C ul t ural Ex change-o r Invasion?

Film as International Business

by Thomas H. Guback
When they aren’t selling Hollywood movies
to the rest of the world, American conglomerates are
financing and profiting from other countries’ movies

T h e relatively new and highly conspicuous international trade in television

programs has grown along lines already traced by the circulation of
theatrical motion pictures over the last half century. T h a t the international
film business has provided the prototype or model for television should not
be too surprising; in the United States, at any rate, many of the same com-
panies are engaged in both fields.
Allied Artists, Avco Embassy, Columbia, Disney, MCA (Universal),
MGM, National General, Paramount, Twentieth Century-Fox, United
Artists, and Warner Brothers are important Hollywood companies which
also deal in television programs for domestic and foreign consumption.
Indeed, the member companies of the Motion Picture Association of
America (the above minus Disney and National General) supplied 70
percent of the prime time programming on the three national commercial
television networks during 1972-predominantly series produced directly
for television, but also feature films made for theatrical distribution or
especially for video. (10) T h e same companies, as members of the Motion
Picture Export Association, also account for about 80 percent of television
program exports from the United States. (25, pp. 194-95).
T h e similarity between the production and distribution of film and
that of telefilm also is apparent in the forms of financing, specifically in
the rise of coproduction in the making of television series. This method
brings together capital from at least two sources, usually in different coun-
tries, to cover production expenses. While this kind of financing is rela-
tively new to television, it is nonetheless increasing, and for a number
of reasons. T h e cost of making splendid, showcase series can exceed the
investment possibilities of one producer or television company, but the
project can be realized if the financial burden is shared by two. I n some
cases, international financing of series can give one of the producing
partners access to a market which hitherto had been relatively closed to it.

Thomas H. Guback is Research Associate Professor at the Institute of Communica-

tions Research, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is the author of The
International Film Industry and of numerous articles on the cinema and other aspects
of mass communications. This article is an abridged version of a longer paper.
Copyright @ 1973 by Thomas H . Guback.

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 Film as International Business

This is (rue, for example, in the case of Anglo-American productions, which

for the British producer open the United States, a market traditionally
difficult to crack.
I n 1972 there were 153 coproduced programs on BBC television, com-
pared with 77 the previous year. T h e motive was not so much cultural
exchange as the sharing of the production costs. Many were bilaterally
produced, but others involved as many as 13 different organizations. (8)
Although coproduction of telefilm series is still somewhat unusual, for
theatrical motion pictures it is the dominant method in Europe and has
been for at least the last decade. Official coproduction in the European film
industries takes place under terms set by treaties among nations, the first
of which was signed in 1949 by France and Italy. I n the years since, prolif-
erating agreements have brought together many of the important filmmaking
nations of the world. France, for instance, has treaties in force covering
coproduction with eighteen countries. From 1960 to 1972, she made 1,191
coproductions as against 744 completely French films. ( 3 , p. 2)
Similar figures confirming the importance of coproduction could be
presentcd for other countries in Western Europe. What they do not show,
however, are films made by two or more partners not covered by bilateral
treaties. Usually these involve American filmmakers; the United States
is not party to any coproduction agreements, but American film sub-
sidiaries abroad which come to have legal status as “foreign” production
companies would necessarily fall under terms of treaties tying the host
country to others. I n actuality, then, the number of pictures financed by
two or more international partners is somewhat greater than just the
number of coproductions. I n the future, it is not totally unlikely that we
will see coventures between even the United States and the Soviet Union,
if the optimism of Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) Presi-
dent Jack Valenti is a guide. (23)
Another similarity between film and telefilm which cannot be over-
looked is the American hegemony throughout much of the world. A cross-
section of the international flow of images shows American products domi-
nant; their position on video and film screens, the consumer end, is equally
impressive. Where American programming is not the dominant television
fare in a country, then it is often at least the hulk of imported material. (25)
Startling as that may seem, it has been a long-established rule in the
American motion picture industry. With markets in more than 80 coun-
tries, the American film occupies more than 50 percent of world screen
time and accounts for about half of global film trade. (14) At every moment
of the day, an American picture is being shown someplace on earth. Up-
wards of 30 million people around the world see the average American
film during its period of release outside the socialist countries. (20, p. 25)
T h e motion picture has become a good to be manufactured and mar-
keted; !he flow of films around the globe is guided by simple commercial
imperatives. This means that the films which are available at any moment
on screens are there as a result of commercial decisions rather than of

