ADMIN | LDCS

KMU V. GARCIA

239 SCRA 386

FACTS:

The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and the Land Transportation Franchising
and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) released memoranda allowing provincial bus operators to charge
passengers rates within 15% above and below the official LTFRB rate for a period of one year. Provincial
Bus Operators Association of the Philippines applied for fare rate increase. This was opposed by the
Philippine Consumer Foundation, Inc. and Perla Bautista as they were exorbitant and unreasonable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provincial bus operators have authority to reduce and increase fare rates based on
the order of the LTFRB

HELD:

The Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing rates of public
services and the LTFRB is likewise vested with the same. Such delegation is permitted in order to adapt
to the increasing complexity of modern life. The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus
operators to set a fare range is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative
authority. Potestas delegata non delegari protest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. A
further delegation of power would constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in
the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. The policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to
change their fares would lead to a chaotic situation and would leave the riding public at the mercy of
transport operators.
 ADMIN | LDCS

PASEI V. TORRES

212 SCRA 298

FACTS:

DOLE Dept. Order No. 16 temporarily suspends the recruitment by private employment agencies of
Filipino DH going to Hong Kong in view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the
protection for the same. The DOLE, through POEA took over the business of deploying such HK-bound
workers. Pursuant to the above order, POEA issued memorandum circular no. 30 providing guidelines on
the government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to HK and the accreditation of
HK recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers, and the memorandum circular No.
30, pertaining to the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for HK. Petitioner
contends that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making
authority in issuing said circulars.

ISSUE:

w/n the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making
authority in issuing said circulars.

HELD:

No. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate
recruitment and placement activities. On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the
POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 on May 1, 1982 to take over the functions of the
Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment
functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging. The assailed circulars do not
prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers
for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the
same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication
conferred" upon the respondents. Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for
lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in
Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987. The administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and
implemented.
 ADMIN | LDCS

SANTIAGO V. COMELEC

270 SCRA 106

FACTS:

In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend Constitution, to lift term limits of
elective officials, by people’s initiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and supervise said people’s
initiative the signature-gathering all over the country. The proposition is: “Do you approve of lifting the
term limits of all elective government officials, amending for the purpose Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article VI,
Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article 8 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution?” Said
Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least 12% total
number of registered voters in the country, it will be formally filed with the COMELEC. COMELEC in turn
ordered Delfin for publication of the petition. Petitioners Sen. Roco et al moved for dismissal of the
Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
(a) Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by
law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed. (b) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for 3
systems on initiative but failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the
other modes of initiative. This deliberate omission indicates matter of people’s initiative was left to
some future law. (c) COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of people’s
initiative. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law. d. People’s
initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of
term limits constitutes a revision. e. Congress nor any government agency has not yet appropriated
funds for people’s initiative.

ISSUE:

W/n the people can directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative
under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution

HELD:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 It was intended to include or cover people’s initiative on amendments to the
Constitution but, as worded, it does not adequately cover such intiative. Article XVII Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution providing for amendments to Constitution, is not self-executory. While the
Constitution has recognized or granted the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution via PI, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for
its implementation. What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognized exceptions to the
rule are: [1] Delegation of tariff powers to the President; [2] Delegation of emergency powers to the
President; [3] Delegation to the people at large; [4] Delegation to local governments; and [5] Delegation
to administrative bodies. Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi judicial
functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority. In every
case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only
if the law. Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 did not apply to constitutional amendment.
 ADMIN | LDCS

US V. ANG TANG HO

43 PHIL 1

FACTS:

In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868
entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under
extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and
Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG
issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at
which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro
Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the
EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the
said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00
fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor
General.

ISSUE

Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

HELD:

First of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the
publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be
convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the
order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act
wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be
put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the
insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could
not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete
in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must
be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form
and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
 ADMIN | LDCS

YNOT V. IAC

148 SCRA 659

FACTS:

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen
the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces
but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from
Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as
unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority
provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional.
The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to
promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

HELD:

we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is
unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the
right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby
declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
 ADMIN | LDCS

DAR V. SUTTON

GR No. 162070 October 19 2005

FACTS:

Respondents herein inherited a land which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding.
Pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a
voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the
law. a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock,
poultry and swine. Thereafter, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR this
Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of
agricultural land. Hence, we declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they
included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform. Thus, respondents filed with petitioner DAR
a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising
and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. However, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993
which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry
and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. The DAR Secretary
issued an Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of
CARL but applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9. Respondents moved for
reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted
exclusively to cattle-raising and appealing that the DAR A.O. No. 9 be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 which prescribes a maximum retention
for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional

HELD:

The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and
prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution
.The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry- raising are industrial
activities and do not fall within the definition of “agriculture” or “agricultural activity.” The raising of
livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural
activity. DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution
from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O. The assailed
A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of
agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution
 ADMIN | LDCS

SOLGEN V. MMA

204 SCRA 837

FACTS:

The Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1992 under the specific authority
conferred upon it by EO 392 authorizing itself “to detach the license plate/tow and impound
attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in
Metro Manila.Later on in the case of Gonong, the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates
of motor vehicles and confiscation of driver’s license for traffic violations were not among the sanctions
that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605.Several complaints were filed
before the Court as to the said confiscations by police authorities or traffic enforcers as sanction/s for
traffic violations. In defense, one of the defendants in one ofthose complaints invoked another
ordinance- Ordinance No. 7 Series of 1988 of Mandaluyong justified on the basis of the General Welfare
Clause embodied in the Local Government Code authorizing the said confiscations for traffic violations.

ISSUE:

WON the exercise of Metro Manila Authority’s delegated power is valid.

HELD:

NO. The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national
legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal.
To test the validity of such acts, The Court applied the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid
down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.According to Elliot, a municipal
ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5)
must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.The Gonong
decision shows that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do
not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of
license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan
Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions ofthe decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila
Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions. In fact, the
provisions of PD 605 prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila.The requirement
that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Localpolitical subdivisions are
able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature
(except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the
Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate
legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at
all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely
local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute
 ADMIN | LDCS

BOEI TAKEDA V. DELA SERNA

228 SCRA 329

FACTS:

Presidential Decree No. 851, The ThirTeenTh MonTh Pay Law, defines "Basic Salary" as which shall
include all renumeratons or earnings paid by an employer To an employee For services rendered buT
may noT include cosT oF living allowances profiT sharing paymenTs, and all allowances and monetary
benefits which are not considered or integrated as parT oF The regular or basic salary oF The employee.
While on The, Revised Guidelines on The ImplemenTaton oF The 13Th MonTh Pay Law promulgaTed by
Then Labor SecreTary ranklinDrilon included The These salary-relaTed benefTs as parT oF The basic
salary in The compuTatonoF The 13Th monTh pay. Pettoners in This case were ordered To pay Their
employees due TounderpaymenT oF 13ThmonTh pay pursuanT To The Revised Guidelines. Pettoners
conTendedhowever under P.D. 851, The 13Th monTh pay is based solely on basic salary. As defned by
Thelaw iTselF and clarifed by The implementng and SupplemenTary Rules as well as by The
SupremeCourT in a long line oF decisions, remuneratons which do noT Form parT oF The basic or
regularsalary oF an employee, such as commissions, should noT be considered in The compuTaton
oFThe 13Th monTh pay. ±his being The case, The Revised Guidelines on The ImplemenTaton oF The13Th
MonTh Pay Law issued by Then SecreTary Drilon providing For The inclusion oF commissionsin The 13Th
monTh pay, were issued in excess oF The sTaTuTory auThoriTy conFerred by P.D. 851.

ISSUE:

WheTher or noT The Revised Guidelines on The ImplemenTaton oF The 13Th MonTh PayLaw issued by
Then SecreTary Drilon providing For The inclusion oF commissions in The 13ThmonTh pay, were issued
in excess oF The sTaTuTory auThoriTy conFerred by P.D. 851

HELD:

In including commissions in The compuTaton oF The 13Th monTh pay, The secondparagraph oF Secton
5(a) oF The Revised Guidelines on The ImplemenTaton oF The 13Th MonThPay Law unduly expanded
The concepT oF "basic salary" as defned in P.D. 851. IT is aFundamenTal rule ThaT implementng rules
cannoT add To or deTracT From The provisions oF Thelaw iT is designed To implemenT. AdminisTratve
regulatons adopTed under legislatve auThoriTyby a partcular deparTmenT musT be in harmony wiTh
The provisions oF The law They are inTendedTo carry inTo e³ecT. ±hey cannoT widen iTs scope. An
adminisTratve agency cannoT amend an acToF Congress.
 ADMIN | LDCS

UNITED BF HOMES ASSOCIATION V. BF HOMES

310 SCRA 304

FACTS:

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) placed respondent BF Homes, Inc. (BFHI) under
receivership to undergo a ten-year (10) rehabilitation program due to its financial difficulties. Petitioner
UBFHAI was created and registered with the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) in 1989,
and recognized as the sole representative of all the homeowners' association inside the BF Homes
Parañaque Subdivision. Respondent BFHI, through its receiver, turned over to petitioner UBFHAI the
administration and operation of the subdivision's clubhouse and a strip of open space in 1989 and 1993,
respectively. In 1994, the first receiver was relieved and a new committee of receivers, composed of
respondent BFHI's eleven (11) members of the board of directors was appointed. Petitioner UBFHAI filed
with the HIGC a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction against respondent BFHI alleging
that the committee of receivers illegally revoked their security agreement with the previous receiver.
Without filing an answer to the petition with HIGC, respondent BFHI filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for prohibition for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, to
enjoin HIGC from proceeding with the case. The Court of Appeals granted respondent BFHI's petition for
prohibition and also ordered HIGC's hearing officer to refrain from hearing and to dismiss it for lack of
jurisdiction. Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals

HELD:

In the present case, the HIGC went beyond the authority provided by the law when it promulgated the
revised rules of procedure. There was a clear attempt to unduly expand the provisions of Presidential
Decree 902-A. As provided in the law, insofar as the association's franchise or corporate existence is
involved, it is only the State, not the "general public or other entity" that could question this. The
appellate court correctly held that: "The inclusion of the phrase GENERAL PUBLIC OR OTHER ENTITY is a
matter which HIGC cannot legally do . . . ." The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a
delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by Congress or
the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory
provisions control what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as with
respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is
administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.
Moreover, where the legislature has delegated to an executive or administrative officers and boards
authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative
officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority-granting
statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an
administrative body to legislate. "A statutory grant of powers should not be extended by implication
 ADMIN | LDCS

beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution." It is axiomatic that a rule or
regulation must bear upon, and be consistent with, the provisions of the enabling statute if such rule or
regulation is to be valid.

LUPANGCO V. CA

160 scra 848

FACTS:

PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying
for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to
take the licensure examinations in accountancy, filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction with a
prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the
latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.

HELD:

It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be
reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the
purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. Resolution
No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how
they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking
all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants.
They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors
 ADMIN | LDCS

PEOPLE V. QUE PO LAY

94 PHIL 640

FACTS:

Defendant-appellant Que Po Lay was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S.
checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000. He failed to sell the same to the Central Bank
through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular
No. 20. The appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official
Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular had
no force and effect. Defendant-appellant contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930
both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general
applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and
2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation
of a law in order to have force and effect

HELD:

Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the
absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the
publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386)
equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the
Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its
issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. Moreover, as a rule,
circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which
prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general
principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said
contents and its penalties. In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in
the year 1949, it was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's
conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any
legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951.
 ADMIN | LDCS

TANADA V. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446

FACTS:

Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval.
The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees.
The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential
Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not. The publication means
complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a comment required
by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and
therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new civil code
meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when
necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of
due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force and effect
 ADMIN | LDCS

PEOPLE V. MACEREN

79 SCRA 450

FACTS:

The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 whichpenalizes
electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Lawand the law creating
the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the complaint andheld that the law does not
clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicialdepartments cannot consider the same.
On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, thisappeal to the SC

HELD:

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheriesexceeded their
authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does notexpressly prohibit electro
fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it.Had the lawmaking body
intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect couldhave been easily embodied in
the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to anexecutive official the power to declare
what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize theissuance of regulations and the imposition of
the penalty provided for in the law itself. Where thelegislature has delegated to executive or
administrative officers and boards authority to promulgaterules to carry out an express legislative
purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards,which have the effect of extending, or which
conflict with the authority granting statute, do notrepresent a valid precise of the rule-making power.
 ADMIN | LDCS

US V. PANLILIO

28 PHIL 300

FACTS:

The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from
dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. It is alleged that the accused illegally
and without being authorized to do so, and while quarantine against the said carabaos exposed to rinder
pest was still in effect, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they
were quarantined and drove them from one place to another. The accused contends that the facts
alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760

ISSUE:

Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture?

HELD:

NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made
unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of Act No. 1760
provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, be punished.
However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawful are Sections
3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. A violation of the orders of the Bureau of
Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The orders of the
Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and
particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute
itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a
violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished
in any way therein. However, the accused did violate Art. 581, ¶2 of the Penal Code which punishes any
person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemic disease among animals.
 ADMIN | LDCS

PEOPLE V. SANTOS

63 PHIL 300

FACTS: