Land Use Policy 97 (2020) 104784

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Land Use Policy

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/landusepol

Effects of the private land acquisition process and costs on mining T

enterprises before mining operation activities in Turkey
Taşkın Deniz Yıldız
Department of Mining Engineering, Adana Alparslan Türkeş Science and Technology University, Adana, Turkey

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Keywords: According to the mining legislation in Turkey, different permits must be obtained from the authorized institu-
Cost tions or to reach an agreement with a private landowner according to whether there is private or public land for
Enterprise mining. If the landowner and the mining investor do not agree, the expropriation is conducted if the public
Expropriation interest is observed in the mining operation. There is no doubt that the rights of landowners should be ade-
Investment
quately ensured by legislation. However, there are cases where land ownership problems cannot be solved in
Mining
Property
areas that overlap with mining areas and are subject to private ownership. The expropriation permit process may
sometimes last 1.5–2 years. Therefore, mining enterprises are unable to start production activities and risk losing
their investments. Especially for the reasons related to private landowners and experts, private land acquisition/
expropriation costs for mining activities are quite high compared with the market.
To identify and produce solutions to the legal problems in Turkey, in May, June, and July of 2018, a survey
study was conducted to ask mining enterprises about their problems in private land acquisition and the costs for
them. The mining sector in Turkey expects that all applicable legislations will be proposed in a manner that does
not waste the time of the mining investor and that the private land acquisition/expropriation costs will be
reduced in a manner that does not pose a risk of mining investment. In this respect, the ratio of expropriation
costs to the mining investment amount (MIA) was analyzed according to the different mineral groups and the
social and economic development level of the cities where mining was conducted. Based on this research, leg-
islation practices also have negative effects on mining enterprises, on the expropriation costs and the ex-
propriation permit processes.

1. Introduction
Mine areas and private property land conflicts are frequently ex-
perienced1 (Yıldız, 2013). Because mines must be produced on-site,
mining of these conflicts requires private land to be purchased, rented,
or allocated to mining operations through expropriation.
A fundamental principle of traditional mining law is that mining is a
priority over other land uses. Typically, an assumption is that mines
will produce more value than using a particular piece of land for other
purposes. For this reason, mining should be conducted independently of
the will of the landowner. Of course, this does not mean that the rights
of the landowner are completely taken away. Mineral extraction re-
gimes establish rules and procedures to allow access and use of surface
areas (e.g., easements) and sometimes expropriation. These rules pro-
vide for the determination of compensation for the use or expropriation
of land areas and ultimately avoid conflicts by providing conciliation
that may be useful for mining operations (Bastida, 2004).
In the legislation between land use, land ownership, and the terri-
torial interests of land use, the perception of good balance is largely
linked to the view of sustainable development (Johnson, 2010). Ac-
cordingly, in the assessment of mining compensation for compulsory
land, the applicable laws, and various identifiable interests of pur-
chased landowners should also be considered2 . It is insufficient to only
pay compensation (Kidido et al., 2015). Additionally, adequate, rapid,
and effective compensation must be provided for relocation of the local
community (Asante-Manteaw, 2011).

E-mail address: tdyildiz@atu.edu.tr.