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Journal of Communication, Winter 1974

considerations of aesthetic quality o r more detached concerns about where

a society ought to be going and how it can get there. I n the absence of a
cultural policy, company accounts and management loyalty to stockholders
become the arbiters.
I n recent years, much attention has been devoted to multinational
corpora.tions, their seemingly sudden rise, and the kinds of consequences
they have for societies around the world. Yet the multinational corpora-
tion has been the basis of the American film industry for perhaps the last
half century.

Upwards of 30 million people around the world

see the average American film
during its period of release outside the socialist countries

American motion picture companies not only export their products over-
seas; they also have subsidiaries which make, distribute, and exhibit films
abroad. These chains of businesses were forged in the decades before World
War I1 and strengthened in the decades after, so that American film com-
panies now have some 700 foreign offices employing 16,000 people. Perhaps
no industry in the United States is so heavily dependent upon foreign
markets as is the film industry. (20, p. 21) By the late 1960’s, foreign earnings
represented about 53 percent of total film rentals.
While many American conglomerates have become multinational, the
film companies were multinational before some of them were absorbed
by conglomerates. I n the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Com-
mittee’s 1971 study of conglomerates, one finds among the sample com-
panies Gulf and Western Industries, which acquired Paramount Pictures
i n 1966 and Desilu Productions the following year. (17) Another con-
glomerate, National General, in a reversal of the pattern, began as the
owner and operator of the Twentieth Century-Fox theater chain, which
was spun off from the parent corporation to comply with an antitrust
judgment. From there National General spread to banking, insurance,
book publishing, and (after receiving a court order amending an anti-
trust ruling) into film production and distribution at home and abroad.
Western Europe, particularly the European Economic Community,
constitutes the largest foreign market for American motion pictures. It
is also the area in which American film companies have concentrated their
overseas production capacity, especially in Great Britain, Italy, and France.
Not surprisingly, this is the region in which American business in general
has made substantial investments. Their magnitude demonstrates the
strength of America’s commercial movement abroad.
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, the book value of
American private investment abroad in 1950 was $19.0 billion; a pre-
liminary figure for 1971 put the worth at over $130.0 billion, a more than
sixfold increase in only twenty years. I n the same way, the value of Ameri-
can direct private foreign investment (branches and subsidiaries of Ameri-

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 Film as Znternational Business

