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Caneva K.L. - Possible Kuhns in The History of Science Anomalies of Incommensurable Paradigms - 2000
Caneva K.L. - Possible Kuhns in The History of Science Anomalies of Incommensurable Paradigms - 2000
87–124, 2000
Pergamon 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved
Printed in Great Britain
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Kenneth L. Caneva*
The work of Thomas Kuhn in the history and philosophy of science has often
confronted even its sympathetic readers with a perplexing problem: To what extent
does that work constitute a unified whole? What is the relationship among its parts?
Insisting that he put his philosophy aside when doing history but that his historical
work nonetheless bore witness to his central philosophical concerns, Kuhn was
himself remarkably unenlightening when it came to answering such questions.2 A
dominant motif in Kuhn’s work suggests that this problem may be a matter of
perception, and that its solution may hinge upon the reader’s undergoing an appro-
* Department of History, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 219 McIver Building, P.O.
Box 26170 Greensboro, N.C. 27402-6170, U.S.A.
Received 14 April 1999; in revised form 4 August 1999.
1
An earlier version of this paper was presented at a symposium on ‘The Legacy of Thomas S. Kuhn’
at the Dibner Institute for the History of Science and Technology in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on 21
November 1997. Except as otherwise noted, all quotations are exactly as given in the original. Dates
of composition or presentation of Kuhn’s works, when that could be determined and when it was
different from the publication date, are given in square brackets before the date of publication. For
subsequently reprinted papers, the date in square brackets is either that of original composition or
presentation or that of original publication, when the former is unknown or is the same as the date of
original publication. An equals sign (=) joins texts that are identical but for possible insignificant vari-
ations in spelling or punctuation; an ‘approximately equals’ sign ( ⬇ ) joins texts that are basically the
same but with some differences in wording. I have used the handy German abbreviation ‘bzw.’ (for
beziehungsweise, meaning ‘or, as the case may be’) to join paired references following the immediately
preceding specification of their respective referents.
2
Kuhn (1980), p. 183; (1984), pp. 243, 245 ⫽ ([1984]1987), pp. 361, 363). In the latter essay he
asserted that his book on Planck and black-body theory ‘provides the most fully realized illustration
of the concept of history of science basic to my historical publications. The same conception underlies
my more philosophical writings—is, indeed what ties these apparently disparate aspects of my work
together’ (p. 231 bzw. 349, italics added). Unfortunately, he neglected to spell out just what that concep-
tion was, or how it underlay the totality of his work. Compare the judgement of Trevor Pinch: ‘Black-
Body Theory can be seen as the final stage of a process of retraction initiated by Kuhn in response to
some of the reactions which Structure produced’ ([Thackray] et al., 1979, p. 440).
PII: S0039-3681(99)00038-2
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88 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
priate gestalt shift with regard to the nature of the Kuhnian enterprise.3 Although
such transformations of perception are, if truly Kuhnian in nature, holistic events
not amenable to anatomization and discursive elaboration, and thus not available
to the would-be interpreter as a deployable method of analysis, Kuhn outlined an
approach to be followed in coming to terms with outdated scientific texts that can
serve as a model for this exercise in understanding. In a 1968 encyclopedia article
on the history of science he offered the following excellent advice for the practis-
ing historian:
Recognizing that scientists are often famous for results they did not intend, he should
ask what problems his subject worked at and how these became problems for him.
Recognizing that a historic discovery is rarely quite the one attributed to its author
in later textbooks (pedagogic goals inevitably transform a narrative), the historian
should ask what his subject thought he had discovered and what he took the basis of
that discovery to be. And in this process of reconstruction the historian should pay
particular attention to his subject’s apparent errors, not for their own sake but because
they reveal far more of the mind at work than do the passages in which a scientist
seems to record a result or an argument that modern science still retains.4
Taking these directives in roughly reverse order, my strategy in this paper, whose
goal is not just criticism but a deeper understanding of Kuhn’s historiography of
science, will be to isolate what appear to be anomalies and inconsistencies in his
work, to puzzle out what he thought he was doing, and to identify what the central
problems were for him in terms of which that work makes more coherent sense.5
In accord with Kuhn’s advice, my way of going at these issues was in the first
instance via a ‘deep and sympathetic immersion in the sources’.6 I have tried to
distinguish significant anomalies and inconsistencies in Kuhn’s work from the
much larger set of issues that might be problematic for this or that reader—say
with regard to the factual truth of some claim, the nature of its evidentiary base,
or the historical accuracy of the overall philosophical enterprise—although that
line can be hard to draw in practice. I agree with Kuhn that it is attention to
3
In Structure Kuhn used both ‘shift’ and ‘switch’—as both verbs and nouns, with ‘shift’ somewhat
more frequent than ‘switch’—to describe changes in perception ([1961a]1962, pp. 113–121 ⫽
[1969d]1970, pp. 114–122). He spoke of ‘gestalt switch’ (pp. 116, 119, 121 bzw. 117, 120, 122) but
of ‘paradigm shift’ (p. 118 bzw. 119). I have used what appears to be the more common form in general
use, gestalt shift.
4
Kuhn (1968a), pp. 76–77 ⫽ ([1968]1977), p. 110.
5
Although he did not make the issue the focus of his paper, Thomas Nickles noted four topics with
respect to which the Kuhn of Structure was fundamentally ambivalent: whether he advocated ‘the
method of belief’ or ‘the method of doubt’; whether an account of science should be theory-centered
or practice-centered; whether he wrote as an insider or outsider with respect to the scientific community;
and whether his account is whiggish or anti-whiggish (Nickles, 1998, pp. 55–56, 58, 61, 63). With one
exception, to be discussed below, Hoyningen-Huene (1993) did not thematize the issue of the anomalies,
tensions, and inconsistencies in Kuhn’s work. Perhaps because his purposes were essentially philosophi-
cal, he did not comment on tensions between the historical and philosophical aspects of Kuhn’s work.
6
Kuhn (1968a), p. 77 ⫽ ([1968]1977), p. 111. Shifts in Kuhn’s views over time and the silent
disappearance of once-prominent terms and issues create real problems for a diachronic assessment of
Kuhn’s work, since it is often hard to know whether, in a later work, he did or did not still hold to
the views advocated in earlier works.
Possible Kuhns in the History of Science 89
apparent incongruities that is most likely to bring enlightenment. I also agree with
the sentiment of an injunction Kuhn quoted from Bertrand Russell: ‘In studying a
philosopher, the right attitude is neither reverence nor contempt, but first a kind
of hypothetical sympathy, until it is possible to know what it feels like to believe
in his theories.’7
7
Kuhn ([1970a]1971), p. 290 ⫽ ([1970a]1977), p. 149, citing Bertrand Russell, A History of Western
Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), p. 39. His own maxim for students was: ‘[W]hen
reading the works of an important thinker, look first for the apparent absurdities in the text and ask
yourself how a sensible person could have written them’ (Kuhn, 1977a, p. xii ⬇ [1976a]1977, p. 34;
cf. 1990a, pp. 21–22). As Kuhn wrote of himself, ‘[p]robably the thing I do best and certainly the one
to which I have devoted most time is climbing from the writings into the minds of dead scientists,
figuring out how they thought, why they believed what they did, and how they came to change their
minds’ (Kuhn, 1983, p. 27). Yet he never really understood the thinking of his many critics. See Kuhn
([1969c]1970), p. 237, for his confessed inability to understand Lakatos’ pronouncements, and Kuhn
([1995]1997), p. 193 for his feeling that his critics treated him ‘as though I were a fool’ by attributing
to him beliefs no ‘respectable human being’ could hold.
8
Kuhn ([1956]1957), pp. 136, 138, 142 ⫽ ([1979]), pp. 137, 139, 143; cf. pp. vii, 1–2, 74–75, 144
bzw. 1–2, 75–76, 145.
9
Kuhn ([1956]1957), pp. 130, 131 ⫽ ([1979]), pp. 131, 132; cf. pp. vii, 123 bzw. vii, 124.
90 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
As near as I can make out, the book never adequately addressed, let alone resolved,
this apparent contradiction.10 It foreshadowed, I think, the widespread confusion
in the minds of many readers of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962)
over whether Kuhn’s view of the history of science was essentially internalist or
externalist. In an essay of 1972 on Joseph Ben-David’s sociology of science, Kuhn
described his own historiographical position as ‘close to’ internalist insofar as he,
too, believed that ‘the dominant forces shaping the development of scientific ideas
are internal to the community of scientists’.11 Yet later in the same essay he wrote
that ‘[b]oth ancient and Renaissance astronomy provide important examples of
ways in which social demands can affect—decisively if also deviously and unpre-
dictably—the direction in which scientific ideas develop and thus ultimately their
essential structural form.’12 How do these divergent claims go together?
An analogous ambiguity with respect to the proper level of historical expla-
nation—whether individual, collective, or contextual—was evident in Kuhn’s abun-
dantly insightful (if ultimately flawed) paper on ‘Energy Conservation as an
Example of Simultaneous Discovery’, read in 1957 and published in 1959. After
reviewing the case for his trio of favored factors (availability of conversion pro-
cesses, concern with engines, and Naturphilosophie) compared with the duo he
neglected (the impossibility of perpetual motion and the dynamical theory of heat)
he concluded his paper with the following diffident reflections:
That does not mean that these [three] factors explain either the individual or collective
discoveries of energy conservation. Many old discoveries and concepts were essential
to the work of all the pioneers; many new ones played significant roles in the work
of individuals. We have not and shall not reconstruct the causes of all that occurred.
But the three factors discussed above may still provide the fundamental constellation,
given the question from which we began: Why, in the years 1830 to 1850, did so
many of the experiments and concepts required for a full statement of energy conser-
vation lie so close to the surface of scientific consciousness?13
What is the relationship between general factors and those peculiar to certain indi-
viduals, and how does either function in an explanatory capacity? What, ultimately,
is being explained by what? Although Kuhn hinted that he intended to take this
preliminary study further, he never returned to the topic.14
As already noted, much confusion has surrounded the question of just what The
10
Kuhn later observed that ‘when it was written the book was the only one that attempted to portray,
within a single pair of covers, both the technical–astronomical and the wider intellectual–historical
dimensions of the revolution’ (Kuhn, [1970a]1971, p. 297 ⫽ [1970a]1977, p. 157), thereby failing to
note that the book had not actually integrated those disparate sets of factors. See the probing analysis
of this book and its relationship to Kuhn’s other work by Robert Westman (1994); here, especially pp.
