Article

Theory, Culture & Society

30(5) 24–44
Towards an Economy ! The Author(s) 2013
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DOI: 10.1177/0263276413484070

Morin and Bataille tcs.sagepub.com

Oliver Human
Stellenbosch University, South Africa

Paul Cilliers
Stellenbosch University, South Africa

Abstract
In this article we explore the possibility of viewing complex systems, as well as the
models we create of such systems, as operating within a particular type of economy.
The type of economy we aim to establish here is inspired by Jacques Derrida’s
reading of George Bataille’s notion of a general economy. We restrict our discussion
to the philosophical use of the word ‘economy’. This reading tries to overcome the
idea of an economy as restricted to a single logos or master narrative. At the same
time, however, Derrida illustrates that we always operate from a restricted frame-
work and as such something will always escape and interrupt our understanding of
the world. In this paper we will propose that one could use Derrida’s reading of
Bataille, along with notions such as différance, in order to move towards an under-
standing of complex systems as existing within certain sets of possibilities and con-
straints. We argue that this view of an economy agrees with the work of Edgar Morin
on complexity and his conceptualization of general complexity.

Keywords
Bataille, complexity, Derrida, difference, general economy, heterogeneous, Morin

Introduction
There has been a sustained engagement with complexity and complex
systems at least since the second half of the 1980s. In the last decade or
so, this engagement has shifted from more traditional and reductionist
approaches to approaches which emphasize the contingent nature of
complex systems. It is argued that the characteristics of such systems

Corresponding author:
Oliver Human, Department of Philosophy and the Centre for Studies in Complexity, Stellenbosch
University, Private Bag X1, Matieland 7602, South Africa.
Email: olhuman@gmail.com
http://www.sagepub.net/tcs/
Human and Cilliers 25

are context dependent and irreducible to their constituent parts. Byrne

(2005), Cilliers (1998), Smith and Jenks (2006) and Urry (2005) provide
some overview of these developments.
In summary, the following general description of complexity is nor-
mally given: A complex system is defined by a network of rich inter-
actions which change over time. It is not the number of parts
interacting which define complexity but rather the nature of their inter-
actions: these interactions are non-linear. The fact of non-linearity has at
least two implications. In the first place, since the law of superposition
does not hold, a complex set of non-linear relationships cannot be
reduced to a simpler set which is equivalent. This is referred to as the
‘incompressibility’ of complexity (Cilliers, 1998: 9–10). Secondly, there is
not a linear relationship between cause and effect. Small causes can have
large effects and vice versa (for a discussion on nonlinearity see Borgo
and Goguen, 2005; Knyazeva, 2004).
Furthermore, complex systems are usually open systems, i.e. they
interact with their environment. Instead of simply being a characteristic
of the system itself, the extent of the system is also determined by the
purpose of the description of the system, and is thus influenced by the
position of the observer (Cilliers, 1998: 4). This is an important aspect of
complex systems. The boundaries which we draw between the system and
its environment are often a product of the description we use of such
systems. What we exclude from analysis has just as strong an impact on
our understanding of the system as that which is included (for a discus-
sion of the radical openness of complex systems see below and also Chu
et al., 2003; for a discussion of issues involved in observing complex
systems see Rasch, 1991).
An important consequence of these characteristics is that our know-
ledge of complex systems is always context dependent, determined by the
models we construct of such systems (see Byrne, 2005). Strong reduction-
ism, where the aim is to reduce the complexity faced to a neat, compre-
hensive model or algorithm, becomes impossible. We cannot know
complex systems completely (Cilliers, 2002, 2005b). This implies that
the possibilities which a model holds will always be the product of the
frames we apply because we cannot comprehensively determine the limits
of the system and hence accurately define the field of possibilities. The use
of words such as ‘models’, ‘exclusion’, and ‘partial description’ by no
means implies that we can contrast this with the ‘complete’ or ‘compre-
hensive’ view of the ‘system itself’ which we may have access to outside of
the problems of modelling.1 Modelling is not only a limitation of epis-
temology; it is also an ontological problem. A ‘pure’ description or ‘full’
presence will always elude us, mainly due to the ontological characteris-
tics of complex systems described above. Indeed, the problems of com-
plexity arise precisely because of the inevitable contingency of our
existence.
26 Theory, Culture & Society 30(5)