can companies) was $11.8 billion in 1950, but about $86.0 billion in 1971.
Western Europe attracts an important and growing share of American
investment, about one-third of the total. T h e worth of our direct private
investment there was estimated by the Department of Commerce to be
more than fifteen times greater in 1971 than it was in 1950.
Considering the European Economic Community, in 1971, the book
value o f American direct investment in the Original Six plus the soon-to-be
members-Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom-was about $23.0
billion, or about twice as much as the 1950 value of American direct in-
vestment in the world. (15) T h e United Kingdom’s Common Market entry,
moreover, is the realization of American hopes and political manipulation,
for i t gives the many U.S. firms in Britain easy access to the important
continental market constituted by the other members.
T h e international expansion of American business has been actively
encouraged and aided by the US. government. T h e Webb-Pomerene Ex-
port Trade Act of 1918 was one of the earliest efforts to stimulate exporting
by small and medium-sized firms at a time when few companies, including
the largest, were much concerned with foreign markets. T h e Act permitted
domestic competitors to cooperate in trade by forming export associations
which might otherwise have been held illegal under the Sherman and
Clayton Antitrust Acts. In effect, this exemption allowed American com-
panies to combine and to fix prices and allocate customers in foreign
markets.
Fifty years of experience with this legislation has shown, according to
one government study, that the major beneficiaries rarely have been firms
that needed associations to cope more effectively with the strength of
foreign competitors. (16) Nor did the power of foreign cartels seem to be a
reason prompting formation of asociations. “More often than not,” the
Federal Trade Commission observed, companies “exercising the right [to
form export associations] were least in need of it, being capable of support-
ing export programs on their own accounts and, in fact, typically doing
so.” (16, p. 59) T h e study cited a few products-sulphur, potash, carbon
black, and films-whose export prices had been effectively influenced by
such associations.1
T h e survey pointed out that in 1962, the only year for which data were
presented, export associations founded under Webb-Pomerene legislation
handled twelve product lines. I n three-sulphur, carbon black, and motion
pictures-these associations accounted for more than half the total value of
exports of such products. Moreover, the F T C revealed that for America’s
theatrical and television film exports, over $290 million worth (an esti-
mated 80 percent of total film exports) was accounted for by associations
founded under the Webb-Fomerene Act. T h e position of film was out-
1 A s if to confirm this, industry sources claim that despite civil war in Nigeria and
political upheaval in Ghana, American film earnings in west Africa in 1967-when
companies were trading through the Motion Picture Export Association-were triple
those of prior years when companies individually distributed pictures. (7)

93
Journal of Communication, Winter 1974

standing and unique because the other eleven products combined had less
than $208 million in assisted exports. T h u s the present chief beneficiary of
the Webb-Pomerene Act is the film industry, specifically the members of
the MPEA.

American media products went forth into the world

with the rank of ambassador

But encouragement of export trade was not just a feature of the early
years of this century. It is hardly a secret that during World War I1 the
U.S. State Department already was making plans for the postwar inter-
national spread of our print and film media, and of T i n Pan Alley music
as well. T h e Informational Media Guaranty Program, established in 1948
as part of the Economic Cooperation Administration, permitted the con-
verting of certain foreign currencies into dollars at attractive rates-
providing the exported information materials earning the money reflected
the best elements of American life.
This was a decided advantage to American media, particularly film
companies, for it allowed them to distribute products in difficult currency
areas with complete assurance that a portion of the resulting revenue would
become available to them in dollars. American media products therefore
went forth into the world with the rank of ambassador. Film companies
alone received almost $16 million between the end of 1948 and mid-1966.2
More recent aid to overseas expansion of American business has taken
other forms. T h e Revenue Act of 1971 included provisions permitting the
establishment by an American business of a Domestic International Sales
Corporation as a subsidiary to handle foreign sales. T h e DISC purchases
from the parent and sells abroad. If the DISC derives at least 95 percent of
its revenue from overseas sale, lease, or rental transactions, and other quali-
fications concerning incorporation are met, it can defer tax 011 u p to half
of its export income. These tax-deferred retained earnings can be used in
export development activities or can be loaned to domestic producers of
export products. However, they become taxable if they are distributed to
stockholders. In essence, the program’s effect is to defer taxation of 50
percent of export earnings, a feature which led the European Commission
late in 1972 to declare that this is equivalent to a tax exemption on exports
and a violation of G A T T .
Further aid to the international expansion of American business has
been provided by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, authorized
in 1969 but formally organized in January 1971. OPIC is a wholly-owned
government corporation with majority private sector representation on its

2 Print media also received considerable payments (over $2 million each to Reader’s

Digest and Time, Inc., for instance), prompting Senator Allen Ellender to complain
that the IMG “is a Fund primarily to benefit a chosen few of our large publishing
houses located in New York City.” (19)

