MY REVIEWER IN REMEDIAL LAW_CONTEMPT (R-71)

BASED ON ATTY. BRONDIAL’s SYLLABUS

Special Civil Actions (R-62-71)

Contempt (R-71)
1. Kinds: Direct (S-1); Indirect (S-3) Section 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. —

A person GUILTY OF MISBEHAVIOR …

 in the presence of or
 so near a court …

as to OBSTRUCT / INTERRUPT the proceedings before the same, including…

 disrespect toward the court,
 offensive personalities toward others, or
 refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit
or deposition when lawfully required to do so, …

 may be SUMMARILY ADJUDGED IN CONTEMPT by such court and

punished by:
o a FINE = not exceeding P2,000 pesos or
o IMPRISONMENT = not exceeding ten (10) days,
o or both,
(if it be a REGIONAL TRIAL COURT or a COURT OF
EQUIVALENT OR HIGHER RANK),

or by:
o a FINE = not exceeding P200 or
o IMPRISONMENT = not exceeding one (1) day,
o or both,
( if it be a LOWER COURT). (1a)

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. —

After ….

 a charge in writing has been filed, and

 an opportunity given to the respondent…
 to comment thereon (within such period as may be fixed by the
court) and
 to be heard by himself or counsel,….

a PERSON GUILTY of any of the following acts may be punished for INDIRECT
CONTEMPT;

(a) MISBEHAVIOR of an officer of a court in the performance:

 of his official duties or
 in his official transactions;

(b) DISOBEDIENCE of, or

RESISTANCE to …
 a lawful WPOJ (writ, process, order, or judgment) of a court,
including…
 the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or
ejected from any real property (by the judgment or
process of any court of competent jurisdiction), ==
 E,A/I (enters or attempts/induces another to
enter) into or upon such real property,
…for the purpose of executing acts of ownership
or possession, or
 (in any manner) disturbs the possession given
to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any ABUSE of or
any UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE with …
 the processes / proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt (under section 1 of this Rule);

(d) Any IMPROPER CONDUCT tending, (directly or indirectly), to:

 IOD (impede, obstruct, or degrade) the administration of
 justice;

(e) ASSUMING to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and

ACTING as such without authority;

(f) FAILURE TO OBEY A SUBPOENA duly served;

(g) The RESCUE / ATTEMPTED RESCUE, of…

 a person / property in the custody of an officer (by virtue of an
order/process of a court held by him).

NOTE: But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court …

 from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or

 from holding him in custody pending such proceedings. (3a)

2. Procedure (S-4 to 9) Section 4. How proceedings commenced. —

Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated

 motu propio by the court against which the contempt was committed, by:
 an order or
 any other formal charge

requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced:

 by a VERIFIED PETITION with …

 supporting particulars and
 certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein,

and

 upon FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR FILING

INITIATORY PLEADINGS for civil actions in the court concerned.

If the CONTEMPT CHARGES AROSE OUT OF OR ARE RELATED TO A

PRINCIPAL ACTION PENDING IN THE COURT, the petition for contempt shall…

 allege that fact

 (but said petition shall be DHD (docketed, heard and decided)
SEPARATELY, UNLESS the court in its discretion orders the consolidation
of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and
decision). (n)

Section 5. Where charge to be filed. —

Where the charge for indirect contempt has been committed against a Regional
Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer appointed by
it, ==the charge may be filed with SUCH COURT.

Where such contempt has been committed against a lower court,

==the charge may be filed with the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF THE PLACE IN
WHICH THE LOWER COURT IS SITTING; …

(but the proceedings may also be instituted in SUCH LOWER COURT subject to
appeal to the Regional Trial Court of such place in the same manner as provided in
section 11 of this Rule). (4a; Bar Matter No. 803, 21 July 1998)
Section 6. Hearing; release on bail. —

If the hearing is not ordered to be had forthwith, the respondent may be released
from custody upon…

 FILING A BOND, (in an amount fixed by the court, for his appearance at
the hearing of the charge).

On the day set therefor, the court shall proceed to…

 INVESTIGATE THE CHARGE (and consider such ComTestDef

(comment, testimony or defense) as the respondent may make or offer).
(5a)

Section 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. —

If the respondent is adjudged guilty of INDIRECT CONTEMPT committed against a

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OR A COURT OF EQUIVALENT OR HIGHER RANK ,

 he may be punished by:

o a FINE not > P30K or
o IMPRISONMENT not> exceeding six (6) months, or
o both.

If he is adjudged guilty of contempt committed AGAINST A LOWER COURT,…

 he may be punished by:

o a fine not > P5,000 or
o imprisonment not > one (1) month,
o or both.

If the contempt consists in the violation of a writ of injunction, temporary restraining

order or status quo order, he may also be ordered to…

 make COMPLETE RESTITUTION to the party injured by such violation,

of:
 the property involved or
 such amount as may be alleged and proved.

The WRIT OF EXECUTION, as in ordinary civil actions, shall issue for the
enforcement of a judgment imposing a fine UNLESS the court otherwise provides.
(6a)

Section 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed. —

When the contempt consists in the REFUSAL OR OMISSION TO DO AN ACT

which is yet in the power of the respondent to perform, he may be…

 IMPRISONED by order of the court concerned until he performs it. (7a)

Section 9. Proceeding when party released on bail fails to answer. —

When a respondent released on bail fails to appear on the day fixed for the hearing,
the court may…

o issue another ORDER OF ARREST or


3. Judgment and Review (S-11)
From VITO Notes:
Nature of Contempt
Direct Contempt vs. Indirect Contempt
Say you are in the sala Judge Cuerdo
and you blurted out against Judge
Villena, can you be cited in contempt?
Until when a person can be cited in
contempt?
Punishment for a person in any manner
disturb the person who is entitled thereto
as adjudged by the court?
CASES:
1. Yasay vs. Recto, 313 SCRA
o may ORDER THE BOND FOR HIS APPEARANCE TO BE FORFEITED
AND CONFISCATED, or
o both;
and,
if the bond be proceeded against, the measure of damages shall be…
 the extent of the loss or injury sustained by the aggrieved party by reason
of the misconduct for which the contempt charge was prosecuted,
 with the costs of the proceedings,
(and such recovery shall be for the benefit of the party injured).
(If there is no aggrieved party, the bond shall be liable and disposed of as
in criminal cases). (8a)
Section 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay. —
The JUDGMENT OR FINAL ORDER OF A COURT IN A CASE OF INDIRECT
CONTEMPT may be appealed to…
 the proper court as in criminal cases.
But EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT OR FINAL ORDER shall not be suspended
UNTIL a bond is filed by the person adjudged in contempt, …
(in an amount fixed by the court from which the appeal is taken), …
(conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him he will abide by and perform
the judgment or final order). (10a)
All forms of contempt are CRIMINAL IN NATURE (since it imposes penalty, of @
least 1 day)
Direct Contempt Indirect Contempt
Misrespect/Disrespect to the court is
Actually Done in the court or So Near
the court
(Ex. Rescue or Attempt to Rescue
property/person in custody of the court)
Remedy: Certiorari (subject to posting Remedy: Appeal
of the bond.
Yes, you can be cited for direct contempt.
During the pendency of the case.
Indirect contempt (remedy is appeal)
Doctrine and Brief Facts:
Yasay was scolded by the SC when he cited certain lawyers in contempt of his court
for disobeying order without knowing that his basis is already reversed by CA.
Yasay said that the lawyer is suspended for practicing in SEC for six months. SC
said that only the SC can suspend the practice of law, not even the judge of lower
court.
Yasay vs. Recto, 313 SCRA
On June 28, 1996, some stockholders of Interport Resources Corporation (IRC)
asked then SEC Chairman Perfecto Yasay to investigate and validate the proxies
and nominations for directors of the corporation.
In line with this and on the same date (June 28), the SEC issued a TRO against the
officers of the corporation to CEASE and DESIST from conducting its annual
stockholders meeting.
But because the officers of IRC where able to get from the Court of Appeals a TRO
against the Order of SEC not to go through with the July 9 stockholders’ conference,
the respondents (officers of IRC) still conducted its meeting as planned.
On the next day, the SEC declared IRC’s conference as invalid and ordered the
respondents (officers of the IRC) to show cause why they shouldn’t be cited for
contempt.

On the hearing, the respondent officers cited the TRO issued by the CA as the
reason why they still went through with the meeting/conference.
Nevertheless, the SEC still found the respondent officers guilty for contempt.

The Order of the SEC went even as far as barring Atty. Manalaysay, one of the
respondent officers, from engaging in the practice of law.

And so, respondent went to the CA to appeal SEC’s decision wherein the appellate
court reversed SEC’s decision.

From this reversal, the petitioner SEC chairman APPEALS to the SC via petition for
review, claiming that the reversal of the appellate court of the decision of the SEC
was improper.

But the respondents argue that the CONTEMPT CHARGE against them was
CRIMINAL in nature. Thus, when the CA reversed the guilty verdict of the SEC
finding respondents guilty of contempt, said decision/reversal was tantamount to a
NOT GUILTY verdict wherein no appeal can be taken.

Was the reversal of the CA of the findings of SEC that respondents were guilty of
contempt proper [are respondents guilty of contempt – No

The ruling of the CA was proper because even though the SEC ordered the officers
of IRC not to go through with the stockholders’ conference on July 9, said officers
were able to get a TRO with the CA against SEC’s CEASE and DESIST Order on
July 8. Thus, it was only proper that the stockholders’ conference pushed through.

Was the contempt proceedings conducted by the SEC criminal or civil in nature? As
such, was the reversal of the CA appealable?
It is criminal in nature.
The charge of contempt partakes of the nature of a criminal offense. The
exoneration of the contemner from the charge amounts to an acquittal from which
an appeal would not lie.

“A distinction is made between a civil and criminal contempt.

Civil contempt criminal contempt

is the failure to do something ordered is any conduct directed against the
by a court to be done for the benefit of authority or dignity of the court.
a party.

“Civil contempt proceedings are If the contempt is initiated by the court

generally held to be remedial and civil
in their nature; that is, they are
proceedings for the enforcement of
some duty, and essentially a remedy
for coercing a person to do the thing
required.” “In general, civil contempt
proceedings should be instituted by an
aggrieved party, or his successor, or
someone who has a pecuniary interest
in the right to be protected.”
or tribunal exercising the power to
punish a given contempt, it is criminal
in nature, and the proceedings are to
be conducted in accordance with the
principles and rules applicable to
criminal cases.

when the purpose is primarily The proceedings are to be regarded as

compensatory or remedial. criminal when the purpose is primarily
punishment.

Petitioners argue that the contempt committed by respondents was civil in nature,
as the temporary restraining order the SEC issued was for the benefit of a party to a
case. The contention is untenable.

The State is the real prosecutor. “The real character of the proceedings in contempt
cases is to be determined by the relief sought or by the dominant purpose. The
proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily
punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.”

“But whether the first or the second, contempt is still a criminal proceeding in which
acquittal, for instance, is a bar to a second prosecution. The distinction is for the
purpose only of determining the character of punishment to be administered.” In this
case, the contempt is not civil in nature, but criminal, imposed to vindicate the
dignity and power of the Commission; hence, as in criminal proceedings, an appeal
 would not lie from the order of dismissal of, or an exoneration from, a charge of
contempt.”
2. Sison vs. Caoibes, Jr., 429 Doctrine: The power of contempt must not be exercised in a vindictive manner and
SCRA 258 always cautiously and in a preservative way.

Brief Facts:
Sison is a traffic enforcer of MMDA.

While manning traffic in EDSA he accosted the driver.

Sison requested for the driver’s license who is the son of Judge Caoibes and
issued ticket.

The son went to Las Pinas and informed the Judge father of the confiscation.

The judge ordered the sheriff to recover the driver’s license which was executed by
the sheriff.

However, the sheriff failed to recover the license from Sison since it was already
surrendered to Sison’s boss.

Subsequently, the Judge ordered the police to arrest Sison and brought him to the
sala of Judge. Judge ordered the detention of Sison.

SC terminated/dismissed the Judge and all his retirement benefits. (If you try to
analyse, SC imposed too harsh penalty: But based on records he has been warned
four times. There was also a case wherein he called for another judge in a boxing
match on quarrel over an office table)

Sison vs. Caoibes, Jr., 429 SCRA 258

Judge issued an Order requiring the complainant to appear before him to explain a
traffic incident involving his son and Salvador Sison, a Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) traffic enforcer.

Sison failed to appear.

Judge issued another Order for Sison’s arrest and commitment which the sheriff
served.

Sison appeared and executed an affidavit admitting to the court that he made a
mistake and that it was all a misunderstanding.

Judge lifted the 2nd order, Sison filed a complaint against Judge (complainant was
greatly surprised when respondent TEODORO ALVAREZ came and arrested him
without any warrant of arrest, only on orders of the respondent Judge, and he was
ordered to board a motor vehicle and was brought to the respondent Judge in Las
Pinas City who ordered him detained in the Las Pinas City Jail).

Respondent Teodoro Alvarez informed him that there will be a hearing of his indirect
contempt charge before the sala of the respondent Judge in Las Pinas City.

Judge filed comment, vehemently denied the accusations against him, contending
that he was merely preserving the dignity and honor due to the courts of law.
- The respondent narrated that on September 8, 1999, he ordered his son,
Jose R. Caoibes III, to go to the Pasig City Regional Trial Court to secure
certain records. While on his way there, he was flagged down by the
complainant for an alleged traffic violation. Caoibes III explained to the
complainant that he was on an errand for his father, the respondent judge,
to which the complainant reportedly uttered, Walang Judge, Judge
Caoibes sa akin; kahapon nga, abogado ang hinuli ko.

OCA recommended: the Dismissal of charge against Sheriff Alvarez, the

Referral of charge against Judge to the CA, although the complainant
never appeared to prove the charges against the respondent judge, the
facts averred in the complaint appear to be substantially correct and true.
Thus, the respondent judge abused his authority to charge and punish any
person for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure

Whether Judge Caoibes was correct in citing Sison in indirect contempt, considering
that the latter never became a party to a case pending before Judge Caoibes’ sala –
No

Is the order citing Sison of indirect contempt proper? No, the person cited for
contempt is not a party to case pending in court.

At first blush, it would seem that the respondent judge was justified in holding the
complainant for contempt, due to the latter’s refusal to comply with the judge’s
Order of September 15, 1999.

However, it is not lost upon this Court that the complainant was not a party to any of
the cases pending before the RTC, Branch 253.

What triggered the contempt charge was, in fact, the traffic violation incident
involving the respondent judge’s son.

Furthermore, the record shows that when the complainant filed his reply to the
charge as required by the respondent judge, the same was refused by some staff
member in the latter’s sala.

The respondent judge should have refrained from ordering the arrest and detention
of the complainant, since the incident involved his own son, and the matter was very
personal to him.

The power of contempt is power assumed by a court or judge to coerce cooperation

and punish disobedience, disrespect or interference with the courts orderly process
by exacting summary punishment.

The contempt power was given to the courts in trust for the public, by tradition and
necessity, in as much as respect for the courts, which are ordained to administer the
laws which are necessary to the good order of society, is as necessary as respect
for the laws themselves.

And, as in all other powers of the court, the contempt power, however plenary it may
seem, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly.

A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or

pettiness in the performance of his duties.

In Cortes v. Bangalan, we held that a judge may not hold a party in contempt of
court for expressing concern on the judge’s impartiality through a motion for
voluntary inhibition, even if the latter may have felt insulted therein.

The Court also declared, thus: …[W]hile the power to punish in contempt is inherent
in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold due
administration of justice, judges, however, should exercise their contempt powers
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing
their contempt powers for correction and preservation not for retaliation and
vindication

Was Judge Caoibes justified in considering the act of Sison as deliberate disregard
of the respect due to court – No, the respondent Judge was not justified to so
consider the act and remarks of Sison as thereby displaying arrogance towards and
deliberate disregard of the usual respect, courtesy and accommodation due to a
court of law and its representative.

First of all, the refusal of Sison and the supposed remarks should not cause
resentment on the part of the respondent Judge (whom Sison most likely did not yet
know at the time) because he knew, as a public official himself, that Sison was only
doing his duty of enforcing evenly the particular traffic regulation against swerving
into a one-way street from the wrong direction, regardless of the office or position of
the violator’s father.

Secondly, the respondent Judge should have had the circumspection expected of
him as a judge to realize that the remarks of Sison were invited by Caoibes III’s
attempt to bluff his way out of the apprehension because he was the son of an RTC
judge.

Hence, the respondent Judge would have no grounds to cite Sison for contempt of
court.

And, thirdly, the respondent Judge and his son should have challenged the
issuance of the traffic violation receipt pursuant to the pertinent rules if they did not
agree with the basis of the apprehension and also administratively charged Sison
for any unwarranted act committed.

Since neither was done by them, but, on the contrary, both ultimately accepted the
validity of the apprehension, as borne out by the retrieval of the driver’s license after
September 29, 1999 by paying the fines corresponding to the traffic violation, then it
 follows that the respondent Judge had the consciousness that his son was at fault,
instead of Sison.

3. Espanol vs. Formoso, 525 Doctrine: Judge cannot take judicial notice of the decisions and orders of the other
SCRA courts.

Brief Facts:
Atty. Formoso when presenting documents, Judge Espanyol said the documents
being presented are spurious since that same document has been presented and
pronounced spurious in other case.

Due to argument of Atty. Formoso, the judge order the sheriff to Atty. Formoso be
detained prompting the latter to file administrative case against Judge Espanyol.

SC ruled in favour of Atty. Formoso , Judge was reprimanded.

Can a judge take judicial notice of the decision or notice of the other court – No.

Judge Espanol vs. Atty. Formoso, 525 SCRA

Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. (Sharcons) bought from Evanswinda Morales a

piece of land in Cavite.

TCT was issued in the name of Sharcons.

Sharcons’ worker then tried to fence the land.

HOWEVER, the caretaker thereof prevented them, claiming that spouses Joseph
and Enriqueta Mapua were the true owners of the land.

Sharcons filed with RTC Dasma complaint for quieting of title, Impleaded as
defendants were spouses Mapua, Evanswinda Morales, and the Register of Deeds
of Trece Martires City.

Sps Mapua filed Answer, alleging that all documents used by Sharcons were
spurious and falsified.

Judge Espanol (PJ of RTC Dasma Br 90) issued an Order stating that Benito See
and Marly See, president and treasurer, respectively, of Sharcons, and its counsel,
Atty. Benjamin Formoso, respondents, have used a spurious certificate of title and
tax declaration when it (Sharcons) filed with the RTC its complaint for quieting of
title.

Consequently, petitioner declared respondents guilty of direct contempt of court and

ordered their confinement for ten (10) days in the municipal jail of Dasmariñas,
Cavite.

Petitioner stated that in determining the merits of Sharcons' complaint for quieting of
title, she "stumbled" upon Civil Case No. 623-92 for cancellation of title and
damages filed with the RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, presided by then Judge
Lucenito N. Tagle.

Petitioner then took judicial notice of the judge’s Decision declaring that Sharcons'
TCT and other supporting documents are falsified and that respondents are
responsible therefor.

Judge then issued a warrant against respondents.

Respondents were then arrested and confined in the municipal jail.

Respondents filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the CA.

CA nullified and set aside (ruled in favor of Formoso et. al.?),

- ruling that Judge Español erred in taking cognizance of the Decision
rendered by then Judge Tagle in Civil Case No. 623-92 since it was not
offered in evidence in Civil Case No. 2035-00 for quieting of title.
- Moreover, as the direct contempt of court is criminal in nature, petitioner
should have conducted a hearing. Thus, she could have determined
whether respondents are guilty as charged.

Whether herein respondents were correctly cited in direct contempt so as to warrant

their incarceration - No

Contempt of court is "some act or conduct which tends to interfere with the business
of the court, by a refusal to obey some lawful order of the court, or some act of
disrespect to the dignity of the court which in some way tends to interfere with or
hamper the orderly proceedings of the court and thus lessens the general efficiency
of the same.

In this jurisdiction, it is now recognized that courts have the inherent power to
punish for contempt on the ground that respect for the courts guarantees the very
stability of the judicial institution.

Such stability is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, to the

enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently,
to the very administration of justice.

Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

SEC. 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. –

A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as

to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including
disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or
refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an
affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be
summarily adjudged (JOV: meaning, without a hearing) in contempt by
such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos
or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a
Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine
not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment, not exceeding one
(1) day, or both, if it be a lower court.

On the other hand, Section 3, Rule 71 of the same Rules states:

SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a

charge in writing has been filed and an opportunity given to the respondent
to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to
be heard by himself or by counsel, a person guilty of any of the following
acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of court in the performance of his official

duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or
judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or
process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any
manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be
entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section
1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting as
such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the
custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held
by him.

Indirect or constructive contempt, in turn, is one perpetrated outside of the sitting of

the court and may include misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of
his official duties or in his official transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a
lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted
by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct
tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of
justice.

We agree with petitioner that the use of falsified and forged documents is a
contumacious act.

However, it constitutes indirect contempt not direct contempt.

Thus, following Section 3, Rule 71, a contemner may be punished only after a
charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity has been given to the accused
to be heard by himself and counsel.
 Settled is the rule that a contempt proceeding is not a civil action, but a separate
proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court exercises limited jurisdiction.

Perforce, petitioner judge erred in declaring summarily that respondents are guilty of
direct contempt and ordering their incarceration. She should have conducted a
hearing with notice to respondents.

Evidence issue – W/N Judge Espanol correctly took judicial notice of the Decision in
another civil case presided by Judge Tagle – No, In Gener v. De Leon, we held that
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records of other
cases even when such cases have been tried or pending in the same court.

4. Marantan vs. Diokno, 716 SCRA Brief Facts and Doctrine:

164, 716 SCRA 164, 2/2014 Atty. Diokno allowed the media interview on the case that he is handling about the
gun fight of his client.

Maranthan moved that Atty. Diokno be cited for contempt for allowing media
interview.

However, SC ruled it is not sub judice since Atty. Diokno is only discussing the facts
of the case and not merits of the case, hence, he shall not be cited for contempt.

P/SUPT. Marantan vs. Atty. Diokno, 716 SCRA 164, 2/2014

This case stemmed from a criminal case entitled “People vs. P/SINSP Marantan, et.
al” pending before the RTC.

Marantan and his co-accused were charged with homicide (where persons
[including Anton Cu-Unjieng (son of respondent La’O)] were shot and killed by
police in front of AIC Gold Tower at Ortigas Center which was captured by a TV
crew from UNTV).

In the meantime, another shooting incident transpired which also involved

Marantan. This allegedly resulted in much negative publicity on the part of
Marantan.

Marantan filed a petition before SC to cite La’o (the private complainant in the
homicide charge) and Atty. Diokno (La’o’s counsel therein) in contempt,
- contending that the respondents violated the sub judice rule, making them
liable for indirect contempt for their contemptuous statements and
improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice.
- He argues that their pronouncements and malicious comments delved not
only on the supposed inaction of the Court in resolving the petitions filed,
but also on the merits of the criminal cases before the RTC and
prematurely concluded that he and his co-accused are guilty of murder.
- It is Maranta’s position that the press conference was organized by the
respondents for the sole purpose of influencing the decision of the Court in
the petition filed before it and the outcome of the criminal cases before the
RTC by drawing an ostensible parallelism between the Ortigas incident
and the Atimonan incident.]

La’o and Diokno filed their comment

- [arguing that there was no violation of the sub judice rule as their
statements were legitimate expressions of their desires, hopes and
opinions which were taken out of context and did not actually impede,
obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in a concrete way;
- that no criminal intent was shown as the utterances were not on their face
actionable being a fair comment of a matter of public interest and concern;
and that this petition is intended to stifle legitimate speech.]

Whether there was a violation of the sub judice rule on the part of La’o and Atty.
Diokno so as to merit their being cited in contempt –
No,

The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or
obstructing the administration of justice.

- A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under
Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
- Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. – x x x a person guilty of any of the following acts may

5. Capitol Hills Golf and Country
Club vs. Sanchez, 717 SCRA
be punished for indirect contempt: (d) Any improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice[.]
The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature.
This form of contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of
the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of
justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.
Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and no one can be punished for
a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit
it.
For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that
such does impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice.
As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents' comments reveals that
they were simply stating that it had not yet resolved their petition.
There was no complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate amount of time had
passed since the petition was filed without any action from the Court.
There appears no attack or insult on the dignity of the Court either [wala namang
reklamo na matagal desisyunan ung case, no attack/insult also, no criminal intent to
impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice can be inferred from the
comments of the respondents].
The power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature,
should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice. In the present
case, such necessity is wanting.
Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club vs. Sanchez, 717 SCRA
Manuel O. Sanchez (respondent), a stockholder of petitioner Capitol Hills Golf &
Country Club, Inc. (Corporation) filed a petition for the nullification of the annual
meeting of stockholders of May 21, 2002 and the special meeting of stockholders of
April 23, 2002.
Sanchez filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents which the RTC
granted.
Capitol then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC denied.
Capitol filed a Rule 65 before the CA which the CA dismissed.
Capitol then filed a Rule 45 before the SC which the SC dismissed.
The supposed inspection was not held.
Sanchez set the inspection on August 1, 2003, BUT Atty. Matias V. Defensor, then
Corporate Secretary of the Corporation, was alleged to be out of town and petitioner
Pablo B. Roman, Jr. (Roman) purported to have shown no willingness to comply
with the directive.
Finally, the inspection was conducted on January 11, 2007, the only document
produced by the Acting Corporate Secretary, Atty. Antonio V. Meriz, and one of the
staff, Malou Santos, was the Stock and Transfer Book of the Corporation.
They alleged that they could not find from the corporate records the copies of the
proxies submitted by the stockholders, including the tape recordings taken during
the stockholders’ meetings, and that they needed more time to locate and find the
list of stockholders as of March 2002, which was in the bodega of the Corporation.
Sanchez filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion
- praying that an order be issued in accordance with Section 3, Paragraphs
(a) to (d) of Rule 29 of the Rules of Court (Rules), in relation to Section 4,
Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate
Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 (Interim Rules).
RTC gave the parties one last chance to comply with the order dated September 10,
2002.
The Supreme Court orders the defendants to strictly comply with this order. Failure
of the defendants to comply with all the requirements of the order dated September
10, 2002 will result in this court citing all the defendants in contempt of court.

This Court shall order defendants solidarily to pay a fine of P10,000.00 for every day
of delay to comply with the order of September 10, 2002 until the defendants shall
have fully and completely complied with the said order.

Capitol filed a Rule 65 before the CA which the CA dismissed,

- ruling that there is no indication that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
- According to the appellate court, the September 3, 2007 Resolution was
issued pursuant to Section 3, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules, with the
suppletory application of Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules.
- It noted that, except for the sanctions contained therein, the assailed
Resolution merely reiterated the September 10, 2002 Order of Judge
Bruselas, which petitioners did not dispute in accordance with Section 2,
Rule 3 of the Interim Rules or via petition for certiorari.
- The CA further held that petitioners were not denied due process as they
were able to move for a reconsideration of the September 10, 2002 Order,
but not opted to file the same with respect to the September 3, 2007
Resolution.

Capitol filed a Rule 45 before the SC,

- contending that the "threatened imminent action" by the RTC to penalize
them sua sponte or without regard to the guideline laid down by the Court
in Engr. Torcende v. Judge Sardido is not proper and calls for the exercise
of Our power of supervision over the lower courts.
- Likewise, citing Panaligan v. Judge Ibay, among others, they claim that the
threatened citation for contempt is not in line with the policy that there
should be willfulness or that the contumacious act be done deliberately in
disregard of the authority of the court.

Whether RTC was justified in issuing an order constituting a threat to cite Capitol in
contempt. Yes

A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court or

commits any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt.

In particular, Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules states that, in addition to a

possible treatment of a party as nonsuited or as in default, the sanctions prescribed
in the Rules for failure to avail of, or refusal to comply with, the modes of discovery
shall apply.

Under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules, if a party or an officer or managing agent of a

party refuses to obey an order to produce any document or other things for
inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to be done, the court may make
such orders as are just.

The enumeration of options given to the court under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules
is not exclusive, as shown by the phrase "among others”.

If adjudged guilty of indirect contempt, the respondent who committed it against a

Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank may be punished with a
fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos, or imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
months, or both.

In this case, the threatened sanction of possibly ordering petitioners to solidarily pay
a fine of P10,000.00 for every day of delay in complying with the September 10,
2002 Order is well within the allowable range of penalty.

Under the Rules of Court, there are two ways of initiating indirect contempt
proceedings:
(1) motu proprio by the court; or

In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed.

Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provide the procedure to

be followed in case of indirect contempt.
- First, there must be an ORDER requiring the respondent to show
cause why he should not be cited for contempt.
- Second, the respondent must be given the opportunity to
comment on the charge against him.
- Third, there must be a HEARING and the court must investigate
the charge and consider respondent’s answer.

6. Tormis vs. Paredes, 749 SCRA
505, Feb. 4, 2015
- Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be punished
accordingly
(2) by a verified petition.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a
verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of
documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned.
If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action
pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said
petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court
in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the
principal action for joint hearing and decision
In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been initiated.
To the Court’s mind, the September 3, 2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere
reiteration of the September 10, 2002 Order.
It is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt" as
contemplated under the Rules. The penalty mentioned therein only serves as a
reminder to caution petitioners of the consequence of possible non-observance of
the long-overdue order to produce and make available for inspection and
photocopying of the requested records/documents.
In case of another failure or refusal to comply with the directive, the court or
respondent could formally initiate the indirect contempt proceedings pursuant to the
mandatory requirements of the Rules and existing jurisprudence.
Even if We are to treat the September 3, 2007 Resolution as a "judgment or final
order of a court in a case of indirect contempt," this would still not work to
petitioners’ advantage.
Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court lays down the proper remedy from a
judgment in indirect contempt proceedings. It states:
Sec. 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay.––The
judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt may be
appealed to the proper court as in criminal cases.
But execution of the judgment or final order shall not be suspended
until a bond is filed by the person adjudged in contempt, in an amount
fixed by the court from which the appeal is taken, conditioned that if the
appeal be decided against him he will abide by and perform the
judgment or final order.
The recourse provided for in the above-mentioned provision is clear enough: the
person adjudged in indirect contempt must file an appeal under Rule 41 (Appeal
from the Regional Trial Courts) and post a bond for its suspension pendente lite.
Obviously, these were not done in this case. Instead, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules and did not post the required bond, effectively
making the September 3, 2007 Resolution final and executory.
JILL M. TORMIS v. JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES, AM No. RTJ-13-2366, 2015-
02-04
Facts:
Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave misconduct. 
Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review... at the Southwestern
University,... Cebu City. 
She averred that sometime in August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge Paredes
named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis)... as one of the
judges... involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. 
Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her
position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law.
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only
once but several times.
In one session, Judge Paredes was even said to have included in his discussion
Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of Judge Tormis, stating that he was a

"court-noted addict."

To avoid humiliation in school, Jill decided to drop the... class under Judge Paredes
and transfer to another law school in Tacloban City.

Jill also disclosed that in the case entitled "Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge Tormis"[5]
(Lachica v. Tormis), her mother was suspended from the service for six (6) months
for allegedly receiving payment of a cash bail bond for the temporary... release of an
accused for the warrant she had issued in a case then pending before her sala. 

Judge Paredes was the one who reviewed the findings conducted therein and he
recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe reprimand.

Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than that
committed by her mother. 

- She averred that on March 13, 2011, Judge Paredes accepted a cash bail
bond... for the temporary release of one Lita Guioguio in a case entitled,
"People of the Philippines v. Lita Guioguio,"... she prayed that Judge
Paredes be administratively sanctioned for his actuations.

Justice Diy found Judge Paredes guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. 

- She opined that his use of intemperate language during class discussions
was inappropriate.  His statements in class, tending to project Judge
Tormis as corrupt... and ignorant of the laws and procedure, were
obviously and clearly insensitive and inexcusable.
- Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his discussions
of the administrative case of Judge Tormis in class was an exercise of his
right to freedom of expression. 
- She cited the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
which urged members of the Judiciary to be models of propriety at all
times. 
- She quoted with emphasis Section 6 which stated that "Judges, like any
other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and
assembly, but in exercising... such rights, they shall always conduct
themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office
and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary."
- Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes' position that he could not be
held administratively liable for his comments against Judge Tormis and
Francis as these were uttered while he was not in the exercise of his
judicial functions.  Jurisprudence,[17] as well as the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, required that he conduct himself beyond reproach, not only in the
discharge of his judicial functions, but also in his other professional
endeavors and everyday activities.

Justice Diy found merit in Jill's allegation that Judge Paredes violated the subjudice
rule when the latter discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010
when the said issue was still being investigated.

Justice Diy came up with the following recommendations

- The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed Judge Paredes is

guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge.
- Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes' first offense and considering the
factual milieu and the peculiar circumstances attendant thereto, it is
respectfully recommended that Judge Paredes be meted out with the
penalty of REPRIMAND

Is Judge Paredes liable for misconduct?

 No. To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to
and be connected with the performance of his official duties.

Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks against Judge Tormis
and Francis, were made by Judge Paredes in his class discussions, they
cannot be considered as "misconduct." 

They are simply not related to the discharge of his official functions as a
judge.  Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct, much
less for grave misconduct.

Did the act of Judge Paredes of critizing certain Judge Tormis during former class
discussion (about the pendency of the administrative case of Judge Tormis and...
the publicity of the marriage scams) violates the subjudice rule?
  Yes.

On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct

provides:

CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
SEC. 4.  Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could
come before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected
to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of
the process.  Nor shall judges make any... comment in public or otherwise
that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge
Tormis in 2010, the investigation relative to the said case had not yet been
concluded.

In 2010, he still could not make comments on the administrative case to prevent any
undue influence in its resolution. 

Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the judges
involved, was in contravention of the subjudice... rule. 

Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated Section 4,
Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge
Paredes for discussing the marriage scams in his classes seemed noble, his
objectives were carried out insensitively and in bad taste. 

The pendency of the administrative case of Judge Tormis and... the publicity of the
marriage scams did not give Judge Paredes unrestrained license to criticize Judge
Tormis in his class discussions.

The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be held
administratively liable for his negative portrayal of Judge Tormis and Francis in his
class discussions. 

Judge Paredes should be reminded of the ethical conduct expected of him as a

judge not... only in the performance of his judicial duties, but in his professional and
private activities as well. 

Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the Code mandates:

CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but
also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1.  Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach,
but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of the
court, should not be tolerated for he is not a judge only occasionally. 

It should be emphasized that the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct
of a judge must be free of a whiff of... impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a
private individual.

Principles:

Misconduct

 is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of

action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public
officer. 
 The misconduct is GRAVE if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to... violate the law, or to disregard established
rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.
 As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
manifest in a charge of... GRAVE MISCONDUCT.
 Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an
official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person,
 contrary to duty and the rights of... others.

The subjudice rule…

 restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in

order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice. 
 The rationale for the rule was spelled... out in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v.
Sanchez, where it was stated that it is a traditional conviction of civilized
society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact
and law should be immune from every extraneous... influence; that facts
should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies.

7. Oca vs. Custodio, 832 SCRA BRO. BERNARD OCA v. LAURITA CUSTODIO, GR No. 199825, 2017-07-26
(2017)
Facts:

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari

- assailing the May 25, 2011 Decision and the December 19, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R, CR. No. 31985.
- *The assailed Decision affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision, which
found petitioners Bro. Bernard Oca, Bro. Dennis Magbanua, Cirila N.
Mojica, Alejandro N. Mojica, Josefina Pascual, Atty. Silvestre Pascual, and
St. Francis School of General Trias, Cavite, Inc. (petitioners) guilty of
Indirect Contempt. The assailed Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.

St. Francis School was established with the assistance of the La Salle brothers on
July 9, 1973 by respondent Laurita Custodio (Custodio), petitioner Cirila N. Mojica
(Cirila), petitioner Josefina Pascual (Josefina), Monsignor Felix Perez, and Brother
Vernon Poore.

- These five (5) incorporators served as St. Francis School's Board of

Trustees until the latter two (2) passed away.

Without a written agreement, the La Salle brothers agreed to give the necessary
supervision to establish the school's academic foundation

Cirila, Josefina, Bro. Oca, and Bro. Magbanua wanted to expand the scope of La
Salle's supervision to include A matters relating to the school's finances,
administration, and operations

Custodio was subsequently removed from the Board of Trustees and as Curriculum
Administrator

Custodio filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal but eventually withdrew
her appeal to file a new suit instead

On October 3, 2002, Custodio again filed a complaint against petitioners for

violating the Corporation Code

- She sought to disqualify Bro. Oca and Bro. Magbanua as members and
trustees of the school and to declare void all their acts as President and
Treasurer, respectively.
- She likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary
injunction to enjoin the remaining board members from holding meetings
and to prevent Bro. Oca and Bro. Magbanua from discharging their
functions as members, trustees, and officers of St. Francis School.

October 8, 2002, the Regional Trial Court heard Custodio's prayer for the issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order.

Custodio filed a Manifestation and Motion dated October 9, 2002.

- She alleged that after the hearing for the Temporary Restraining Order,...
the counsel for petitioners went to St. Francis School to instruct several
parents not to acknowledge Custodio's administration as she had been
removed... and that her complaint had been dismissed. The parents were
also allegedly directed to pay the students' matriculation fees exclusively to
petitioner
- This meeting allegedly caused 15 teachers to hold a strike, which nearly
disrupted classes and caused parents to request the early dismissal of
their children for fear that violence would ensue.
- Custodio reiterated her prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order.
- She moved that the hearing be converted into an injunction hearing or that
 a status quo order be issued to allow her to continue functioning as school
director and curriculum administrator...

The Regional Trial Court issued an Order designating Reynante to act as school
cashier "with authority to collect all fees" and, together with Custodio, "to pay all
accounts."

- The trial court also directed all parties in the case to submit a report on and
to turn over to Reynante all money previously collected.

On February 21, 2003, petitioners filed an Explanation, Manifestation and

Compliance.

- They alleged that they partially complied with the October 21, 2002 Order
by submitting an accounting on the tuition fee collections and by turning
over to Reynante a manager's check in the amount of P397,127.64
payable to St. Francis School.
* The amount allegedly represented the school's matriculation fees from
October to December 2002.
- However, they alleged that Reynante refused to accept the check and
required that the amount be turned over in cash or in a check payable to
cash. Thus, petitioners placed the check in the custody of the Regional
Trial Court for safekeeping

Custodio also claimed that petitioners violated the trial court order that only she and
Reynante were authorized to pay the outstanding accounts of St. Francis School.

- Petitioners allegedly made salary payments to four (4) employees who had
resigned

On March 24, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued another Order[41] directing
petitioners to fully comply with its earlier order to submit a report and to turn over to
Reynante all the money they had collected:

Petitioners filed a Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion

on April 18, 2003,

- praying, among others, that the trial court issue an order excluding from its
March 24, 2003 Order the amounts which were not covered in its October
21, 2002 Order.

On August 5, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order denying all motions
raised in petitioners' Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion
and declared that they had not complied with the March 24, 2003 Order:

La Salle served Custodio a notice dated January 4, 2003, that they were terminating
the Memorandum of Agreement with St. Francis School.

On August 21, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order granting Custodio's
Manifestation and Motion dated October 9, 2002 and issuing a status quo order
allowing Custodio to discharge her functions as school director and curriculum
administrator.

- The trial court ruled in favor of Custodio when it found that petitioners had
already established another school, the Academy of St. John (Academy of
St. John) in Sta. Clara, General Trias, Cavite

Petitioners filed their Motion for Clarification.

- They alleged that the bulk of the money ordered to be turned over to
Custodio and Reynante was allotted to St. Francis School's teachers'
retirement fund.
- Considering that it must be preserved, petitioners raised several queries.
*They wanted to know if Custodio and Reynante would use the money for
other purposes other than for the teachers' retirement benefit and if
Custodio and Reynante would be required to file a bond to guaranty its
safekeeping and exclusive use as teacher's retirement compensation.
*Finally, they asked who would be held liable in case of Custodio and
Reynante's unlawful use of this fund.

On September 2, 2003, Custodio filed the Petition to Cite Respondents in Contempt

of Court under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

- She likewise prayed that an order be issued reiterating the Orders dated
October 21, 2002, March 24, 2003, and August 5, 2003.

In response to petitioners' Motion for Clarification, the trial court issued an Order
dated October 8, 2003
 - clarifying that the retirement fund was to be held in trust by Custodio and
Reynante.
- It also directed Custodio and Reynante to file a bond of P300,000.00 each.
- Later, it ordered petitioners to comply with the mandate in the March 24,
2003 and August 5, 2003 Orders and directed them to disclose to the court
the total amount of the fund deposited and reserved for teachers'
retirement benefit and its bank detail

On October 10, 2003, petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals

- to question the Regional Trial Court's Orders dated August 5, 2003, August
21, 2003 and October 8, 2003.

Eventually, this was elevated to this Court and was docketed as G.R. No. 174996.

Meanwhile, trial commenced for the contempt case. Custodio presented as her lone
witness, Joseph Custodio (Joseph), St. Francis School's finance and property
resource development administrator. Petitioners did not present any witness

In its Decision dated February 6, 2008,...it found petitioners guilty of indirect

contempt for failing to comply with the Orders dated October 21, 2002 and March
24, 2003 and ordered them to jointly and severally pay a fine of P30,000.00

In its May 25, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court Decision.

- It found that it was sufficiently established that petitioners did not remit all
the money they had previously collected despite the trial court's October
21, 2002 Order, which they admitted to be lawful
- The Court of Appeals ruled that defying the trial court orders amounted to
contumacious conduct, which "tended to prejudice St. Francis School's
operations due to lack of operational funds.
- The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration in its Resolution dated
December 19, 2011.

Petitioners held that to be cited for contempt, the contemnor must be guilty of willful
disobedience.

- However, they did not disobey the trial court orders.

- They insisted that they had complied in good faith because the trial court
October 21, 2002 Order only pertained to the school's matriculation fees
and not any other fees.
- They claimed that the October 21, 2002 Order was a response to
Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated October 14, 2002, which only
requested that the matriculation fees be turned over to Reynante.
- Thus, they averred that it was reasonable for them to conclude that the
subject of the turnover was the matriculation fees only.

In its March 5, 2012 Resolution, this Court denied the Petition

- on the ground that the issues raised were factual in nature and petitioners
failed to raise any reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

Issues:

Whether petitioners are guilty of willful disobedience;

Whether petitioners can refuse to follow the orders of the Regional Trial Court on
the premise that their legality is being questioned in this Court;

Whether Alejandro N. Mojica and Atty. Silvestre Pascual are equally guilty of
indirect contempt despite the fact that they are not parties to the complaint.

Ruling:

This Court rules that petitioners Oca, Magbanua, Cirila, and Josefina are guilty of
indirect contempt. There is a contumacious refusal on their part to comply with the
Regional Trial Court Orders.

In the case at bar, petitioners were charged with indirect contempt through
"disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a
court."

The wording of the October 21, 2002 Order is clear that the amounts do not pertain
only to the matriculation fees but to all collectibles, all fees, and all accounts. It also
states that petitioners were to render a report and turn over all the amounts they had
previously collected. It does not state that only matriculation fees were to be handed
over.

This Court finds that the subsequent trial court orders did not unduly expand the
scope of the October 21, 2002 Order as petitioners argue. The October 21, 2002
Order itself already directed that all fees be turned over to Reynante.

Custodio pointed out that petitioners paid the salaries of four (4) other employees
who had already resigned, violating the court order that only Reynante and Custodio
were authorized to pay the outstanding accounts of St. Francis School. Thus, it
cannot be said that Custodio inserted a surreptitious prayer for the turnover of funds
not included in the October 21, 2002 Order.

She simply stated that petitioners failed to substantially comply with the October 21,
2002 Order and specified the other amounts that petitioners needed to turn over.
When she prayed for the turnover of the other amounts, she merely sought
petitioners' compliance of the trial court October 21, 2002 Order.

The trial court reiterated this in its March 24, 2003 Order and specified more
particularly the amounts that needed to be remitted.

However, despite its clear wording, petitioners still did not comply with the March
24, 2003 Order. Instead, they filed a Manifestation, Observation, Compliance,
Exception and Motion on April 18, 2003, praying that the trial court exclude the other
amounts, which were allegedly not included in the October 21, 2002 Order

The trial court denied petitioners' Manifestation, Observation, Compliance,

Exception and Motion in its August 5, 2003 Order

- for being a differently worded motion for reconsideration, which is a

prohibited pleading under Section 8 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for
Intra-Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC).
- The trial court noted that petitioners still had not complied with its March
24, 2003 Order and reiterated that they must submit a report and turn over
all the money they had collected.

Their defense that they were denied due process deserves little consideration.

- Petitioners had attended hearings and had filed several pleadings showing
that they were given several opportunities to present their position on the
matter. All these were considered before the trial court rendered its orders.

This Court notes that petitioners' justification for refusing to turn over the stated
amounts was that, the amounts constituted teachers' retirement fund, which
consequently did not belong to St. Francis School and was not covered by the
assailed Orders.

However, the trial court lent credence to Joseph's testimony that the amounts
deposited in the Special Savings Accounts were funds for the operations of the
school... petitioners could not refuse to comply with the trial court orders just
because they opined that they were invalid.

It is not for the parties to decide whether they should or should not comply with a
court order. Petitioners did not obtain any injunction to stop the implementation of
the trial court orders nor was there an injunction to prevent the trial court from
hearing and ruling on the contempt case.

Petitioners' stubborn refusal cannot be excused just because they were convinced
of its invalidity. Their resort to the processes of questioning the orders does not
show that they are in good faith.

Petitioners likewise cannot invoke the principle of judicial courtesy.

In the two (2) cases involved, there are two (2) separate issues.

- In G.R. No. 174996, the issue was whether the orders of the trial court
were valid.
- In this indirect contempt case, the issue is whether petitioners willfully
disobeyed the orders of the trial court.

Although this Court may find the orders invalid in G.R. No. 174996, the petitioners
may still be cited in contempt for their contumacious refusal and defiance of the trial
court orders.

Therefore, the finding of indirect contempt will not render moot this Court's ruling in
G.R. No. 174996

In this case, petitioners were given several opportunities to comply with the trial
court orders.
Even after the trial court clarified which funds to turn over, they still refused to obey.

While petitioners questioned the legality of these orders, they are immediately
executory.

Moreover, the parties do not have the power to determine for themselves what
should and should not be excluded from the orders.

Their failure to turn over the amounts showed petitioners' defiance and disregard for
the authority of the trial court.

Civil contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or
judge "for the benefit of the other party."

A criminal contempt is committed when a party acts against the court's authority and
dignity or commits a forbidden act tending to disrespect the court or judge.

Principles:

Contempt of court is willful disobedience to the court and disregard or defiance of its
authority, justice, and dignity.

It constitutes conduct which "tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due
administration of justice" or "interfere with or prejudice parties' litigant or their
witnesses during litigation."

All courts are given the inherent power to punish contempt.

- This power is an essential necessity to preserve order in judicial

proceedings and to enforce the due administration of justice and the
court's mandates, orders, and judgments.
- It safeguards the respect due to the courts and, consequently, ensures the
stability of the judicial institution.

There are two (2) types of contempt of court:

(i) direct contempt and

(ii) indirect contempt.

Direct contempt

 consists of "misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to

obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before it."
 It includes: (i) disrespect to the court, (ii) offensive behavior against others,
(iii) refusal, despite being lawfully required, to be sworn in or to answer as
a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition.
 It can be punished summarily without a hearing.

Indirect contempt

 is committed through any of the acts enumerated under Rule 71, Section 3
of the Rules of Court:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his [or her]
official duties or in his [or her] official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or
judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process
of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the
possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of
this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such
without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody
of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him [or her].

 Indirect contempt is only punished after a written petition is filed and an

opportunity to be heard is given to the party charged.

In intra-corporate controversies, all orders of the trial court are immediately

executory

Questioning the trial court orders does not stay its enforcement or implementation.
There is no showing that the trial court orders were restrained by the appellate
court.

Judicial courtesy is exercised by suspending a lower court's proceedings although

there is no injunction or an order from a higher court.

- The purpose is to avoid mooting the matter raised in the higher court.
- It is exercised as a matter of respect and for practical considerations.
- However, this principle applies only if the continuation of the lower court's
proceedings will render moot the issue raised in the higher court.

Civil contempt

 is committed when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge

"for the benefit of the other party."

A criminal contempt

 is committed when a party acts against the court's authority and dignity or
commits a forbidden act tending to disrespect the court or judge.[161]

This stems from the two (2)-fold aspect of contempt which seeks:

(i) to punish the party for disrespecting the court or its orders; and
(ii) to compel the party to do an act or duty which it refuses to perform.

The difference between civil contempt and criminal contempt

Criminal contempt proceedings

 are generally held to be in the nature of criminal or quasi-criminal actions.

 They are punitive in nature, and the Government, the courts, and the
people are interested in their prosecution.
 Their purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the authority and
dignity of the court, and to punish for disobedience of its orders.
 Strictly speaking, however, they are not criminal proceedings or
prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a crime.
 The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some
of the elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, but really
constituting neither.
 In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be conducted in
accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so
far as such procedure is consistent with the summary nature of contempt
proceedings.
 So it has been held that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions
apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be
afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases, and
that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly
construed.
 However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular form
so long as the substantial rights of the accused are preserved.
 In criminal contempt proceedings, it is generally held that the State is the
real prosecutor.
 Contempt is not presumed.
 In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent
and the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond
reasonable doubt.

Civil contempt proceedings

 are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature;

 that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and
essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required.
 As otherwise expressed, a proceeding for civil contempt is one instituted to
preserve and enforce the rights of a private party to an action and to
compel obedience to a judgment or decree intended to benefit such a party
litigant.
 So a proceeding is one for civil contempt, regardless of its form, if the act
charged is wholly the disobedience, by one party to a suit, of a special
order made in behalf of the other party and the disobeyed order may still
be obeyed, and the purpose of the punishment is to aid in an enforcement
of obedience.
 The rules of procedure governing criminal contempt proceedings, or
criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are inapplicable to civil contempt
 proceedings . . .
 In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved
party, or his successor, or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the
right to be protected.
 In proceedings for civil contempt, there is no presumption, although the
burden of proof is on the complainant, and while the proof need not be
beyond reasonable doubt, it must amount to more than a mere
preponderance of evidence.
 It has been said that the burden of proof in a civil contempt proceeding lies
somewhere between the criminal “reasonable doubt” burden and the civil
“fair preponderance” burden.
 Civil contempt proceedings seek to compel the contemnor to obey a court
order, judgment, or decree which he or she refuses to do for the benefit of
another party.
 It is for the enforcement and the preservation of a right of a private party,
who is the real party in interest in the proceedings.
 The purpose of the contemnor's punishment is to compel obedience to the
order.
 Thus, civil contempt is not treated like a criminal proceeding and proof
beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary to prove it

While the nature of the punishment imposed is a mixture of both criminal and civil,
the contempt proceeding in this case is more civil than criminal.

The purpose of the filing and the nature of the contempt proceeding show that
Custodio was seeking enforcement of the trial court orders in the intra-corporate
controversy because petitioners refused to comply.

Hence, this is a civil contempt case, which does not need proof beyond reasonable
doubt.

8. Causing vs. De la Rosa, 857

SCRA (2017)
SECOND DIVISION

[ OCA IPI No.17-4663-RTJ, March 07, 2018 ]

ATTY. BERTENI C. CAUSING AND PERCIVAL CARAG MABASA,

COMPLAINANTS, V. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE LORENZO R. DELA ROSA,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 4, MANILA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J:

Before the Court is the Complaint[1] dated January 6, 2017 filed before the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) by Atty. Berteni C. Causing (Atty. Causing) and
Percival Carag Mabasa a.k.a. Percy Lapid (Mabasa) against respondent Judge
Jose Lorenzo R. Dela Rosa (respondent Judge Dela Rosa), Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch (Br.) 4, Manila.

Antecedents

Atty. Causing and his client, Mabasa (Complainants), charged respondent Judge
Dela Rosa with gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct and gross
incompetence for reversing[2] the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 09-268685-86
entitled People v. Eleazar, et al. (Libel Cases), wherein Mabasa was one of the
accused.

Complainants alleged that the Libel Cases were dismissed by former Acting
Presiding Judge Gamor B. Disalo (Judge Disalo) in an Order [3] dated April 13, 2015
on the ground that the right of the accused to speedy trial had been violated.

The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 13, 2015 Order
before the RTC Br. 4 Manila, now presided by respondent Judge Dela Rosa.

Respondent Judge Dela Rosa granted the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration
in the assailed Resolution[4] dated November 23, 2015 (November 23, 2015
Resolution), the pertinent portions of which read:

xxxx

In opposition thereto, counsel for the accused cites double jeopardy. However,
several settings of this Court showed that the resetting was on motion of counsel for
the accused and hence with the consent of the accused. Further, the questioned
Order dated April 13, 2015 has not yet attained finality, so double jeopardy is not yet
attached.

Further, the records of this case would show that the accused is not entirely without
blame as to why this case has been pending. Aside from that, the accused filed a
Motion to Quash as well as accused's Motion for Reconsideration thereto resulting
in the conduct of the arraignment only in the last year of September.

The prosecution should be given its day in court. To deny the Motion For
Reconsideration is a (sic) deny to prosecute on the part of the prosecution.[5]
Complainants questioned respondent Judge Dela Rosa's November 23, 2015
Resolution granting the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration because,
according to them, it was elementary for respondent Judge Dela Rosa to know that
the prior dismissal of a criminal case due to a violation of the accused's right to
speedy trial is equivalent to a dismissal on the merits of the case and, as such,
granting the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration was tantamount to a violation
of the constitutional right against double jeopardy. [6] Complainants averred further
that it was unacceptable, given respondent Judge Dela Rosa's position and the
presumption of his knowledge of the law, for him to have disregarded a rule as
elementary as the constitutional right of an accused against double jeopardy.[7]

Complainants also criticized respondent Judge Dela Rosa's act of referring to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Atty. Causing's two (2) separate posts on his
Facebook and blogspot accounts about the subject criminal cases. They reasoned
that respondent Judge Dela Rosa should have first required Atty. Causing to show
cause why he should not be cited in contempt for publicizing and taking his posts to
social media. Atty. Causing emphasized that the posts were presented using decent
words and thus, it was incorrect for respondent Judge Dela Rosa to refer his actions
to a disciplinary body such as the IBP. Atty. Causing further asserted that he did not
violate the sub judice[8] rule because this rule cannot be used to preserve the
unfairness and errors of respondent Judge Dela Rosa.[9]

In a 1st Indorsement[10] dated January 16, 2017, the OCA directed respondent Judge
Dela Rosa to file his Comment within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. [11]

In his Comment[12] dated March 13, 2017 (Comment), respondent Judge Dela Rosa
averred that he had already reversed the November 23, 2015 Resolution as early as
June 20, 2016 or way before the filing of the Complaint on January 6, 2017 — when
he issued a Resolution[13] of even date, which states:

x x x While the records of the cases will show delay also attributable to the defense
and that this court was acting in the spirit of fairness, the April 13, 2015 Order of
Hon. Disalo should be upheld to the prejudice of fairness. Being caught between a
rock and a hard place, liberality is afforded to the accused. x x x

xxxx

As the records would show that the Hon. Judge Disalo dismissed these cases on
the right of speedy trial, double jeopardy attaches. Hence, this Court's Resolution
dated November 23, 2015 is recalled and set aside. The dismissal dated April 13,
2015 as dictated in the Order of Hon. Judge Disalo is reinstated.

While the right of due process of the State may have been circumvented, the
interest of the private complainants with regard to the civil aspect of the cases is
protected as the dismissal of the subject criminal cases is without prejudice to the
pursuit of civil indemnity.[14]
Respondent Judge Dela Rosa explained in his Comment that he had issued the
November 23, 2015 Resolution because, after studying the records, he discovered
that Complainants caused much of the delay in the proceedings.[15]

Respondent Judge Dela Rosa then enumerated in his Comment the instances
wherein Complainants caused the delay in the proceedings in the Libel Cases:

1. While the warrant of arrest for Mabasa was issued on May 28, 2009, it was
only one (1) year and four (4) months after or on September 28, 2010 that
Mabasa was detained;[16]

2. Mabasa filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 30, 2010; [17]

3. The arraignment and pre-trial of the cases were reset after then Presiding
Judge Marcelino L. Sayo, Jr. (Judge Sayo) issued an Order dated April 6,
2011, which indicated that Mabasa, through counsel, moved that the
scheduled arraignment and pre-trial be reset in order "for the parties to
settle the civil aspect of these cases";[18]

4. The counsel of Mabasa filed an Urgent Motion for Deferment dated June 9,
 2011 requesting again for the re-scheduling of the arraignment and pre-
trial;[19]

5. The pre-trial of the case was again rescheduled in an Order dated August
24, 2011 by the lower court due to the absence of Mabasa's co-accused,
Johnson L. Eleazar;[20]

6. Mabasa filed a Motion to Quash dated October 11, 2011, citing the court's
lack of jurisdiction;[21]

7. The lower court, in an Order dated June 27, 2012, rescheduled again the
arraignment and pre-trial, citing the absence of the private prosecutor,
Mabasa and his counsel;[22]

8. Judge Sayo thereafter issued an Order dated November 28, 2012,

directing the issuance of warrants of arrest against Mabasa and co-
accused Gloria Galuno due to their continued non-appearance in court; [23]

9. In an Order dated December 12, 2012, Judge Sayo lifted the warrants of
arrest against Mabasa and his other co-accused in the Libel Cases after
their counsel admitted that their non-appearance in the previous hearing
was due to the fault of their counsel's law Office. [24]

10. The hearing of the case on June 30, 2014 was rescheduled after Mabasa
moved for the resetting of the case due to the absence of his counsel; [25]

11. In an Order by Judge Disalo dated August 11, 2014, counsel for Mabasa
was absent again. Mabasa was finally arraigned after the court appointed
one of the lawyers from the Public Attorney's Office as counsel de oficio for
Mabasa;[26]

12. The Commissioner's Report dated September 23, 2014 stated that the
preliminary conference failed to push through due to the absence of
Mabasa and his counsel;[27] and

13. The initial date of the presentation of the prosecution evidence was set on
April 13, 2015 by the branch clerk of court. Notably, the cases against
Mabasa would be dismissed on the same day.[28]

Respondent Judge DelaRosa emphasized that the day the Libel Cases were
dismissed, i.e., on April 13, 2015, was actually the date set for the first actual trial of
the cases. He stressed that the delay of almost five (5) years in the subject cases
was attributable more to Mabasa than anyone else.[29]

Respondent Judge Dela Rosa claimed that the November 23, 2015 Resolution was
issued in good faith and after evaluation of the evidence submitted by each party.
He denied that the same was motivated by bad faith, ill will, fraud, dishonesty,
corruption or caprice. In fact, Respondent Judge issued this as a matter of fairness
— that is, to give the private complainants in the Libel Cases an opportunity to
pursue against Mabasa and his co-accused the civil aspect of the Libel Cases.[30]

Finally, respondent Judge Dela Rosa stressed how the filing of this administrative
complaint against him — on January 6, 2017, or after he had already reversed the
November 23, 2015 Resolution through his June 20, 2016 Resolution — is pure
harassment.[31]

OCA Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation[32] dated June 28, 2017, the OCA recommended
that the administrative complaint against Judge Dela Rosa be dismissed for lack of
merit.

After considering the allegations in the Complaint and respondent Judge Dela
Rosa's Comment, the OCA found that in the absence of any proof that respondent
Judge Dela Rosa was ill-motivated in issuing the November 23, 2015 Order and that
he had, in fact, issued his June 20, 2016 Resolution reversing himself, the charge of
gross ignorance of the law should be dismissed.

The OCA ratiocinated as follows:

The main issue in this administrative complaint is rooted in respondent Judge's

issuance of the Order dated 23 November 201[5], reversing the previous one
dismissing the criminal cases on the ground of violation of the right of the accused
to speedy trial. Respondent Judge has already admitted that be made a mistake in
issuing the said order as this would have constituted a violation of the right of the
accused against double jeopardy. To rectify his error, he granted the motion for
reconsideration filed by the accused.

Although not without exceptions, it is settled that the function of a motion for
reconsideration is to point out to the court the error that it may have committed and
to give it a chance to correct itself. In " Republic of the Philippines v. Abdulwahab A.
Bayao, et al."[33], the Court explains the general rule that the purpose of a motion for
reconsideration is to grant an opportunity for the court to rectify any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. The wisdom of this rule is to expedite the resolution of
the issues of the case at the level of the trial court so it can take a harder look at the
records to come up with a more informed decision on the case. [34] (Emphasis
supplied)
The OCA found that the records of the case show that respondent Judge Dela Rosa
admitted that he had erred in issuing the November 23, 2015 Order, but that he had
rectified such mistake.[35] The OCA held that this is precisely why our judicial system
has remedies for both the party-litigants and the court to avail of if need be. [36] The
OCA asserted that it would be absurd to still hold respondent Judge Dela Rosa
liable despite his rectification through his June 20, 2016 Resolution.[37]

As to the referral by respondent Judge Dela Rosa to the IBP of Atty. Causing's act
of posting matters pertaining to the pending criminal case on the internet, the OCA
disagreed with Atty. Causing's argument that respondent Judge Dela Rosa should
have first required him to show cause for having done so. [38] The OCA explained that
respondent Judge Dela Rosa cannot just exercise his contempt powers on a whim,
if not haphazardly, if he believes that he has other remedies to resort to, just like in
this case.[39]

The Court's Ruling

In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby adopts and approves the findings of facts
and conclusions of law in the above-mentioned OCA Report and Recommendation.

Gross ignorance of the law

 is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence.

A judge may also be administratively liable if shown to have been motivated by

bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or failing to
apply settled law and jurisprudence.[41]

The Court however has also ruled that "not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his official duties renders him liable."[42]

For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or
actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found
erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by
bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive. As a matter of policy, in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous.
[43]

The Court agrees with the OCA that it would be absurd to hold respondent Judge
Dela Rosa liable for his November 23, 2015 Order when he had himself rectified this
in his subsequent June 20, 2016 Order. To rule otherwise would be to render
judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in
the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. [44] To hold
otherwise "would be nothing short of harassing judges to take the fantastic and
impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments."[45]

Furthermore, nothing in the records of the case suggests that respondent Judge
Dela Rosa was motivated by bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious
error in rendering his decision. Other than their bare assertions, Complainants failed
to substantiate their allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be
presumed[46] and this Court cannot conclude bad faith intervened when none was
actually proven.[47]

The Court likewise finds no merit in Complainants' allegation that respondent Judge
Dela Rosa should have first required Atty. Causing to show cause for his act of
posting matters pertaining to the pending criminal case on the internet. The Court
agrees with the OCA that respondent Judge Dela Rosa's act of referring the matter
to the IBP, an independent tribunal who exercises disciplinary powers over lawyers,
was a prudent and proper action to take for a trial court judge. The Court has
explained, in the case of Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution Management
Association of the Philippines ,[48] that judges' power to punish contempt must be
 exercised judiciously and sparingly, not for retaliation or vindictiveness, viz.:

x x x [T]he power to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the preservative

and not on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its
inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of
justice must falter or fail. As judges[,] we ought to exercise our power to punish
contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of
utilizing the power for the correction and preservation of the dignity of the Court, not
for retaliation or vindictiveness.[49]
In fine, the administrative charge against respondent Judge Dela Rosa should be,
as it is hereby, dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against respondent Presiding

Judge Jose Lorenzo R. Dela Rosa, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Manila is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

9. Sps. Bayani & Myrna Partoza FIRST DIVISION

vs. Lilian Montano &Amelia
Solomon, 866 SCRA 35 (2018) [ A.C. No. 11173 (Formerly CBD No. 13-3968), June 11, 2018 ]
RE: CA-G.R. CV NO. 96282 (SPOUSES BAYANI AND MYRNA M. PARTOZA VS.
LILIAN* B. MONTANO AND AMELIA SOLOMON), COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
CLARO JORDAN M. SANTAMARIA, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A recalcitrant lawyer who defies the directives of the court "must deservedly end in
tribulation for the lawyer and in victory for the higher ends of justice." [1]

The administrative liability of a lawyer who repeatedly ignores the directives of the
Court of Appeals (CA) is properly resolved in this case.

Factual Antecedents

A civil action for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Real Estate Mortgage,

Reconveyance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-710729 and Damages [2] was
filed by the spouses Bayani and Myrna M. Partoza (spouses Partoza) against Lilia
B. Montano and Amelia T. Solomon.

The case was dismissed[3] by the Regional Trial Court.

On November 25, 2010, a Notice of Appeal [4] was filed by the counsel on record,
Atty. Samson D. Villanueva (Atty. Villanueva). The appeal was docketed as CA G.R.
CV No. 96282 and in a Notice[5] dated March 25, 2011, the CA required the
submission of the Appellant's Brief pursuant to Rule 44, Section 7 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.

On April 27, 2011, however, Atty. Villanueva filed his Withdrawal of Appearance; [6]
subsequently, a Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellant's Brief [7] dated May
19, 2011, was also filed. Atty. Villanueva's Withdrawal of Appearance carried the
conformity of the appellant's attorney-in-fact, Honnie M. Partoza (Honnie) who, on
the same occasion, also acknowledged receipt of the entire records of the case
from Atty. Villanueva.

Thereafter, respondent Atty. Claro Jordan M. Santamaria (respondent) submitted an

Appellant's Brief[8] dated July 4, 2011.

In a Resolution[9] dated August 4, 2011, the CA directed Atty. Villanueva to submit

proof of authority of Honnic to represent appellants as their attorney-in-fact and the
latter's conformity to Atty. Villanueva's Withdrawal of Appearance; in the san1e
resolution, the CA also required respondent to submit his formal Entry of
Appearance, viz. :
CA G.R. CV No. Sps. BAYANI P. PARTOZA and MYRNA M. PARTOZA vs. LILIA B.
96282 MONTANO and AMELIA T. SOLOMON

Before acting on the counsel for appellant's Withdrawal of Appearance, [Atty.

Villanueva] is directed to submit within five (5) days from notice the proof of
authority of Honnie M. Partoza to represent the appellants and to signify his
conformity to the Withdrawal of Appearance. In the meantime, the Motion for
Extension of Time to File Appellants' Brief is granted in the interest of justice.

[Respondent] is directed to submit within five (5) days from notice his formal Entry of
Appearance as counsel for appellants and to secure and submit to this Court also
within the same period the written conformity of his clients to his appearance as
their counsel. Likewise, said counsel is also directed to furnish this Court the
assailed RTC Decision that should have been appended to the Appellant's Brief
also within the same period.
Atty. Villanueva then filed a Manifestation with Motion [10] dated August 31, 2011
explaining that he communicated with Ronnie and with appellants as well, but was
informed that appellants were residing abroad (in Germany at the time). He then
requested for a period of 15 days, or until September 15, 2011, to comply with the
CA's Resolution.

On March 20, 2012, the CA issued a Resolution granting the Manifestation and
Motion filed by Atty. Villanueva, and ordered the latter to show cause, within 10
days from notice, why he should not be cited in contempt for his failure to comply
with the CA's Resolution of August 4, 2011; and why the Appellant's Brief filed by
respondent should not be expunged from the rollo of the case and the appeal
dismissed for his failure to comply with the August 4, 2011 Resolution.

On September 5, 2012 the CA, in another Resolution,[11] declared that: 1) as shown

by the Registry Return Receipt dated April 4, 2012, respondent received the copy of
its March 20, 2012 Resolution; 2) on June 19, 2012, the Judicial Records Division
reported that no compliance with the March 20, 2012 Resolution had been filed by
respondent; and 3) respondent was, for the last time, directed to comply with the
March 20, 2012 Resolution within five days from notice and to show cause why he
should not be cited for contempt for his failure to comply with the CA's Resolutions,
dated August 4, 2011 and March 20, 2012; and why the Appellant's Brief filed by
him should not be expunged from the rollo of the case and the appeal be dismissed.

All these directives by the CA were ignored by the respondent.

Thus, in a Resolution[12] dated October 25, 2012, the CA cited respondent in

contempt of court and imposed on him a fine of P5,000.00. In the same Resolution,
the CA once again directed respondent: (1) to comply with requirements of a valid
substitution of counsel and to file his formal Entry of Appearance within five days
from notice; and (2) to show cause, within the same period, why the Appellant's
Brief filed should not be expunged from the rollo of the case and the appeal be
dismissed for his failure to comply with the Rules of Court.

Ultimately, in a Resolution dated April 11, 2013, the CA ordered the Appellant's
Brief filed by respondent expunged from the rollo and dismissed the appeal. More
than that, the CA directed respondent to explain why he should not be suspended
from the practice of law for willful disobedience to the orders of the court.

Respondent paid no heed to this Resolution.

So it was that the CA, in a Resolution [13] dated September 17, 2013, referred the
unlawyerly acts of respondent to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.

Report and Recommendation the Investigating Commissioner

In his Answer[14] of November 13, 2013, respondent contended: (1) that the spouses
Partoza sought his opinion regarding their case and later on requested that he
handle their appeal before the CA; (2) that he advised the spouses Partoza to
inform Atty. Villanueva of their decision to engage the services of a new counsel; (3)
that he relied on the Withdrawal of Appearance filed by Atty. Villanueva and then
prepared the Appellant's Brief; (4) that he was not aware of the authority of Honnie
to represent spouses Panoza as well as of Honnie's conformity to the Withdrawal of
Appearance by Atty. Villanueva; (5) that he believed that he had no personality to
represent the spouses Partoza in the case, and to address the
problems/compliances pertaining to appellant's appeal; and (6) that it was still Atty.
Villanueva who should have continued to represent the spouses Partoza.

The Investigating Commissioner Michael G. Fabunan (Investigating Commissioner)

found respondent liable for willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the CA and
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for six months. The
Investigating, Commissioner gave the reasons for the said recommendation in his
Report and Recommendation,[15] viz.:
The act of respondent in not filing any of the compliances required of him in the 4
August 2011, 20 March 2012, 5 September 2012, and 25 October 2012 Resolutions
of the [CA] despite due notice, emphasized his contempt and total disregard of the
legal proceedings, for which he should be held liable.

x x x x

Granting that he [was] not aware of the problem between Atty. Villanueva and
[Honnie], he could have explained this fact by complying with the court resolutions
and not just ignored them on the premise that he has no personality to represent the
[spouses Partoza]. The compliances required of the respondent by the [CA] are
provided under the rules for a valid substitution of counsel and validity of the appeal
and may not be disregarded.

The nonchalant attitude of the respondent cannot be left unsanctioned. Clearly, his
acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the [CA], which under
Section 27. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is a sufficient case for suspension. x x x
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors

The IBP Board of Governors resolved [16] to adopt and approve the recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner.

In its Report[17] dated March 18, 2016, the Office of the Bar Confidant informed this
Court that no petition for review or motion for reconsideration has been filed by
either party. Thus, pursuant to Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
this case is now before us for final action.

Issue

Whether or not respondent is administratively liable.

Our Ruling

This Court adopts the findings of fact of, and the penalty recommended by, the IBP
Board of Governors.

This Court explained the crucial role played by lawyers in the administration of
justice in Salabao v. Villaruel, Jr.,[18] viz.:

While it is true that lawyers owe 'entire devotion' to the cause of their clients, it
cannot he emphasized enough that their first and primary duty is not to the client but
to the administration or justice.

Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility slates that 'A lawyer shall exert
every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.' x x x This is a fundamental principle in legal ethics and
professional responsibility that has iterations in various forms:

x x x x

Because a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the administration
of justice, any act of a lawyer that obstructs, perverts, or impedes the administration
of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him.
(citations omitted)
There is no dispute that respondent did not comply with five Resolutions of the CA.
His actions were definitely contumacious. By his repeated failure, refusal or inability
to comply with the CA resolutions, respondent displayed not only reprehensible
conduct but showed an utter lack of respect for the CA and its orders. Respondent
ought to know that a resolution issued by the CA, or any court for that matter, is not
mere request that may be complied with partially or selectively.

Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. In
particular, Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that it "is the duty of
an attorney [t]o observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and
judicial officers." In addition, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that "[a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal processes." Also, Canon 11 provides that a
"lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others."

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appealing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority [to do so]. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
This Court, in Anudon v. Cefra[19] citing Sebastian v. Atty. Bajar,[20] held that a
lawyer's obstinate refusal to comply with the Court's orders not only betrayed a
recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscored his disrespect towards the
Court's lawful orders which was only too deserving of reproof

"Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes, and this
deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof may subject the
lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well." [21]
In this case, respondent deliberately ignored five CA Resolutions, thereby violating
his duty to observe and maintain the respect due the courts.

In one case,[22] the Court suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for one year
for having ignored twelve (12) CA Resolutions. The Court found that the said
lawyer's conduct gave the impression that he was above the duly constituted judicial
authorities of the land, and looked down on them with a patronizing and supercilious
attitude. In this case, we find the penalty of suspension for six (6) months, as
recommended by the IBP, commensurate under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Claro Jordan M. Santamaria is SUSPENDED from

the practice of law for six (6) months effective upon his receipt of this Resolution. He
is STERNLY WARNED that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's personal records as

attorney, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in
the country through the Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.