06F40e

Close Air Defence ( Also see Air Defence)

- Advance to Contact 06C08c
- Link Up 06E08a
- Relief in Place 06F16a

Index - 4
 - Forward Passage of Lines 06F26b

CJIIM 0111
- Command in a CJIIM context 0218

Combat identification 0287

- Reconnaissance - Protection 06A19
- Link Up 06E08c

Combat power
- Restoration 02115

Combined Arms Obstacle Integration (CAOI) 0278, 0441, 04A01

- Planning Principles 04A02-04A04
- Planning responsibilities 04A05
- Classification 04A06

Command
- States 0226, 0227a-g
- Advance to Contact 06C04a-e
- Meeting Engagement 06D05a-b
- Link Up 06E03a-d
- Relief in Place 06F12a(1-8)
- Forward Passage of Lines 06F21, 06F22a-f
- Rearward passage of Lines 06F36a-g
- Withdrawal 06G06a-f
- March 06H10a-d
- Crossing and Breaching Obstacles 06I11a-e

Commander 0224, 0319

- Position 0224
- Role 0240
- Role, Sustainment 0296
- Roles - Crossing and Breaching Obstacles 06I11b(1-5)

Communications
- Defensive actions 0431
- Stabilisation actions 0526
- Reconnaissance 06A08
- Link Up 06E03d
- Relief in Place 06F12b
- Forward Passage of Lines 06F22f
- Rearward Passage of lines 06F36f
- Withdrawal 06G05e
- Crossing and Breaching Obstacles 06L11d (3)

Conflict

- Mosaic of 0105

Index - 5
COIN (Protection) 0448

Control of Battlespace 0233

- Control Categories 0233a
- Control Measures 0233b

Counter Intelligence
- Defensive Actions 0420d
- Security 06B10
- Threat 06B17a-c

Counter ISTAR 0420c

Counter Mobility
- Offensive actions 0333d(1-6)
- Defensive actions 0440
- Tasks 0444a
- Delaying actions 0472a-d
- Link Up 06E08b
- Withdrawal 06G09b

Covering force 0348d(1), 0416a, Fig 4-1

Crossing and Breaching Obstacles. ( Also see Annex A to Chap 6

Combined Arms Obstacle Integration,
Obstacles, and Obstacle Effects)
- Overview 06I01, 06I02
- Obstacle Crossing 06I03a-h
- Types of Crossing and Breaching 06I04a-d
- Purpose and Principles 06I05
- Maintenance of Momentum 06I06
- Other principles 06I07a-f
- Water Crossing Actions 06I08a-e
- The Crossing Location 06I09
- Crossing Area 06I09a(1-2), 06I09b(1-3)
- Crossings 06I09c(1-7)
- Bridgehead 06I09d(1-3)
- Brigade Manoeuvre Elements 06I10
- In Place Force 06I10a
- Bridgehead Force 06I10b(1-2)
- Breakout Force 06I10c
- Engineers 06I10d
- Planning Considerations
- Command 06I11a-e
- Planning Factors 06I12a-c
- Information and Intelligence 06I13a-c
- Manoeuvre 06l14
- Firepower 06I15a-c
- Protection 06I16a-b

Index - 6
 - Sustainment 06I17a-d
- Conduct
- Assault Stage 06I18a(1-2)
- Build Up Stage 06I18b(1-3)
- Consolidation Stage 06I18c
- Crossing During Delaying Actions 06I19a-c

- Breaching Actions
- Purpose and Principles 06I20
- Planning Considerations 06I21a-e
- Conduct 06I22a-e
- Sustainment 06I23
- Command and Control 06I24
- Crossing Other Obstacles 06I25
- Obstacle Crossing - Summary 6-I-1-1
- Crossing and Breaching of Obstacles Aide 6-I-1-2
Memoire

Cultural Awareness 07B01, 07B02 a-e, 07B03,

07B04a-h

Cyber Activity 0330

Cyberspace 06B11

Deception 0273
- Offensive actions 0333g(1-3)
- Defensive actions 0444c(3)
- Relief in Place 06F16d
- Rearward passage of Lines 06F40d
- Crossing and Breaching Obstacles 06I12C(3)

Defensive Actions
- Objectives 0404
- Principles 0404
- Defensive actions in the COE 0406-0408
- Influence 0409a-g
- Types of Defence 0410
- Mobile Defence – Purpose and conduct 0411-0412a-b
- Considerations 0413 a-d
- Area Defence – Purpose and conduct 0415,0416a-c
- Considerations 0417a-b
- Planning Yardsticks 0418a-b
- Planning Considerations
- Command 0424-0428
- Coordination 0429a-b
- Headquarters 0430a-c
- Communications 0431

Index - 7
 - Battlespace Management 0432-0434
- Information and Intelligence 0435a-e, 0436
- Firepower 0437, 0438a-b
- Components of offensive support 0439a-e
- Manoeuvre 0440-0442
- Protection 0443
- Use of Engineers 0444a-c
- OPSEC 0445a-e
- Sustainment 0446a-f, 0447, 0448
- Stages of the defence 0419a-d
- Shaping and battle preparation 0420a-h
- The approach 0421a-c
- The block 0422a-d
- The counter attack 0423a-c
- Defensive action - generic summary sheet 4-C-1
- Defensive action – Area and mobile defence - 4-C-2
Aide -Memoire

