AC72098 AFM Tactics PT 5 Mil Sup PDF

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Army Field Manual Tactics for Stability Operations AC 72098
Part 5: Military Support

to Capacity Building
Contents
ii | Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5
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Contents
Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5 | iii
Foreword
AFM Tactics for Stability Operations: Part 5 is closely nested within its parent publication, AFM
Tactics for Stability Operations, which provides the land environment context for the delivery
of stability within a pan-government approach. The publication seeks to define the breadth of
capacity building operations across the mosaic of conflict.
In the past three years a focus of Defence Engagement and the increase in overseas training
tasks undertaken by the adaptable force has once again brought the importance of the
contribution of military capacity building to strategic force projection and the UK prosperity
building agenda to the fore. Land forces have a strong tradition of contributing to the
development of partner-nation armed forces through successive campaigns since WW2 and
presently through numerous smaller scale undertakings across Africa and the Middle East.
The most capable Iraqi forces during the Battle for Mosul in 2016/17 were the Counter Terrorism
Force; an organisation who had retained a mentored relationship with the US special forces since
the withdrawal of the bulk of US forces from Iraq in 2011. Thier success in the defeat of ISIS/
Daesh shows the strategic value of persistent engagement at the tactical, operation and strategic
level. This may not define a new paradigm of warfare, but certainly provides an effective model
for delivery of UK Defence objectives ‘by, with and through’ a partner.
Capacity building at the tactical level is fundamentally a human endeavour which demands new
skills of our soldiers; an aptitude for language, a capacity to empathise with the cultures and
motivations of others; and an ability to adapt teaching materials and styles to the needs of the
indigenous force. But we must not lose sight of the fact that UK credibility to conduct such tasks
is founded on our professional excellence and warfighting acumen.
This doctrine has been developed closely with me as the Land proponent for capacity building.
It therefore captures the experience gleaned from the plethora of overseas training tasks
undertaken in the past three years, and the operational successes achieved in combination with
our partners. The doctrine has additionally been used to support planning during Exercise RHINO
CHARGE 18, which featured an intervention and downstream capacity building scenario, which
has served to validate the utility of this. I commend it to all personnel preparing for Defence
Engagement and capacity building missions overseas.
General Officer Commanding 1st (United Kingdom) Division
March 2018
Capacity Building Doctrine Hierarchy
NATO AJP-3.16 AJP-3.16 AJP-3.22 AJP-3.4.1

ABCA AJP-3.4.9
Security Force Stabilisation & Stability Peace
CIMIC
Assistance Reconstruction Policing Support
ABCA Security
NATO Allied
Force Capacity
Building Handbook
JOINT JCN 1/14 JDP 05 JDN 1/15

i. J
Defence DJoint Shaping a Defence
Operating Concept
P stable world Engagement
0
iv | Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5
2
LAND DN 13/03 SFA in ii. U
DN 17/04 Security
ADP Land Operations
Afghanistan K Forces Assistance
O
DN 15/03 Land p
s
AFM Tactics
Contribution to
: for Stability
Defence Engagement Ops (TFSO)
t
h
UK land and joint doctrine
D
AFM TFSO Part 1 AFM
e TFSO Part 2 AFM TFSO Part 3 AFM TFSO Part 4
AFM TFSO Part 5
Counter-Irregular f Peace Humanitarian Stabilisation &
Capacity Building
Activity e Support
n
Assistance Reconstruction
c
e
Legend:
c
ADP - Army doctrine dublication
o AJP - Allied joint publication JDN - joint doctrine note
AFM - Army field manual DNn - doctrine note JDP - joint doctrine publication
t
JCN - joint concept note CIMIC
r
- civil-military cooperation
Contents
Contents
Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5 | v
Preface
Scope. Army Field Manual (AFM) Tactics for Stability Operations, Part 5: Capacity Building
gives an overview and best practice for personnel deployed, or about to deploy, on capacity
building tasks overseas from a land perspective. It also provides the policy rationale for why
capacity building takes place. Tactical considerations pertaining to wider stability operations
are covered in the overarching AFM, Tactics for Stability Operations. A detailed breakdown of
tactics, techniques and procedures pertinent to capacity building can also be found separately in
the Stability Tactics Handbook, which will be held as a live publication on the Army Knowledge
Exchange (AKX)
Purpose. This publication is the primary source of doctrine for the UK land contribution to
capacity building elements of stability operations. Building on the foundations laid by higher-
level NATO, Defence and land doctrine, it provides the principles that guide UK land forces’
approach to capacity building within stability operations.
Application. AFM Tactics for Stability Operations Part 5: Capacity Building is required reading
for all staff officers and land force commanders from subunit upwards. They must explain the
doctrine to their subordinates and ensure that the whole land force operates in accordance
with its principles. It is also useful for allies, joint staffs, civil servants, contractors and civilians
working alongside land forces.
Background. This functional doctrine supersedes the Land Contribution to Defence Engagement
Doctrine Note, providing a broader contextual view of capacity building and acquiring best
practice both from an historical viewpoint, but also capturing lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan,
and other short-term training team (STTT) deployments. The UK has a deep historical legacy
and commitment to capacity building, having both trained and fought alongside local forces
throughout the history of the modern British state. It gained further experience in the twentieth
century with examples such as Malaya, Dhofar, and Sierra Leone. Case studies are included in
Part D.
This manual continues the evolution in land forces’ doctrine, using Army Doctrine Publication
(ADP) Land Operations as a framework. The AFM complements joint doctrine through reference
to JDP 05. Where possible, it also complements NATO doctrine and while not exhaustive, the
linkages to key NATO and joint publications are shown overleaf.
Contents
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Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5 | vii
Contents
Foreword iii
Preface v
Contents vii
Part A - Context PA-1
chapter 1 - Introduction 1-1
Chapter 2 - The UK government approach to capacity building 2-1
Introduction 2-1
The role of security capacity building during military operations 2-5
Wider benefits of capacity building 2-8
Chapter 3 - Capacity building within a military framework 3-1

Introduction 3-1
Tactical functions 3-1
Defence Engagement 3-8
Chapter 4 - Capacity building approach and principles 4-1

Introduction 4-1
Capacity building approach 4-1
Capacity building principles 4-3
ANNEX A to Chapter 4 - Capacity building definitions 4A-1

Capacity building 4A-1
Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) 4A-1
Defence Engagement 4A-1
Demobilisation 4A-1
Disarmament 4A-1
Full spectrum approach 4A-1
Police capacity building 4A-1
Reinsertion 4A-2
Reintegration 4A-2
Security capacity building 4A-2
Security force assistance (SFA) 4A-2
Security sector reform (SSR) 4A-2
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viii | Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5
Stabilisation 4A-2
Stability policing 4A-2
PART B - Delivery PB-1

Chapter 5 - Planning and preparation 5-1
Introduction 5-1
Cultural awareness 5-1
Training needs analysis (TNA) 5-5
Working within a coalition 5-5
Land delivery plans (LDP) 5-5
First contact with the partner nation 5-6
Funding 5-6
Pre-deployment training (PDT) and pre-employment training (PET) 5-6
Annex A to Chapter 5 - Capacity building actions and effects terminology 5A-1

Annex B to Chapter 5 - Human security themes 5B-1
Chapter 6 - Execute – general information 6-1
Introduction 6-1
Threats 6-1
Command and control 6-3
Language requirements 6-3
Use of interpreters 6-4
Use of contractors 6-5
Discipline and professionalism 6-6
Communication 6-6
Reporting chain 6-7
Sharing of information 6-7
Supporting uk defence and security exports 6-7
Partner-nation written products 6-9
Transition, disengagement or enduring support 6-9
Chapter 7 - Execute – nature of capacity building across the mosaic of conflict 7-1
Introduction 7-1
Counterterrorism and counter-criminality 7-2
Defence Engagement 7-3
Security force assistance background 7-5
Security force assistance characteristics 7-6
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Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5 | ix
Police capacity building 7-9

Special forces and militia 7-11
Capacity building activities 7-12
Transition 7-25
Phases of transition 7-29
Annex A to Chapter 7- Risk 7A-1

Annex B to Chapter 7 - Characteristics required in a good adviser 7B-1
Chapter 8 - Case studies 8-1

Case Study 1 - Exercise BOTSWANA BAYONET 8-1
Background 8-1
Preparation 8-1
Deployment 8-1
Students 8-2
Training 8-2
Course design and output 8-5
Support 8-5
Case Study 2 - Operation HERRICK 8-6

Taken from the operation HERRICK campaign study 8-6
Good practice – enabling indigenous security forces (EISF) 8-6
Background 8-6
Counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) training, overseas engagement
and capacity building 8-7
Vignette – Pipper electronic countermeasures (Ecm) for the Ansf 8-8
Special forces (SF) mentored indigenous force tiger teams 8-9
Case Study 3 - Capacity building in Nigeria 8-11

Background 8-11
UK short-term training team (STTT) 8-11
BMATT and UK in country actors 8-12
Mission locations 8-12
The mission 8-13
Training aim 8-13
STTT establishment 8-14
Conduct of training 8-14
The trainees 8-14
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Lessons 8-15
Conclusion 8-19
CASE STUDY 4 - Operation NEWCOMBE 8-20

Background 8-20
EUTM-MALI 8-21
Mission area 8-22
UK contribution 8-22
The mission 8-23
The Malian armed forces 8-25
Additional training 8-28
Conclusion 8-29
CASE STUDY 5 - Operation SHADER 8-30

Background 8-30
UK short-term training team (STTT) and aim 8-30
Lessons and observations 8-31
Conclusion 8-36
Contents
Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5 | PA-1
PART A
Context
Part A establishes the policy, doctrinal and conceptual context

in which capacity building operations take place. Chapter 1 Part A - Context
describes capacity building’s relationship to stability operations • The government approach
and its wider place and utility within the mosaic of conflict. • The UK military approach
It addresses the full spectrum approach and the role of • Capacity building
government in stability operations. It provides commanders principles and process
at all levels with a bridge to Joint Doctrine Publication 05 –
Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution (JDP 05). This
is required because deployments on stability operations will generally require a higher level of
understanding than the usual considerations of intent ‘two up’ as applied on more conventional
combat operations. Chapter 2 examines the UK military approach to capacity building in the land
environment and sets out Army international activity and structures. It links to this document’s
superior publication, AFM Tactics for Stability Operations, and explains the relevance of
integrated action to capacity building. Chapter 3 sets out the principles and process of capacity
building. The annex to Chapter 3 defines the terms used in capacity building by both the UK and
NATO in order to provide clarity for land forces operating in the multinational context.
Contents
AFM TFSO
Capacity Chapter 1
Building
PART 5
Contents
Introduction
Contents
Contents
Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5 | 1-1
Chapter 1
Introduction
1-01. This Army field manual gives an overview and the best practice for personnel deployed, or
about to deploy, on capacity building tasks overseas or in the UK from a land perspective.
It also provides the policy rationale for why capacity building takes place. From this, flow
the fundamentals of the capacity building approach.
1-02. Capacity building is a tactical function as well as an activity. As a tactical function,

it concerns those actions taken to improve military, and when necessary, civil,
security and infrastructure capability.1 It is a conceptual device that helps organise
activities into an intelligible group.2 Capacity building which encompasses a variety of
activities has first order effects on actors’ behaviours and (in the case of security forces)
on their fighting power. It, thus, has utility and applicability across the operations themes
of warfighting, security, peace support and Defence Engagement. Capacity building
is the full spectrum approach to increasing a partner nation’s ability to achieve
self-sufficiency,3 typically through improved governance, security, human capital,
development and reconstruction.4 It encompasses three broad stability activities, which
mainly take place in:
a. support to security sector reform (SSR);
b. support to initial restoration of essential services; and
c. support to interim governance tasks.
1-03. For structural reasons, this document concentrates upon the first, as it is most likely
to be the aspect of capacity building contributed to by land forces. Part 4 of this AFM,
Stabilisation and Reconstruction, deals with capacity building as part of the military’s
support to the initial restoration of essential services and interim governance tasks.
1-04. Capacity building should focus on establishing relationships, increasing access and
influence, developing and enhancing understanding, and building capability and
capacity for specified partner and host nations. It is not about conducting activity, but
the achievement of UK objectives, effects or impact.5 It therefore ought to be coherent,
coordinated and prioritised across Defence and government. Those involved in any
capacity building activity must have an understanding of the UK’s strategic plan for the
partner or host nation in which they are deployed, and their part in that plan.
1 ADP Land Operations, paragraph 8-28.

2 ADP Land Operations, paragraph 8-10.
3 For definitions of terms included in this definition of capacity building, see the definitions box overleaf.
4 Paraphrased from the ABCA Security Forces Capacity Building (SFCB) Handbook, Edition 2 (July 2011) and ADP
Land Operations.
5 Other government departments and civilian agencies use ‘impact’ over ‘effect’. Impact is the outcome of an intervention
compared to what it would have been in the absence of intervention.
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1-2 | Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5
1-05. Capacity building can be conducted outside of operations, both upstream and
downstream,6 and can also feature during conflict or crisis, as demonstrated by
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some capacity building activity can also be conducted
in the UK through the reciprocal deployment of the partner-nation elements requiring
training, or delivered through a third-party country. Programmes can be one-off (short
term) or sustained (long term). From a counterterrorism or counter-criminality perspective,
capacity building is normally upstream in nature, attempting to prevent, disrupt or
neutralise threats at source before they can be aimed at the UK or her interests overseas.
During conflict or crisis, capacity building will be a key element of a campaign plan to
build up the capacity of a partner nation to deal with immediate threats. Post-conflict or
crisis, capacity building helps to stabilise a state or region either through support to the
initial restoration of essential services, or through support to interim governance, and
with longer-term security capacity building. Capacity building is therefore a mixture of
defence, development and diplomacy.
1-06. From a Defence Engagement perspective, capacity building supports integrated and coherent
cross-government strategies in order to improve security and stability, prevent conflict and
other crises developing, and to achieve global influence by demonstrating a ‘shift from
confrontation to cooperation’.7 Central to Part A of this publication is the idea that capacity
building, as conducted by land forces, is only one way of supporting the aim of developing
a structurally stable state. Capacity building can occasionally take place in contexts other
than those of stabilisation such as warfighting. It can also take place outside the context of a
formally recognised state8 - these are covered in Part A, Chapter 2.
1-07. Capacity building can be applied specifically to the security sector. Security capacity
building is an integrated approach to the generation, employment, and
sustainment of local, partner-nation, or international security forces in support of
a legitimate authority.9 This covers security force assistance, and capacity building as an
element of Defence Engagement and counterterrorism/counter-criminality.
1-08. Security force assistance, alongside capacity building as an element of Defence

Engagement, is an activity in which land forces should take the lead, while wider capacity
building activity will normally either be in support of other civil stabilisation actors.
Occasionally, due to a lack of initial readiness or security concerns, the wider, non-military
lead practitioners may not be in a position to fulfil their leading role, obliging land forces
to temporarily fill it for them.
6 ‘Upstream’ refers to a period before an anticipated threat or crisis (often described as a ‘policy moment’) that compels the
international community, the UK Government and/or the affected country to act to attempt to prevent it. ‘Downstream’
describes activity carried out after the ‘policy moment’ or crisis. The perspective of an actor determines the ‘policy
moment’ : what may suddenly occasion overseas intervention for the UK may well have already been considered a crisis
for a number of years by those living, working and/or governing in the crisis area.
7 Derek S. Reveron, Exporting Security (2010), page 79.
8 For example HMG provides capacity building to Kurdish forces but does not recognise the Kurdish regional government as
an independent entity from the Iraqi government.
9 ABCA Security Force Capacity Building Handbook, Edition 2 (1 July 2011), Glossary-3. ‘Host nation’ has been replaced
with ‘partner nation’ for this Army Field Manual.
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The full spectrum approach has largely replaced the ‘integrated approach’ in the
UK lexicon, although some other government departments may still refer to it as the
‘integrated approach’. NATO uses the older term ‘comprehensive approach’. The full
spectrum approach is a whole-of-government approach to providing agile national crisis
response capabilities as well as routine Defence activity, coordinated through the National
Security Council in support of the goal of a secure and prosperous UK with global reach
and influence. See AFM Tactics for Stability Operations, paragraphs 2-20 to 2-22.
Self-sufficiency refers in this instance to the extent to which a state or partner nation
has the ability to ensure its own stability and the security of its population and political
processes within its own resources. Recognising that no polity can be truly and entirely
self-sufficient, self-sufficiency remains the theoretical end of a structurally stable state. It
informs the capacity building principle of ‘cooperation not dependency’. See Chapter 1 of
AFM Tactics for Stability Operations for more on the concept of stability.
Human capital can be defined as the skills, knowledge, health and experience possessed
by an individual or population, viewed in terms of their sum value or cost to an
organization or country.
Host nation refers to countries where the UK’s intervention may be uninvited, or where
there may be no effective constituted or internationally recognised government with
which to work.
Partner nation indicates a more formal relationship between the UK and a partner
government, where there are explicitly agreed mutual interests and a letter of exchange,
memorandum of understanding, treaty or other such shared agreement as basis for UK
support.
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AFM TFSO
Capacity Chapter 2
Building
PART 5
Photo Credit: Shutterstock.com

Contents
The UK government approach

to capacity building
Contents
Contents
Chapter 2
The UK government approach to
capacity building
Introduction The UK government
approach to capacity
2-01. This chapter outlines how the UK government uses
building
capacity building as a part of stability operations and as
a tool to support its strategic objectives. It identifies the • National Security Strategy
key strategies and policies and provides the foundation • Building Stability
for the use of land forces conducting capacity building. Overseas Strategy
• International Defence
2-02. A number of policies and strategies provide direction for
Engagement Strategy
capacity building.10 These include:
• CONTEST
a. The UK approach to stabilisation. • Serious and Organised
Crime Strategy
b. The National Security Strategy (NSS).
• Linkage to stability
c. The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). operations
• Linkage to counter-
d. The tri-departmental Building Stability Overseas
insurgency
Strategy (BSOS).
• Wider benefits of
e. The MOD’s International Defence Engagement capacity building
Strategy (IDES).
f. The UK’s counterterrorism strategy (CONTEST).
g. The Serious and Organised Crime Strategy.
2-03. The UK approach to stabilisation. The UK government’s approach to stabilisation

outlines three mutually reinforcing components. They are referred to as the ‘3Ps
framework’: protect, promote and prepare. While it is likely that the principal role for the
UK military will be in the ‘protect’ component through the provision of security, capacity
building can play a part in all three elements of the framework, depending on the nature
and stability of the partner or host nation. Although the figure below shows an equal
emphasis of the three components, each scenario will demand differing levels of effort,
and a shift in focus as stabilisation develops.
a. P1 – Protect political actors, the political system and the population. Power is
established and protected through force and the threat of force, thereby generating
security (a key enabling factor for stabilisation). Through building the capability and
capacity of the partner or host nation’s forces (army, police, paramilitary or border forces)11
this component can be enhanced in order to manage existing violence or to deter further
outbreaks. UK land forces may be capacity building during operations (in conflict and also
in direct combat) or conducting upstream or downstream capacity building.
10 Doctrinal hierarchy for capacity building is included in the preface.

11 Border forces can include a coastguard element.
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b. P2 – Promote, consolidate and strengthen political processes. A political arena

may be militarised, and fragmented/factionalised. Stabilisation can support interim
political arrangements, and the partner or host nation will require security forces
capable of stabilising contested or fragile areas. Capacity building can aid those
partner or host-nation units in providing this capability.
c. P3 – Preparing for longer-term recovery. All stages of capacity building (upstream,

in conflict, downstream) should be aimed at aiding a partner or host nation’s long-term
recovery. Understanding of conflict dynamics and their impact on the population, as
well as a focus towards transition from the outset will aid in achieving this component.
2-04. The combined National Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence and Security
Review (SDSR) serves as a strategic framework document. A new National Security
Strategy is scheduled for every five years and is predicated upon the Strategic Trends
Programme12 and the Defence Joint Operating Concept, founded on an analysis of the
strategic global context. The NSS sets out the UK’s strategic posture, vision, values and
approaches, and its national security objectives. Capacity building aids in achieving the
following national security objectives:
a. Protect our people.
b. Project our global influence.
c. Promote our prosperity.13
2-05. The 2015 SDSR describes our UK response to crisis, conflict and instability as one which
will use all the tools of national power available (diplomacy, defence, development,
intelligence, etc.), coordinated through the National Security Council (NSC). It describes
this variously as an ‘integrated’, ‘whole-of-government’, and ‘full spectrum’ approach.
This is complemented by our intent to ‘invest more in our alliances, build new stronger
partnerships, and persuade potential adversaries of the benefits of cooperation, to
multiply what we can achieve alone’. In this publication we will use the term full
spectrum approach to describe this concept.
2-06. Sitting beneath the NSS and SDSR, the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS)
is an integrated cross-government strategy to address instability and conflict overseas.
It focuses on strengthening cross-government cooperation and improving performance
through three mutually supporting pillars:
a. Early warning through the anticipation of instability and potential triggers of conflict.
b. Rapid crisis prevention and response through appropriate and effective action to
prevent a crisis or stop it spreading or escalating.
c. Investment in upstream prevention to help build robust, legitimate states capable

of managing tensions and shocks and lower the likelihood of instability and conflict.
12 DCDC Global Strategic Trends (GST) – Out to 2045, fifth edition seeks to set the strategic context for wider defence and
security planning.
13 More detail on Protect, Project, Promote is in Chapter 2 of AFM Tactics for Stability Operations.
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National Security Strategy (NSS)

Protect our people | Protect our global influence | Promote our prosperity
Strategic Defence & Security Review (SDSR)

Defend and contribute to the security and resilience of the UK and Overseas Territories | Provide the nuclear deterrent | Contribute to improved understanding
of the world through strategic intelligence and the global defence network | Reinforce international security and the collective capacity of our allies, partners
and multilateral institutions | Support humanitarian assistance and ??????? response, and conduct rescue missions | Conduct strike operators
Conduct operators to restore peace and stability | Conduct major combat operators if required, including under NATO Article 5
International Defence Engagement Strategy

Develop Understanding | Prevent Conflict | Capability and Capacity Building
Promote Prosperity | Access and Influence
Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS)

Early Warning | Rapid crisis prevention and response | Investing in upstream prevention
Counterterrorism strategy (CONTEST)

Pursue | Prevent | Protect | Prepare
Serious and Organised Crime Stragegy

Pursue | Prevent | Protect | Prepare
Figure 2-1. National strategy documents - core guidance for capacity building
2-07. The 2010 SDSR committed the government to produce the Building Stability Overseas
Strategy, which is one of several strategies stemming from the 2010 NSS. It is aligned
with related strategies, notably the counterterrorism strategy (CONTEST), the Organised
Crime Strategy, the Cyber Crime Strategy, and the International Defence Engagement
Strategy (IDES). It takes into account the government’s strategies in areas such as
proliferation and arms control, energy security, and climate change and resource
competition, which it complements. The 2015 NSS and SDSR also promoted the role of
Defence in building stability overseas.
UK forces conducting counter-sniper training with partner-nation elements as part of Op SHADER in Iraq
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2-08. International Defence Engagement Strategy (IDES). Defence Engagement is the

means by which the UK uses its Defence assets and activities, short of operations, to
achieve influence.14 The IDES sets out how Defence Engagement contributes to the
UK’s vision of security and prosperity with strengthened influence to further its interests
globally. The IDES has redefined Defence Engagement as ‘the use of our people and
assets to prevent conflict, build stability and gain influence’. Capability and capacity
building is one of the IDES objectives aimed at achieving national security objectives.
This is shown in Figure 2-3. Army International Activity (AIA) is the land contribution to
Defence Engagement, and this is articulated through the Army Defence Engagement Sub-
Strategy. This provides authority and direction for policy and delivery of AIA. It is reviewed
biennially. AIA is examined further in Chapter 2, paragraphs 2-18 to 2-24.
National security vision

A secure and prosperous UK
National security objectives

Project our
Protect our Promote
global
people prosperity
influence
Develop Prevent Capability and Promote Access and

understanding conflict capacity prosperity influence
building
International Defence Engagement objectives
Defence Engagement Defence Engagement Defence Engagement MOD works closely Alongside diplomatic
ensures that the UK steers efforts to builds partners’ with diplomatic and efforts. Defence
understands other promote UK interests capability and capacity economic partners Engagement seeks to
nations’ defence and enhance national in support of good in government to build and maintain
perspectives and security by preventing governance and ensure the success of the relationships
equally that they and ending instability stability, and also to the UK as a trading which allow the UK to
understand UK intent and conflict overseas, enable interoperability nation. Defence-related influence partners and
and capability. by using diplomatic, with partners. industry support to international
Understanding of this military and security exports generates trade organisations in
nature is vital when tools including and enables partners. support of UK values
crises arise. deterrence. and interests.
Figure 2-2. Defence Engagement objectives’ relationship with the national security objectives
14 Land forces’ element (excluding Royal Marines and the RAF Regiment) of Defence Engagement comprises Army
International Activity. This includes: interoperability; security cooperation; capacity building; high-level international
engagement (HLIE) and senior working-level international engagement (SLIE); Army staff talks (AST); support to Defence
staff talks; deployment of liaison officers (LO) and exchange officers (EO); loan service; training and education (including
overseas training exercises (OTX) and international defence training (IDT)); Defence sections, and regimental affiliations
and alliances; support to Department for International Trade (Defence Security Organisation) (DIT DSO).
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2-09. Counterterrorism strategy (CONTEST). CONTEST reflects changing terrorist threats and
incorporates revised policies. Its aim is to ‘reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas
from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence’.15 As part
of the ‘Pursue’16 workstream, the UK aims to work overseas, collaborating with other nations
and multilateral organisations, developing the capability and capacity of overseas partners,
in order to deal with threats at source. This can be challenging, particularly from a legal
perspective, and requires close coordination across government departments. The MOD can
contribute capacity building as one element of this strategy, and the Joint Counter-Terrorist
Training and Advisory Team (JCTTAT) is the MOD’s principal organisation for conducting CT-
specific capacity building. Priority will be in areas where the threat from terrorism is high, but
where the state lacks the institutional capacity to tackle the threat. The MOD contributes to
CONTEST using its military capability to disrupt terrorist groups overseas, as well as through
intelligence collection, counterterrorism capacity building for partner nations, and support
to overseas law enforcement and security agencies. Its support to conflict prevention work
also contributes to CONTEST objectives. In the event of a terrorist attack that exceeds the
capability or immediate capacity of the UK civilian response, the MOD can provide support to
‘prepare’ through military aid to the civil authorities.17
2-10. Serious and Organised Crime Strategy. The Serious and Organised Crime Strategy
addresses organised crime as a threat to national security and is aimed at reducing the
level of serious and organised crime, through the four pillars of activity shared with
CONTEST. Defence supports the Serious and Organised Crime Strategy through capacity
building in priority countries.
The role of security capacity building during military operations

2-11. Stability operations. Stabilisation is used in situations of violent conflict and is designed
to protect and promote the legitimate political authority, using a combination of integrated
civilian and military actions to reduce violence, re-establish security and prepare for longer-
term recovery by building and enabling environment for structural stability.18 To bring about
structural stability, stabilisation needs to be applied with other approaches, including longer-
term state building and peace building as described by DFID.19 The stabilisation approach is
intended to provide sufficient stability to initiate an inclusive political settlement and begin to
address the primary drivers of violent conflict. Stabilisation is the first step towards progress
in state building and peace building in very insecure environments.20 Capacity building in its
many forms can contribute to reducing instability, while promoting long-term stability in a
partner or host nation. Capacity building also directly contributes to all four of the stability
activities that are the bespoke tactical methods set out in ADP Land Operations for delivering
the stabilisation aspect of any land operation – security and control, support to security
sector reform (SSR), support to initial restoration of essential services and support to interim
governance tasks.21 See Chapter 3, Figure 3-7.
15 CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism (July 2011), page 9.
16 CONTEST contains four workstreams: Pursue (to stop terrorist attacks); Prevent (to stop people becoming terrorists or
supporting terrorism); Protect (to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack); Prepare (to mitigate the impact of a
terrorist attack). CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism (July 2011), page 10.
17 CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism (July 2011), pages 122 to123.
18 Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 05, Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution (July 2015), page17.
19 Building Peaceful States and Societies: a DFID practice paper, 2010, page 14.
20 Ibid, page 36, paragraph 86.
21 ADP Land Operations, pages 8-62 to 8-66.
Contents
2-12. Counter-insurgency (COIN). NATO defines counter-insurgency as ‘a comprehensive

civilian and military effort made to defeat an insurgency and address any core grievances’.22
The UK defines counter-insurgency as ‘those political, military, law enforcement,
economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency, while addressing
the root causes’.23 There is likely to be an element of capacity building involved in any
COIN operation. This will fall principally under the ‘develop’ element of the UK COIN
operational framework and NATO shape, secure, develop (SSD) framework, and in
the ‘build’ phase at the tactical level. This is highlighted in the purple area in Figure
2-4. Capacity building can also be a key part of the ‘shape’ element of the UK COIN
operational framework and NATO SSD framework, and also in the ‘shape’ phase at the
tactical level. This is highlighted in the pink area in Figure 2-4. It also shows that ‘shaping’
can be taking place throughout the whole process, hence capacity building’s role across
the spectrum of counter-insurgency operations. As intervening forces will almost certainly
not have sufficient manpower or adequately detailed cultural awareness to counter
an insurgency themselves, the ability to build the capacity of local security forces is
essential to countering an insurgency. Capacity building may also serve as one element
of an indirect approach to countering an insurgency within a partner or host nation, or
regionally. This allows the UK to conduct a form of ‘proxy warfare’.24
UK COIN operational framework Phases of stability
NATO SSD framework
Key leader engagement with

Shape Shape local officals and elders,
Capacity information activities
building
Capacity Separate the insurgents

building Clear
from the population
Secure
as a Maintain security for

shaping Hold governance and
activity development operations
Support development
(economic, infrastructure,
Develop Build social) stability and partner
Capacity or host-nation
Building government legitimacy
Finally, transition to independent partner or host-nation governance and development

