Case Digest in Special Proceedings:

Silverio Sr. vs. Silverio Jr, Aug. 13, 2014

FACTS:

The late Beatriz S. Silverio died without living a will, survived by her legal heirs, namely:
 Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (husband)
 Edmundo S. Silverio (son)
 Edgardo S. Silverio (son)
 Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. (son)
 Nelia S. Silverio-Dee (daughter)
 Ligaya S. Silverio (daughter)

Subsequently, an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate was filed by Silverio, Sr.

Edgardo Silverio (Edgardo)-first appointed by Court as Administrator

But by virtue of a Joint Manifestation (Nov. 3, 1999) (filed by the heirs of the deceased), motion to
withdraw as administrator filed by Edgardo was approved by the intestate court. In his stead, Silverio,
sr. was appointed as the new Administrator.

Thereafter, an active exchange of pleadings to remove and appoint a new administrator ensued
between Silverio, Sr. and Silverio, Jr.

In an order in 2005, Silverio, Sr. was removed as administrator and in his stead, Silverio Jr. was
designated as the new administrator.

By virtue of aforesaid order, Silverio Jr. (Oct. 16, 2007) executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Citrine Holdings, Inc. (Citrine) over the property located in Makati City. Citrine became the reg. owner
thereof.

A Deed of Absolute Sale was likewise executed in favor of Monica P. Ocampo, subsequently sold to
ZEE2 Resources, Inc. (ZEE2).

Silverio, Sr. filed an Urgent Application for the Issuance of TRO restraining and/or preventing Silverio,
Jr., Monica, Citrine and their successors-in-interest from committing any act that would affect the
titles to the 3 properties.

Omnibus Order was issued by the intestate court acting upon pending motions filed by petitioner and
respondent Silverio, father and son, respectively, who are the central figures in the now decade-old
controversy over the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio.
 On Feb. 2011, Silverio Sr. filed an Urgent Motion :
To declare as Null and Void the Deed of Absolute Sale (dtd. Sept. 16, 2010)
To cancel the TCT (No. 006-2011000050)
To reinstate the TCT (No. 2236121) in the name of Ricardo C. Silverio Sr. and the intestate Estate of
the late Beatriz.

Intestate court rendered Orders granting the preliminary injunction against Silverio, Jr. and declaring
the Deed of Absolute Sale, TCT and all derivative titles over the Cambridge and Intsia properties as
null and void.

CA rendered decision declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, TCT and all derivative titles over the
Cambridge and Intsia Property was valid.

Silverio Sr., contends that CA committed a reversible error committed a reversible error in upholding
the validity of the Intsia and Cambidge properties on the ground that the intestate court cannot annul
the sales as it has a limited jurisdiction only and which does not include resolving issues of ownership.

ISSUE:
W/N the sale of the intestate Estate by the administrator valid?

RULING:
Yes. An Administrator can validly sell the intestate estate under his administration ONLY by leave of
court.

While it is true that Silverio Sr. was eventually reinstated as Administrator pursuant to the 2008
decision, the permanent injunction issued by the CA, as explicitly stated in its fallo, pertained only to
the portions of the 2006 Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of administration to and taking
of an oath of administration by Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the CA would have expressly set aside as well
the directive in the same Omnibus Order allowing the sale of the subject propertis.

The CA therefore did not err in reversing the Aug. 18, 2011 Order of the intestate court annulling the
sale of the subject properties grounded solely on the injunction issued. Respondent Ocampo, Citrine
and ZEE2 should not be prejudiced by the flip-flopping appointment of Administrator by the intestate
court, having relied in good faith that the sale was authorized and with prior approval of the intestate
court under its Omnibus Order dated Oct. 31, 2006 which remained valid and subsisting insofar as it
allowed the aforesaid sale.

San Luis vs. San Luis, 314 SCRA , Feb. 2007

FACTS:
This case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna.

During his lifetime, he contracted 3 marriages.

1st marriage- with Virginia Sulit (Mar. 17,1942)- 6 children were born: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita,
Manuel
Virginia predeceased Felicisimo (8/11/1963)

2nd marriage- with Merry Lee Corwin (5/1/1968) – with son: Tobias
Merry Lee , an American Citizen filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii (10/15/1971), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody
(12/14/1973).

3rd marriage- with Felicidad San Luis (then surnamed Sagalongos) (6/20/1974)- no children with- respondent-
but lived with her for 18 yrs. from time of their marriage up to his death (on Dec. 18, 1992)

Upon the death of his dad, Rodolfo sought the dissolution of of Filicisimo’s conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate.
Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate.

(12/17/1993)- Felicidad filed a petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC of Makati City.
Rodolfo claimed that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death was still legally married Merry Lee.

Heirs of Virginia Sulit, 1st wife filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of:
Improper venue
Failure to state a cause of action.

Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorse issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, state of Hawaii
to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to
marry her by virtue of par. 2, Art. 26 of the Family Code.

Rodolfo asserted that par. 2, Art. 26 of the FC cannot be given retroactive effect to validate Felicidad’s bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because it would impair vested rights in derogation of Art. 256.

But TC issued an order denying the 2 motions to dismiss.

9/12/1995- TC dismissed the petition for Letters of Administration. It held that:

 at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of
Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City.
 Respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her
marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio.

CA reversed and set aside the orders of the TC, and , hence, the case before the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent Felicidad has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration

HELD:
Respondent Felicidad would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo
by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners.
If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage
with him was validly performed under the laws of the USA, then she may be considered as a co-owner under
Art. 144 of the Civil Code-it governs property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. – It provides that the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.

In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and
industry.

Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.

Moreover, the SC found that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Art. 144 of the CC or Art.
148 of the Family Code.

The order of the RTC which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its Oct. 24,1994 order which dismissed
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It was also Remanded to TC for further proceedings.

Other Note on the case:

The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry,
would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s
surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of
the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the laws of
the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving
foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient
and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged
and proved.
The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
FACTS:

During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of
which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October
15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before
Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
dismiss  on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
 administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his
death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) Trial Court: denied the motion to dismiss, ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to
file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Mila filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994.
Thus, a new trial ensued.
(2) Trial Court (new): dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the
duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna
and not in Makati City. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in
the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
(3) CA: reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court

ISSUES:
(1) Whether venue was properly laid, and 
(2) Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that
Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
(3) Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.

RULING:
(1) Yes, the venue was proper. Section 1,  Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death."
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation,
or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency. While petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. From the foregoing, we
find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
(2) Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. As such,
the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With
the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established
through judicial precedent.
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad
with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was
done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they
must be alleged and proved.Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
(3) Yes. Respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the
surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the
legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as
regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

Agtarap vs. Agtarap, 651 SCRA, June 2011

FACTS:
 Decedent Joaquin left (2) parcels of land with improvements. He contracted (2) marriages.

o With Lucia (W1), who died 1924; three children, Jesus (+), Milagros (+), Jose (+)

o Then with Caridad (W2), with three children, Eduardo, Sebastian, Mercedes
  Son Eduardo (W2) filed petition for settlement of Joaquin’s intestate estate. RTC issued
resolution appointing Eduardo as administrator.

 The RTC issued an Order of Partition on Oct 23, 2000 which ruled that “bulk of estate
property were acquired during the existence of 2 nd marriage, TCTs showing Joaquin married
to Caridad.

 Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph & Teresa (Jose children) filed their respective
motions for reconsiderations. The RTC

o Denied Eduardo & Sebastian MRs

o Granted MR of Joseph & Teresa

o Declared “real properties belonged to conjugal partnership of Joaquin & Lucia” and
directed Oct Partition to reflect correct sharing of heirs

 Eduardo & Sebastian both appealed to CA before RTC could issue new order of partition. The
CA dismissed the appeals and affirmed the RTC resolution. The CA also directed the partition
of Joaquin’s properties. Aggrieved, Sebastian and Eduardo filed separate MRs which were
denied. They filed separate petitions for review which were eventually consolidated.