85–88.
11
Kuhn (1972), p. 168.
12
Kuhn (1972), p. 171; cf. p. 173.
13
Kuhn ([1957]1959), pp. 340–341 ⫽ ([1957]1977), p. 104.
14
Kuhn ([1957]1959), pp. 322 [‘preliminary identification’], 323 [‘as yet’], 331 [‘Another paper will
be needed to document this conclusion’], 339 [‘... provide leads for further research. At the moment I
shall only...’], 339 [‘preliminary discussion’] ⫽ ([1957]1977), pp. 73, 84, 100, 101.
Possible Kuhns in the History of Science 91
Structure of Scientific Revolutions is about. Among other things, it’s about the
nature of normal science and its guiding paradigms; it’s about the dynamics of
scientific change—that is the ‘structure of scientific revolutions’; it’s about the
nature of the radical differences between successive paradigms; and much more.
Ultimately this diversity of possibilities, juxtaposed without necessarily being har-
monized, will have to be unpacked. Kuhn himself called attention to an aspect of
his presentation that he feared might strike some readers as a confusion of issues:
‘I may even seem to have violated the very influential contemporary distinction
between “the context of discovery” and “the context of justification”. Can anything
more than profound confusion be indicated by this admixture of diverse fields and
concerns?’15 Had Kuhn in fact addressed the ramifications of this issue more
explicitly he might have avoided some of the confusions and ambiguities in his
work.
For me personally, the most glaring apparent inconsistency in the book concerns
the problematic relationship between the individual and the community to which
he or she ostensibly belongs and the role each plays.16 Kuhn the metahistorian
repeatedly insisted, here and elsewhere, that it is the community and not the indi-
vidual that plays the central role in scientific change. It is shared paradigms, after
all, that allow the identification of the all-important anomalies. Yet Kuhn the his-
torian recognized that ‘Copernicus saw as counterinstances what most of Ptolemy’s
other successors had seen as puzzles in the match between observation and theory.
Lavoisier saw as a counterinstance what Priestley had seen as a successfully solved
puzzle in the articulation of the phlogiston theory. And Einstein saw as counterin-
stances what Lorentz, Fitzgerald, and others had seen as puzzles in the articulation
of Newton’s and Maxwell’s theories.’17 In other words, none of these revolution-
aries can be understood as a representative of a group. In his 1986 Nobel Sym-
posium address on ‘Possible Worlds in the History of Science’ Kuhn recounted
his own experience in encountering passages that made no apparent sense in the
writings of Aristotle, Newton, Volta, Bohr, and Planck.18 What is striking is not
only that all his examples are of individuals, but also that none of the anomalies
he perceived related to community meanings, but rather to the peculiarities of the
individual scientist. In any case, Kuhn did not himself establish any basis on which
one might assess the possibly shared character of any particular belief. The same
15
Kuhn ([1961a]1962), pp. 8–9 ⫽ Kuhn ([1969d]1970), pp. 8–9. These dual concerns were early
fused in Kuhn’s conception of his enterprise. In an ‘Intellectual Biography’ dated 22 October 1953—
part of his successful application for a Guggenheim Fellowship—Kuhn wrote that for the previous five
years he had been ‘princi[p]ally concerned, as teacher and scholar, with the procedures by which fruitful
scientific concepts are devised by the innovator and accredited by the profession’ (quoted in Huf-
bauer, 1998).
16
See the earlier development of this theme in Caneva (1998). Hoyningen-Huene (1993, pp. 150–
154, 239–251) discussed the issue without identifying any deep explanatory anomalies, perhaps because
he’d concluded that ‘in the Kuhnian framework the principal agent in science, its subject, is not the
individual but the group’ (Hoyningen-Huene, 1992, p. 495).
17
Kuhn ([1961a]1962), pp. 79–80 ⫽ ([1969d]1970), pp. 79–80.
18
Kuhn ([1986a]1989), pp. 9–10 ⫽ Kuhn ([1986b]1990), p. 299.
92 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
pattern obtained both in his and John Heilbron’s 1969 study of ‘The Genesis of the
Bohr Atom’ and in his 1978 book on Black-Body Theory, each of them otherwise a
wonderful exemplar of fine-grained historical reconstruction: a lack of any attempt
to establish community meanings—or even the existence and extent of any parti-
cular community of researchers—alongside repeated acknowledgement (especially
in the latter work) of the idiosyncrasies of the principal scientists, of the lack of
consensus on key issues.19
Although in 1969 Kuhn was already insisting that ‘[i]f the term “paradigm” is
to be successfully explicated, scientific communities must first be recognized as
having an independent existence’, that ‘[s]cientific communities can and should be
isolated without prior recourse to paradigms; the latter can then be discovered by
scrutinizing the behavior of a given community’s members’, he himself never actu-
ally identified a real-life exemplar of an historically attested scientific community.20
Similarly, in what must surely be one of the great anomalies of omission in Kuhn’s
work, although Structure outlined a paradigm for doing the history of science, he
himself never provided a completely worked out historical exemplar of what Kuhn-
ian history of science would look like in full dress rehearsal. Ironically, he evidently
believed that he could teach by precept rather than by example. Especially in the
philosophical works of his later years Kuhn scarcely attempted to ground—or even
to exemplify—his general claims in significant historical particulars. Somewhat
earlier, in his 1980 review of Method and Appraisal in the Physical Sciences, he
complained that most of the papers in it ‘seldom present or even seek evidence of
what actually attracted scientists to or repelled them from the various research
19
Kuhn and Heilbron (1969a), pp. 212, 217; Kuhn ([1977b]1978), pp. 21 [‘only Boltzmann attempted
to develop a statistical theory of entropy’]; 23 [‘his [Planck’s] own by no means typical attitude towards
the second law’]; 26 [‘No one but Planck had taken such a position [with regard to making irreversibility
the core of the second law]’]; 38 [‘Until the end of the nineteenth century... only Boltzmann devoted
significant attention to a kinetic theory of irreversibility’]; 71 [‘To the best of my present knowledge,
Bryan’s outline of it [i.e., Boltzmann’s resort to probability calculus in 1877] in his 1894 report to the
British Association is the only published discussion of this aspect of Boltzmann’s work before Planck
took it up in December 1900’]; 98 [‘Planck, who must have discovered the combinatorial definition
[of entropy] in Sections 6 and 8 of Boltzmann’s Gas Theory, appears to have been the first man other
than its author to acknowledge even its existence’; cf. p. 100]; 112 [‘Ernest Rutherford... is the only
scientist known to have been drawn to “the general idea of a quantum of action” by the special accuracy
of Planck’s computations’]; 114 [‘reactions [to Planck’s derivation papers] from others were rare’];
143–144 [‘Though Einstein and Ehrenfest doubtless helped here and there to prepare the way for a
new attitude towards the significance of Planck’s work, only Max von Laue... appears to have found
their analysis of Planck’s theory convincing from the start’; cf. p. 188]; 182 [‘for the entire period
between their introduction in 1905 and the discovery of the Compton effect in 1922, very few theoretical
physicists besides Einstein himself believed that light-particles provided a basis for serious research’;
cf. p. 187].
20
Kuhn ([1969b]1974), p. 460 ⫽ ([1969b]1977), p. 295; ([1969e]1970), p. 176; cf. ([1969c]1970),
p. 252; 1977a, p. xvi ⬇ ([1976a]1977), p. 38. One reasonably well worked out attempt to identify a
coherent group of scientists and to associate with its representatives a distinctive style of science—
albeit not in the simple fashion Kuhn proposed here—was the dissertation I completed under Kuhn’s
direction in 1974. In an early draft I had referred to the ‘concretizing science’ and ‘abstracting science’
of my two generations of German researchers as ‘paradigms’. Kuhn objected, however, that, as his
student, people might wrongly impute my [mis]understandings to him, and I dropped the term. See
Caneva (1974) and its reworking as Caneva (1978).
Possible Kuhns in the History of Science 93
programmes under study’.21 This is fair enough, but his further charge could, with
only slight modification, as well be entered against his own work: ‘Historically
meticulous when dealing with the nature and development of scientific ideas, they
substitute philosophical analysis for historical investigation when discussing why
and how those ideas appealed.’22 For example, his various treatments of Newtonian
mechanics from ‘Second Thoughts’ and ‘Postscript’ to ‘Possible Worlds’ made
no use of historical texts or examples but were based solely on his own rational
reconstruction of meanings without history even in the footnotes.23 What did Kuhn
believe such dehistoricized philosophy of science was good for?
By the 1970s Kuhn had turned increasingly to languages and problems of trans-
lation as the favored analogs to paradigms and problems of interparadigm incom-
mensurability. In the preface to The Essential Tension of 1977 he wrote that ‘[p]ro-
ponents of different theories (or different paradigms, in the broader sense of the
term) speak different languages—languages expressing different cognitive commit-
ments, suitable for different worlds. Their abilities to grasp each other’s viewpoints
are therefore inevitably limited by the imperfections of the processes of translation
and of reference determination.’24 Yet his own epochal experience with (finally)
understanding Aristotle had forcefully shown him that understanding an outdated
paradigm—an alien scientific language—is entirely possible without translation.
Similarly, the incommensurability of the referents of phlogiston and oxygen theory
did not stand in the way of Priestley’s and Lavoisier’s ability to understand each
other’s views. Why did Kuhn not see this? Or, if he saw it, why did it not make
any difference?