Figure 2-3. UK COIN operational framework and phases of stability
22 Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.4 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-insurgency (COIN).
23 AFM1-10 Countering Insurgency. This definition has been reordered prior to the publication of a new UK counter-irregular
activity doctrine in 2018.
24 Proxy warfare is defined as ‘warfare carried out by state or non-state paramilitary groups in support of a sponsor state’s
interests’. Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 4/12, Intervention: Relationships With Paramilitary Groups (June 2012), Lexicon, Part
2.
Contents
2-13. Combat operations. Capacity building may be a feature of combat operations by

building up allies who will fight alongside UK forces, or those who could fight on our
behalf. Combat operations will usually be conducted concurrent with stability operations
within the mosaic of conflict. Capacity building can also be a line of effort or operation
in an ongoing campaign plan (either during or post-conflict), as recently witnessed in Iraq
and Afghanistan.25 As DCDC’s Future Character of Conflict predicts, ‘capacity building will
be a major element in overcoming the problems of achieving sufficient mass’.26
The Capture of MOSUL from ISIS – validating a ‘by, with, and

through’ approach.
The battle for Mosul was a huge military operation to recapture Iraq’s second largest city from
so-called Islamic State (IS). Mosul had fallen to IS in June 2014, with IS leader Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi proclaiming the creation of a ‘caliphate’ shortly after. Combat operations began on
17 October 2016 with the aim of retaking eastern Mosul.
Break-in operations initially progressed swiftly, and the Iraqi Counter Terrorist Service (CTS)
and Iraqi Army advancing from the north, south and east, seized outlying towns and villages
in the face of coordinated ISIS defensive operations. Progress slowed as troops encountered
fierce resistance from IS, including snipers, suicide bombers and shellfire. The campaign
in eastern Mosul was characterised and further complicated by an emerging threat from
modified, commercial sourced drones that ISIS used to drop modified conventional munitions
on partner forces; this had a disproportionate psychological effect on the Iraqi forces.
By January 2017 eastern Mosul was back under Iraqi government control, but the more complex
urban terrain in the west of the city, particularly in the densely developed and populated Old City
presented a more difficult challenge. The densely packed housing and narrow alleyways enabled a
relatively small number of militants to target advancing troops with snipers and suicide IEDs.
Despite coalition efforts to minimise the collateral impact of operations and the judicious use of
precision munitions the fighting caused extensive damage to Mosul’s infrastructure, buildings and
archaeological sites, most significantly to the bridges across the Tigris River, schools and hospitals
(both of which were used by ISIS for defensive ops in a deliberate ploy to complicate coalition
targeting decisions) and to Mosul airport. As Iraqi forces completed their final assaults in the Old
City towards the Tigris river, in June 2017, the ancient Great Mosque of al-Nuri, was destroyed
by ISIS.
An expeditionary approach was adopted by US operational mentors planning and operating

alongside Iraqi counterparts. The approach demanded the maintenance of a shared common
operating picture to enable dynamic targeting and visualisation of the battlespace. The US
confirmed the need for the ‘right’ people to mentor partners – tactically capable individuals, who
are culturally attuned and have high emotional intelligence. A holistic view of partner abilities and
capabilities was needed.
25 A line of operation/effort is a line linking decisive conditions or points in time and space on the path to the centre of
gravity. Lines may be functional, thematic or environmental. For further detail see AFM Command, Chapter 6, Section 2
and Army Joint Publication (AJP) 5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning, paragraph 0238.
26 Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) Future Character of Conflict, page 36.
Contents
Niche coalition capabilities were central to the operational approach and critical
in outmatching the opponent. Full motion video ISTAR assets were essential but
demonstrated limitations in dismounted close combat due to the complexity of the urban
makeup of Mosul. The forward deployment of joint tactical air controllers to synchronise
coalition fires was particularly significant. Modern GMLRs, mortars, and cannon artillery
were highly effective. Understanding of electronic warfare capabilities, by necessity,
became a core competency at the tactical level. Heavy engineer platforms proved vital.
Wider benefits of capacity building

2-14. Persistent capacity building in a country or region may also generate wider benefits for
UK Defence. Among these is the possibility of advancing the UK’s Prosperity Agenda as
directed in the NSS and SDSR, by supporting the Department for International Trade’s
Defence and Security Organisation to assist and facilitate the UK defence industry
where militarily possible and commercially appropriate.27 Capacity building forces must
conform to both MOD export policy and the code of behaviour for UK land forces when
supporting UK Defence and Security Exports. This guidance is laid out in AFM Tactics for
Stability Operations, Annex A to Chapter 6.
2-15. Aside from benefiting the UK’s Prosperity Agenda, successful, persistent capacity building
can have other advantages:
a. Through improving the ability for UK Armed Forces to interoperate with allies and
partner or host nations (at tactical and operational levels, within the context of
operations).
b. By creating opportunities for UK training to be conducted within the geographical

boundaries of the partner nation (including mission-specific pre-deployment training).
c. By providing a mechanism by which the UK military can learn from other actors, allies
and partner nations, including the development of awareness and understanding,
personal skills, confidence and credibility – in short, ‘experiential learning’.
d. Maintaining and cultivating an expeditionary mindset among UK land forces, many of

whom ordinarily will be based in the UK. It also acts as a potential retention tool.
e. By broadening cultural understanding, and fostering mutually beneficial links between

the UK and partner or host nations.
27 UKTI is part of the Department for International Trade (DIT). See AFM Tactics for Stability Operations, Chapter 6, Appendix
1 to Annex A.
Contents

Contents
AFM TFSO
Capacity Chapter 3
Building
PART 5
Contents
Capacity building within

a military framework
Contents
Contents
Chapter 3
Capacity building within a military
framework
Introduction
Capacity building within a
3-01. This chapter describes the high-level joint force and land military framework
component doctrine for the delivery of security sector
• Army International
and indigenous force capability development in support
Activity (AIA)
of the wider governmental approach. Integrated action
• Defence Engagement
is the land contribution to joint action which may draw
• Human security themes
on all Defence’s capabilities. The tactical functions,
which include capacity building and are blended to build
integrated action, are described within this context. The
role of persistent Defence Engagement and its contribution to building capacity
and supporting the military contribution to stability are integral to this approach and
are explained.
Tactical functions
3-02. Tactical functions are the primary levers of influence, representing the full breadth of
the force’s activities that are integrated when orchestrating and executing operations.
Capacity building is a tactical function principally directed towards actors. Integrated
action blends lethal and non-lethal actions (the use and orchestration of capabilities and
activities) to have effects (the immediate, first order consequence of actions as they are
perceived and experienced by the target actors) on the understanding, physical capability,
will and cohesion of the audience.28 Organised into attainable objectives, these effects
are ultimately realised in people’s minds, influencing their decision making, to achieve
the desired outcomes (the second order consequences of our actions, defined in terms
of human behaviour). From a capacity building perspective, integrated action is shown at
Figure 3-1.
28 Understanding is defined as ‘the perception and interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context,
insight and foresight required for effective decision-making’ JDP 04 Understanding and Decision-making, second edition).
In a capacity building context this is developing mutual understanding of each other (relationships), the task (attainment of
objectives) and the environment. Physical capability - in a capacity building example, this is improving the effectiveness of
a partner nation’s forces through developing its physical capability. Will and cohesion - in a capacity building example, this
can be achieved through consistent training deliveries.
Contents
Output Output Effects

Input
The amount of The way a thing turns The consequences
What is put in
something produced out - a consequence of actions
Unit X
empowered
Unit X
morale
improved Unit X
operations in
Area Y
disrupting
Unit X enemy
Partner-nation Partner-nation
successfully
training module training
operating in
conducted completed
Area Y
Enemy in
Area Y
Audiences will and cohesion
Non-lethal Objectives in Area Y undermined
actions complete witness
enemy disruption
Enemy in
Area Y isolated and
discredited (in
the eyes of
Desired
audiences)
outcomes
Effects
achieved
Figure 3-1. Integrated action from a capacity building perspective
3-03. Capacity building will have desired outcomes directed towards those partner or host-
nation elements. In this example it also has indirect outcomes focused towards an enemy
who are subsequently affected by the partner or host-nation trainees. The effects can
impact on enemies (disrupted, will and cohesion undermined), actors (partner or
host-nation trainees’ morale increased, empowered), and audiences (civilian population in
the area witness partner or host-nation success, enemy forces isolated and discredited).
There may of course, also be a series of potential unintended effects which must be
planned for.
ADP Land Operations – The place of capacity building

ADP Land Operations builds on the foundations laid by UK Defence doctrine to provide
the philosophy and principles for the British Army’s approach to operations. As capstone
doctrine it provides an overview and a framework for understanding, which reinforced by
this publication, establishes the doctrine for land forces delivering stability activity.
Operations may be assigned or described in terms of particular contextual themes. These

operations themes allow the general conditions of the operating environment to be
understood and provide a framework for understanding, in general terms, the context
and dynamics of a conflict. As a conflict evolves, the thematic designation may change.
Contents
Operations themes Tactical functions

Represent the full breadth
Allows the general conditions of the operating of a land force’s activities
environment to be understood when conducting
operations
Types of operation
Warfighting Alds analysis and articulation of complex missions and
provides essential gearing required to sequence
a series of tactical activities
Security Stability operation (NATO - crisis response)
Peace Capacity building Capacity building

support
Tactical activities
Defence A range of activites
Engagement conducted by land forces
(NATO -
Stability activities
peacetime • Security and control
military
• Support to security
engagement) sector reform
• Support to initial
restoration of
essential services
• Support to interim
governance tasks
Figure 3-2. Operations themes, types of operation and tactical activities
Within the operations themes, certain types of operation exist. They are not mutually
exclusive and are often concurrent with other types of operation within the mosaic of
conflict. As doctrinal definitions, they do they necessarily correspond to UK Defence
planning tools or assumptions, but aim to aid analysis of complex missions and provide
the gearing required to sequence tactical activities to achieve operational objectives.
Unlike NATO doctrine, ADP Land Operations includes capacity building as a discrete type
of operation.
Within all types of operation, land forces conduct all or some of a range of tactical
activities, often concurrently. The balance between the different activities varies from one
operation to another over time. The three stability activities related to capacity building
are described in Part B.
Capacity building is seen as one of the eight tactical functions, alongside command,
intelligence, manoeuvre, fires, information activities, protection and sustainment. Tactical
functions are a device that helps commanders to organise activities into intelligible
groups; they have no effects themselves, whereas the activities do. Few, if any, stand
alone. For example, capacity building needs to be commanded and sustained and is likely
to have information activities and protection dimensions. Like all other physical activity,
capacity building enhances and is enhanced by information activities.
Contents
3-04. Army International Activity (AIA). AIA supports the achievement of Defence effects
and objectives. It sees the Army persistently and actively engaged overseas, and is
international by design. Through AIA the Army enhances its ability to understand,
shape and respond to emerging opportunities, threats and trends. Regional alignment
to specified countries and regions drives much of this interaction. This allows the Army
to develop understanding, establish relationships, increase access and gain influence to
better coordinate Army activity and deliver Defence Engagement effect. AIA is focused
on interoperability, security cooperation and capacity building. None of these exclusively
supports or replaces any one Defence Engagement activity although there are varying
degrees of overlap between elements. They are the Army’s ways to achieve the ends of
the International Defence Engagement Strategy.29
3-05. Interoperability. Interoperability is the ability to act together coherently, effectively and
efficiently to achieve Allied tactical, operational and strategic objectives.30
3-06. Security cooperation.31 This promotes close bilateral Army-to-Army relationships with
specified partner nations: fostering exchanges; developing insight and understanding; and
growing capability.
Future Land Operating Concept (2012)

“There is a need to refocus land forces around strategic, integrated and long-term
capacity-building, including: role specialisation focussed on the development of a foreign
service career stream; conducting training in countries and regions that may benefit from
our influence; and examining how our force structure might be adapted to integrate
indigenous capacity in partnership.”
The Future Land Operating Concept strongly articulates the value and future need
for military capacity building. UK engagement with partner forces should reflect the
increasing importance of improving host-nations’ military capabilities so that they
can provide effective security on their own terms, either domestically or as part of an
international intervention elsewhere.
Indigenous capacity building and upstream security assistance is likely to play a key role
in generating the necessary indigenous capability, mass, insight and understanding that
the UK will need in these environments in the future. The concept demands ‘strategic
sensitivity’; requires complex relationships to be fostered and developed; and continuous
service and engagement abroad.
Local security forces, correctly trained and equipped, serve as a powerful force-multiplier
in preserving regional stability. They can also change the geometry of a campaign and
ultimately provide the means to return power to the local people.
29 See ADP Land Operations, Chapter 7.

30 Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06 – NATO Glossary of Terms.
31 Note that Defence Engagement broadly equates to security cooperation in US doctrine whereas security cooperation is a
subset of Defence Engagement in UK doctrine.
Contents
3-07. Capacity building. From an AIA perspective, capacity building concerns efforts to
optimise indigenous security forces, build institutional capacity and provide support to
institutional reform and/or gain greater local, national or regional influence. It leads to
better regional understanding and is often conducted with countries on the fringe of
areas of potential conflict. Closer cooperation leads to better ‘day one’ understanding
should conflict arise, and provides land forces with better situational awareness, a
network in place, and linguistic and cultural expertise.32 From an AIA perspective capacity
building does not include restoration of essential services, support to interim governance
tasks or security force assistance (SFA) as these elements of capacity building are pertinent
in the wake of crisis/conflict.
3-08. Persistent engagement. Persistent engagement overseas provides a different33 and

indirect approach to crisis/conflict resolution. It requires working in collaboration with
government, joint and coalition partners to build an enduring and consistent relationship
with the PN Armed Forces, so that through trust and cooperation, the UK can assist a PN
prevent and resolve instability. While early and effective engagement is key to successful
prevention, political and economic realities will mean that predicting and providing the
necessary effort upstream may prove impossible, therefore engagement will be required
throughout the continuum of conflict. Persistent engagement is often delivered through
capacity building.
Joint and integrated action

Joint action. Capacity building by the land component often takes place within the
context of joint action. Joint action is defined as ‘the deliberate use and orchestration of
military capabilities and activities to affect an actor’s will, understanding and capability,
and the cohesion between them to achieve influence’ and is the principal approach to
planning and executing the military elements of a joint campaign, of which, capacity
building is likely to be a major part. While capacity building is an element of outreach, it
can also be integrated and synchronised to achieve effects within the other three tenets
of joint action, shown in Figure 3-3. Joint action recognises the centrality of influence as
an objective; the integration of activities to realise it; and the need to influence not only
an adversary, but a range of actors, including our own population, forces, allies, civilian
partners and regional audiences.
32 AFM Tactics for Stability Operations, paragraph 6A-16.

33 ‘Engagement is about managing relationships, not command and control; it is about cooperation, not fighting; it is about
partnership, not dominance. Success often relies on fully comprehending the influence of warrior-diplomats and these
leaders’ penchant for intercultural communication.’ Exporting Security, Derek S Revron, Georgetown University Press 2010.
Contents
Joint action model

Military contribution to influence
Manoeuvre
Provides an enabling capability as well as an effect in its own right
Fires Outreach Information activities
Primary impact on capability Primary impact on

including that which enables Primary impact on
capability and understanding
him to understand understanding
his situation
Direct impact on will

Manoeuvre and outreach realise effects in
their own right. Deployment of a force can deter an
opponent. Regional engagement can reassure
other actors
Direct impact on will Direct impact on will

Concentrated fires shatter an opponent’s Information activities may encourage
morale. Outreach activity can friendly or neutral actors and/or
develop friendly capabilities and have a deterrent effect to prevent
hence morale a would-be opponent acting at all
Capability Will Understanding

Build/protect own Protect own Develop/protect
affect others Affect others own enhance others
erode adversary Erode adversary affect adversary
Indirect impact on will

Loss of capability may affect understanding. At the same time a lack of
accurate situational understanding impacts upon an actor’s effective use of
capability. Together, these may affect, indirectly, his will to act
Figure 3-3. Joint action model
Integrated action. Integrated action is the land tactical adaptation of joint action
and involves the application of the full range of lethal and non-lethal capabilities to
change and maintain the understanding and behaviour of audiences to achieve a
successful outcome. These capabilities may belong to the land force, or to joint, inter-
governmental, inter-agency, non-governmental, private sector or multinational actors. It is
the manifestation of joint action in the land environment and requires sophisticated and
continual understanding , has audiences as its major consideration, integrates lethal and
non-lethal capabilities to create effects and is outcome-focused. Capacity building is one
of the non-lethal methodologies utilised to achieve an outcome. The process of capacity
building can aid in the development and deepening of situational awareness, context,
insight and foresight.
Contents
3-09. Defence Engagement in relation to crisis. Defence Engagement will be conducted

during the build-up to a crisis, as a minimum by providing early warning via Defence’s
global network. At that stage it may be possible to help avert the crisis (and instability)
through upstream engagement. During a crisis, Defence Engagement can be used to aid
access to a theatre and gain basing/overflight rights. Defence Engagement activities may
also be possible in crisis. After a crisis, Defence Engagement can contribute to stability
operations through capacity building activity as demonstrated in Sierra Leone following
Operation PALLISER and during Operation TORAL in Afghanistan.
Threat Crisis Crisis

emerging resolution
Upstream Downstream
Weight of effort
Combat operations
Defence Engagement activities to reassure, persuade, empower, deter
Understand
Figure 3-4. Defence Engagement activities in relation to crisis
3-10. Figure 3-1 illustrates this for a hypothetical situation; it is not intended to be viewed
as linear or present a misleading clarity between crisis and non-crisis. We must accept
that it is possible that our intervention may destabilise a state if conflict sensitivity
is not applied.34 At all times, the overall military response should involve Defence
Engagement activities, not least because those activities make a major contribution to our
understanding of the operating environment or theatre in question.35
34 Conflict sensitivity means acting with the understanding that any initiative conducted in a conflict-affected environment
will interact with that conflict and that such interaction will have consequences that may have positive and negative
results. See AFM Tactics for Stability Operations, Chapter 2 for more detail.
35 JDN 1/15 Defence Engagement, paragraph 1.7.
Contents
Joint and integrated action focuses on actors and adversaries/enemies. Capacity building initially affects the actor but
with a view to impacting adversaries and enemies. Kurdish Peshmerga forces receiving basic C-IED training in Iraq.
Defence Engagement
3-11. International Defence Engagement is ‘the means by which we use our defence assets
and activities short of combat operations to achieve influence’.36 Defence Engagement
is one of the major outputs of Defence, requiring coordination across the Services, Joint
Forces Command (JFC) and cross-government. Defence Engagement aims to achieve
three national security objectives: protect our people; promote prosperity; and protect
our global influence. This can be achieved through international Defence Engagement
objectives: develop understanding; prevent conflict; capability and capacity building;37
promote prosperity; and access and influence.
36 JDN 1/15 Defence Engagement.

37 Capability is focused on forces or resources giving a country the ability to undertake a particular kind of military action.
Capacity is the amount that something can produce (Oxford English Dictionary).
Contents
3-12. While capacity building is an element of one of the Defence Engagement objectives, it
can also contribute to achieving the other four. The Army Defence Engagement Policy
Directive provides high-level policy and direction on three areas: capacity building is one
area, but this also has applicability to the other two areas – interoperability and security
cooperation. Capacity building may lead to greater levels of interoperability and security
cooperation between the UK and the partner nation in which capacity building is taking
place. While a large element of Defence Engagement is conducted at the operational
and strategic levels, tactical-level activity has the capacity to deliver strategic objectives or
effects/impact for the UK; land forces therefore have a key role to play.
Contents
AFM TFSO
Capacity Chapter 4
Building
PART 5
Photo Credit: Shutterstock.com

Contents
Capacity building approach

and principles
Contents
Contents
Chapter 4
and principles
The fundamental military capacity building lesson is that we must embed and
partner UK forces with indigenous troops if we are attempting to develop their
capability whilst in contact with the enemy. Embedding also gives us greater
leverage to shape their conduct of operations and provides greater situational
awareness. Op TELIC Mission Exploitation
Operations in Iraq January 2005 – May 2009 (Op TELIC 5 – 13) An Analysis from the Land Perspective
Introduction
4-01. Chapter 4 serves to provide a baseline of understanding Capacity building
approach and principles
in the delivery of capacity building operations; specific
guidance on executing the breadth of capacity building • Capability building
tasks may be found in Chapter 7. This chapter looks approach
at the approach to capacity building that should be • Capability building
taken, and provides a framework and principles to guide principles
capacity building activity. The annex to this chapter
defines the terms used in capacity building by the UK
and her allies.

4-02. At the tactical level capacity building is delivered through the persistent engagement of
permanently deployed UK teams, including the BPSTs and BMATTs, the regionally aligned
brigades (RABs) and specific to task short-term training teams (STTT). The RABs are the
focal point for Army engagement within their areas of responsibility and are the focus for
the delivery of the capacity building design within these areas. The Specialised Infantry
Group provides an emerging capability to provide persistent, deeper training support in
remote and higher threat areas complementing the RAB approach.
4-03. The Joint Counter Terrorist Training and Advisory Team (JCTTAT) provide a niche
counterterrorism capacity building function. Liaison training teams (LTT) develop the
liaison and training design which facilitates the deployment of mission support teams
(MST); these bespoke training cadres may be drawn from across Defence or from a
relevant public or private sector and are, thereby, well placed to provide the specific effect
required within integrated action. However, irrespective of how the military capacity
building contribution is force generated or structured, the key throughout is to ensure
an efficient and intelligent application of UK capabilities, aligned to cross-government
direction, with robust prioritisation and coordination.
Contents
4-04. The UK aims to conduct its capacity building efforts using the following approaches:
a. Joint, multi-agency, whole-government approach, coordinated with the

international community. Successful strategy requires an inter-agency approach
to integrate the application of the military, economic and diplomatic instruments of
power, at all levels of command and throughout the campaign. Ultimately, states resort
to the use of force when diplomatic and economic power cannot achieve the outcome
required. When military power is used, it is in conjunction with the other two. It is,
therefore, important to understand which agencies function at the operational level,
how they will affect the tactical level, and the impact they will have on the conduct of
operations. The CJIIM38 environment includes supranational organisations, for example
the UN; government departments other than the MOD; national intelligence agencies;
partner nation or other indigenous partners; non-governmental organisations;
humanitarian groups; private security companies; other contractors; and commercial
organisations. Usually, a single department will be nominated to lead the effort, based
on the nature of the crisis or intervention. As a minimum, capacity building by Defence
will involve close coordination with the FCO and DFID, and possibly other departments
of state, as the need arises. AFM Command describes how land forces should operate
within multinational command structures and the CJIIM environment more broadly.
b. Deliver specialist activity. While generalist military skills and competence are often
required in order to establish credibility with partner and host nations and to make
training work, many other countries, be they the partner or host nation or countries
competing with the UK for influence, can deliver that generalist training. Specialist
training, by contrast, is often what is required to improve capability and capacity in the
partner or host nation.
c. Bespoke to the context. Short-term training teams (STTT) with specialist manpower
can be deployed for limited duration capacity building tasks to meet a specific
requirement. Larger-scale force packages can be generated in order to provide the
partner nation with a broader capability, such as the development of the Afghan
National Army in Afghanistan during Operation HERRICK.
d. ‘By, with and through’. The UK seeks to work jointly with partner or host nations
towards the same end – that of building host or partner-nation capacity to stabilise
their own polity.39 The UK approach is not to take on another partner or host nation’s
core responsibility of securing its people and state on its behalf. Rather, the aim is to
help the partner build greater security and stability themselves. In certain instances,
assistance in the form of the provision of funding or information may be undertaken
by the UK or CJIIM actors other than land forces in order to build host or partner-
nation capacity. This is most clearly illustrated by coalition operations in Iraq since
2014 (Op INHERENT RESOLVE/Op SHADER) where tactical, dismounted close combat
operations have been conducted by the host nation’s force; with coalition niche
capabilities, including intelligence, air and fire support, and political, operational and
tactical advisers; thereby, effecting the defeat of ISIS (the UK objective) and wider
influence through the partner. This is an approach TE Lawrence would recognise and
his famous quote remains a mantra for capacity building:
38 Combined, joint, intra-governmental, inter-agency, multinational.

39 A polity is any kind of political entity that is organised. It is a group of people who are collectively united by a self-reflected
cohesive force such as identity and who have a capacity to mobilise resources.
Contents
Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably
well than you do it perfectly. It is their way and you are there to help them, not win
it for them.
TE Lawrence
e. Intervention. In extremis, UK forces may conduct activity or operations on behalf

of, or in lieu of, a host or partner-government – such as in occupations or complete
absence of state capability.
Capacity building principles

4-05. The process of capacity building helps contribute to stabilisation in a partner
nation or a region. Therefore, when conducting capacity building operations the
overarching principles for stability operations remain relevant and should be considered
when building and executing the engagement plan. The principles for stability operations
are as follows:
a. Primacy of the political purpose.

b. Unity of effort.
c. Understand the context.
d. Foster partner-nation governance and capacity.
e. Prepare for the long term.
f. Provide security for the population.
g. Neutralise adversaries.
h. Gain and maintain popular support.
i. Anticipate, learn and adapt.
j. Operate in accordance with the law.
4-06. The principles for capacity building operations are nested within the fourth principle
of stability operations, ‘foster partner-nation governance and capacity’ and provide
guidelines for conducting capacity building tasks across the breadth of upstream, in crisis
and downstream interventions. They are focused on the audience (partner-nation trainees,
UK training teams and UK planners and decision makers), while also considering coalition
partners who may be conducting activity in the same area, either independently or as an
element of the overall effort. They also span from the tactical through to the strategic
level, and remain applicable throughout. The principles are as follows:
a. Recognise partner-nation priorities and needs.
b. Apply bespoke, local solutions with realistic goals.
c. Culture and people before skills and equipment.
d. Honest measurement of effectiveness and impact.
e. Cooperation not dependency.
f. Ensure all actions are auditable.

Contents
Ad
dit
ion
al c
Unity of
apa
effort Culture &
city
people first
Understand Primacy of
All actions Honest MOE
political
buil
the context audible & impact
purpose Foster partner-
ding
nation governance
& capacity
Recognise Cooperation
principle
not
Operate in partner
priorities
Apply
dependency
accordance bespoke
local
with the law solutions
s
Gain and maintain
Prepare for
popular support
the long term
Provide
security for the Anticipate,
population learn and
Neutralise adapt
adversaries
Figure 4-1. Capacity building principles and their relationship with the principles of stabilisation
4-07. Recognise partner-nation priorities and needs. The ability to understand the environment
in which the partner or host-nation security forces live and operate, and the make-up of the
trainees can determine the overall outcome of the capacity building programme.40
Where there has been previous engagement in a region, previous reporting should be studied
to ensure relevance, coherence and progression. Understanding should be developed through
the build-up phase in the UK (prior to and during pre-deployment training), during any
familiarisation package in country (including the reception, staging, onward movement and
integration (RSOI) phase), and should be refined throughout training delivery with a focus on
building social, cultural, political and historical empathy.
4-08. Capacity building activities must be prioritised to ensure any changes to the plan -
whether driven by the UK, coalition or partner nation - may be reacted to and that
focus may be targeted on activities that will have the greatest impact with the resources
and time available; the identification of a main effort is key. Contingency plans should
be developed at the earliest opportunity, and be continuously refined. Nuanced
understanding of the environment will aid anticipation. All personnel deployed on
capacity building therefore need to be pragmatic, diplomatic and retain a flexible mindset
to provide creative solutions to the breadth of challenges that may be presented.
40 Understand is defined as ‘the perception and interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context’. Joint
Doctrine Publication (JDP) 04 Understanding.
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Understand the audience. Capacity building in Uganda.
4-09. Apply bespoke, local solutions with realistic goals. All capacity building undertaken
by land forces should be coherent with other UK actors, previous capacity building efforts
and outputs. Contractors may also be employed as part of a whole force approach.41
If working as part of a coalition, or as an element of an international organisation,
detailed direction is required to coordinate all contributing nations and agencies. Issues
which may affect the ‘UK brand’; impact on the training or capacity building standards; or
fall outside UK policy guidance should be highlighted at the earliest possible opportunity.
4-10. While the UK agenda will define the objectives, effects and impact to be delivered during
a capacity building task, local factors may inhibit the achievement of all the aims of the
capacity building programme. The partner nation will have their own aims and their
requirements may not always complement the UK view. UK capacity building efforts
should aspire to offer guidance and principles to the partner nation, not prescriptive
explanation on how to do a given activity; however, the most effective capacity building
encourages partner-nation input to enable local solutions to be developed. Imposed,
UK centric solutions are unlikely to be adopted by the partner nation. Short-term gains
which may adversely affect longer-term development must be avoided. However, there
may be occasions where early in-country activity is appropriately focused on short-term
confidence building rather than effects,impact or objectives in order to achieve early
momentum.
4-11. Environmental, religious, or cultural factors, the experience of indigenous forces, the lack
of equipment or other local resource shortfalls (lack of food, trainees not being paid,
and non-arrivals as examples) may compromise programme delivery. The end-state of the
partner-nation unit is unlikely to be a full capability. If a programme is constrained focus
should be placed on “brilliance in the basics”.42
41 The whole force approach concerns the appropriate mix of individuals within each group of Defence actors that contribute
to operations. It places human capability at the heart of decision-making, ensuring that outputs are delivered by the right
mix of capable and motivated people. ADP Land Operations. Use of contractors is covered in Chapter 6.
42 Hoffmann, quoted in Counterinsurgency Doctrine, Operations and Challenges (2010), Rid & Keaney, page 95.
Contents
Persistently engaged forces

Regionally aligned brigades (RABs). RAB Comds are the Army’s primary interlocutor
to regional actors, responsible for the provision of land advice to the MoD for Defence
Engagement and the design of capacity building to achieve strategic effect. The RABs
are the Army point of contact for all regional and country matters, responsible for:
understanding of partner-nation land capabilities; development of land delivery plans
and their delivery as the Army’s Coordinating Authority; and the force preparation of
FEs deploying to their aligned theatre. The Bde HQ is able to be deployed to the PN as a
small C2 node for influence and understanding if more focused activity or support to an
intervening force is required.
Specialised Infantry Group.43 The Specialised Infantry Group is regionally aligned

and persistently engaged. It comprises capacity building and security force assistance
specialists able to operate in remote, higher threat environments. Working closely with
the RAB the group is able to provide focused capacity building to specific PN formations
and units pre crisis and security force sssistance including partnering and accompanying
(beside, with and through) during the crisis, where a ‘narrow and deep’ approach, rather
than the ‘broad and shallow’ approach of the RABs, is required.
Force generation construct. Commander Field Army (CFA), through GOC 1 (UK)
Division continues to develop capacity building activity, to build up regional understanding
and establish relationships and influence, while supporting the government’s prosperity
agenda. CFA will ensure that the understanding generated by the regionally aligned
brigades and specialised infantry battalions is shared across land forces, both during
routine peacetime engagement and in the event of contingent operations. 1 (UK) Division
will be made available to inform operational design as appropriate and to assist in the
operational gearing during any transfer of responsibility from a regionally aligned brigade
to a deploying force. Less demanding operations, or operations in areas where the host
nation has sufficiently capable military units, but requires niche capability support, may
see the deployment of UK forces under a ‘by, with, through’ operational design.
Maintenance of effect. The regionally aligned brigades, in support of Defence Attachés,

will shape demand from countries in their regions which land forces can support and
which is beneficial to the UK’s interests in terms of regional security, influence and
prosperity. Land delivery plans (LDP) will be used to plan, cohere and coordinate all AIA
within each region/country. International Policy and Plans (IPP) in the MOD is responsible
for the IDES regional strategies activity-output mapping, which will inform the shaping
process. 1 (UK) Division is the proponent for capacity building within the Field Army and
will coordinate with the Army Directorate of Operations and Commitments (ADOC) to
ensure a coherent, persistent effect in the delivery of capacity building through short-term
training teams, liaison matrices and, where appropriate, overseas training exercises.
4-12. Culture and people before skills and equipment. Contextualising the human
characteristics44 of the partner nation can be helped through studying the three distinct
themes below. This list is not exhaustive and provides a start point from which to study
the human terrain of the partner-nation trainees.
43 The CONEMP for the Specialised Infantry Group is currently in production.