 Sebastian contended that

o Joseph & Teresa failed to establish that they are legitimate heirs of Jose, and thus of
their grandfather Joaquin

o Certificates of title of subject property indicate “Joaquin married to Caridad” which is

conclusive proof of ownership, and thus not subject to collateral attack

 Eduardo alleged

o CA erroneously settled Joaquin’s estate together with the estates of Lucia, Jesus,
Jose, Mercedes, Gloria and Milagros in one proceeding

o Estate of Milagros cannot be distributed, since a proceeding was already conducted in

another court for the probate of Milagros’ will, thus violating the rule on precedence
of testate over intestate proceedings.

o RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction has no jurisdiction to

determine questions of ownership which belongs to another court with general
jursdiction

ISSUE:
 RTC as intestate court has jurisdiction to resolve ownership of real properties?

 CA settlement of Joaquin estate together with the estates of the other heirs

 Legitimacy of Joseph & Teresa

HELD:
 Eduardo’s petition granted. Sebastian’s petition denied. CA affirmed with modification that
the

o share awarded in favor of Milagros shall not be distributed until the final
determination of the probate of the will .

o Sebastian to be represented by wife and children, given demise in 2010

 Case remanded to RTC for further settlement of Joaquin’s estate.

 RTC has jurisdiction to resolve ownership of the real properties.

o Gen Rule: Jurisdiction of trial court, either as probate or intestate court, relates only
to matters having to do with probate of will and or settlement of estate of deceased
persons and does not extend to determination of questions of ownership that arise
during the proceedings.

o Exceptions, as justified by expediency and convenience:

 Probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate

proceeding the question of inclusion or exclusion, from inventory of a piece
of property w/o prejudice to final determination in a separate action

 If interested parties are all heirs or question is one of collation/advancement

or parties consent to the assumption of of jurisdiction by the court and the
rights of 3P are not impaired

 Estate is settled and distributed among heirs only after payment of debts of the estate,
funeral charges admin expenses, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax. Records show
these were not complied with in 1965.

 Sebastian did not present evidence to support averments to exclude Joseph and Teresa as
heirs.

 CA disposition related only to the estate of Joaquin.

o Sec 1 Rule 90: RTC granted jurisdiction to determine lawful heirs of Joaquin as well as
respective shares in the payment of obligations

o The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes and Gloria was merely a necessary
consequence of the settlement of Joaquin’s estate, they being his legal heirs.
 G.R. No. 177099 & G.R. No. 177192
AGTARAP vs. AGTARAP

FACTS:

On 15 September 1994, Eduardo G. Agtarap filed a Petition for the Judicial Settlement of the
estate of his deceased father Joaquin Agatarap, who dies intestate, with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay Branch 114. It was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 94-4055.
The Petition alleged that during the lifetime of Joaquin he has contracted two marriages, first with
Lucia Garcia who died no April 24, 1924 with three issues by the names of Jesus (died without issue)
Milagros and Jose (survived by three children, namely, Gloria, Joseph and Teresa). Jaoquin then
married Caridad Garcia which had three children, namely Eduardo, Sebastian and Mercedes (survived
by her daughter Cecile). At the time of his death, he left two parcels of land with improvements in
Pasay City with TCT Nos. 973-(38254) and 874-(38255). Joseph, son of Jose, grand son of Joaquin
was leasing and improving the said realties and had been appropriating P26,000.00 per month since
April 1994.
Pending the appointment of regular administrator, Eduardo alleged that there was an imperative
need for him as special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate assets and their civil
fruits. Also for the court to issue an order stating the following (a) confirming and declaring the
compulsory heirs of Joaquin who will be entitled to participate in the proceedings; (b) apportioning and
allocating the unto the named heirs their aliquot shares in the estate in accordance with Law; (c)
entitling the distributes the right to receive and enter in to possession those parts of the estate
individually awarded to them.
Meanwhile, Joseph, Gloria and Teresa filed their answer/opposition alleging among others that
the two subject lots belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia, thus, upon death of Lucia
April 1924, they became the pro indiviso owners of the subject properties. They say that the house was
built by the exclusive money of their late father Jose, and the expense of the extensions to the house
were shouldered by Gloria and Teresita, while the restaurant (Manong’s Restaurant) was built with the
exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner. They opposed the appointment of Eduardo as the
administrator on the following grounds: (1) he is not physically and mentally fir to do so; (2) his interests
in the lots is minimal; and (3) he does not possess the desire to earn and claim that Joseph be
appointed as special or regular administrator.
On February 16, 1995, RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as regular administrator and
later on letters of administration.
On September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro, husband of Cecile, filed an answer in intervention
alleging that Mercedes is survived not only by his wife Cecile but also by him as her husband. Also,
claimed that though the estate indeed needed an administrator, Eduardo was not fit for the designation.
Court rendered a decision dividing among the heirs per their shares the amount of
P14,177,500.00. Heirs of the first marriage received the following amounts as their share in the estate
of their late Father as stated: P531,656.23 each for Joseph, Teresa and Walter De Santos. As for heirs
of the Second Marriage: P5,522,854.06 each for Eduardo and Sebastian. The amount of P295,364.57
was given to Priscilla Agtarap being the wife of Jose Agtarap and the amount of P1,181,458.38 was
given to Abelardo Dagoro as the surviving husband of Mercedes Agtarap.
Eduardo, Sebastian and oppositors Joseph and Teresa filed their respective motions for
reconsideration.
On August 27, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for reconsideration of
Sebastian and Eduardo while granting that of Joseph and Teresa. Also declared that the real estate
properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. The court also directed the
modification of the partition issued last October 23, 2000 to reflect the correct sharing of the heirs.
Before the court could issue a modified partition, Eduardo and Sebastian appealed the case to
the CA.
CA rendered a decision declaring the instant appeals as dismissed for lack of merit, affirming the
Resolution dated August 27, 2001. The order of partition was modified as ordered by the trial court.
Sebastian and Eduardo filed their respective motion for reconsideration and were both denied by
the CA on a Resolution dated March 27, 2007.

ISSUE:

Hence, the two petitions now pending before this court raises the following issues:

GR No. 177192, as filed by Sebastian Agtarap.

That the CA erred in not considering the necessity of hearing the issue of legitimacy of
respondents as heirs.

GR No. 177099, as filed by Eduardo Agtarap.

1.That the CA did not acquire jurisdiction over the estate of Milagros Agtarap and erred in
distributing her inheritance from the estate of Joaquin Agtarap notwithstanding the existence of her last
will and testament in violation of the doctrine of precedence of testate proceedings over intestate
proceedings.
2.That the CA erred in dismissing the decision Appealed from for lack of merit and in affirming
the Resolution dated August 27, 2001 of the lower court holding that the parcels of lands covered by
TCT No. 38254 and TCT No. 38255 of the Registry Of Deeds of the City of Pasay belongs to the
conjugal partnership of Joaquin Agtarap married to Lucia notwithstanding their registration under the
existing certificates of title as registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, Casado Con Caridad Garcia.
Under existing jurisprudence, the probate court has no power to determine the ownership of the
property described in these certificates of title which should be resolved in an appropriate separate
action for a torrens title under the law is endowed with incontestability until it has been set aside in the
manner indicated in the law itself.