Decision points 0461f

Delay
- Purpose 0453, 0454a-b, 0455, 0456a-
e, 0457 a-e
- Principles 0454a-d
- Conduct
- Stages 0458a-c
- Shaping and battle preparation 0459a-b
- The delaying action 0460a-c, 0461a-d
- Breaking contact 0462a-b
- Planning Considerations
- Considerations 0463a-b
- Command considerations 0464a-f
- Control measures 0465a-c
- Morale 0466a-d
- Information and Intelligence 0467, 0468
- Firepower 0469, 0470
- Manoeuvre 0471a-g, 0472a-d
- Protection 0473
- Sustainment 0471a-e

- Delay from alternate positions 0451a, Fig 4-3

- Delay from successive positions 0451b, Fig 4-4

Demolitions
- Terminology 04B01
- Authorised commander 04B02
- Changes of state 04B11
- Communications 04B10c
- Demolition firing party 04B06

Index - 8
 - Demolition guard 04B05
- Documentation 04B07
- Firing 04B10b
- Preliminary demolitions 04B03
04B09a-d
- Reserved demolitions 0442, 04B04, 04B10a-c
- Time to fire 04B12

Demonstration 0314
0333f(2)

Division, the 0119

- Functions 0120a-h

Enabling Actions
- Overview 0601,0602a-i
- Reconnaissance Annex A to Chap 6
- Security Annex B to Chap 6
- Advance to contact Annex C to Chap 6
- Meeting Engagement Annex D to Chap 6
- Link Up Annex E to Chap 6
- Relief of Troops Annex F to Chap 6
- Withdrawal Annex G to Chap 6
- March Annex H to Chap 6
- Crossing and Breaching Obstacles Annex I to Chap 6

Echelon Force
- Offensive actions 0338d, 0344

Economy
- of effort 0417a

Electronic
- Advance to Contact 06C07d
- Attack, 0329
- Counter measures, 0333h

Electronic Warfare (EW)

- Offensive actions 0333h
- Defensive actions 0439e
- Delaying actions 0467
- Meeting Engagement 06D07e
- Relief in Place 06F14c
- Forward Passage of Lines 06F24c
- Rearward Passage of Lines 06F38b
- Withdrawal 06G08h
- Crossing and Breaching Obstacles 06L15b

Index - 9
Engineers 0133d
- Offensive actions 0333d-e
- Defensive actions 0444
- Obstacle planning 04A05
- Reconnaissance 06A04c
- Relief in Place 06F16c (1-6)
- Forward passage of Lines 06F26d
- Rearward Passage of Lines 06F40c
- Withdrawal 06G09b
- Crossing and Breaching Obstacles 06I10d(1-3)

Equipment and Supply Denial

- Offensive actions 0336c
- Defensive actions 0451

Exploit 0216
0308d

Exploitation 0311, 0340b, 0350a-e

Feint 0313, 0333f(1)

Field fortifications
- Defensive actions 0444c(1)

Fight Through, the 0349b

Find 0211, 0308a

- Advance to Contact 06C07a

Fire Power (Also see Artillery and Offensive 0243

Support)
- Components (Offensive Actions) 0324 a-f, 0325-0329a-c, 0330
- Components (Defensive Actions) 0437a-c, 0438a-b, 0439a-e

- Fire power and manoeuvre 0244

- Joint Fires 0245
- Allocation (Advance to Contact) 06C07c
- Find (Advance to Contact) 06C07a
- Strike (Advance to Contact) 06C07b
- Control of Fires 0246
- Link Up –coordination of fires 06E06a-f
- Relief in Place - Artillery 06F14a (1-4)
- Forward Passage of Lines 06F24a-c

Index - 10
 - Rearward Passage of Lines 06F38a-b
- Withdrawal 06G08a-h
- March 06H12
- Crossing and Breaching Obstacles 06I15a-c
- Targeting 0249
- Targeting Cycles 0250
- Co-ordination 0251
- Additional Considerations 0252
- Wider Legal Implications 0536

Fix 0213, 0308b

Fixing force
- Mobile defence 0412a

Flank protection
- Offensive actions 0338c, 0342
- Advance to Contact 06C08a, 06C12a-c

Force Protection 0333a

Forward Dumping (Defensive actions) 0446c

Forward Passage of Lines (FPOL) Annex F to Chap 6

Framework
- Operational, 0204
- Geographic, 0205
- Deep 0206a
- Close 0206b
- Rear 0206c
- Tactical, 0208
- Find 0211, 0212a-c
- Fix 0213, 0214a-d
- Strike 0215a-d
- Exploit 0216a-d

Freedom of action 0461e

Full Command 0227a

Ground manoeuvre forces 0135d

- Armoured forces 0135d(1)
- Mechanised forces 0135d(2)
- Light forces 0135d(3)
- Reconnaissance forces – light cavalry 0135a