In this paper we are trying to develop a means through which we can

explain the simultaneously constrained and excessive nature of complex
systems. We try to develop the notion of economy as a means to under-
stand Morin’s (2007: 11) contention that a system is both more and less
than the sum of its parts. In doing this we aim to explore and forge some
links between recent work in complexity theory as exemplified by Edgar
Morin (1992, 2007), and the work of Jacques Derrida (1977, 1978, 1982,
1992, 2004 [1972]) and Georges Bataille (1989, 1991, 1993). It will be
shown that the complex thought of Edgar Morin shows striking similar-
ities to elements of deconstruction, and that insights from Derrida can be
used to augment our understanding of complexity.2 The key notion
which will be examined is that of an ‘economy’. It is important to note
here that when we use the term ‘economy’ we are not referring to the
discipline of ‘economics’ or ‘economic systems’ per se. Instead we use the
term as it is used by Bataille (adopted from Hegel) and Derrida, in its
philosophical sense, as developed by this tradition of critical thinkers (see
below). We will attempt to answer the following questions: Why is the
notion necessary when we talk of systems? How does one understand the
difference between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ systems and between ‘general’ and
‘restricted’ economies? Are these notions related and what do they imply
for the way in which we engage with complex phenomena?
In thinking about complex phenomena, the notion of a ‘frame’ has
often been used as a tool to describe how we exclude certain phenomena
from our view in order for us to develop a model of the phenomenon we
are exploring. However, as will become clear below, we consider the
notion of a frame too limiting as it fails to take into consideration the
various sets of relationships which are established in the process of mod-
elling. These relationships include both the sets of relationships inside the
model as well as the sets of relationships established with that which is
excluded from the model. The metaphor of a general economy, as read
by Derrida, helps us out of this conceptual blind spot.
The argument in this paper moves through five stages. First, we give a
general introduction to the notion of an economy. We try to give a brief
outline of how we use the term and which aspects of the term pertain to
modelling complex systems. Following this we provide an overview as to
the difficulties of modelling complex systems. We try to describe the sets
of relationships which are established in the process of modelling, both
those which occur inside the model and those established with that which
is excluded from the model. Thirdly, we look at the distinction Edgar
Morin establishes between ‘restricted’ and ‘general’ complexity. In this
discussion we illustrate how it is impossible to reduce complex phenom-
ena to simply the sum of their parts but rather argue for the fact that
complex systems are always excessive and thereby incomplete. Finally,
we illustrate how the view of complexity we have established here has
affinities with the notion of a general economy as described by Bataille
Human and Cilliers 27

and Derrida. In this regard we propose that the notion of a ‘general

economy’ as understood by Derrida is a useful aid to assist us in thinking
about complex systems. In the conclusion, we aim to illustrate some of
the benefits of adopting the term economy in relation to thinking about
complexity.

What Is an Economy?
The notion of ‘economy’ evokes a certain set of meanings. Primarily
these include usages of the term in relation to the study of economics.
The dictionary definition of an ‘economy’ is twofold. In the first place, it
refers to a concern with the production and consumption of resources,
but it also indicates the orderly interplay between the parts of a system
(Collins English Dictionary, 2006). In effect, an economy is the concern
with the production and consumption of resources made possible by the
orderly interplay of the parts of a system. Furthermore, the notion of
economy implies limited or scarce resources which constrain not only the
amount of things produced within a system but also what is produced by
that system (things which are not fixed and which can change over time).
A consequence of these constraints is that processes have to be developed
within a system which prioritize what should be produced and in what
amounts (Flemming, 1969). However, these processes, shaped by the
orderly interplay between parts, not only determine what should be pro-
duced but also what can be produced. An economy then operates on the
principle of a relationship of feedback (see below) between the use of
limited resources (production and consumption) and what the system is
able to do with these resources. This system of production, and the
limited resources it exploits, produces a contingent set of priorities
which favours some aspects but has to suppress or exclude others.
There is a further meaning of the word ‘economy’ which does not
necessarily reflect the concern for production and consumption. In this
use of the word, as the second part of the dictionary definition illustrates,
an economy is more concerned with the limited sets of relationships
between parts or the play between parts of a system. An economy in
this regard is something internal to a system, not as concerned with
the production or consumption of resources as with the constraints
placed on the ability of parts to act in certain ways. This sense of the
term economy affects our understanding of the general notion. An econ-
omy is dependent upon limits or constraints determined by the relation-
ships between the components in the system. It is this, more
philosophical, definition of the notion of an economy which we will be
using in this paper.
The limits of an economy imply that in order for a system to produce
something, it must receive in return. Indeed, it would be difficult to con-
ceive of an economy, as an economy, that only distributes or
28 Theory, Culture & Society 30(5)

disseminates without return. There must be constraints on how much a

system can do. In a certain sense, then, an economy can be conceived of
as being conservative. It aims to preserve its structure through the prior-
ities it establishes. The means by which an economy establishes its prior-
ities, and hence preserves its foundations, can be described as the reason
of the economy (see below). These limits are not to be understood only in
a negative sense. Not only are they enabling (see Cilliers, 2001: 139;
Juarrero, 1999: 132–3), they are necessary for the existence of the
system in the first place. Something which has no boundaries, which
purports to encompass everything, is indeed nothing.
If one looks at different strategies or systems of thinking as economies,
this point becomes clearer. A paradigm of thought requires that the
theories or propositions which constitute it retain a certain coherence,
a certain allegiance to limits which allows some components but excludes
others. As a matter of fact, paradigm shifts are often initiated by the
upsetting or disruption of such limits. These economies of thinking
exclude that which does not suit the reason guiding the model and
hence resist that which may disrupt the foundations and priorities estab-
lished. For example, the shift which occurred from modernism to post-
modernism was a result of the disruption of the taken-for-granted foun-
dation of modernity, namely that of an accurately reducible world, by an
economy of analysis which argued for an excess to such a foundation.

The ‘Open’ Boundaries of an Economy

For certain theorists, complex systems are conceptualized as being open
to their environments, but at the same time they are operationally closed
(see, for instance, Chu et al., 2003: 28; Cilliers, 2005a: 608; Morin, 2007:
10; Luhmann, 1989). We thus need to explore the idea of limits, that
which makes an economy possible, in more detail. Due to the fact that we
are always partial and situated observers of the phenomenon we are
studying, we inevitably exclude certain aspects which may have a bearing
on our analysis from that analysis. What is excluded, as mentioned
above, is a result of the process of prioritization granted to certain
facets of the phenomenon we are exploring. Early attempts to deal
with complex problems took for granted the fact that this prioritization
was natural and sufficient to explain the phenomenon under consider-
ation. These approaches assumed that what was irrelevant to analysis did
not have an essential bearing on the functioning of the system as a whole.
This approach can loosely be described as ‘modernist’. They considered
their models of complex systems to be comprehensive since they were
based on the essential, underlying properties or structure of such systems
usually, but not solely, described in mathematics. This approach could be
justified by the atomistic and rationalistic tendency inherent within
Western metaphysics (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986; Dreyfus, 1999).
Human and Cilliers 29

The reductionist rationality assumes that some kind of coherence,

some kind of ‘reason’, is necessary in order for the model to be sensible
at all.3 Therefore, that which is excessive, that which is excluded, stands
outside the particular logic or reason of that epistemology. In order to
ensure the rational representation of what is investigated, that which is
excluded is often depicted as being ‘noise’ or ‘inconsequential’, or even to
be rotten or defiled in some way. The ‘other’ in this instance is margin-
alized in order to provide a sense of coherence and order to the
model (for a discussion of this strategy in social systems see Laclau,
2005: 139–44). Thinking in this instance demands that we exclude the
heterogeneous, that we exclude that which challenges the taxonomy of
our thought. Rationality will structure and determine the process of
exclusion.
However, that which is found outside the strict borders of our models
can never be seen as a blank space or simply as noise. The process
whereby a model is developed does not occur within a neutral, context-
free environment. In order to function as models, our models can never
contain everything of relevance. There is no a priori way of determining
what is relevant and what is not (see Cilliers, 2005b: 259). What occurs
inside our models cannot be easily separated from what is excluded
because what we exclude from our models constitutes them as much as
that which is included. Nevertheless, this should not be seen as a weak,
postmodern cry for heterogeneity, as a plea for the inclusion of every-
body and their best friend into the economy. Such a position is as futile
as the complete exclusion of everything heterogeneous. It is by exclusion,
the setting of limits, that the economies become useful to us. These limits
are productive not only because they are constitutive, but also because
they allow the very antagonisms within the models to function. That
which is excluded makes possible the debates or differences found
inside the system.
In science, for example, for a discipline such as botany to exist, for
there to be debates within the discipline about the subject matter of that
discipline, botanists need to behave and engage in a manner which by
necessity excludes other fields from their discussion. In order to be bot-
anists, they have to differentiate themselves from physicists, chemists and
social anthropologists. This differentiation nevertheless remains prob-
lematic since it is constantly challenged. The nature of the boundary,
of what is considered internal or external, is perpetually transformed
by the threat of ‘the outside’ since the ‘threat’ simultaneously structures
the ‘inside’.4 In order to give more content to this ‘double movement’, a
distinction can be made between heterogeneity and difference.5
We will label heterogeneous that which is perceived as noise from the
perspective of the system or the model itself. In other words, heterogen-
eity is that which, again from the perspective of the model, makes no
sense or appears to bear no influence on the outcomes we aim to achieve,
30 Theory, Culture & Society 30(5)

despite the fact that it has an influence nonetheless. Heterogeneity can

be shown to carry weight within the model through a process of analysis
which makes use of other frames of analysis. Heterogeneity is thus
not noise or a mystical force but simply that which does not make
sense from the limited perspective of this model. Following Ernesto
Laclau (2005: 141), one can use the example of chess players to describe
heterogeneity and difference. Difference makes the game of chess pos-
sible, the fact that two players compete with different pieces which have
different capabilities in terms of how they move around the board.
Difference is both the set of capabilities of the chess pieces as well as
the two competing players. Heterogeneity intervenes when another
person knocks over the chess board, for instance, or some event disturbs
the game. The field on which the competing players were playing is now
destroyed or changed.
Difference refers to the discriminations which can be made from the
perspective of the model under consideration. Differences can be recog-
nized only in terms of a common frame. For example, the difference
between a dictionary and a novel occurs within the framework of what
we understand as books. The difference between a dictionary and a tree
requires that one shift frames of reference considerably in order to make
these differences understandable (see Cilliers, 2010). To recognize hetero-
geneous objects one has to establish a chain of different frameworks, on
different scales, which will eventually allow some comparison to emerge.
Consider the following very simplified example. The notion of tree is
heterogeneous to the frame ‘books’, but the frame ‘paper’ allows us to
see the importance of the notion to the frame by which this heterogeneity
is defined. Yet, as Bataille (1989: 98) pointed out, the inclusion of the
heterogeneous as a difference within an economy necessarily destroys its
radical status. As we include the heterogeneous into our models we neces-
sarily homogenize these possibilities within current frameworks at the
same time as producing other forms of heterogeneity outside the newly
accepted range of differences.
There is a contextual dimension to difference and heterogeneity. Due
to the adaptability of the system we cannot categorically state that some-
thing will remain heterogeneous to a system because, in a different con-
text, it may make sense to that economy. For example, if we were
building a lightweight car out of composite materials, the differences
within our economies would be concerned with the different pliabilities
and strengths of the materials. The colour of these materials would be
heterogeneous to our discussion. However, if we were told we were now
building this car in a country with a warm climate, the relative colours of
the composites, such as black carbon, would begin to function as differ-
ences within our economy due to concerns with heat. What was hetero-
geneous to this economy now becomes a difference within that economy
as it fits within the logic of the economy.6
Human and Cilliers 31

An important consequence of these dynamics is that it is difficult to

illustrate the incoherence and excess of any economy clearly since the
language we use within models relies only on difference. In other words,
the language we use within models recognizes difference, not heterogen-
eity, as a result of the fact that they are built around a concern for coher-
ence. This is the reason why critiques from outside a ‘system’ are often not
considered valid critiques at all by proponents working within the system.
An excellent example of this is the difficulty encountered in finding a
meaningful interaction between ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ philosophy.

