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Speaking the language of security: the

Commonwealth, the Francophonie and
the CPLP in conflict management in
Africa
Rodrigo Tavares & Luís Brás Bernardino
Published online: 15 Dec 2011.
To cite this article: Rodrigo Tavares & Luís Brás Bernardino (2011): Speaking the language of
security: the Commonwealth, the Francophonie and the CPLP in conflict management in Africa,
Conflict, Security & Development, 11:5, 607-636
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Conflict, Security & Development 11:5 November 2011
Analysis
Speaking the language of
security: the Commonwealth,
the Francophonie and the
CPLP in conflict management
Downloaded by [85.138.115.189] at 10:55 30 April 2013
in Africa
Rodrigo Tavares and Luı́s Brás Bernardino
The last decade has seen an unprecedented examining the role of the Commonwealth, the
increase in conflict management activities in Francophonie and the CPLP in Africa.
Africa by international organisations. This has Traditionally regarded as cultural organisations,
been accompanied by a flurry of academic they have gradually extended their profile to
publications and of policy reports that stress the include a security mandate. Drawing from
comparative advantages at the legal and fieldwork and an extensive review of the
operational levels of regional and other literature, the article presents the first
intergovernmental organisations. The article comparative study of the conflict management
assesses this dominant favourable view by activities of these organisations in Africa.
Introduction
Over the last two decades considerable attention has been devoted to the role of regional
and other intergovernmental organisations in conflict management. Although the 1919
Rodrigo Tavares is an associate research fellow at United Nations University (UNU– CRIS) and was a visiting
scholar at the University of California, Berkeley and Columbia University. He is the author of Regional Security:
The Capacity of International Organizations (Routledge, 2010) and co-editor (with Fredrik Söderbaum) of
Regional Organizations in African Security (Routledge, 2011).
Luı́s Brás Bernardino is a Major in the Portuguese Army and a PhD student at the Institute for Social and Political
Sciences, Technical University of Lisbon (ISCSP).
ISSN 1467-8802 print/ISSN 1478-1174 online/11/050607-30 q 2011 Conflict, Security and Development Group
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2011.641771
608 Rodrigo Tavares and Luı́s Brás Bernardino
Covenant of the League of Nations already acknowledged the validity of regional

understandings for securing the maintenance of peace,1 it was only with the end of the
Cold War that a global consensus emerged on the advantages of empowering regional
organisations to handle local conflicts. Indeed, even though the United Nations (UN)
remains the main source of international legitimacy on the use of military force, the global
body has been devolving power to regional and other intergovernmental actors to resolve
their own conflicts.2 The growing body of literature includes contributions from both
policy and academic scholarship.
In the policy sphere, the major source of data consists of primary documents (e.g.
verbatim records, resolutions, statements, reports) emanating from the UN. The general
consensus at the UN level is that regional organisations offer a competent service in

conflict management. In 1992, Boutros-Ghali noted that the post-Cold War era was
characterised by problems regarding the ‘logistics, equipment, personnel and finance’ of
increasingly demanded peacekeeping missions, ‘all of which could be corrected if Member
States so wished and were ready to make the necessary resources available’.3 The answer
was regional task-sharing, also called regional subcontracting or regional subsidiarity.
The escalating interest was complemented by several meetings between the UN and
regional organisations. Since 2003, the UN Security Council has held eight sessions with or
on regional organisations, whereas the UN Secretary-General has convened seven High-
Level Meetings (HLMs) with regional organisations involved in security matters from all
continents (the first HLM was held in 1993). Symbolically, at the fifth HLM in July 2003
the Secretary-General offered a ‘new vision of global security’ that rested on a ‘network of
effective and mutually-reinforcing multilateral mechanism—regional and global’.4 In
January 2010, at a Security Council meeting to discuss co-operation with regional
organisations, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘we are only beginning to
realise the great potential of what we [UN and regional organisations] can do together’.5
The same consensus emerged in the academic literature. Even if the published work is vast
and focuses on a wide range of different subjects such as the capacity, history or operational
experience of these organisations,6 the general tone is sympathetic to regional task-sharing.
For example, Lake and Morgan have observed that, ‘efforts to cope with violent conflicts, as
well to achieve order and security, will primarily involve arrangements and actions devised
and implemented at the regional level’.7 In the same positive vein, Tavares argues that
‘regional organizations have a bank of accumulated knowledge that should be capitalized
and provide unquestionable comparative advantages vis-à-vis other actors’.8 Tellingly,
Speaking the language of security 609
Angelov’s study on the pros and cons of regional involvement ‘indicates that there is a clearly
established numerical predominance of supporters of greater regional involvement in peace
operations over regio-skeptics. This attitude is based on the already existing record of RO
[regional organisations]-led peace operations that generally demonstrates that they could
contribute to the maintenance of the international peace and security’.9
Fertilised by this dominant perspective, regional organisations have mushroomed and
multiplied their competences in the security field.10 As a clear epitome of this interest,
even ‘language organisations’ such as the Commonwealth Secretariat (COMSEC), the
International Organisation of La Francophonie (IOF) and the Community of Portuguese-
Speaking Countries (CPLP) have instilled themselves with the operational and financial
means to engage in security issues. Although they were established to foster cultural relations
and promote the use of the English, French and Portuguese languages, respectively, they
have added new dimensions of co-operation into their portfolio, mainly the mandate to
prevent conflicts.
This article examines the legal and the operational capacity of these newcomers to the
security field in order to assess the prevailing idea—expressed in policy and academic
circles—that international organisations are well-equipped to handle regional security
challenges. The article scrutinises, first, their legal authority in the field by determining (1)
whether they are international organisations with legal personality under international law
or if they are mere groupings of states. The UN Charter calls the first an international
‘agency’, whereas the second is an ‘arrangement’; (2) if they are ‘regional’ and can thus
operate under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter; and (3) if they have an internal legal
mandate to engage with security issues.
The second key consideration is their operational capacity. As there is a proliferation of
security organisations in Africa what is the added value of these three organisations? What
are their operational capacities and experience?11 Despite the growing relevance of these
organisations to global governance, there are very few comparative studies. Shaw calls this
absence ‘a remarkable gap in the study of international organisations institutions’.12
The focus on Africa is almost inevitable. Firstly, the UN has declared in different forums
that Africa is a natural case study to test the capacity of regional organisations in security.13
Secondly, the Commonwealth, Francophonie and CPLP’s operational experience with
security issues has concentrated to a very large extent on this continent making it the
logical focus. From a methodological point of view, this article derives from semi-
structured interviews conducted in 2010 and 2011 with academics and policy-makers
(attached to governmental departments or to the CPLP and COMSEC) in Lisbon, London

and Port-of-Spain. Additionally, an extensive review of literature on this topic was also
carried out.
Commonwealth Secretariat (COMSEC)