Index - 11
Handover line
- Delaying actions 0462b

Headquarters
0320
- Brigade Main 0224a
- Brigade Tactical 0224b
- Brigade Step-up 0224c
- Defensive actions 0430
- Crossing and Breaching Obstacles 06I11c (1-3)

Host Nation
- Security 06B07
- Support 0336e

HUMINT 0135a, 0135b

- Brigade Reconnaissance Force 06-A-05

Human Terrain 0527, 0528a-e

Infiltration 0318
0348 f (1-2)

Influence 0110, 0409a-g

- Special influence methods 0115

- CIMIC 0115a
- Media communication 0115b
- OPSEC 0115c, 0275
- Information methods 0115d
- Security 06B09
- Link Up 06E04a-b
- Withdrawal 06G06f
- March 06H16b

Initiative
- retaining the, 0417b

Information and Intelligence

- Offensive Actions 0322, 0323
- Defensive Actions 0435a-e, 0436
- Assurance 06B12
- Advance to Contact 06C05
- Meeting Engagement 06D06
- Link Up 06E05

Index - 12
 - Relief in Place 06F13
- Forward Passage of lines 06F23
- Rearward Passage of Lines 06F37
- Withdrawal 06G07
- March 06H11a-c
- Understanding 0235
- Stabilisation 0522, 0523

Intelligence
- Offensive action (Current Picture and 0322
Requirements) 0323
- Preparation of the environment 06B17a-c

Interoperability
- Relief of Troops 06F08a-c

Introduction To brigade Tactics 0101, 0102

ISTAR 0236
- Assets 0242
- Planning Considerations 0241
- Role of the Brigade Commander 0240
- Stabilisation 0524, 0525

Joint Fires 0245

Key Leader Engagement (KLE) 0559

Legal
- Firepower - Wider Implications- Stabilisation 0536
Actions

Liaison
- Crossing and Breaching Obstacles 06I11d (1-2)

Line of Departure 0348b

Link Up
- Introduction 06E01
- Purpose and Principles 06E02a-c
- Planning Considerations
- Command 06E03a-b(1-4)
- Mission 06E03 a
- Battlespace Management 06E03c(91-5)

Index - 13
 - Communications and Liaison 06E03d
- Influence 06E04a-b
- Information and Intelligence 06E05
- Firepower considerations 06E06a-f
- Manoeuvre 06E07
- Protection 06E08
- Air Defence 06E08a
- Mobility and Counter Mobility 06E08b
- Combat Identification 06E08c
- OPSEC 06E08d
- Sustainment 06E09
- Conduct
- Link up of moving force with a stationary force 06E10a-e
- Link up two moving forces 06E11a-d
- Link up between moving and stationary forces. 6-E-1-1
Summary and Aide Memoire .
- Link up between two moving forces. 6-E-2-1
Summary and Aide Memoire

Main body
- Offensive Actions 0348d(3)
- Advance to Contact 06C12a-c

Main Defensive Area (MDA) 0416b, Fig 4-1

Manoeuvre
- Forms of 0254
- Envelopment 0255
- Double envelopment 0256
- Encirclement 0257, 0350e
- Turning movement 0258
- Penetration 0259
- Deep penetration 0260
- Multiple penetration 0261
- Multiple and deep penetration 0262
- Infiltration 0263
- Part of Offensive Action
- Sequencing 0331
- Mobility 0332
- Defensive Actions 0440-0442
- Delay 0471a-g
- Counter Mobility 0472a-d
- Advance to Contact 06C06a-c
- Meeting Engagement 06D08a-b

Index - 14
 - Link Up 06E07
- Relief in Place 06F15a-c
- Forward Passage of Lines 06F25
- Rearward Passage of Lines 06F39
- March 06H13
- Crossing and Breaching Obstacles 06I14

Manoeuvrist Approach ( Key Tenets) 0110

- Manoeuvrist Approach 0111 a-c, 0112a-i
- Enhancing the Manoeuvrist Approach 0113a-e

- Mission Command 0114a-e, 0115

March Annex H to chap 6

- Overview 06H01, 06H02
- Purpose and Principles 06H03
- Column length and speed 06H04
- Routes 06H05
- Harbour Areas 06H06a-e
- Movement Sectors 06H07
- March Discipline 06H08
- Planning Considerations
- General 06H09
- Command 06H10a-d
- Responsibilities 06H10a
- Orders 06H10b(1-10)
- Subordinate Orders 06H10c(1- 10)
- Warning Orders 06H10d 1-3)
- Information and Intelligence 06H11a-c
- Firepower 06H12
- Manoeuvre 06H13
- Protection 06H14
- Sustainment 06H15a-d
- Additional Considerations 06H16
- Battlespace Management 06H16a
- Influence 06H16b
- Conduct
- Movement to the Start Point 06H17
- Actions during the move 06H18a-b(1-2)

- Priorities 06H19a-b
- Release Point 06H20
- March. Summary and Aide Memoire. 6-H-1-1