1
See about mining areas and other land-use conflicts and mining area usage in Turkey (Yıldız, 2020a, d). For applications and examples in other world states, see
(Adams and Moon, 2013; Bloodworth et al., 2009; Burke et al., 2015; Corbett et al., 2017; Everingham et al., 2018; Gałaś, 2017; Lopes et al., 2018; Rolfe and Windle,
2015; Rugadya, 2020; Spiegel, 2016; Walcott, 2019; Zhang et al., 2019).
2
There are significant differences between developed and developing countries among countries that accept adequate compensation for expropriated land (Cao
et al., 2018). See related examples USA (Eaton, 1995; Sun, 2013); England (Denyer-Green, 2019; DCLG, 2010); Pakistan (Hull, 2008); India (Mahalingam and Vyas,
2011); Vietnam (Dao, 2010); China (Huang et al., 2017; Zhang and Qiu, 2013; Lin and Ho, 2005; Tan et al., 2009).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2020.104784
Received 22 March 2019; Received in revised form 7 May 2020; Accepted 22 May 2020
0264-8377/ © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
T.D. Yıldız
In this context, to conduct mining operations on private lands in
Turkey, as in many other countries, the relevant legislation primarily
requires an agreement with the landowner. If the agreement cannot be
achieved, expropriation is applied. In all of these methods, mining
enterprises are obliged to pay landowners cost/compensation.
With the consent of the landowner, the purchase of the private land
by the mining enterprise often results in disputes. Under the influence
of these and other factors, the land acquisition cost of mining en-
terprises is increasing considerably in Turkey through an easement or
direct agreement with the landowner. If land acquisition is not achieved
with this method, land acquisition through expropriation is compul-
sory. In this case, the cost of expropriation is determined to be quite
high compared with the market conditions because the valuation cri-
teria defined in Article 11 of the Expropriation Law no. 2942 are not
considered. In particular, local expert boards tend to fulfill the very
high expectation of the landowner rather than appreciate the income
and market value of the land (Tanrivermis, 2018). In Turkey, private
land purchases and the expropriation of mining enterprises in the re-
gions where the purchase price of land is higher compared with the fair
value have been observed (Tanrivermis, 2018; Cagatay and
Aliefendioglu, 2019). The reasons for these phenomena have not been
investigated; thus, an analysis that considers this legislation with an
aim to balance the interests of mining investors and landowners is ne-
cessary.
Understanding the factors behind the link of property rights to
natural resources can help build an understanding of the investment
and growth of natural resource-extracting sectors (Laing, 2015). One
study found that land access and ownership problems were the most
important problems for mining enterprises when the important issues
for international mining enterprises were ranked according to their
importance (Clark and Clark, 1999). For example, according to the
legislation and practice in Slovenia, an example of a country with ty-
pical expropriation legislation and practices, the expropriation right
holder (municipality or state authority) can start expropriation 1 month
after the attempt to purchase a bid fails (Sumrada et al., 2013). Re-
garding that in Turkey, the duration of the permitting process for all
private lands, including private property permits and other permits, is
up to 6 months. The duration of expropriation practices can sometimes
be 1.5–2 years; therefore, mining enterprises cannot start production
activities. In addition, high expropriation costs in Turkey, together with
the expropriation permit applications stipulated by the legislation,
make it compulsory to investigate whether these costs put the mining
investments at risk and to propose solutions.
1.1. Purpose and method
This study aims to calculate the amount of the consideration of paid
shares in mining investments in the mining activities necessary for
expropriation in Turkey. In addition, this study aims to evaluate these
shares according to different mineral groups, determine whether the
legislation practices in the expropriation process and the landowners
play roles in high expropriation costs, and propose mining legislation
practices that put neither the landowners nor the mining investors at
risk.
In line with this objective, the survey was conducted in May, June,
and July 2018 by using the Survey Monkey program, to identify the
problems of mining enterprises and to find solutions to these problems.
In the survey, mining enterprises were asked about the problems they
experienced in expropriation and their expenses on expropriation.
Subsequently, the expropriation costs of mining enterprises operating in
different mineral groups were proportioned to the amount of each
mining enterprise. The results were evaluated together with the reg-
ulations, and solution suggestions were presented. In this context, the
following method was followed within the scope of the study, respec-
tively,
In Section 2, the process of permitting mining operations, including
2
Land Use Policy 97 (2020) 104784
“private ownership permits,” is briefly explained.
In Section 3, what is envisaged by the legislation on private land
acquisition in Turkey is described.
In Section 4, the share of expropriation costs within the MIA of
mining operations is determined; to do so, the mining enterprises were
first asked to report the expropriation costs they paid: "How much is the
expropriation cost you have paid so far to perform mining operation activ-
ities?" The prices paid by 42 mining enterprises that answered this
question were evaluated according to different mineral groups3 . The
mineral groups stipulated by the legislation in Turkey are presented in
(Table 1).
To determine the expropriation costs of these 42 mining enterprises
according to the different mineral groups in Table 1, the MIA of these
mining enterprises were first learned. In this calculation, the average
values of the expropriation cost range stated in the survey responses
were compared with the total MIA. Thus, average values were calcu-
lated for each mineral group.
Mining activities of mining enterprises that answered the survey
were conducted based on an assessment of where they were conducted
in Turkey. Accordingly, in which cities of Turkey these mining en-
terprises operate was not directly asked in the survey4 . Only the social
and economic development coefficients of the cities in which the
mining enterprises operate were learned. Thus, as the development
level of cities increased by using the city coefficients of each mining
enterprise, a determination was made as to whether the ratio of ex-
propriation costs to MIA changed according to different mineral groups.
In Section 5, the reasons for the factors that may affect changes in
expropriation cost were investigated. In particular, this study aimed to
assess whether legislative practices had an impact. In this respect, an-
other survey question was asked to the mining enterprises, and 34 of 42
mining enterprises responded. These answers were divided into dif-
ferent topics and then analyzed to determine whether the issues that
affect the expropriation process and their costs affect mining en-
terprises, landowners, or both, and to what extent they affect them. In
addition, the problems encountered in land acquisition for mining op-
erations were identified. Based on the results, these problems may be
the main driver of the increase in expropriation costs, which have a
high-risk share in mining investments.
2. Private property permits in permitting mining operation
activities
Mining activities comprise multiple processes: exploration is fol-
lowed by ore production and enrichment and ultimately, the closure of
these workplaces and the environmental regulations implemented fol-
lowing the depletion of the resource (Legislation Information System,
2019). To conduct mining operation activities in Turkey, as a rule, first
an operating license and then an operation permit must be obtained.
After obtaining the operating license, a second area, called the pro-
duction license area (operation permit area), is determined and is where
the activities in the mining operating project are conducted. This area is
always smaller than the operating license area (Gunay, 2016).
The mining operation permit indicates that all permits have been
obtained for the mines within the operating license area and that there
are no obstacles to the production of the mine. That is, obtaining the
operation permit required for a mining operation can be realized by
first reducing the operating license areas to proven reserves, namely, by
narrowing these areas. In the same manner, mining operations can be
conducted in the area permitted by the forestry administration, in the
field permitted by the EIA, except for short/medium range watershed
3
See the mineral groups stipulated by the Turkish mining legislation (Yıldız,
2019).
4
More precisely, it was thought that the mining enterprises that responded to
the survey would not want this to be explained
T.D. Yıldız Land Use Policy 97 (2020) 104784

Table 1
Mineral groups in Turkish mining legislation (summary) (Yıldız, 2020c)11.
Ist Group Minerals I (a) Sand and Gravel
I (b) Clays and rocks used in cement and ceramics industries
nd
II Group Minerals II (a) Aggregate rocks and rocks for ready-mix concrete and asphalt
II (b) Dimension stones, Marble, Travertine, Granite, Andesite, Basalt etc.
II (c) Ground/milled rocks for industrial use (Calcite, etc.)
IIIrd Group Minerals Salts (incl. sea, lake, and spring water), CO2 gas (except geothermal, natural gas and petroleum areas, Hydrogen Sulfide
IVth Group Minerals IV (a) Industrial minerals
IV (b) Peat, Lignite, Hard Coal, Anthracite, Asphaltite, Bituminous Schist/Shale Shale, Coccolith/Sapropel
IV (c) Metallic ores, rare earth elements/minerals
IV (ç) Radioactive minerals
Vth Group Minerals Precious and semi-precious stones