44 Paraphrased from The Human Terrain Analysts’ Handbook.
Contents
a. The characteristics of the partner-nation group (unit)
(1) Social structures.
(2) Religion.
(3) Culture.
(4) Language.
(5) Customs.
b. The psychological characteristics of individual humans (trainees)
(1) Behaviour.
(2) Motivation.
(3) Attitude.
(4) Perception.
(5) Intellect.
(6) Values.
c. The physical characteristics of individual humans (trainees)
(1) Health.
(2) Fitness.
(3) Drug dependency.

4-13. Building rapport and trust with the partner nation over a protracted period provides
disproportionate benefit and, where practicable, UK personnel with previous experience
in the country and region and local language aptitude should be force generated. This
‘bottom-up’ approach may also support the production of a country or regional estimate
and intelligence preparation of the environment (IPE), and deepen operational and
strategic understanding.
4-14. Honest measurement of effectiveness and impact. Capacity building activity

aims to provide the maximum benefits to the international community, coalition,
UK and the partner nation. Thus, all activity must be output-focused and directed at
realising the end-state. Defined MOE should be considered as a component of the
coherent capacity building approach from the outset as honest, unbiased and objective
assessments are central to understanding the progress that has been made and its impact.
Such assessments may be completed internally by the UK personnel, or through an
independent verification team who may be able to identify concerns that are not apparent
to those intimately involved in programme delivery. Political or cultural sensitivities may
constrain how areas for development are expressed, but this may be addressed through
local dialogue or discrete UK (open/full) and partner-nation (redacted) reports. Mentoring
or partnering of indigenous forces provides the best means of gaining objective data, but
this approach is reliant on sufficient acceptance of risk to allow UK forces elements to
co-locate with counterparts.
Contents
UK training team with Peshmerga forces in northern Iraq. Working closely with partner-nation forces allows for honest,
objective assessments.
4-15. Cooperation not dependency. Partner-nation commanders should be encouraged

to contribute to the design, conduct and validation of the capacity building effort.
Consolidation periods should be included to allow a partner nation time and space to
develop their own solutions. Realistic goals should be set which must be achievable;
factors to consider are timeframe, scope and content of training.
4-16. ’Gifting’ of equipment is a vital element of capacity building but must be planned and
be in line with the current status of partner-nation training, capacity and capability. It
must be a coherent element of the training plan (with long-term sustainment and an
accounting system in place), should conform to MOD gifting rules, and must also be
cleared in advance by the operational and strategic headquarters, after FCO advice and
direction. If equipment is ‘gifted’ as part of a UK or coalition timetable (for example at
the end of a financial year to utilise a funding line), the partner nation may not be in
a position to receive it or use it, and it is likely to have an adverse effect on the overall
training plan. Interoperability may also be desired in some cases.
4-17. Ensure all actions are auditable. In order to achieve long-term impact, a project must
maintain a level of continuity and consistency through successive regional engagements.
Maintaining an audit trail of actions taken and progress achieved supports handover,
longer-term project management and continuity. Ensuring an auditable record is
maintained provides protection if the partner-nation unit carries out activities that sit
outside the UK’s ethical standards or values. In achieving desired objectives or effects/
impact, programmes should also provide value for money. For example, value for
money and MOE is central to the justification of CSSF expenditure to FCO local strategy
boards. Expressing effect in value for money terms also supports national and regional
prioritisation, allowing funding to be diverted to other priority regions or areas.
Contents
Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5 | 4A-1
ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 4
Capacity building definitions
Capacity building
4A-01. The full spectrum approach to increasing a partner nation’s ability to achieve
self-sufficiency, typically through improved governance, security, human capital,
development and reconstruction (ABCA Security Force Capacity Building (SFCB)
Handbook and UK interpretation).
Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)

4A-02. The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO
commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well
as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies (AJP-3.4.9/
JDP 3-90 Civil-Military Cooperation (2013)).
Defence Engagement
4A-03. The means by which we use our Defence assets and activities, short of combat
operations, to achieve influence (Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1/15 Defence Engagement).
Demobilisation
4A-04. The process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment and defence-
based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national
security and economic vitality.
Disarmament
4A-05. The collection, documentation, control, and disposal of small arms, ammunition,
explosives, and light and heavy weapons of former combatants, belligerents, and the
local population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms
management programmes.
Full spectrum approach

4A-06. A sophisticated whole-of-government approach to providing agile national crisis
response capabilities as well as routine Defence activity, coordinated through the
National Security Council in support of the goal of a secure and prosperous UK with
global reach and influence (Doctrine Note 16/07 Information Activities).
Police capacity building

4A-07. The development of police capabilities in fragile states (AJP-3.22 Allied Joint Doctrine
for Stability Policing).
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4A-2 | Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5
Reinsertion
4A-08. The immediate assistance (usually cash) provided to demobilised combatants to allow
them to return home and support themselves and any dependents until such time as
their reintegration programmes commence.
Reintegration
4A-09. The process through which demobilised combatants receive amnesty, re-enter civil
society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members of the local
population.
Security capacity building

4A-10. A full spectrum approach to the generation, employment, and sustainment of local,
partner-nation, or international security in support of a legitimate authority (ABCA
Security Force Capacity Building (SFCB) Handbook and UK interpretation).
Security force assistance (SFA)

4A-11. Activities that develop and improve, or directly support the development of local forces
and their associated institutions in crisis zones (AJP-3.16 Allied Joint Doctrine for
Security Force Assistance (SFA)).
Security sector reform (SSR)

4A-12. A comprehensive set of programmes and activities undertaken to improve the way
a host nation provides safety, security and justice (AJP-3.16 Allied Joint Doctrine for
Security Force Assistance (SFA)).
Stabilisation
4A-13. NATO - Stabilisation is an approach used to mitigate crisis and promote legitimate
political authority, using comprehensive civilian and military actions to reduce violence,
re-establish security, end social, economic and political turmoil ... and set the conditions
for long-term stability (AJP-3.4.5 Allied Doctrine Doctrine for Military Support to
Stabilization and Reconstruction).
4A-14. UK national perspective - Stabilisation is one of the approaches used in situations of

violent conflict which is designed to protect and promote legitimate political authority,
using a combination of integrated civilian and military actions to reduce violence,
re-establish security and prepare for longer-term recovery by building an enabling
environment for structural stability (The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation
(2014)).
Stability policing
4A-15. A set of police-related activities which contributes to the restoration and/or upholding
of the public order and security, rule of law, the protection of human rights (AJP-3.22
Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing).
Contents

Contents
Contents
Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5 | PB-1
PART B
Delivery
Part B covers considerations for the tactical delivery of a

Part B - Delivery of
capacity building task across the breadth of the spectrum of
capacity building
conflict from pre-deployment planning and preparation through
to delivery. • Planning and preparation
• Execution (general
Chapter 5 sets out the generic planning and preparation
information)
requirements in advance of deployment and includes an
• Nature of capacity
in depth analysis of the cultural, partner force, partner
building across the
requirement, own-force generation and own-force mission-
mosaic of conflict
specific training requirements. Chapter 6 introduces the
considerations for commanders when executing all types of
capacity building. It includes threat mitigation, use of contractors, interpreters, methods of
instruction, reporting chains and gifting. Chapter 7 describes the principles and guidance on
the execution of capacity building as a component of a wider counterterrorism and counter-
criminality, Defence Engagement, and security force assistance (SFA) strategy.
Contents
AFM TFSO
Capacity Chapter 5
Building
PART 5
Contents
Planning and preparation

Contents
Contents
Chapter 5
Planning and preparation
Introduction Planning and preparation

• Cultural awareness
5-01. A tactical deployment will begin with a scoping
• Operations process (phases of
phase, including engagement with persistently
deployment) at the tactical level
aligned force elements. Following this the detailed
• Working within a coalition
capacity building approach will be designed, the
• Land delivery plans (LDP)
force generation of deliverers will be finalised
• Funding
and mission-specific training will be completed.
• Pre-deployment training (PDT) &
Following delivery of the package, the evaluation
pre-employment training (PET)
phase is used to measure the effectiveness of
the approach followed. This chapter further Annex
describes this process and considers the activities • Capacity building actions and
conducted in advance of deployment. It aims to effects terminology
provide planners and practitioners with guidance
on gaining situational awareness to determine
the tactical delivery requirements, regional understanding and an appreciation of the
capabilities and culture of the indigenous forces. While considered as a precursor to
deployment, persistent engagement within a region should ensure that UK forces seldom
face the challenge of developing this knowledge base from scratch. Further development
of regional understanding should continue throughout an engagement and should form
the basis for handover to later deploying force elements.
Cultural awareness
5-02. Time spent during the pre-deployment phase gaining an understanding of the
background and culture of a country and region will ensure that those deploying are
better prepared to both deal with the potential threats that they will face, but also to
better understand the training audience. UK land forces need to be outward-facing rather
than introspective and develop an inquisitive mindset. Background and facts on the
country and its population, including its history will provide a context and perspective,
thereby ensuring that rapport and empathy can be quickly built. Those individual
relationships with partner-nation personnel may again, determine how well the capacity
building is received or the project progresses; the use of discussions, diplomacy, gentle
persuasion, rather than issuing of orders will allow for local solutions to be incorporated
into the final product. An element of collaborative planning with the partner nation will
help to shape the capacity building programme into one that suits the environment and
the training audience.
Contents
Apply local solutions. Capacity building in Africa
5-03. Developing a tolerance for a culture that is different from the UK should also be
considered. For example, behaviour that appears bad through a Western prism may
be perfectly acceptable in the partner nation; ‘the difficulty lies in understanding the
threshold of unacceptable behaviour – often this can only be established through
experience, trial and error’.45 All activity however, should be based on core values
(human-rights compliant, gender awareness and protection against sexual violence, rule
of law, legitimate, accountable, and in accordance with international humanitarian law).
Capacity building activities can either be overt or discreet, based on the situation and the
requirements of the partner nation, or national/multinational constraints.
Phase 1
Scoping phase
Scoping, visits to identify Aim: To identify capability
capability gaps and gaps and opportunities Phase 2
opportunities for for capacity building Development
capacity building with phase
Phase 5 the partner nation
Development Confirmation of the Aim: To identify training
phase partner nation’s training needs, design course(s)
needs (TNA completed) and produce an
Identifying what has been and generation of an
Aim: To recover personnel, engagement plan
delivered in terms of
training,objectives and
capture lessons, produce Develop engagement plan (design
and development of the
post-operational report training module(s))
strategic effect
(measure of effectiveness (POR) and subsequently understanding
(MOE) and make
recommendations or
evaluate
throughout
further deliveries
(exploitation) all phases
Phase 4 Phase 3
Training Mission
delivery phase preparation phase
Execution of the engagement Aim: To deliver Selection and preparation of Aim: To prepare to
plan, refinement of the manpower and establishing operate effectively and
delivery, ongoing validation appropriate world-class
training equipment requirements so that safely in the deployed
and reporting. The aim environment
should be to deliver initial those deploying can operate
training (T1) through to effectively and safely, and have
train-the-trainer (T3) progression the necessary skill-sets required to
deliver the task, and achieve mission
success. Includes pre-deployment
training (PDT)
Figure 5-1. Operations process (phases of deployment) at the tactical level
45 Directorate Land Warfare (DLW) Operation HERRICK Campaign Study, page 2-4_9.
Contents
5-04. Receipt of an appropriate directive will initiate the operations process to conduct capacity
building. 46 The five phases of deployment below show a relatively mechanistic linear
approach, although in reality the process will be iterative, overlapping and performed as a
continuous loop. It provides a generic framework against which to plan and prepare for a
capacity building task.
a. Scoping phase (plan). This combines UK-based preparation with an initial country
(scoping) visit, or visits by forward elements of the UK forces deploying and, where
necessary, appropriate subject matter experts or functional specialists to identify
capability gaps and opportunities for capacity building with the partner nation; a
statement of requirement (SOR) should be produced if not already received within
the tasking. An estimate and intelligence preparation of the environment (IPE) should
be developed to build understanding and threat assessments and force protection
mitigation measures also cultivated. Activity is synchronised with that of other UK and
coalition partners to ensure coherence, and to reduce the threat of capacity building
fratricide. Likely funding streams are identified.
b. Development phase (plan/prepare). Building on the work already conducted, this

phase confirms the partner nation’s training or capacity building needs (including
a detailed training audience analysis (TAA) and training needs analysis (TNA)) and
generates an engagement plan, including the design and development of the training
module(s). Further scoping can also be conducted, and operational requirements (force
protection, joint personnel recovery (JPR), sustainment, legal and policy arrangements)
are all examined with the higher headquarters.
c. Mission preparation phase (prepare). The mission preparation phase selects

and prepares the manpower and establishes the equipment requirements of the
engagement plan so that those deploying can operate effectively and safely in the
deployed environment, and have the necessary skill sets required to deliver the task,
and achieve mission success. This includes pre-deployment training,47 the production
of operational staff work in support of the deployment and any formal training
agreements with the partner nation. The establishment of a separate administration
team to allow the UK delivers to focus on the mission should be considered,
particularly for short notice deployments. In this phase, early dispatch of equipment to
the theatre may take place.
d. Mission delivery phase (execute). This is the execution of the engagement plan,
refinement of the delivery, ongoing validation and reporting. It should be conducted
in whichever profile is most suitable for the location, threat and desired outcome
of the task. Redundancy should also be built in to this phase. Capacity building is
not a ‘quick-fix’ and this delivery is most likely to be part of a broader multi-year
programme. The aim should ultimately be to deliver initial training (T1) through to
train-the-trainer (T3) progression.
e. Evaluation phase (assess). This phase identifies what has been delivered in terms
of training, objectives and strategic effects/impact, evaluates it in the context of
the partner-nation engagement programme or regional need (measurement of
effectiveness (MOE)) and makes recommendations for further deliveries (exploitation).
Other activities include delivering comprehensive backbriefings to key stakeholders and
46 The phases of deployment conform to the Defence systems approach to training (DSAT).
47 Including mission-specific training (MST).
Contents
the formalised debriefing of UK personnel; capturing issues and lessons, identifying

gaps or improvements in UK pre-deployment training, and also looking at deficiencies
in equipment to effectively and safely conduct future tasks. Costs of the training
module will also be captured. This will then feed the next cyclical iteration (scoping
phase) of the operational process. Operational stress management activities may also
be included.
5-05. An example of a capacity building programme consisting of two training modules

delivered to a newly formed partner-nation unit is shown in Figure 5-2. UK actions are in
blue, with partner-nation actions in green highlighting the collaborative nature of capacity
building in order to produce a local rather than a ‘Westernised’ solution. It needs to be an
equal mixture of ‘UK push’ and ‘partner-nation pull’ to be effective.
Understand
Review existing Re-evaluate

Evaluate
TTPs/doctrine TNA Determine
intermediate Intermediate
objectives, objectives Lessons objectives
Baseline and end-state identified achieved
assessment Objectives
Training achieved
objectives set
Start- Training Training End-

state Delivery 1 Delivery 2 state
LoD or
LoE Intermediate Objectives
set objectives achieved
Formation Lessons achieved
of Unit identified
Objectives Re-evaluate
Evaluate
set
Establish
baseline Expose Identification of ‘Funnel of
capability existing individuals based capability’
TTPs/Doctrine on performance
(Future Commanders)
Figure 5-2. Example of the development of a training programme with two training modules
Contents
Training needs analysis (TNA)

5-06. A TNA analysis is a structured scoping and analysis of training or capacity building need
arising as a result of new equipment acquisition, doctrinal change, organisational change,
or changes to policy/legislation. It generally includes a comparison of differing training
methods and technologies, with a view to recommending the optimum training solution
for maximum cost effectiveness. It is a highly flexible procedure with the choice of
supporting tools and techniques to suit different training systems. In all cases however,
a training needs analysis is an output-based, iterative process that provides an audit trail
for all decisions, and is closely mapped to the requirements of the quality management
standard (QMS). A TNA should not imply that training will be the only solution.48
Working within a coalition

5-07. Capacity building often takes place in a coalition or multinational environment, where
there can be competition for access and influence with the partner nation. Conversely,
it also potentially allows for bilateral or multilateral burden sharing with like-minded
countries, and can enhance relationships with those nations involved.49 Capacity building
in the coalition context requires coherence across the contributing nations in order to
be effective and prevent duplicate or contradictory effort. This coherence is difficult to
achieve given variations in policy freedoms and risk appetite between contributors and
requires regular, early and dedicated staff engagement, particularly in the scoping and
planning phases of the capacity building intervention. It further requires clarity on which
nation is in the lead and doctrinal framework, either for the overall capacity building
effort or for a particular line of operation. Coherence also requires a common operating
picture between the contributing nations, a common assessment of the needs of the
partner nation, and common metrics of performance at the tactical and operational levels.
Land delivery plans (LDP)

5-08. LDPs are a more detailed explanation of the land component of an MOD country plan,
beneath which they sit. Both deliver against the CSSF framework that is used to measure
and record CSSF programmes. The CSSF is the overarching framework against which
the MOD is held to account by the National Security Council. As the LDP focuses on
land activity it only provides a limited sense of joint or other single-Service activity being
undertaken, and therefore presents only a partial snapshot of the UK’s overall capacity
building effort. If, however, the link cannot be demonstrated between capacity building
activity and CSSF programmed outcomes, then the activity should either be refined or
not take place. The Army’s regionally aligned brigades have responsibility for producing
LDPs which are only for Defence Engagement capacity building activity, not security force
assistance (SFA).50
48 Joint Service Publication (JSP) 822, Defence Direction and Guidance for Training and Education, Part 2, Guidance, page
166.
49 An example of a coalition capacity building headquarters is the Train, Advise and Assist Commands (TAAC) adopted
under Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT in Afghanistan. Based on the previous regional commands from ISAF, TAACs were
established in Kabul, Kandahar, Jalabad, Mazar-e Sharif and Herat.
50 See Annex A to Chapter 4 for definitions.
Contents
First contact with the partner nation

5-09. This is a crucial element of any preparation phase, although it is possible that this may
not occur until the training delivery takes place. First contact with the partner nation
should be focused principally on gaining understanding, establishing and starting to build
relationships, developing trust and credibility, and also determining detail on the training
activity; this will include establishing priorities. First contact, if handled incorrectly, can
have a catastrophic effect on a capacity building task, so preparation and planning must
be thorough, and any UK actors in country should be involved to ensure that local context
is understood.
Funding
5-10. Capacity building can be funded from a number of areas both within the MOD (such
as the Defence Assistance Fund (DAF)51 and from external sources; through the tri-
departmental Conflict, Stability & Security Fund (CSSF) (MOD/FCO/DFID) in support of
the BSOS52 and the Counterterrorism Programme Fund (CPF), linked to CONTEST. Army
funding can be utilised for training, exchange and liaison posts.
Pre-deployment training (PDT) and pre-employment training (PET)

5-11. Military annual training tests (MATT) level 1 is the common pre-deployment training
baseline for the deployment of Army personnel, and this also applies for capacity building
tasks. The pre-deployment training will be designed based on the threats likely to be
encountered (and may be driven by the latest force protection reconnaissance or scoping
visit) and any country-specific issues, such as theatre-specific rules of engagement (ROE);
the mission-specific training element is likely therefore to be bespoke, but should contain
the following subjects:
a. Survive, evade, resist, extract (SERE).53
b. Medical and health – theatre-specific.
c. Communication information systems (CIS).
d. Driver training.
e. Foreign weapons and partner-nation doctrine (if known).
f. Language and cultural training.
g. Communication, negotiation-mediation and behavioural detection (CNBD).
h. Engagement and influence skills.
i. Coaching and mentoring skills.
j. Security force assistance (SFA) and working with indigenous forces.
51 DAF (North) covers NATO and Europe Policy (NEP) countries; DAF (South) covers International Policy and Planning
(IPP) countries; DAF (FAB) covers all tier 1 courses; DAF (CT) covers specific counterterrorism-related activities; Defence
Engagement Provision (DEP) covers the promotion of the ‘operationalisation’ of the International Defence Engagement
Strategy (IDES) through specific DE-focused projects and programmes.
52 This was previously split into regional conflict pool funding lines.
53 The SERE package may include evasion plan of action (EPA) training.
Contents
Short-term training team - Mission specific training OPTAG/MTMC training delivery

Pre-employment training Force protection and operating at reach
CONTEXT/ORIENTATION FORCE PROTECTION
J2 country brief - (LIFC) PPE CIS
J2 threat and environment - (LIFC) Base security Tactical comms
IPP overview/context - (IP/Def Sect) Op CITADEL Operational comms
STTT Mission Briefs - (PJHQ/JW/ADOC) Op CARDEL (mobile/static) Comms planning MEDICAL
Counter-IDF Mobile communications Team medic
Incident management (4Cs) PRC 112G FPOS (DGAMS)
SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE Tac sat Trauma emergency first aid course
Theatre FP SOPs
Instructing indigenous forces Personal locating beacon (DGAMS)
Adviser methods and tools First responder (DGAMS)
Use of an interpreter COUNTER-EXPLOSIVE THREAT
FIREPOWER CASEVAC
Op CARDEL Mines/UXO
Combat/specialist weapons Remote environment factors
Coaching and mentoring skills (Schinf) IED threat
Foreign weapons Environmental health
Capacity building/stabilisation C-IED TTPs
Ground sign awareness CQM/CQB
(MSSG/SAG)
ECM(if applicable) Combat marksmanship SURVIVAL EVASION RESISTANCE
Compound clearance AND EXTRACTION
ENGAGEMENT AND INFLUENCE Concealed pistol drills Theatre response plan and C2
PERSONAL SECURITY
SKILLS (IPP/ADOC)
Personal security (1 MI Bde)
Communication MANOEUVRE Pre-deployment SERE brief
Social media security (PJHQ)
Negotiation/mediation Vehicle protective equipment SERE A and B
CJO red-lines (PJHQ)
Conflict management 4x4 and CAV Drills/TTPs SERE C (DSTO)
Operational safety (PJHQ)
Enhanced self-awareness Off-road/remote Permissive land survival training
(Environmental/social/tactical) environment driving Evasion plan of action
Human factors RULES OF ENGAGEMENT RODENT (If applicable) ISOS/HELIX
Profiling JUDGEMENTAL TRAINING Extraction techniques
Cultural awareness (DCSU/COEFOR) Theatre ROE Vehicle recovery
Judgemental training Key
Language training )DCSU/DEdCap/DSL) Heli awareness
DCCT/VBS2 scenarios Delivered by OPTAG
Behaviour detection GPS navigation
Op LAW (LWS) Delivered by external
Crowd dynamics agencies/contractors
Decision-making/judgemental skills
Escalation/de-escalation
Media handling/training (AMOC)
Start state - MATTs 1-9
Figure 5-3. STTT mission-specific training (MST) ‘menu’

Contents

Contents
Annex A to Chapter 5
Capacity building actions and

effects terminology54
Advise (Action). Counsel and inform of the implications of adopting a certain pattern of behaviour, beliefs or
attitudes (SOHB)
Assist (Action). Help someone, typically by doing a share of the work (OED)
Assess (Action). Pose a judgement after comparing measured performances against a standard (SOHB, AJP-3.10)
Augment (Action). Provide a self-contained element to the partner-nation forces to contribute a specific effect (time-
based) (ABCA SFCB Handbook). Make something great by adding to it (OED)
Collect (Action). Assemble, accumulate or acquire data or information (SOHB, AJP-3.10)
Compel (Effect). Force, through kinetic or non-kinetic action, a group or individual to undertake a desired course of
action (COA) (SOHB, AJP-3.10)
Confirm (Action). Provide current information of previous reporting within a specified degree of certainty and/or
accuracy (SOHB)
Convince (Effect). Bring to belief, consent, or a course of action (SOHB, AJP-3.10)
Coordinate (Action). Bring functions, systems or entities operating in the same environment in proper relation in
order to avoid counterproductive results such as duplication of effort or mutually negating actions (SOHB, AJP-3.10)
Demonstrate (Action). Deceive the enemy by making a show of force without seeking contact (SOHB, STANAG
2287))
Deploy (Action). Move forces within areas of operation; position forces into a formation for battle, relocate forces to
desired areas of operation (SOHB)
Detect (Action). Discover the presence or absence of a unit, object, activity, situation, event or person(s) of
significance (SOHB, JDP 0-01)
Develop (Effect). Advance friendly force capability and competence (SOHB)
Discredit (Effect). Damage the credit or reputation of an individual or group(s) (SOHB)
Disembark (Action). Unload personnel and/or vehicles and their associated stores and equipment from ships,
aircraft, rail or road transport (SOHB)
Dislocate (Effect). Deny an individual or group(s) the ability to bring strength(s) to bear, or to persuade that strength
is irrelevant (SOHB)
Divert (Effect). Draw attention from the point of the principal activity, in so doing masking the intended operation or
draw forces down a route or direction of own choosing (SOHB)
Educate (Action). An activity to teach the benefits or consequences of patterns of behaviour (SOHB). Develop an
individual or organisation’s intellectual capacity, knowledge and understanding (AJP-3.16)
Embark (Action). Load personnel and/or vehicles and their associated stores and equipment onto ships, aircraft, rail
or road transport (SOHB)
54 Effects are the change brought about in a target by the consequences of action or activity, but may also be achieved by
other effects. Effects are therefore the commander’s desired outcome in relation to the friendly forces. Actions describe
a physical or observable activity carried out in order to achieve the commander’s desired effect(s). Multiple tasks can be
given to subordinates and tasks may be specified or implied. The Staff Officers’ Handbook (SOHB) 2014, page. 4.1.2_1.
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Emphasise (Action). Add further credibility or information which will enhance effects of existing operations and
further develop key messages and themes (SOHB)
Empower (Effect). Promote confidence, authority, accountability and responsibility in an individual or group(s)
(SOHB)
Enable (Action). Provide means, conditions or authority to make possible (SOHB) Provide services that underpin and
facilitate other Security Force Assistance (SFA) work (AJP-3.16)
Encourage (Action). Stimulation to respond in the desired manner (SOHB)
Establish (Action). Set-up a capability (SOHB)
Exploit (Effect). To take advantage of another individual or target group(s)’ weaknesses or vulnerabilities (SOHB)
Expose (Action). Make visible, reveal something undesirable or injurious (SOHB, AJP-3.10)
Generate (Action). Assisting someone to develop the systems, structures and manpower that will be required to
build a sustainable local force capability (AJP-3.16)
Identify (Action). Determine, the status (including friendly or hostile nature) of the detected unit, object, activity,
situation, event or person(s) (SOHB, JDP 0-01)
Induce (Action). To persuade or cause an audience to believe as true (SOHB)
Influence (Action). Persuade – usually covertly (SOHB, JDP 0-01)
Inform (Action). Impart information or knowledge (SOHB, AJP-3.10)
Inspect (Action). Assess the suitability of equipment for task (SOHB)
Issue (Action). Distribute a commodity to a receiving unit (SOHB)
Liaise (Action). Maintain contact or intercommunication between elements of military forces to ensure mutual
understanding and unity or purpose of action (SOHB)
Maintain. Take supply and repair action to keep a force in condition to carry out a mission (SOHB)
Manipulate (Action). Manage to advantage (person or situation) (SOHB, JDP 0-01)
Mentor (Action). Develop capacity through example and/or advice through planning and preparation, execution and
lessons captured/after action review (AAR) phases (SOHB, JDN 6/11)
Monitor (Action). Develop or maintain situational awareness, pattern of life or atmospherics of a geographical area,
activity or situation (SOHB)
Organise (Action). Give orderly structure to (SOHB, JDP 0-01). Assisting someone to shape its local forces
(AJP-3.16)
Partner (Action). An approach to relationship building (usually with an indigenous force) through direct assistance
and shared endeavour that creates the right conditions, spirit and capabilities to achieve a formal and enduring
strategic partnership (SOHB, JDN 6/11)
Prevent (Effect). Keep from happening, avert (SOHB, AJP-3.10)
Promote (Action). Advocate or advance awareness of an individual, organisation and/or courses of action (SOHB)
Protect (Effect). Prevent the enemy, environment or disease from having effect on an individual or group(s)
(SOHB, DN 11/17)
Reassure (Effect). Restore confidence or dispel fear (SOHB, AJP-3.10)
Receive (Action). Take delivery of a consignment (SOHB)
Recognise (Action). Classify the capability of the unit, person(s), object, event, situation or activity, of potential
military significance (SOHB)
Reconstitute (Action). Expand force structures and infrastructure beyond existing levels, including the raising of new
units and formations and the expansion of industrial capacity to support the procurement of equipment and stocks
(SOHB)
Recuperate (Action). Replace resources (following the use of military force) in preparation for future operations
(SOHB)
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Redeploy (Action). Return to original or other position having deployed (SOHB)
Regenerate (Action). Activate, in full or part, existing force structures and infrastructure, including the restoration of
manning, equipment and stocks to designated levels (SOHB)
Reinforce (Action). Strengthen in-place forces with additional personnel or equipment (SOHB)
Relief-in-Place (Action). An operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in
an area by the incoming unit. The responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned zone of
operations are transferred to the incoming unit. The incoming unit continues the operation as ordered
(SOHB, APP-06(c))
Reorganise (Action). Internally distribute personnel and equipment in a formation or unit to render it battleworthy
again, albeit maybe at a reduced size (SOHB)
Replenish (Action). Refill or restock a unit to a predetermined level, pressure or quantity (SOHB)
Resupply (Action). Provide with or obtain a fresh supply to maintain required levels (SOHB)
Shape (Effect). Cause to conform to a particular form or pattern (SOHB, AJP-3.10)
Stabilise (Effect). Impose security and control over an area while employing military capabilities to restore services
and support civilian agencies (SOHB)
Support (Effect). Aid, complement or sustain another force, individual, or group(s) (SOHB)
Sustain (Action). Maintain the necessary levels of combat power for the duration required to achieve objectives
(SOHB, JDP 0-01)
Take-over (Action). Accept responsibility from another force for the conduct of operations (SOHB)
Track (Action). Maintain identification and location of a unit, activity, situation or person(s) (SOHB)
Train (Action). Teach an individual or organisation knowledge, a skill or type of behaviour through instruction and
practice (AJP-3.16)
Transport (Action). Move equipment, personnel or materiel from one location to another (SOHB)
Undermine (Effect). Weaken the will to fight (SOHB)
Understand (Effect). Develop knowledge, insight, context and intent of a unit, object, activity, situation, event or
individual or group(s) (normally to inform subsequent operations or decisions) (SOHB)
Warn (Action). Pre-planned provision of information to provide warning of a specified situation, event or activity
(SOHB)
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Contents
Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5 | 5B-1
Annex B to Chapter 5
Human security themes
5B-01. The moral dilemma. There may be occasions when the partner nation places an
issue into the lap of their UK partners. This is likely to be principally a moral issue; one
involving human rights/international humanitarian law (IHL), proportionality, sexual
and gender-based violence, women, peace and security, gender mainstreaming, child
soldiers, corruption or overall behaviour. UK partners should not just accept that
this is normal for that particular theatre and will need to strike a balance between
doing nothing (‘complicity’) and walking away (‘abdication’). Guidance, education
and teaching should be attempted in order to shift the partner nation towards legal
compliance and accountability, while reporting of inappropriate activity must be made
to the UK chain of command at the earliest opportunity.
5B-02. Human rights training and education. Human rights are rights inherent to all human
beings, whatever their nationality, place of residence or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
language, or any other status. All people are entitled to their human rights without
discrimination, and they are all interrelated, interdependent and indivisible.55 Violations
and abuses of human rights deny individuals their fundamental moral entitlements,
and include genocide, torture, slavery, rape, enforced sterilisation or medical
experimentation, and deliberate starvation. Conflict typically leads to an increase in
human rights violations, and violations may lead to further violence. The protection of
human rights is therefore central to conflict resolution. UK forces conducting capacity
building tasks must have human rights training and education as a central tenet of all
that they do – training should be prioritised or weighted to reflect the importance of
this area. They must also develop an understanding behind the underlying reasons why
human rights abuses and violations are occurring in an area, country or region in order
to cogently reason with partner-nation elements, to better comprehend societal norms,
and to provide practical alternatives to this behaviour.
5B-03. Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) training and education. The term
‘gender-based violence’ refers to violence that targets individuals or groups on the
basis of their gender. Sexual violence includes sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. It
refers to any act, attempt, or threat of a sexual nature that result, or is likely to result
in, physical, psychological and emotional harm. Sexual violence is prevalent in conflict
and may be used as a method of warfare. It is likely therefore that some element of
training and education in this area will form part of any capacity building training plan
if partner-nation forces are deemed susceptible or vulnerable to carrying out SGBV
violations.56
55 United Nations definition.