Media Communications
- Security 06B08

Meeting Engagement Annex D to Chapter 6

- Introduction 06D01

Index - 15
 - Purpose 06D02a-c
- Principles 06D03a-i
- Characteristics 06D04
- Planning Considerations
- Command 06D05
- Information and Intelligence 06D05
- Firepower 06D07
- General 06D07a
- Offensive Support 06D07b
- Shared situational awareness 06D07c
- Battlespace Management 06D07d
- Manoeuvre 06D08a-b
- Protection 06D09
- Meeting Engagement - Aide Memoire and 6-D-1-1
Summary Sheet

Mission Command 0114a-e, 0115

Mobile Defence 0411, 0427

- Firepower 0438a

Mobility
- Offensive actions 0332
0333d
- Defensive actions 0440
- Tasks 0444b
- Link Up 06E08b

Momentum
- Maintenance of, 0340a

Morale 0463
- Withdrawal 06G06c

Mortars
- Offensive actions 0326
- Defensive actions 0439b

Movement
- Assembly areas 0268
- Planning 0264
- Route matrix 0265
- Route matrix infrastructure 0267
- Route selection 0266

Multinational (MN)
- Divisions 0221
- Environment 06B05

Multi Agency

Index - 16
 - Environment 06B06

Obstacle(s) (Also see Crossing and Breaching

Obstacles and Combine Arms Obstacle
Integration)
- Purpose and principles 0420h
- Existing 04A06a
- Reinforcing 04A06b
- Tactical 04A06b(1)
- Protective 04A06b(2)
- Control Measures 04A16
- Zones 04A18
- Belts 04A19
- Groups 04A20
- Recording and numbering 04A21
- Withdrawal 06G08d
- Crossing and Breaching Obstacles Annex I to Chap 6

Obstacle Effects 04A10

- Disrupt 04A11
- Turn 04A12
- Fix 04A13
- Block 04A14

Offensive Actions
- Purpose 0302
- Principles 0303
- Characteristics 0304
-Types of Offensive action 0309-0318
- Planning considerations
- Command 0319-0321
- Information and Intelligence 0322, 0323
- Firepower 0324-0328
- Electronic attack 0329, 0330
- Manoeuvre 0331, 0332
- Protection 0333a-j
- Sustainment
- Co-ordination 0334a-e
- Considerations 0335a-j
- Functional Grouping 0336a-e
- Planning Yard sticks 0337a-d

Offensive Actions in a Complex Environment

- Influence 0305, 0306a-g
- Challenges 0308a-d

Index - 17
Offensive Actions - Conduct
- Grouping 0338, 0339a-d, 0340a-c,
0341-0344
- Stages of an Attack 0345a-e, 0346-0350
- Summary sheet 3-A-1
- Aide Memoire 3-B-1

Offensive support (OS)

- Components of OS 0324a-f
- Artillery 0325
- Mortars 0326
- Air and Aviation 0327
- Attack Aviation 0328
- Electronic Attack 0329a-c
- Offensive Cyber Activity 0330
- Defensive actions 0439
- Reconnaissance OS 06A12
- Meeting Engagement OS 06D07b
- Relief of Troops 06F09
- Withdrawal 06G08

Operational Command (OPCOM) 0227b

Operational Control (OPCON) 0227c

Operational Safety 0289

Operational Security (OPSEC) 0275

- Definition 06B02b
- OPSEC process 0276
- OPSEC measures 0277
- Offensive actions 0333f
0340c
- Defensive actions 0445a-b(1-3)
- Defensive measures 06B16a-d
- Stabilising actions 0568
- Advance to Contact 06C08b
- Link Up 06E08c
- Withdrawal 06G09d

Organisation of Land forces 0116-0118

Other Considerations
- Captured Persons 07A01-07A11
- Sites of Cultural and Historic Importance 07B01-07B04
- Other Actors in the Battlespace 07C01, 07C02a-i

Index - 18
Passage of Lines 0348a , Annex F to Chap 6

Physical Security 06B02b

Planning Yardsticks
- Offensive actions 0337a-d
- Defensive actions

Principles (and Objectives)

- Offensive actions 0303
- Defensive actions 0404a-f, 0405a-e
- Advance to Contact 06C03a-e
- Meeting Engagement 06D03a-i
- Link Up 06E02a-c
- Delay 0454
- Withdrawal 06G02a-g, 06G03a-e
- March 06H03-06H06, 06H07, 06H08

Positioning (Defensive actions) 0447

Protection
- Offensive Actions 0333a-i
- Defensive Actions 0443, 0444 a-c
- COIN 0448
- Advance to Contact 06C08a-c
- Meeting Engagement 06D09
- Link Up 06E08a-d
- Relief in Place 06F16a-e
- Rearward Passage of Lines 06F40a-e
- Withdrawal 06G09a-d
- March 06H14
- Crossing and Breaching Obstacles 06I16a-b

Provost 0366d(1)(2)
- March 06H15d
- Crossing and Breaching Obstacles 06I17b

Purpose
- Offensive actions 0302
- Defensive actions 0404
- Delay 0450
- Relief in Place 06F10a-b, 06F11a-h
- Forward Passage of Lines 06F20a-d
- Rearward Passage of Lines 06F34a-e, 06F35a-c
- Withdrawal 06G02a-g, 06G03a-e