The contemporary Commonwealth is a voluntary association of 54 independent sovereign
states covering one third of the world’s population. As the successor to the former British
Commonwealth of Nations/British Empire, many of its members are former British
colonies. All member states, except for Rwanda (admitted in 2009) and Mozambique
(admitted in 1995) have experienced direct or indirect British rule,14 or have been linked
administratively to another Commonwealth country.
Even if for some observers the Commonwealth is still an anachronistic club struggling
with its colonial heritage,15 the association has been able to adjust itself to post-colonial
challenges. As Shaw remarks, ‘the Commonwealths do have something to contribute to
global governance at the start of the new millennium in both analysis and practice, even if
the rest of the world, including almost all the academy, has yet to so notice’.16
Legal capacity in peace and security
Commonwealth members have never adopted a foundational treaty that would permit the
association to have international legal personality. This is the reason why the official
declarations of the Commonwealth—which are made not by the COMSEC but by heads of
government in the first person plural—often tag it as ‘an association’17 or as ‘a platform’.18
Indeed, when the COMSEC was founded in 1965, member states declared that ‘the
Commonwealth is not a formal organisation’,19 and ever since the ethos of the organisation
rejects formality.20 This view is, however, not consensual. Some COMSEC staff argue that
if practice makes law and since COMSEC operates as an international organisation, it
should then be recognised as so.21 Nevertheless, there is an inclination in academia to not
regard COMSEC as an international organisation. Larby and Hannam call it instead ‘a
forum for the expression of views and exchange of ideas in a confidential and informal
atmosphere’,22 whereas Dale describes it as ‘a community of nations joined together by
agreed terms of association’,23 and Anyaoku as a ‘system of networks’.24 The
Commonwealth Secretariat Act 1966—an act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom
that established the legal character of the Secretariat—granted the Secretariat full legal
immunity but it did not endow it with the status of an international organisation. The
COMSEC should, hence, be regarded as an ‘arrangement’ and not as an ‘agency’.
Secondly, the association cannot be considered a ‘regional’ actor under Chapter VIII
because its membership area does not hold any territorial coherence. In fact, the dispersion
is even celebrated by the Commonwealth as one of its trademarks. The Singapore
Declaration exalts that the members of the Commonwealth ‘come from territories in the
six continents and five oceans’ (para. 2), whereas the Harare Declaration states that, ‘the
special strength of the Commonwealth lies in the combination of the diversity of its
members’ (para. 3). The Millbrook Action Program talks, furthermore, of an organisation
with ‘global reach’ (para. 7). The Commonwealth ‘is now praised not for its unity but its
diversity, and for its diversity rather than its strength’.25 It likes to look at itself as a value-
based and not geographically-based organisation.26 Nevertheless, the Commonwealth has
been invited to participate in every High-Level Meeting between the UN Secretary-General
and the Heads of regional organisations since their inception (1994). The UN Secretariat’s
invitations did not derive from a rigorous assessment of the COMSEC’s profile, rather they
are a sign of the enduring tendency of the Secretariat to be inclusive and politically
conformist. The lack of straightforwardness brings, however, some negative consequences
as it conveys the wrong impression that the COMSEC can operate under a Chapter VIII
banner.
The association holds, nonetheless, an internal legal capacity to address security issues.
Since its foundation, it has adopted several declarations on this matter. The first
fundamental statement is the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles, which was issued at
the 1971 summit in Singapore (aka Singapore Declaration). The Declaration defines the
voluntary character and consensual working methods of the Commonwealth, specifying
its objectives, which include democracy, human rights, good governance, rule of law,
multilateralism and world peace. Stating these overall guiding principles does not confer a
clear mandate to the organisation to intervene directly in these areas, but provides a broad
political framework within which the Commonwealth functions. It is true that the
Declaration also enounces that member states ‘recognise that the security of each member
state from external aggression is a matter of concern to all members’ (para. 13), which
seems to put the organisation in the radar of collective defence. Yet, the declaratory level
has never been accompanied by any political or military decision and there seems to be no
intention to do so in the near future.
Twenty years later, the Commonwealth adopted another landmark declaration. The
Harare Commonwealth Declaration of 1991 sets out more clearly the Commonwealth’s
commitment to ‘soft’ security through the promotion of democracy, rule of law and good
governance. This course was substantiated when in 1995 the Millbrook Commonwealth
Action Program on the Harare Declaration was adopted. Millbrook introduces compulsory
adherence to the Harare principles, and, in enforcing them, includes aspects of both carrot
and stick approaches. The programme encourages the membership to empower the
Commonwealth Secretariat to provide incentives for upholding the core political values of
the Harare Declaration. For serious or persistent offending countries, suspension and
expulsion from the Commonwealth altogether are permitted. The Declaration has been
invoked amply and led to the temporary suspension of several members: Nigeria (1995 –
1999), Pakistan (1999 –2004 and 2007), Sierra Leone (1997 – 2001), Zimbabwe (suspended
in 2002, withdrew from the organisation in 2003) and Fiji Islands (2000 – 2001 and 2006 –
present). Within the Secretariat, the organ tasked to assess the nature of the infringement
and recommend measures for collective Commonwealth action is the Commonwealth
Ministerial Action Group, convened by the Secretary-General and composed of the Foreign
Ministers of nine Commonwealth member countries, supplemented as appropriate by one
or two additional ministerial representatives from the region concerned. The Group is
‘underfunded and unappreciated, often receiving less than sympathetic/empathetic
responses to its rulings on patterns of governance in members states’,27 but it does a
fundamental job in enforcing the COMSEC’s principles.
The Commonwealth’s allegiance to good governance has been reiterated ever since. In
2003, leaders adopted the Aso Rock Commonwealth Declaration on Development and
Democracy committing to making democracy work better for pro-poor development by
implementing sustainable development programmes and enhancing democratic
institutions and processes. In 2007, in Kampala, the Commonwealth Summit
(CHOGM) agreed on new criteria for membership. According to the new rules, new
applicants should accept and comply with Commonwealth fundamental values. And in
2009, the CHOGM adopted the Trinidad and Tobago Affirmation on Commonwealth Values
and Principles, where allegiance to democracy, rule of law and human rights was advocated.
Hence security, through the Commonwealth’s lenses, is mostly regarded as a ‘soft’ issue
and associated with democracy and good governance promotion. Although the association
may intermittently also show some commitment to mobilising resources for ‘conflict
prevention, resolution and management’, for curbing illicit trade in small arms and light
weapons,28 or for the fight against terrorism,29 its political focus and resources are centred
on the promotion of democracy, constitutional law and good governance. Its staff has even
acquired a reputation for its strong expertise on these issues. Its role is hence similar to other
organisations, namely the Council of Europe, one of the largest and oldest European
organisations.
Operational experience in Africa
The good offices role of the Secretary-General (or his Special Envoys) is the
Commonwealth’s primary mechanism for addressing political problems and conflicts
where they arise.30 In 2003 a Good Offices Section established within the Political Affairs
Division was tasked to provide an early warning mechanism, propose measures for
preventive action and co-ordinate integrated approaches to conflict and political tensions
within member states. Since its establishment there has been a significant increase in the
scope and depth of the Secretary-General’s good offices role. As one of the trademarks of
the COMSEC is its institutional timidity and informality, the Secretary-General has always
been able to interact directly with heads of government.31
The historical precedent was the initiative taken by Secretary-General Arnold Smith to
mediate in the dispute over the independence claim of Biafra (Nigeria) in 1967. Since then
the Secretary-General has mediated tens of conflicts in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and the
Pacific. In the specific case of Africa, facilitation efforts occurred in Lesotho after the 1998
elections between the government and opposition. The Commonwealth worked closely
with all international partners, including the South African Development Community
(SADC), to encourage the signing of an agreement that worked out the modalities for
electoral reform involving a new voter register and the adoption of a system of
proportional representation. The COMSEC provided support to the independent electoral
commission and observed the subsequent elections in 2002, which were accepted by all
political parties.
The Secretary-General has also used his good offices to promote dialogue between the
United Kingdom and Mauritius over the Chagos Islands (2004). Don McKinnon met with
Prime Minister Paul Berenger, criticised the Orders in Councils passed by the British
Government that provided for a total ban on all Chagossians returning to their islands and
supported Mauritius in its struggle to recover its sovereignty over the Chagos. McKinnon
offered Mauritius the support of the Commonwealth Legal Advice Office to take the case
to the International Court of Justice. Despite these efforts, COMSEC’s role had little
impact and the row has remained active.
In South Africa, a Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons though not immediately
successful in ending apartheid, was an important factor in the release of Nelson Mandela.
In 1986 the seven-member Group (headed by Malcolm Fraser, former premier of
Australia, and Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, former Nigerian head of state) met with Mandela,
who since 1962 had been serving a life sentence in the Pollsmoor jail outside Cape Town,
and with President Botha as well as with leaders of southern Africa’s independent black
states. After discussions with Mandela, the Group proposed to the South African
government that the ANC should be allowed to operate freely as a political movement,
with Mandela at its head. Botha offered to set Mandela free in return for his open support
of South Africa’s reform initiatives and provided that the ANC declare an end to its
guerrilla war. It was one of the first breakthroughs in the political conflict.32
Other COMSEC efforts are worth mentioning. In Swaziland, special envoy Ketumile
Masire facilitated the adoption of a new constitution in 2005. In Zanzibar, the
Commonwealth facilitated the implementation of the Muafaka peace agreement (2001). In
Cameroon, Commonwealth assistance with the implementation of a wide range of reforms
resulted in the establishment of the first independent election management body in
Cameroon (since 2002). In Swaziland, a Commonwealth mediation team intervened in the
country’s ‘rule of law’ crisis by bringing King Mswati III together with five of the six South
African judges who resigned from the country’s Court of Appeal (2003). In The Gambia,
special envoy Abdulsalami Akubakar is promoting dialogue between political parties. The
focus has also been on the strengthening of democratic processes and institutions,
including the judiciary through the provision of Commonwealth judges and prosecutors
(since 2005). In Kenya, the Commonwealth’s envoy, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, facilitated
efforts aimed at finding a solution to the crisis (2008). The Commonwealth also supported
Kofi Annan and the Panel of African Eminent Personalities’ efforts to negotiate a peace
settlement. Finally, in Fiji former New Zealand governor-general Paul Reeves met regime
leaders to try to discuss a return to democracy, but with no tangible results (2009).
The Commonwealth has also undertaken peacekeeping missions in Africa involving police
and armed forces with a ‘soft mandate’ but has not undertaken, and is not designed to
undertake, any enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In 1979 a
Commonwealth Monitoring Force was set up to address the intrastate conflict in Southern
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The role of the multinational force was to keep peace between 22,000
guerrillas and the Rhodesian forces during the ceasefire run-up to the 1980 elections in
independent Zimbabwe. The Force had about 1,400 members—most of them British
personnel, with detachments from New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Fiji and Kenya. The
presence of Commonwealth peacekeepers in what would otherwise have been a unilateral
British operation added international legitimacy to the intervention, helped to build
confidence among the rebel leaders and ensure that the final settlement did not force the rebels
to end their struggle on unfavourable terms.33 The UN Institute for Disarmament Research
describes the Monitoring Force as ‘one of the most effective demilitarisation operations that
has been mounted’.34Albeit successful, it was the only Commonwealth military engagement.
The Commonwealth’s ad hoc decision to intervene was motivated mainly by the lack of any
other interested player (namely the UN). But over time, as the UN increased its global
peacekeeping presence, the COMSEC felt less pressured to remain on that path.
From a look at the operational experience of the COMSEC some conclusions can be
reached. First and foremost, the Commonwealth is manifestly more tailored to engage
with soft security issues (namely through the good offices of the Secretary-General) than
with peacekeeping or enforcement. The Secretariat has neither the resources nor the
political will to be involved with hardcore security measures, a field where its comparative
advantages vis-à-vis other organisations would diminish. Griffin argues that it would even
be self-defeating since the non-military, co-operative and non-threatening nature of the
Commonwealth is ‘its greatest asset’.35 COMSEC also has some comparative advantages in
peacemaking and conflict prevention vis-à-vis other organisations active in Africa. In a
continent so suspicious of foreign interventions and exploitation, the COMSEC can
almost be considered a ‘native’ organisation as over 95 per cent of its members have
experienced colonial rule and therefore are also sensitive to Western meddling (namely
through the UN or the EU). On the other hand, it does not run into the same problems as
African organisations which are often so entrenched in the problems (or even cause them)
that they cannot offer a non-partisan view to the conflict.36 This can somehow explain why
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has not played a cogent role
in The Gambia in 2010 or the African Union (AU) in Zimbabwe over the last decade.
Moreover, in some situations the COMSEC may be seen as a more digestible organisation
for domestic constituencies because it does not have a peacekeeping capacity and therefore
will shy away from becoming involved with sensitive military issues.37
The good offices work of the group goes hand-in-hand with democracy promotion.
Whereas mediation presents a short-term solution, democratisation addresses the root
causes. This dialectic was present, for instance, in the Commonwealth’s intervention in the
Maldives. A special Commonwealth envoy held talks with political parties in the Maldives
on drafting a new constitution, as the main opposition group accused the government of
orchestrating attacks on five of its members. This was followed by long-term assistance. As
Duxbury suggests, ‘The Commonwealth [ . . . ] with disparate cultural and ethnic
backgrounds, has [been able to] use the human rights debate to reaffirm and reform its
role as an international organisation’.38 This goes in line with the suggestions contained in
the Report of the Commonwealth Expert Group on Development and Democracy.39 In the
section on ‘Peace and Security’, the Expert Group enunciated that ‘the Commonwealth has
a comparative advantage in promoting and supporting a multilateral approach [on
democratisation processes] that is based on peer review, engagement and pressure’ (para.
209). This was reiterated some years later by the Commonwealth Commission on Respect
and Understanding: ‘Civil Paths to Peace’, under the chairmanship of Amartya Sen.
International Organisation of La Francophonie (IOF)