56 More information on sexual and gender-based violence is in Doctrine Note 16/02, Human Security: the Military
Contribution and AFM Tactics for Stability Operations, Chapter 10, Annex A.
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5B-2 | Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5
5B-04. Women, peace and security and gender mainstreaming. This UN campaign aims to
address the culture of impunity that exists for sexual violence crimes in conflict, while
raising awareness, promoting international cooperation, and increasing the political will
and capacity of states to do more. The UK has a national action plan which looks to
build national capacity of partner nations as an integral element of tackling conflict and
instability. Capacity building tasks should therefore determine UK outputs in this field
and design training in line with the national action plan.57
5B-05. Child soldiers. A child is a person below the age of 18, unless the law of a particular
country set the legal age for adulthood younger.58 Note that UK doctrine59 in a
captured persons (CPERS) context, classes people aged 15, 16 or 17 as juveniles. This
distinction is explained further in AFM Tactics for Stability Operations, Chapter 10,
Annex B as is the broader issue of child soldiers. Child soldiers are children who have
been conscripted into armed forces or groups who have been used to participate
actively in hostilities.60 UK forces training partner-nation elements must make every
effort to identify any potential children among training audiences and ensure that
they are initially safeguarded and then removed from any training being conducted by
the UK. The UN produces an annual report on children and armed conflicts, and this
provides up-to-date context.61
5B-06. Corruption. Corruption harms societies, undermines economic development and

threatens stability and democracy. Those deployed on capacity building tasks must be
able to recognise and support efforts to tackle corruption. The UK Anti-Corruption Plan
provides guidance in this area.62
57 See AFM Tactics for Stability Operations, Annex A to Chapter 10 for more detail.
58 UN Convention on the Rights of a Child.
59 Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 1-10 Captured Persons (CPERS) Edition 3.
60 Law of Armed Conflict.
61 Details on children and armed conflict can be found in AFM Tactics for Stability Operations, Annex B to Chapter 10. Child
Soldiers: A Handbook for Security Sector Actors, published by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research
(UNITAR), also provides guidance.
62 Details on corruption can also be found in Doctrine Note 16/02 Human Security: The Military Contribution, Chapter 6 and
AFM Tactics for Stability Operations, Part 1, Counter-Irregular Activity.
Contents
AFM TFSO
Capacity Chapter 6
Building
PART 5
Contents
Execute – general information

Contents
Contents
Chapter 6
Execute - general information
Introduction Execute – general

6-01. Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the execution of a capacity information
building task. Chapter 6 covers general information for • Introduction
capacity building execution across the stability activities • Threats
outlined in Army Field Manual Tactics for Stability • Language requirements
Operations. Chapters 7 describes considerations when • Use of interpreters
conducting a capacity building tasks throughout the • Use of contractors
mosaic of conflict and considers capacity building as a • Discipline and
component of counterterrorism and counter-criminality, professionalism
Defence Engagement, security force assistance (SFA) • Communication
programmes. • Supporting UK Defence &
security exports
Threats • Transition,
disengagement or
6-02. Operational safety and strict adherence to environmental
enduring support
health guidelines and advice is key throughout any
deployment, as a number of potential threats exist
during capacity building. A safe system of training and working must be developed,
understood by all team members and adhered to throughout the deployment; instilling a
culture of safety will reduce the likelihood of accidents.
6-03. Force protection measures can be complicated if working within a coalition; some
nations may be over-prescriptive or risk averse, while others will have no system in place
for recognising or dealing with threats. The UK commander will have to determine a
common ground, while having the ability to report any force protection concerns up the
chain of command. The ability to individually track all personnel and their movement
in country is also vital. These threats include adversarial, insider, environmental and
project; commanders need to conduct dynamic risk assessments and be able to formulate
effective risk management or mitigation plans. Consequence management plans should
also be concurrently developed.
6-04. Adversarial threat. A number of adversaries may exist in a state/region in which capacity
building is taking place. While terrorists and insurgents are normally viewed as the most
dangerous, the most prevalent threat may come from criminals; the presence of a deployed UK
personnel provides opportunities to nefarious groups. Building a rapport with a local population
in the vicinity of locations inhabited by UK personnel will also provide an external ring of goodwill,
and may aid in the identification and mitigation of threats. Locally employed contractors (LEC)
with access to the training camp should also be viewed with a degree of caution. Basic drills will
also reduce the threat (avoid pattern setting, consider posture and profile) and the perpetual
implementation of operations security (OPSEC). Rehearsal of concept (ROC) drills which consider
potential issues and scenarios will also increase confidence among UK force elements, aid in the
development of ‘actions on’, and further reduce the potential impacts if threats arise.
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6-05. Insider threat. An insider threat is the potential for an attack by, or facilitated by, a
person (or persons) who has a position of trust with capacity building personnel by virtue
of their employment, status, access or facilitation. This may lead to an insider attack (or
‘green on blue’) which occurs when a person, or persons, in a position of trust initiates an
act of violence against the capacity building personnel. Perpetrators of an insider attack
possess motive, intent and capability, and need opportunity in order to attack. Insider
attacks are characterised by surprise, speed and shock. The insider threat can be reduced
by conducting vetting/background checks, biometric enrolment, through the development
of personal relationships, and the development of mutual understanding and respect
between the capacity building elements and the partner-nation forces. Cultural awareness
(adaptability, empathy,63 rapport-building, respectfulness, self-reflection, self-control) is
therefore key in determining what offends, and the development of an environmental
awareness will allow for the identification of ‘atmospheric’ changes which may provide
warning of impending issues. All UK personnel need to be ‘outwardly relaxed, but
inwardly alert’64 at all times.
6-06. Force protection posture. Force protection measures can be implemented (both overt
and discreet) which may include a stand-alone guard force (UK elements should not
be relying solely on a partner-nation guard force for protection), a ‘guardian angel’
65
element and arming of trainers. The routine arming of trainers allows for a more
discreet force protection posture depending on whether the weapon carriage is overt
or covert. While many of the force protection measures will be specified in the orders
that a capacity building programme receives, many of the escalatory and de-escalatory
measures will be driven by the local commander on the ground; a specific insider threat
strategy for the local environment needs to be developed and continually reviewed.66 Any
change in posture based on ‘atmospherics’, ‘social combat indicators’ or threat should be
implemented immediately, with guidance from the chain of command to follow in slower
time.
6-07. Environmental threat. A diverse range of environmental threats could be present,

based on the location of the training delivery or task. These can range from temperature,
climate and weather, illness and disease, and the risk from various flora and fauna.
Industrial contamination of air, water and food may also present risk. Pre-deployment
training should focus on awareness and identification of threats, and management
and mitigation of risks. This may include bespoke elements of first aid training, specific
medical equipment procured and prophylactic treatment. The greatest environmental
threat is, however, from road traffic accidents. Poor driving standards, un-roadworthy
vehicles, extreme and changeable environmental (weather) conditions, and questionable
road qualities are common across many regions of the world. Driver training is an
essential element of pre-deployment training, but this needs to be reinforced with specific
environmental and familiarisation training once in theatre.
63 Empathy consists of two stages: the ability to identify what someone else is thinking or feeling; and then responding to
their thoughts and feelings with an appropriate emotion.
64 Directorate Land Warfare (DLW) Operation HERRICK Campaign Study (November 2014), page 2-3-B-1.
65 Guardian angels are designated armed individuals, pairs, or small groups of personnel whose sole purpose is to protect
the capacity building team who are in close proximity to the partner-nation forces. This protection can be intimate, in
overwatch, overt or discreet. They must be separate from routine activity, and must be focused solely on the principal force
protection task.
66 Lesson from the Directorate Land Warfare (DLW) Operation HERRICK Campaign Study (November 2014), page 6-2_2.
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Pre-deployment training for a capacity building task
6-08. Project threat. Threats within the operating environment may be directed towards the
capacity building project, thereby causing it to falter or fail. This can be through funding,
individuals or units (including rivals), environmental or through changed circumstances.
For example, a human rights violation or other illegal, unethical or immoral actions
conducted by UK-trained partner-nation elements may place the project at risk, or a
change of regime could place future activity in jeopardy. Plans should have inherent
contingency and redundancy anticipating the unpredictable and fragile nature of capacity
building deployments. A recent example of these unanticipated issues surrounding
capacity building saw a UK training team in Mali having to reduce their training plan by
50 per cent due to the inability of the Malian authorities to feed their trainees. The troops
could only be trained in the morning and had to be sent home in the afternoon.
Command and control

6-09. The command and control of capacity building forces will be based on a number of
factors: threat; partner-nation training audience; and UK/coalition footprint or force
structures in country. The nature of the capacity building task, whether carrying out
security force assistance in a joint operating area (JOA) or conducting capacity building
under a Defence Engagement remit, will also impact upon the command and control
model to be used and whether the chain leads to a Defence Attaché, BPST, BMATT or
to PJHQ.
Language requirements
6-10. While it is not essential to be able to speak fluently in the language of the partner nation
and/or any coalition allies, having the rudiments (key and common phrases) will help
to break down the language barrier. Maximum time between being warned off and
deploying should be devoted to language training; some of the other traditional elements
of training may need to be sacrificed to fulfil this requirement. Force elements who have
been assigned to specific countries/regions, should be able to adopt a more formal long-
term plan to develop language ability. Once formal qualifications have been achieved,
Contents
these should be recorded to ensure that individuals with an aptitude are able to fully
utilise their skills. Army education centres should be consulted to provide both resources
and guidance.
Interpreters are vital to mission success
Use of interpreters67
6-11. While some partner nations may have English as a principal language, most capacity
building activities will require the use of interpreters; they are key elements to a training
or mentoring plan as they facilitate communication and understanding. Relationships
established with interpreters are vital. This must be considered from the outset as a lack
of effective interpreters may degrade the mission or even lead to mission failure. Civilian
and/or security force interpreters are both effective, although utilising elements of the
training audience who can speak English should be avoided. There may be a diverse range
of regional dialects or language differences between soldiers and officers. Occasionally,
there may therefore be a requirement for further translation from the partner nation’s
official language to a regional one. There can also be issues between interpreters and
67 Tactics, techniques and procedures for working with interpreters is in the Capacity Building Handbook.
Contents
partner-nation forces due to personality differences, religion, cultural/ethnic background

or pay disparity; the interpreter is likely to be receiving significantly higher wages than
the security forces personnel, and this can lead to tension. UK elements should also be
cognisant of discussion topics with interpreters, or what is said within earshot, to avoid
misunderstanding or offence. Operationally sensitive and/or classified information should
not be divulged.
Use of contractors
6-12. For specific niche subjects, or if there is a gap in Defence capability to generate resources,
contractor support may be required. Planning should seek to identify and highlight
opportunities for contractor cooperation or collaboration where utility, productivity and
efficiency can be improved. Contractors should be integrated with UK force elements at
the earliest possible stage and receive suitable pre-deployment training. Force protection
of contractors may be a UK responsibility, and command relationships will also need to be
formally established and adhered to (including arrangements for disciplinary action). There
is also likely to be an element of oversight and verification by the military training team to
ensure that the ‘UK brand’ remains of the highest standard, while additionally determining
the levels and ownership of risk in using contractors. The contractor’s aims need to be
aligned with the overall capacity building design - set the requirements accurately, and be
aware that contractors may look to leverage profit. This can run counter to the efficiency
of the capacity building intervention. The use of contractors should not be viewed as an
appendage to the capacity building plan, and must be fully integrated.
A UK contractor delivering international humanitarian law training as part of the European Union
Training Mission in Mali
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6-13. Criteria for utilising contractors should include: their experience; relevance of
expertise; track record in delivering previous programmes (including other government
departments); ability to work at scale; and value for money.
Operation NEWCOMBE post-operation interview comments

(September 2014)
Op NEWCOMBE constituted the British military contingent contribution in support of the
European Union (EUTM) and the UN (MINUSMA) missions in MALI in West Africa.
‘The interpreters were vital. We should not forget they have been in Mali all along and
many know the North [of the country where an insurgency is taking place]. I think, in
some respects, we should see them far more as cultural advisers. Some people might
caution against that use, but I found them important for giving me background and
context. We found they could actually operate very effectively in the capacity of being a
teaching assistant for us.’
‘Delivering mobile training caused constraints in that we had no means to feed and water
the Malian soldiers and had to accommodate with ‘workarounds’ for their travelling and
attendance issues. We could offer no sustenance (as you would in a fixed-base scenario);
this accommodation on our part impacted upon both the time constraint and their
motivation. The Malian moral component was definitely affected by this.’
‘Whenever we could, we used our past experiences to tell them a story of a situation to
initiate the thinking we sought from the Malians, or to emphasise a learning point. Our
vignettes served a purpose in several ways, as they also aided our relationship-building
with them. Honest (candid) sharing is very effective in proving that we are there to work
as partners, rather than impose any hierarchical relationship.’
Discipline and professionalism

6-14. Careful selection of personnel for UK deployments delivering capacity building outputs is
essential. The highest standard of personal discipline, dress and behaviour is a basic tenet
of professionalism; any lapse will be noticed by the partner nation, and will undermine
the training programme. Individuals should be motivated and confident to carry out tasks
with little direction, and always be respectful of partner-nation law.
Communication
6-15. The capacity building force elements will need to have an ability to communicate in
theatre and also back to the UK. If working alongside coalition partners, or as part of
an international organisation, there is the added requirement to establish and maintain
further links. Basic radio links need to be established, as well as more complex systems
(video teleconference (VTC), satellite) and the use of an experienced communications
specialist as a member of the force structure should be considered. This is particularly
pertinent to the theatre-UK link.
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Reporting chain
6-16. The capacity building deployed element will need to determine reporting chains both
within theatre and back to the UK. This includes normal daily routine, operational
(including G2) reporting and G1 requirements. Personnel reporting may require the
production of dual UK/international reports, based on the different requirements.
Sharing of information
6-17. The release of sensitive or classified information to partner-nation forces and institutions
must be authorised beforehand to prevent actionable intelligence being used in a manner
that may embarrass HMG and create operations security (OPSEC) issues. Capacity building
staff and commanders must clarify both political and policy direction concerning release
authority and disclosure early in the planning process. It is recognised however, that the
inability to share information with partner-nation forces may at times run contrary to
immediate operational requirements and logic, and could also jeopardise relationships
between the capacity builders and their partners. As the capacity building relationship
deepens information sharing policies should be reviewed to reflect a greater degree of
trust between the UK and its partners. Overcautious release policies are likely to prevent
the development of deeper trust with certain actors.
Supporting uk defence and security exports

6-18. During capacity building tasks there may be opportunities to promote UK exports
which can help to provide corporate income, enhance Treasury and MOD revenue and
benefit the UK’s defence procurement and support programmes. It can also support the
maintenance and growth of UK jobs. The MOD and its armed forces have a specified
task to support the UK’s prosperity agenda, and all personnel engaged in capacity
building must have a clear understanding of the UK’s aims and posture, the alignment
and planning of mutually supporting activities, and should be proactively assisting
and facilitating sales campaigns alongside other HMG stakeholders, particularly the
Department for International Trade’s Defence and Security Organisation (DIT DSO).
6-19. Personnel deployed on capacity building tasks can assist the prospects for Defence exports
in the following ways:
a. Acting as the ‘eyes and ears’ for overseas capability gaps and requirements.
b. Identifying where these could align to interoperability and dependency opportunities.
c. Being aware of UK defence and security industry capabilities, products and prospects.
d. Providing military-to-military subject matter expert advice on the operational and

training use of UK military and equipment capabilities.
e. Being prepared when asked to by DIT DSO to demonstrate UK equipment on inward

and outward training exercises or training team deployments.
f. Providing training support to equipment sales contracts when requested and endorsed
by the MOD and DIT DSO.
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6-20. Codes of behaviour.68 Capacity building forces should observe the following rules when
supporting UK defence and security exports:
a. Do not compromise the Army’s reputation, their own integrity or the capacity building
activity they are primarily engaged in by being seen to be an overt salesman.
b. Ensure their support has been endorsed by both MOD export policy and DIT DSO – aim
to receive appropriate pre-deployment briefing from them.
c. Receive a briefing by the in-country Defence section before contact with the partner
nation or in-country UK industry representatives. Refer any issues arising from meeting
engagements with the latter two to DIT DSO.
d. Only comment on in-service equipment that they know and have knowledge or
experience of its use.
e. In the absence of lines to take, adopt a non-committal position before referring the
matter to DIT DSO.
6-21. Achieving coherence. Figure 6-1 shows the three steps that should be adhered to, in
order to achieve coherence between capacity building activities and defence exports.
Governance
Identification and Deconfliction and Planning and

understanding alignment exploitation
Identify and understand Deconflict and align Consider UK export

what export prospects capacity building and interests in all capacity
and campaigns are export activities through building activity in
relevant to the persistent engagement order to exploit both
country or region you and liaison with key to optimum effect
are engaged in by stakeholders - this
accessing relevant data avoids duplication or
sources, receiving contradictory messaging,
appropriate briefing while exploiting areas
and maintaining a of mutual interest
level of awareness of
activites and issues
pertinent to your Process
partner nation*
*Examples can include the ESCAPADE database, DIT DSO country briefs, CDS’ regional or
country directives, Stabilisation Unit JACS, campaign trackers and dashboards and briefings by
MOD IPP/EASP/EBRX/WEP, Ops Directorate, Army International Branch (AIB), MOD export policy and DIT DSO
Figure 6-1. Model for capacity building and exports coherence
68 More detail is in special operating instructions (SOIs) for Army Defence Engagement personnel dealing with the defence
and security industry (6 February 2015).
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6-22. Governance and process. Capacity building and export activity must be properly
cohered and coordinated through a recognised governance structure, and with robust
underpinning processes. The following principles apply:69
a. CFA leads on capacity building, D Cap leads on interoperability and ACGS is the Army’s
proponent for Defence Engagement.
b. All land forces’ capacity building activity is subordinate to, and guided by, the regional
and country strategies.
c. All capacity building activity related to export opportunities is subject to endorsement

by MOD export policy and DIT DSO.
d. Defence Engagement activity is governed by the 3* Defence Engagement Board (DEB),

2* Joint Commitments Strategic Steering Group (JCSSG) and its subordinate groups,
and 1* Strategic Regional Implementation Group for Defence Engagement (STRIDE).
e. Army Defence Engagement is also governed by the Defence Engagement Steering

Group (Army) (DESG(A)), 2* Defence Engagement meeting, Army Defence
Engagement Working Group (ADEWG), Formation Regionally Aligned Directive (FRAD)
and Land Delivery Plans (LDP).
f. DIT DSO must be involved wherever possible in all Land Delivery Plans (LDP)
development work and major capacity building planning.
Partner-nation written products

6-23. As part of the planning process an effort should be made to determine if the partner
nation has existing doctrine, concept of operations (CONOPS), concept of use (CONUSE)
or standing operating procedures (SOPs) for the unit that is to be trained.70 This will help
to shape the training plan, and will also aid in determining the criteria for measurement
of effectiveness (MOE). There may be occasions when written products exist, but that the
UK has no access to them – there can be sensitivities to this. If no documents exist, then
the deployed UK training element should plan within the training construct to aid the
partner nation in developing them. The temptation to pass a UK document to the partner
nation, or produce a UK-centric document must be resisted; it has to be developed by
the partner nation with UK assistance or guidance, if required. However, the use of UK
doctrine and other supporting documents may provide a basic start point with which to
commence discussions with the partner nation.
Transition, disengagement or enduring support

6-24. There may be occasions when disengagement is required, rather than an orderly
transition. Disengagement can be through a model of ‘tough love’ whereby the partner
nation may suffer setbacks, or adopting a ‘light and early’ model, which graduates the
disengagement. A mixture of the two models may also be suitable on occasion, and there
could also be periods when re-engagement is required. Transition is covered in more
detail in Chapter 7. There may also be occasions when there is no plan to transition or
disengage, and the capacity building plan will be enduring.
69 More detail is held in the Army Defence Engagement Policy and MOD Export Policy DIN.
70 There may be a different nomenclature for these documents in the partner nation, or they may not exist.
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AFM TFSO
Pub Title
Capacity Chapter 7?
Building
PART 5
Contents
Chapter -Title?
Execute nature of capacity
building across the mosaic of
conflict
Contents
Contents
Chapter 7
Execute – nature of capacity
building across the mosaic of
conflict
The British decided relatively early (I think in 2005 or 2006) not to embed Military
Transition Teams (MiTT) in the Iraqi Army in Basra, although we were prepared
to do so when Iraqi forces were temporarily detached to Baghdad. The argument
against MiTTs at the time was that we could not guarantee their protection; since
we were so short of troops we could not provide them dedicated support at the
same time as running our own operations. In retrospect this was a poor decision:
resourcing MiTTs should have been the FIRST use of our troops, before our own
operations.
Colonel Richard Iron, Basra 2008: Operation Charge of the Knights, British Generals in Blair’s Wars (2013)
Execute – nature of capacity building

Introduction
across the mosaic of conflict
7-01. Partner-force capacity building constitutes
• Introduction
land forces’ most significant contribution
• Counterterrorism and counter-
to security sector reform (SSR). SSR is a
criminality
comprehensive set of programmes and
• Defence Engagement
activities undertaken to improve the way
• Security force assistance (SFA)
a partner nation provides safety, security
• SFA background
and justice.71 Partner-force development
• SFA characteristics
demands a full spectrum approach to the
• Police capacity building
generation, employment, and sustainment of
• Special forces and militia
local, partner-nation, or international security
• Capacity building activities
forces in support of a legitimate authority.
• Transition
Capacity building is undertaken across the
mosaic of conflict but is characterised by Annexes
activity in four areas: capacity building as • Risk
an element of counterterrorism or counter- • Characteristics required in a good
criminality; capacity building as an element adviser
of Defence Engagement; security force
assistance (SFA); and capacity building as an
element of reinforcement in stability policing (through police capacity building).
71 Adapted from Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.16 Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (SFA).
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Counterterrorism and counter-criminality

7-02. This is a specialist area of capacity building, although generalist skills can be disseminated
in order to build up a partner nation’s capability in these two areas. Capacity building is
likely to be in the upstream or pre-conflict area, although it can continue throughout any
elements of a campaign. This is shown in the Figure 7-1 with shading representing higher
levels of activity.
Maintain Threat Crisis Crisis Rules-based

rules-based emerging resolution international
international order
order re-established
Pre-conflict Conflict Post-conflict
Weight of effort
Upstream Combat operations Downstream
Counterterrorism and counter-criminality capacity building

Defence Engagement activities to reassure, persude, empower, deter
Engage to Engage to
promote Engage to Engage to
prevent instability Engage to win stabilise promote security
security and and prosperity
prosperity
Understand
Figure 7-1. Counterterrorism and counter-criminality capacity building within a wider capacity building context
7-03. Counterterrorism is all preventive, defensive and offensive measures taken to reduce
the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property against terrorist threats and/or acts,
to respond to terrorist acts.72 Land forces involved in capacity building as an element
of counterterrorism will principally be special forces and through the provision of force
elements to the Joint Counter Terrorist Training and Advisory Team (JCTTAT). In the future,
the specialised infantry battalions may be employed in this area. Special forces have an
extensive range of skills which can be taught to the military, police or other civilian law
enforcement agencies in permissive or non-permissive environments, either covertly or
overtly, depending on the situation. JCTTAT designs, establishes, coordinates, evaluates,
supports and monitors counterterrorism capacity building programmes in priority
countries in support of the UK government’s counterterrorism strategy (CONTEST). JCTTAT
is a Joint Forces Command (JFC) asset.
7-04. Counter-criminality is the action focused on preventing organised criminal groups from
escalating their activities to the point where they become a threat to allied forces.73
Wider counter-criminality capacity building will be in support of police or other specialist
agencies, and can be through the provision of niche skills.
72 Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) Land Operations, page 8C-7.