Index - 19
Pursuit
- Advance to Contact 06C18a-d, 06C19a-c
- Offensive Actions 0312, 0350d

Raid 0310

Rear guard 0348d(4)

Recovery (Defensive actions) 0446d

Relief of Troops Annex F to Chap 6

- Introduction 06F01
- Characteristics 06F03-06F05
- Conditions 06F06a-d
- Mission 06F07
- Interoperability 06F08a-c
- Offensive Support 06F09

- Relief In Place (RIP)

- Purpose and Types 06F10a-b
- Timings 06F11a-h
- Planning Considerations
- Command 06F12a-c
- Communications and Liaison 06F12b
- Continuity 06F12c
- Information and Intelligence 06F13
- Fire Power 06F14
- Artillery 06F14a(1-4)
- Air and Aviation 06F14b
- Electronic Warfare 06F14c
- Manoeuvre 06F15
- Movement 06F15a(1-9)
- Advance Party 06F15b
- Allocation of Routes 06F15c
- Protection 06F16
- Air Defence 06F16a(1-2)
- Air 06F16b
- Engineers 06F16c(1-4)
- Security and Deception 06F16d
- Chemical, Biological, Radiological and 06F14e
Nuclear
- Sustainment 06F17a-h
- Conduct 06F18a-g, 06F19
- Relief in Place- Summary Sheet and Aide 6-F-1-1
Memoire

- Forward Passage of Lines (FPOL)

- Purpose 06F20a-d

Index - 20
 - Planning Considerations 06F21, 06F22a-f
- Controlling Headquarters 06F22a(1-6)
- In Place Force 06F22b(1-11)
- Advancing Force 06F22c(1-5)
- Timings 06F22d(1-5)
- Command and Control 06F22e(1-2)
- Communications 06F22f
- Information and Intelligence 06F23
- Firepower 06F24a-c
- Manoeuvre 06F25
- Protection 06F26a-f
- Sustainment 06F27a (1-6)
- Artillery Re-supply plan 06F27b
- Medical Plan 06F27c
- Conduct
- General 06F28a-b
- Routes 06F29a-b
- Grouping 06F30
- Order of March 06F31
- Forward Assembly Area 06F32
- Summary 06F33
- Forward passage of Lines – Summary and Aide 6-F-2-1
Memoire

- Rearward Passage of Lines

- Purpose 06F34a-e, 06F35a-c
- Planning Considerations
- Command 06F36
- Controlling headquarters 06F36a(1-9)
- In Place Force 06F36b(1-6)
- Withdrawing Force 06F36c(1-3)
- Passage of Command 06F36d
- Control 06Fe(1-9)
- Communications 06F36f
- Liaison 06F36g
- Information and Intelligence 06F37
- Firepower 06F38
- Artillery 06F38a
- EW 06F38b
- Manoeuvre 06F39
- Protection 06F40
- Air defence 06F40a
- Air 06F40b
- Engineers 06F40c
- Security and Deception 06F40d
- CBRN 06F40e
- Sustainment 06F41
- Conduct 06F42-06F44
- Summary 06F45a-e
Rearward Passage of Lines – Summary and Aide 6-F-2-2

Index - 21
 Memoire

Reorganisation 0350c

Rearward Passage of Lines Annex F to Chap 6

Reserve(s)
- Offensive actions 0338e, 0343
- Defensive actions 0416c, Fig 4-1
- Delay 0457c

Reconnaissance 06A01, 06A02

- Purpose and Principles
- Key principles 06A03
- Brigade Reconnaissance Forces 06A04a-d
- Additional Reconnaissance Assets 06A05a-g
- Planning Considerations
- Command 06A06-06A08
- Information and Intelligence 06A09
- Firepower
- Joint Fires 06A10
- Tactical Groups (Tac Gps) 06A11
- Offensive Support (OS) 06A12
- Manoeuvre
- Ground manned reconnaissance 06A13
- Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) 06A14
- Aviation 06A15
- Tactical Air Reconnaissance 06A16a-b, 06A17
- Protection
- Vulnerability 06A18
- Combat Identification 06A19
- Sustainment 06A20
- Force 0338a
- In force, 0315
- Offensive actions 0339, 0340a-c

Retirement 06G04

Risk
- Orchestrating Brigade level tactics 0291, 0292 a-d, 0293
- Security 06B04

Routes
- Advance to Contact 06C16

Screen
- Delaying action 0457a

Index - 22
Security 06B01
- Types of 06B02a-b
- Purpose and Principles 06B04a-d
- Planning Considerations
- The Multi National (MN) Environment 06B05
- The Multi Agency Environment 06B06
- Host Nation 06B07
- Media 06B08
- Influence 06B09
- Counter Intelligence 06B10
- Cyberspace 06B11
- Information Assurance 06B12
- Conduct
- Force Protection 06B13
- Military 06B13a(1-5)
- Civilians 06B13b
- Infrastructure 06B13 c
- Area and movement control 06B14 a-h, 06B15
- OPSEC 06B16a-d
- Determining the enemy surveillance threat 06B17a-c
- Offensive actions 0338c, 0342, 0348e
- Defensive actions 0445b, 0446e
- Relief in Place (Security and Deception) 06F16d
- Forward Passage of Lines (Security and 06F26f
Deception)
- Withdrawal (Security and Deception) 06G09d