The IOF is the institutional organisation that brings together the Francophonie or, to put it
in other words, the people and states speaking French. It brings together 56 different states
and governments,40 of which 32 have French as an official language, whereas the others
either have French as one of the shared languages or are influenced by French culture.41
While the Charter of the IOF was only adopted in 2005, the roots of the organisation can
be traced back to the 1960s. The founding fathers of the Francophonie portrayed it in
absolute and ideal terms. For Habib Bourguiba, the first president of Tunisia, it was the
French language that allowed the members of the francophone community to become
‘truly human beings’. He added that the Francophonie was ‘situated beyond politics and
geography’.42 In similar terms, Léopold Sédar Senghor, the first President of Senegal, wrote
that ‘In the rubble of the colonization, we find this wonderful tool: the French language’.43
Yet, the Francophonie would take some time to become institutionalised. The deadlock
was only broken in 1986 when the first Summit of the heads of states and governments
having French language in common was convened in Paris.44 This Summit bringing
together 42 participating governments marked the beginning of a new era for the
institution. The current set up of the IOF only emerged, however, after the tenth Summit
held in 2004 in Ouagadougou where the member states and governments agreed to
energise the intergovernmental institution by giving it a juridical personality and adopting
a charter that would clarify the structure of the various agencies and institutions of the
Francophonie.
The IOF qualifies fully as an international organisation or as an ‘agency’, using the UN

jargon. The IOF Charter adopted in 2005 states that, ‘The International Organisation
of la Francophonie is a legal person of public international law and has legal personality’
(art. 9),45 and its Secretariat in Paris grants it the status of a permanent organisation. It is
thus fully capable to sign memoranda of understanding with the UN Secretariat.
Nonetheless, the organisation cannot be typified as a ‘regional’ organisation, since there is