HELD:
 With regards to a common issue raised by both Sebastian and Eduardo, concerning the courts
jurisdiction to resolve the same. That the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate
court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of
the deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise
during the proceedings as a general rule, as such, it is therefore subject to exceptions as justified by
expediency and convenience.
Such circumstances are when the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or
testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property
without prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a separate action. Another would be if the
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are
not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership.
Jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the
estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is
conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
The court holds that the case is covered in the exception since as stated in the present case, the
parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third persons will be impaired by the resolution of
the ownership of said property.
Also, the determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the
probate court’s jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.
As to the validity of the distribution of the decedent’s property, it was found out by the court that
the title with the name of Joaquin Agtarap with Caridad as his spouse originated from a title wherein the
spouse was Lucia who eventually died and were survived by her compulsory heirs namely Joaquin,
Jesus, Milagros and Jose.
The statement “Joaquin Agtarap married to Cardad Garcia” is not conclusive evidence of
ownership but is a mere description of the civil status of Joaquin who is the registered owner and not
the conjugal property of Joaquin and Caridad. Also, pursuant to Rule 90 sec 1 of the Rules of Court,
The RTC was specifically granted jurisdiction to determine who are the lawful heirs of Joaquin, as well
as their respective shares.
With regards to the issue of legitimacy of Teresa and Joseph, both RTC and CA found that they
are both legitimate children of Jose.
Concerning the legitimacy of the claims of both Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos, the court
decided to admit the two in the intestate proceedings.
However the SC agrees to Eduardo’s position that the CA erred in distributing Joaquin’s estate
pertinent to the share allotted in favor of Milagros. Eduardo was able to show that there is a separate
proceeding instituted for the probate of the will allegedly executed by Milagros, bequeathing all of her
share from Joaquin’s estate in favor of Eduardo. Prudence dictates that this Court refrain from
distributing Milagros’ share in Joaquin’s estate.
Wherefore, the petition in GR No. 177192 filed by Sebastian, who died on January 15, 2010, is denied
for lack of merit while petition in GR No. 177099 filed by Eduardo is partially granted. That the
Resolution dated March 27, 2007 of the CA are affirmed with modification that the share awarded to
Milagros shall not be distributed until the final determination of the probate of her will. Also, that since
Sebastian G. Agtarap died, he shall be represented by his wife Teresa B. Agtarap and his children
Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio.

Suntay III vs. Cojuanco-Suntay, 683 SCRA, Oct. 2012

AGUINALDO-SUNTAY v. COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
G.R. No. 183053
June 16, 2010

FACTS:
1. On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr. Federico
 Suntay (Federico), died intestate.
a. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina
and Federico.
b. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and several
grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and
respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
2. Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children, namely: herein
respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II
3. Emilio I’s marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had
two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita, by two different women, Concepcion
Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.
4. Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother,
separately from their father and paternal grandparents.
5. After the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for visitation rights over his grandchildren. It
was altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed by respondent Isabel, articulating her
sentiments on the unwanted visits of her grandparents.
6. After the death of his spouse, Federico, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and
Nenita
7. On October 26, 1995, respondent Isabela filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor. Federico filed his opposition. Being the surviving spouse of Cristina,
he is capable of administering her estate and he should be the one appointed as its
administrator; that as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be
accorded legal preference in the administration
8. After a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed a
Manifestation, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the decedent’s estate
on his behalf. Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio III’s Motion for Leave to Intervene
considering his interest in the outcome of the case.
9. In the course of the proceedings, Federico died.
10. The trial court rendered a decision, appointing petitioner Emilio III, as administrator of decedent
Cristina’s intestate estate. The RTC ruled that what matters most at this time is the welfare of
the estate of the decedent in the light of such unfortunate and bitter estrangement. The Court
honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would go against the wishes of the decedent
who raised Emilio III from infancy as her own child. Certainly, it would go against the wishes of
the surviving spouse who nominated Emilio III for appointment as administrator.
11. Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III. The CA zeroed
in on Emilio III’s status as an illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from representing
his deceased father in the estate of the latter’s legitimate mother, the decedent. That he cannot
be appointed for the ff reasons:
a. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive condition, i.e., Federico’s
appointment as administrator of the estate. The death of Federico before his
appointment rendered the nomination of Emilio III inoperative.
b. As between the legitimate offspring (Isabel) and illegitimate offspring (Emilio III) of
decedent’s son, Emilio I, Isabel is preferred, being the "next of kin" referred to by
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court
c. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992 of the Civil Code bars the
illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of
his father or mother.

ISSUE : Who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of the
decedent's estate.

HELD:
1. The Court cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s ruling excluding Emilio III in the
administration of the decedent’s undivided estate. The underlying philosophy of our law on
intestate succession is to give preference to the wishes and presumed will of the decedent,
 absent a valid and effective will.
2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule, is quite the
opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the actual relationship between Federico and
Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III. Both spouses acknowledged Emilio III as their grandchild.
Cristina’s properties forming part of her estate are still commingled with that of her husband,
Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon her death,
remains undetermined and unliquidated. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico,
entitled to share in the distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from
Federico, not simply representing his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
3. It is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the
decedent’s estate. As Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s interest in the estate of Cristina is as
much as the interest therein of Isabel. Considering that the CA even declared that "under the
law, Federico, being the surviving spouse, would have the right of succession over a portion of
the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership."
4. However, the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate found in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of
each case.
5. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of
the trial court. In this case, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at
the least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmother’s,
Cristina’s, estate.
6. In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of
the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-
administrators, especially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.
a. The subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative heirs, including
another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita Tañedo.

Other issue:
1. Petitioner argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar between the legitimate
and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably
demonstrate the contrary – Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually
treated by the decedent and her husband as their own son.
a. Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate
succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish
between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband,
Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate
grandchild to that of a legitimate child.
b. The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for
petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there
exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a
deceased. It must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making
a final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in
the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who will
administer the properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.

[G.R. No. 183053 : June 15, 2010] 

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO-SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III,
PETITIONER, VS. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N 

NACHURA, J.

Doctrine: The law [of intestacy] is founded... on the presumed will of

the deceased... Love, it is said, first descends, then ascends, and, finally,
spreads sideways.
Facts:
1. On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died
intestate.
~ In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico.
~ At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein
petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
2. Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and
Emilio II
3. Emilio I’s marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock,
Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Tañedo (Nenita), by two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.
4. Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City,
separately from their father and paternal grandparents.
5. Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for visitation rights over his grandchildren. It was
altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed by
respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the unwanted visits of her grandparents.
6. After her spouse’s death, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on September 27, 1993, adopted their
illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita
7. On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor. Federico filed his
opposition. Being the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of
administering her estate and he should be the one appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of conjugal
properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference in the administration
8. After a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999,
nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the decedent’s estate on his behalf. Subsequently, the trial court
granted Emilio III’s Motion for Leave
to Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case.
9. In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico died.
10. The trial court rendered a decision on November 9, 2001, appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of
decedent Cristina’s intestate estate.What matters most at this time is the welfare of the estate of the decedent in the light of
such unfortunate and bitter estrangement. The Court honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would go against the
wishes of the decedent who raised [Emilio III] from infancy in her home in Baguio City as her own child. Certainly, it would go
against the wishes of the surviving spouse x x x who nominated [Emilio III] for appointment as administrator.
11. Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the
Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III. In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio III’s status as an illegitimate child
of Emilio I and, thus, barred from representing his deceased father in the estate of the latter’s legitimate mother, the decedent.
That he cannot be appointed for the ff reasons:
        i. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive condition, i.e., Federico’s         appointment as
administrator of the estate
        ii. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and illegitimate offspring (Emilio III) of          decedent’s son,
Emilio I, respondent is preferred, being the "next of kin" referred to by            Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court
        iii. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992 of the Civil Code bars the illegitimate          child from
inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or          mother.

ISSUE :

A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE UNDER SECTION 6 OF RULE 78 OF THE RULES
OF COURT, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES; and

B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE HEREIN PETITIONER WAS REARED BY THE DECEDENT AND HER
SPOUSE SINCE INFANCY, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE APPLIES SO AS TO BAR HIM FROM
BEING APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE

The pivotal issue:

Who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedent's estate.
Ruling:

The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule, is quite the opposite scenario in the facts
obtaining herein for the actual relationship between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin
to the normal relationship of legitimate relatives;

In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The
order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, especially in cases where justice and equity
demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.

Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of
Cristina and Federico, Nenita Tañedo, but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of respondent
Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the conflicting claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal
partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their respective estates, we are impelled to move in only one
direction,i.e., joint administration of the subject estate.

One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar between the
legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the
contrary - Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as their
own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedent's husband,
the original oppositor to respondent's petition for letters of administration.

Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the
decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico,
who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar
circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of
the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to
both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court,
Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination and to declare the heirs of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the
subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, and Perez,* JJ., concur.