remain within the mining license area are as follows: pasturelands,

Fig. 1. Mining operating/production license area (representative) (Yıldız et al.,
2016).
protection zones, and in the full production license area (Yıldız et al.,
2016) (Fig. 1).
In Fig. 1, the EIA permit area is not the same as the operation permit
area. Thus, no operation permit is issued for that area because no
proven reserve is found in a part of the EIA permit area after the op-
erating license and EIA permit applications. To obtain an operation
permit license, the operating license holder is obliged to obtain all the
following permissions within 3 years (Fig. 2).
In Fig. 2, the operating license holder is granted an operation permit
after all these permissions, including the private ownership permits, are
completed. All permits, except for private property permits, are ad-
ministrative permits. Private property permits, similar to other permits,
are one of the necessary permits to start mining operations, that is, to
obtain mining permits. Thus, the private land that overlaps with the
mineral reserve is allocated for mining activities (Yıldız, 2020b).
3. Private land acquisition methods
In mining where land is directly affected, various property types are
the subject of the field of activity. The types of these properties that can
forest lands, treasury lands, non-cadastral areas, private property lands,
and legal property lands (Kavci, 2014).
Land acquisition or acquisition of rights on land is a critical, in-
dispensable issue for almost all infrastructure and superstructure pro-
jects, and especially for the construction, mining, and energy sectors
(Sezener, 2015). Therefore, first, it is critical to know where the mining
activity area will be established at the planning stage (Kavcı, 2014) and
to know which of the property lands in question overlap with it. In this
respect, it is useful to know that mining legislation is envisaged for
conducting these activities before a decision is made to conduct mining
operations on private property.
In the event of an operation request at the end of the mine ex-
ploration activity in Turkey, the purchase of the private property areas
within the operating license area shall be made by paying the price
agreed to by the parties. In case of a failure to reach an agreement, upon
the request of the licensee, if the Ministry decides that there is a public
interest, it shall be expropriated in accordance with the provisions of
Expropriation Law no. 2942 (Kavci, 2014).
3.1. Agreement with the owner on private Land
Reaching mining sites and using immovables located or adjacent to
mine sites is a necessity for mining activities. This issue is expressed in
the world mining law literature with the concept of “access to mining
land,” one of the most important problems of the mining sector. This
problem is connected to the legal rules varying from country to country
according to the regulation of mining law and real estate law
(Topaloglu, 2016a).
For example, in the Republic of South Africa mining rights legisla-
tion provides an example of rights in the land by contacting the gov-
ernment instead of negotiating with the landowner. In extreme cases,

Fig. 2. Permits and licenses necessary for mining operation activities (TUMMER, 2017).

3
T.D. Yıldız
acquiring such rights does not require the consent of the landowner. By
contrast, mining enterprises in South Africa generally allocate 3%–5%
of the value of the mine to landowners, which in exceptional cases may
increase to 7% and up to 10 % in diamond mining (Van Heerden et al.,
2015; Hartman et al., 2015). However, in Sudan, the land acquisition
process is poorly structured, and there is little clarity about the ap-
plicable procedures. Rarely, affected communities are consulted (Deng,
2014).
The legislation in Sweden is also remarkable. The protection of
expropriation under the Swedish constitution also affects land owner-
ship. Such protection is that property can be limited only to the basic
public interests, and the owner must be compensated for surrendering
the land or for any damage. However, as a result of restrictions imposed
on land use rights, a landowner is not always guaranteed compensation
and sometimes may have to endure a certain infringement of the
property right without compensation. The latest amendments to the
Minerals Act provide for a strong public interest in the extraction of
minerals as necessary to fulfill the constitutional prerequisites for in-
terfering with the rights of landowners (Johnson, 2010).
Regardless of the system, the rights arising mainly from the world’s
mining licenses provide the owner multiple monopolistic powers for the
extraction and production of mines on the land. However, these mining
rights do not entitle the non-mining use of the land where mine is lo-
cated or required for mining operations (Topaloglu, 2016a).
In cases where energy transmission lines, conveyor belts, or pipe-
lines are not used for the whole operation of the immovable property,
administrative easement can be preferred instead of expropriation
(Topaloglu, 2011). In this manner, mine easement can be established to
search for and extract from mines on the land that belong to someone
else (Yıldız, 2012). Although the owner of the easement right is the
owner of the extracted mine, they cannot have the right of ownership
over the mine reserve (Telli, 1989). In general, legal provisions have
been introduced to establish easement rights on the land in favor of the
mining concessionaire in general, and attempts are made to resolve the
problems that may arise with the landowners (Topaloglu, 2011).
Turkish Mining Law also states that the Ministry of Energy and
Natural Resources (MENR) establishes an easement or usufruct rights in
favor of the miner, who is a private person. Article 46 of the Mining
Law No. 3213 has the following provision: “The immovable property
subject to private property required for operation activities during the op-
erating license phase is expropriated if the parties cannot reach an agreement
and upon the request of the owner of the operating license, it is decided that
the ministry has a public interest.”
The licensee must first enter into an agreement with the proprietor
for mining on the basis of private law, such as that for rent, bailment,
usufruct, or sale, regarding the use of land. If the licensee cannot reach
an agreement with the private property owner, the owner applies for an
administrative easement or mining expropriation through MENR ac-
cording to Article 46 of the Mining Law (Topaloglu, 2011, 2016a). The
expropriation right granted through the General Directorate of Mining
and Petroleum Affairs (MAPEG) is understood from the aforementioned
statement, that is, this is not the case for the exploration period and is
only recognized for the operational phase.
Article 7/13 of Mining Law No. 3213 evaluates mining activities at
close distances to the immovables subject to ownership and specifies
places where mining can be conducted with the permission of the
landowner. Accordingly, mining within the area, which is 60 m hor-
izontal from private buildings and 20 m from courtyards, vineyards,
and gardens, is only possible with the permission of the landowner. If
the landowner does not give permission within the specified limits, the
easement right can be established by MENR pursuant to Article 46 of
the Mining Law.
If an easement is established with the expropriation method for an
immovable property within the scope of private property, the price
corresponding to this easement must be paid to the landowner in ad-
vance (Yildirim, 2006). The procedures and conditions stipulated in the
4
Land Use Policy 97 (2020) 104784
Expropriation Law for expropriation (e.g., the determination of prop-
erty, owner or possessor, appraisal) shall also be followed in easement
practices.
The decrease in the value of the immovable property due to the
establishment of the easement right (expropriation easement fee) is the
provision for the easement. To calculate these values, first, the value of
the immovable is calculated as if there is no easement; the difference
between them shows the value of the easement right (Topaloglu, 2015).
According to Article 46 of the Mining Law, the expropriation pro-
visions shall not be applied to Group I and Group 2 (a) minerals.
Therefore, for the extraction of these mineral groups, mining en-
terprises are obliged to agree with the landowners.
3.2. Expropriation practice and rights of Real Estate owners
The establishment of an easement may not necessarily correspond to
the need for mining in all cases. In some cases, it may be necessary to
use the entire land for mining activities. In this case, the inability to
acquire property from the private property owner necessitates the ex-
propriation (Yıldız, 2012). Expropriation is the process of confiscation
of all or some of the immovable property in private ownership, pro-
vided that the public interest requires the state or other public legal
entities to pay the price in advance (TMMOB, 2015). The relevant
legislation in Turkey is the Expropriation Law, and the Mining Law
implements the principles of this law. The competent authority for
expropriation is the MAPEG, which must implement the relevant law.
3.2.1. Rights of the real estate owner in the expropriation application
An expropriation decision must be made for the mining owner to
conduct the mining activities. To obtain the expropriation decision, a
decision of public interest is required for the mines (Yıldız, 2012). In
general, mining laws worldwide recognize that mining activities are of
public interest. In some countries, mining has such a strong position
that it has an absolute superiority and privilege over other fields of
activity. Bolivia, for example, considers that the public interest is in-
herent to mining and allows expropriation without a public-interest
decision5 (Topaloğlu, 2011). Even in the European Union, which at-
taches more importance to environmental protection than do other
countries, it is emphasized that mining can be conducted within the
framework of public interest if certain conditions are fulfilled in almost
every region, including special environmental protection zones (TMA,
2011). Of course, expropriation has the public interest on one side and
the rights of the expropriated real estate owner on the other side.
The right to property is a right that gives real or legal persons the
right to save on the objects in which they possess, but only with the
limitations required by public interest (TMMOB, 2015). Therefore, in a
legal system in which the right to property is subject to a constitutional
guarantee, there is no doubt that although the expropriation authority
is authorized, mutual rights and benefits are reconciled. With this or-
ientation, before the decision of public interest was made in Article 74
of the Mining Regulation, which entered into force in 2017, it was
obligatory to investigate certain issues specific to the mining operation
stipulated in addition to Article 7 of the Expropriation Law.
According to this, expropriation is decided by evaluating the fol-
lowing:
• The operation project and reserve status of the mine in the area to be
expropriated,
• The benefits and damages to the region and the national economy in
the absence of the production of the mine in this area,
• The production opportunities according to the reserve status in
5
In Peru, there are examples of the reasonable land prices of mining com-
panies in land acquisition, and the transfer of the people of the region to other
areas. See (Bury, 2005).
T.D. Yıldız
other areas within the license area other than the area to be ex-
propriated,
• The alternative production areas in the region,
• The losses of the property owner,
• The economic activity to be sustained by the owner after the ex-
propriation and how it will be affected by the expropriation, and
• All the technical and social factors such as the relations of the area
to be expropriated with the environment (The Regulation on Mine,
Article 74).
No information is in the legislation on how these parameters are