no territorial integrity amongst its 56 members, and therefore cannot operate under Chapter
VIII of the UN Charter. Indeed, the IOF’s discourse is often based on the idea of defending
plurilingualism and cultural pluralism.46 Even its five-colour logo symbolises the union
between the five continents, bestowing it with the status of a global organisation. Hence, the
organisation’s work in conflict prevention should be authorised instead under Chapter VI,
Article 33 (Pacific Settlement of Disputes). Even so, this has not prevented the Francophonie
(similarly to the Commonwealth) from participating since 1998 in the regular High-Level
Meetings convened by the UN Secretary-General with regional organisations.
Finally, the IOF has an explicit legal mandate to manoeuvre in the security sector.
Indeed, security issues have been part of the Francophonie’s agenda since the late 1980s. At
the third Summit held in Dakar in 1989 democracy and human rights were added as one of
the main thematic priorities for the Francophonie’s co-operation, which was
supplemented by peace and security at the following Summit in 1991. Yet, the
Francophonie did not have a strong legal mandate to operate in that area. This gap was
first filled in 2000 with the adoption of the Bamako Declaration on Democracy, Freedoms
and Rights in the Francophone Space which would serve as the blueprint for the projects of
the Francophonie in the domain of democracy and human rights, notably through the
establishment of international networks and institutional- and capacity-building. More
specifically, Article 5 of the Bamako Declaration details the instruments and procedures
the Francophonie can use to ensure the respect of democracy and human rights within the
member states. These include a permanent evaluation of the human rights and democratic
situations in the member states (Art. 5 –1), the possibility to send mediators (Art. 5 – 2)
and the possibility for the Permanent Council to take sanctions (Art. 5 – 3).
The adoption of the IOF Charter in 2005 was another important milestone. Even if it
does not include any specific articles giving a mandate to the Francophonie in regard to
peace and security, it nevertheless reiterates, in Article 1 (Objectives), the affirmed aims of
peace, support for democratic processes, rule of law, human rights and conflict resolution.
In 2006, in order to strengthen the legal capacity of the Francophonie in the field of
conflict prevention and security, member states adopted during the Ministerial Conference
the Saint Boniface Declaration on Conflict Prevention and Human Security. This Declaration
emphasises the role of the Francophonie in regard to election observation, mediation and
conflict prevention and at the same time calls for a greater involvement of francophone
countries in peacekeeping operations. For example Article 4 states that the member states
‘reaffirm their will to strengthen the conflict prevention role of the Organisation
Internationale de la Francophonie [ . . . ] so as to enable it to play its part in terms of
observation, early warning, preventive diplomacy, crisis management, support to
transitional processes and peace building within a framework of systematic collaboration
with international and regional organizations’.47 The Saint Boniface Declaration also
recognises the responsibility to protect human security and the responsibility of the
international community to act, with a UN mandate, in cases of gross violations of human
rights (Art. 3). This ‘responsibility to protect’ had already been mentioned in the
Ouagadougou Declaration (Art. 80) adopted in 2004 at the tenth Summit.
Moreover, in 2008, at the end of the Québec Summit, heads of state and government
adopted a declaration expressing the commitment to work more vigorously to promote
peace, democracy and human rights, including ‘to strengthen the work of the IOF in early
warning, preventive diplomacy and mediation, in close liaison with the UN and regional
organisations’ (Art. 17); and ‘to reinforce the capacity of francophone states in peacekeeping,
and encourage them to provide the United Nations and regional organisations with
francophone troops (military, police and civilians), to the extent of their means’ (Art. 17).
These commitments were cemented at the Montreaux Summit of 2010, with the adoption of
the Resolution on the Bamako Declaration Ten years after its Adoption.
Since the adoption of the Bamako Declaration in 2000, the Francophonie (mainly through
the Secretary-General) has tried to find solutions to political crises. In Côte d’Ivoire, the
Francophonie participated, as an observer, in the talks between the government and the
rebel forces which ended with the signing of the Linas –Marcoussis Agreement in January
2003. The Francophonie was represented by its delegate for human rights and democracy
and by Lansana Kouyaté, its special representative for Côte d’Ivoire. A working group was
also instituted to monitor the follow-up of the agreement. The Secretary-General Abdou
Diouf also met on numerous occasions with Ivorian government officials in order to find a
solution to the crisis. The IOF’s role was, however, marginal when compared to the
ECOWAS, which deployed a 1,300-troop peacekeeping mission (in co-ordination with
3,800 French forces) and had a peremptory role in pacifying the country. Some years later,
in 2007, Burkinabe President Blaise Compaoré played the role of mediator by bringing
together President Laurent Gbagbo and the leader of the former rebel New Forces,
Guillaume Soro, which led to the signing of a peace agreement.

In the Comoros, the IOF involved itself in the mediation between the conflicting parties.
With the collaboration of other international actors it helped in reaching an agreement
signed by all the parties in December 2003. The Francophonie was also a member of the
committee monitoring the implementation of the provisions made in the Agreement. The
OIF is also involved in the reconstruction of the Comorian state institutions including its
Court and its Parliament. But in 2008, when the archipelago plunged again into instability,
the IOF only managed to send an election observation team, whereas the muscle was
provided by an AU peacekeeping mission (AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to
the Comoros), composed of 1,500 troops.
Secretary-General Abdou Diouf delegated a fact-finding mission in 2004 –2005 to the
Central African Republic (CAR) following political unrest in the country. The
Francophonie became involved in the capacity-building effort for the National
Dialogue—a conference aimed at resolving the political tension in the country. Later
on, the Francophonie participated in the follow-up committee on the implementation of
the National Dialogue provisions. A more or less similar pattern was used in regard to
Burundi (2005) and to Chad (2005 – 2006). In the Central African Republic (CAR), the
merit of bringing back security to the country should be given, however, to the Economic
and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) and Economic Community of
Central African States (ECCAS), which deployed military forces to mitigate the conflict.48
The Democratic Republic of the Congo also benefited from the Francophonie’s support
in its transition process. The Francophonie organised an international seminar on the
management of the transitional institutions in Kinshasa in 2004, which paralleled its
capacity-building effort towards the Congolese institutions. But the largest contribution
has been provided by the UN, which has deployed the world’s biggest peacekeeping
mission (25,000 personnel), estimated to cost more than US$1 billion a year (United
Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo).
Following the coup in Mauritania in 2005, the Permanent Council decided to suspend
some of the projects that the Francophonie was carrying out in the country. Nevertheless,
the IOF expressed its readiness to resume those projects and provide support to the
democratic transition if the military junta announced its intention to hold democratic
elections. A fact-finding mission was thus sent to Mauritania and institutional-building
support was provided (including to the Mauritanian Constitutional Council). Elections
were eventually held in 2006 and 2007, but in 2008 another coup ousted president Sidi
Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi. The IOF decided to suspend Mauritania. Mohamed
Ould Abdel Aziz, who led the coup, later won the 2009 Presidential election, which was
observed by several international organisations, including the IOF.
To diffuse the political crisis that occurred in Togo in 2005, regarding the succession of
President Gnassingbé Eyadema, Secretary-General Abdou Diouf convened a special
meeting of the Permanent Council that eventually condemned the unconstitutional
succession and even decided to suspend Togo until it returned to its constitutional order.
Other organisations, such as the AU or ECOWAS, have also reacted forcefully to the
unlawful takeover and threatened Togo with sanctions.
In January 2009 the IOF dispatched a mission to Guinea for talks with the leader of the
National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD), Moussa Dadis Camara, who
had seized power the month before. The delegation also met with several other Guinean
social and political stakeholders. The IOF Permanent Council strongly condemned the use of
violence, especially sexual violence against women perpetrated by the CNDD and decided to
suspend Guinea. The AU and the ECOWAS have taken the same condemnatory measures in
protest against the coup. The IOF supported the mediation efforts of the ECOWAS led by the
President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré. In December 2010 Alpha Conde was declared
winner in Guinea’s first democratic election since gaining independence from France in 1958,
taking over from the military junta which had seized power in 2008. General Siaka Toumany
Sangare from the IOF was named Election Commission Head contributing to settling a
number of tensions which could have compromised a peaceful election.
In the various instances where the Francophonie has involved itself as a mediator or a
facilitator to resolve a crisis it has never really managed to be the lead actor but has in
general acted alongside other and more important mediation efforts. In several conflict
situations the IOF has been unable to portray itself as a credible actor that can lead the
efforts in terms of conflict prevention and mediation. This is so for a set of reasons. First,
the Francophonie still suffers from an image that associates it with the sole aim of
promoting French language and francophone culture in the world. The organisation is
largely regarded as a cultural, not security organisation, and seen as a vehicle ‘for the
defence of French exceptionalism in the face of “Anglo-Saxon” cultural hegemony’.49
Second, organisational resources are still weak. Even if the Secretariat has established the
Delegation for Peace, Democracy and Human Rights (Délégation à la Paix, la Démocratiet et
aux Droits de l’Homme, DDHDP), an Observatory in charge of presenting to the
Secretary-General regular reports on the advancement of democracy, in the francophone
area, and is expected to establish a conflict early alert mechanism, the organisation still
lacks muscle to make an expressive contribution to security management. The IOF has
tried to overcome its organisational limitations by focusing on the good offices role of the
Secretary-General. From a cost-benefit perspective, the mediation role of the Secretary-
General ensures a high level of visibility for the organisation at a minimum financial and
political cost. But it is unlikely to provide conflicting parties a definite and sustainable
solution to their problems. Aware of its own breadth, the IOF has attempted to focus on
conflict prevention and early warning. The organisation has signed memoranda of
understanding with African organisations that have run early warning mechanisms (e.g.
the AU) and organised best-practices conferences with the UN, AU, EU and ECOWAS.
There is, however, a clear distinction between expectations and deliverables as the
organisational capacity of the IOF is still weak in this area. For instance, the organisation
has not given itself strong political and organisational means to attain a number of set
objectives in the area of democracy promotion. Although some members have been
suspended due to their low democratic credentials (e.g. Mauritania, Togo, Madagascar or
Guinea), some governments, such as Québec and Canada, have pushed for the adoption of
a more robust mechanism to allow the organisation to play a more vigorous role when it
comes to the protection of human rights and the practice of democracy (along the same
lines as the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group). Such a measure was never
approved. The early warning mechanism is also not operational. This point is
complemented by Bryant, who highlights that the notion of French exception in the field
of defence policy is more a question of rhetoric than substance. This rhetoric serves
specific political and professional interests, she argues. It can be mobilised to cajole French
public opinion whenever the government is under criticism since anti-Americanism