An incongruity with ultimately profound significance for the understanding of
Kuhn’s enterprise is the uneasy coexistence of his conception of discovery as an
extended process with a complex internal structure alongside his conception of the
gestalt shift as a sudden, unstructured, holistic event.25 As he wrote in Structure,
‘[crises] are terminated... by a relatively sudden and unstructured event like the
ges[t]alt switch’.26 Although Kuhn never explicated the precise relationship
between discoveries and gestalt shifts, clearly both are for him somehow closely
implicated in the process by which a scientific revolution is achieved. Indeed, the
year before the publication of Structure he presented a piece of his larger research
project as the ‘Historical Structure of Scientific Discovery’.27 His examination of
the issues surrounding the question of the discovery of oxygen, an essential aspect
of Lavoisier’s chemical revolution, was a crucial episode in the formation of his
21
Kuhn (1980), p. 188.
22
Kuhn (1980), p. 188.
23
Kuhn ([1969b]1974), pp. 464–465 ⫽ ([1969b]1977), pp. 298–300; ([1969e]1970), pp. 188–189;
([1986a]1989), pp. 14–15 ⬇ ([1986b]1990), pp. 301–302.
24
Kuhn (1977a), pp. xxii–xxiii ⬇ ([1976a]1977), p. 45.
25
For the former see Kuhn ([1961c]1962) and 1984, pp. 244–252 ⫽ ([1984]1987), pp. 362–370.
26
Kuhn ([1961a]1962), p. 121 ⫽ ([1969d]1970), p. 122.
27
Kuhn ([1961c]1962) ⫽ ([1961c]1977).
94 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
28
Kuhn (1984), p. 251 ⫽ ([1984]1987), p. 369.
29
Kuhn (1981), p. 23 ⫽ ([1981]1987), p. 19. Kuhn’s argument sounds curiously like an idealist’s
rejection of the possibility of species transformation.
30
Kuhn ([1982]1983), p. 715.
31
Kuhn (1981), pp. 11–15 ⫽ ([1981]1987), pp. 12–14.
Possible Kuhns in the History of Science 95
32
Kuhn ([1989]1991), pp. 23–24.
33
Kuhn ([1956]1957), pp. 200–209 and 188 [quote], respectively ⫽ ([1979]), pp. 200–209 and 188.
34
Kuhn ([1956]1957), pp. 118, 121 ⫽ ([1979]), pp. 119, 122.
35
Hoyningen-Huene said that Kuhn saw the development of science as a more continuous process
than did the older historiography of science, and argued that in his later work Kuhn presented scientific
revolutions as ‘gradual to a much greater degree than the gestalt switch metaphor suggests’ (Hoyningen-
Huene, 1993, pp. 22, 205). Leaving unaddressed the question of how this historical gradualism chimes
with the incommensurability that played an ever greater role in Kuhn’s philosophy of science, Hoyn-
ingen-Huene noted that, although Kuhn himself expressed dissatisfaction with his treatment of the conti-
nuities persisting through revolutions, ‘he didn’t analyze them in any depth’ (ibid., p. 222).
96 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
36
Kuhn ([1986a]1989), p. 50.
37
Kuhn ([1986a]1989), pp. 50–51 [quotes on p. 51]. Note that Miller himself never spoke in terms
of ‘community.’ Some years before, Kuhn paraphrased Lakatos as saying that ‘[r]ecourse to external
history is often needed if one is to explain, for example, why a particular development occurred when
and as it did or how a particular group of scientists could fail to recognize an apparent implication of
their position’ (Kuhn, 1980, p. 181). Lakatos himself, however, had not spoken in terms of groups.
38
Kuhn ([1991]1992), p. 19. Cf., from his last-but-one published work: ‘[T]he topic that dominates
my project [is] incommensurability and the nature of the conceptual divide between the developmental
stages separated by what I once called “scientific revolutions”. My own encounter with incommensura-
bility was the first step on the road to Structure, and the notion still seems to me the central innovation
introduced by the book.... Efforts to understand and refine it have been my primary and increasingly
obsessive concern for thirty years’ (Kuhn, [1992a]1993, pp. 314–315).
39
Kuhn ([1968b]1977), p. 5. Cf. Kuhn ([1992a]1993), p. 320: ‘The fundamental product of historical
research is narratives of development over time’.
40
Kuhn ([1968b]1977), pp. 14, 18.
Possible Kuhns in the History of Science 97
practice.41 Although the burden of Kuhn’s argument was about the near impossi-
bility of doing history and philosophy of science simultaneously, he asserted, with-
out substantive elaboration, that ‘there are also great difficulties about practicing
them alternately,’ that ‘each switch is a personal wrench’.42 It’s not that there’s
anything wrong with any of this; it’s just that Kuhn didn’t exploit the occasion to
explain the relationship between his own historical and philosophical studies of
science—another anomalous omission, it seems to me, especially since Kuhn didn’t
here plead his usual lack of time or space. Nonetheless it does appear that, in the
event, Kuhn the philosopher of science wished to free the understanding of scien-
tific knowledge from dependence on the multifarious particulars that ground an
historical accounting.
Kuhn’s only elaborated consideration of the issue of doing history with philo-
sophical expectations came in his long review of Method and Appraisal in the
Physical Sciences, a book which contained a number of historical studies designed
to exhibit the applicability of Lakatos’ methodology of research programs. That
aim prompted the following reply:
As a motive for doing history that one seems to me a likely invitation to disaster.
Dangers arise partly from the nature of historical research, partly from the way Lak-
atos suggests doing it. In both history and the sciences the selection and interpretation
of sources of data are influenced by prior expectations, but in neither field does ‘to
influence’ imply ‘to determine’ or ‘to dictate’. Data can, and must be permitted to,
react back on expectations, make trouble for them, play a role in their transformation.
That mechanism is essential to the evolution of ideas in both fields, which are to that
extent methodologically similar.
The mechanism operates differently in science and history, however, and the result
is a decisive divergence in their optimal research strategies. For the sciences expec-
tations are ordinarily quite precise.... In history, on the other hand, expectations are
far less precise, and there is correspondingly less agreement than in science about
whether expectations ‘fit the facts’ and about the sorts of data relevant to their evalu-
ation. If prior expectations are not merely unreasonable, the historian committed to
them can usually make a case without consciously forcing the data. Accordingly, the
historian is usually well-advised to set expectations aside before beginning research...
That advice is, of course, a council of perfection: no one can entirely set aside
thought patterns induced by prior experience and training; such patterns do influence
research, which in any case could scarcely begin without them. But it is nonetheless
essential that the attempt to unlearn them be made. The historian’s problem is not
simply that the facts do not speak for themselves but that, unlike the scientist’s data,
they speak exceedingly softly. Quiet is required if they are to be heard at all. That
is a principal reason why I have myself resisted attempts to amalgamate history and
philosophy of science though simultaneously urging increased interaction between the
two. History done for the sake of philosophy is often scarcely history at all.43
41
In a retrospective account, Kuhn said that what he and his (unnamed) ‘fellow innovators’ ‘mostly
thought we were doing as we turned to history was building a philosophy of science on observations
of scientific life, the historical record providing our data’ (Kuhn, [1991]1992, p. 4).
42
Kuhn ([1968b]1977), p. 5.
43
Kuhn (1980), pp. 182–183. See his further comments in Kuhn ([1995]1997), pp. 192–193.
98 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
44
Kuhn (1980), p. 185.
45
Kuhn (1980), p. 185.
46
Kuhn (1980), p. 188.
47
Kuhn (1980), p. 188.
48
Kuhn (1980), p. 188.
49
For Kuhn’s de-emphasis of the empirical aspects of his enterprise, see Kuhn ([1990b]1991), p. 6;
([1991]1992]), pp. 10, 14–15.
Possible Kuhns in the History of Science 99
Taken by themselves, these specific claims are eminently defensible. But taken
against the grander expectations of Kuhn’s historiography of science, they fail.
There was no general crisis; his examples of incommensurability seem rather
strained, a modest base on which to erect so grand a conclusion, such incommen-
surability as there was being limited in any event to one or a few people; and
pace Kuhn, bona-fide Kuhnian paradigms must be generally shared examples. The
localized applicability of Kuhnian concepts as suggestive aperçus is not the same
thing as the demonstrated applicability of ‘the developmental schema that Structure
provides’.51 Nor did Kuhn here, or elsewhere, see how to use such a fine-grained
analysis of conceptual change in science as a way of getting at what was otherwise
one of his chief concerns: the ways in which scientific knowledge is necessarily
a communal product. Perhaps such analyses, precisely because of the small-step
50
Kuhn (1984), p. 245 ⫽ ([1984]1987), p. 363. Kuhn’s footnote 2 refers the reader to Kuhn (1980).
In a later interview Kuhn backed away from even this modest claim concerning the congruence between
expectations drawn from the general philosophical schema and historical particulars: ‘I never thought
that Structure was more than a highly schematic sketch. I did not expect any direct lessons [from the
quantum physics project]. I’ve always said, assimilate this point of view and this way of doing it, and
then see what it does for you when you try to write a history, but don’t go out looking at history to
see whether this is true or false, to test the ideas. The only test of the ideas, at least at this level of
development, is going to be whether having assimilated those ideas, you see the material usefully
different. But it’s not going to be “Can you always locate the paradigm, can you always tell the differ-
ence between a revolution and a normal development?” It’s not meant to be applied that way’ (Kuhn,
1990a, p. 23). Again in 1995 he insisted that one cannot ‘apply a point of view that... is as schematic’
as that of Structure (Kuhn, [1995]1997, p. 192). With that, Kuhn effectively freed his analysis of science
from too-ready empirical disconfirmation.
51
It’s not clear how much of that developmental schema Kuhn was willing to give up and still claim
victory. In the 1969 postscript to Structure he reported that ‘[a] number of [—typically unnamed—]
critics have doubted whether crisis, the common awareness that something has gone wrong, precedes
revolutions so invariably as I have implied in my original text. Nothing important to my argument
depends, however, on crises’ being an absolute prerequisite to revolutions... [C]rises need not be gener-
ated by the work of the community that experiences them and that sometimes undergoes revolution as
a result’ (Kuhn, [1969e]1970, p. 181).
100 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
52
‘[M]y attempt to come to terms with Aristotle’s texts determined my future life’; ‘[W]hat I’d
encountered in reading Aristotle was my first example of what I later called scientific revoutions’ (Kuhn,
[1992b]1995, pp. 104, 106). Reporting on his interview with Kuhn, John Horgan recorded that ‘Kuhn...
traces his view of science to a single “Eureka!” moment in 1947’ (Horgan, 1991, p. 40).
53
Kuhn (1977a), pp. xi–xiii ⬇ ([1976a]1977), pp. 32–33, provides a few other details (quote on p.
xi bzw. 33) and a description of its significance: ‘What my reading of Aristotle seemed... to disclose
was a global sort of change in the way men viewed nature and applied language to it, one that could
not properly be described as constituted by additions to knowledge or by the mere piecemeal correction
of mistakes. That sort of change was shortly to be described by Herbert Butterfield as “putting on a
different kind of thinking-cap”, and puzzlement about it quickly led me to books on Gestalt psychology
and related fields. While discovering history, I had discovered my first scientific revolution, and my
subsequent search for best readings has often been a search for other episodes of the same sort’ (p.
xiii bzw. 35).
54
Kuhn (1981), pp. 5–6 ⫽ ([1981]1987), p. 9. Cf. Kuhn ([1982]1983), p. 715: ‘The concept of a
scientific revolution originated in the discovery that to understand any part of the science of the past
the historian must first learn the language in which that past was written. Attempts at translation into
a later language are bound to fail, and the language-learning process is therefore interpretive and her-
meneutic. Since success in interpretation is generally achieved in large chunks (“breaking into the
hermeneutic circle”), the historian’s discovery of the past repeatedly involves the sudden recognition
of new patterns or gestalts. It follows that the historian, at least, does experience revolutions.’ He
repeatedly likened the historian’s experience to the gestalt shift associated with revolutionary science:
‘My way of using concepts like revolution and gestalt switch was drawn from and continues appropri-
Possible Kuhns in the History of Science 101
It is thus clear that Kuhn projected onto the historical development of science his
own profound personal experience of suddenly understanding a foreign text, which
left him convinced that revolutionary change in science must also be ‘sudden and
unstructured’, that here, at least, phylogeny recapitulates ontogeny: ‘The route I
travelled backwards with the aid of written texts was, I shall simply assert, nearly
enough the same one that earlier scientists had travelled forward with no text but
nature to guide them.’55 The pivotal concept of incommensurability, later to be
glossed in terms of a linguistic analogy, was born in this experience: ‘Incommen-
surability is a notion that for me emerged from attempts to understand apparently
nonsensical passages encountered in old scientific texts.’56 And perhaps it is not
far-fetched to suggest that his image of normal science as (largely quantitative)
puzzle-solving derived principally from his own experience as a physics graduate
student, just as his conviction that a mature science rests on a firm consensus may
reflect the fact that the physics he knew was in the main unproblematically accepted
by the physicists he knew. In certain pivotal ways, Kuhn’s historiography of science
was Kuhn writ large.57 Ultimately the question is whether an adequate understand-
ately to represent what historians must often go through to recapture the thought of a past generation
of scientists’, amounting to ‘a close parallelism between an historiographic and an epistemological
position’ (Kuhn, 1984, p. 246 ⫽ [1984]1987, p. 364).
55
Kuhn (1981), pp. 3–4 ⫽ ([1981]1987), p. 8. Kuhn eventually saw the connection between his
personal experience and his conception of the nature of scientific change. From the vantage point of
1986 he wrote (Kuhn, [1986a]1989, pp. 49–50):
In recent years I have increasingly recognized that my conception of the process by which
scientists move forward has been too closely modelled on my experience with the process by
which historians move into the past. For the historian, the period of wrestling with nonsense
passages in out-of-date texts is ordinarily marked by episodes in which the sudden recovery of
a long-forgotten way to use some still-familiar terms brings new understanding and coherence.
In the sciences, similar ‘aha-experiences’ mark the periods of frustration and puzzlement that
ordinarily precede fundamental innovation and that often precede the understanding of inno-
vation as well. The testimony of scientists to such experiences, together with my own experience
as an historian, was the basis for my repeated reference to gestalt switches, conversion experi-
ences, and the like. In many of the places in which such phrases appeared, their use was literal
or very nearly so, and in those places I would use them again, though perhaps with more care
for rhetorical overtones.
In other places, however, a special characteristic of scientific development led me to use such
terms metaphorically, often without quite recognizing the difference in use. The sciences are
unique among creative desciplines [sic] in the extent to which they cut themselves off from
their past, substituting for it a systematic reconstruction.... When reconceptualization occurs in
a scientific field, displaced concepts rapidly vanish from professional view. Later practitioners
reconstruct their predecessors’ work in the conceptual vocabulary they use themselves, a vocabu-
lary incapable of representing what those predecessors actually did. Such reconstruction is a
precondition for the cumulative image of scientific development familiar from science textbooks,
but it badly misrepresents the past. No wonder that the historian, breaking through to that past,
experiences the breakthrough as a gestalt switch.
56
Kuhn ([1990b]1991), p. 4. ‘The wrenching experience of entering into an older mode of thought is
the source of my references to gestalt switches and revolutions; difficulties in translating the discoverer’s
language into our own are what led me to write also of incommensurability’ (Kuhn, 1984, p. 245 ⫽
[1984]1987, p. 363).
57
John Heilbron (1993, pp. 111–112) has called attention to autobiographical aspects of Kuhn’s work:
‘His persuasiveness derives from a powerful dialectic often made more powerful still by a resonance
between his personal experiences and his historiographical ideas.... The autobiographical resonance is
102 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
ing of a person’s writings can be derived solely from an analysis of the ideas
contained in them, or whether clarifying insights might not also be derived from
the particularities of that person’s concerns and personal history. For an historian,
the answer to that question is obvious. Understanding, not evaluation, is what’s at
issue here.
In 1992, in another recounting of his 1947 encounter with Aristotle, Kuhn lik-
ened that experience to others he subsequently had with Boyle, Newton, Carnot,
Maxwell, Bohr, and Planck, ‘all [of which] had the same general character’:
First comes the discovery of anomalous passages, passages that make no sense, at
least not if written by a respectable author. Then the realization that the fault is the
reader’s, that the text is written in a vocabulary that is here and there foreign and
that must be recovered in order to make the text make sense. And, finally, comes the
discovery of a vocabulary which removes the anomalies and permits a new and plaus-
ible way of reading, a way of reading which, however, changes also the nature of
the problems on which one supposes the author of the text was at work.58
From here, clearly, comes the abiding concern with language and incommensura-
bility. Kuhn’s further gloss on his experiences sought to ground in them both the
historical and the philosophical aspects of his work:
Both as a historian and as a philosopher of science, experiences of that sort have
been central to my career. Most of my historical work has begun with the discovery
of passages that seem not to make sense, passages which for me have provided clues
to especially significant changes in the way a group of scientists looks at the world.
Most of my philosophical work has been directed in one way or another to the attempt
to understand experiences like these and to show how they fit with notions like the
objectivity and the progressive nature of science.59
Kuhn thus claimed at least genetic relatedness for his twin enterprises, though to
me they seem at best fraternal twins, separated at birth and nurtured in radically
different environments.
perhaps clearest in the story of Kuhn’s discovery that Aristotle’s physics was not bad modern science
but good old philosophy. The involvement of self while retaining respect for the historical actor, the
technique of scrutinizing texts not for what sounds familiar but for what seems bizarre, and the reliance
on a clear and simple schema as a first approximation to a historical reconstruction were lessons of
great value.’
58
Kuhn ([1992b]1995), p. 106 [both quotes].
59
Kuhn ([1992b]1995), p. 106.
Possible Kuhns in the History of Science 103
dichotomies do not simply map the same terrain from different perspectives, there
is enough analogical coherence among them that their correspondences stand out
unambiguously. Most globally, there appears to be a radical non-intersection
between the historical and philosophical aspects of Kuhn’s work that verges on
incommensurability: different goals, different questions, different kinds of evi-
dence, different audiences.60 That incommensurability, however, is often largely
analytical; in practice those different aspects were not always distributed cleanly
or clearly among separate works, nor were they adequately distinguished within
individual works. Grosso modo, the contrasting alternatives of the other dichot-
omies also belong to the two inadequately distinguished yet somehow distinct
worlds of discourse pertaining respectively to history and philosophy: context of
discovery versus context of justification; continuity versus discontinuity; the pro-
cess of discovery versus the symbolism of the gestalt shift; the individual versus
the scientific community; concern with the history of science versus the nature of
science, with the particular versus the general. Although these issues coexist uneas-
ily in much of Kuhn’s work, their complex interpenetration not easily to be undone,
I believe that their analytic separation will at least render understandable many of
the outstanding problems and unresolved tensions in that work.61 Most importantly,
this analysis will enable us to specify the various unreconciled concerns, the funda-
mentally different problems and issues, that motivated his intensely pursued pre-
occupations. The conceptual unity that escapes us in Kuhn’s work can perhaps
thus be discovered in his personal trajectory.
60
The categories here are, to be sure, poorly defined. In The Essential Tension, for example, he
distinguished between his ‘historical’ work—which he excluded from the volume—and the ‘historiogra-
phic’ and ‘metahistorical’ studies comprising the volume’s two sections (Kuhn, 1977a, pp. x and vii).
Elsewhere he more regularly distinguished between his ‘historical’ and ‘philosophical’ works.
61
John Schuster’s analysis of explanatory tensions and unexploited leads in Kuhn’s work identified
a closely cognate set of issues: ‘It seems to me that The essential tension unintentionally reveals two
different but related sets of themes in Kuhn’s work. The major set comprises the grand and well debated
theses of SSR: normal/revolutionary science, disciplinary matrices, Gestalt shifts, conversion without
real choice. The minor set consists of more disparate heuristic and metahistorical insights, sometimes
implicit and sometimes explicit in these essays, but always sitting uneasily with the major themes and
yet sometimes confused with them. Minor themes include (1) the doctrine of “significant discovery”
and complex feed-back, which cuts across the normal/revolutionary science dichotomy; (2) the view
of theory choice, and of normal science, which stresses the role of the actor as a skilled interpreter and
negotiator; (3) a sketched theory of conceptual alterations which avoids recourse to the metaphor of
dramatic, ineffable Gestalt switches; and (4) a whisper of a thesis that a fully historicized paradigm
concept demands an account of the social processes of production, maintenance, negotiation and
enforcement of the (continually alterable) elements of the disciplinary matrix. The metahistorical studies
show how Kuhn at various times stumbled upon these themes and turned away from them toward the
major themes of SSR’ (Schuster, 1979, pp. 308–309).