Shared Situational Awareness (SSA)

- Link Up 06E06a
- Security 06B14

Shaping
- Offensive action 0347
- Defensive action 0419a, 0420
- Delay 0455a, 0456

Sites of Cultural and Historic Importance 07B01, 07B02a-e, 07B03,

07B04a-h

Siting
- Defensive actions 0420f

Special influence methods 0115

- CIMIC 0115a
- Media communication 0115b
- OPSEC 0115c
- Information methods 0115d

Stabilising Actions
- Overview 0501-0505

Index - 23
 - Purpose 0506a-c, 0507-0512
- The Stabilisation Model : The Military Fig 5-1
Contribution
- Planning considerations
- Command 0513, 0514
- Competing narratives 0515
- Influence Matrix 0521
- Integrated Approach 0517, 0518
- Messaging 0516
- Working with partners 0519, 07C01, 07C02 a-i
- Stakeholder analysis 0520
- Additional considerations
- Security transition 0543, 0544
- Campaign continuity 0545, 06F12c
- Information and Intelligence
- Understanding 0522, 0523
- Communications 0526
- ISTAR 0524, 0525
- Human Terrain 0527, 0528a-e, 0529
- Measures of Effectiveness 0530, 0531, 0532
- Force Elements 0546, 0547a-f, 0548
- Firepower 0533
- Targeting 0534, 0535
- Wider legal implications 0536
- Protection
- Battlespace Management and Air Land 0539, 0540
Integration
- Force Protection 0537
- Threat Assessment 0538
- Specialist Stabilisation Elements
- Stabilisation Unit 0549a-d
- Military Stabilisation Support Group (MSSG) 0550a-c
- Sustainment 0541, 0542
- Conduct of Stabilising Actions 0551, 0552
- Framework Security 0553
- Role of the Brigade 0554, 0555
- Tactical bases 0556a-c
- Establish human security 0557a-d
- Countering adversaries 0558a-e
- Key leader engagement (KLE) 0559
- Security Sector Reform and Military Capacity 0560, 0561
Building
- Security Sector Reform 0562-0564a-d
- Military Capacity Building 0565
- Role of the Brigade 0566-0568a-e, 0569
- Support to the Delivery of Essential Services 0570
- Role of the Brigade 0571, 0572a-d
- Restoration Planning 0573
-Targeting 0574a-c, 0575
- Coordination of activity 0576

Index - 24
 - Funding 0577
- Use of local expertise and labour 0578
- Transition management 0579
- Support to Governance 0580
- Role of the Brigade 0581
0582
- Building on local capacities 0583, 0584a-d
- Support to Economic Development and 0585
Reconstruction
- Role of the Brigade 0586-0589a-j
- Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) 0591-0593
- Stabilisation Actions – Aide Memoire 5-A-1

Strike 0215, 0308c

- Advance to Contact 06C07b

Striking force
- Mobile defence 0412b

Strong points 0420g

Surveillance
- Counter, 0333f(3)

Survivability
- Offensive actions 0333e
- Defensive actions 0444c
- Withdrawal 06G09c

Sustainment
- ‘4 Ds’ 02116
- Administrative support 02107a-e
- Brigade Support Group (BGS) 02100
- Commander’s role 0296
- Tactical Considerations
- DCOS 0297
- Denial 0451
- Equipment support 02106a-d, 0336c
- Host Nation support 0336e
- Infrastructure support 02108a-b
- Logistic support 02105a, 0336a
- Health Service Support (HSS) 02105b(1-5)
0336b
- HSS planning 02118a-d
- Principles of logistics 02104
- Positioning 0450
- Functional Groupings 02105a-b
- Provost support 0336d
- Sustainment Risk 0297a-e
- Terminology 0295

Index - 25
 - Offensive Action 0334a-e, 0335 a-j, 0336 a-e
- Defensive Action 0449a-f, 0450, 0451
- Delay 0474a-e
- Advance to Contact 06C09
- Meeting Engagement 06D10
- Relief in Place 06F17a-h
- Forward passage of Lines 06F27a-(1-6)
- Artillery Re-supply Plan 06F27b
- Medical Plan 06F27c

- Withdrawal 06G10
- March 06H15a-d
- Crossing and Breaching Obstacles
- Medical Support 06I17a
- Provost Support 06I17b
- Logistic Support 06I17c
- Equipment Support 06l17d

Tactical Functions
- Command 2-1
- Information and intelligence 2-15
- Firepower 2-19
- Manoeuvre 2-21
- Protection 2-28
- Sustainment 2-34

Tactical Basing
-Defensive Action 0475, 0476a-c, 0477a-j, 0478
- Stabilising Actions 0556a-c