remains a winning card in French domestic politics.50
Third, there is the perception that the Francophonie is a veiled instrument used by France
to push forward its own interests or to institutionalise the idea of French exceptionalism.51
Recently, French President Sarkozy stressed the need to make more frequent use of the
French language in international institutions, including the EU, and called for a more
‘offensive Francophony’.52 Ager describes with lucidity the way France uses the institutional
structure of the IOF to project its national interests and to foster its historical ties with Third
World countries. He notes that ‘the meetings [Summit of Heads of State] ensure that France
does not forget the obligations of an ex-colonial power to her former colonies, and that the
implications of the French point of view in international diplomacy are fully understood
and their effect on her actual and potential friends are calculated and evaluated’.53 He also
argues that ‘it is inevitable that France should take the lead among French-speaking
countries’ in ways that contrast with the anglophone Commonwealth since there is no other
member state of the IOF whose economy, population or influence matches that of France.54
It would be unfair, however, to judge the Francophonie as simply an element of French
foreign policy, much less a tool of neo-colonialism.55 After all it was three African leaders—
Senghor, Bourguiba and Diori—who proposed the idea. But even if the IOF shall not be
unfairly regarded as an extension of the Quai d’Orsay, the Francophonie serves clearly as a
tool to project France abroad. French domination is facilitated by the weak capacity of Third
World states to push their positions forward. The way the Summits are organised, bringing
together the Heads of States serves the French Presidency well as foreign policy has always
remained one of its ‘domaine reservé’.56 It is symptomatic that French-speaking countries
that resent French dominance, such as Algiers, have decided to stay out of the IOF.
Due to (or despite) this background, it is manifest that the Francophonie aims to
become increasingly involved in issues pertaining to peace and security. There is actually a
tendency to adopt UN General Assembly resolutions that commend the contribution of
the organisation in the security field.57 Hence, although the Francophonie can still be
regarded as a newcomer in the field, security-related activities may take on a relevance that
may surpass the more traditional effort of the IOF regarding co-operation for sustainable
development.
Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP)

The CPLP is one of the main global symbols of the Lusophone cultural heritage, comprising
eight countries that have Portuguese as an official language spreading across four
continents.58 The institutionalisation of Lusophone co-operation was set into motion in
1989 with the proposal of the Brazilian government to establish an International Portuguese
Language Institute, which is now one of the institutional instruments of the CPLP.59 But the
formal establishment of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries only
materialised in 1996 and was aimed at serving as an instrument for promoting Lusophone
culture and the Portuguese language in the world. The Community was thus founded upon
common cultural denominators with no reference to its role in security and defence.
Since the beginning Portugal has been acting as the main driving force of the
organisation. Beyond running the Secretariat in Lisbon, it provides most of the human and
financial resources. As MacQueen pointed out, ‘the CPLP represented the first determined
attempt by the Portuguese state to frame its post-colonial relationships in a
comprehensibly “European” way’.60 In contrast, the degree of importance conferred by
Brazil to the CPLP is proportional to the limited importance that the Community holds
on the international scene.61 In fact, Brazil is far from prioritising the Portuguese-speaking
countries in its foreign policy towards Africa,62 preferring a more continental and bilateral
approach. Although the CPLP Secretariat emphasises that decision-making is based on
consensus and thereby no country is able to stick out,63 in practice Lisbon is the main
string puller on the backstage of decision-making.
According to CPLP’s Statutes, adopted in July 1996, the Community has legal personality
and is recognised as an intergovernmental organisation (Art. 2). Since it is considered an
‘agency’, the CPLP has the juridical ability to enter into international agreements. In this
light, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in 2008 where it calls for the CPLP
Secretariat to initiate consultations with a view to considering the establishment of a
‘formal co-operation agreement’ with the UN.64 The CPLP cannot, however, be regarded
as a ‘regional’ organisation since there is no territorial coherence amongst its members
(spread out across Latin America, Europe, Africa and Southeast Asia). The CPLP
Secretariat tends to dispute this idea by arguing that its actions have regional implications
and therefore it should be regarded as a Chapter VIII organisation,65 even if in some

forums the Community leaders have declared that ‘the geographical discontinuity of the
CPLP is its strength’ as it permits it to be represented in four continents.66 This seems to be
a very idiosyncratic reading of the UN Charter and, therefore, it is still incongruous that
the above-mentioned UN General Assembly resolution is framed under Chapter VIII,
which constitutes a disregard for international norms.67 The UN’s lack of coherence is also
mirrored in the invitation to the Community to join the High-Level Meetings with
regional organisations (the CPLP participated for the first time in 2003). For an
organisation with such a limited security profile and low organisational capacity, the
CPLP’s decision to participate seems to be motivated by the wish to stand on the same
ground as other similar participating organisations—such as the Commonwealth and