From Restricted to General Complexity

As argued above, classical science attempted to reduce the problems of
complexity to a level at which the unique problems faced in complex
systems are not visible. Edgar Morin (1992, 2007) argues that this restric-
tion of the problem of complexity was achieved by relying on three
explanatory principles. The first of these principles is that of epistemo-
logical determinism, which implies that all future and past events must be
known within the present state of a system. The principle of determinism
argues that a complex system rests on a neat historical trajectory and,
based upon its current state as well as the next state description, we can
trace, as well as predict, the shape of the system as it has been and will be
(see also Dekker, 2010). The second explanatory principle adopted is that
of reduction. Reduction is the assumption that ‘consists in knowing any
composite from only the knowledge of its basic constituting elements’
(Morin, 2007: 5). The reductionist argument states that a system consists
simply of a sum of its parts, that the higher or emergent properties of a
system can be reduced to the characteristics of the parts which determine
them. Finally, classical science argues for the explanatory principle of
disjunction, which ‘consists in isolating and separating cognitive difficul-
ties from one another, leading to the separation between disciplines,
which have become hermetic from each other’ (Morin, 2007: 5). One
can see that all the explanatory principles of classical science are predi-
cated upon a very similar principle, that a scientist can objectively and
comprehensively know what is essential to the functioning and survival
of a system. Classical science, therefore, works on the principle of sim-
plification. The complexity of a system is simplified to sets of laws and
universal truths which operate as the foundation of science. Morin refers
to this strategy as ‘restricted complexity’.
Against the approach of ‘restricted complexity’, Morin (2007) pro-
poses the concept of ‘general complexity’. In the paradigm of general
complexity the assumptions made by classical science are not taken for
granted as simple truths. Although such assumptions are necessary for
the process of science, it should be kept in mind that they are assumptions
made in order to reduce complexity to a point where practical research
32 Theory, Culture & Society 30(5)

becomes possible. The strategy of general complexity is to recognize this

dilemma.

In opposition to reduction, complexity requires that one tries to com-

prehend the relations between the whole and the parts. The principle
of disjunction, of separation (between objects, between disciplines,
between notions, between subject and object of knowledge) should be
substituted by a principle that maintains the distinction, but that tries
to establish the relation. (Morin, 2007: 10–11).

General complexity points towards an epistemology of complex systems

which examines the relationships between the parts as well as the parts
themselves. A strong reductionism thus ceases to be possible as the focus
of analysis shifts away from the parts to a consideration of the contingent
sets of relationships between the parts. It is this contingency which denies
simple and universal models. The best we have are models which are
partial and provisional.
The simplified models of a modernist science, we argue, only recognize
difference, not heterogeneity. A ‘general’ approach to complexity is one
which recognizes that we have to reduce and constrain, but that the
heterogeneous will remain a force which disrupts our provisional reduc-
tions. Thus, consciously or not, we make exclusions when we build
models, but these exclusions always have an impact on both the system
and the model. Some of these exclusions hold the potential to destroy the
systematic representation of what we are modelling, but the notion of
general complexity is precisely to make us aware of this. The strict dis-
junctions, separations and exclusions are imposed by us in order to make
these systems intelligible to us.
In what follows we will propose that the economies of complex sys-
tems, along with the models we create of them, should be conceived of as
‘general’ economies. We will argue that, despite the necessity of restricted
models, when we are faced with a complex system we are forced to con-
cede that our models are context dependent and therefore always open to
chance and error as well as certain types of paradox, even to what may be
seen as ‘irrational’. A restricted economy of analysis, as we will show, is
one which does not take heterogeneity into consideration. In contrast,
like Morin’s general complexity, the notion of a general economy aims to
keep heterogeneity in mind whilst granting us the use value of a restricted
economy.

Towards an Economy of General Complexity

Thus far we have presented the notion of an economy and then illu-
strated how complex systems can be conceived of as operating within a
particular economy. Since we can never have a complete view of a
Human and Cilliers 33

complex system, we are forced to acknowledge that the economy we

postulate of a complex system is always the product of the particular
viewpoint we adopt. Following Morin, we argued that classical science
adopted a restricted view of complexity. However, despite our critique of
the reductionism of classical science, we argued that, to a certain extent,
this reductionism is necessary in order for us to be able to say anything
about complex systems in the first place. The question before us now is
the following: How then does this ‘new’ approach to complexity differ
from that of classical science? In other words, if we criticize the economy
of thought established by classical science yet, at the same time, argue for
the necessity of that which we are criticizing, what is different about this
economy? How can we speak of an economy, as an economy, if we are
forced to speak of it as open and closed at the same time? These questions
can be tackled by first investigating another perspective on the notion of
an economy, one offered by the philosopher George Bataille (1989, 1991,
1993).