1. The Court cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s ruling excluding Emilio III in the administration of the decedent’s
undivided estate. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to give preference to the wishes and
presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will
The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule, is quite the opposite scenario in the facts
obtaining herein for the actual relationship between Federico and
Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III. Both spouses acknowledged Emilio III as their grandchild. Cristina’s properties forming
part of her estate are still commingled with that of her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership, albeit
terminated upon her death, remains undetermined and unliquidated
Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one
degree from Federico, not simply representing his deceased illegitimate
father, Emilio I.
2. It is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the decedent’s estate. As Federico’s
adopted son, Emilio III’s interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent.
Considering that the CA even declared that "under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have the right of
succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership."
3. However, the order of preference (Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment of
an administrator of an estate) is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case.
Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. In the main, the
attendant facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III
of their grandmother’s, Cristina’s, estate.
4. [I]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed.
The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity
demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.
5. Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild
of Cristina and Federico, Nenita Tañedo.
6. On a final note, counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar between
the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the
contrary – Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as their
own son.
7. Contention on 992 by JBL:
        the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the legitimate family; so much
so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father and mother.
        The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish
Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency
        i. in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to
his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from
representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so
This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and
decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be
suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998.
8. Manresa:
        The law [of intestacy] is founded... on the presumed will of the deceased... Love, it is said, first descends, then
ascends, and, finally, spreads sideways.
        Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first
descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her
husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child.
The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in
Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a
deceased. It must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and
distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who
will administer the properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.
Decision: The petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE

Lee vs. RTC of QC, 423 SCRA Feb. 2004

FACTS: Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance
Company, Inc. on July 6, 1956. At the time of the company’s incorporation, Dr. Ortañez owned
ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed capital stock.
On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortañez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado Ortañez), three
legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortañez) and five illegitimate children by Ligaya
Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo,
Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortañez).2
On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortañez filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City
Branch (now Regional Trial Court of Quezon City) a petition for letters of administration of the
intestate estate of Dr. Ortañez.
Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings filed an opposition to the petition for
letters of administration and, in a subsequent urgent motion, prayed that the intestate court appoint a
special administrator.
As ordered by the intestate court, special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez submitted an
inventory of the estate of their father which included, among other properties, 2,0293 shares of stock
in Philippine International Life Insurance Company (hereafter Philinterlife), representing 50.725% of
the company’s outstanding capital stock.
On April 15, 1989, the decedent’s wife, Juliana S. Ortañez, claiming that she owned
1,0144 Philinterlife shares of stock as her conjugal share in the estate, sold said shares with
right to repurchase in favor of herein petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG),
represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. Juliana Ortañez failed to repurchase the
shares of stock within the stipulated period, thus ownership thereof was consolidated by petitioner
FLAG in its name.
On October 30, 1991, Special Administrator Jose Ortañez, acting in his personal capacity and
claiming that he owned the remaining 1,0115 Philinterlife shares of stocks as his inheritance share in
the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase also in favor of herein petitioner FLAG,
represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. After one year, petitioner FLAG
consolidated in its name the ownership of the Philinterlife shares of stock when Jose Ortañez failed to
repurchase the same.
It appears that several years before (but already during the pendency of the intestate
proceedings at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85), Juliana Ortañez and her two
children, Special Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez, entered into a memorandum of
agreement dated March 4, 1982 for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio
Ortañez, partitioning the estate (including the Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves.
This was the basis of the number of shares separately sold by Juliana Ortañez on April 15, 1989
(1,014 shares) and by Jose Ortañez on October 30, 1991 (1,011 shares) in favor of herein
petitioner FLAG.
On July 12, 1995, herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez–Enderes and her siblings (hereafter
referred to as private respondents Enderes et al.) filed a motion for appointment of special
administrator of Philinterlife shares of stock. This move was opposed by Special Administrator Jose
Ortañez.
On November 8, 1995, the intestate court granted the motion of private respondents Enderes et al. and
appointed private respondent Enderes special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock.
On December 20, 1995, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void  ab
initio the memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982. On January 9, 1996, she filed a motion
to declare the partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the decedent’s estate. These motions were
opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortañez.
On March 22, 1996, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab
initio the deeds of sale of Philinterlife shares of stock, which move was again opposed by Special
Administrator Jose Ortañez.
On August 11, 1997, the intestate court denied the omnibus motion of Special Administrator Jose
Ortañez for the approval of the deeds of sale for the reason that:
Under the Godoy case, supra, it was held in substance that a sale of a property of the estate without
an Order of the probate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. Since the sales in
question were entered into by Juliana S. Ortañez and Jose S. Ortañez in their personal capacity
without prior approval of the Court, the same is not binding upon the Estate.
On August 29, 1997, the intestate court issued another order granting the motion of Special
Administratrix Enderes for the annulment of the March 4, 1982 memorandum of agreement or
extrajudicial partition of estate. The court reasoned that:
Aggrieved by the above-stated orders of the intestate court, Jose Ortañez filed, on December 22, 1997,
a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied his petition, however, ruling
 that there was no legal justification whatsoever for the extrajudicial partition of the estate by Jose
Ortañez, his brother Rafael Ortañez and mother Juliana Ortañez during the pendency of the settlement
of the estate of Dr. Ortañez, without the requisite approval of the intestate court, when it was clear that
there were other heirs to the estate who stood to be prejudiced thereby. Consequently, the sale made
by Jose Ortañez and his mother Juliana Ortañez to FLAG of the shares of stock they invalidly
appropriated for themselves, without approval of the intestate court, was void.8
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao (president and secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife)
and FLAG now raise the following errors for our consideration:
The Court of Appeals committed grave reversible ERROR:
xxx
D. In failing to declare null and void the orders of the intestate court which nullified the sale of
shares of stock between the legitimate heir Jose S. Ortañez and petitioner FLAG because of
settled law and jurisprudence, i.e., that an heir has the right to dispose of the decedent’s
property even if the same is under administration pursuant to Civil Code provision that
possession of hereditary property is transmitted to the heir the moment of death of the
decedent (Acedebo vs. Abesamis, 217 SCRA 194);
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the shares of stocks was invalid.

HELD: YES.
We cannot allow petitioners to reopen the issue of nullity of the sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock
in their favor because this was already settled a long time ago by the Court of Appeals in its decision
dated June 23, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 46342. This decision was effectively upheld by us in our
resolution dated October 9, 1998 in G.R. No. 135177 dismissing the petition for review on a technicality
and thereafter denying the motion for reconsideration on January 13, 1999 on the ground that there
was no compelling reason to reconsider said denial.18 Our decision became final on February 23,
1999 and was accordingly entered in the book of entry of judgments.
From the above decision, it is clear that Juliana Ortañez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio,
all surnamed Ortañez, invalidly entered into a memorandum of agreement extrajudicially partitioning
the intestate estate among themselves, despite their knowledge that there were other heirs or
claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the intestate court. Since the
appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana Ortañez and her children (Jose, Rafael and
Antonio Ortañez) was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party
(FLAG), without court approval, was likewise void.
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under Art. 533 of
the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir
without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent.20 However, an heir can only alienate
such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate
or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid or the
devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares.21 This means that an heir may only
sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In the present
case, Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares
of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the final
adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the
other claimants to the estate, as what happened in the present case.