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 Film as International Business

board 131 directors, although it is an agency of the United States under

policy guidance from the Secretary of State. Its objective is the more ef-
fective investment of American private capital and know-how in friendly
developing countries and areas. It seeks to accomplish this by insuring
American companies against loss due to certain political risks of currency
inconvertibility, expropriation, war, revolution, and insurrection. It also
provides direct dollar and foreign currency loans for financially sound new
investments or expansions of existing projects.
T h e Corporation has already placed part of its expropriation insurance
liability with private underwriters. During fiscal 1972, OPIC reinsured
$289 million of its then current coverage with Lloyd’s of London and others,
including the USSR’s Black Sea and Baltic Insurance Company. (12)
Political risk insurance has covered some two-thirds of American private
investment (excluding petroleum) in eligible developing countries, or about
$500 million annually. Considering all its programs, OPIC has helped en-
courage more than $4 billion of direct American investment abroad. (13)

“The motion picture is the only US. enterprise

that negotiates on its own with foreign governments”

These are just a few of the ways in which government directly aids
international business. Of course, there are less dramatic and more routine
methods on the embassy level, where foreign service officials assist American
companies abroad in overcoming a variety of local political and trade
obstacles. Film companies have received this kind of help because they are
seen as a great asset to the U.S. foreign propaganda program.
Advantageous trade terms for American films often have been the
product of pressure exerted by companies, and not only on their foreign
counterparts. As Jack Valenti, MPAA/MPEA president (and former White
House aide to Lyndon Johnson) has observed: “ T o my knowledge, the
motion picture is the only U.S. enterprise that negotiates on its own with
foreign governments.” (20, p. 22) T h e film association has offices or repre-
sentatives in 16 foreign cities, and boards composed of representatives from
member companies exist in 38. When American pictures keep half a coun-
try’s theaters open and generate an important share of entertainment tax
revenue, the threat of a market boycott through the withholding of films
can bring foreign adversaries to terms. According to Valenti, foreign gov-
ernments earn more income from the showing of American films (through
import, admission, and income taxes) than do the producers of those films.
(20, p. 24)
One factor contributing to the worldwide strength of American pictures
is the virtual monopoly of international distribution achieved by American
companies. There is no European company with the stature of, say, Par-
amount or Twentieth Century-Fox. In effect, this locus of power means
that a handful of distributors decides, by and large, which pictures circulate
internationally among major filmmaking nations. As these companies also

95
Journal of Communication, Winter 1974

are important in financing production through distribution guarantees,

they exert considerable influence on the kinds of pictures made for global
audiences.
Even within markets the role of American distributors is substantial.
During 1972 in France, a major continental market, of the 364.5 million
francs (close to $75 million) paid by exhibitors to distributors, almost 42
percent went to seven American companies. T h e remainder was divided
among the 115 French distributors. (3, p. 12) This is not exceptional; data
from other European countries demonstrate substantially the same situa-
tion. I n 1970, seven American distributors in Great Britain were estimated
to have received 84 percent (about $44 million) of all film rental income. (1)
Another important feature of the European cinema is the extensive
American financing of European films. These are not simply American
films shot on location to deplete accumulations of blocked and unex-
portable earnings, as was the case in the years after World War 11. Rather,
these pictures meet all criteria for being granted British, French, Italian, or
another nationality and thereby qualify to receive subsidy payments from
various national aid schemes. T h e extent of American participation is such
that, i n the decade u p to 1972, two of every three “British” features ex-
hibited on the country’s two main circuits were partially or entirely financed
by American subsidiaries. In fact, American companies were financially in-
volved in almost five times more British films than was the British govern-
ment’s chosen instrument, the National Film Finance Corporation. (11 ) In
this respect, the British film industry is little more than an appendage of
Hollywood and American companies. It is an example of what has been
happening more recently in other industries: American companies export
their production plants to take advantage of lower paid foreign labor and
often tax incentives from foreign governments. “Runaway production”-a
term coined a quarter-century ago in the film industry-now is applicable
to automotive, electronic, and a host of other manufacturing fields.
I n European film industries, the extent of American investment is
usually obscured because data from these countries d o not distinguish
adequately between locally-financed and American-financed pictures. More-
over, foreign subsidiaries of Hollywood companies usually acquire the
nationalities of their host countries, making it difficult to identify the
precise nationality of the source of money. Further, American subsidiaries
not only make pictures abroad under their own names; they can supply
funds to foreign producers as well, or guarantee loans made by foreign
banks. It is evident that companies themselves are not especially helpful to a
researcher, for they are reluctant to release details of business practices for
public scrutiny. As a result, American investment is masked in dozens of
nominally “national” and coproduced films. One can scan the list pub-
lished annually by the Centre National de la CinPmatographie (or Italy’s
Unitalia or Spain’s Uniespana) of completely national and coproduced
pictures and not find a single reference to American investment. Nor do
these nations have official coproduction treaties with the United States. Yet