73 Ibid, page 8C-7
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7-05. Direction is provided in the Serious and Organised Crime Strategy which uses the
CONTEST framework of the 4Ps: pursue; prevent; protect; and prepare. Examples of land
forces providing support to counter-criminality have been through aviation and border
security, and anti-poaching. Some Defence Engagement activities can also have an impact
in the counter-criminality sphere.
Defence Engagement
7-06. Capacity building conducted as an element of Defence Engagement again sits in the
upstream or pre-conflict area, aimed at preventing conflict, building stability and gaining
influence for the UK. While a deterrence effect can be achieved aimed at enemies/
adversaries, Defence Engagement actively seeks to reassure, persuade and empower
partner nations through relationships and collaboration. Defence Engagement therefore
may also be conducted during a crisis alongside other security capacity building elements
such as security force assistance. Additionally, Defence Engagement can continue into the
downstream or post-conflict areas. This is shown in Figure 7-2.

international order
Weight of effort
Engage to Engage to
prevent instability Engage to win Stabilise promote security
prosperity
Understand
Figure 7-2. Defence Engagement within a wider capacity building context Security Force Assistance (Sfa)
7-07. Security forces assistance includes all UK or coalition activities that develop
and improve, or directly support, the development of local forces74 and their
associated institutions in crisis zones.75 Security force assistance relates to, or its
implementation will impact upon, other UK or coalition concepts, policies and operations
including: security sector reform (SSR); stabilisation and reconstruction(S&R); military
assistance;76 couter-insurgency (COIN); stability policing; support to initial restoration of
74 Local forces are defined by NATO as ‘indigenous, non-NATO, military security forces’. AJP-3.16 Allied Joint Doctrine for
Security Force Assistance (SFA), page vii.
75 Ibid, page 1-1.
76 Ibid, page viii. Military assistance is a broad category of measures and activities that support and influence critical friendly
assets through organizing, training, advising, mentoring or the conduct of combined operations (NATO agreed definition).
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essential services and interim governance tasks. During conflict, security force assistance
as a component of capacity building will often be a key element of a campaign plan.
7-08. Security force assistance is distinct in the cycle of capacity building in that it is conducted
principally during crisis or conflict. This is shown in Figure 7-3.

international order
Weight of effort
Security force
assistance (SFA)
Engage to Engage to
prevent instability Engage to win stabilise promote security
prosperity
Understand
Figure 7-3. Security force assistance within a wider capacity building context
7-09. NATO has no Defence Engagement, and a limited counterterrorism or counter-criminality

remit, so provisions security force assistance during any phase of an operation, or across
the full range of military operations. This is shown in the model above through the
shaded areas, so from a coalition perspective, security force assistance may also be an
element of pre-conflict (upstream) or post-conflict (downstream) activities.
Operation SHADER, Iraq. The blurring between downstream capacity building and conflict
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Operation HERRICK campaign study – ‘Advise and Assist’ in a

COIN theme.
Each SFA plan must be entirely bespoke to the host nation and should find an effective
balance between NATO established best practice and the host nation’s knowledge,
capabilities and traditions. Imposing a foreign system onto an indigenous force does not
work; advisors need to get to know their partner’s system, enable it and use it.
Advisor force elements are best drawn from a formed unit, augmented as required, and
structured to provide their own force protection. Unity of advisor effort is vital and the
approach proved effective and resilient through Op HERRICK. Soft skills such as rapport,
empathy and cultural awareness are essential for advisor success but hard combat skills
must underpin an advisor’s skill-set as they are often in combat situations. Good combat
skills also present the right image to the indigenous force. Immersion provided the
important conceptual training for preparing for this role.
Indigenous force Tiger Teams, mentored by Special Forces, made a significant contribution
to the enablement of ISAF operations in Southern Afghanistan. A Tiger Team comprised
a section of 6 policemen from the partnered Afghan Territorial Force (ATF) equipped
as a light-role rifle section. This section was mentored and enabled by two SF mentors
who provided the interface between the Tiger Team and the Combined Force unit with
which it was embedded. Living side by side they operated as one cohesive unit. The
genuine Afghan lead provided an Afghan face and voice to a partnered Combined Force;
enhanced understanding, intelligence collection and influence activities; ensured culturally
attuned injects to shuras; enabled access to sensitive sites; and harnessed Afghan
intuition.
Security force assistance background

7-10. Types of security force assistance provided, in addition to training/education, include
monitoring, advising, accompanying, mentoring and partnering. A partner-nation force
may also be generated, organised, equipped, enabled, assisted and augmented. These
activities can take place at all levels, although tactical activities are generally easier to
conduct than operational and strategic levels. They must also be planned, coordinated,
executed and assessed as part of a full spectrum approach with other government
departments and coalition allies.
7-11. In situations where the UK has formal lead security responsibility for securing the partner
state, security force assistance should focus on achieving conditions which permit the
transition of that formal responsibility back to the partner-nation government. However,
security force assistance is equally likely to take place in contexts where we are supporting
the partner nation but have not assumed responsibility for the security of that state. In
these instances security force assistance should focus on building the effectiveness of the
trained force. There may be occasions when security force assistance is directed towards
governments that are not formally recognised by the international community in order to
stabilise a region or destabilise a regime which it is HMG’s policy to oppose.77
77 For example, training of the Peshmerga in Kurdistan and the Somaliland Police in Somalia.
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Figure 7-4. Bespoke security force assistance guide for a specific operational area (Afghanistan)
Security force assistance characteristics78

7-12. Security force assistance characteristics
that commanders, planning staff and those Security force assistance characteristics
delivering SFA activities should consider are • Political primacy
listed below: • Full spectrum approach
• Understanding
a. Political primacy. Conducting security
• Trust
force assistance activities and committing
• Leadership
to transition are political decisions, and
• Legitimacy
political primacy underpins cooperation
• Rule of law
between the partner nation and the
• Strategic communication
UK or any coalition within which the
• Transparency
UK is operating. It is also fundamental
• Partner-nation commitment
to effective and sustainable security
• Support partner-nation ownership
transition – ‘Political primacy in both the
• Sustainability
host nation and the coalition is key to
• Transition
effective security transition because it
sets the conditions for cooperation and
coordination across agencies’.79 Commanders of security force assistance missions
need to be cognisant of the UK political-military outcomes to ensure that their activity
is contributing to desired effects/impact.
78 Taken from AJP-3.16 Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (SFA). They are termed ‘imperatives’ in the NATO
doctrine, but this Army field manual has amended this to ‘characteristics’ to better reflect that they provide guidance
rather than a dogmatic process that must be rigidly followed. ‘Comprehensive approach’ has been replaced by ‘full
spectrum approach’ to reflect UK policy and doctrine.
79 UK Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan (2013).
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b. Full spectrum approach. Security force assistance must be planned, executed and
assessed through integration between civil and military actors and organisations in
order to achieve common objectives – junior commanders need to analyse, appreciate
and articulate why and how they are contributing to a national full spectrum approach.
This can be achieved through orchestration, coordination and deconfliction, and
must include the replicated partner-nation actors and organisations. Developing a
partner nation’s capability and capacity will usually involve a long-term and complex
process aimed at developing its forces and infrastructure.80 All security force assistance
activities therefore must complement the partner nation’s establishment, psyche and
instruments of national power. A guiding principle for working with partner
nations is that everything we do must be ‘beside, with and through’ the
partner nation.
c. Understanding. An in-depth understanding of the environment, and in particular

the political, social and organisational cultures of the partner nation and UK
military and political outcomes is critical to the planning and conduct of security
force assistance. Understanding the environment will help to define the goals and
methods, priorities and focus for developing the partner nation’s security forces and
institutions. A wider regional geopolitical understanding is also vital. Understanding
of other nations’ activities within the borders of the partner nation will also reduce
the chance of ‘fratricide’ whereby similar training is conducted. Coordination is key,
while also determining who has the lead; this will ensure that the partner nation is not
overwhelmed by conflicting activity from a number of nations’ training teams.
d. Trust. Developing and maintaining mutual trust between all parties involved in security
force assistance is key.
e. Leadership. Security force assistance requires the personal interaction between all
parties (military and civilian) at all levels. Effective leadership is therefore critical and
the linkage and personal interaction between leaders on all sides and levels will reduce
the complexity of the process.
f. Legitimacy. If security force assistance activities are perceived as legitimate, the actors
and audiences are likely to support them and strengthening the legitimacy of the
partner-nation government is essential to security force assistance efforts. Authority is,
thus, dependent upon the interplay between the perceived legitimacy of the mission
mandate; the manner in which it is implemented; the consent of the local population
and security actors; and their expectations of the mandate.
g. Rule of law. A nation’s security policies and practices must be founded upon the rule
of law and linked to a broader justice sector. Security force assistance activities should
promote the rule of law, including developing the police and a functioning justice
system and contain appropriate human rights and gender focus. If the rule of law is
not upheld by the partner nation’s security forces legitimacy will be undermined.
h. Strategic communication. This is integral to mission planning and execution, and will
aid the development of a shared understanding of security force assistance activities.
The communications strategy should align with the stated intent and agreed policies
and objectives between the partner nation and other agencies, highlighting credible
80 Capability is the ability for a partner nation to do something, while capacity is the amount that a partner nation can
absorb.
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results, and promoting legitimacy aimed at building trust and transparency. A coherent
narrative will help to create a positive perception of the security force assistance
mission within local, regional and international communities, while maintaining the
UK’s freedom of action.
i. Transparency. Security force assistance activities must be transparent to all relevant

stakeholders, and actors and audiences involved must be accountable.
j. Partner-nation commitment. The long-term commitment of the partner nation

is required for successful security force assistance activities. This is developed and
maintained through personal relationships, cooperation and mutual trust, underpinned
by strong leadership; it is therefore a two-way process with the partner nation involved
in planning from the outset.
k. Support partner-nation ownership. Security force assistance activities will be

underpinned by principles, policies, laws and structures shaped by the partner nation’s
history, culture, religion, legal framework and institutions. Bespoke or tailored solutions
should be created based on the partner nation’s needs (political, economic, societal),
priorities, processes, organisations and circumstances, but should be focused on
addressing the basic security concerns of the partner nation’s population. In order to
achieve long-term, sustainable goals, security force assistance should steer the partner
nation towards making their own decisions; learning from their successes and failures;
and taking ownership for their own organisation, preparation, planning and execution
of operations.
l. Sustainability. A nation’s institutions may take years to develop which may be at odds
with rapid progress or the timescale of transition/disengagement. Security transitions
should be based on an effective political settlement and should be apolitical and
not undermine any future political progress. There should also be a balance across
combat, combat support, logistic support, healthcare,81 administrative and legal
elements. The effects of security force assistance must be sustainable after transition
or disengagement, and should ideally be part of a wider security sector reform (SSR)
process. Long-term success will depend on developing sustainable security frameworks
and organisations, which must deliver effective day-to-day operations, management
and oversight. Commanders planning security force assistance should consider and
review:
(1) The supporting diplomatic/economic structures and processes.

(2) The procurement of the appropriate equipment (‘gifting’).
(3) The sequencing of withdrawing enablers as the partner nation transitions towards
self-sufficiency.
(4) Continuing to build partner-nation capacity in specialist areas that will require
time and investment.
(5) Ongoing external defence requirements of the partner nation, brokered by either
a treaty or agreement (within a formal legal framework).
81 Healthcare support can include areas such as environmental health, basic health education and promotion, and longer-
term effects to drive down infant and perinatal maternal mortality.
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m. Transition. Effective security transition strategies must contribute to sustaining

security in the post-transition/disengagement environment allowing for the partner
nation (host nation) to assume responsibility.
7-13. While these characteristics provide generic security force assistance advice, it is also
important to produce nuanced guidelines for each specific operational theatre. The
example in Figure 7-5 shows the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) principles
developed for security force assistance activities in Afghanistan in 2013.
One command,
one mission
Mirror the Afghan
chain of commmand
SFA is the way to

achieve mission success
ISAF will support the ANSF in
accordance with the strategy
SFA does not equal SFA Teams

Afghan success is our success
This is Afghanistan
Always adopt an Afghan perspective
One Afghan, one adviser
Allow the individual adviser to own
SFA is based on Afghan needs
and develop the relationship
Mission Focus on ‘why and how’ not ‘what to do’
Don’t allow cultural difference to divide us

Understand in order to advise Be comfortable with Afghan timelines and priorities
Advise from the perspective of
unified action Afghans in the lead does not mean Afghans alone
Live, eat, advise and fight with the Afghans
There is no single approach Maintain the sensory network

Provide assistance to all ANSF entities View the ANSF as a means of maintaining
situational awareness
Accept adequacy It is ok to say “no”

Your effect is measured by You don’t always have to provide enablers
how well the ANSF develop Learning organisation
Share best practices
Mindset Approach
Figure 7-5. ISAF principles of security force assistance in Afghanistan
Police capacity building

7-14. Land forces are not principally suited to training, mentoring, advising and developing
partner-nation police or gendarmerie82 forces, but there may be occasions when the Army
is the only viable option. This may be due to the security situation, particularly during
security sector stabilisation (SSS),83 through a lack of UK police resources or civilian police
risk appetite. Some generic police basic training can be conducted by generalist military
forces but specialist police training (such as evidence handling and forensic investigation),
advising, mentoring and partnering should be conducted by military police units, civilian
contractors, or multinational specialised units (MSU). Stability policing84 plays a key role in
any security sector reform programme.
82 A gendarmerie is sometimes referred to as a ‘third force’ - a cross between a community police service and a military force.
83 A gendarmerie is sometimes referred to as a ‘third force’ - a cross between a community police service and a military force.
84 AJP-3.16, Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (SFA), page IX.
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7-15. Stability policing is a set of police-related activities intended to reinforce, or

temporarily replace, indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration
and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection
of human rights in order to enable the development of a sustainable peace,
through reinforcing and/or temporary replacing of the indigenous police.85 In
NATO terms therefore, police capacity building under the remit of the ‘reinforcement’
element of stability policing, is separate to security force assistance and is viewed as the
‘development of police capabilities in fragile states’.86 Police capacity building can also,
however, be conducted as an element of security force assistance.
Reinforcement Stability policing Replacement
Combat
Reinforce
Security
Peace support
Peacetime military
engagement
Stable peace Levels of conflict High-intensity
Figure 7-6. The reinforcement requirement within stability policing. The reinforcement of a partner-nation police
force may take place if it had previously been replaced by an international police force and needs to reassume its
duties, if the partner-nation police force did not have sufficient capabilities or to enable restructuring, training or
capability development.
7-16. Certain skill sets or specialised training, such as conducting public order, close protection,
marksmanship or first aid, may be suited to military force elements. There may also
be situations where police trainers are restricted to bases and can provide theoretical
training, but will not be able to mentor the partner nation in the field. The police training
and mentoring role may therefore be best suited to qualified reserves. Another option
for the UK land forces may be to employ formed units to provide force protection for
deployed police mentors, thereby providing indirect assistance to stability policing.
85 Ibid, page LEX 4-5.

86 AJP-3.22, Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing, page 3-3.
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Level of police development

Police Police Police Police Police
absence intervention development assistance autonomy
Replacement Reinforcing
Effective civil
policing
Policing capacity
Limited civil
policing
The ‘policing gap’
Enforcement
of
public order
Lawlessness
Figure 7-7. The partner-nation ‘policing gap’. The aim of police capacity building will be to aid in closing of the gap
between current capability (red line) and the capability required (dotted line).
7-17. Structure of police training. General training normally comprises three categories:
a. Basic level. Aimed at developing basic police skills such as ethics, legal, basic weapon
training, physical training, general policing and patrol duties.
b. Mid-level. Aimed at executive cadres (station commanders) and is focused on more

detailed processes such as legal procedures, laws, disciplinary matters, code of ethics
(professionalism and integrity) and management.
c. High level. Aimed at senior officers and headquarters staff officers looking at strategic
implications of management, resources, information gathering, and strategy.
Special forces and militia

7-18. Special forces. Special forces can provide military assistance to both regular and irregular
forces. They can be used to help raise, organise, equip, train and advise indigenous,
regular and irregular forces in support of foreign policy. Special forces involvement, either
covert or overt, can have support and influence (S&I), surveillance and reconnaissance
(S&R) and offensive action (OA) objectives; it may include commanding and operating
with the forces undergoing training, before passing command to local leaders.
7-19. Militia. There may be occasions when a local force or militia element requires some
form of capacity building. The term militia is widely used to describe local forces or other
non-standard/irregular security forces that are usually associated to an ethnic group, tribe,
region, village, neighbourhood or individual.87 Many of the capacity building principles
87 AJP-3.4.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support, page 2-8.
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and security force assistance characteristics remain relevant, but there may need to be an
added focus on accountability, chain of command, human rights and a greater emphasis
on oversight.
Capacity building activities

Security force assistance activities
7-20. Figure 7-8 shows capacity building activities,
with definitions set within a framework. It • Generating
is presented in a linear fashion envisioning a • Organising
sequential process, as in most stabilising actions, • Equipping
although activities are likely to run concurrently • Training/educating
and flow back and forth based on conditions. • Enabling
An example is that monitoring as an activity • Assisting
is required throughout the capacity building • Augmenting
process in order to aid understanding, principally • Accompanying
at the start of the mission and at the end if • Monitoring
leading towards transition. UK force elements • Advising
conducting capacity building must plan on being • Mentoring/coaching
capable of conducting, and able to transition • Partnering
between, these activities and should also be • Transition
cognisant of the different capabilities required
to achieve specified effects within the bounds
of each activity. The standard, professionalism and structures of the partner nation’s
forces may also preclude the requirement for some of the capacity building activities – for
example, working alongside a First World partner nation is likely to be egalitarian and
transactional in nature.88 It also has potential to be more focused on the areas of security
cooperation and interoperability, rather than on building capacity: security cooperation
aims to maintain close bilateral Army-to-Army relationships; interoperability develops
capabilities to allow the Army to work alongside our strategic allies and partners.89 All
capacity building activities also involve an element of risk – this is covered in detail in
Annex A.
88 First World signifies the industrialised capitalist countries of Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia and New
Zealand. See the Global Firepower List for details on the rankings of military forces.
89 For more detail on security cooperation and interoperability see Defence Engagement doctrine.
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All activity should lead towards transition
There may be requirements to revert back, or conduct concurrent multiple activities
Generating – assisting a PN to develop the systems, structures and manpower that will be required to build a
sustainable local force capability. Organising – Assisting a PN to shape its local forces
Training – teaching an individual or organisation knowledge, a skill or type of behaviour through instruction and practice
Educating – developing an individual or organisation’s intellectual capacity, knowledge and understanding
Equipping – supply a PN with necessary items for a particular purpose
Enabling – providing services that underpin & facilitate other SFA activities
Assisting – providing support or sustainment capabilities that the PNSF requires to meet their objectives
Augmenting – providing a self-contained element to the PN forces to contribute a specific effect (time-based)
Accompanying – go somewhere with someone as a companion or escort
Monitoring – develop or maintain situational awareness, pattern of life or atmospherics of a

geographical area, activity or situation. Assisting or supervising through observation
Advising Mentoring Partnering Transition

‘Counsel and inform of ‘Develop capacity Embedded Integrated Assessment Implement
the implications of through example and/or
‘An approach to ‘The progressive
adopting a certain advice through planning
relationship-building transfer of security
pattern of behaviour, and preparation,
through direct assistance functions and
beliefs or attitudes’ execution and lessons
and shared endeavour responsibilities
captured/after that creates the right between actors in
action reviews (AAR)
‘Someone who can conditions, spirit and order to reach a
phases’
recommend a course capabilities to achieve durable level of
of action, offer advice, a formal and enduring stability for the host
or inform another ‘An experienced and strategic partnership’ nation that is not
party, about a fact or trusted adviser who dependent on a
situation’ provides counsel and significant
leadership to another ‘Partnering (a group operational
person, or organisation, activity) – working international military
‘Building partner-nation by agreement’ shoulder to shoulder as contribution’
expertise through equals to achieve a
focused specialist common goal’ ‘The transfer of
UK advice’ ‘Mentoring (an
responsibility and
individual activity) –
authority from the
working one-on-one to
UK to a partner
unlock partner-nation
nation’
potential’
Figure 7-8. Capacity building definitions, taxonomy and activities

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7-21. The activities must be coherent, synchronised and tailored to each partner-nation force to
which the activity is directed.90
7-22. NATO security force assistance guidance on activities focuses on the mnemonic, ‘GO
TEAM’ – Generate, Organise, Train, Enable, Advise, Mentor. These activities are included
in the paragraphs below, but this chapter has been developed from a UK-specific
perspective taking into account lessons learned and experience (historic and recent)
and is broader than the NATO guidance; for example, equipping, educating, assisting,
augmenting, accompanying, monitoring, and partnering are included. The NATO
framework does have utility and can be used when operating within a NATO or other
coalition mission but the UK will principally use the operations process (plan, prepare,
execute, and assess).91 Its security force assistance framework is shown in Figure 7-9.92
Understand the environment

Generate
Assess
Organise and
Plan
evaluate
Train
Enable
Assess
Advise Transition
and
evaluate Mentor
Figure 7-9. NATO security force assistance framework
90 Recent UK security force assistance activities have been described as TAA (Train, Advise, Assist), T3A (Train, Advise, Assist,
Accompany), TAAMA (Train, Advise, Assist, Mentor, Accompany); TA3MA (Train, Advise, Assist, Mentor, Accompany); T &
E (Train and Equip), TEA3 (Train, Equip, Advise, Assist, Accompany) and Train to Understand.
91 At the tactical level, this equates to a series of phases – scoping; development; mission preparation; mission delivery; and
evaluation.
92 More detail can be found in AJP-3.16 Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (SFA). The ABCA Security Force
Capacity Building (SFCB) Handbook describes an ‘OTERA’ framework – Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild/Build, and Advise/
Assist, page 3-1. US SFA doctrine reflects a variation with ‘OTERA–A’ – Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild and Build, Advise
and Assist, and Assess. US Army Field Manual 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, page 4-3.
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7-23. Generating. Generating activities assist a partner nation to develop the systems,
structures and manpower that will be required to build a sustainable local force
capability.93 This will require identification, resourcing and then the resolution of any
partner-nation capability gaps; individuals, specialists or complete units. The process may
include recruiting, selecting and potentially vetting of those personnel (including leaders),
and can span the period from initial intervention through to transition. Infrastructure
improvements may also be a key element. It will require consensus from key partner-
nation stakeholders. Interlinked to the generation process is the organisation of the
partner nation.
7-24. Organising. Organising or shaping a partner nation’s forces may be a requirement

alongside generating that force. Organising encompasses all measures taken to
assist partner-nation security forces to improve its organisational structure,
processes, institutions, and infrastructure.94 It may also be a separate element of the
plan, if the partner nation already has the force numbers, but has not configured them
to the conditions. An example is the organising of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed
Forces (RSLAF) to provide a functioning command structure during the initial intervention
operation (Operation PALLISER) in 2000. Areas that may require organising can include:
basic force generation; development and utilisation of unit staff; alignment of resources
and requirements; development of an effective train and assign pipeline; command and
control (C2); leadership design; functional areas (manpower and personnel, intelligence
operations, logistics, planning and policy, communications, force development,
manoeuvre); supporting institutions and infrastructure. If the partner nation is unable to
effectively organise in the required time span, a period of temporary augmentation may
be required. Organising is one element of the NATO-defined ‘military assistance’.
7-25. Equipping. To equip is to supply a partner nation with necessary items for a
particular purpose. Procurement or ‘gifting’ of equipment must be conducted as part of
a coherent training and sustainment plan and be suitable to the operating environment
and threats faced. Areas of consideration should include the ease with which the
equipment can be operated; its maintainability; and long-term support and sustainment,
including costs. In some cases, interoperability with UK or coalition forces may be
considered, and UK exports as part of the prosperity agenda may also be a factor. When
looking at the threats that the partner nation may face in the future, longer-term plans
should aim to improve the partner nation’s equipment so that it can deal effectively with
enemies/adversaries. This may also entail bringing in specialists to provide the appropriate
level of expertise and support required to field the equipment effectively.
7-26. Training and educating. Training and educating are generally the most visible and
better-understood elements of capacity building. The aim of training is to teach an
individual or organisation knowledge, a skill or type of behaviour through
instruction and practice. Education develops an individual or organisation’s
intellectual capacity, knowledge and understanding. All training and educating
activity needs to be planned and structured, aimed at developing a partner nation’s
capability, and ideally towards their own sustainable solution.
7-27. Enabling. NATO security force assistance doctrine refers to ‘enabling’, whereby services
are provided to facilitate other security force assistance activities, particularly
93 AJP-3.16 Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (SFA). ‘Host nation has been replaced by ‘partner nation’.
94 Paraphrased from the ABCA Security Force Capacity Building (SFCB) Handbook, page 6-6.
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during transition, and focused on creating a sustainable capability. It should be

coordinated across the full spectrum of partner-nation actors or institutions and must be
aimed at empowering them, rather than creating dependency. Enabling activities95 may
include:
a. Development of policy, doctrine, and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).
b. Providing services linked to joint functions such as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD),
air or sea lift, basic medical treatment, route clearance, air support, and intelligence,
surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR).
c. Building or rebuilding facilities and infrastructure directly contributing to partner-

nation forces, such as training facilities and headquarters.
d. Managing equipment and materiel delivery.
e. Managing financial matters.

f. Threat information sharing.
g. Maintaining facilities, infrastructure, and equipment.
7-28. Assisting. Assisting is focused on helping someone, typically by doing a share of

the work, and in a capacity building context providing support or sustainment
capabilities that the partner-nation security force requires to meet their
objectives.96 If conducting an assist mission, it is key that the parameters of the
assistance are clearly defined so that constraints are determined and freedom of action is
also exploited. For example, assistance can take place in-camp or in the field.
7-29. Augmenting. Augmenting involves providing a self-contained element to the

partner-nation forces to contribute a specific effect, and it should ideally be
time-based. Conversely, augmentation can be by the partner nation to UK forces.
The command and control and employment of augmentees must be simple and clearly
understood, and their skill sets should be in an area that the partner nation does not
possess. Temporary augmenting may be required if a partner nation is unable to organise
its forces in the required time span.
7-30. Accompanying. Accompany tasks should be bound by geographical boundaries and

have other parameters specified to ensure that UK forces accompanying partner-nation
elements have clear direction on what they can achieve. Accompany missions require the
agreement of the partner nation, and can be focused on either individuals or units, and
this will affect the number of UK personnel required on the mission. There are a number
of reasons to conduct accompany missions:
a. To assess the partner nation’s capability. An essential element of measurement of

effectiveness (MOE) is measuring and tracking progress.
b. To demonstrate UK commitment and enhance credibility with the partner nation – to

build rapport.
c. To create or enhance UK effect or impact.

d. To develop or refine the training needs analysis (TNA) for further capacity building.
95 These activities are taken from AJP-3.16 Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (SFA), page 2-4.
96 ABCA Security Force Capacity Building (SFCB) Handbook, page 6-10. ‘Host nation’ has been replaced by ‘partner nation’.
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Accompanying the partner nation demonstrates a level of shared risk
e. To build greater UK understanding of the operating environment, and the partner-

nation unit.97
f. To influence partner-nation unit employment.98

g. To shape, enhance or reinforce the effectiveness of the partner-nation unit.
97 This can be through focused requests for information (RFI) and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR), or as
an element of the intelligence collection plan (ICP).
98 Either in the conduct of, or the manner of, the partner nation’s employment of the unit.
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7-31. Monitoring. Monitoring is observing and checking the progress or quality of

something over a period of time in order to develop understanding. Monitoring
can be utilised to determine an understanding of a situation prior to action, or can be
used throughout the process of capacity building. Its main difference from other forms of
capacity building is that it is ‘hands-off’ activity, providing a system of progress tracking,
and a critical feedback loop. It can also be used once transition has taken place to
determine if re-engagement is required in certain areas. In the case of the development of
the Afghan National Army Officers’ Academy (ANAOA), the monitoring phase at the end
of the process has been referred to as ‘assurance’.
7-32. The level of monitoring will be determined by the UK or coalition, but principally based
on the acquiescence of the partner nation (consensual). Monitoring is one element of
the NATO-defined ‘military assistance’ and monitoring reports can be produced for UK,
coalition and partner-nation action, as required. Novel methods of monitoring have
been mis-labelled as ‘novel accompanying’ or ‘virtual advising’ and include using global
positioning systems (GPS) and action cameras such as the GoPro Hero on partner-nation
individuals to track their progress during training and on operations, or through the use
of ISR including unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). This can provide a system which allows
the partner nation freedom from those accompanying them, and allows them to make
decisions without recourse to UK or coalition individuals serving alongside them.
7-33. Advising. An adviser is someone who can recommend a course of action, offer
advice, or inform another party, about a fact or situation.99 Advising aimed at
improving capability and capacity, and is about persuasion, proposition and suggestion
rather than compulsion or commanding, and advice should be both relevant and timely.
It is therefore a personal and professional relationship where mutual trust and confidence
will determine the level of influence that an adviser can have with a partner nation.
An adviser may also be able to provide the partner nation with specific support or
sustainment capabilities such as air support, fires, medical evacuation and intelligence.
An adviser may deploy into a well-developed operational environment (such as Iraq or
Afghanistan), into austere, high-threat environments with little UK support available,
or into relatively benign areas as one component of ‘upstream or downstream capacity
building’. The level of advising should be conditions based, and may increase or decrease
depending on the prevailing circumstances and effects or objectives desired. Other actors
in the region who are providing advice to the partner nation should be identified and
their roles and relationships understood, as this may have an effect on what the UK
can achieve. This publication focuses on generic principles and guidance, which can be
adapted to the operating environment in which the adviser is deployed. Advising is one
element of the NATO-defined ‘military assistance’. Desirable qualities in military personnel
engaged in advising tasks may be found at Annex B.
7-34. Mentoring and coaching. Mentoring is the highest form of advising, as a mentor is
empowered to take the lead where appropriate and mentoring has been described as a
‘mindset not a skill set’.100 A mentor is defined as an experienced and trusted adviser
who provides counsel and leadership to another person, or organisation, by
agreement.101 A mentor may also be able to provide the partner nation with specific
99 Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 6/11 Partnering Indigenous Forces, page 3-12.
100 Directorate Land Warfare (DLW) Operation HERRICK Campaign Study, page 2_4_5.
101 JDN 6/11 Partnering Indigenous Forces (December 2011), page 3-11.
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capabilities such as air support, fires, medical evacuation and intelligence. However, with
the long-term aim to move towards transition, all opportunities for the partner nation
to move away from this reliance should be developed. Mentoring is one element of the
NATO-defined ‘military assistance’.
7-35. Levels of mentoring support.102 There are four basic levels of mentoring support:
a. Level 1 – Direct.
b. Level 2 – Support.
c. Level 3 – Coach.
d. Level 4 – Delegate.
Peshmerga forces training in Irbil, northern Iraq
102 Paraphrased from the Op HERRICK Operational Mentoring & Liaison Team (OMLT) & Police Mentoring Team (PMT) Aide
Memoire, Version 2 (18 December 2008), page 33.
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7-36. Coaching. Coaching provides partner forces with professional advice on how to attain
their goals. It focuses on achieving specific objectives, usually within a defined time
period. It is concerned principally with performance and the development of definable
skills. They help the learner to develop the skills of listening to themselves and self-
observation which can lead to a more rapid acquisition of skills and modifications to
behaviour. Mentoring and coaching use similar skills and approaches, but coaching is
short-term task-based and mentoring is a longer-term relationship. The differences are
summarised below:
Mentoring Coaching
Ongoing relationship that can last for a long period Relationship generally has a set duration.
of time. Generally more structured in nature and meetings are
Can be more informal and meetings can take place as scheduled on a regular basis.
and when the mentee requires some advice, guidance Short term (sometimes time-bounded) and focused on
or support. specific development areas/issues.
More long term and takes a broader view of the Coaching is generally not performed on the basis that
individual. the coach needs to have direct experience of their
The mentor is usually more experienced and qualified client’s formal occupational role, unless the coaching
than the mentee. Often a senior person in the is specific and skills-focused.
organisation who can pass on knowledge, experience Focus is generally on development/issues at work.
and open doors to otherwise ‘out of reach’
opportunities. The agenda is focused on achieving specific,
immediate goals.
Focus is on career and personal development.
Coaching revolves more around specific development
Agenda is set by the mentee, with the mentor areas/issues.
providing support and guidance to prepare them for
future roles.
Mentoring revolves more around developing the
mentee professionally.
7-37. Partnering. Partnering is an approach to relationship-building through direct

assistance and shared endeavour that creates the right conditions, spirit and
capabilities to achieve a formal and enduring strategic partnership.103 Partnering
allows for integral training and mentoring components, which are vital to supporting,
reconstituting, developing and maintaining partner-nation forces; it is a natural
progression from mentoring and is a trust-based relationship in which both elements live,
train and operate together in order to gain leverage from the strengths of both sides. UK
forces will therefore usually have the partnering lead at the outset (supporting), while
transitioning ownership to the partner nation as its own capability improves, leading to
it accepting and taking responsibility; a move from ‘dependency to autonomy’. During
partnering, success and failure are therefore shared, and commitment from both sides
is aggregated. There is risk involved in partnering, and that must be balanced against
the advantages that the UK will achieve, particularly when looking at environments that
do not have a significant UK footprint. Experience gained in Iraq and Afghanistan has
captured those experiences and provides generic guidance for wider application by UK
forces. Partnering is one element of the NATO-defined ‘military assistance’.
7-38. There are two partnering concepts based on the position of UK personnel within the
partner-nation forces, and these are termed as embedding and integrating.
103 JDN 6/11 Partnering Indigenous Forces, page 1-4.