considered in the expropriation decisions on mining in Turkey. In other
words, detailed economic, social, and regional analyses, including
economic and social benefit–cost analyses, are not foreseen in the ex-
propriation decisions in Turkey but envisaged in public investments
(Konukman et al., 2016).
Worldwide, there are various forms of compensation for the land
purchased. Nevertheless, the determination of the amount of compen-
sation in monetary terms is the valuation process in which values are
not created but achieved through the application of relevant economic
and legal principles (Ayitey et al., 2006). Of course, the laws in force in
the assessment of monetary damage have drawn attention to the var-
ious private interests of the landowners acquired (Kidido et al., 2015).
Therefore, the legal regime is a critical factor.
In Turkey, introduced by Law No. 5177, dated May 26, 2004, the
arrangement that promotes the interests of landowners is as follows: “If
it is determined by the Ministry that the expropriated real estate does not
need for mining operations, the owner of the expropriated place shall be
notified that the expropriated place shall be returned to the former owner
provided that the fair value to be determined in accordance with the pro-
cedures and principles stipulated in the Expropriation Law shall be paid. If
the former owner does not want to receive the immovable within 6 months,
the immovable will be left to the Treasury.”
Here, the immovable property expropriated for mining law and
mining activities is returned to the former owner on the condition that
the fair value is paid after the activity. If the former owner does not take
the immovable, it was foreseen to transfer this land to the treasury. The
notable point of this provision is that the real estate owner is given the
opportunity to reclaim the immovable property because this is not in
the previous legislation in Turkey.
All these legislative arrangements in Turkey enable mining activities
on private property. However, the rights of the former real estate owner
are also considered, and private property is secured.
Fig. 3. Costs paid for expropriation by mining enterprises8 (TL)9 .
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Land Use Policy 97 (2020) 104784
3.2.2. “State right” granted to the people of the mining region after
expropriation
The contributions of the mining industry contribute to economic
development in the region where mining initiatives occur are critical
for the relationship between the mining industry and the local com-
munity (Söderholm and Svahn, 2015).
A mine investor in Turkey grants a government right of 1 %–15 % of
the total sales of the ore, which varies according to mineral groups,
every year. It is envisaged that 25 % of the state right (royalty) invested
by the holder of the license shall be given to the special administration
of the city where the license is held as a special provincial adminis-
tration share. Twenty-five percent of the state right -starting from the
nearest village where the license is located- will be transferred directly
to the account of the related districts or districts, to the Union For
Providing Services For Villages, in proportion to their share in the
mining activity area to be used in infrastructure investments limited to
the region where the villages are located. The remaining 50 % of the
state right is deposited into the Treasury account. Thus, a significant
portion of this money should be used to benefit the local community.
4. Expropriation costs in the mia
In Turkey, because land is used to conduct mining operations, a
mining investor is obliged to pay expenses: expropriation cost, private
land cost, forest cost, pasture cost, operating license cost, waste man-
agement cost, rehabilitation cost, environmental compliance guarantee,
state right, and taxes.
“Expropriation costs” and “private land costs” are “compensation
for land” or “negotiation or transaction costs.” However, these costs can
be evaluated under a single name (“private land acquisition costs” or
shortly "expropriation costs”) as the sum of all the costs paid by the
owners of the private lands where the mine areas overlap, and the total
amount paid as a result of the expropriation if there is no agreement
with the landowners. According to the legislation, these costs do not
change according to different mineral values, and it is not a state right
or a tax paid for the mining area.
To determine the amount of expropriation expenses in Turkey (in-
cluding costs paid in direct agreement with the private landowner), the
following survey question was asked to the mining enterprises: “What is
the total amount (TL) of expropriation you have paid so far to be able to
conduct mining activities?” The distribution of the answers of 42 mining
enterprises according to different mineral groups is in Fig. 3.
In Fig. 3, the expropriation costs have high values, particularly in the
4 (b) and 4 (c) mineral groups. Expropriation costs may vary by the
T.D. Yıldız
Fig. 4. Representation of city coefficients on the "Turkey city map.".
Fig. 5. MIA of mining enterprises until the end of 201710 (TL).
geographic region where mining is conducted. However, according to
the value of mineral groups (e.g., mineral sales amount), expropriation
costs should not change to an excessive extent. In this respect, an
evaluation according to where mining enterprises are performing their
mining activities in Turkey is useful. For this purpose, city coefficients
can be used in the calculation of the forest land permit cost, which is
predicted the 20th (I) (b) article of "Implementation Regulations of
Forest Law Article 16," which entered into force on April 19, 2015, in
Turkey. The representation of city coefficients foreseen by the Forest
Regulation for different cities (Annex-3) in Turkey is presented in Fig. 4.
In Fig. 4, the "city coefficient" increases according to the degree of
social and economic development of the cities in Turkey. Accordingly,
there are higher forest costs for mining operating activities conducted
in cities with a high city coefficient.
In many countries where the mining and natural stone sector is
developing, all property permits, including forest permits that paid for
mining activities during the project, do not exceed 2% of the total MIA
(Aydin, 2018; TMA, 2018). However, there are concrete examples in
Turkey where this ratio exceeds 40 %–45 % in forestlands (Yöldöz,
2018).
Similarly, to determine the extent to which the expropriation costs
of the mining enterprises operating in different geographical regions of
Turkey have a share in the MIA of each company, the following ques-
tion was asked to the mining enterprises: “What is the MIA of your mining
enterprise (until the end of 2017)?” The distribution of 42 answers to this
question by different mineral groups is presented in Fig. 5.
This distribution of MIA shows that mining enterprises in Turkey are
mostly in small and medium-sized enterprises. This finding indicates
6
Land Use Policy 97 (2020) 104784
that the expropriation costs paid by the mining enterprises will have a
greater impact on mining enterprises as a cost item. The costs paid by
the mining enterprises that respond individually to the expropriation
can be proportional to their current MIA (total before 2018). However,
these mining enterprises are planning to make new investments in 2018
and beyond. Accordingly, the following question was asked to mining
enterprises: “How much is the new MIA targeted for your mining operation
in 2018 and beyond?” The answers of 42 mining enterprises to this
question are presented in Fig. 6 according to different mineral groups.
The ratio of the expropriation costs paid by the mining enterprises
to the values calculated by adding the new MIA targeted by each
mining enterprise in 2018 and after and the existing MIA before 2018
are presented with their average values in Table 2.
In Table 2, considering the targeted new MIA of mining enterprises
in 2018 and beyond, the ratio of expropriation costs to the total of
current and future MIA is 2.97 % on average for all mineral groups. In
mining countries worldwide, the expropriation costs and the total costs
of all types of ownership do not exceed 2% of the amount of the mining
investment. By contrast, these amounts paid for the expropriation of
private lands, which is one of the items that mining enterprises spend
on to start mining production, have a high6 share (on average, close to
3%) in the sum of the current and future MIA alone.
The average sales value per ton of mines increases partly from the
2nd group of minerals to the 4th group of minerals. Notably,
6
The rate does not include the royalties that the mine mentioned above en-
terprises pay for the socio-economic development of the people
T.D. Yıldız Land Use Policy 97 (2020) 104784

Fig. 6. New MIA of mining enterprises in 2018 and the future (TL).

Table 2
Ratio of expropriation costs to the total of current and future MIA.
Groups of Minerals Number of mining Average sum of the current Average of expropriation Ratio of the expropriation costs to the sum Average of city
enterprises considered and future MIA (TL) costs (TL) of the current and future MIA & averages coefficients
(%)

2 (a) Group 9 10,916,667 50,000 2.70 2.20

2 (b) Group 11 32,363,636 229,545 1.38 1.75
4 (a) Group 4 435,062,500 100,000 0.05 2.15
4 (b) Group 12 545,979,167 10,908,333 5.19 2.14
4 (c) Group 6 647,541,667 12,600,000 3.80 2.08
For all groups of 42 300,750,000 4,997,024 2.97 2.00
minerals

expropriation costs increase from the 2nd group of minerals to the 4th
group of minerals (Fig. 7).
In Fig. 7, the average values of expropriation costs for different mi-
neral groups show an exponential relationship. The correlation coeffi-
cient is R2 = 0.967. Based on this data, there is a strong significance
between mineral groups and expropriation costs. However, other factors
that affect the expropriation costs shown in Fig. 7 according to the
mineral groups. Therefore, it is useful to assess whether the ex-
propriation costs change according to the degree of social and economic
development of the cities in Turkey. Accordingly, the relationship be-
tween the "average of city coefficients according to mineral groups" and
the "average ratio of expropriation costs to MIA" in Table 1 can be
examined (Fig. 8).
In Fig. 8, the values for different mineral groups show an ex-
ponential change in the correlation coefficient. The correlation coeffi-
cient is R2 = 0.651. Based on this data, there is a moderate significance
between pre-calculated city coefficients and the expropriation costs.
Several factors can be cited as reasons for this to occur.
Notably, the fair value of land in different regions of the same city in
7
The values of the 4 (a) mineral group were not included in this calculation
because the number of mining enterprises participating in the evaluation was
low and the values decreased the overall correlation coefficient
8
> 25 million: 25–50 million Turkish Liras (TL), the average was accepted as
37.5 million TL.
9 manner that provides a balance between these two situations
1 USD = 4.7236 TL (18th June 2018) (Central Bank of the Republic of
Turkey, 2019).
10
500 million TL: 500 million–1 billion TL, i.e., the average was accepted as
750 million TL
11
For a detailed version of this summary table, see (Yıldız, 2019; Topaloglu,
2016b).
Turkey (unit prices per m2) may vary. The distribution presented above
shows that the ratio of expropriation costs to MIA required for mining
operations in Turkey does not increase linearly in cities with high city
coefficients.
Probably, this moderately exponential exchange relationship be-
tween these values is particularly related to the number and quality of
the private land overlapping with the mining activity area, rather than
the expropriation costs for different mineral groups (this data could not
be obtained from mining enterprises). However, this change is note-
worthy among the values of other group mining enterprises except for 4
(a). Notably, 2 (b) group mining enterprises have low city coefficients,
and the ratio of expropriation costs to MIA is the lowest. The number
and quality of the expropriated private land may have been particularly
effective in the low correlation coefficient from Group 2 to Group 4
minerals.
5. Parameters expropriation process and costs
Expropriation is not an unjust enrichment of the owner of the real
estate and does not impoverish it by taking the real estate for a very low
price. As a result of expropriation, the owner of the immovable should
not have the feeling that the immovable property was forcibly taken
away through an unfair process. The expropriation process should not
harm the mining investor who wants to invest. An expropriation pro-
cess should be conducted to determine the expropriation value in a
(Tanrivermis, 2018; Cagatay and Aliefendioglu, 2019).
The heading of this section shows that the expropriation costs re-
quired for mining operations are sufficiently high to create mining in-
vestment risk in Turkey. One of the most important factors that cause
such costs to be so high is the practices and orientations created by the

7
T.D. Yıldız Land Use Policy 97 (2020) 104784

Fig. 7. Relationship between the cost of the expropriation and mineral groups.

Table 4
Private land permitting process (TUMMER, 2017).
Stages Owner of the Real Estate - Permit Process of Provincial Directorate of
Agriculture and Forestry

1st Sale or lease of land

2nd Application for the Permission of the Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry
3rd Preparation of Soil Conservation Project
4th Opinions of the State Hydraulic Works and Museums
5th Non-Agricultural Status Permission

evaluations. A comparative analysis of landowners and mining en-

terprises is presented in Table 3.
In Table 3, the parameters that affect the expropriation process and/
or the expropriation costs mostly have—at different levels—negative
effects on mine investments, but have positive effects on landowners.
Although the majority of these topics may affect both the expropriation
Fig. 8. Relationship between city coefficients and the ratio of expropriation process and the expropriation costs from time to time, they are ex-
costs to MIA. amined separately by considering the dominant issue.

legislation.
For this reason, another question was asked of the mining en-
terprises to identify the problems experienced in the expropriations
required for mining operations in Turkey and to find solutions to these
problems: “Do you have any problems in the expropriation process or do
you have any legislative-implementation suggestions for when you make an
agreement with the private property owner to conduct mining activities?”
Thirty-four mining enterprises answered the question with various
5.1. Factors affecting the expropriation process
Many factors affect the expropriation process required for mining
operation activities. Among these, the following issues can be ex-
amined: "the long-term approval of MAPEG and MENR for the decision
of public interest in the expropriation process” and "extension of ex-
propriation process of property owners."

Table 3
Comparative analysis of landowners and mining enterprises.
Parameters affecting the expropriation process and Topic affected Positive (+) / negative (-) effect of Positive (+) / negative (-) effect
expropriation costs mining investments on landowners

The duration of the public benefit decision is long Affects "expropriation process" (-)High (+) High
Extension of the expropriation process by property (-) High (+) High
owners
Effect of Olives Law Affects both "the expropriation process" and (-) Moderate / (-) High (+) High
"the expropriation costs."
Experts' inadequacies and wrongly determined (-) Moderate / (-) Moderate (+) Moderate
expropriation costs
Private property prices are costly Affects "expropriation costs." (-) High (+) Very high
Failure to reach an agreement with private owners (-) Very high (+) Very high