96
 Film as Zntcrnational Business

behind the names of producers and their addresses in Paris, Rome, or

Madrid often stand American subsidiaries or American production loans.
One recent case is U l t i m o tango a Parigi, an Italian-French picture
financed in a 60:40 ratio and coproduced under the terms of a treaty.
While the film fulfills the legal definition of an Italian-French copro-
duction, it is in reality an Italian-American coventure, and not simply be-
cause the male lead is Marlon Brando and one-third or so of the dialogue
is in Ehglish. Closer inspection of the French producer reveals it to be
Productions Artistes Associes, a subsidiary of United Artists. According to
the production contract of January 10, 1972, the “French” producer con-
tributed 40 percent of the estimated budget of 714,000,000 lire (about $1.2
million), with United Artists receiving world distribution rights. T h e box
office was to be divided 60:40, except for Italian- or French-speaking areas,
where all receipts were to be paid to the Italian or French producer, re-
spectively. Other terms specified that the film was to be made under the
Italian-French film agreement and that the principal role was to be given
to Brando who was to be remunerated for his services by the Italian pro-
ducer, P.E.A., to which Bernard0 Bertolucci had transferred his scenario
rights. T h e contract also stipulated that the production subsidies in Italy
and France were to be paid respectively to the Italian and French producers.
T h e Last T a n g o i n Pan’s is not an isolated case. At least one-quarter of
1972 Italian-French coproductions involved an American subsidiary as pro-
ducer. (2) In virtually all cases its contribution to the estimated budget was
only 20 percent-the legal minimum, but enough to secure “French”
nationality for the film and thereby access to the production subsidy in
France, about 13 percent of the picture’s domestic box office receipts.

Through the 1960’s, American-financed films abroad

rose from 35 percent to 60 percent
of the total output of American producers

There can be no denying that the subsidies to production in Great

Britain, Italy, and France have been important factors in attracting Ameri-
can investment to those film industries, although the total amount of such
payments cannot be determined with any precision. It has been estimated,
however, that for every dollar-equivalent of subsidy American subsidiaries
are paid in France, they receive two in Italy and probably four in the
United Kingdom. In some instances, through complex international copro-
duction arrangements, American producers have been able to accrue
subsidies from three countries for one film, covering as much as 80 percent
of its production cost. It is not surprising then that through the 1960’s,
American-financed films abroad rose from about 35 percent to 60 percent
of the total output of American producers, although the early 1970’s have
seen a slight decrease in such activity overseas. Toward the end of the
1960’s, American motion picture interests were investing an estimated $100
million per year in films made outside the United States. (4) T h a t figure is

