13-3 System Designs

When new plants are constructed or when modifications are needed in existing
plants, detailed process designs are required. These designs must include special
safety features to protect the system and operating personnel. The following case
histories emphasize the importance of these special safety design features.

Ethylene Oxide Explosionl 2

-A process storage tank contained 6500 gal of ethylene oxide. It was accidentally
con- taminated with ammonia. The tank ruptured and dispersed ethylene oxide into
the air. A vapor cloud was formed and almost immediately exploded. It created an
explosive force equivalent to 18 tons of TNT, as evidenced by the damage. The
events happened so rapidly that person- nel could not take appropriate cover. One
person was killed and nine were injured; property losses exceeded $16.5 million.
-lack of design protection to prevent the backup of am- monia into this storage
tank. It also appears that mitigation techniques were not part of the sys- tem
(deluge systems, dikes, and the like).

Ethylene Explosionl
-Failure of a 3/8-in compression fitting on a 1000-2500-psi ethylene line in a pipe
trench resulted in a spill of 200-500 lb of ethylene. A cloud was formed and
ignited, giving an explo- sion equivalent to 0.12-0.30 ton of TNT. This accident
took place in a courtyard, giving a par- tially confined vapor cloud explosion. Two
people were killed and 17 were injured; property loss was $6.5 million.
-probable causes of this accident include (1)use of nonwelded pipe, (2)
installation of pipe in trenches, resulting in an accumulation of flammable vapors,
and (3) lack of automated vapor detection analyzers and alarms.

Butadiene Explosion
-A valve on the bottom of a reactor accidentally opened because of an air failure.
The spill
generated a vapor cloud that was ignited 50 ft from the source. About 200 gal of
butadiene spilled before ignition. Overpressures of 0.5-1 psi were estimated. Three
people were killed and two were injured.
-Probable causes of this accident include (1)installation of a fail-open valve
instead of a fail-closed valve, (2) lack of vapor detectors, (3) lack of a block
installed as a mitigating device, and (4) failure to eliminate ignition sources in
this operating region.

Light Hydrocarbon Explosion

-A pipe failed and resulted in a spill of 16,800lb of light hydrocarbons. A vapor
cloud de-
velopedandignited.Theexplosionknockedoutthedelugesystemsandelectricalsuppliestothe
fire pumps. Significantdamage resulted from the subsequent fires.The maximum
overpressure was estimated from the damage to be 3.5 psi at 120ft. An equivalent of
1ton of TNT was esti- mated, giving an explosion yield of approximately 1%of the
total energy source. This accident had two fatalities and nine injuries. The total
damage was estimated to be $15.6 million.
-The magnitude of this accident could have been reduced with (1) improved pipe
design, (2) improved deluge system design, (3) backup or more secure electrical
supply, and (4) instal- lation of detection analyzers and block valves.

Pump Vibration
-Vibrationfromabadpumpbearingcausedapumpsealtofailinacumenesectionofaphe- nol
acetone unit. The released flammable liquids and vapors ignited. An explosion
ruptured other process pipes, adding fuel to the original fire. Damage to the plant
exceeded $23 million.
-This accident could have been prevented by a good inspection and maintenance
program. Potential design improvements include vibration detectors, gas analyzers,
block valves, and del- uge systems.

Pump Failure
-Numerous accidents are unfortunate duplicates of previous accidents, as the
following shows.
-A pump roller bearing failure in a crude oil refinery initiated the fracture of
the motor shaft and the pump bearing bracket. The pump casing then broke, releasing
hot oil, which au- toignited. Secondary pipe and flange failures contributed fuel
to the fire. Plant damage totaled over $15 million.
-Because the pump was equipped only with manually operated suction-side valves, the
valves could not be reached during the fire.
-Automated block valves would have minimized damage in this fire. A good inspection
and maintenance program would have prevented the accident.

Ethylene Explosion
-A drain fitting in a high-pressure (40 kpsi) compressor line broke, allowing
ethylene to escape. The ethylene cloud drifted and entered the intake system of an
engine that was driving one of the compressors. The ethylene detonated in the
engine, and this explosion ignited the rest of the vapors.
-The explosions were felt 6 miles away. Twelve buildings were destroyed, and fire
and ex- plosion damage occurred throughout the polyethylene plant. The damage was
estimated at over $15 million.
-Automatic equipment promptly detected the hazardous vapor and operated the auto-
matic high-density water-spray system, which was designed to wash the ethylene from
the at- mosphere. The leak was too large for the spray system to handle.
-This accident could have been mitigated if the gas detection analyzers alarmed at
lower concentrations. Also, in the layout design it should have been noticed that
the compressor needed special consideration to eliminate this ignition source.

Ethylene Explosion
-Ethylene was accidentally released from a 118-in stainless steel instrument tubing
line leading to a gauge from a main line on a compressor system. The tubing failed
as a result of transverse fatigue caused by vibration from the reciprocating
compressor. Ignition may have been by static electricity. This accident caused
$21.8 million in damage.
-The unmanned compressor building was equipped with a combustible gas detection
sys- tem. However, it failed to sound an alarm because of a faulty relay in the
control room. Auto- matic fail-safe valves functioned properly, blocking-in the
flow of ethylene, but not before 450- 11,000lb of gas had already escaped.
-This accident emphasizes the importance of adding gas detectors that measure
flamma- ble gases at low concentrations so that alarms and block valves can be
actuated before large quantities of gas are released.

Ethylene Oxide Explosion

-Ethylene oxide is produced by adding ethylene, oxygen, a methane diluent, and
recycled carbon dioxide to a continuous reactor. Gaseous compositions are
controlled carefully to keep the concentrations outside the explosion limits.
-One plant experienced an emergency situation. The emergency procedures specified:
Close the oxygen feed valve. The oxygen control valve was normally closed by
bleeding air out of the valve bonnet diaphragm (air to open). The bleed line was
opened and was noted on the control panel. The air, however, did not bleed off
through the bonnet vent because a mud dauber wasp constructed mud cells over the
vent hole. Although the vent valve was open, as indicated on the control panel, the
air could not escape.
-The gases in the ethylene oxide reactor moved into the explosiveregion while being
above the autoignition temperature. A violent explosion occurred, resulting in
several injuries and sig- nificant plant damage.
-It is now an industrial standard to use positive identification of the valve
position on all important safety valves -limit switches that are tripped when the
valve is open or shut. In ad- dition, all valve vent lines are now covered with bug
screens to prevent blockage.
-In this particular case the accident could also have been prevented with
appropriate in- spection and maintenance procedures.

Example 13-3
Analyze the first ethylene explosion example (318-in fitting failure) to determine
the percentage of fuel that actually exploded compared to the quantity of ethylene
released in a vapor cloud.

Solution
The total energy contained in the vapor cloud is estimated by assuming the heat of
combustion (appendix B). The combustion reaction is
Therefore the theoretical energy is
AHc = 1411.2kJ/mol = 12046callg.
The tons of TNT based on this heat of combustion are calculated using Equation 6-
24. vm AHc
where
Therefore
~ T N =T
(1)(227,000 g)(12,046 callg)
~ I N =T
1.017X 1OYcal/ton m, =2.69tonofTNT
Based on the accident investigation, the explosive energy was equivalent to 0.3 ton
TNT. Therefore the fraction of energy manifested in the explosion is 0.312.69 =
11.2%. This 11.2% is considerably higher than the 2% normally observed (see section
6-13) for unconfined vapor cloud explosions. The higher energy conversion is a
result of the explosion occurring in a partially confined area.