104 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
62
Kuhn (1959a), p. 169 ⬇ ([1959a]1963), pp. 347–348 ⫽ ([1959a]1977), p. 232.
63
Kuhn (1959a), p. 163 ⫽ ([1959a]1963), pp. 342, 343 ⫽ ([1959a]1977), p. 227.
64
Kuhn (1959a), p. 164 ⬇ ([1959a]1963), p. 343 ⫽ ([1959a]1977), p. 227. In 1961 he identified
scientists’ ‘acquired tension’ as ‘partly within the individual and partly within the community’ (Kuhn,
[1961b]1963, pp. 368–369).
65
Kuhn ([1959b]1961a), p. 182 ⫽ ([1959b]1961b), p. 52 ⫽ ([1959b]1977), p. 208.
Possible Kuhns in the History of Science 105
explained ‘the function of dogma in scientific research’ in 1961, this shift in per-
spective appears to have been firmly in place: ‘Preconception and resistance [to
innovation] seem the rule rather than the exception in mature scientific develop-
ment. Furthermore, under normal circumstances they characterize the very best and
most creative research as well as the more routine. Nor can there be much question
where they come from. Rather than being characteristics of the aberrant individual,
they are community characteristics with deep roots in the procedures through which
scientists are trained for work in their profession. Strongly held convictions that
are prior to research often seem to be a precondition for success in the sciences.’66
Writing of scientific education in Structure, Kuhn asserted that ‘the loss due to
rigidity accrues only to the individual. Given a generation in which to effect the
change, individual rigidity is compatible with a community that can switch from
paradigm to paradigm when the occasion demands’.67 The provisional answer he
proposed in 1959 to the anomaly-induced question of how scientific progress
rhymes with the de facto conservatism of much scientific work was ‘because no
other sort of work is nearly so well suited to isolate for continuing and concentrated
attention those loci of trouble or a crisis upon whose recognition the most funda-
mental advances in basic science depend’.68 The isolation of what Kuhn was
already calling ‘anomalies’ in that early paper was, in Structure, to become the
well known engine of progress-by-revolution.
In Structure, whose first draft Kuhn reported completing early in 1961, he
addressed the question of how ‘conversion’ to a new paradigm takes place. His
answer reveals the way in which shifting attention from the individual scientist to
the scientific community absolved him of the thorny responsibility of explaining
any particular conversion in favor of being able to explain how conversion in
general takes place:
Individual scientists embrace a new paradigm for all sorts of reasons and usually for
several at once. Some of these reasons—for example, the sun worship that helped
make Kepler a Copernican—lie outside the apparent sphere of science entirely. Others
must depend upon idiosyncrasies of autobiography and personality. Even the national-
ity or the prior reputation of the innovator and his teachers can sometimes play a
significant role. Ultimately, therefore, we must learn to ask this question [of how
conversion is induced] differently. Our concern will not then be with the arguments
that in fact convert one or another individual, but rather with the sort of community
that always sooner or later re-forms as a single group.69
66
Kuhn ([1961b]1963), pp. 348–349. On the explanatory centrality of the scientific community, see
also his remarks to commentators on pp. 392 and 394–395.
67
Kuhn ([1961a]1962), p. 165 ⫽ ([1969d]1970), p. 166.
68
Kuhn (1959a), p. 170 ⬇ ([1959a]1963), p. 349 [which has ‘causes of crisis’ instead of ‘a crisis’]
⫽ ([1959a]1977), p. 234.
69
Kuhn ([1961a]1962), pp. 151–152 ⫽ ([1969d]1970), pp. 152–153. This loss of historical particu-
larity as one shifts the locus of change from the individual to the group nicely parallels the loss of
‘career line’ Kuhn identified as accompanying the shift of attention from particular named individuals
to generalized and abstract ‘natural kinds’ in dealing with the problem of reference: ‘When one makes
106 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
It is clear that for Kuhn an understanding of the nature and function of the scientific
community solved pressing problems with regard to the progressiveness of science
and the special character of scientific knowledge, problems that had concerned him
from the outset of his career:
In the process [of scientific revolution] the community will sustain losses. Often some
old problems must be banished. Frequently, in addition, revolution narrows the scope
of the community’s professional concerns, increases the extent of its specialization,
and attenuates its communication with other groups, both scientific and lay.... Yet
despite these and other losses to the individual communities, the nature of such com-
munities provides a virtual guarantee that both the list of problems solved by science
and the precision of individual problem-solutions will grow and grow. At least, the
nature of the community provides such a guarantee if there is any way at all in which
it can be provided. What better criterion than the decision of the scientific group
could there be?70
Like many readers coming from the history of science—the field with which Kuhn
often identified himself71—it took me a long time to appreciate just how radical
Kuhn-the-philosopher’s surrendering of responsibility was for the explanation of
the actual course of historical change in science.
Kuhn reiterated these themes throughout the 1960s in a series of papers
responding to his critics and restating his explanatory goals. As he put it in ‘Second
Thoughts on Paradigms’, originally presented in March 1969, his central problem
was ‘[t]o understand how a scientific community functions as a producer and valid-
ator of sound knowledge’.72 Later that year, in ‘Reflections on My Critics’, he
characterized his goals as ‘an understanding of science, of the reasons for its special
efficacy, of the cognitive status of its theories’ and ‘an explanation for science’s
the transition from proper names to the names of natural kinds, one loses access to the career line or
lifeline which, in the case of proper names, enables one to check the correctness of different applications
of the same term. The individuals which constitute natural families do have lifelines, but the natural
family itself does not’ (Kuhn, [1977c]1979, p. 411 ⫽ [1977c]1993, p. 535).
70
Kuhn ([1961a]1962), p. 169 ⫽ ([1969d]1970), p. 170. In a paper delivered in 1973 Kuhn revisited
passages in Structure that argued that a scientist’s decision to accept a particular theory or paradigm
is not a matter of proof but of persuasion: ‘Statements of that sort obviously raise the question of why,
in the absence of binding criteria for scientific choice, both the number of solved scientific problems
and the precision of individual problem solutions should increase so markedly with the passage of time.
Confronting that issue, I sketched in my closing chapter a number of characteristics that scientists share
by virtue of the training which licenses their membership in one or another community of specialists.
In the absence of criteria able to dictate the choice of each individual, I argued, we do well to trust
the collective judgment of scientists trained in this way. “What better criterion could there be”, I asked
rhetorically, “than the decision of the scientific group?”’ (Kuhn, [1973]1977, pp. 320–321).
71
In a 1968 talk on ‘The Relations between the History and the Philosophy of Science’ he said ‘I
stand before you as a practicing historian of science’, though he allowed as how ‘my deepest interests
remained philosophical’ (Kuhn, [1968b]1977, pp. 3, 4). In an article published in 1971 on ‘The Relations
between History and History of Science’ he referred to the history of science as ‘my own profession’
(Kuhn, [1970a]1971, p. 291 ⫽ [1970a]1977, p. 150). In a 1975 presentation to an audience of logicians
and philosophers he spoke ‘[a]s an historian’ (Kuhn, [1975]1976, p. 180 ⫽ [1975]1977, p. 290). In
1990 he called his enterprise ‘historical philosophy of science’ (Kuhn, [1990b]1991, p. 6).
72
Kuhn ([1969b]1974), p. 463 ⫽ ([1969b]1977), p. 298.
Possible Kuhns in the History of Science 107
In 1964 Kuhn wrote that ‘the new understanding produced by thought experi-
ments is not an understanding of nature but rather of the scientist’s conceptual
apparatus’.75 That insight can be applied to the audacious thought experiment Kuhn
proposed in 1969 by which communities were made the locus of epistemological
decision-making:
Some of the principles deployed in my explanation of science are irreducibly socio-
logical, at least at this time. In particular, confronted with the problem of theory-
choice, the structure of my response runs roughly as follows: take a group of the
ablest available people with the most appropriate motivation; train them in some
science and in the specialties relevant to the choice at hand; imbue them with the
value system, the ideology, current in their discipline (and to a great extent in other
scientific fields as well); and, finally, let them make the choice. If that technique does
not account for scientific development as we know it, then no other will. There can
be no set of rules of choice adequate to dictate desired individual behaviour in the
concrete cases that scientists will meet in the course of their careers. Whatever scien-
tific progress may be, we must account for it by examining the nature of the scientific
group, discovering what it values, what it tolerates, and what it disdains.76
What Kuhn was after were general explanations of the general conditions for scien-
tific progress, not specific explanations of specific instances of scientific change.
In responses to Popper and Lakatos, Kuhn stressed that he was not concerned
with the psychology of individuals but with a ‘social psychology’ that abstracts
from the differences among individuals.77 An apparent weakness with this move
he handily turned to his advantage:
73
Kuhn ([1969c]1970), p. 236.
74
Kuhn (1983), p. 28.
75
Kuhn (1964), pp. 308–309 ⫽ ([1964]1977), p. 242.
76
Kuhn ([1969c]1970), pp. 237–238. The next paragraph begins: ‘That position is intrinsically socio-
logical.’
77
Kuhn ([1965]1970), p. 22 ⫽ ([1965]1977), p. 291; ([1969c]1970), p. 240 [quote, to which he added
in parentheses: ‘I prefer “sociology”’]. Cf. Kuhn ([1969e]1970), p. 191: ‘Some readers have felt that
I was trying to make science rest on unanalyzable individual intuitions rather than on logic and law.
But that interpretation goes astray in two essential respects. First, if I am talking at all about intuitions,
they are not individual. Rather they are the tested and shared possessions of the members of a successful
group, and the novice acquires them through training as a part of his preparation for group-membership.’
108 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Given a group all the members of which are committed to choosing between alterna-
tive theories and also to considering such values as accuracy, simplicity, scope, and
so on while making their choice, the concrete decisions of individual members in
individual cases will nevertheless vary. Group behaviour will be affected decisively
by the shared commitments, but individual choice will be a function also of person-
ality, education, and the prior pattern of professional research. (These variables are
the province of individual psychology.) To many of my critics this variability seems
a weakness of my position. When considering the problems of crisis and of theory-
choice I shall want, however, to argue that it is instead a strength. If a decision
must be made under circumstances in which even the most deliberate and considered
judgement may be wrong, it may be vitally important that different individuals decide
in different ways. How else could the group as a whole hedge its bets?78
And again: ‘That variability of judgement [in the application of criteria] may, as
I suggested above in connection with the recognition of crises, even be essential
to scientific advance.... If all members of the community applied values in the same
high-risk way, the group’s enterprise would cease.... The needed results are instead
achieved by distributing the risk that must be taken among the group’s members.’79
And from the ‘Postscript’ to Structure, prepared late in 1969: ‘[T]he resort to
shared values rather than to shared rules governing individual choice may be the
community’s way of distributing risk and assuring the long-term success of its
enterprise.’80 With this turn, aimed at justifying his inattention to individuals, Kuhn
had come perilously close to reifying the scientific community into a self-conscious,
purposeful, decision-making agent.
That threatened reification lay at the heart of a passage in the ‘Postscript’ that,
more than any other, symbolized for me Kuhn’s inexplicable slighting of the need
for the historian to deal with biographical particulars in understanding the dynamics
of scientific change:
There is no neutral algorithm for theory-choice, no systematic decision procedure
which, properly applied, must lead each individual in the group to the same decision.
In this sense it is the community of specialists rather than its individual members that
makes the effective decision. To understand why science develops as it does, one
need not unravel the details of biography and personality that lead each individual to
a particular choice, though that topic has vast fascination. What one must understand,
however, is the manner in which a particular set of shared values interacts with the
particular experiences shared by a community of specialists to ensure that most mem-
bers of the group will ultimately find one set of arguments rather than another decis-
ive.81
What I for a long time could not see was that by ‘understand[ing] why science
develops as it does’ Kuhn was not referring to our understanding of the dynamics
78
Kuhn ([1969c]1970), p. 241.
79
Kuhn ([1969c]1970), p. 262; the passage Kuhn alluded to is on p. 248.
80
Kuhn ([1969e]1970), p. 186. Accepting Kuhn’s lead, Hoyningen-Huene linked the legitimacy of
‘individually variable factors’ in theory choice to the ‘higher-order goal’ of the community’s further
development of scientific knowledge (Hoyningen-Huene, 1993, p. 251).
81
Kuhn ([1969e]1970), p. 200.
Possible Kuhns in the History of Science 109
82
Kuhn (1977a), p. xx ⬇ ([1976a]1977), p. 43.
83
But even that paradigmatic scientist disappears into an ostensible group: ‘Competition between
segments of the scientific community is the only historical process that ever actually results in the
rejection of one previously accepted theory or in the adoption of another’ (Kuhn, [1961a]1962, p. 8 ⫽
[1969d]1970, p. 8). Such a view grants pride of place to justification, not discovery.
110 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
84
Kuhn ([1986a]1989), p. 51.
85
Kuhn ([1992a]1993), p. 327.
86
Kuhn ([1992a]1993), p. 327.
87
Kuhn ([1992a]1993), p. 328.
88
Kuhn ([1992a]1993), p. 328.
89
Kuhn ([1992a]1993), p. 329.
Possible Kuhns in the History of Science 111
the members of the species are parts. I am persuaded that this example contains
important clues to the sense in which science is intrinsically a community
activity.’90 On occasion, Kuhn chided philosophers of science for failing to consider
personal factors and individual idiosyncrasies in their accounts of decision making
and consensus formation.91 In particular his lecture of 1973 on ‘Objectivity, Value
Judgment and Theory Choice’ appeared to open up possibilities for a more success-
fully historicized philosophy of science than Kuhn regularly propounded.92 These
overtures, however, remained unexploited as Kuhn increasingly drew his problems
not from science or the history of science but from his own prior work.
90
Kuhn ([1992a]1993), p. 329.
91
Kuhn ([1970b]1971), p. 140; ([1973]1977), pp. 325–326; ([1991]1992), p. 7.
92
On this subject see the insightful comments in Schuster (1979), pp. 306–307.
93
In November 1970 I submitted to Kuhn a Mannheim-inspired (handwritten!) prospectus for my
dissertation entitled ‘Erster Entwurf eines Versuchs einer wissenssoziologischen Erklärung des Über-
gangs von einer gesellschaftsbedingten Wissenschaftsform zu einer neuen’. Generally supportive, he
posed a simple question with his typical incisiveness: ‘Where does the science go?’ Figuring that out
kept me busy for four years.
94
Kuhn recounted a conversation with Mary Hesse after Structure had appeared: ‘She turned to me
and she said, “Tom, the one problem is now you’ve got to say in what sense science is empirical, or
what difference observation makes.” And I practically fell over, of course she was right but I wasn’t
seeing it that way’ (Kuhn, [1995]1997, p. 170). He apparently never did.
95
The characterization is from Kuhn (1977a), p. xxi ⬇ ([1976a]1977), p. 44; cf. Kuhn ([1967]1969)
⫽ ([1967]1977). Evelyn Fox Keller has put this central question more acutely than anyone else I know
(Keller, 1992, pp. 35–36):
Feminist critics of science, along with other analysts of science, need to reclaim access to the
mind-set of the working scientist, to what makes their descriptions seem so compelling.
For this, we need to redress an omission from many of our analyses to date that is especially
conspicuous to any working scientist: attention to the material constraints on which scientific
knowledge depends, and correlatively, to the undeniable record of technological success that
science as we know it can boast. If we grant the force of belief, we must surely not neglect the
even more dramatic force of scientific ‘know-how.’ Although beliefs, interests, and cultural
norms surely can, and do, influence the definition of scientific goals, as well as prevailing criteria
of success in meeting those goals, they cannot in themselves generate either epistemological or
technological success. Only where they mesh with the opportunities and constraints afforded by
material reality can they lead to the generation of effective knowledge. Our analyses began with
the question of where, and how, does the force of beliefs, interests, and cultural norms enter
112 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
plays no formal role in Kuhn’s account of science, despite the fact that he described
himself and Richard Boyd as ‘unregenerate realists’ and occasionally let slip state-
ments such as ‘[n]ature itself must first undermine professional security by making
prior achievements seem problematic’, ‘[e]nergy is conserved; nature behaves that
way’, and ‘nature cannot be forced into an arbitrary set of conceptual boxes’.96
Likewise, although he rejected what he took to be the implication of the ‘strong
program’ that ‘[n]ature itself, whatever that may be, has seemed to have no part
in the development of beliefs about it’ and dismissed otherwise unspecified ‘newer
formulations’ as uninformative ‘about the way... in which nature enters the negoti-
ations that produce beliefs about it’, he himself never in fact found a place for
nature in his erstwhile sociological philosophy of science.97 Indeed, one aspect of
his proffered reconceptualization of the scientific enterprise was that ‘what evalu-
ation aims to select is not beliefs that correspond to a so-called real external world,
but simply to the better or best of the bodies of belief actually present to the
evaluators’.98 The crocodile tears Kuhn had shed over the disappearance of nature
(‘whatever that may be’) are thus shown for what they were by his subsequent
acceptance of ‘bodies of belief’ in place of the ‘so-called real external world’ in
the evaluation of scientific knowledge claims.
It is possible that Kuhn’s continued failure to find a place for nature in his
explanation of the scientific enterprise and its peculiar effectiveness stemmed at
into the process by which effective knowledge is generated; the question that now remains is,
Where, and how, does the nonlinguistic realm we call nature enter into that process? How do
‘nature’ and ‘culture’ interact in the production of scientific knowledge? Until feminist critics
of science, along with other analysts of the influence of social forces on science, address this
question, our accounts of science will not be recognizable to working scientists.
Keller’s remarks remind us of the importance of considering the audience before which claims are
made and of the author’s sense of responsibility (or not) to that or other audiences.
96
Kuhn ([1977c]1979), p. 415 ⫽ ([1977c]1993), p. 539; ([1961a]1962), p. 168 ⫽ ([1969d]1970), p.
169; ([1957]1959), p. 323; ([1969c]1970), p. 263.
97
Kuhn ([1991]1992), pp. 8, 9. The published text of his comments on the strong program from a
later interview reads, curiously, ‘But you are not talking about anything worth calling science if you
leave out the role of [nature]’, the word in brackets having been supplied by the editors (Kuhn,
[1995]1997, p. 195). In Structure Kuhn wrote that ‘[o]bservation and experience can and must drastically
restrict the range of admissible scientific belief, else there would be no science’ (Kuhn, [1961a]1962,
p. 4; emphasis supplied), but that was not the theme he chose to develop, preferring then to emphasize
‘[a]n apparently arbitrary element, compounded of personal and historical accident’ (ibid.) Kuhn found
‘unenlightening’ Ludwik Fleck’s distinction between what he called the passive and active elements of
knowledge, the former representing object-sided constraints (Kuhn, [1976b]1979, p. xi).
The one ‘tension’ Hoyningen-Huene explicitly identified in Kuhn’s work was that between Kuhn’s
‘conventional reference to nature or the world as the object of science’ and his claim, that, after a
scientific revolution, ‘the scientist... works in a different world’ (Hoyningen-Huene, 1993, p. 31, quoting
from Kuhn, [1961a]1962, p. 120 ⫽ [1969d]1970, p. 121). In Hoyningen-Huene’s gloss, the meaning
of ‘world’ that makes Kuhnian sense here is ‘phenomenal world’, since Kuhn insisted on the unknow-
ability of a Kantian ‘world-in-itself’ (ibid., pp. 32–36; cf. 60–61, 267–271). Later, in quoting Kuhn to
the effect that ‘nature cannot be forced into an arbitrary set of conceptual boxes’, Hoyningen-Huene
inconsistently assigned this ‘resistance of nature’ to the world-in-itself without demonstrating that Kuhn
in fact assigned a coherent role to nature in explaining the development and peculiar success of science
(ibid., p. 75, quoting from Kuhn, [1969c]1970, p. 263).
98
Kuhn ([1991]1992), p. 18.
Possible Kuhns in the History of Science 113
least in part from a conflation of that issue with his rigorous exclusion from con-
sideration of the extent to which scientific knowledge captures anything one might
wish to call ‘truth’. Replying to the charge that he was an antirealist, Kuhn wrote:
‘My goal is double. On the one hand, I aim to justify claims that science is cogni-
tive, that its product is knowledge of nature, and that the criteria it uses in evaluat-
ing beliefs are in that sense epistemic. But on the other, I aim to deny all meaning
to claims that successive scientific beliefs become more and more probable or better
and better approximations to the truth and simultaneously to suggest that the subject
of truth claims cannot be a relation between beliefs and a putatively mind-inde-
pendent or “external” world.’99 Kuhn never explained how knowledge can be about
nature if truth claims cannot be judged against the natural world, but only with
reference to a particular ‘lexicon’.100 As he put it, still tentatively, in Structure,
‘We may... have to relinquish the notion, explicit or implicit, that changes of para-
digms carry scientists and those who learn from them closer and closer to the
truth.’101 If we do so, ‘a number of vexing problems may vanish in the process’.102
Indeed they do, but the cost is high: it is hard to take seriously Kuhn’s contention
that he has discovered the proper way to provide ‘an explanation for science’s
success’ vis-à-vis other human enterprises. Ironically, if tellingly, Kuhn missed the
importance of Copernicus’ belief that the earth really does move. Copernicus’ goal
was not just technical proficiency, just as his motivation was scarcely Neoplatonic.
Copernicus was after truth.
99
Kuhn ([1992a]1993), p. 330.
100
Kuhn ([1992a]1993), p. 330.
101
Kuhn ([1961a]1962), p. 169 ⫽ ([1969d]1970), p. 170. Kuhn reiterated this stance with greater
forcefulness in his subsequent writings, tying it to his rejection of the correspondence theory of truth
(Kuhn, [1977c]1979, p. 418 ⫽ [1977c]1993, p. 541; [1990b]1991, p. 6; [1991]1992, p. 14; [1992a]1993,
p. 330).
102
Kuhn ([1961a]1962), p. 170 ⫽ ([1969d]1970), p. 171.
103
Kuhn ([1992a]1993), p. 330.
104
Kuhn ([1990b]1991), p. 3; cf. (1990a), pp. 24–25. ‘Efforts to understand and refine it [incommen-
surability] have been my primary and increasingly obsessive concern for thirty years’ (Kuhn,
[1992a]1993, p. 315).
114 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
all other considerations, including his original goal of understanding the special
efficacy of science as an epistemic enterprise. Moreover, we see here in the strong-
est terms Kuhn-the-philosopher’s attachment to the notion of discontinuity, where
Kuhn-the-practising-historian had sought (for example) to render Planck’s concep-
tual trajectory understandable by identifying its continuities. In his commentary on
Kuhn’s ‘Possible Worlds’ paper, Arthur Miller identified ‘the principal problem in
Kuhn’s analysis to be his emphasis on discontinuous change from one theory (or
world) to another’.105 Quoting this passage in his rebuttal, Kuhn took Miller to
task: ‘There is, however, no talk of discontinuous change in my paper, much less
any emphasis on it. The contrast throughout is between the lexicons used at two
widely separated times: nothing is said about the nature of the intervening process
by which a transition between them is made.’106 Kuhn was correct, though I think
somewhat disingenuous, since his insistence on the impossibility of translation in
fact emphasized a kind of resultant discontinuity—if, to be sure, he left untouched
the issue of the dynamics of change, precisely the issue that typically concerns the
historian. Such an omission is hard to cover with silence alone, nor was Kuhn’s
effective black-boxing of such a central issue of general concern likely to satisfy
many people.
Kuhn’s linguistic turn, begun in earnest by at least 1969, gave him a powerful
analogy with which to argue the necessarily communal nature of scientific knowl-
edge, the self-contained nature of paradigms, and—in the end most importantly—
the importance of incommensurability. Groups, he suggested, ‘should... be regarded
as the units which produce scientific knowledge. They could not, of course, func-
tion without individuals as members, but the very idea of scientific knowledge as
a private product presents the same intrinsic problems as the notion of a private
language.’107 Characteristics of language communities and problems with trans-
lation came increasingly to stand for, indeed to drive out, attention paid more
directly to actual scientific communities and the problems they might have had
with regard to interparadigm communication. By the 1980s he was speaking in
terms of scientists’ sharing of ‘a lexicon, a structured vocabulary’, such that ‘[d]if-
ferent lexicons—those of different cultures or different historical periods, for
example—give access to different sets of possible worlds, largely but never entirely
overlapping’.108 With respect to the historically significant terms that mark the
development of science, accurate translation from one lexicon to another is not
usually possible.
105
Miller (1989), p. 34.
106
Kuhn ([1986a]1989), p. 49.
107
Kuhn ([1969c]1970), p. 253). The last words of the ‘Postscript’ are ‘Scientific knowledge, like
language, is intrinsically the common property of a group or else nothing at all. To understand it we
shall need to know the special characteristics of the groups that create and use it’ (Kuhn, [1969e]1970,
p. 210). Cf. Kuhn (1977a), pp. xxii–xxiii ⬇ ([1976a]1977), pp. 44–45. The whole topic is discussed
extensively in ‘Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability’ (Kuhn, [1982]1983).
108
Kuhn ([1986a]1989), p. 11 ⫽ ([1986b]1990), p. 300.
Possible Kuhns in the History of Science 115
109
Kuhn ([1990b]1991), p. 8. By invoking isolated populations and species as stand-ins for scientific
communities, Kuhn has already effectively exaggerated the extent to which the latter are either isolated
or clearly demarcated.
110
Kuhn ([1992a]1993), p. 324; cf. (1990a), p. 20.
111
Kuhn ([1969c]1970), pp. 276–277; ([1969e]1970), pp. 201–202; ([1990b]1991), p. 9. On rare
occasions Kuhn relaxed his usual insistence on discontinuity: ‘Communities do not have experiences,
much less gestalt switches. As the conceptual vocabulary of a community changes, its members may
undergo gestalt switches, but only some of them do and not all at the same time. Of those who do not,
some cease to be members of the community; others acquire the new vocabulary in less dramatic ways.
Meanwhile, communication goes on, however imperfectly, metaphor serving as a partial bridge across
the divide between an old literal usage and a new one’ (Kuhn, [1986a]1989, p. 50).
116 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
112
See the passages quoted at notes 24 and 104.
113
Kuhn ([1961a]1962), p. 1.
Possible Kuhns in the History of Science 117
replace them’.114 In a curious way he seems to have adopted the viewpoint that in
Structure he invoked to explain scientists’ inclination to suppress the historical
context of science: ‘More historical detail, whether of science’s present or of its
past, or more responsibility to the historical details that are presented, could only
give artificial status to human idiosyncrasy, error, and confusion.’115 Tellingly, his
response was to turn (again) from history to a properly recast general philosophical
account of science in order to defend its epistemological authority.116 He seemingly
did not see how to ground the authority of science on its actual history. Yet he
was the man who had once boldly asked, ‘How can the history of science fail to
be a source of phenomena to which theories about knowledge may legitimately be
asked to apply?’117
Again ironically, one of Kuhn’s great strengths was his willingness in Structure to
deploy explanatory terms that in principle resisted specification. Implicitly, it always
seemed to me, Kuhn was rejecting the philosopher’s challenge either to define one’s
terms or to confess one’s confusion. Historians, of course, can scarcely function
under such a constraint. Implicitly, it seemed to me, he correctly recognized that
speaking meaningfully about such a matter as ‘science’—at least as an unreconstruc-
ted historical affair—meant laying aside any desire to speak with philosophical pre-
cision. By allowing philosophers of science by and large to set the terms of his post-
Structure conversation he gave in to the temptation to seek salvation in an ever
narrower circumscription of his own language, in an ever more idealized picture of
science in which analogy effectively replaced historical substance.
A similar story can be told concerning the vicissitudes, actual and potential, of
the work that first brought Kuhn to widespread scholarly attention, The Copernican
Revolution. It seems to me the book fails at precisely those points most crucial to
the Kuhn of Structure: identification of the relevant scientific community, identifi-
cation of anomalies, evidence of crisis, and evidence of incommensurability that
actually frustrated communication or understanding. Nor did he address one of the
glaringly unresolved tensions in the book, over whether the Copernican revolution
is best understood as an internal, technical affair among the community of pro-
fessional astronomers or as the result of a welter of extrascientific factors.118 After
114
Kuhn ([1991]1992), p. 18.
115
Kuhn ([1961a]1962), p. 137 ⫽ ([1969d]1970), p. 138.
116
Kuhn ([1991]1992), pp. 10, 14–15, 18. With regard to his intentions, cf. Kuhn ([1992a]1993), p.
314: ‘To my dismay, what John [Earman] not unfairly labels my “purple passages” led many readers
of Structure to suppose that I was attempting to undermine the cognitive authority of science rather
than to suggest a different view of its nature.’ For the passages in question, see Earman (1993), p. 19
(in Horwich, 1993).
117
Kuhn ([1961a]1962), p. 9 [the last sentence of the Introduction].
118
In an address delivered in 1985 at the XVIIth International Congress of History of Science, Kuhn
offered the following sketch of ‘the outstanding challenge now facing the profession’ (Kuhn,
[1985]1986, pp. 32, 33):
Those who emphasize the history of ideas typically read it as the story of the increasingly close
approach of successive scientific constructions to the real world, a reading which I take to be
simply incoherent. Those who emphasize institutional and social history, on the other hand, tend
118 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Structure, in particular, Kuhn retreated from any strong claims concerning the role
of external factors in the history of science. It seems to me that that problem,
especially as it concerns the Copernican case, can only find some kind of resolution
via a fully contextualized history of science at the level of the individual scientist.