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a. Embedding. Embedded partnering is where selected personnel are formally lodged

within a partner-nation organisation (security force or department). It is the transfer
of advice and skills through personal or ‘peer-to-peer’ connection and cooperation.
This provides consistent, constant and informed leadership, advice or mentoring within
a framework which can build trust and help ensure that UK or coalition aims are
maintained. Partner-nation personnel can also be embedded within UK organisations.
Embedded partners may provide reinforcement to weak partner-nation organisations,
or allow for advice to be immediately imparted without a convoluted process. It should
occur at all levels, but can be conducted at different scales depending on the situation
and the competence of the partner nation’s elements.104
b. Integrating. Integration and employment of partner-nation forces (whole capabilities)

into UK command structures and functional/operational frameworks, under a single
command structure working to a common plan, allows UK forces to generate higher-
level operational skills among the partner nation’s forces. It also allows the UK to
better influence and direct command, control, communications, combat and logistic
support. Integration therefore increases understanding from both sides, and can
enhance interoperability, a key tenet of Defence Engagement. The understanding that
the partner nation’s forces have of the human domain in the operating environment
will be superior to that of UK forces and will therefore enhance the intelligence
picture.105
7-39. Factors. In order to have an effective partnership, the following factors apply:
a. Shared risk. Each partner bears an appropriate share of risk in the alliance. No partner
should have a disproportionate level of risk.
b. Shared resources. Each partner commits an appropriate portion of resources (capital,

people, knowledge, technology).
c. Shared rewards. Each partner shares appropriately in the rewards; partners must
work together to create mutual wins.
d. Shared vision. Partners must share a common view of the objectives, results and
outcomes of the relationship.
e. Shared values. Partners must share a common value system and complementary
culture. This value system is the bedrock of the relationship, providing the means,
motivation and commitment to resolve problems within the relationship and, more
importantly, the actual growth of the relationship.
7-40. Partnering must take place at all levels to be effective, and partnered forces will share
bases and live together; it is a relationship based on trust and equality. Partnering should
also be concurrently taking place with civilian agencies and ministries. Partners will
aim to plan, rehearse and execute missions together, thereby sharing risk. Partnering
seeks to combine resources and leverage each other’s strengths while compensating for
weaknesses; this will therefore improve overall combat effectiveness.
104 See JDN 6/11 Partnering Indigenous Forces, pages 3-14 to 3-15 for more detail.
105 Ibid, pages 3-15 to 3-16 for more detail.
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Partnering and Mentoring Approaches – Op INHERENT RESOLVE-

Iraq (OIR-I) /Op SHADER, Iraq; 2016/17.
During OIR-I four models for partnering and mentoring were employed during ‘by ,with
and through’ coalition operations alongside Iraqi forces. The models were shaped by the
unique circumstances on the operations defined by the inherent capabilities of the Iraqi
infantry; the lack of political appetite within western governments to accept casualties;
the depth of the available Coalition niche resources; and the legacy of earlier US and
UK operations in Iraq. By consequence, most significantly, the permissible scope to
accompany Iraq forces during tactical operations was much more restrictive than during
previous UK operations in Iraq (Op TELIC) and in Afghanistan (Op HERRICK).
Advise and Assist (A&A). A&A operations were conducted from within a secured coalition
base location and typically mentored partner force 1* commanders and above. These operations
involved facilitating and influencing by means of counsel; and the development of partner national
operational capacity through a relationship build on trust. A&A operations also mentored partner-
force planning activity and advised on the best coordination of the partner-force plan with coalition
niche capabilities supporting the operation; this included the sharing of intelligence, ISR provision,
the deconfliction of joint effects and sustainment arrangements.
Expeditionary Advise and Assist (EA&A). EA&A comprised short duration (generally
less than 24hrs) A&A operations conducted forward of coalition bases to a separate
location cleared of enemy activity and behind the forward line of own troops (FLOT).
EA&A operations completed similar liaison tasks to A&A operations but enabled lower
level engagement with partner forces. EA&A operations did not extend to direct
support to the partner on combat operations where direct contact with the enemy was
anticipated.
Advise, Assist and Accompany (A3). A3 operations were conducted alongside partner
forces at the FLOT. Coalition personnel conducting A3 operations did not advance beyond
the last cleared position.
Advise, Assist, Accompany, Enable (A3E). A3E operations were advisory operations
conducted behind the FLOT where Iraqi forces required specific coalition support whilst
engaged in combat to directly enable operational effect. These capabilities included JTACs
and fire control for lethal fires and air warfare teams (AWT). A3E teams operated for
extended periods alongside 1* Iraqi formations and below; however, they were placed
neither in locations where direct contact with the enemy was anticipated nor advance
forward of the last cleared position.
7-41. Partnering outcomes. The following partnering outcomes should be aimed for:
a. Partner-nation self-reliance.
b. Improved interoperability between the partner nation (among its units) and the UK.
c. Improved partner-nation leadership.
d. Improved and enduring partner-nation operational effectiveness.
e. Improved retention and re-enlistment rates in the partner nation’s units.

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7-42. The mutual benefits of partnering. From the UK’s perspective, partnering allows for local,
contextual understanding to be developed, both short and long term, particularly when
developing an intelligence picture of a country/region. The partner nation will know
the terrain, people and local nuances. They can engage with the people and know and
understand the local powerbrokers, thereby allowing effective leverage to be applied
when necessary. It also presents opportunities for the UK to gain experience from local
forces which may have better-developed tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), and
considerable combat experience. It allows for maintenance of situational awareness if
transition is taking place.
7-43. If combined with a UK-delivered training programme, effective measurements of

effectiveness (MOE) can be developed and assessed through partnering; observing the
effects of the UK training of a partner nation in an operational context. A learning loop
can then be developed, which will allow the adjustment and improvement of the next
phase in the partner nation’s training.
7-44. The partner nation can gain from UK operational and specialist experience and expertise,
increasing their confidence and developing their own capabilities. The partner nation
may also be able to access UK specialist capability such as medical support to operations,
ISTAR, offensive support, counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) and quick reaction
forces (QRF).
7-45. Frictions and challenges. Those UK elements conducting partnering have been offered
advice such as ‘be comfortable with being uncomfortable’106 or ‘be comfortable with
chaos’.107 They must develop a depth of understanding, adapt rapidly to local culture and
be cognisant of the nuances and characteristics that each partnered organisation will
have; all solutions therefore have to be bespoke. The UK elements should also be aware
of the level of buy-in that the partner nation has to the process, as this has the potential
to dramatically affect progress and results. A number of challenges will be encountered;
from the need to balance operations security (OPSEC) with the requirement to divulge
timely information in order to build trust and allow for a common operating picture,
through to force protection and the insider threat (‘green on blue’). Use the ‘need to
know, need to share, need to use’ methodology as a basic rule.108
7-46. Operational behaviour of the partner-nation force must also be understood and any
potential risks managed or mitigated; how will they behave, what are their rules of
engagement, what levels of corruption exist, how will they treat prisoners as examples?
There is also the risk of fratricide as different force elements attempt to work together
in generally complex environments. The use of UK assets will usually decrease over time,
and there is also a balance to be struck with developing the partner nation and allowing
for independence, while also providing credible battle-winning force elements, such
as surveillance, artillery, aviation, C-IED, and medical support to operations. There is a
danger that dependency on specialist or battle-winning UK assets can be created.
7-47. Processes that hold any degree of complexity should be simplified to ensure that the
partner nation is comfortable with it. These can be adapted by the partner nation as
they become conversant with these processes; the planning process is a case in point.
Reversionary planning and simple teaching aids should be used whenever possible.
106 Boyd, Walking the Tight Rope – a District Advisory Team in Transition, Combat 2014, page 78.
107 Willing, ‘Be Comfortable with Chaos’ – Planning with 3/215 Brigade Headquarters, Combat 2013, page 46.
108 Task Force Helmand (TFH) Afghan Uniformed Police Smartbook (2011), page 7.
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Helicopter drills using a simple framework
7-48. While the aim should be to partner at all levels, and in all disciplines, a balance will need
to be struck based on resources, the mission and the partner nation’s capacity to receive
UK elements. The aim should be to have joint headquarters and joint command and
control at all levels. It should be noted that it is easier to partner and shape behaviour at
the tactical level, while greater difficulties arise once the operational and strategic levels
are reached. Headquarters-level partnering should complement actions taking place on
the ground and operations rooms and planning activity should be joint; civilian interfaces
should also mirror this partnered effect. Specific partnering for command elements and
specialist areas should be conducted, if it sits within the overall plan; these areas include
logistics, intelligence and close support (fires). The ideal scenario is to combine ‘top-
down’ with ‘bottom-up’ partnering.
7-49. Partnering with a single organisation will present a simplified process, but it is likely that
the UK will need to partner with multiple groups and actors, such as Army and police. A
simple and coherent approach is therefore vital to ensure that frictions that already exist
between partner-nation forces are not increased or widened. This is further complicated
when working within a coalition.
7-50. Training centres. An element of partnering may be the establishment and running of
training centres for the partner nation. This should again complement the partnering
activity occurring in the operational theatre. Recent examples include the Iraqi Military
Academy al-Rustamiyah (IMAR), Helmand Police Training Centre (HPTC). An historical
example comes from the British campaign in Malaya (1948-60).
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7-51. Partnering commanders. The following guidance has been developed from recent
operational experience, focused on those who have responsibility for partnering
commanders.
a. Personally invest in relations with the partner. The UK partner’s period in

theatre will be transitory compared to their partner-nation ally and it is therefore the
responsibility of the UK actor to make the relationship work. Humility, and an ability
to listen and learn, particularly if the partner is more experienced or of a higher rank,
is key and the UK actor must invest personally in the relationship. This also means
falling into line with the timescale that is set by the partner nation; attempting to
enforce a Western timeline is likely to flounder and result in the partnership failing.
The partnership should also go beyond working together. This close partnership at the
high level will set the tone for the partnering taking place further down the chain of
command and ingraining a depth of leadership will aid the path along the partnering
continuum.
b. Progress the partnership along the partnering continuum. Partnering is a means

to an end, and UK actors must always be thinking of progression along the partnering
continuum towards the desired end-state (transition). Building partner-nation capacity
in order to reduce dependency and increase its self-reliance should be at the forefront
of all activities.
c. Understand and reap the benefits of partnered operations. Utilising local

knowledge reduces one of the UK’s vulnerabilities; understanding. This should be
exploited at all levels to ensure that this exigent shortcoming is lessened. A sound
analysis, assessment and understanding of the partnered force is therefore key. A
balance has to be struck between education, training, development and operations;
education and training are vital components of long-term development and the tempo
of operations must be sustainable, rather than based on the UK operations cycle.
Transition
7-52. The final element of capacity building is transition. Transition is the transfer of
responsibility and authority from UK forces to a partner nation.109 The UK definition
of security transition which provides more depth is:
“The progressive transfer of security functions and responsibilities between actors in

order to reach a durable level of stability for the host nation that is not dependent on a
significant operational international military contribution.”110
7-53. It is the culmination of a process which may have involved generating, organising,
training/educating, augmenting, enabling, assisting, monitoring, advising, mentoring and
partnering with a partner nation. It may also be coordinated with other peace building
processes such as a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme. It
requires comprehensive and coherent tri-departmental (FCO-DFID-MOD) coordination at
all levels of planning, preparation, sequencing and implementation in order to create the
best conditions for successful transition. Transition is likely to be conducted in contact
or a highly competitive/dynamic environment, so will be complex and may contain
significant risks. It is also likely to be multinational and inter-agency in nature. As transition
109 What does Transition Look Like? The Military Contribution to Transition, Issue 1 (August 2011), page 8-1.
110 JDN 6/11, Partnering Indigenous Forces, page 2-23.
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progresses, UK situational awareness and influence is likely to decrease, and this needs
to be factored in to any plan. Transition is unlikely to be linear in nature and is usually
gradual and progressive. It is also likely to be unique in character due to international,
regional, national, and local factors and dynamics. Transition will occur at variable speeds
in different areas, often producing differing outcomes, and the partner nation is unlikely
to have full capability at the culmination of the process – to that end, transition is unlikely
to have a clearly defined or precise end-state. This will also be allied to whether the
end-state is time or conditions-based (or an amalgam of the two). A successful transition
however, implies that the partner nation will not revert back to conflict and have
sufficient resilience mechanisms in place to prevent conflict in the future. Figure 7-10
shows a simple linear process with projected force levels, highlighting that at the critical
stage, a troop ‘surge’ may be required.
Transition
Conflict Post-conflict
Assessment Implementation
Surge?
Partner nation
Force levels
A ‘surge’ of UK force elements may UK forces

be required to cover the vulnerable
cross-over period
Time
Figure 7-10. A simple linear transition process
7-54. If the transition process is carried out too quickly or prematurely, development may be
undermined and there could be a requirement to revert back to a previous stage of the
evolution. There may also be shocks and setbacks; a durable solution is the aim, and this
can be aided through having shared aims and objectives with the partner nation. Local
ownership, engagement and integration, and coherent communications will also reduce
friction.
7-55. Transition is a strategic issue but at the tactical level, commanders need to determine if the
partner-nation elements alongside whom they are working, are at the required standard to
allow effective transition to take place. Honest reporting is essential to ensure that the chain
of command knows the ‘ground truth’ and can adjust its policy, funding, resources, timelines
and decisions accordingly. On operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the operational-level
monitoring process has been labelled ‘M2T’, (monitoring, mentoring and training) which
describes military support to the partner nation during transition. This publication therefore
provides guidance at the tactical level; high-level direction and more detail on transition is
contained in Joint Doctrine Note 6/10 Security Transitions and the Military Contribution to
Transition (Issue 1). UK and US lessons on transition from Iraq are at Annex F.
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7-56. Transition is a progressive process and is likely to be managed in two phases; assessment,
followed by implementation.
7-57. Transition principles
a. Adopt a conditions-based process.
b. Plan ‘bottom-up’, not ‘top-down’.
c. Thin out, don’t hand off.

d. Retain headquarters.
e. Start at small geographic locations, e.g. district, province.

f. Reinvest some of the dividend.
g. Transition institutions and functions.

h. Enduring resources are not diverted simply to pursue transition.
7-58. The characteristics of security force assistance111 and NATO security transitions
considerations112 also provide guidance when conducting transition.
Security force assistance characteristics Coaching
Political primacy Political focus
Full spectrum approach A multinational and inter-agency process
Understanding Negotiated process
Trust
Leadership
Legitimacy Legitimacy
Rule of law
Transparency
Strategic communications
Partner-nation commitment Building comprehensive capacity
Support partner-nation ownership
Sustainability Sustainability
Transition
111 Security force assistance imperatives taken from AJP-3.16 Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (SFA).
Redefined as characteristics in this publication.
112 AJP-3.4.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support, pages 3-14 to 3-15.
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7-59. Best practice 113
a. Set and continuously ‘refresh’ mindsets. Develop cultural empathy and the skills to
influence. Remain dispassionate and avoid the ‘soap opera’, report what you see, not
what you think you see. ‘It is more about chemistry than physics.’
b. Follow the partner nation’s ambition and support partner-nation solutions.

Always start by looking from the perspective of the partner nation. Allow the partner
nation to generate its own operational design and sustainable, locally influenced
solutions. Do not try to impose or ‘stretch to fit’ Western models or solutions on to the
partner nation.
c. Information activities – have a consistent and coherent message. This will help
the partner-nation units to understand what is going on, and must also be focused
on the partner-nation elements that will take over any UK responsibilities as transition
takes place. It will also aid the information campaign aimed towards the local
population.
d. ‘Gifting’ and fielding. Understand the issues and nuances of ‘gifting’ and fielding,
and ensure that the partner nation has the capacity and knowledge to receive
equipment. This is a tangible element of the ‘transactional relationship’.
e. Force protection. The force protection posture must be continuously reviewed

throughout the transition process, with suitable force protection postures in place,
such as guardian angels. Weapon training and range practice should be continuously
undertaken to ensure confidence and currency. The relationships developed with
the partner nation will be the single most important factor. Cultural and language
advisers, and interpreters should be used to understand atmospherics and to act as a
temperature gauge.
7-60. Transition challenges.114 A number of challenges exist during the transition process:
a. Maintaining situational awareness and an in-depth understanding of the drivers of

instability. Transition requires more ISTAR assets to be deployed in order to maintain
the required level of situational awareness, and other innovative approaches should be
looked at in order to bridge this gap. Transition is likely to occur at a different tempo
across regions, and coherence should be maintained.
b. Managing perceptions, both in theatre and at home.
c. Retaining the necessary level of influence as resources draw down. This can be
achieved through the establishment of relationships, or through the retention of
control of high-value specialist capabilities (the transactional relationship).
d. Determining the appropriate pace of transition. This must be supported by rigorous

assessment in order to ensure that long-term stability remains on course.
e. Tackling complex problem sets as a partnered force.
f. Training and developing the right mindset. Transition is a risky business and a flexible
mindset is required to deal with setbacks.
113 Paraphrased from Doctrine Note 13/03 UK Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, page 33.
114 Details taken from UK and US Lessons from Iraq for Transition, The Military Contribution to Transition (Issue 1) (August
2011), Annex D
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g. Doing different with less. Force structures will be amended as transition takes place,
but evolvement should be conditions-based. There must also be a credible plan and
ability to reintervene if required, and it must be rehearsed.
Phases of transition
7-61. Assessment. Assessment must be considered at the start of any operation and be across
all lines of development, not just security. If it is restricted to a geographical area, its
surrounding regions must also be assessed. Assessment is the evaluation of status and
progress, based on levels of subjective and objective measurement – a diverse set of
expertise is required to gather and analyse data so that opportunities can be exploited
and future requirements predicted. The assessment threshold should be set to ensure
sustainability, thereby ensuring that development is not undermined.
a. Security. The partner-nation capability must be sufficient to assume lead security

responsibility, albeit with some UK or coalition support. This should be focused on
current and potentially future threats, and in line with providing security to the
population; it must be acceptable to the international community. This transition of
security will also transfer power, particularly in the use of force and the significant
moral responsibility that this entails, back to the partner nation; oversight and
accountability mechanisms should therefore be in place. The security assessment can
include: state of the local security situation; violence trends; freedom of movement
and security of the populace; partner-nation security forces’ operational effectiveness
and institutional capacity; availability of adequate enablers and capabilities; provincial/
national command and control relationships; UK/partner-nation command and control
relationships; and local civilian/security forces’ coordination.
b. Governance. There should be public confidence in local government in delivering

basic rule of law, public administration and essential (and expected) public services.
This should include access to local institutions and resources. A basic assessment
model should be standardised to ensure commonality across regions, and pilots may be
conducted to test the assessment process.
c. Development. Adequate development conditions should be in place, including

the foundations of private sector development and economic infrastructure, and
local participation in wider programmes and development initiatives. Development
assessment can include: foundations for attracting private sector investment; local
engagement in development initiatives; development of economic infrastructure;
ensuring development programmes are aligned with the partner nation’s national
priorities, and provide reasonable attention to all development sectors; levels of
integration of UK other government departments’ assistance with government
planning and priorities; and improved programme development in key ministries to
deliver basic services.
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Op TELIC – UK and US lessons from Iraq for transition115

‘Transition’ policy was executed in Southern Iraq through a five-step process; understand,
enable indigenous forces, demonstrate, engage and a consequence management
programme. This was sometimes referred to as ‘Train – Equip – Over-watch’. Within the UK
AOR, a host of training and development activities were conducted by Multinational Division
South East (MNDSE) and Shaibah Logistics Base was developed into a divisional training
centre. As time went on both the Coalition and MNDSE tried to encourage Iraqi Army (IA)
self-reliance by refusing access to British resources, a deliberate policy of ‘tough love’.
Maintenance of situational awareness. As Transition progressed and presence on the

ground decreased, so there was an increased requirement for other ISTAR assets in order
to maintain situational awareness. ISTAR platforms provided a key capability to indigenous
forces, enhancing their effectiveness and commanders’ prestige and thereby Coalition
influence. Trust and information sharing was critical at all levels, and coalition efforts to
fuse all sources of information to retain situational awareness essential, including local
and international media.
Security force and civil capacity building. Coalitions must focus efforts to set the
conditions for the security forces to have the minimum essential capabilities prior to
transition. This requires the coalition to identify what these capabilities are at the earliest
opportunity and develop plans to achieve the desired end-state. Embassy efforts to build
civil capacity should be supported and amplified where practicable.
Coherency and risk. Transition will occur at different speeds in different areas and
will often result in different outcomes. Transition is an inherently risky business and it is
unlikely to go precisely according to plan. All partners must be prepared to accept that
the process can go backwards as well as forwards and plans must be robust enough to
take this into consideration.
Force structures. Force structures may also need to change over the process of
Transition. The evolving US laydown in Iraq was a good example of this with the
formation of ‘Advisory and Assistance Brigades’. Once the drivers of instability are
understood, a coalition must ensure that the most appropriate means are available and
used to target them, these will often require non-lethal effects, including information ops
and media ops to be brought to bear. Recognition that transition demands inter-agency
cooperation is required.
Partnering remains the cornerstone of the campaign. The campaign relies on

partnered operations to improve the security situation, allowing time for continued
governance development. Greater synergy is achieved through extensive collaboration
and information sharing. Showing respect and cultural understanding helps to develop
close relationships which, in turn, allows resolution of difficult issues.
Rigorous assessment. Regardless of the metric used for deciding on Transition to

indigenous control the assessment must be rigorous and honest. The Iraq experience
showed there was considerable political pressure brought to bear for Transition to
proceed. Failure to make decisions based on a thorough understanding of the situation
could threaten longer term success.
115 UK lessons are taken from Operations in Iraq (Op TELIC 6-13): An Analysis from the Land Perspective, and focus on
the post-Operation CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS. The US lessons are from a presentation by the US Joint Center (sic) for
Operational Analysis, Transition to Stability Operations, dated 22 November 2010.
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7-62. Assessment planning.116 Assessments need to be developed using a comprehensive

and enduring methodology, and should be adjusted to meet the dynamics of an evolving
campaign. Assessment planning should be based on four principles:
a. Objectives focused. Understand the end-state, and be aware of partner-nation, UK

and coalition goals and objectives. An assessment plan should be consistent with
campaign or mission objectives and effort should be focused towards reaching desired
milestones.
b. Utility. Data from the assessment must be useable and add value, thereby informing
the planning process and enabling effective decision making.
c. Resourced. Planners and the assessment team must be realistic and efficient, and
must take into account the operational environment. Where resources are constrained,
areas should be prioritised.
d. Validity. Assessments must include a validation of the data and analysis (including
alternative interpretations of the data). The reliability of methods, findings and
recommendations is therefore extremely important.
7-63. Measuring development. A method or tool to formally record partner-nation

development can be utilised to update the chain of command on the status of units. This
can incorporate a mix of qualitative and quantitative measurements. In Afghanistan, a
commander’s unit assessment tool (CUAT) was used as the primary means, and this is
shown on next page.
116 Paraphrased from AJP-3.4.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support, pages 3-16 to 3-17.
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Commander’s subjective A command assessment of the status of each partner-nation unit,

assessments completed in consultation with the partner nation, characterising
them with one of five rating definition levels (RDL):
• Established
• Developing
• Effective with assistance
• Effective with advisers
• Independent
Assessments reflect the commander’s judgement as to how the
status of the unit compares to the definitions established for each
RDL.
Qualitative objective data Catalogue equipment and personnel issues.
Commander’s assessment
This focuses on the assessment of individual partner-nation
appendix
commanders through a subjective assessment of their capability.
This was a confidential element to the main CUAT, although a
sanitised version can be released to the partner-nation chain of
command.
The CUAT can provide a traffic light colour coded system of partner-nation progress, and is also
a useful tool for continuity during handovers.
7-64. Three steps to the assessment. There are three steps to the assessment:
(1) Establishment of a transition board (comprising UK (or coalition) and partner-

nation key stakeholders).
(2) Recommendations are agreed on which areas qualify for the process. This will
take place after reviews have been conducted on each area.
(3) An announcement is made that the implementation of transition will commence

in the named area(s).
7-65. Implementation. Implementation of transition will consist of multiple activities at

different levels which will need to be coordinated over a specified period of time. These
activities can be conducted concurrently or sequentially through the use of milestones to
achieve desired outcomes. Flexibility should be built in to the plan, which must be linked
to a political agreement with the partner nation. There must also be a mechanism to
monitor and evaluate progress. A different process was adopted in Iraq, demonstrating
that different theatres may require bespoke solutions.
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Annex A to Chapter 7
Risk
7A-01. All capacity building activities involve an element of risk – the possibility that something
unpleasant or unwelcome may happen. 117 These risks also have the potential to impact
at different levels of operation. Risks from a capacity building perspective are shown
in the two theoretical models in Figures 7A-1 and 7A-2 and include the risk to UK
personnel,118 risk to the UK’s credibility and risk to the UK’s reputation.119 All risks should
be identified, evaluated (assess the impact and prioritise), managed and/or mitigated
(develop a response plan to reduce and/or control the risks), and these models only
provide broad guidance against activities and a generally observable pattern of risk.
They should not be treated as risk assessments – each capacity building task should
be assessed independently.120 Risk control and mitigation is complex, and actions can
have correlated and different effects to personnel, credibility and reputation in different
locations, with different audiences, and at different times.
Level of
risk
Risk to UK
credibility
Risk to
UK personnel
Risk to UK
reputation
Generate Organise/ Train/ Enable Assist Augment Accompany Monitor Advise Mentor/ Partner Transition
equip educate coach
Figure 7A-1. Capacity building risk model 1: Normal static or passive capacity building activities present standard
day-to-day risks to personnel that any military activity would produce, although each operating environment can
rapidly change based on local conditions or events. This is shown in the red line on the model above. As capacity
building starts to shift towards operating alongside the partner nation (enabling; assisting; augmenting; accompanying;
monitoring; advising; mentoring/coaching; and partnering) either as an advanced element of training oversight or
through participating in operations alongside force elements, the risk to UK personnel potentially increases. If UK force
elements are operating alongside the partner nation, the risk to UK credibility and reputation decreases as it affords the
UK visibility of partner-nation activity which can be monitored.
117 Oxford English Dictionary.