8
T.D. Yıldız
5.1.1. The duration of the public benefit decision is long
The public-interest decision takes a long time to be approved by
MAPEG and MENR in the expropriation process. The most important
problem in expropriation practices is that the mining investor cannot
start operating activities due to the late expropriation permit. In
Turkey, the duration of the permitting process of all private lands, in-
cluding private property permits, and other permits, can be up to 6
months (Table 4).
In Table 4, the sale or rental of land is insufficient for mining ac-
tivities in Turkey. In addition, the Non-Agricultural Use Permit appli-
cation should be made to the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture and
Forestry for the land to be mined. First, a soil conservation project is
prepared for this permission, and if necessary, opinions are obtained
from the General Directorate of the State Hydraulic Works and the
Ministry of Culture and Tourism. All these processes take approximately
6 months on average.
However, in Turkey, many mining enterprises may not obtain per-
mission for expropriation for 2.5–3 years after obtaining a mining op-
erating license. Notably, the expropriation process of the land subject to
private property can take as long as 5–10 years (TMA, 2018). This issue
can be explained by the following application: All landowners should be
notified in the expropriation required for the mining activities. For
example, notifying a village with more than one hundred households
requires a considerable amount of time. In addition, the completion of
expropriation in tens of disputes may take approximately 2.5–3 years
after obtaining a mining operating license (Topaloglu, 2018).
In conclusion, this parameter has a negative impact on mining in-
vestments but a positive effect on landowners.
5.1.2. Extension of expropriation process by property owners
The bureaucratic process of expropriation is long. In addition, if
private properties are multi-partnered or have successors, the failure to
reach an agreement with all partners further extends the expropriation
process. Additionally, in case of a disagreement with property owners,
during the expropriation process, it becomes sometimes impossible to
obtain the necessary identification information and addresses of the
property owners for notification. In this respect, the Civil Registry
should provide information through MENR, the relevant ministry, even
if it does not provide direct information to the mining enterprises on the
relevant information of the property owners.
As a result, this issue has a (high) degree of negative impact on mine
investments but a (high) degree of positive impact on landowners.
5.2. Parameters affecting the expropriation process and the expropriation
costs
5.2.1. Effects of the olive law
A large part of the fields where the mining projects are conducted in
Turkey is located on private-registered lands. Additionally, a significant
portion of these lands is registered as “field” or “olive groves” in the
“Land Registry Records” (TGNA, 2010). In 1995, as a result of the
amendment in a paragraph of Article 20 (1) of the Law on Breeding of
Olive Cultivation and the Vaccination of Wild Animals, the provision
“No facility that leaves chemical waste which prevents the vegetative and
generative development of olive gloves, excluding olive oil factory, and
causes dust and smoke can be built or operated within olive grove fields and
at least a distance of 3 km from these fields” is envisaged.
However, in practice, mining is not allowed within a distance of
3 km without examining whether the mining to be conducted will
prevent the vegetative and generative development of olive groves
(TUMMER, 2010). With the effect of this provision, in these places, the
purchase price is very high because the land is negotiated with private
property owners and the process is prolonged before starting mining
operations. As a result, "the Effect of the Olive Law" is moderately ne-
gative in terms of the expropriation process of mine investments and
highly negative in terms of expropriation costs; however, it has a high
9
Land Use Policy 97 (2020) 104784
positive impact on landowners.
Mining license holders are obliged to conduct their activities in a
manner that will not harm the environment and agricultural lands, and
restore the places allocated to them during mining activities as a result
of rehabilitation activities at the end of the allocation period.
5.2.2. Experts' inadequacies and wrongly determined expropriation costs
According to Article 11 of the Expropriation Law, the expert board
will go to the location of the immovable property or resource, accom-
panied by the court committee, and listen to the immovable owners.
Subsequently, based on other objective measures that will be effective
in determining the value of the immovable property or its source,
provided that the following articles are explained, it shall specify the
answers of all these elements separately and consider the declaration of
the concerned persons. They then determine the value of the im-
movable property based on a justified assessment report in accordance
with the valuation standards adopted by the Capital Markets Board.
In Article 11 (3) of the aforementioned Law, a provision which says,
“In the valuation of the immovable property, the appreciation to be caused
by the proceedings of zoning and service, and the profit to be brought de-
pending on the usage forms intended for the future are not considered”
(Expropriation Law). Despite this provision, for example, during the
expropriation process of a gold mine operation in Elazig, 50 % objective
appreciation was applied by considering the recent sale prices of many
parcels of land where mining activities were planned. However, the
appreciation caused by mining activities should not be considered in
the valuation (Cagatay and Aliefendioglu, 2019).
Additionally, in determining the expropriation value, the experts
tend to determine the high value by using the retail purchase prices
(except withholding and other legal cuts) instead of the wholesale
prices of the products that are commonly grown on the land and the
land purchase–sale values realized at the local level. Under these con-
ditions, land expropriation for mining inevitably increases several times
compared with the local market conditions, and high land prices result
in difficulties for mining companies (Tanrivermis, 2018).
Expropriation is a long and difficult process. Disputes between the
mining license holder and the landowner are often brought to court.
The problems of determining the competent authority to conduct the
expropriation process in the cities and the lack of experienced per-
sonnel in this regard arise. This causes both the wrong determination of
the expropriation costs and the delay of the expropriation process if the
landowners submit the dispute to the court. Therefore, the inadequacies
of the experts and the determination of incorrect costs have a (mod-
erately) negative impact on mine investments in terms of the ex-
propriation process but have a (low degree) positive impact in terms of
the expropriation costs. However, they affect the landowners negatively
(low degree). The resolution process of such disputes with the official
arbitration institutions can be accelerated.
As a result, the inadequacies of the experts and defective price de-
terminations have a (moderately) negative effect on mine investments
both in terms of expropriation process and in terms of expropriation
costs and have a positive effect on landowners.
5.3. Parameters affecting expropriation costs
Expropriation costs are affected by factors such as land prices in the
region where the mining operation is conducted. Considering the de-
gree of social and economic development of cities, these costs were
examined in the title of this subsection. In this subsection, the factors
other than the degree of the social and economic development of the