Tactical Command (TACOM) 0227d

Tactical Control (TACON) 0227e

Tactical Groups (Tac Gps) 06A11

Target Area of Interest (TAI) 04A07

Targeting 0249, 06G08 b

Targeting Cycles 0250, 06G08 b

Training
- The Brigade 07D01-07D02a-e

Transition
- Advance to Contact 06C20
- Transition Management 0579

Index - 26
 - Transition and overwatch 0568e

Under Command for Administration (UCADMIN) 0227f

Under Command for Daily Maintenance 0227g

Understanding 0235
- Delaying actions 0461d

Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) 0281

- Reconnaissance – manoeuvre 06A14

Withdrawal Annex G to Chap 6

- Overview 06g01
- Purpose and Principles 06G02a-g, 06G03a-e
- Retirement 06G04
- Withdrawal in Contact 06G05
- Command 06G06a-f
- General 06G06a(1-4)
- Key Success Factors 06G06b
- Morale 06G06c(1-4)
- Battlespace Management 06G06d(1-8)
- Communications 06G06e
- Influence 06G06f
- Information and Intelligence 06G07
- Firepower 06G08a-h
- Protection 06G09
- Air defence 06G09a
- Mobility and Counter Mobility 06G09b
- Survivability 06G09c
- Security 06G09d
- Sustainment 06G10
- Conduct 06G11a-g
- Procedure 06G11
- Grouping and Tasks 06G11a(1-3)
- Positions 06G11b(1-2)
- Timings 06G11c(1-2)
- Coordination 06G11d
- Sequence of Withdrawal 06G11e(1-6)
- Hasty Withdrawal 06G11f(1-2)
- Battlefield Shaping 06G11g(1-10)
- Withdrawal – Summary and Aide Memoire

Withdrawal in Contact 06G05

Index - 27
ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations - 1
4Ds Destination, Distance, Demand, Duration
5Cs Congested, Cluttered, Contested, Connected, Constrained

AA Avenue of Approach / Air Assault

Assy Area Assembly Area
AAAD All Arms Air Defence
ACM Airspace Control Means
ACP Ammunition Control Point
AD Air Defence
ADP Army Doctrine Publication
AFM Army Field Manual
AH Attack Helicopter
AJP Allied Joint Publication
ALI Air Land Integration
AM Air Manoeuvre
AMPT Air Manoeuvre Planning Team
AO Area of Operations
AOR Area of Responsibility
Armd Armoured
ARRC Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
Avn Aviation
AVRE Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers
AWL Acoustic Weapon Locating

BAE Battlespace Area Evaluation

BALO Brigade Air Liaison Officer
BDA Battle Damage Assessment
Bde Brigade
BG Battlegroup
BGISD Battlegroup Intelligence Support Detachment
BM Battlespace Management
Bn Battalion
BRF Brigade Reconnaissance Force
BSG Brigade Support Group
Bty Battery

C2 Command and Control

C3 Command, Control and Communications
C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information
CA Comprehensive Approach
CAD Close Air Defence
CAOI Combined Arms Obstacle Integration
CAS Close Air Support
CASEVAC Casualty Evacuation
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CCA Counter Command Activity
CCIR Commander’s Critical Information Requirement

Abbreviations - 2
CCS Combat Command Support
CD Collateral Damage
CDE Collateral Damage Estimate
Cdo Commando
CFA Covering Force Area
CFL Coordinated Fire Line
CGRS Common Geographic Reference System
CI Counter Intelligence
CID Combat Identification
C-IDF Counter Indirect Fire
C-IED Counter Improvised Explosive Device
CIMIC Civil Military Cooperation
CIS Communications and Information Systems
CI&Sy Sect Counter Intelligence and Security Section
CJIIM Combined, Joint, Inter-Agency, Inter-Governmental, Multi-National
CLP Combat Logistic Patrol
CNA Computer Network Attack
CND Computer Network Defence
CNE Computer Network Exploitation
CNO Computer Network Operations
CO Commanding Officer
COA Course of Action
COE Contemporary Operating Environment
COIN Counter Insurgency
COIST Company Operational Intelligence Support Team
Comd Commander
COMSEC Communications Security
CONOPS Concept of Operations
COP Common Operating Picture
COS Chief of Staff
COTS Commercial Off the Shelf
COY Company
C-RAM Counter Rocket, Artillery, Mortars
CS Combat Support / Close Support
CSG Civilian Stabilisation Group
CSS Combat Service Support
CT Counter Terrorism
CULAD Cultural Adviser

DCDC Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre

DCOS Deputy Chief of Staff
DDR Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID Department for International Development
DHU Defence HUMINT Unit
Div Division
DP Decision Point

ECM Electronic Counter Measures

ECP Equipment Collection Point
EEFI Essential Elements of Friendly Information

Abbreviations - 3
EMCON Emission Control
EMS Electro Magnetic Spectrum
EO Electro-Optical
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ES Electronic Surveillance / Equipment Support
EW Electronic Warfare
EWCC Electronic Warfare Control Centre
EWSI Electronic Warfare Signals Intelligence