118 The risks to UK personnel are principally through adversarial, insider, and environmental threats.
119 The risks to UK credibility and reputation are principally through the project threat.
120 Risk can be managed or mitigated through avoidance, deflection or contingency planning.
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Level of
risk
Risk to UK
credibility Risk to UK
reputation
Risk to
UK personnel
Generate Organise/ Train/ Enable Assist Augment Accompany Monitor Advise Mentor/ Partner Transition
equip educate coach
Figure 7A-2. Capacity building risk model 2 shows a scenario whereby UK forces conduct static capacity building
activities only and this reduces the risk to UK personnel - this is shown in the red line. By solely conducting static
activities, the risk to UK credibility and reputation increases (shown in the green and blue lines respectively),
particularly if the partner nation wishes the UK elements to provide capacity building as an active or forward element
of operations. Once the static capacity building activities have been concluded, lack of UK oversight may allow the
partner-nation forces to conduct activity which could fall outside Western behavioural standards. While the model
again shows similar risk paths for UK credibility and reputation, this can differ in audiences, locations, and over specific
time periods.
7A-02. Risk to UK personnel may be mitigated through the numbers of troops deployed on
a capacity building task (although it can be argued that too many force elements can
actually increase the risk on occasion). Risk can be mitigated through the level of forces
deployed (special forces elements can operate in a higher individual and collective
risk environment for example), and also through the breadth and depth of training
conducted for those force elements deploying. Use of technology and employment of
contractors may further mitigate risk.
7A-03. Risks to the reputation of the deployed force may arise from ethical failings; the safety,
security, and sustainability of the capacity building mission; and the quality of UK force,
the training delivered, and their performance working alongside a partner nation.
These are all areas demand careful and thorough planning, with contingency plans and
consequence management measures in place to reduce or manage the risk.
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Annex B to Chapter 7
Characteristics required
in a good adviser121
7B-01. The selection of the right person as an Characteristics required in a good adviser
adviser is key, and the length of tour can
• Patience
also have an effect on the progress to be
• Bearing
made. Individuals must be professional
• Intellect
(a role model), possess basic values
• Maturity
and standards, good manners, and
• Manners
sound cultural awareness. The experience,
• Humour
ages, gender and ranks (and credibility)
• Respectful of culture
of advisers, should be based on the
• Insight
criteria of the advisees and the culture
• Self-reliance
of the partner nation. A longer tour is
• Stoicism
preferential, but a similar effect can be
• Perseverance
achieved by consistently deploying the
• Humility
same UK force elements into theatre
• Enthusiasm
for sustained periods, with breaks in
• Professionalism
between. This allows the UK element
122
to remain fresh and allows for periods of

consolidation when the partner nation can work independently and provide a localised
solution without Western direction and pressure; there are pros and cons to each
scenario.
7B-02. Valuable qualities in advisers.123
a. The confidence and motivation to act without detailed or frequent direction.
b. The humility to respect a different culture and its customs, and to pay deference to
partner-nation commanders (whether or not that respect has been earned).124
c. The patience, stoicism and perseverance to accept and impose small, steady
development steps, while accepting repeated and frequent setbacks.
d. The humour to build relationships and stave off frustration.
e. The ability to listen.
121 Doctrine Note 13/03 UK Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, page 32, with some additional characteristics, based on
operational reports.
122 JCTTAT deploys two or three-man liaison training teams (LTT) into partner nations over sustained periods. They provide a
liaison and oversight function to the actual teams delivering training, and build up deep relationships with key partner-
nation personalities over protracted periods. The periods spent back in the UK between training deliveries provide respite
for the LTT, and creates a sustainable solution.
123 Paraphrased from Doctrine Note 13/03 UK Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, page 32.
124 It is also key to understand how a partner nation conducts activity, and to accept that their method may be better than
ours.
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f. The social skills to quickly build robust working relationships that will help make
advising effective and resolve conflicts between individuals and groups.
g. The improvisation skills to make up for a lack of resources and specialists.
h. Sufficient knowledge to advise the partner-nation forces who may have significantly
more combat experience than their advisers.
TE Lawrence – ‘Advise, Assist, Accompany, Enable’ of partner

forces during high intensity conflict. 125
“The whole Arab campaign provides a remarkable illustration of the extraordinary
results which can be achieved by mobile guerrilla tactics. For the Arabs detained tens of
thousands of regular Turkish troops with a force barely capable of engaging a brigade of
infantry in a pitched battle.”
General Glubb 126
After graduating as an archaeologist, TE Lawrence joined an expedition to Carchemish,

in the north of modern day Syria. He found that he had a natural affinity with the Arab
people who he met. He learned their language and customs and spent time reading their
history. During WW1, Lawrence joined the intelligence branch of the general staff and
was posted to the Arab Bureau in Egypt.
In June 1916, the Arab Revolt led to the capture of Mecca, Jidda and Taif; however,
significantly the Turks were able to reinforce rapidly as a result of a failure to capture the
main rail line. Lawrence was amongst those sent to investigate and met with Amir Feisal,
son of the ruler of the Hejaz; the two developed an immediate rapport.
Whilst enthusiastic, Feisal’s men were ill-disciplined. Undeterred, harnessing their

commitment to their cause, understanding the constraints of the indigenous force, and
appreciating the importance of the Turk’s delicate strategic supply routes, Lawrence
believed that Feisal’s best chance lay in a pursuing a targeted, guerrilla campaign
harassing forces defending the rail line between Medina and Damascus.
Lawrence and Arab forces captured Aqaba in July 1917 and following this, Feisal moved
his headquarters to Aqaba, placing his force under the command of General Allenby,
the British commander in Palestine. Allenby provided the Arabs with guns, ammunition,
gold and deployed small numbers of British, French and Indian troops in a liaison and
mentoring capacity.
125 Adapted from C N Trueman Lawrence of Arabia and others.

126 Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb, KCB, CMG, DSO, OBE, MC, KStJ, led and trained Transjordan’s Arab Legion
between 1939 and 1956. In 1931, he formed the Desert Patrol, a force consisting exclusively of Bedouin, to curb the
raiding problem that plagued the southern part of Iraq at the time. In 1939 Glubb succeeded Frederick G. Peake as the
commander of the Arab Legion which later became the Royal Jordian Army. During this period, he transformed the Legion
into the best-trained force in the Arab world. During the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Glubb led the Arab Legion across the River
Jordan to occupy the West Bank.
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Allenby planned a large, combined arms attack against the Turks for September, 1918.
Lawrence was asked by Allenby to launch a diversionary attack on the Turks at an
important rail junction at Deraa in advance of the main Allied assault. This and the wider
operation were successful and Feisal and Lawrence entered Damascus in triumph.
Lawrence lived among those Arabs who fought the Turks, going out of his way to
befriend them. He lived the life of a Bedouin, always doing more than those he fought
with, riding his camel further and pushing his body harder. He ate what they ate which
led to a number of debilitating stomach ailments. But by doing this, he earned the respect
of those who fought with him.
7B-03. Best practice (advising).
a. Set and continuously refresh mindsets and review assumptions (‘intellectual curiosity’).
(1) Develop cultural empathy and the skills to influence.
(2) Observe and reflect, evaluate and test.
(3) Listen.
(4) Remain dispassionate and avoid the ‘soap opera’; report what you see, not what
you think you see.
(5) ‘It is more about chemistry than physics.’
b. Follow partner-nation ambition and support local solutions.
(1) Always start by looking from a partner nation’s perspective.
(2) Allow the partner-nation unit to generate their own operational design and
sustainable solutions.
(3) Do not try to impose or ‘stretch to fit’ UK models onto the partner nation.
(4) Have the agility to conform to a changing situation.

c. Information activities – have a consistent and coherent message for partner-nation
forces.
(1) In order to maintain and enhance the partner nation’s nerve, will and confidence
(particularly during transition phases).
(2) In order to allow partner-nation forces to connect to the local population, shaped
by their own media/public affairs officers.
d. ‘Gifting’ and fielding.

(1) Understand the delicacies of ‘gifting’ and fielding.
(2) Advisers must offer something tangible to maintain influence.

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e. Force protection – constantly review postures at every location and by day and night.127
(1) The greatest force protection measure will be the relationship developed with the
partner-nation forces.
(2) Approaches must be honest and firm.
(3) Use cultural and language advisers to understand ‘atmospherics’ and act as a
temperature gauge.
(4) Ensure there are robust guardian angel and adviser team force protection
measures.
(5) Continually conduct weapon training and range practice to ensure currency and
confidence.
7B-04. An adviser should ideally have a period of ‘immersion training’128 in the theatre of
operations, whereby individuals spend a period of time working alongside those
currently in post. This allows for development of training design, consistency of
approach and also reduces the overall risk during handover periods.
7B-05. An adviser must be capable of a ‘hands-off’ approach, supporting the partner nation to
solve a problem; advisers can drive partner-nation dependency on adviser-led solutions.
There is however, a balance to be struck between short-term gain (instilling confidence)
against long-term institutional development or enduring progress. This may instil a
tension between commanders who want to demonstrate progress, with advisers who
need to continually develop advisees at a different or slower tempo (this may be based
on the pace that the advisee wishes, or is physically able, to develop for example). There
also needs to be a sensible, pragmatic approach to the level of development that a
partner nation needs. A 100 per cent solution is neither practical, nor required in most
cases.
7B-06. There may be occasions when the UK is requested to ‘advise and assist’ a partner
nation. ‘Assist’ can also be referred to as ‘support’. Assistance can be in many forms
but the principal areas of assistance will be in the form of mentoring or partnering,
although it can also include the provision of resources, key or niche skills, or
information. Training/education can also be a key element and may be conducted either
as part of the mentoring/partnering process, or as a stand-alone activity.
127 For more information on force protection, see Doctrine Note 15/11 Op CARDEL – Countering the Insider Threat.
128 Draper, A window on the Afghan world; observations from living and working in the Helmand Police Headquarters,
Combat 2014, page 80.
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UK training team with the Peshmerga in northern Iraq

Contents
AFMTitle
Pub TFSO
Capacity Chapter 8
?
Building
PART 5
Contents
Chapter
Case studies
Title?
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7B-8 |
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Army Field Manual I Warfighting Tactics - Part 1 | 8-1
Case Study 1
Exercise Botswana Bayonet
(Upstream capacity building)
Background
8-01. A small seven-man team from the Infantry Training Centre (ITC) Catterick formed a short-
term training team (STTT) in May 2014 to produce a bespoke training module for a junior
non-commissioned officer (JNCO) cadre for the Botswana Defence Force (BDF). This would
form a precursor to further STTT tasks to be conducted in the future in the country, as a
wider element of Defence Engagement in Southern Africa. The Botswana Defence Force
is aiming to deploy all arms, but principally infantry-based battlegroups on peacekeeping
operations as part of the African Union within the African continent. The Botswana
Defence Force also has a national anti-poaching remit. It is well-equipped, and highly
motivated, but with an over-reliance on its officer corps in lieu of its non-commissioned
officers.
Preparation
8-02. The pre-deployment period was spent conducting administration, booking
accommodation, ensuring the correct levels of pay, completing medicals and inoculations,
passing the driving matrix test, taking periods of leave and was also focused on additional
familiarisation and training on the weapon systems that the team were likely to encounter
in Botswana. This included the Belgian FN rifle and also involved a trip to Leeds armouries.
There was also a formal brief by the reconnaissance party to accompany the mission
preparation training which focused on the production of lesson plans and suitable training
aids. This was not ideal as the reconnaissance team consisted of personnel who were not
conducting the task.
Deployment
8-03. The team deployed on a civilian flight via Johannesburg and were met in Botswana by
the British Peace Support Team (South Africa) (BPST (SA)). The first week was spent
continuing preparation for the course, and familiarisation with the training area and
physical training routes, in addition to meeting the BDF chain of command. Administration
for the course was also key during the first week; this included checking vehicles,
ammunition, classrooms, and recces, and concluded with an orders group to finalise the
training programme and main events list. Some issues resulting from having a separate
reconnaissance team needed to be resolved; these included having to re-recce routes
and training facilities/areas, and booking of transport for exercising troops along with
weapons, ammunition and rations.
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Students
8-04. The course commenced with 39 students from across the Botswana Defence Force, and
with a broad range of skills and experience. The UK training team therefore decided to
split the students into four equal sections with an even spread of cap badges, abilities
and skills. All had an appetite to learn and were enthusiastic to put new skills taught into
practice. The Botswana Defence Force was also well-resourced.
Training
8-05. The course was split into four phases:
a. Instruction and teaching phase.
b. Offensive operations phase.
c. Defensive operations phase.
d. Test phase.
Junior NCO activities and roles were divided between in-barracks and in the field.
8-06. The training module started with a ten-mile march carrying 16kg which provided a
baseline of fitness and mental robustness. It also allowed the instructors to gauge
the standard of the BDF students, and led to some minor adjustments to the training
programme.
Teach the basics first. Instructing the BDF students

Contents
We were unsure of their level of soldiering skills. To that end we added into the
training programme some start standard assessments. These proved vital and a
few of the training objectives were slightly tailored to the students’ capabilities.
UK Training Team Platoon Sergeant, post-operational report
8-07. The course was designed around a steep learning curve, focused on creating junior
leadership; infantry tactics were used as the principal conduit to achieving this aim.
8-08. Classroom lessons, teaching the theory, were followed by practical applications.
The lessons ranged from command leadership management (CLM) highlighting the
responsibilities of a non-commissioned officer, through to values-based leadership
(VBL)129 demonstrating the importance of the development of subordinates. Simple but
essential traits were discussed and emphasised focused on G1 personnel issues, including
ensuring timeliness, and having the correct equipment. Commencing with prescriptive
measures, the training progressed to employing duty students and then onto self-policing,
highlighting a progressive process, which allowed the Botswana Defence Force to assume
ownership once they had bought in to why these issues were important. This was further
reinforced once the students deployed into the field, and their use of a reports and
returns system, aligning G1 personnel issues with the G4 logistics.
Learning essential equipment administration skills. BDF students preparing for deployment into the field.
129 Values-based leadership is simply another way of expressing the act of setting the correct example, even in difficult
circumstances.
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8-09. Basic infantry lessons including the combat estimate and orders process were taught,
and were based on those conducted at the Household Division and Parachute Regiment
Centralised Courses (HDPRCC).
8-10. The first exercise focused on low-level skills such as harbour occupation and routine,
with inspections being a key part of the administration process undertaken by the UK
training team. The exercise also saw the practical application of the orders process and
the construction of model pits as the prelude to conducting section-level reconnaissance,
attacks and ambushes. The local training area used was 35km from the barracks and it
provided a large amount of varied and challenging terrain, and an element of remoteness
which simulated being deployed on operations. The distance between camp and the
training area also allowed for a more realistic exercise for the G4 logistic elements to
resupply those deployed.
Encourage partner-nation ownership. BDF instructing camouflage and concealment in the field.
8-11. The next series of lessons were then conducted back in the camp, further administration
was completed, and a long weekend allowed some rest and recuperation prior to the
start of the second exercise. This was a patrols/defensive exercise, allowing the students
to be split into multiples to provide a current operational context. An insertion patrol was
followed by the occupation of a defensive position which entailed digging in at night, a
skill that was unfamiliar to all the students, but which was successfully achieved by first light.
Contents
8-12. The final exercise was a culmination of all the skills taught on the course, with practical
application allowing for testing and grading of all the students by the UK training team.
It commenced with a Cambrian Patrol-style march of 55km with checkpoints in obscure
and difficult-to-find locations, and with command tasks to be completed at each one.
There was then a period of enforced rest prior to the remainder of the exercise, which re-
emphasised previously taught skills but in a testing environment, and with tight timelines.
Elements of free-play were brought in, and section commanders had to deconflict to
bring together the final platoon attack.
Course design and output

8-13. The course was designed to ensure that junior leadership was assessed, but also focused
on a commonality with UK training to ensure a basic level of interoperability between
Botswana and the UK in the future. Testing was conducted throughout, and a high
tempo of activity was maintained. Progress was monitored and feedback provided to the
students on a weekly basis. The students achieved very good standards, and a pass out
parade provided a suitable culmination with high-achieving individuals being given formal
recognition and prizes.
8-14. Through shared experiences both trainers and trainees were able to gain new insights
into how other forces operate; as an example, the UK training team learned how the
Botswana Defence Force conduct anti-poaching operations, and experienced the realities
of surviving and operating in a southern African terrain and climate. It was a superb
vehicle for personal and professional development. A basic level of understanding on
Botswana, its people and culture was also achieved and relationships were established
with the Botswana Defence Force chain of command.
Support
8-15. The STTT was supported in country by the British Peace Support Team – South Africa
(BPST – SA), providing both assistance and advice.
The Liaison Officer knew the BDF well and if we had any problems, he was the
man to talk to and quickly solved the issue. He gave us a heads-up on the BDF and
their background and was able to provide advice on what to do in our spare time.
Having that top-cover made us feel confident in overcoming any issues we faced.
UK Training Team Platoon Sergeant, post-operational report

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Case Study 2 -
Operation HERRICK
(Capacity building during conflict - security force
assistance (SFA))
Taken from the Operation HERRICK campaign study

8-16. Three areas of best practice, observations and lessons from the Operation HERRICK
Campaign Study highlight capacity building as elements of security force assistance (SFA)
conducted during conflict. The first area is the generic training and mentoring of the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), with a subsequent focus on police forces, an
area that should not ideally be a task for the military, but one that may be undertaken
through necessity. The second area looks at capacity building in a niche or specialised
area, that of counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) training during operations. This
also demonstrates the blurring of the lines between upstream, during operations and
downstream as the lessons gained on Operation HERRICK can also be applied to C-IED
capacity building undertaken as an element of Defence Engagement or counterterrorism
capacity building. Thirdly, special forces (SF) trained and mentored indigenous forces show
the benefits of long-term persistent engagement, continuity and the disproportionate
advantages and effects that a partner-nation force can bring to UK or coalition
operations. The C-IED and SF capacity building examples also highlight the importance
of the use of small numbers of specialists and their ability to create wide-ranging impact
globally for the UK when looking to achieve strategic effects or objectives.
Good practice – enabling indigenous security forces (EISF)

Background
8-17. EISF is second nature to the British Army and this capability has been seen in some
form in almost all of our campaigns throughout history. EISF was key in Afghanistan to
enabling transition to host-nation governmental security authority and therefore the
ability to reach the campaign endstate. Over the duration of the HERRICK campaign the
enabling of indigenous security forces was a continually evolving process. Mentoring
of indigenous security forces in Afghanistan began in early 2002 immediately after the
initial intervention by UK forces. In Helmand Province the initial support to the Afghan
National Army (ANA) and Afghan Uniformed/National Police (AUP/ANP) took the form of
composite operational mentoring and liaison teams (OMLT) task-organised from across
the deployed brigade. These OMLTs tactically supported the ANSF on operations and
provided a direct link into the ISAF enablers (ISTAR, MEDEVAC, C-IED, QRF and Fires)
requested by host-nation security forces. These teams were led normally by a Captain
(OF2) and a variety of specialists (combat medical technicians and fire support elements as
examples).
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8-18. Enabling the wide spectrum of indigenous capability evolved into the deployment
of formed units in specific advisory roles. This ranged from specialist mentoring of
indigenous special forces at tier 1 and tier 2 (at company or specialist task force level)
to the mentoring and training of the non-specialist army and police forces by battalion-
based units. The formation of the Brigade Advisory Group (BAG) and the Police Mentoring
Changing role of Police Mentoring
Advisory Group (PMAG) allowed formed combat units to deploy maintaining a degree
of their organic C2 and force protection structures therefore ensuring a coherence of
Advisory Group (PMAG)
advising across the indigenous security force pillars.
PARTNER
ISAF FOOTPRINT
MENTOR MENTOR
ASSIST ASSIST ADVISE
ENABLE ENABLE ENABLE LIAISON
TRAIN TRAIN TRAIN ENABLE/ADVISE
OCT 12 DEC 12 APR 13 JUL 13
Op HERRICK 17 Op HERRICK 18
Figure 8-1. Police mentoring capability drawdown at the end of the campaign showing the
changing role of the Police Mentoring Advisory Group (PMAG)
8-19. The endstate that was achieved on Operation HERRICK 18 was the complete transfer of
lead security responsibility (September 2013), an increase in both situational awareness
and battlespace deconfliction by the Afghan National Security Forces and a complete ‘lift
off’ of UK mentoring assets to minimal numbers at ANSF Brigade and provincial levels
(Brigade Advisory Team (BAT)). This good practice will only address the enabling of non-
specialist ANSF units. Underpinning the generic ANSF advising and mentoring at the
end of the campaign was the introduction and implementation of Operation CARDEL to
mitigate and reduce the insider threat.
Counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) training, overseas

engagement and capacity building
8-20. Initial shortcomings. ANSF C-IED training had been delivered in Mazar-e-Sharif in
Regional Command (North) (RC(N)). Training there was lengthy, complex, reliant on kit
and largely inappropriate for Afghanistan. The course lasted nearly a year, had a high
failure rate and produced no trained operators within Helmand Province in an 18-month
period prior to Operation HERRICK 11. Little or no indigenous force C-IED training by
the UK took place until Operation HERRICK 12 (May 2010) as there was neither sufficient
ANSF capacity nor UK capacity available to assist. This was further complicated by the
fact that the theatre effort initially was too involved trying to understand and counter
the threat.
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8-21. An over-complicated solution. After full ISAF scoping, the solution chosen was for
a NATO Training Mission (Afghanistan) (NTM (A))-delivered equipment and training
package. Initially it was never really given the attention it deserved, was over-ambitious
and arrived too late. However, the UK did provide an OF3 staff lead in HQ Regional
Command (South West) (RC(SW)) and there was a joint US-UK effort to deliver the chosen
training package. UK equipment was lent to do ad hoc training when there was spare
capacity. In hindsight hi-tech solutions proved inappropriate for the ANSF. It was not until
more low-tech means were adopted such as ground sign awareness (GSA) training, joint
patrolling and more human intelligence work, that real progress was made and a useful
capability was developed. This had fully matured by Operation HERRICK 18 and UK C-IED
was able to step back.
Vignette – Pipper electronic countermeasures (Ecm) for the Ansf

8-22. PIPPER was developed by the RC(SW) C-3 C-IED Team and provided the ANSF vital life-
saving electronic countermeasures force protection from 2013. It offered protection from
the most prevalent radio-controlled IED (RCIED) threats in Afghanistan, which were 95%
of the RCIED threat. Before its introduction, RCIEDs had been used to target ANSF. Similar
to ISAF ECM, the introduction of PIPPER did not mean that own communications systems
were jammed and it did not affect mobile phones, radios or televisions.
8-23. While ECM did not make ANSF invincible to IED threats, it did offer a protective ‘bubble’
of 50 metres for all those inside. It could be used mounted in vehicles or by dismounted
patrols when searching or confirming an IED. When dismounted it was not necessary
for the lead searcher to carry it. Its introduction provided the ANSF with a life-saving
capability which boosted morale and confidence at an important moment as they
expanded their forces.
Observation: The application of UK and NATO standards to the ANSF training problem
became an issue. What was really required was an ‘ANSF Good Enough’ solution which
could endure.
Lesson: There is a requirement to develop a more practical indigenous C-IED threat

capability in the future rather than looking solely for an over-complicated equipment
solution.
Lesson: There is a requirement to commence understandable indigenous forces C-IED

training as early as possible in a campaign.
8-24. Defence Engagement - overseas capacity building. A natural expansion of mentoring

was the requirement to help other nations to develop their skills. Upstream capacity
building is embedded in Army 2020, but will require forces to remain fully trained and
focused. There is a direct link between these activities and the wider understand. C-IED
is a high-demand niche area to try to build indigenous capacity. Providing some support
enables a country to deal with IED threats, and can improve their domestic stability.130
Countries like Pakistan are natural choices currently to help, but for the future it would
be wise to establish a plan to ensure there is priority coverage in other parts of the
130 Consistent with the UK’s counterterrorism strategy (CONTEST).

Contents
world of interest. Defence Engagement and upstream capacity building ought to be a

justification for producing more trained high-threat operators to use in this role between
deployments. This is of key importance to the C-IED community and the UK is currently
engaged in C-IED capacity building across the globe, but demand has outstripped
supply.
Lesson: There is a requirement for a permanent C-IED training cadre for indigenous
force training, which was not taken into core. There is now no training cadre with the
reduction of the Collective Training Advisory Cell (CeTAC).
Observation: Defence Engagement and overseas capacity building should become a

formal driver for C-IED organisational structures and capability development.
Special forces (SF) mentored indigenous force tiger teams

8-25. SF mentored indigenous force Tiger Teams (TT) made a significant contribution to the
enablement of ISAF operations in southern Afghanistan. A TT comprised a section of
six policemen from the partnered Afghan Territorial Force (ATF) equipped as a light
role rifle section. This section was mentored and enabled by two SF mentors who
provided the interface between the TT and the combined force (CF) unit with which it
was embedded. Living side-by-side, they operated as one cohesive unit. Providing an
Afghan face and voice to a partnered CF, and ultimately an Afghan lead, enhanced
understanding and could be utilised to achieve the following effects:
a. Intelligence collection. TTs helped answer commander’s critical information

requirements (CCIR) through local engagement. They also helped verify existing
intelligence assessments. Human terrain mapping confirmed a battlespace owner’s
assessment of local power structures.
b. Influence activities.131 TTs supported influence activities through the delivery of

appropriate messaging to the local population. Their assessments also helped support
future influence planning by identifying potential areas of influence among the
Afghan people.
c. ‘Shura’ support. TTs provided a specialist, Afghan-led shura capability. Battlespace

owners used this shura capability to enhance their own understanding of a particular
area, reach out to a select section of the population or deliver focused messaging.
d. Sensitive site access. TTs provided ISAF awareness of, and access to, sensitive or
religious sites thus reducing the possibility of cultural misunderstanding.
e. Call-out and engagement. TTs conducted call-outs of local nationals (LN) from
compounds, enabling collection and providing an Afghan lead to security patrols.
f. Afghan intuition. Through insight and an understanding of local dynamics, politics

and characters, TTs provided enhanced situational awareness and feel. They were
often instrumental in identifying the absence of the normal and/or the presence of
the abnormal.
131 Doctrinally referred to as information activities.

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8-26. The success of the TT model was ensured by enduring SF support to the partnered
ATF. Subunits from the same SF unit provided the mentoring task force for eight years
providing continuity and coherence which CF units rotating every six-months could not
replicate. Other key factors contributed to success, among them:
a. Financial incentive. Partner forces were financed by their national chain of command
but also received substantial ‘top-up’ pay. This additional pay greatly increased
motivation, morale and loyalty. Additionally, an operational bonus was paid for
each day TTs were deployed in the field resulting in greatly increased enthusiasm to
participate in high tempo operations, or those with a longer duration.
b. Equipment. The ATF was equipped to a much higher standard than the majority of
ANSF soldiers. Night vision devices, laser light modules, and the enhanced training
TTs received greatly increased their operational capability and therefore their utility
to partnered ISAF units. The specialist equipment also increased ATF morale by giving
them a sense of pride, self-esteem and elevated status which further encouraged their
commitment and professionalism.
Contents
Case Study 3 -
Capacity building in Nigeria
(Upstream capacity building and capacity building during
conflict)
Background
8-27. An Islamist insurgency has been ongoing in Nigeria since 1999, with several northern
regions adopting Sharia law, and violence between Christians and Muslims accounting
for thousands of deaths. Since 2009, an Islamist insurgent group known as Boko Haram
(translated to mean ‘Western Education is forbidden’) has been active and the death toll
in the country has dramatically increased. Nigerian government forces have struggled to
cope with the escalating conflict which has also spilled across the border into Cameroon.
Great Britain has a long-term relationship with Nigeria, and a large Nigerian diaspora
population resides in the UK.
UK short-term training team (STTT)

8-28. 2 Royal Anglian deployed a number of short-term training teams (STTT) to Nigeria
during 2014 in order to train 72 Special Operations Battalion of the Nigerian Army (NA).
It subsequently provided a discrete team to conduct a train-the-trainer (T3) package to
Nigerian Army instructors at the Nigerian Army School of Infantry (NASI), and further
personnel were also dispatched to train elements of 145 Battalion of the Nigerian Army.
Contents
A small tactical team has the ability to achieve operational and strategic effects
8-29. The deployment was in support of the in-country British Military Advisory Training Team
(BMATT), providing aid to the Nigerian government in containing the existential threat
posed by Boko Haram.
BMATT and UK in country actors

8-30. The BMATT is based in Abuja with a small permanent UK footprint in country, providing
military advice and aid to the Nigerian Army. It also operates in support of the British High
Commission (BHC) in Nigeria.
Mission locations
8-31. The three STTT elements deployed to the following locations: Makurdi (Benue State); Jaji
(Kaduna State); and Kachia (Kaduna State).
Contents
Figure 8-2. Mission locations
The mission
8-32. To deliver infantry training packages to force elements drawn from 72 Special Operations
Battalion and the Nigerian Army School of Infantry in order to provide the Nigerian Army
with an enhanced light role infantry manoeuvre capability.
Training aim
8-33. The principal aim for both STTTs was to deliver a company group tactical pre-deployment
training (PDT) package in order to prepare subunits from 72 Special Operations Battalion
for a deployment to north eastern Nigeria where they would conduct offensive operations
against Boko Haram. Within nine weeks, STTT1 was able to achieve this goal, while STTT2
had to moderate its plan as their training window was reduced to four weeks, thereby
limiting their training to platoon level. In this case (and based on available resources
and the trainees’ start-state) a period of eight to ten weeks appeared to be the optimal
timeframe in which to deliver company-level training.
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STTT establishment
8-34. The STTT comprised the following personnel:
1 ROYAL ANGLIAN STTT HQ