Francophonie—rather than due to political and operational legitimacy.
In what regards the internal legal capacity of the CPLP to operate in the security field the
situation is less controversial. When its Statutes were signed in 1996 co-operation in the
areas of security and defence was neglected since priority was to be given to the common
linguistic, historical and cultural matrix that underpinned the initiative.68 However,
defence and security soon flourished as a subject of common interest to the CPLP. In 1999,
an Agreement for the Globalization of the Technical-Military Cooperation was signed by
Portuguese-speaking Ministers of Defence in Praia, Cape Verde, which called for the
expansion and consolidation of defence co-operation—from bilateralism to multi-
lateralism. To integrate this new dimension the CPLP revised its Statutes in 2001 and
included ‘defence’ in the list of areas of co-operation (Art. 3b).
The most resolute step towards the overhauling of its legal capacity in security issues was
however taken in September 2006 through the adoption of the Protocol for Co-operation in
Defence Among the Portuguese-Speaking Countries (at the ninth Meeting of Defence
Ministers in Praia). The process leading up to the signing of the Protocol took about three
years. It was tailored to integrate and articulate a set of activities that had been conducted in
an uncoordinated way within the CPLP.69 Amongst these activities the most relevant ones
are the so-called ‘Felino’ joint military exercises, conducted annually since 2000 with the
purpose of developing synergies between military personnel in the armed forces of the
CPLP countries.70 The Protocol’s main objectives were to create a common platform for
sharing military defence knowledge, to promote a common policy of co-operation on
defence matters and to contribute to the development of internal military capabilities, with
the purpose of strengthening the armed forces of the CPLP countries. The Protocol also sets
forth the establishment, or the reinforcement of competences, of organs such as the Centre
for Strategic Analysis as related to the CPLP Defence Matters (CAE) (Maputo), the
Permanent Secretariat for Defence (SPAD) (Lisbon) and the Centres of Excellency in
Training to Peacekeeping Operations (soon to be established in Africa, probably in Angola).
It is ironic that the SPAD has been set up not at CPLP headquarters but rather within
the Directorate-General of National Defence Policy of the Portuguese Ministry of National
Defence. This has occurred for two main reasons: first, multilateral defence co-operation
within the CPLP stems largely from the original bilateral co-operation promoted by
Portugal since 1991;71 and, second, the CPLP Secretariat faces critical financial constraints.
It has no capacity to co-ordinate and financially support defence co-operation between its
member states and has somehow transferred this task to the Portuguese Ministry of
Defence. It is symptomatic that the SPAD runs on a budget line of the Ministry and that
there is no strong link between the SPAD and the CPLP Secretariat, even if it sends one
delegate to participate in the SPAD meetings twice a year. This division of labour sends a
strong message in terms of the limitations of the CPLP in operating as an autonomous
instrument of policy formulation.
CPLP’s defence co-operation policy is often entangled with Portugal’s governmental
agenda. Indeed, although the CPLP has adopted legal instruments to become a security
actor, it still operates under a strict intergovernmental and non-supranational basis. The
epicentre of security decision-making is still the annual meeting of CPLP Defence
Ministers and of Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHOD), which is responsible for the doctrinal,
operational and logistical aspects of planning, execution and evaluation of the ‘Felino’
Series Military Exercises. The scope of the CPLP Secretariat is also minimal in this regard
serving merely as an observer. It is important to recall that the foundation of the
independent Commonwealth Secretariat in 1965 was sparked, to a large extent, by the
mounting criticism of African countries over the traditional role played by the British
Cabinet Office of servicing Commonwealth meetings.72
Despite the high level of multilateral co-operation on defence issues, the CPLP’s
operational experience in conflict management is still meagre. In fact, the most systematic
contribution to security has been through election observation missions, which are
deployed with a considerable degree of autonomy unlike the earlier missions, embedded in
other organisations. The missions are however temporary and do not necessarily
contribute directly to security management. According to the CPLP’s Secretary Executive,
Domingos Simões Pereira, ‘the development of this capacity is one of the priorities on the
CPLP agenda in the near future’.73
Beyond electoral missions, the CPLP’s only interventions in Africa have been in Guinea
Bissau and Sao Tomé and Principe. In Sao Tomé the CPLP was quick in condemning the
coup against President Fradique de Menezes in 2003 and showed its availability to send a
mediation team in co-ordination with local regional organisations.
In Guinea Bissau the CPLP has employed its largest efforts thus far. In June 1998 a coup
attempt led to a protracted stalemate between loyalist and rebel forces. Troops from
neighbouring Senegal and Guinea, as well as from the regional peacekeeping force,
ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), intervened before elections were eventually
held in December 1999 and January 2000. The ECOWAS also set up a Committee of Seven,
chaired by the Foreign Minister of Cote d’Ivoire. The CPLP has intervened by, first,
condemning the revolt and demanding a return to constitutional government (similarly to
what the Organisation of African Unity and the EU did). And later it associated itself with
the good offices initiative of Portugal and Angola and set up a ministerial Contact Group,
co-ordinated by the Foreign Minister of Cape Verde.
However, these two organisations central to the mediating process—the ECOWAS and
CPLP—established a rivalry that threatened to undermine the peace process and prolong the
war. Both bodies were manipulated by extra-African powers. France used its influence within
the francophone members of the ECOWAS (namely Senegal and Guinea) to further its
support for President Nino Vieira, whilst Portugal sought to counter French influence and re-
establish its own position to mediate in the conflict.74 The rivalry between both organisations
was so evident that the ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyate alluded to Portugal’s
‘neo-colonial behaviour’,75 and it appealed to the Security Council to stop Portugal from
‘undermining regional efforts in resolving the conflict as well as to avoid supplying arms to
the rebels’.76 The CPLP’s mediation eventually led to the signature of a Memorandum of
Understanding, which was successful in ending the post-coup fighting and prevented the civil
conflict from escalating into a broader regional war.77
In 2003 another coup was staged in Guinea Bissau but the CPLP took a more moderate
position. In a communiqué it declared only that it was available to contribute to efforts
that resulted in the institutional normalisation of the country.78 It also supported the fact-
finding mission of the ECOWAS in the country. Seven years later, in April 2010, the
country was again shaken up by another crisis sparked by the detainment by soldiers of
Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior, in an apparent coup attempt. The CPLP dispatched
a mission led by its Executive Secretary and composed also by Portuguese diplomats
accredited in Bissau. As the situation was already fairly stable when the mission arrived, it
served mainly for Portugal and the CPLP to monitor and keep control of the situation.
Over the years Guinea Bissau has also become a major transit point for South American
drugs headed to Europe.79 To confront that threat an International Contact Group on
Guinea-Bissau (GIC-GB) was formed in 2006. Besides the CPLP it is formed among others
by France, Spain, Portugal, Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea and the Executive Secretariat of
the ECOWAS. The Contact Group called for reforms in Guinea Bissau’s justice sector to
support changes in defence and security. One of the accomplishments of the GIC-GB was
the inclusion of Guinea Bissau in the supporting list of the UN Peace-building
Commission. All CPLP member states and the CPLP Secretariat take part in the Peace-
building Commission’s discussions over Guinea Bissau.
CPLP is also about to take an important step with the proposed creation in some CPLP
countries of Centres of Excellency in Training to Peacekeeping Operations. They aim to fulfil
two important objectives: first, they will train national forces in international peacekeeping
norms. As pointed out by the former Defence Minister of Portugal, Nuno Severiano
Teixeira, it is important that ‘African countries have the capacity to intervene in their own
continent’.80 Second, each national Centre will be able to train other CPLP country’s
armed forces on areas of specific expertise. To a large extent, the programme seems to be
the Lusophone version of the old French RECAMP Programme (Reinforcement of African
Peacekeeping Capacities). Yet, much work lies ahead. The Centres still need to be certified
by the UN, AU and EU, and co-operation with other African military and research training
centres still needs to be articulated (such as the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training
Centre in Harare, the ECOWAS Training Centre of Excellence in Peace Support Operations
or the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre).
From this analysis two main conclusions emerge. Firstly, CPLP operational capacity and
experience is still very limited. The Community has only intervened in conflicts when the
process is driven by an interested state (normally Portugal), which means that the
Community is often used to provide a more institutional and legitimate clout to national
ambitions in Africa. It is symptomatic that, unlike the COMSEC and IOF, the CPLP
Executive Secretary has no tangible experience of serving as a conflict mediator (apart
from the inexpressive mission to Guinea Bissau in 2010), nor does the Secretariat have a
permanent structure to monitor the security situation of member states. It has only about
20 staff members and its budget is meagre. In 2008 it amounted to only EUR 1.2 million,
whereas the IOF’s reached EUR 79.3 million in the same year. Moreover, the CPLP
Secretariat has not grown since 1998 when it was founded, although the competences and
the objectives of the organisation have increased manifold. One of the reasons for the
CPLP’s narrow outreach is the timid participation of Brazil. Since the economic and
strategic gains of an increased participation would be limited, Brazil has centred its policy
on the CPLP largely on cultural issues.81 It is revealing that Brazil’s first Ambassador to the
Community (2006 –2010), Lauro Moreira, has made his professional career in the cultural
divisions of the Itamaraty. It is also symptomatic that when Luiz Felipe Lampreia and
Celso Lafer, the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Brazil from 1995 to 2002, reviewed
Brazil’s foreign policy under their respective mandates, the CPLP was almost neglected.82
Secondly, the CPLP has not been able to articulate its efforts in Africa with the local
regional organisations. This was clear in Guinea Bissau in 1998. Although the prevailing
orthodoxy dictates that the lead actor in conflict management should be the relevant
regional organisation on the basis that proximity leads to mutual understanding (this is the
reason why the OAU endorsed the ECOWAS as the prime organisation to address the
conflict), the CPLP and ECOWAS failed in the attempt to harmonise their common efforts.
National interests prevailed over the interests of Guinea Bissau. In Sao Tome and Principe
the tone was more sympathetic but distrust still exists between these organisations. The
difficulty in co-operating with the local organisations stems not only from political
divergences but may also be imputed to the different stages of maturity of the organisations.
The CPLP acknowledges that ‘it is a child when compared to the regional organisations’,83
and therefore institutional co-operation may sometimes pose a challenge.
Conclusions
The legitimacy of these organisations to engage in security issues derives, to a large extent,
from the fact that language and culture are a symbol of common identity.84 In the same way
that the legitimacy of Chapter VIII organisations stems from the idea that regional territorial
coherence presupposes the sharing of common problems and the upholding of common
solutions, so the COMSEC, IOF and CPLP feel that more than simply united by language
and culture, they are united by common interests towards the importance and centrality of
certain notions of humanism, universality and the purpose of political organisation.
The comparative analysis permits us to reach four important conclusions. Firstly, on the
legal capacity of these organisations, solely the IOF and the CPLP may be regarded as
international organisations with legal personality under international law. The Common-
wealth has, through the agency of the Secretariat and other organs, some relations with states
and international organisations, of an informal character. However, given its lack of
international legal capacity it cannot enter into agreements governed by international law,85
restricting its capacity to stand side-by-side with other actors that play an important role in
conflict management, such as the UN. There is, hence, a discrepancy between the UN’s high
ambitions on regional task-sharing and the reality on the ground. For instance, whereas Kofi
Annan’s ‘In Larger Freedom’ report of 2005 proposed the introduction of memoranda of
understanding between the UN and international organisations to foster the exchange of