F3EA Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit and Analyse

FARP Forward Arming and Refuelling Point
FAO Foreign Area Officers
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FEC Force Exploitation Company
FFIR Friendly Force Information Requirements
FHT Field HUMINT Team
FLOT Forward Line of Own Troops
Fmn Formation
FMV Full Motion Video
FOB Forward Operating Base
FOO Forward Observation Officer
FP Force Protection
FPOL Forward Passage of Lines
FRAGO Fragmentary Order
FSCC Fire Support Coordination Cell
FSCL Fire Support Coordination Line
FSCM Fire Support Coordination Measures
FSSL Fire Support Safety Line
FST Fire Support Team

GBAD Ground Based Air Defence

GCS Ground Control Station
GMLRS Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System
GMR Ground-Based Manned Reconnaissance
GS General Support

HQ Headquarters
HN Host Nation
HNS Host Nation Support
HUMINT Human Intelligence
HSS Health Service Support

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IER Information Exchange Requirement
IM Information Management
IMINT Imagery Intelligence
Int Intelligence
IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
IPE Intelligence Preparation of the Environment / Individual Protective Equipment
IR Information Requirement

Abbreviations - 4
ISF Indigenous Security Forces
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
IX Information Exploitation

JDN Joint Doctrine Note

JFAC Joint Force Air Component
JFC Joint Fires Cell
JFHQ Joint Force Headquarters
JFLogC Joint Force Logistic Component
JFI Joint Fires Integration
JIIM Joint, Interagency, Inter-Governmental and Multinational
JOA Joint Operational Area
JTF Joint Task Force

KLE Key Leader Engagement

LC Land Component
LCC Land Component Commander
LCHQ Land Component HQ
LD Line of Departure
LEC Locally Employed Civilian
LEGAD Legal Advisor
LO Liaison Officer
LOAC Law of Armed Conflict
LoC Line of Communications
LoO Lines of Operation
LOP Local Operating Picture
LPB Logistic Preparation of the Battlefield
LSR Logistic Support Regiment

MACE Military Assistance to Civil Effect

MASD Military Assistance to Stabilisation and Development
MCB Military Capacity Building
MCO Major Combat Operations / Movement Control Organisation
MDA Main Defensive Area
ME Main Effort
MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation
Mech Mechanised
MI Military Intelligence
MN Multi National
MNF Multi National Force
MOE Measures of Effectiveness
Mor Mortar
MPE Material and Personnel Exploitation
MSR Main Supply Routes
MSSG Military Stabilisation Support Group
MSST Military Stabilisation Support Team
MST Mission Specific Training
MUAS Mini Unmanned Aerial systems

Abbreviations - 5
NAI Named Area of Interest
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEC Network Enabled Capability
NFA No Fire Area
NGO Non Governmental Organisation
NGS Naval Gunfire Support

OA Operational Area
OC Officer Commanding
OGD Other Government Department
OISG Operational Intelligence Support Group
OODA Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act
OPCOM Operational Command
OPCON Operational Control
OPLAW Operational Law
Op Operation
OPSEC Operational Security
ORBAT Order of Battle
OS Offensive Support

PB Patrol Base
PID Positive Identification
PInfo Public Information
PIR Priority Information Requirements
PJHQ Permanent Joint Headquarters
Pl Platoon
PMC Private Military Company
PME Peacetime Military Engagement
POD Port of Disembarkation
POE Point of Entry
POLAD Political Advisor
PPP Presence, Posture and Profile
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSC Private Security Contractor
PSYOPS Psychological Operations
PW Prisoners of War

QIP Quick Impact Project

QRF Quick Reaction Force

RA Royal Artillery
RC Regional Command
RE Royal Engineers
Regt Regiment
RFA Restricted Fire Area
RFI Request for Information
RFL Restricted Fire Line
RIC Reconnaissance Intelligence Cell
RIP Relief in Place

Abbreviations - 6
RM Royal Marines
ROE Rules of Engagement
RPOL Rearward Passage of Lines
RSOM Reception, Staging and Onward Movement
RV Rendevous

SA Situational Awareness
SF Special Forces
SH Support Helicopter
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SIN Single Intelligence Narrative
SITREP Situation Report
SLT Specialist Liaison Team
SOI Standard Operating Instructions
SOP Standard Operating Procedures
SPT Stabilisation Planning Team
SSA Shared Situational Awareness
SSR Security Sector Reform
STA Surveillance and Target Acquisition
STABAD Stabilisation Advisor
STAP Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan
SU Situational Understanding / Stabilisation Unit

TACOM Tactical Command

TACON Tactical Control
TAI Target Area of Interest
TEP Tactical Effects Planning
TI Thermal Imaging
TIM Toxic Industrial Materials
TQ Tactical Questioning
TTPs Tactics Techniques and Procedures

UAS Unmanned Aerial System

UCADMIN Under Command for Administration
UCDM Under Command for Daily Maintenance
UD3A Understand, Decide, Detect, Deliver and Assess
UOR Urgent Operational Requirement

W&R Warning and Reporting

WLR Weapon Locating Radar
WMD Weapons of mass Destruction

Abbreviations - 7