OC - Maj
2IC - WO2
Support staff
General duties staff
RMO - Maj
CQMS - CSgt
2 x CMT1
3 x Pte
SASC - SSgt
Trg Team 1 Trg Team 2 Trg Team 3 Trg Team 4 Trg Team 5
Team Leader (Sgt) Team Leader (Sgt) Team Leader (Sgt) Team Leader (Sgt) Team Leader (Sgt)
Instructor- 2 x Cpl* Instructor- 2 x Cpl* Instructor- 2 x Cpl* Instructor- 2 x Cpl* Instructor- 2 x Cpl*
Instructor- 1 x LCpl Instructor- 1 x LCpl Instructor- 1 x LCpl Instructor- 1 x LCpl Instructor- 1 x LCpl
Note: * Section Commanders’ Battle Course (SCBC) - trained
Figure 8-3. STTT establishment
Conduct of training
8-35. The training consisted of the following activities:
a. Basic soldiering skills (fieldcraft and marksmanship).
b. Live firing marksmanship training (LFMT)/Live firing tactical training (LFTT) ranges.
c. Basic dismounted manoeuvre (focused on offensive operations).
d. Counter-insurgency (COIN) package.
The trainees
8-36. The Nigerian trainees were highly motivated, attentive, receptive, and responded well to
the competitive elements of training. Their basic skills were generally good although there
were weaknesses in weapon handling and marksmanship. Their NCO cadres were also
above average age and this had an effect on their overall fitness levels. Their officers had
an understanding of doctrine, but their application at tactical level was limited, and many
had an aversion to attending training with their soldiers; this is a common weakness and
one that has to be addressed with full participation vital, particularly when establishing
esprit de corps (an important element of the moral component).
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The element of competition; the best soldier award presented at the end of each week
Lessons
8-37. Deployment timelines. Due to the urgent nature and tempo of the requirement, the
deployment timeline was compressed from the normal 105 days’ notice, and was further
squeezed by the additional requirements driven by the Nigerian partners. This created
a number of friction points (force generation, deployment, sustainment and command
and control (C2)). One uplift was requested by the BMATT in response to a larger than
expected partner-nation training audience, and a significant proportion of the timeline
was taken up between the statement of requirement (SOR) being produced by the BMATT
and 2 Royal Anglian receiving it. The importance of maintaining an active edge readiness
posture (ten days’ notice to move) whereby all Military Annual Training Tests (MATTs) were
kept up-to-date allowed the unit to focus its limited mission training windows on the pre-
deployment and mission-specific areas,132 in addition to the required administration and
preparation. The sooner that a unit can be warned off for a STTT deployment will enable
early and more detailed reconnaissance, aid force generation and SOR refinement, and
allow suitable resourcing and planning of PDT. It also presents suitable planning windows
for the partner nation who will be receiving the training.
8-38. Regional alignment. This deployment highlights the benefits of regionally aligning units
to geographical areas (specifically countries), allowing 2 Royal Anglian to deploy multiple
132 This included devising course programmes, lesson plans and planning administrative requirements for trainers and
students.
Contents
elements into discrete areas within a target country, and simplified the force generation
procedures, particularly those conducted at short notice. This has also aided handovers
incountry, ensured that the relationship with the BMATT is close, and that a greater depth
of understanding of the operating environment in Nigeria has been developed.
8-39. Command and control (C2). There was initial confusion as to the C2 architecture of
the mission and this had an impact on the force generation process and delayed the
medical and force protection recces. Early resolution of this critical issue will therefore aid
preparation and allow for concurrent activity to take place.
8-40. Pre-deployment training (PDT). MATTs 1-9 is the mandatory start point with each
soldier also requiring Team Medic and SERE B qualifications, an environmental health
team (EHT) briefing, a G2 threat briefing and legal briefing (covering rules of engagement
(ROE)). The BMATT also provided a brief incountry RSOI package on arrival in Abuja. While
generic briefings are useful, more targeted lectures should be the aim, particularly area
rather than country-specific and also focused specifically on the threats. It would also
have been useful to have received training in soft engagement skills (communication,
negotiation and behaviour detection).
8-41. Movement issues. This included the difficulty in gaining visas (through the MOD visa
section to the Nigerian Embassy in London), conflicting advice on freight allowances
(Defence Supply Chain Operations and Movements (DSCOM) or mover specialists to be
engaged), and the use of French air assets and their conflicting regulations which led to
deployment delays (RAF Mil AT should be the norm, although civilian aviation can also be
used). Similar confusion was experienced during the redeployment back to the UK, and
the use of a forward deployed mover would have reduced this friction.
8-42. Human rights (HR) training/Law of armed conflict (LOAC). This was included in
the training package, and presents a challenge, not just in Nigeria. Troops can deliver a
certain level of training but there may be a requirement for specialists to conduct this
activity; many nations have varying concepts on human rights and rules of engagement,
and any transgressions can become a national ‘red-line’ issue.
All training is conducted with due regard for human rights and international
humanitarian law. Where necessary, other safeguards for potential human rights
violations will be put into place, including seeking high-level assurance that new
capabilities will not be used or misused for the commission of human rights
violations.
Building Stability Overseas Strategy (2011)
8-43. Subject matter expert (SME) training advice. Specialists deployed into training teams
can be force multipliers, and all STTTs should consider task-organising experts to their
teams in order to deepen the effects achieved. For this deployment a Small Arms School
Corps (SASC) senior NCO deployed with both STTTs and supervised the planning and
execution of range practices, in addition to providing education in the concepts and
application of safe systems of training.
Contents
Marksmanship training
8-44. Force protection. Nigeria is a semi-permissive environment and the UK STTT adopted
appropriate and workable force protection plans for the periods when conducting
training, and during movement, an area of significant risk. The local commander’s ability
to constantly monitor atmospherics, to reduce pattern setting and to have the ability to
escalate or reduce force protection posture is a generic skill set across all capacity building
tasks. The use of local armed escorts is a double-edged sword, providing visible protection
but also ensuring that a low profile is more difficult to adopt.
8-45. Real-life support (RLS). This was provided through a combination of the BMATT and 72
Special Operations Battalion. Services provided included: laundry; food (NA chefs and UK
operational ration packs (ORP)); funds for supplementary rations; Internet and satellite TV;
mobile phones; and rest and recuperation (R&R) opportunities. The deployment of a UK
chef and field kitchen, however, would have greatly improved the quality of life for the
deployment period. The BMATT demonstrated the important utility of an in country UK
team with the support that it provided to the STTTs throughout.
8-46. Medical. An RMO and CMT1 were deployed providing a Role 1 capability. This was then
supported by a local Role 2 facility (a local hospital) with an aviation CASEVAC plan
through a civilian contractor. This is a typical medical model for global deployments. While
local facilities may be rudimentary and country-specific professional standards lower than
expected in UK facilities, there is utility in having the RMO deploy on any reconnaissance
trips so that limitations can be identified early.
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8-47. Partner-nation systemic issues. As is common across much of Africa, the Nigerian
Army suffered weaknesses in logistics, equipment care, weapon serviceability and
familiarisation, vehicle maintenance and availability, and lack of investment. This had a
tangible effect on the training that could be achieved and highlighted the issue that UK
training teams must remain flexible and pragmatic in their approach, and then tailor the
training accordingly. It also highlights the importance of the reconnaissance in identifying
these weaknesses early, and thereby better planning the actual training delivery with the
constraints known. There was also a lack of in country training aids, and the UK STTT had
to either import them, or locally produce.
Reinforcing lessons learned after a section attack lane
8-48. Nigerian planning capacity is principally reactive, leading to problems with the
timely production of training resources. Tactics can be viewed as predictable and
outdated and combined arms integration is limited, both from organic support weapons
and external units. There is a lack of mission command, which stifles the development
of low-level leadership, in addition to a reluctance to share information. Many of the
equipment care and logistic issues are generic and commonly found by other STTTs in
all parts of the world, and simple measures related to equipment husbandry should be
factored in to all deployments.
Contents
8-49. The moral component. The UK STTT were able to ply their trade, imparting knowledge
to the partner nation knowing that this was to be used immediately post-training in
combat operations. Instructors felt great pride in the knowledge that their partner-nation
trainees would be more professional and effective once deployed. Individually the UK
soldiers matured and gained rewarding experience as trainers and leaders, in addition to
experiencing a new and unusual environment, thereby providing both professional and
personal development; it is also retention positive.
‘Icebreakers’ (command tasks) used by the instructors helped create bonding between teams and reinforced teamwork
Conclusion
8-50. This deployment demonstrates that a well-prepared unit can deploy at short notice to
conduct tactical-level activities which provide strategic effect, and can set the conditions
for further higher-level engagement between the two partner nations. The activity
also delivered tactical success in north eastern Nigeria, highlighting the importance of
determining effects or objectives as the ultimate measurements of effectiveness (MOE) of
the STTT, rather than an output of Nigerian trainees. It was also hugely rewarding for the
UK soldiers on both professional and personal levels.
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CASE STUDY 4 - Operation

NEWCOMBE, European Union
training mission in Mali (EUTM-
Mali) (downstream capacity building)
Background
8-51. During 2012-13 a number of events took place which created a political, humanitarian
and security crisis in Mali, a country situated in the Sahel region of North Africa. In
the north of the country Jihadist Armed Groups (JAG) including al-Qa’ida in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA)133
emerged to threaten regional stability, and this was exacerbated by the re-emergence
of separatist and extremist Tuareg groups claiming secession from the state and the
formation of an autonomous Tuareg homeland centred on the Azawad region; these
groups included Ansar Dine and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
(MNLA).
8-52. The security issue was further complicated by a coup d’état on 21 March 2012 staged by
a small element in the Malian armed forces under the lead of Captain Amadou Sanogo.
This group was angered by the policies of the government and forced the removal of the
President Amadou Toumani Touré.
8-53. In response to the gains made by the armed groups in the north, which was threatening
the capital Bamako, and on request of the Malian government, the French launched an
intervention into northern Mali known as Operation SERVAL on 11 January 2013 with
ground and air elements. This neutralised the armed elements and provided some stability
to the situation, allowing firstly ECOWAS134 and latterly the UN, through its mission
MINUSMA135 to gain a foothold in the country and start to deploy its civilian and military
components. Government control was restored in the south with jailing of the coup
leaders, re-establishment of a unified government and an election in September 2013 of a
new President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta.
133 Also known as Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) and Mouvement pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en
Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO).
134 Economic Community of West African States. The Force deployed was known as AFISMA (African-led International
Support Mission to Mali).
135 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.
Contents
This business of being persistently engaged overseas provides you with the basis
that you can then operate with agility and with precision. I think a lot of us
looking in on what the French did in Mali have great respect for the insight and
understanding that they developed over many years in that part of Africa and then
were able to respond with agility and precision. It looked like they were taking
significant risk but they weren’t, because they knew what they were doing.
Chief of the General Staff, speech to Chatham House (17 February 2015)
Malian GTIA troops training
EUTM-MALI
8-54. On 18 February 2013 at the request of the Malian authorities, the European Union
(EU) launched a training mission for the Malian armed forces. Involving 28 states,
it was mandated to help restore constitutional and democratic order through the
implementation of a road map, aid the Malian authorities to exercise their sovereignty
over the whole of the country and to neutralise organised crime and terrorist threats. It
trained Malian battlegroups known as GTIA136 at Koulikoro Training Camp (KTC) while
providing advice and expertise at the operational and strategic-levels through an advisory
task force (ATF) whereby individuals mentor partners within the Malian armed forces’
hierarchy and its Ministry of Defence.137
136 Groupement Tactique Interarmes.

137 This advice is aimed at command and control (C2), logistic support, human resources, operational preparation
and intelligence.
Contents
Mission area
8-55. The EUTM-Mali is not mandated to conduct combat operations and is bounded to the
south of the country through its mission area.
SAHARA OCC.
ALGÈRIE
Zouérat
AZAWAD
Tessalit Adrar
des ifoghas
MAURITANIE Tinzawaténe
Kidal
Tombouctou
Kiffa
Niger Gao
Mopti
Kayes Ségou NIGER
Ouagadougou
Bamako Niamey
BURKINA
Sikasso FASO
GUINÈE BÈNIN
CÔTE GHANA
D’IVOIRE
Figure 8-4. Mission area (in blue)
UK contribution
8-56. The UK provided a limited number of staff officers in key appointments in the mission
headquarters in Bamako, but its main element was based at KTC in the form of a joint
UK and Irish Training Team (UKITT). This comprised 27 soldiers, with an additional six
from the Irish Defence Forces (IDF) who conduct the tactical-level training of the Malian
GTIAs. The soldiers were mixed to form four coherent training teams with a command
element consisting of the officer commanding and his support staff. There was also a
small team from the UK Stabilisation Unit providing international humanitarian law (IHL)
training, a key element of the EUTM mission. The UK training team therefore provided
administration, pastoral and force protection support to the stabilisation unit personnel.
Contents
UKITT HQ
OC – OF3
Ops Offr – OF2
G4 SNCO – OR6
RLD – OR2
Clerk – OR4
Medic – OR3
Armourer – OR1
International Humanitarian Law

(IHL) Team
2 – 3 pax from the SU
Trg Team 1 Trg Team 2 Trg Team 3 Trg Team 4 (Sp Wpns)
1 x OF1 1 x OF1 (IDF) 1 x OF1 1 x OF1
1 x OR5 (IDF) 1 x OR5 (IDF) 1 x OR5 (IDF) 1 x OR5
2 x OR4 1 x OR4 2 x OR4 (1 x IDF) 2 x OR4 (1 x IDF)
1 x OR3 3 x OR3 1 x OR3 1 x OR3
1 x OR2 1 x OR2 2 x OR2 1 x OR2
Figure 8-5. UK and Irish Training Team (UKITT) establishment
The mission
8-57. The lead nation was provided by the French. There were 180 trainers, split into three
training companies, and a number of specialist elements. There was also a headquarters
staff, and enablers, including a German hospital and a joint Belgian/Spanish force
protection (FP) element. In total there were approximately 400 EU personnel in KTC with
80 staff manning the mission headquarters in Bamako.
Contents
MCdr
DMCdr MA LEGAD POLAD PIO MSC
SUPPORT
COS
GROUP
XO
J1 J2
ATF MED
… KTC
(+)
J4 J3 FP KTC Cdt
ROLE 1
J6 J5 MHQ Fwd
AIR
J8 J7 MEDEVAC
I
EOD TRAINING
LO JMED
FP
MEDICAL
VET HELO LO
INFO OPS ROLE 1 ROLE 2
Figure 8-6. The mission
Notes: Principal staff (yellow), Mission HQ branches (green), MCdr’s cabinet staff (red),
Koulikoro Training Camp (KTC) branches (blue); MSC – Mission Support Cell; ATF –
Advisory Task Force.
Contents
The Malian armed forces
BG
Staff
Recce Engr Tp
TACP
1st Rifle 2nd Rifle 3rd Rifle Armd Arty Log

Coy Coy Coy Sqn Bty Sqn
Inf Pl Inf Pl Inf Pl Armd Tp Arty Tp Tpt
Fire Sp Fire Sp Fire Sp Armd Tp Arty Tp Maint

Pl Pl Pl
Armd Tp Arty Tp Med
HMG HMG HMG
ATk ATk ATk
Mor Mor Mor
Figure 8-7. Malian GTIA establishment
8-58. The basic training of the Malian armed forces took place centrally at KTC, utilising the
local region as a training area. KTC had a number of indoor and outdoor classrooms,
sandpits for models, and an obstacle course. The local area consisted of varied terrain
with thick scrub, rocky outcrops, wadis and open valleys; seasonal variations determined
suitability for lessons. There were also a large number of abandoned buildings which were
used with permission. It was suitable for company and GTIA-level exercises. There was an
OBUA complex near to KTC made up of a series of abandoned buildings known as ‘ghost
village’, and a 600 metre purpose-built ten-lane range at Tanabougou.
Contents
A French instructor in the OBUA complex
8-59. The construct of the training is shown in the Figure 8-8.
2 weeks 2 weeks 5 weeks 3 weeks

Coy Cdrs
Company BG
Plt Cdrs Effort at platoon level
level level
Commanders’ Basic Specialised training Area Offensive GTIA

cadre training (including 1 x week of urban training) control &
defensive
operations
Leadership Initiation Specialisation Combination

training
During this phase the During this phase

young officers of the the new arrivals will
GTIA will receive undergo an induction
leadership and tactical and equipment issue
training, designed to process, a fitness During this phase the GTIA will progress from section During the final phase of the
develop company-level and tactical to company-level training. Additionally drivers, course, the company starts to
officers in battle assessment, and sharpshooters and mortarmen, once identified and operate as a company group
procedure, tactical training at individual assessed, will all undergo specialist training in their and progresses to GTIA-level
briefings and tactics. and section level. fields of expertise. operations.
Figure 8-8. Training construct

Contents
8-60. Training was objectives-based, allowing training teams to be flexible in designing their
own training programmes, which were produced weekly for J7 approval. At the GTIA-
level there were four specific objectives to be achieved:
a. Offensive operations.
b. Defensive operations.
c. Stabilisation and framework operations (known as ‘area control’, or ‘controlling the

zone’) (this was the main effort).
d. Advance to contact.
8-61. A series of tasks and missions are derived from these objectives, which had to be achieved
at section, platoon and company levels. They were underpinned by basic skills that each
soldier had to master. Good practice was shared between training teams during a weekly
trainers’ meeting. This meeting also allowed for control of training resources. Weekly
routine involved two days in the field, a day of shooting and mandatory medical and IHL
training. Daily routine started at 0630 hours with muster parade and physical training
with lessons commencing at 0830 hours and lasted for four hours. Lessons restarted at
1530 hours due to the heat and finished at 1730 hours. Periods in the field had more
flexible working hours. UK forces mentored counterparts, focusing on leadership training
and utilising the British Army’s values and standards as basic tenets of behaviour both for
themselves and their trainees. They also focused on International Humanitarian Law (IHL),
counter-indirect fire (C-IDF) and counter-IED training.
Prepare for austere conditions. A typical classroom.

Contents
Additional training
8-62. Company commanders’ courses. Conducted at Koulikoro Training Camp (KTC).
8-63. Refresher training. Refresher training (also referred to as ‘mobile training’) of GTIAs
was also introduced in 2014. This focused on GTIAs as they returned from operations in
the north, and prior to their redeployment back on operations. It was initially conducted
for the first module in Kati which is in the vicinity of Bamako, but was extended to
conducting the training in Malian garrisons (hence the term ‘mobile training’). This
demonstrated a commitment to the Malian Armed Forces and highlights that potentially
logical Western solutions (continuing to train centrally in KTC) have to be balanced with
the needs and wishes of the partner nation (requested by the Malians to conduct the
‘mobile training’ in their home garrisons). This however, presented additional logistical
and force protection burdens on the EUTM.
A key lesson is that a team of trainers has to be comfortable with delivering

something that is flavoured and influenced by the necessities of the operating
environment, rather than a text book solution.
Op NEWCOMBE post-operational report (September 2014)
British troops advising their Malian partners

Contents
Conclusion
8-64. This mission highlights the effects that can be achieved through shared endeavour within
a coalition. The UK contributed in a training capacity, but also through selected staff
appointments in the mission headquarters. The partner-nation trainees deployed straight
onto operations after the training, delivering tangible effects in stabilising northern Mali,
and a process was in place to effectively capture the measurements of effectiveness (good
and bad); this was achieved through Operation SERVAL interaction, open source reports
and by conducting formal debriefs with the GTIA when they returned from operations.
The mission has widened to include refresher training, ‘mobile training’, and also provided
selected niche courses based on the Malians’ needs and requirements. The mission had
an effect at the tactical level, but also focused on the operational and strategic levels
through the ATF.
Contents
CASE STUDY 5 -
Operation SHADER (downstream capacity
building and capacity building during conflict)
Background
Flexible, agile, adaptable and driven by the needs of the Peshmerga.
Infantry Training Team Lessons, Op SHADER (September 2015)
8-65. Operation TELIC in Iraq officially ended in 2011. In 2013 as the result of conflict in Syria
and worsening conditions in Iraq, an insurgency recommenced out of the ashes of al-
Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) with a new group, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).138
The Iraqi Army (IA) suffered a number of setbacks and limited UK reintervention was
required as part of a US-led counter-ISIL coalition. While the US have deployed under
Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, the UK operation name is SHADER. This précis highlights
UK involvement under one of four campaign aims supporting military operations -
capacity building and training. It provides a summary of lessons, observations and
insights into a ‘downstream capacity building’ task, albeit in a theatre where conflict has
reignited. This case study takes a number of diverse lessons from several iterations of
training.
UK short-term training team (STTT) and aim

8-66. 2 YORKS sent a small company minus-sized STTT of 45 personnel to train the Kurdistan
Regional Forces (KRG) Peshmerga initially in the use of heavy machine-guns (HMG) but
later providing a more generic dismounted close combat (DCC) infantry training package.
The team took medic, chef and armourer support.
Instant rapport was formed with our Peshmerga brothers. They proved to be
eager to learn, motivated and professional in their approach, their focus no doubt
sharpened by their impending deployment to Kirkuk.
Burma Company 2 YORKS post-operational report
138 Also referred to as Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Islamic State (IS) and Daesh.
Contents
8-67. This establishment was altered with the second deployment of 2 PWRR, shown in the
figure below.
UK building partner capacity

(Kurdistan) (BPC (K))
Infantry training team Counter- improvised Weapons maintenance

explosive device (C-IED) training team
training team
Note: 77 pax total, 55 delivering training
Figure 8-9. 2 PWRR, Building Partner Capacity (BPC) establishment
Lessons and observations

8-68. Pre-deployment training (PDT). As part of the PDT, support company from 2 YORKS
provided internal training to the Burma Company short-term training team (STTT) who
were due to deliver the HMG training module to the Peshmerga. The HMGs had been
‘gifted’ by the UK to the Peshmerga.
Observation: This highlights the requirement to conduct familiarisation training in the

UK prior to deploying in order to establish credibility with the partner nation. It also
demonstrates that any gifting must have a support plan incorporated, in this case training
and maintenance. Gifting alone should never take place.
8-69. HMG Training. A UK training team of 12 personnel delivered three HMG training
modules of five days each. The module included how to operate and maintain the HMG,
how to tactically employ them, and how to use the weapon system legally (rules of
engagement, Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)). Basic weapon proficiency was poor and
detailed weapon handling training was essential, followed by weapon handling tests to
confirm proficiency. All zeroing was conducted at 25 metres after weapons had been
bore-sighted, but the partner nation lacked understanding of grouping and zeroing, and
this theory lesson should be planned for when dealing with partner-nation marksmanship
training. The marksmanship principles also provide a simple method of better ensuring
success for the partner nation when they progressed to live firing.
Lesson: Basic weapon handling, grouping, zeroing and marksmanship principles need to
be mastered before progressing to live firing.
Contents
Heavy machine gun training
8-70. Live firing. The training location was situated on the outskirts of Irbil, and culminated
with a live-fire day to confirm that skills had been assimilated. The conduct of ranges was
difficult to coordinate as the partner nation was unfamiliar with normal live-firing rules
and conduct.
Observation: Use two interpreters, one to assist the range conducting officer (RCO) on
the firing point, and one to monitor the waiting details and assist with concurrent activity.
8-71. The words of command used during live-firing practices were often lost in
translation which added to the confusion among the firers, and caused them to
carry out incorrect drills.
Observation: The use of rehearsal of concept (ROC) drills on ranges prior to commencing
live firing will reduce the issues, and the use of extra safety supervisors should also be
considered.
Contents
Sharpshooter training on the range
8-72. Infantry battle course (IBC). This was conducted during the 2 PWRR tour and fluctuated
in focus and scale. It was delivered over six weeks at Menila Training Centre (MTC) with
the UK training team instructing a company and company headquarters, and focused on
the key tenets of ‘shoot, move, communicate’. The training programme was informed by
the needs of the Peshmerga and was directed principally towards defence, but founded
on offensive soldiering skills of the individual, section and platoon. This developed low-
level competency. A concurrent training programme aimed at the company headquarters
centred on command and leadership, sub unit tactics and military decision making.
The culmination of the training brought the two elements together to conduct a rural
company manoeuvre exercise, with a secondary aim of preparation for a potential
battalion-level exercise if the competency allows.
8-73. Equipment. Personal protection equipment (PPE) was not readily available to the
partner nation, and it may have been useful to include this as an element of the gifting
package with the HMGs, although the UK training team may need to identify sizing
once in country and the equipment then being sent as a secondary package. In practice,
equipment was sourced in an ad hoc fashion incountry by the UK training team, but there
also needs to be an acceptance that range rules may not conform to UK standards.
8-74. Equipment care. The partner nation had little comprehension of equipment care,
particularly when dealing with weapon cleaning. Concurrent activity on static ranges was
focused on how to clean their weapons, and how to identify common basic faults.
Contents
8-75. The final element of training was a maintainers’ package aimed at armourers, and this
also deliver a train-the-trainer (T3) module to their instructors.
Lesson: A T3 module provides the partner nation with the ability to train itself, and allows
the UK training team the ability to disengage if required.
8-76. Collective tactical training. Towards the end of the HMG module, an opportunity arose
in which to conduct further unplanned training – in this case collective infantry training
(dismounted close combat (DCC)). The units to be trained had previously received training
from US elements, were well-equipped and highly motivated. Their role was identified as
that which would achieve significant effect in the area of operations.
Insight: There may be opportunities to conduct further training, but it should be cleared
through the appropriate chain of command to ensure that it is coherent with the UK
strategic plan, and that it also conforms to the requirements of the partner nation. When
dealing with partner-nation units who have received training from other coalition partners,
it is useful to coordinate, to reduce the chance of ‘mentoring fratricide’.
8-77. A three-week training module was devised which had two elements; sharpshooter/
counter-sniper capability and a generic capability. The generic capability included:
a. Marksmanship.
b. Medical.
c. Basic C-IED.
d. HMG.
e. Individual skills and team tactics.
f. Urban operations (offensive and defensive).
g. Officer mentoring.
8-78. Each of the two elements was run by officers and NCOs from Burma Company. A general
shortage of blank ammunition, both for UK trainers and to issue to the Peshmerga, had
a detrimental effect on the overall training module. Blank ammunition can be used in
demonstrations, and can highlight the importance of rates of fire, fire control orders, and
appropriate moments to switch fire – it aids visualisation.
Contents
We quickly established that the Peshmerga are kinesthetic139 and visual learners,
and react much better to demonstrations and practical work than to theory
lessons. Our instructors would look to minimise the amount of talking they did
and to maximise the time available for soldiers to practice the drills being taught,
explaining the theory as they went along. Demo troops were effective at visually
communicating the key learning points of the lessons.
8-79. Support. The UK training team lived in a house allocated to them within a Peshmerga
camp and the partner nation provided real-life support (RLS), interpreters and force
protection (FP).
Observation: While there remain risks with dependency on the partner nation, each
deployment will have a different context and the transactional relationship can deepen
the relationship between the UK training team and the partner nation. It is also important
that the local UK commander on the ground can determine force protection requirements
(but with a line of communication up the UK chain of command) – “The Peshmerga took
the protection of the 2 YORKS personnel extremely seriously. Adding an overt sentry
threatened to offend the hosts and undo some of the rapport they had built, which in
itself affects force protection”.140
8-80. Resources. The UK training team deployed with a lack of strategic communications
equipment, and had to work around using RAF support helicopters (SH) communications
once in theatre. This was achieved through a secure satellite phone and beyond line of
sight (BLOS). There should also be the option of taking equipment such as electronic
countermeasures (ECM), enhanced combat body armour (ECBA), and personal locator
beacons (PLB). The team deployed with combat equipment marching order (CEMO) and a
black grip bag between two, based on the premise that ‘less is more’, and this provided
the ability to move quickly, extract easily, and also reinforced the ability of an infantryman
to remain comfortable in austere conditions. Large quantities of equipment were sent
forward to the UK training team without their request, consent or knowledge; this
created issues as there was no plan in place to either collect or store it.
8-81. 2 YORKS deployed without a government procurement card (GPC) and had to carry large
quantities of cash. This is a potential risk. To compound this issue, an overly prescriptive
process was put in place via the UK chain of command that meant authority had to be
sought prior to purchasing items, and then additional scrutiny was directed at how money
had been spent. This was a frustration to the UK training team and demonstrated a lack
of trust in the deployed commander. Mapping was not produced by the Geo Cell in time
for the deployment, and this process needs to be improved.
139 Kinesthetic is a learning style in which learning takes place by the students carrying out physical activities rather than
listening to a lecture or watching demonstrations. Kinesthetic learners are commonly referred to as ‘do-ers’.
140 Op SHADER Lessons Capture, dated 22 June 2015.
Contents
8-82. Training. MATTs provided a suitable baseline, although additional training in survive,
evade, resist, extract (SERE),141 medical and driving (including civilian armoured vehicles
(CAV)). Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) refresher training was conducted prior to
deployment.
The most significant success story was the sharpshooter/counter-sniper course

which, over three weeks saw the Peshmerga develop from struggling to hit a
target at 60 metres to successful first round strikes (with unprompted corrections)
onto a head-size target at 960 metres. This gave the Peshmerga not only a
significant capability but also a confidence that would prove beneficial in the
planning and conduct of operations.
Conclusion
8-83. The Peshmerga were enthusiastic and eager to learn, and there was a noticeable
improvement in their skills on a daily basis. As one of the UK team leaders described:
Our aim was focused on making each peshmerga soldier better.142
The fact that the partner-nation forces were due to use their newly-acquired skills in
combat against ISIL also added to the professional satisfaction that the UK training teams
gained from this training delivery. This module also demonstrates the flexibility required to
deliver a planned package (heavy machine gun), with the ability to seize opportunities to
deliver further training in country, albeit with caution to ensure that it is suitable for the
partner nation and fits within the UK and coalition’s strategic plan.
141 A SERE(B) course would have been the ideal solution.

142 OC UK BPC Training Team, Op SHADER Force Generation Conference, Headquarters Army (8 October 2015).
Contents

Contents
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Contents

Army Field Manual Tactics for Stability Operations AC 72098

Part 5: Military Support

ii | Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS & Conditions of Release

Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5 | iii

General Officer Commanding 1st (United Kingdom) Division

NATO AJP-3.16 AJP-3.16 AJP-3.22 AJP-3.4.1

JOINT JCN 1/14 JDP 05 JDN 1/15

Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5 | v

Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5 | vii

Chapter 3 - Capacity building within a military framework 3-1

Chapter 4 - Capacity building approach and principles 4-1

ANNEX A to Chapter 4 - Capacity building definitions 4A-1

viii | Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5

PART B - Delivery PB-1

Annex A to Chapter 5 - Capacity building actions and effects terminology 5A-1

Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5 | ix

Police capacity building 7-9

Annex A to Chapter 7- Risk 7A-1

Chapter 8 - Case studies 8-1

Case Study 2 - Operation HERRICK 8-6

Case Study 3 - Capacity building in Nigeria 8-11

x | Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5

CASE STUDY 4 - Operation NEWCOMBE 8-20

CASE STUDY 5 - Operation SHADER 8-30

Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5 | PA-1

Part A establishes the policy, doctrinal and conceptual context

Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5 | 1-1

1-02. Capacity building is a tactical function as well as an activity. As a tactical function,

a. support to security sector reform (SSR);

b. support to initial restoration of essential services; and

c. support to interim governance tasks.

1 ADP Land Operations, paragraph 8-28.

1-2 | Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5

1-08. Security force assistance, alongside capacity building as an element of Defence

Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5 | 1-3

Photo Credit: Shutterstock.com

The UK government approach

Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5 | 2-1

f. The UK’s counterterrorism strategy (CONTEST).

g. The Serious and Organised Crime Strategy.

2-03. The UK approach to stabilisation. The UK government’s approach to stabilisation

10 Doctrinal hierarchy for capacity building is included in the preface.

2-2 | Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5

b. P2 – Promote, consolidate and strengthen political processes. A political arena

c. P3 – Preparing for longer-term recovery. All stages of capacity building (upstream,

a. Protect our people.

b. Project our global influence.

c. Promote our prosperity.13

c. Investment in upstream prevention to help build robust, legitimate states capable

Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5 | 2-3

National Security Strategy (NSS)

Strategic Defence & Security Review (SDSR)

International Defence Engagement Strategy

Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS)

Counterterrorism strategy (CONTEST)

Serious and Organised Crime Stragegy

2-4 | Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5

2-08. International Defence Engagement Strategy (IDES). Defence Engagement is the

National security vision

National security objectives

Develop Prevent Capability and Promote Access and