information, expertise and resources,86 some organisations, such as the Commonwealth,
would not be legally entitled to sign those agreements.
Secondly, none of these organisations may be considered a ‘regional agency or
arrangement’ under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. This carries important implications.
According to international practice, when the UN is not able or willing to intervene in a
conflict crisis, Chapter VIII subsidiary would normally apply.87 In this context, the IOF,
COMSEC and CPLP would only be able to act when the UN or the regional and sub-
regional organisations revoke their prerogatives. Although the UN has a tradition of
inviting these three organisations to High-Level Meetings on the role of regional
organisations and, therefore, high expectations are generated on their operative role under
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, in fact, the IOF, COMSEC and CPLP have little scope
under international law. As the article showed, whenever these organisations insisted on
taking a resolute role and ended up disregarding the precedence of regional organisations
(such as the CPLP in Guinea Bissau), inter-institutional tension arose.
Thirdly, all of these organisations have adopted legal instruments to engage with
security issues. But this hasn’t always been the case. As we saw, the competence of the CPLP
was contested in the context of its intervention in Guinea Bissau in 1998. Unlike the
ECOWAS (the other main player), the CPLP was dismissed as a mere cultural organisation
with no legal mandate to intervene through mediation (as it ended up doing) or
peacekeeping (as it planned to do).88 This handicap was only revoked in 2006 when the
CPLP adopted the Protocol for Co-operation in Defence. The adoption of a distinct legal
mandate equips the organisation in terms of legal authority, political legitimacy and policy
coherence. The strong legal mandate of the IOF, COMSEC and CPLP is the only manifest
variable that vindicates the thesis, expressed in policy and academic circles, that
international organisations are well-equipped to handle regional security challenges.
Fourthly, the study also concluded that in what regards resources and experience, the
IOF and the CPLP, and to a large extent also the COMSEC, are still weak security players.
They have tried to overcome their constraints by finding specific security niches where
their comparative advantages could stand out. The CPLP has centred itself on defence co-
operation, whereas the IOF and the Commonwealth have centred themselves on good
governance promotion and peacemaking (namely through the Secretary-General’s
offices). Nonetheless, their added value is still questionable. Let us start with the IOF and
Commonwealth. Griffin argued in 2001 that ‘the Commonwealth seems almost uniquely
well suited to preventive diplomacy’,89 given its loose, consensual and non-threatening
character. But since then, African organisations have also developed strong expertise and
practice in peacemaking. The AU’s Panel of the Wise (operational since 2008), the
ECOWAS’ Council of Elders (created in 2001 and reformulated in 2003) or special envoys
sent by other African organisations have made important contributions.90 In 2000, the
COMSEC Secretary-General also claimed that his organisation was the only ‘with a set of
rules—and the power to implement these rules—that commit each country to promote
democratic processes and institutions’.91 Much has changed since then. The AU and
ECOWAS have shown ‘zero tolerance’ for unconstitutional changes of government in their
member states. The reaction to a coup in Niger in February 2010 was again unyielding.
Both organisations condemned the coup and the ECOWAS even dispatched a mediation
team to the country. The local organisations’ reaction was manifestly faster than the
Francophonie’s (it includes Niger amongst its members), which expressed condemnation
and, in a conceding attitude, supported the ECOWAS initiative.92 We have also seen that
IOF’s peacemaking interventions in Côte d’Ivoire, Comoros, Central African Republic,
Togo or Guinea were obfuscated by the more dexterous interventions of the ECOWAS, AU
and CEMAC/ECCAS. This does not obviously mean that the IOF and COMSEC’s
capacities in peacemaking shall not be exercised or even expanded. But their actions
should be articulated with the sub-regional organisations, which seldom happens now. In
1969, Arnold Smith, then Secretary-General of the Commonwealth had already declared
that he was a ‘strong believer’ in the value of ‘regional co-operation and regional
organisation’ outside of the Commonwealth.93
The poor operational capacity of these organisations, which is more evident in the cases of
the IOF and the CPLP, is mostly due to their poor institutional and financial capacity. They
lack human resources and administrative and organisational arrangements to play a