But Kuhn the metahistorian of science consistently declined to take the individual
as the proper unit of analysis, and in the event he effectively walked away from
the problem as he declined to treat scientific communities as historical entities.
That issue surfaces again in consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of
Kuhn’s examination of ‘Energy Conservation as an Example of Simultaneous Dis-
covery’, which recently passed the fortieth anniversary of its original presentation
but whose historiographical promise was never realized.119 At least two factors—
the particular subject matter, and Kuhn’s general take on the issues involved in
going from a collective story about discrete individuals to an explanation of the
creation of the consensus that represents scientific knowledge—made the topic a
natural one for an investigation of the relative importance of internal and external
factors, and for the exploration of the relationship between individual and group.
But how does one actually do that kind of history of science? Alas. we have no
Kuhnian exemplar of what it would look like. As it stands, neither the inadequate
depth of coverage of its principals nor the scarcely attempted identification of the
putatively relevant scientific community (or communities) permits ‘Energy Conser-
vation’ to achieve that goal. Despite the conceptual centrality of the scientific com-
munity to Kuhn’s philosophy of science, as an historian he never undertook to
study the composition and dynamics of any actual scientific community.
to view it as displaying the dominant role of interests in determining the conclusions reached
by scientists, usually socio-economic interests but often interests of a broader sort as well. The
role of reason and experiment in scientific development is for them minor at best, a conclusion
I take to be as unsatisfactory as the first. We simply no longer have any useful notions of how
science works or of what scientific progress is.
That is the gap that currently needs to be filled, and I think historians of science—some of
them—will need to help in filling it.
Ignoring the rather caricatured nature of his characterization of what otherwise usually pass for internal-
ist and externalist approaches to the history of science, I note that Kuhn himself did not contribute to
the effort to close the gap, nor even to suggesting what such a bridge might look like.
119
Cf. Ian Hacking’s judgement (Hacking, 1979, p. 234): ‘The energy conservation paper is the only
piece in this collection that the ordinary historian of science will want to emulate, yet it is doubly
anomalous. First, although it is highly original and suggestive, even it is not a very good example of
the kind of history that Kuhn recommends. Secondly, it in no way exemplifies use of the sweeping
analytic tools that can be deduced from the “metahistorical” essays or Structure itself. Full understanding
of the conservation of energy... will almost certainly proceed in the direction of more detailed internal
history modified by awareness of input from technology and the other sciences.... Here, then, is another
“essential tension” revealed in Kuhn’s work. On the one hand there is the disciplinary matrix dominating
one hundred souls with its acknowledged achievements, its institutionalized hierarchy, and the standard
examples taught to students. On the other hand there is [what Herbert Butterfield called] “the new
texture of human experience in a new age.” The Structure of Scientific Revolutions too easily rides the
roller coaster of a continuum between the two.’
Possible Kuhns in the History of Science 119
References
Caneva, K. L. (1974) ‘Conceptual and Generational Change in German Physics: The Case
of Electricity, 1800–1846’, Ph.D. diss., Princeton University.
120
In glossing his finding that ‘[r]adical revolutions in science are rarely preceded by a crisis’ because
‘laterborns do not think or behave like good Kuhnians’, Frank Sulloway observed that ‘Kuhn’s (1962)
model of science provides a better description of firstborn behavior than it does of laterborn behavior.
Kuhn himself is a firstborn, so perhaps this is no surprise’ (Sulloway, 1996, pp. 347 and 536 n. 33).
121
That faith seems also to have been rooted in his experience of philosophical controversy. He wrote
tellingly in his essay review of Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: ‘Much in this volume testifies
to what I described above as the gestalt-switch that divides readers of my Scientific Revolutions into
two groups. Together with that book, this collection of essays therefore provides an extended example
of what I have elsewhere called partial or incomplete communication—the talking-through-each-other
that regularly characterizes discourse between participants in incommensurable points of view.... For
some readers, I suspect, the recurrent failure of these essays to intersect on intellectual issues will
provide this book’s greatest interest. Indeed, because those failures illustrate a phenomenon at the heart
of my own point of view, the book has interest for me’ (Kuhn, [1969c]1970, pp. 231–232, 232). Ironi-
cally, Kuhn’s attachment to the incommensurability between his and his critics’ views gave him a subtle
vested interest in not understanding them.
122
Kuhn ([1976b]1979), pp. vii [twice], 167 n.1 [in quotation marks]. On the relationship between
faith and experience see Heschel (1951), p. 165.
120 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
8 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel), pp. 137–146. (The meeting was held at Boston on 22–25
October. A commentary on I. Lakatos, ‘History of Science and Its Rational Reconstruc-
tions’, pp. 91–136.)
Kuhn, T. S. (1972) ‘Scientific Growth: Reflections on Ben-David’s “Scientific Role”’,
Minerva 10(1), 166–178. (Review of J. Ben-David, The Scientist’s Role in Society: A
Comparative Study (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971).)
Kuhn, T. S. ([1973]1977) ‘Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice’, paper deliv-
ered at Furman University, 30 November 1973. (First published in Kuhn (1977a), pp.
320–339.)
Kuhn, T. S. ([1975]1976) ‘Theory-Change as Structure-Change: Comments of the Sneed
Formalism’, Erkenntnis 10(2), 179–199. (Reprinted in R. E. Butts and J. Hintikka (eds),
Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of
Science, Part Four of the Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Logic, Meth-
odology and Philosophy of Science, London, Ontario, Canada, [27 August–2 September]
1975. ‘The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science’ vol. 12
(Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, 1977), pp. 289–309; cited as Kuhn ([1975]1977).
Kuhn’s talk was given on 28 August.)
Kuhn, T. S. ([1976b]1979) ‘Foreword’, in L. Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific
Fact, ed. T. J. Trenn and R. K. Merton, trans. F. Bradley and T. J. Trenn (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press), pp. vii–xi. (Dated June 1976.)
Kuhn, T. S. (1977a) The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and
Change (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press). (Undated ‘Preface’ on pp.
ix–xxiii; the much-the-same ‘Vorwort’ of the German edition published earlier that year–
Kuhn ([1976a]1977)–dated May 1976.)
Kuhn, T. S. ([1977b]1978) Black-Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity, 1894–1912
(Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press). (Preface dated Sep-
tember 1977; came out mid-November 1978 (Kuhn, [1979]1980, p. 194).)
Kuhn, T. S. ([1977c]1979) ‘Metaphor in Science’, in A. Ortony (ed.), Metaphor and Thought
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 409–419. (From a conference at the Uni-
versity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, September 1977; possibly substantially revised
(preface, dated December 1978, p. vii). Largely a reply to Richard Boyd’s paper ‘Meta-
phor and Theory Change: What is ’Metaphor‘ a Metaphor for?’, pp. 356–408. Reprinted
in the expanded second edition, of 1993, on pp. 533–542; cited as Kuhn ([1977c]1993).)
Kuhn, T. S. (1980) ‘The Halt and the Blind: Philosophy and History of Science’, British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31(2), 181–192. (Review of C. Hawson (ed.),
Method and Appraisal in the Physical Sciences: The Critical Background to Modern
Science, 1800–1905 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).)
Kuhn, T. S. (1981) What Are Scientific Revolutions? Occasional Paper #18 (Cambridge:
Center for Cognitive Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology [1981]). (Reprinted
in L. Krüger, L. J. Daston, and M. Heidelberger (eds), The Probabilistic Revolution, vol.
1, ‘Ideas in History’ (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1987), pp. 7–22; cited as
Kuhn ([1981]1987).)
Kuhn, T. S. ([1982]1983) ‘Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability’, in P. D.
Asquith and T. Nickles (eds), PSA 1982: Proceedings of the 1982 Biennial Meeting of
the Philosophy of Science Association, vol. 2, ‘Symposia’ (East Lansing: Philosophy of
Science Association), pp. 669–688. (Delivered at Philadelphia, 31 October 1982.)
Kuhn, T. S. (1983) ‘Reflections on Receiving the John Desmond Bernal Award’, 4S Review
1, no. 4(winter), 26–30. (Originally delivered 5 November 1983, with additions.)
Kuhn, T. S. (1984) ‘Revisiting Planck’, Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 14(2),
231–252. (Reprinted as ‘Afterword: Revisiting Planck’, in Kuhn ([1986c]1987), pp. 349–
370; cited as Kuhn ([1984]1987).)
Kuhn, T. S. ([1985]1986) ‘The Histories of Science: Diverse Worlds for Diverse Audiences’,
Academe. Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors 72, no. 4(July–
August), 29–33. (Delivered at the XVIIth International Congress of History of Science,
Berkeley, 31 July 1985.)
Possible Kuhns in the History of Science 123
Further Reading
Allén, S. (ed.) (1989) Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences: Proceedings of
Nobel Symposium 65 (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter).
Kuhn, T. S. ([1976a]1977) Die Entstehung des Neuen: Studien zur Struktur der Wissen-
schaftsgeschichte,ed. L. Krüger, trans. H. Vetter (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp). (‘Vorwort’
by Kuhn (pp. 31–47) dated May 1976.)
Kuhn, T. S. ([1979]1980) ‘Einstein’s Critique of Planck’, in H. Woolf (ed.), Some Strange-
ness in the Proportion: A Centennial Symposium to Celebrate the Achievements of Albert
Einstein (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley), pp. 186–191. (Also includes Kuhn’s partici-
124 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
pation in an ‘Open Discussion Following Papers by [M.] J. Klein and T. S. Kuhn’, pp.
192–196. Symposium held at the Institute for Advanced Study, 4–9 March 1979.)
Kuhn, T. S. ([1986c]1987) Black-Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity, 1894–1912,
with a new Afterword (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press). (‘Note to
the Paperback Edition’ dated November 1986 (p. xv).)
Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A. (eds) (1970) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Proceed-
ings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, [11–17 July]
1965, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). (Preface dated August 1969.)