cities and the fair land price prices are mentioned, because the region of
each mining operation differs, and no other data can provide an overall
assessment.
5.3.1. Private property prices are costly
In almost all mining operations, private landowners often declare
T.D. Yıldız
that the expropriation value is low, and this is subjective. Notably,
different interest groups also support reporting injustices at the local
level (Tanrivermis, 2018). As a result, property owners within the
mining operating license area often think of themselves as stakeholders.
In addition, private property owners demand the fair value of the real
estate they want to buy in the metropolitan areas from the mining
enterprises for the land they have neither visited nor planted for 15–20
years.
In addition, the owners of the immovable property desire to find
employment opportunities in mining enterprises and to earn an income
or receive unrequited assistance and support from mine-based business
areas in addition to receiving compensation in case their property is
sold (Tanrivermis, 2018).
Under the influence of all these factors, this parameter has a (high)
degree of negative impact on mine investments has a (very high) po-
sitive impact on landowners. First, precedent and equivalent pricing
should be fair in the consideration of fair values for immovables pur-
chased for mining. Of course, the appraisal of the expropriation, ac-
cording to the Mining Law, is a critical issue for the private property
owner. However, if a certain portion of the income to be generated from
the exploitation of the mine reserve in the immovable subject to ex-
propriation is based on the valuation of the asset, this practice would be
wrong.
According to Article 168 that entered into force in the 1982 Turkish
Constitution and Article 4 of Mining Law No. 3213, mines are under the
rule of the state, namely, mines are in the public domain. Therefore,
mines in immovable property subject to private property are not related
to the ownership of the land. Landowners do not have the right to
benefit from the mines (Topaloglu, 2011).
However, as a result of expropriation, the rights of mining en-
terprises and landowners should be balanced (Gulan, 2008). In Turkey,
where the dominality system is adopted, the mines are under the rule
and disposition of the state and do not depend on the ownership of the
supply. In this respect, the owner of the immovable property cannot ask
for a share of the operating income because of the occurrence of the
mine on his/her immovable which he/she is not authorized to exploit.
However, because the mine is located on that immovable property, the
expropriation of the landowner’s property through expropriation cre-
ates a negative situation. For these reasons, Topaloglu argues that a
reasonable increase in the determination of the value of the immovable
will be an appropriate solution to the balance of interests by con-
sidering the asset in the immovable to be expropriated as an objective
value increasing factor. The approach of the Supreme Court in similar
cases in Turkey is also in this direction (Topaloglu, 2011).
5.3.2. Failure to reach an agreement with private owners
If no agreement can be reached with private property owners,
property owners may request hundreds of times the value of their land
from miners. Thus, the expropriation process takes a long time and is
unbearable.
For example, as in the 1st group of minerals, because the ex-
propriation cannot be made in the 2 (a) group of mines in accordance
with the legislation, an agreement is requested with the landowners.
Therefore, there is often disagreement with landowners. As explained, a
similar situation was experienced with the effect of the Olive Law. This
leads to the formation of operation areas according to private land
ownership conditions rather than a plan-project. In this case, private
property owners are paid more than their value to ensure optimum
operating conditions. This results in excessive increases in private
property costs. As a result, this issue has a (very high) negative impact
on mining investments but a (very high) positive impact on landowners.
6. Conclusion and recommendations
The research in the study demonstrates that the amounts paid for
expropriation to conduct mining operation activities in Turkey are a
10
Land Use Policy 97 (2020) 104784
large share of the MIA of mining enterprises. Expropriation costs in-
crease from the 2nd group to the 4th group minerals. This increase is
influenced by the degree of social and economic development of the
city in which mining is conducted (hence the increase in the fair value
of land in developed cities), and the change in the value of the mineral
groups. When moving from the 2nd group of minerals to the 4th group
minerals, the correlation coefficient between “the ratio of expropriation
costs to the MIA” and “the city coefficient” is low. As a reason for this is
that the number and quality of the expropriated private land—data
unknown—may be particularly effective. Nevertheless, the results show
a significant relationship change in these parameters. In particular,
excessive increases in private property costs occur as a result of the
failure to reach an agreement with private owners and paying private
owners more than their value (to ensure optimum mining operation
conditions).
In the event that no agreement can be made with the proprietor and
in the acquisition of land through expropriation, the experts determine
the value of the immovable property rather than learn the market value
of the land (contrary to the legislation), associate the objective value
increase with the mining activities, and determine very high prices
compared with the market conditions. Notably, the increase in ex-
propriation costs in precious mineral groups clearly reveals this situa-
tion.
As a result, legislation application regarding expropriation is one of
the most important reasons for the high expropriation costs forced on
the mining investor. The expropriation process takes a long time be-
cause of externalities created by the legislation. The expropriation
process is very long because of the implementation of the legislation.
Concerning land ownership in mining projects, first, the public-interest
decisions should be made according to objective criteria, and these
criteria should be predictable by the mining investor.
Because shortening the administrative and judicial stages or periods
of expropriation processes is critical for the realization of the mining
investments, it is appropriate to regulate the legislation accordingly.
The prolongation of the expropriation process increases the aforemen-
tioned average expropriation costs, and the cost of permissible delays
and other investment costs which cannot be easily calculated increase
the overall risk of mining investment.
For this reason, a maximum period of 6 months should be set for
expropriation if no agreement can be made with the private property
owner, considering the problems in the mining sector due to ex-
propriation. During this period, a Commission, including MAPEG,
should be established to complete the expropriation process.
The survey responses from the mining enterprises show that some
parameters are affecting the expropriation process, expropriation costs,
or both. Correcting the legislative problems of these and similar issues
may reduce the risks of mining investors operating in different mineral
groups to a certain extent and enable landowners and people of the
region to receive financial support and more qualified rights as the
mining investments take place.
Author statement
During the preparation and revisions of this article and finalizing it,
I have made all the study alone.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary material related to this article can be found, in the
online version, at doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2020.
104784.
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