97
Journal of Communication, Winter 1974

quite reasonable; the Italian industry has released data revealing that
in the decade to 1967, American companies spent a yearly average of $35
million to acquire and to finance Italian features and to make their own
films in Italy. (9).
T h e position of American subsidiaries in Italy is such that they con-
tribute about half the annual budget of ANICA, the Italian motion picture
trade association. (22) One of the recent achievements of ANICA was a
campaign for tax reform which became effective in 1973. According t o the
association’s managing director, Carmine Cianfarani, this legislative victory
represented the equivalent of $15 million in additional remittances to home
offices by American companies in Italy. (23) However, through voting power
in ANICA, American members can block certain moves which could make
Italian companies more competitive in their own home market. I n 1972, for
example, American distributors there releaaed 24 Italian films which were
among the biggest box office attractions in the country. For reasons such as
these, some Italians consider their film industry has been “colonized” by
American interests.

Europeans cannot lose control of the economic end of filmmaking

and expect to retain autonomy in the cultural or social spheres

T h e American involvement in the financing and distributing of Euro-

pean films-quite apart from the large number of authentic made-in-USA
films on European screens-has wide political, social, and economic con-
sequences which I have examined at length elsewhere. (5) Suffice it to say
that preference is given to those kinds of pictures whose international
marketing possibilities seem most satisfactory. Consequently, films are made
for world markets rather than local ones, and this results in the closing of
channels to the expression of indigenous cultural characteristics and the
submerging of regionalisms in the mix demanded by international com-
merce. Further, the dependence of European film economies on American
corporations means that Europeans have lost effective control of their in-
dustries, and thus of their own artistic destinies. Those who are concerned
only with the shadows on the screen and not their source are judging ends
and disregarding means, for how something is done inevitably affects what
is done. Europeans cannot lose control of the economic end of filmmaking
and expect to retain autonomy in the cultural or social spheres.
Some have hoped the framework of the Common Market would provide
the mechanism and model for increasing relations and trade among film
industries of member states, eventually leading to commercial and economic
integration. However, it is unrealistic to believe that a European film in-
dustry can be constructed on American investment. Mihat will be built is
a large European market without internal trade restrictions; the principal
beneficiary will be American subsidiaries, who will produce in the market
and employ local talent, but only as long as they consider it profitable.
Lacking any intrinsic loyalty to their host nations, these subsidiaries will

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 Film as Znternational Business

manage investment and production according to their own demands and

not the economic, cultural, or artistic needs of the countries in which they
work. Some observers believe that as multinationals they will not even
exhibit any loyalty to the United.States.
A decade or two ago, American film companies might have weighed
their policies in terms of motion picture economy, but it is evident today
that as parts of “leisure time” divisions of conglomerate corporations (which
themselves are multinational), fields far removed from the cinema can affect
film policy. Universal marketing strategy, worldwide monetary patterns,
speculation in Eurodollars, corporate investment in distant lands, or global
industrial warfare can influence the ways in which corporations allocate
resources by shifting men, material, and capital to meet their own needs.
T h e major film industries in Europe cannot escape the shock waves from
this; they have lost their sovereignty to huge international companies over
which no country or any citizens can exercise power.
Acceptance of American investment has not solved, as some seemed to
think, the economic difficulties of European film industries. I t has only
postponed the day of reckoning, for these problems are endemic to a
private market economy, regardless of the extent of state aids and sub-
ventions, whose presence only serves to confirm the inadequacies. There is
continuous talk of establishing an American production subsidy or in-
stituting tax incentives to lure more filmmaking to Hollywood. T h e Ameri-
can industry implies that i t is not subsidized-at least in the United States.
Yet its record over the last quarter-century clearly indicates that it has
availed itself of subsidies in foreign countries.
I t is indeed a curious progression of events. T h e deluge of American
films in Europe, especially in the postwar period, restricted the market for
films made locally by industries struggling to recover from the war. I n an
effort to help, governments created subsidy schemes to rejuvenate produc-
tion, arid mandatory screen quotas assured that a portion of theater time
would be available for these films. But the chief beneficiaries, it seems, have
been American subsidiaries abroad, which garner important shares of
production subsidies while screen quotas assure their films a reserved place
in foreign theaters.
It is not surprising, however, that few voices in European film industries
have attacked this intervention, for in the short run American investment
has meant a new source of production capital, utilization of studios, and
access to the American market for selected films (even if little of the result-
ing revenue finds its way back to Europe). Even some left-wing entertain-
ment trade unions in Europe have uttered only muffled, symbolic cries of
protest while quietly welcoming more stable conditions, although the re-
duction of American finance in Britain in 1970 produced an employment
crisis of sorts and served to spotlight anew the array of dangers. But the
long run will demonstrate how this false prosperity, if it can be called
prosperity, has no foundation beyond the immediate policies of a dozen
American companies, some themselves subject to conglomerate strategies.