Facts:
       Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance Company, Inc. on 1956. At the
time of the company’s incorporation, Dr. Ortañez owned ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed capital stock.
       On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortañez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado Ortañez), three legitimate
children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortañez) and five illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private
respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed
Ortañez).  <3 Peaches <3
       Special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez submitted an inventory of the estate of their father which included
2,029 shares of stock in Philippine International Life Insurance Company, representing 50.725% of the company’s
outstanding capital stock.
       Juliana (wife) and Jose (legit child) sold 1,014 and 1,011 shares respectively to FLAG.  
       The legal family entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, partitioning the
estate among themselves. This was the basis of the number of shares separately sold by them.
       The lower court declared the shares of stock as null and void. CA affirmed.
       Meanwhile, the FLAG-controlled board of directors, increased the authorized capital stock of Philinterlife, diluting
in the process the 50.725% controlling interest Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, in the insurance company. Enderes filed an
action at the SEC. The SEC hearing officer dismissed the case acknowledging the jurisdiction of the civil courts.
       Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao as president and secretary of Philinterlife ignored the orders nullifying the sales of
the shares of stock.  <3 Peaches <3
Issue:
       WON the sale of the shares of stock of Philinterlife is void. (YES)
Ruling:
       YES. Our jurisprudence is clear that
   (1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication requires
court approval and
   (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for a
separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.
       An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under NCC 533 which
provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption from the
moment of death of the decedent. However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be
allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is,
after all debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. This means
that an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein.  <3
Peaches <3

       It
goes without saying that the increase in Philinterlife’s authorized capital stock, approved on the vote of
petitioners’ non-existent shareholdings and obviously calculated to make it difficult for Dr. Ortañez’s estate to
reassume its controlling interest in Philinterlife, was likewise void ab initio.

Heirs of Hilario Ruiz vs. Edmond Ruiz, 252 SCRA, Jan. 1986

FACTS:
1. Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will where he named the following as his heirs
a. Edmond Ruiz – only son
b. Maria Pilar Ruiz – adopted daughter
c. Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline - 3 granddaughters, all
daughters of Ruiz
2. Testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named
Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.
3. Hilario Ruiz died and the cash component of his estate was immediately distributed among
Ruiz and respondents.
4. Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's
holographic will.
5. 4 years after – Pilar filed before the RTC a petition for the probate and approval of the
deceased’s will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz
a. Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue
 influence.
6. The house and lot in Valle Verde, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to the 3
granddaughters was leased out by Edmond to third persons.
7. Probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and
payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property.
8. Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real
properties of the estate.
a. The probate court approved the release of P7,722.00
9. Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will
a. Probate court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters
testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P50,000.00
10. Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for
Release of Funds
a. Prayed for release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court
b. Montes opposed and praying that the release of rent payments be given to the 3
granddaughters
c. Probate court denied the release of funds and granted the motion of Montes due to
Edmond’s lack of opposition
d. Probate Court ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as
may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support"
of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their
share in the inheritance
11. CA sustained probate court’s order.

ISSUE: W/N the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate's
debts and obligations, has the authority:
1. to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator's
grandchildren - NO
2. to order the release of the titles to certain heirs
3. to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.

HELD:
1. grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's estate.
a. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to
the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity
b. Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a
deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the
court, such allowance as are provided by law.
2. In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made:
a. after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the
widow, and estate tax have been paid; or
b. before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond
in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations
3. In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property
and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from
the date of first publication of the notice to creditors
a. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not
hitherto been paid, much less ascertained.
b. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the
estate.
i. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such
provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective
shares in the inheritance.
 ii. at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been
inventoried and appraised.
4. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity and settles only
the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by law
a. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the
legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been
authenticated
i. The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by petitioner
before the probate court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for
release of funds and his motion for reconsideration of the August 26, 1993
order of the said court.
ii.  Therein, petitioner assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and
legatees inasmuch as his father's will included the estate of his mother and
allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother.
iii. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs
of the decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the probate court
shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases.
5. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and
personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not
willed. — An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the
real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the
debts and expenses for administration.
a. When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of
court, he had been previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair
and maintenance expenses on the properties of the estate, and payment of the real
estate taxes thereon, but he moved again for the release of additional funds for
the same reasons he previously cited
i. It was correct for the probate court to require him to submit an accounting of
the necessary expenses for administration before releasing any further money
in his favour
ii. petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of the one-year rental income
from the Valle Verde property.
iii. As executor, he is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate
in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of
a trustee of the highest order.

Facts: On June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz1 executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son,
Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children
of Edmond Ruiz. On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named
executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's holographic will.

On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz
Montes who filed a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of
letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz,3 Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that
the will was executed under undue influence.

On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate — the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street,
Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeline4 — was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.

On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Consequently, the
probate court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters
testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. The
letters testamentary were issued on June 23, 1993.

On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioner's motion for release of funds but granted
respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of the
rent payments to the decedent's three granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the titles to and
possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the
filing of a bond of P50,000.00.

the probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only
"such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for
support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their
share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to
respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of
first publication of the notice to creditors.8

Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals. Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent judge, the appellate court dismissed the petition and sustained the probate court's
order in. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: The issue for resolution is whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but
before payment of the estate's debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from
the funds of the estate for the support of the testator's grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the
titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the
will.

On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a
deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the
direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.

Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the
decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it
to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. 16 It was error, therefore, for
the appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of
the testator pending settlement of his estate.

Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the bequeathed
properties to private respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice to
creditors. An order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance
distribution of the estate which is allowed only under the following conditions:

Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. — xxx the court may, in its discretion and
upon such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not
be affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon
compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these Rules. 17

In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made:
(1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and
estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or
 any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations. 19

In the case at bar. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate
had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that
must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees
post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective
shares in the inheritance.

Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to
take possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor or
administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the
deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment
of the debts and expenses of administration,"27 Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is
merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned.30 As executor, he
is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he
is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order.31 He cannot
unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof
without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased,
rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the
obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity,
propriety and justness.32

Unionbank vs. Santibanez, 452 SCRA, Feb. 2005

FACTS:

On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim Santibañez entered into a loan
agreement in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600
Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the
FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annualamortizations. On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered
into another loan agreement for the payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rotamotor. Again,
Efraim and Edmund executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the later loan. In
1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo
City. Edmund was appointed as the special administrator of the estate. During the pendency of the testate
proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1)
for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the
tractor respectively taken by them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was
executed by and between FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to
Union Bank.

Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988,
Union Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and Florence,
before the RTC of Makati City. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not
served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to
the Philippines. Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not
a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by
the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank under the joint agreement.

Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceasedhad passed to his legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence)
as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing of the joint agreement estopped
Florence, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document.

In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank is trying to recover a sum of money from
the deceased Efraim Santibañez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She points out that
at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings. She asserts
that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been
subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.

ISSUE:

W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the probate court before which the testate estate of the
late Efraim Santibañez was pending. W/N the agreement between Edmund and Florence (which was in effect, a
partition of hte estate) was void considering that it had not been approved by the probate court. W/N there can be
a valid partition among the heirs before the will is probated.

HELD:

Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered.
The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.

In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. In the present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the provision which reads as
follows:

In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. In the present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the provision which reads as
follows:

(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered  later after
my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor
of Edmund and Florence, my children.

The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might
have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter.
Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among
the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among
themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for
the probate of their late father’s holographic will covering the said tractors.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim
Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86
of the Revised Rules of Court.

The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. This requirement is
for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims
against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be
allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the
early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs.

Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence accountable for any liability incurred by her
late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty
agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner
failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the
decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty.

Union Bank vs Santibanez

Facts: Efraim Santibanez and his son Edmund entered into 2 loan agreements with First Countryside Credit
Corporation (FCCC). February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Edmund, as one of the heirs, was
appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent. During the pendency of the testate
proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement
dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3)
tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC
and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, assigned all its assets and liabilities to
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank. USMB then made demand letters to Edmund and Florence for their debts
with FCCC.
Edmund was nowhere to be found (he went to the US) so all demands went to Florence. USMB stated that since
she and Edmund executed a joint agreement for the partition of the estate, she is liable for the debts. Florence
said alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the
joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and
void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement. The TC denies the claim of USMB for
lack of merit.
Issue: Can USMB file a claim against Florence and the estate since the estate was already partitioned
between Edmund and her?
Held: NO! Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the
deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to
be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of
the estate.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated:
USMB should have filed its claim with the probate court as provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules
of Court. It further held that the partition made in the agreement was null and void, since no valid partition may
be had until after the will has been probated.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. USMB, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim
Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86
of the Revised Rules of Court.
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a
proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the
 affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `
The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in
order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable
for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory
notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and
his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go
after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course,
subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner.
Claim denied.

Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen, 702 SCRA, July 31, 2011

FACTS

Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and his common-law wife Ma. Lourdes
Belen. When Eliseo died intestate, Elise represented by her mother, Lourdes, filed a Petition
for Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las Piñas City in order to preserve the estate
of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value. She likewise sought her appointment as
administratrix of her late father’s estate.

Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was married, together with her two children, filed
an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue asserting that Eliseo was
a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper
venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be
appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.

RTC rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise

upon posting the necessary bond. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held
that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by
establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas
City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the
RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.
ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue.

2. Whether or not Elise is qualified to be administrator of the estate.

HELD:

1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where
the decedent resides at the time of his death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an

inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at
the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so
far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from

"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor.13 Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between
the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms
are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for
special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the
context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of
abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for
affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was
properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo
resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the
 venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

2. Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of

Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on
record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack
of interest in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway
this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right
as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the
estate are satisfied.Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his
natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview
of the law.

FACTS
Petitioner Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and Ma. Lourdes Belen, who are common-
law partners. When Eliseo died instestate, Elise through her mother filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the RTC, claiming that she is a natural child of Eliseo having conceived at the
time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Filiation was proven by her Birth
Certificate signed by Eliseo. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes, Elise impugned the
validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia Garcia-Quiazon by claiming it was bigamous.
Respondent Amelia opposed the issuance of the letters of administration asserting that the venue of
the petition was improperly laid. However, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of Elise. On appeal,
the deicison was affirmed. Hence, the petition was filed before the SC raising the argument that Elise
has not shown any interest in the petition for letters of administration and that the CA erred in declaring
that Eliseo and Amelia were no legally married because Elise has no cause of action on it.
ISSUE
Whether or not Elise has a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage despite the death of his
father, hence cannot be deemed as an interested party.
RULING
Yes, Elise has a cause of action. The Court ruled that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place
and it cannot be the source of right, such that any interested party may attach the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage. Having successional rights that would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, Elise
may without a doubt impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said
marriage may be questioned by filing an action attaching its validity, or collaterally by raising it as an
issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse. As a compulsory heir,
Elise has a cause of action for the declaration of nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia.
Likewise, Elise who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate is deemed to be an
interested part. An interested part is one who would be benefited in the estate. Having a vested right in
the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party.

Pilapil vs. Heirs of M. Briones, 314 SCRA Feb. 2007

FACTS: Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones (Donata), consisting of her surviving
sister, Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila (Rizalina); Rizalina’s daughter, Erlinda Pilapil (Erlinda); and the other
nephews and nieces of Donata, in representation of her two other sisters who had also passed away.
Respondents, on the other hand, are the heirs of the late Maximino Briones (Maximino), composed of
his nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, in representation of the deceased
siblings of Maximino.

Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. Maximino died. The CFI
would subsequently issue an Order, dated 2 October 1952, awarding ownership of the real properties
to Donata.

Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donata’s nieces, instituted with the RTC a petition
for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio, were
appointed by the RTC as administrators of Donata’s intestate estate. Controversy arose among
Donata’s heirs when Erlinda claimed exclusive ownership of three parcels of land, based on two
Deeds of Donation, both dated 15 September 1977, allegedly executed in her favor by her aunt
Donata. The other heirs of Donata opposed Erlinda’s claim.

On 21 January 1985, Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew of Maximino, filed a Petition with the RTC
for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino, which was initially granted by the
RTC. The RTC also issued an Order, dated 5 December 1985, allowing Silverio to collect rentals from
Maximino’s properties. But then, Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to Set Aside the Order, dated 5
December 1985, claiming that the said properties were already under his and his wife’s administration
as part of the intestate estate of Donata. Silverio’s Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of
Maximino was subsequently set aside by the RTC.

On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC against the heirs of Donata for
the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real property, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
5794. They later filed an Amended Complaint, on 11 December 1992. They alleged that Donata, as
administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of
trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the
real properties belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino.

xxxx

After trial in due course, the RTC rendered its Decision, dated 8 April 1986, in favor of the heirs of
Maximino x x x.

xxxx

x x x[T]he RTC declared that the heirs of Maximino were entitled to ½ of the real properties covered by
TCTs No. 21542, 21543, 21544, 21545, 21546, and 58684. It also ordered Erlinda to reconvey to the
heirs of Maximino the said properties and to render an accounting of the fruits thereof.

The heirs of Donata appealed the RTC Decision, dated 8 April 1986, to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals, in its Decision, promulgated on 31 August 2001, affirmed the RTC Decision, x x x.

In its Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court found the Petition meritorious and, reversing the
Decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court (RTC), dismissed the Complaint for
partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real property filed by the heirs of Maximino in Civil
Case No. CEB-5794. This Court summed up its findings, 11 thus –

xxx Respondents also advance a fresh contention that the CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952,
being based on the fraudulent misrepresentation of Donata that she was Maximino’s sole heir,
was a void order, which produced no legal effect. xxx

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s contention of fraud for failing to declare that there are other heirs is
meritorious.

HELD: No.

On the finding of fraud

In the Decision, this Court ruled in the negative, since there was insufficient evidence to establish that
Donata committed fraud. It should be remembered that Donata was able to secure certificates of title to
the disputed properties which declared her as Maximino’s sole heir. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, the Court accorded to Special Proceedings No. 928-R the presumptions of regularity and
validity

While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the
court was not able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of the intestate proceedings, it
should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a
proceeding in rem,19 and that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application
and of the date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to
the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time
indicated in the publication. The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is
precisely for the purpose of informing all interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the
existence of the settlement proceedings, most especially those who were not named as heirs or
creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or involuntarily
made.

This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order was the result of the intestate proceedings
instituted by Donata before the trial court. As this Court pointed out in its earlier Decision, the manner
by which the CFI judge conducted the proceedings enjoys the presumption of regularity, and
encompassed in such presumption is the order of publication of the notice of the intestate proceedings.
A review of the records fails to show any allegation or concrete proof that the CFI also failed to order
the publication in newspapers of the notice of the intestate proceedings and to require proof from
Donata of compliance therewith. Neither can this Court find any reason or explanation as to why
Maximino’s siblings could have missed the published notice of the intestate proceedings of their
brother.

Moreover, even if Donata’s allegation that she was Maximino’s sole heir does constitute fraud, it is
insufficient to justify abandonment of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, 22 considering the nature of
intestate proceedings as being in rem and the disputable presumptions of the regular performance of
official duty and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned Order, dated 15
January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R.

FACTS: Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones. Respondents are the heirs of the
late Maximino Briones. Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children.
In 1952, Maximino died, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husband’s estate with the
CFI Cebu City. CFI issued a Letters of Administration in favor of Donata who submitted an inventory of
Maximino’s properties included the disputed land. In same year 1952, CFI issued order awarding
ownership to Donata. In 1960, such order was recorded in Register of Deeds and by virtue thereof, a
new TCT was issued in her name. In 1977, Donata died. Her niece, Erlinda, one of the Petitioners,
instituted with the RTC a Petiton for Administration of the Intestate Estate of Donata. RTC appointed
her and her husband Gregorio as Administrators of Donatoa’s estate. In 1985, Silverio, Maximino’s
nephew, one of the Respondents, filed with the RTC for Letters of Administration for the Intestate
Estate of Maximino which initially granted ordering him to collect rentals from Maximino’s properties.
But Gregorio filed a motion to set aside the Order claiming that said properties were already under his
and his wife’s administration as part of intestate estate of Donata. Hence, Silverio’s Letters of
Administration was subsequently set aside. In 1987, Respondents filed a complaint with RTC against
Petitioners for Annulment/Recovery of possession of real property. In 1992, Respondents amended
their complaint alleging that Donata, as Administrarix of Maximino’s Estate, through fraud and
misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in
registering in her name the real properties belonging to the Intestate Estate of Maximino. RTC favored
Respondents and Ordered Petitioners to reconvey subject properties and render Accounting to the
former. Petitioners appealed to CA but the CA affirmed the RTC, hence, they petitioned to SC.

ISSUE 1: Whether Respondents have rightful claim to recover their share from Maximino’s Estate
based on the alleged misrepresentation of Donata that eventually resulted to her being registered the
disputed estate properties?

HELD: No. Because Respondent’s cause of action had already been prescribed.

Assuming that Donata had employed misrepresentations that constitute fraud on her part that resulted
to her successful registration of the estate properties under her name, such act would necessarily
result to an imposition of an implied trust upon her provided under Art. 1456 of the Civil Code.

There are two kinds of implied trusts. One is the resulting trust and the other one is the constructive
trust. Both are created by operation of law. But the latter  is not created by any words, either expressly
or impliedly, evidencing a direct intention to create a trust, but only by construction of equity in order to
satisfy the demands of justice, as contradistinguished from the former which is always presumed to
have been contemplated by the parties and their intention thereto is traceable in their transaction but
not however expressed in any deed or instrument of conveyance and may be proven by parole
evidence as opposed to that of expressed trust (a trust relation created by express of intention of the
parties thereto).

The rule that an action to compel a trustee to convey property registered in his name in trust for the
benefit of the cestui que trust does not prescribe, only applies to express trust. Basis: the possession of
the trustee is not adverse.  It may also apply to resulting trust so long as the trustee has not repudiated
the trust. But with respect to constructive trust, the rule is different, prescriptibility applies.

While Respondent’s right to inheritance was transferred or vested upon them at the time of Maximino’s
death, their enforcement of said right by appropriate legal action may be barred by prescription of
action.

Art. 1144 of the Civil Code provides that actions must be brought within ten (10) years from the time
the right of action accrues:

Upon written contract;

Upon an obligation created by law;
Upon a judgment.

Since implied trust is an obligation created by law (Art. 1456 CC), then, Respondents had ten (10)
years within which to bring an action for reconveyance of their shares in Maximino’s estate.

ISSUE 2: When the ten (10) year period begins?

HELD: Reconveyance of real property based on an implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years from
registration and/or issuance of title to the property, not only because Torrens System is a constructive
notice to title to the whole world, but also because by registering the disputed properties exclusively in
her name, Donata in effect had already unequivocally repudiated any other claim to the same.

Donata registered and secured TCT over disputed properties in her name on June 27, 1960, but
Respondents filed their complaint Reconveyance and Annulment only on March 3, 1987, or almost 27
years after the registration of said properties in the name of Donata. Hence, there actions had already
been prescribed.

While the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as co-ownership is
expressly or impliedly recognized (Art. 494 CC), but Donata had never recognized respondents as co-
owners or co-heirs either expressly or impliedly, as she asserted to be the sole heir of Maximino
necessarily excludes Respondents.

ISSUE 3: What is the effect if Donata has indeed employed fraud and misrepresentation in registering
the disputed property by claiming that she was the sole and the only heir of Maximino when in truth and
in fact, she was not?

HELD: Donata’s fraud and misrepresentation may render CFI’s Order in 1960 as voidable, but not void
on its face, because, it was rendered by the court in regular exercise of its jurisdiction, hence, it cannot
be subject to collateral attack as respondents did in this case.

ISSUE 4: Is the action to Annul CFI’s Order based on fraud had also been prescribed?

HELD: Yes. Action to annul an order or judgment based on fraud must be brought within four (4) from
discovery of fraud.

In this case, Respondents discovered Donata’s fraudulent acts only in 1985, hence, their right to file an
action to annul CFI’s Order issued in 1960 likewise prescribed as they filed their amended complaint
for Annulment based on fraud only in 1992, or 7 years from date of discovery thereof.

ISSUE 5: What is the quantum of evidence required to prove fraud in a case where the principal actors
 had already been dead?

HELD: Proof beyond reasonable doubt. Reason: Fraud in breach of trust is not lightly imputed to the
living; for the legal presumption is the other way, as to the dead who are not here to answer for
themselves, it would be the height of injustice and cruelty to disturb their ashes, and violate the sanctity
of the grave, unless the evidence of fraud is proof beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE 6: Can Respondents validly assail the court’s decision vesting title to the disputed property in
favor of Donata to be not binding upon them on the ground that they were not made a party to the
proceeding thereon?

HELD: No. While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had surviving siblings
and so the court was not able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of the intestate
proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a
proceeding in rem, and that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the
date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of
the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication.
The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of informing all
interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the settlement proceedings, most
especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such
omission was voluntarily or involuntarily made.

Sabidong vs. Solas, 699 SCRA, June 2013

Trinidad Sabidong, complainant’s mother, is one of the longtime occupants of a parcel of land, designated as Lot
11 originally registered in the name of C. N. Hodges and situated at Jaro, Iloilo City. The Sabidongs are in
possession of one-half portion of Lot 11 of the said Hodges Estate, as the other half-portion was occupied by
Priscila Saplagio. In 1983 ejectment suit however Saplagio was ordered to vacate the portion of Lot 11 leased to
her.

In 1984, respondent who was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City Offered to Purchase on
installment Lots 11 and 12. The Administratrix of the Hodges Estate rejected respondent’s because the actual
occupant of Lot 12 manifested their intention to buy it. He was nevertheless informed that he may file an offer to
purchase Lot 11 "should the occupant fail to avail of the priority given to them” which the respondent
immediately made.

The probate court (Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 27) in Special Proceedings No. 1672 ("Testate Estate of
the Late Charles Newton Hodges, Rosita R. Natividad, Administratrix"), approved the offer upon the court’s
observation that the occupants of the subject lots "have not manifested their desire to purchase the lots they are
occupying up to this date and considering time restraint and considering further, that the sales in favor of the x x x
offerors are most beneficial to the estate x x x".
 Consequently the title of the lot was transferred to the respondent. Later on a writ of demolition was issued by the
probate court in favor of respondent and against all adverse occupants of Lot 11.

In 1999, a complaint was initiated against the respondent in the Supreme Court alleging the prohibition for court
personnel to buy properties in litigation. The complaint likewise alleged that the respondent committed deception,
dishonesty, oppression and grave abuse of authority. It was alleged that complainant and his family were made to
believe by the respondent that he is the representative of the Estate. The complainant relied on the representations
of the respondent that he was authorized to facilitate the sale, with more reason that respondent represented
himself as the City Sheriff;

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent is prohibited to purchase the property subject of probate.

Held:

NO. For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of
the litigation involving the property.34 Where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no
violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.

In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No.
14706 which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be that as it may, it can not be said that
the property is no longer "in litigation" at that time considering that it was part of the Hodges Estate then under
settlement proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 1672).

A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the
moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. 36 A property forming part of the estate under
judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the probate court issues an order declaring the estate
proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate has not
been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated.37 The probate court loses
jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate
delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same.38 Since there is no evidence to show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in
the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been closed and terminated at the time of the execution of the Deed of
Sale With Mortgage dated November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in litigation" subject to the operation
of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code.

This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of respondent did not violate the rule on
disqualification to purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then pending before another court (RTC)
and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.

Aranas vs. Mercado

Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife, Teresita
V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M.
Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage,
namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).

Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir
Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned
his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu
(Lot 3353 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.

Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita
as the administrator of Emigdio's estate. The RTC granted the petition considering that there was no opposition.
The letters of administration in favor of Teresita.

As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio for the consideration and
approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real
properties but only personal properties" worth P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture
and fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty
worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25.

Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma
moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. Teresita filed a
compliance with the order of January 8, 1993, 3 supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of
stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock; 4 the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on
January 10, 1991 involving real properties with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir
Realty shares of stock with total par value of P4,440,700.00; 5 and the certificate of stock issued on January 30,
1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00.

Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory. The RTC issued an
order expressing the need for the parties to present evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the court to
resolve the motion for approval of the inventory. Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave
of court to examine Teresita on the inventory.

The RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by
Teresita had excluded properties that should be included. The RTC denied the administratrix's motion for
approval of inventory and orders the said administratrix to re-do the inventory of properties which are supposed
to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado. The RTC also directed the administratrix to render an
account of her administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her possession.

Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of the order of March 14,
2001 on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had already
been sold to Mervir Realty,

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision insofar as the inclusion of the inclusion of parcels of land
known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of
Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be submitted by the
administratrix is concerned.

ISSUE:
Whether or not he RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been
either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?

RULING: No. The CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC was unwarranted and
erroneous.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE
the decision promulgated on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18,
2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch
in Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas,
petitioner, and to resolve the case; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.

RATIO:
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of their
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be
provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and
distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in the
inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.

Under Section 6 (a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted at the
discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies
intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to
direct the preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as
the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance
of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. —
Within three (3) months after his appointment every executor or administrator
shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and
personal estate of the deceased which has come into his possession or
knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or
more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal
properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has come into
his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known to the administrator to belong to
the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true
inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory,
regardless of their being in the possession of another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent
is "to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and
in malting a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration
of the estate." Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on
the question of what properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta, the CA
cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be
included or excluded from the inventory in the absence of "positive abuse of discretion," for in the administration
of the estates of deceased persons, "the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should
not interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive
abuse of discretion." As long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be
respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The
trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third
parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be
included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is provisional
and may be still revised. As the Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an intestate court,
relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The
patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several
cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties,
not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his
estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be
included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses
no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
The probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination of
ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily,
its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as
the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.

The inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the important purpose of
resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code required
every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to "bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way
of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of
each heir, and in the account of the partition." Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any
advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir "may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person
raising the questions and on the heir." Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC
as an intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to
direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the decedent.
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate
properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its
determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to
include all properties in the possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to
Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long
as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular
performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power
was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent
judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers
acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Facts:
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate
Thelma filed... a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio's estate
The RTC granted the petition
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio... indicated... that at the
time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal properties"
Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory
Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory
Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory... he RTC issued... an order finding and holding that the
inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included
Teresita... sought the reconsideration of the order... on the ground that one of the real properties
affected... had already been sold to Mervir Realty... the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration...
 stating that there was no cogent reason for the reconsideration, and that the movants' agreement as
heirs to submit to the RTC the issue of what properties should be included or excluded... from the
inventory already estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue.
the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari
The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition for certiorari because the order of the
RTC directing a new inventory of properties was interlocutory... the sale by
Emigdio and Teresita had transferred the ownership... to Mervir Realty because the deed of absolute
sale... had been notarized
Issues:
Did the CA p... roperly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding
that such properties had been either transferred by sale
Ruling:
The appeal is meritorious.
Was the CA correct in its conclusion?
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its conclusion, ignored
the law and the facts that had fully warranted the assailed orders of the RTC.
every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real
and personal estate of the deceased... which has come into his possession or knowledge.
The usage of the word all... demands the inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the
decedent in the inventory.
Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to
belong to... the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the
possession of another person or entity.
the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence relevant to the
procedure for preparing the inventory by the administrator.
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty was a
notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the inventory of the properties
involved. A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in... favor of its execution,
but its notarization did not per se guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction under the deed... the
Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision

Sps. Butiong vs. Rinoza Plazo

FACTS:
Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his children with his first wife, respondents Ma. Gracia
R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as several properties including a resort and a family home, both located in
Nasugbu, Batangas.

In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession, respondents
alleged that they discovered that their co-heirs, Pedro’s second wife, Benita"Tenorio and other children, had sold the
subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong.
When confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged the same, showing respondents a document she believed
evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which, however, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan
obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank.

Upon inquiry, the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu informed respondents that he has no record of any transaction
involving the subject properties, giving them certified true copies of the titles to the same.

Subsequently, respondents learned that a notice of an extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late father was
published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this, They caused the annotation of their adverse claims over the
subject properties before the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among others, for the
annulment of all documents conveying the subject properties to the petitioners and certificates of title issued
pursuant thereto.
In their Answer, petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground of lack of personal knowledge and
good faith in acquiring the subject properties.
 Trial court nullified the transfer of the subject Properties to petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in
the Documents of conveyance offered by petitioner’s as well as the circumstances Surrounding the execution of the
same. Specifically, the Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized by a notary public that was not duly commissioned as
such on the date it was executed. The Deed of Sale was Undated, the date of the acknowledgment therein was left
blank, and the Typewritten name "Pedro Rifioza, Husband" on the left side of the document Was not signed.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s Judgment.

Aggrieved, petitioners, substituted by their son Ruel Villafria, filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising the trial
court’s lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal, this Court denied on petitioner's Petition for Review on Certiorari for submitting a verification of the
petition, a certificate of non-forum shopping and an affidavit of service that failed to comply with the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice regarding competent evidence of affiant' s identities.

 This Court also denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in the absence of any compelling reason to warrant a
modification of the previous denial.

The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Order before the CA
assailing the decision and order of the RTC on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, which the CA
dismissed.

ISSUE:

WON THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
ACTED WITHOUT JURISDCITION IN ENTERTAINING THE SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF
PEDRO RINOZA AND THE CIVIL ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE OF THE HEIRS AND THIRD PERSONS IN ONE
PROCEEDING.

HELD: NO
Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of action pertaining to the properties left behind by
the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their interests thereon may fall under an action for
settlement of estate. However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of
the suit, the allegations therein, and the relief’s prayed for, the action, is clearly one for judicial partition with
annulment of title and recovery of possession.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:

RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estate
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs
are all of age5 or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose,
the parties may without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in
an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an
affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an Extrajudicial settlement, whether by public
instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to
himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public
instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with
the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified to under
oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under section 4
of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of
administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.

The fact of the Extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be Published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no Extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. - A person having the right to compel the partition of real
estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an
adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons
interested in the property.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations of respondents in their complaint are but customary,
in fact, mandatory, to a complaint for partition of real estate. Particularly, the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro died
intestate; (2) that respondents, together with their co-heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of one who is
represented by a judicial representative duly authorized for the purpose; (3) that the heirs enumerated are the only
known heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an account and description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro's
estate has no known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful heirs to the decedent’s estate, pray for the
partition of the same in accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is clear, therefore, that based on the allegations of the
complaint, the case is one for judicial partition. That the complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the
decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights thereto, does not perforce make it an action for settlement of
estate.

In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died without a will, leaving his
estate without any pending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention, respondents were under no legal
obligation to submit the subject properties of the estate of a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and
are, in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially.

Thus, respondents committed no error in filing an action for judicial partition instead of a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate as law expressly permits the same.

Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint also prayed for the annulment of title and recovery of possession does
not strip the trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Asking for the annulment of certain transfers
of property could very well be achieved in an action for partition, as can be seen in cases where 1-ourts determine the
parties' rights arising from complaints asking not only for the partition of estates but also for the annulment of titles
and recovery of ownership and possession of property.
Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the settlement of the issue of ownership. In fact, the determination as
to the existence of the same is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition, as held in Municipality of Bifzan v.
Garcia:

The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-
ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary
agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not
entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end,
on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and
an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x

The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by
the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three
(3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by
the court after the. Parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard Thereon, and an award for the recovery by the
party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question.
An action for partition, therefore, is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties.
Unless and until the issue of co-ownership is definitively resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of an
estate.

In view of the foregoing, petitioner's argument that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the action
of settlement of estate and annulment of title in a single proceeding is clearly erroneous for the instant complaint is
precisely one for judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession, filed within the confines of
applicable law and jurisprudence. Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691), amending Batas Pambansa Big.
129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since the action herein was not merely for partition and recovery of ownership
but also for annulment of title and documents, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus
cognizable by the RTC. Hence, considering that the trial court clearly had jurisdiction in rendering its decision, the
instant petition for annulment of judgment must necessarily fail.