Bataille’s general economy

Bataille (1989) argues that traditional political economy restricts its ana-
lysis of a system to the production and consumption of resources, limited
to the immediate ends they serve. According to restricted economics, ‘on
the whole, any general judgement of social activity implies the principle
that all individual effort, in order to be valid, must be reducible to the
fundamental necessities of production and conservation’ (1989: 117).
Restricted economics is therefore utilitarian, only interested in the use
value any object or activity may have. The problem with this model, for
Bataille, is that it does not take into consideration the ‘excesses’ and so-
called ‘waste’ produced by a system. In contrast to the notion of
restricted economy, Bataille argued for the notion of ‘general economy’
which aimed to include within its analysis the excesses and waste not
considered by a restricted worldview.
The ‘law of general economy’ states:

On the whole a society always produces more than is necessary for

its survival; it has a surplus at its disposal. It is precisely the use it
makes of this surplus that determines it: the surplus is the cause of
the agitation, of the structural changes and of the entire history of
society. But the surplus has more than one outlet, the most common
of which is growth. (Bataille, 1991: 106)

For Bataille, the impact which a surplus has on the nature of a system is
not reflected upon by restricted economies of analysis which limit their
analysis to notions such as utility and thereby exclude, and are unable to
explain, other forces which act upon the system. It is for this reason that
34 Theory, Culture & Society 30(5)

Bataille (1989) argues that restricted economic worldviews struggle to

explain the occurrence of such phenomena as war, sacrifice or eroticism.
These aspects of human life and history remain sidelined and are seen as
marginal to the ‘more important’ aspects of survival. Yet it is precisely
these marginalized forms which give shape to the societies we live in
(Bataille, 1991). General economics tries to incorporate these aspects of
life which are considered pure expenditure, or ‘excess’, into its frame of
analysis. However, as we have already argued, we always operate from a
limited, context dependent position. Bataille in this sense tries to ‘re-
economize’ our thinking by attempting to take into consideration the
excess of the frames we use when describing economies purely in utili-
tarian terms. In other words, Bataille tries to include all social activity in
his analysis; he aims to overcome the limits of the economies we create
due to our situated perspectives. However, as Bennington (1995) illus-
trates, by focusing on the waste or excess produced by a system, Bataille
is structuring his analysis around a single concept (that of excess) in the
same vein as the restricted economies he is critiquing:

In its most abstract form, this suggestion would say that ‘general
economy’ is not the other of ‘restricted economy,’ but is no other
than restricted economy; that there is no general economy except as
the economy of restricted economy; that general economy is the
economy of its own restriction. (Bataille, 1991: 47–8, emphasis in
original)

The argument here is simple enough: in order to be an economy, it must

by definition operate as if it is restricted; an economy cannot contain
everything.
We argued above that when we model a complex system our analysis
will always be restricted, due not only to our limited perspectives but also
due to the fact that our models need to deal with the inevitable uncer-
tainty of our existence and still be coherent and logical. We deal with this
uncertainty through the use of reason, which Derrida (2005: 151) defined
as a wager between the calculable and the incalculable. As such there will
always be an excess. Excess, by definition, exceeds reason (Derrida, 1978:
255, quoting Bataille). This excess we have labelled heterogeneity.7 What
the notion of general economy does is to establish a relationship to this
excess (Derrida, 1978: 270). In Derrida’s exploration of Bataille we can
note the double handed movement of the deconstructive process which
aims to maintain the radical nature of Bataille’s critique whilst at the
same time illustrating the impossibility of a ‘pure excess’ without an
economy to which it corresponds (or ‘sovereignty’ as Bataille labels it).
Derrida argues that we need to remember that we can only speak of one
economy (of one discourse); it is senseless in this regard to postulate two
different kinds of economy, one restricted and the other excessive or
Human and Cilliers 35

general. That is, we cannot postulate an economy of excess which runs

parallel to the restricted economy or a general economy in which there is
only excess. When we speak of a general economy it is not an economy
separate from a restricted economy; rather, it is a single economy which
is not closed but is both open to random chance events as well as pre-
dictability, open to the possibility of destruction and yet robust, whether
it comes from the play of forces inside the system or from its relationship
to its environment (Derrida, 1978: 272). The models we construct of such
systems must keep in mind that a system does not run on an entirely
rational, utilitarian basis, but is open to the possibility of paradox and
inconsistency yet still displays enough stability in order to be
comprehended.
The notion of general economy describes an economy with open
boundaries and also a play of forces inside the system. Such an economy
is neither the strictly restricted economy of traditional political economy
or of classical science which denies the partiality of any perspective, nor is
it an economy of excess (whatever that may look like). The double
handed logic of Derrida allows us to conceive of this economy as being
limited, constrained and restricted and, at the same time, as being open
and excessive. What makes this possible? The notion of ‘play’ is crucial to
this understanding.

The play of the general economy

Under a restricted economy, a single term or centre, a single logic or
reason, defines and limits the structure of a system. As Derrida (1978:
278) argues, ‘the function of this centre was not only to orient, balance
and organize the structure – one cannot in fact conceive of an unorgan-
ized structure – but above all to make sure that the organizing principle
of the structure would limit what we might call the play of the structure’.
However, in a complex system, a sort of totalization by means of pro-
posing a centre is not possible. Due to the impossibility of reducing the
system to some essential truth, or algorithm, in the style of restricted
complexity, complex systems are ‘centreless’.

Totalization, therefore, is sometimes defined as useless, and some-

times as impossible. This is no doubt due to the fact that there are
two ways of conceiving the limit of totalization. . . . Totalization can
be judged impossible in the classical style: one then refers to the
empirical endeavour of either a subject or a finite richness which it
can never master. There is too much, more than one can say. But
nontotalization can also be determined in another way: no longer
from the standpoint of a concept of finitude as relegation to the
empirical, but from the standpoint of the concept of play. If total-
ization no longer has any meaning, it is not because the infiniteness
36 Theory, Culture & Society 30(5)

of a field cannot be covered by a finite glance or a finite discourse,

but because the nature of the field . . . excludes totalization. This
field is in effect that of play, that is to say, a field of infinite substi-
tutions only because it is finite, that is to say, because instead of
being an inexhaustible field, as in the classical hypothesis, instead of
being too large, there is something missing from it: a centre which
arrests and grounds the play of substitutions. (Derrida as quoted by
Johnson, 1993: 51, emphasis in original)

Play thus constitutes another, different form of excess. This is no longer

the excess ‘outside’ the system but rather a certain indeterminacy ‘inside’
the system. In the language of complexity, this is due to the nature of the
multiple non-linear interactions and feedback paths within complex sys-
tems, as well as to the fact that the boundaries of complex systems are
always open. This makes them non-totalizable. Play is a product of the
relationships which a system establishes internally as well as with its
environment. The notion of excess is not external to a system. Not
only is the outside folded into the inside, the internal processes them-
selves break open gaps as the result of the process of diffe´rance (see
below). As a result, we cannot reduce this system to a set of preconceived
terms or truths, nor imagine that everything which happens within the
system is reincorporated for utility within the system (Hegelian
Aufhebung). Rather, we must grant, in the same logic as that of
Derrida’s notion of iterability, that systems, even though they are
robust, exist at a point which is open to change and even destruction,
open to chance and a play of forces which we can never comprehensively
predict or calculate. It is for this reason that the notion of general econ-
omy, even though it is read or understood in restricted economic terms,
places our understanding of a system in a space in which we are forced to
grant the vulnerability of both the system and our understanding of it.
There are forces at play which we can never completely predict or control
(Derrida, 1978: 270).
The excess which escapes our models of systems must pass through
two straits. Firstly, we cannot exclude the excesses of the system as if they
exist in some mysterious, unknowable form, ‘outside’ of our understand-
ing of anything, as if they exist in their own context, as if we could simply
write off that which we cannot model whilst claiming that they have an
influence on the system we are studying, even if only as inconsequential
‘noise’ or ‘chaos’. This is what is implied by the use of the term ‘hetero-
geneity’. Heterogeneity can also be found within the play of the system
and is not something simply external to the system. We must remember
that these forces are defined by and thus exist in a relationship with the
model we have constructed. The inaccessible, the unknowable in this
regard, is not some mystical force outside of restricted economies
Human and Cilliers 37

which guides their interactions. The unnameable or unknowable is an

inevitable product of the limits to our model. Secondly, we cannot
assume at the same time that we have mastered these forces, that we
can comprehensively model a system and the play of its processes,
reduce its contingent existence to a single framework. The notion of a
general economy reminds us that our understanding of complex systems
in the world must walk this narrow edge.
Keeping this in mind, the notion of diffe´rance (Derrida, 1982) becomes
central to our understanding of complex systems and the economies
under which these systems operate. Diffe´rance in fact establishes the rela-
tionship between a restricted and a general economy. Difference, hetero-
geneity and noise collapse into the notion of diffe´rance. Thus we can
never comprehensively define a clear distinction between the general
and the restricted. The temporal nature of diffe´rance (to defer) implies
that what is noise today may be central to our understanding of the
system tomorrow, as we gain new means of interpretation or new under-
standings of the system. In this light, there can only be provisional dis-
criminators between noise and structure. However, as the inside and the
outside of the system are a product of the boundaries we draw rather
than something natural or essential to the system itself (Allen, 2000: 80;
Cilliers, 2001: 141; see also Derrida’s chapter ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ in
Derrida, 2004 [1972]), the notions of difference and heterogeneity
cannot be neatly distinguished, as it is often the heterogeneity of the
context which defines which differences will be important, or seen as
differences, inside the model. It is also diffe´rance which represents the
precarity of the system, the fact that any system is always open to
(self-)destruction as it makes place for heterogeneous forces which may
challenge the coherency of the system.
By drawing boundaries, we create the ‘space’ which allows us to say
something about the system. This space is not static but a site of action
(Cilliers, 1998: 45). It is in this space that we create differences, including
the difference between inside and outside, which allows us to create
models and indeed to act in the world. Therefore, in the relationship
which the general economy establishes between the restricted economy
and its excess, one can find the play of diffe´rance. What makes it possible
to model systems is the fact that diffe´rance remains undecided between
activity and passivity (Cilliers, 1998: 45; Derrida, 1982: 8–9). ‘Pockets of
stability’ make it possible to contingently model a system, as long as we
remember this contingency and the conditions under which it was estab-
lished (Cilliers, 1998: 43). Models have to be reinterpreted constantly and
critically re-evaluated when used in different contexts. The process of
diffe´rance thus creates the possibility for the deployment of a restricted
economy in our creation of models whilst at the same time precluding the
finality of such a restriction.
38 Theory, Culture & Society 30(5)

Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that complex systems, and the models we
make of them, operate under a particular economy. We have illustrated
that classical science operates under a restricted economy of analysis
which does not acknowledge a model’s relationship to that which it
needs to exclude in order to function. In contrast, we argued for the
notion of a general economy in which this excess is acknowledged.
However, this does not imply that one can operate from a general econ-
omy. As Derrida illustrated of Bataille, we can only operate from a
restricted economy. This does not mean that we are arguing for a posi-
tivistic reduction of a system to some central economy. The fact that we
have to reduce does not imply that these reductions are comprehensive.
At the same time, we are not arguing for a relativism in which anything
can be constituted as the economy of the system. One cannot privilege
either form of economy. We are always dealing with economies which are
simultaneously restricted and general. We cannot privilege either pole of
this dichotomy, nor can we find a compromise.8 This is not a debilitating
position. The robustness of complex systems does cater for the restricted
economies upon which models are built. Yet the excess of these models
leaves novel possibilities open for the future.
In this regard, the term ‘general economy’ is perhaps not the best one
to use. An ‘open’, ‘folded’ or ‘excessive’ economy may be terms which
could be used to replace the idea of a general economy. However, these
still fall prey to the inside/outside dichotomy and the assumption that a
single, essential economy exists. However, the term ‘general economy’
holds significance for the critical tradition in French philosophy as it
marks the point at which Bataille illustrated for us the impossibility of
a closed system. We have therefore continued using this term as its his-
tory speaks to our current concerns. In this paper we have attempted to
illustrate how both Derrida and Morin drew on Bataille’s development of
the term, and thus the existence of excess was acknowledged by two
thinkers in apparently different domains. In fact, we are led to wonder
whether Morin’s (2007) adoption of the terms ‘general’ and ‘restricted’
was not a product of reading Bataille. What the above argument has
aimed to illustrate is that, despite the different domains in which
Derrida and Morin worked, their work shares many common critiques
of rationalist and reductive approaches to a complex world. In this article
we have illustrated the connection between Morin and Derrida through
the work of George Bataille, and the notion of an economy. This link, to
the best of our knowledge, has not been made before.
The idea of an economy moves away from the limits of speaking about
our knowledge in terms of frames, which rely upon a metaphorical dis-
tinction between an inside and outside. ‘Economy’ allows us to speak
about the boundaries of a system without conceiving of these boundaries
Human and Cilliers 39

as being the limits to the system, as being the borders of influence to the
system. To be an economy means to be open. An economy can be seen as
an interface between resources and the use of those resources. In other
words, an economy is constituted by sets of relationships rather than
individuated components. The structure of the economy is therefore a
relational one, yet it maintains enough form in order to be spoken of as ‘a
system’. The term therefore overcomes the conceptual constraints of
speaking about systems as both being, and being constituted by, isolated
entities. Furthermore, the notion of frame limits what we can say about
the play inside a complex system. The frame is only concerned with what
we can say about the system and its environment. It conjures up an image
of that which happens inside the system not being affected by what hap-
pens outside the system. The idea of economy allows us to begin to say
something about the nature of the relationships ‘inside’ a complex system
whilst acknowledging the openness of a system’s boundaries. The notion
maintains that in a complex system everything is simultaneously close to
the boundary and embedded (Cilliers, 2001: 142). The inside/outside dis-
tinction thereby collapses under the aegis of the general economy. In
short, the term ‘economy’ is a useful placeholder to describe the ‘slippery’
nature of dealing with complexity. The term ‘economy’ holds five impli-
cations for the way we approach complex problems.
Firstly, the concept of an economy allows us to think about the ‘econ-
omy’ of possibilities which any system, and indeed any model of a
system, holds. Under a restricted view of complexity we can see that
any model of a complex system will only acknowledge those possibilities
which can be reduced to the model itself. The range of these possibilities
is defined by the field of differences allowed inside the economy. This
closed economy of possibilities gives little leeway for dealing with unfore-
seen and unexpected occurrences. If we assume that our models of the
world capture the essence of the world, prediction should be a perfect
science. However, under a general economy of complexity we are forced
to grant that the unforeseeable is a necessary or constitutive aspect of
modelling complexity. This implies that we are forced to develop meas-
ures which can deal with this contingency. This ‘open’ horizon of possi-
bilities implies that the world, and our models of the world, always
contain more potentialities for realizing novelties than can ever be mea-
sured at any time. This does not mean that prediction is impossible, only
that prediction is a context specific endeavour. This is both a positive
feature of the notion of a general economy, that there are always diver-
gent ways of living possible, and a negative consequence, that the future
is never guaranteed, the possibility of war or atrocity always remains.
Secondly, the acknowledgement that the economies through which we
view the world always contain a certain set of possibilities allows us to
develop a definition of conservatism. Under this definition we can begin
to see how conservative positions are able to be progressive in
40 Theory, Culture & Society 30(5)

appearance, as they maintain a faith in science and the possibilities of the

future, yet remain tethered to the possibilities of the present economy.
This is because we can argue that a conservative position only acknow-
ledges and aims to forward those possibilities their economy may cur-
rently cater for or realize (see Fukuyama, 1992, for an example of this).
So although these positions may be future orientated they are not neces-
sarily progressive. In contrast then to understandings of conservatism as
always being backward looking, we can begin to understand current
modes of conservatism which argue for progress (see Bourdieu, 1998).
The term ‘economy’ then complicates what we see as progressive or con-
servative positions by disallowing reductionist understandings of these
terms.
Thirdly, the notions of ‘difference’ and ‘heterogeneity’, as worked out
here, illustrate the difficulties we face in coming to some ‘common
ground’ or Habermasian ideal speech situation when faced with other
worldviews. We are always limited by the economies we deploy and the
discriminations (differences) they harbour. We cannot operate under any
other set of circumstances.
However, this does not mean that our worldviews are limited. The
fourth consequence of the term ‘economy’ is that it allows us to realize
the wealth of potentialities any model may contain. The folded or general
nature of general economies of complexity forces us to grant that possi-
bilities for novelty do not only rest outside of the economies we deploy.
We needn’t wait for an event to reveal some other possibility for exist-
ence (see Badiou, 2007) nor for some interaction with a radical ‘other’.
The play of general economies means that there is always a wealth of
possibilities unrealized in the present, inside the very economies we
deploy on a daily basis. The challenge is to begin conceptualizing ways
of realizing these novelties in the present without them being consumed,
or incorporated as differences, within the economies of the present.
Finally, the excess of the general economy of complexity implies a
normative dimension to our engagement with the world. We can only
engage with a complex system by means of a restricted economy, yet both
our economy and the economy we are dealing with are always open. We
cannot thereby comprehensively calculate both the effects of our actions
as well as the reasons for acting in this way. The ethics of complexity rests
in the tension between the different economies, between what we include
in the restricted economy which constitutes our models and what we
exclude. The normative dimension rests in the fact that we have to
choose what we include in the economy, but there is no objective
means of doing so. We cannot escape this normative dimension when
dealing with complexity as we are forced to make exclusions in order to
maintain the coherence of our economies. Our actions are meaningful
precisely because they close down other possibilities. This position
demands that we take a radically critical stance when engaging with
Human and Cilliers 41

complexity, the main component of which is self-critique (Preiser et al.,

2013). Because the economies we are using to analyse the world are
always open to forces we cannot account for, we are forced to reconsider
our position when facing complexity. Self-critique does not imply that we
undermine our stance in the world; it implies that we open this stance up
to other alternatives. The idea of a general economy reminds us of both
the ubiquity and the necessity of alternatives. This reminder is as much
an acknowledgement of the inherent normativity of complexity as it is a
demand. We have to acknowledge this excess in order to begin imagining
alternative means of engaging with the problems the world faces. There is
a wealth of possibilities which goes unacknowledged by restricted or
utilitarian economies which we have to begin to realize in order to
improve living conditions on this planet.

Acknowledgement
We would like to thank Rika Preiser for her invaluable insight and discussions of the
various earlier drafts of this paper. We would also like to thank the reviewers of TCS for
their insightful and patient comments on earlier drafts.

Notes
1. In short, when we use the term ‘model’ or ‘modelling’ we use it as a shorthand
to describe any understanding of the world we express. In this regard, a
theory, explanation and indeed art or music are all ‘models’ which we use
to understand complex phenomena.
2. For further discussion of the links that can be made between complexity and
deconstruction see the work of Cilliers in general (especially Cilliers, 1998,
2005b). In contrast to others who have adopted post-structuralist philosophy
as an approach to dealing with complexity, in this paper we have adopted the
approach of Derrida. Despite the ‘style’ and ‘language’ of philosophers such
as Deleuze which lends itself to complexity, in this paper we find Derrida’s
thoughts on the relationship between restriction and excess, presence and
absence, especially helpful in thinking about complexity.
3. It is important to note here that we are not arguing that we must introduce or
allow irrationality to dominate the models we use in science. Rather, this
argument is simply to illustrate how rationality thins out, or excludes, the
excess of data we are faced with during the process of generating
understanding.
4. For a discussion of the relationship between the notion of ‘inside’ and ‘out-
side’ see Derrida (2004 [1972]).
5. We borrow these terms from Laclau (2005: 140).
6. This does not imply that the economy itself remains exactly the same. Like
the meaning of words, with the possibility of including something previously
heterogeneous to the economy comes the loss of previous difference(s).
7. It is important to note that Bataille uses the term heterogeneity in a far more
radical way than the way we have defined it in this paper. For Bataille (1989:
140), heterogeneity can never be reincorporated into any economy; it is that
which stands radically outside all economies. His ‘science’ of heterology
42 Theory, Culture & Society 30(5)

therefore only hopes to examine the effects of heterogeneity rather than their
reincorporation into a restricted economy (1989: 97–102). This is because the
heterogeneous is a product of an active force for Bataille. In contrast, we
argue that although the heterogeneous carries weight for that which excludes
it, it doesn’t have the same active energy as Bataille hypothesizes.
8. This does not mean that we are arguing for some vague holism either, which
still commits the same error as restricted economies.

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Author Biographies
Oliver Human completed his PhD in Philosophy at Stellenbosch
University. His dissertation was concerned with the notions of ‘economy’
and ‘novelty’ in post-structuralism and complexity. He is currently a PhD
candidate in Social Anthropology at the University of Amsterdam. His
current dissertation is concerned with rethinking the notion of the ‘state’
and ‘subject’ in the context of state craft in South Africa.

Paul Cilliers was Professor of Philosophy at the University of

Stellenbosch in South Africa. He taught Cultural Philosophy,
44 Theory, Culture & Society 30(5)

Deconstruction and Philosophy of Science. He also had a degree in

Electronic Engineering and worked professionally as an engineer for
many years. His research focused on the philosophical and ethical impli-
cations of complexity theory and he published widely in the field. He is
the author of Complexity and Postmodernism (Routledge, 1998). Sadly,
shortly after submitting this paper for review, he passed away. His inspir-
ation, humour and thoughts are sorely missed by all those who knew
him.