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Journal of Communication, Winter 1974

What one British producer has said about the United Kingdom could
apply equally to other nations: “We have a thriving film production in-
dustry in this country which is virtually owned, lock, stock and barrel, by
Hollywood.” (21) When American producers went abroad, they did not
consider it “runaway production,” but just good business. When they leave
England, or some other country, it will be for the same reason.

REFERENCES
1. Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians. Report of the
A.C.T.T. Nationalisation Forum, May 6 , 1973, p. 15.
2. Centre National de la Cinematographie, Bulletin d’lnformation No. 139, February,
1973, pp. 29-30.
3. Centre National de la Cinematographie, L’Activite‘ Cine‘matographique Francaise en
1972, supplement to Bulletin d’lnformation 140-141. April-June 1973.
4. Gilbert, Robert W. “Foreign Film Subsidies as an Aspect of Financing.” The Journal
of the Producers Guild of America 10:3, September 1968, pp. 6, 8.
5. Guback, Thomas H. “American Interests in the British Film Industry.” T h e Quarterly
Review of Economics and Business, 7 2 , Summer, 1967, pp. 7-21. “Les Investisse-
ments AmPricains dans le CinPma EuropPen.” CinCthique, January-February 1970,
pp. 33-40. “Film and Cultural Pluralism.” Journal of Aesthetic Education, 5:2,
April 1971, pp. 35-51.
6 . Guback, Thomas H. The International Film Industry. Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 1969.
7. “Higher Income from Abroad.” T h e Journal of the Producers Guild of America,
lO:l, March 1968, p. 30.
8. International Secretariat of Entertainment Trade Unions. Newsletter 9: 1, January-
February 1973, p. 5.
9. Monaco, Eitel, president of Associazione Nazionale Industrie Cinematografiche ed
Affini, quoted in Centre National de la Cinematographie, Bulletin d’lnformation
No. 108, December 1967, p. 233.
10. Motion Picture Association of America and Motion Picture Export Association of
America. 1972: A Review of the World of Movies. New York, January 1973.
11. National Film Finance Corporation. Annual Refiort and Statement of Accounts, for
the Year Ended 3 l s t March 1972. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1972,
p. 4.
12. Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Annual Report Fiscal 1972, p. 4.
13. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, A n Introduction t o OPZC, July 1971, p. 2.
14. U.S. Department of Commerce. 1973 U S . Industrial Outlook. Washington, P.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973. p. 433.
15. U.S. Department of Commerce. Survey of Current Business 49:10, October 1969, p.
24; 5210, October 1972, p. 21; 52:11, November 1972, p. 28.
16. U.S. Federal Trade Commission. Economic Report on Webb-Pomerene Associations:
A 50-Year Review. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967.
17. U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on the Judiciary. Report by the Staff
of the Antitrust Subcommittee (Subcommittee No. 5), Znvestigation of Conglomerate
Corporations, June 1, 1971. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1971, p. 187.
18. “U.S. Multinationals-the Dimming of America,” a report prepared for the AFL-
CIO Maritime Trades Department Executive Board Meeting, February 15-16, 1973,
as reprinted in United States Senate Committee on Finance, Subcommittee on

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 Film as Znternational Business

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