fundamental role in conflict management. Yet, often the question is not so much of adequate
resources but of legitimacy. The COMSEC, but mostly the IOF and the CPLP are still regarded
as Western-dominated organisations even if the majority of their members are from the
Southern hemisphere. When they intervene, they rely mostly on the resources of the bigger
powers, which sometimes elicits the impression that security interventions are actually
intrusions. Indeed, as each organisation is built upon a linguistic substractum, it is inevitable
that they are connoted with the countries that serve as the historical bastions of those
languages (Great Britain, France and Portugal). And since these countries are former colonial
powers, there is a tendency to regard the COMSEC, IOF and CPLP as institutional
arrangements to rescue and recycle old fashioned notions of imperium. The article has shown
that this was the case mostly with the IOF and CPLP. As Weinstein pointed out ‘some French
elites do try to control directly and indirectly the formal organisations of Francophonie, and,
thus, it may fail to become a transnational force in world politics’.94 It is inevitable, hence, that
the IOF faces ‘profound challenges because of the different interests of its members’.95 The
CPLP includes Brazil and Angola, two major regional powers, but Portugal has been able to
enjoy some prevalence due to these countries’ detachment from the Community. Where the
Commonwealth is concerned, Australia, Canada and India tend to look at Britain in a
horizontal way. This has led some authors to argue that the Commonwealth (unlike for
example the Organization of American States (OAS)) is well positioned to provide a truly
multilateral approach given its internal distribution of power and due to the fact that the US is
not a member.96
Finally, the poor capacity of these organisations in security management is also due to
their difficulty in defending a common view in international affairs. When the CPLP was
formed there were few illusions about the inherent fragility of the project. As MacQueen
notes, Brazil had joined the venture with considerable reservations and Mozambique had
already entered the Commonwealth.97 In another example, the resolute intervention in
Guinea Bissau in 1998 was not strongly supported by Brazil, which favoured instead a
minimalist approach; and Angola supported local African initiatives, namely the
ECOWAS’. Hence, if it is difficult for the eight-member CPLP to postulate a common
understanding of international affairs, for the IOF and COMSEC, with over 50 member
states, that task is a political chimera. Some claim that there is nothing in ‘common’ and no
‘wealth’ in the Commonwealth.98 Little Commonwealth unanimity in foreign affairs was,
for instance, apparent between the two Great Wars and even less during the Suez episode in
1956 or during apartheid.99 Already in 1959 Hedley Bull cautioned that it was a myth that
the Commonwealth could combine ‘the liberty of many states with the unity of one’ and
added that ‘the history of the Commonwealth [ . . . ] is one of continuous disintegration’.100
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Emmanuel Fanta and Francis Baert for their research assistance provided in
the course of a previous research project conducted at the United Nations University (UNU-CRIS).
Financial support was also provided by the Centre for Globalization and Development at the
University of Gothenburg.
Endnotes
1. League of Nations, ‘Covenant of the League of Nations’, much smaller former British Mandate territory of
Art. 21. Southern Cameroons.

2. As stated in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 15. Ford and Katwala, Reinventing the Commonwealth.
3. UN, ‘An Agenda for Peace’, para. 50. 16. Shaw, Commonwealth: Inter-and Non-State Contri-
4. UN, ‘Secretary-General’s Opening Address’. butions, 13; Interview with Timothy Shaw, Professor at
5. UN, ‘Secretary-General Remarks to the Security Council’. University of the West Indies and former Director of
6. Tavares, Regional Security; Alagappa and Inoguchi, the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of
International Security Management; Diehl and Lepgold, London. Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 12 March
Regional Conflict Management; Pugh and Sidhu, United 2010.
Nations and Regional Security; Weiss, Beyond UN 17. See, for instance, the Singapore Declaration, para. 1;
Subcontracting; Boulden, Dealing with Conflict in Millbrook Declaration, para. 7; 2002 Commonwealth
Africa; Graham and Felı́cio, Regional Security and Heads of Government Meeting: Coolum Communiqué,
Global Governance. para. 2; or the Aso Rock Commonwealth Declaration on
7. Lake and Morgan, Regional Orders, 5. Development and Democracy, para. 20.
8. Tavares, Regional Security, 165. 18. Declaration of Port of Spain (2009), para. 18.
9. Angelov, ‘Regional Involvement in Peace Operations’, 19. Agreed Memorandum of the Commonwealth Sec-
619. retariat, 105.
10. A trend that was initiated with the Economic 20. Slinn, ‘Commonwealth and the Law’, 25.
Community of West African States Monitoring 21. Interview with Nita Yawanarajah, Head of Good Offices
Group (ECOMOG)’s intervention in Liberia in 1990. Section of the Political Affairs Division at the Common-
11. Operational experience encapsulates the procedural wealth Secretariat, phone interview, 6 May 2010.
ability of an organisation to undertake action in 22. Larby and Hannam, Commonwealth, xvii.
the field in the maintenance of peace and security. 23. Dale, ‘Is the Commonwealth an International Organ-
This depends on the mechanisms that the partner ization?’, 472.
has developed to put into action the decisions it 24. Cited in Armstrong, ‘From International Community’, 44.
may have taken in conflict prevention, peace- 25. Austin, Commonwealth and Britain, 8.
making, peacekeeping, peace enforcement or peace- 26. Interview with Nita Yawanarajah, Head of Good Offices
building. Section of the Political Affairs Division at the Common-
12. Shaw, ‘Comparative Commonwealths’, 333. wealth Secretariat, phone interview, 6 May 2010.
13. UN, ‘Support to African Union Peacekeeping Oper- 27. Shaw, ‘Commonwealth(s) and Good Governance’, 507.
ations’; UN, ‘Co-operation Between the United 28. See Aso Rock Commonwealth Declaration on Devel-
Nations’; UN, ‘Relationship between the United opment and Democracy, para. 23.
Nations and Regional Organizations’. 29. See Report of the Commonwealth Committee on
14. It could be argued that Cameroon can also be seen Terrorism and the Plan of Action based on their
as an oddity since it’s a French-speaking country. Statement on Terrorism of 25 October 2001; and the
But the present territory is a merging of the formerly 2002 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting:
French Mandate territory of Cameroun with the Coolum Communiqué, paras. 6 and 7.
30. Ross, ‘Commonwealth’. 2004); A/RES/61/7 (20 October 2006); and

31. Mole, ‘From Smith to Sharma’, 44. A/RES/63/236 (17 March 2009) on ‘Co-operation
32. ‘Mandela Speculation May be Premature’. Chicago Between the United Nations and the International
Tribune, 8 May 1986. Organisation of la Francophonie’.
33. Bellamy et al., Understanding Peacekeeping, 42. 58. Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambi-
34. Ginifer, Managing Arms in Peace Processes, 3– 4. que, Portugal and São Tomé and Prı́ncipe are founding
35. Griffin, ‘Peacekeeping’, 157. members. East Timor joined in 2003.
36. Interview with Nita Yawanarajah, Head of Good Offices 59. Oliveira, ‘Os Fundamentos da CPLP’.
Section of the Political Affairs Division at the Common- 60. MacQueen, ‘Community of Illusions?’, 1.
wealth Secretariat, phone interview, 6 May 2010. 61. Miyamoto, ‘O Brasil e a Comunidade dos Paı́ses de
37. Ibid. Lı́ngua Portuguesa’.
38. Duxbury, ‘Rejuvenating the Commonwealth’, 345. 62. Ribeiro, Relações Polı́tico-Comerciais Brasil-África.
39. COMSEC, Making Democracy Work. 63. Interview with Sancho Coutinho, Political-Diplomatic
40. Plus 19 observers. Adviser at the CPLP Secretariat. Lisbon, Portugal, 9
41. This is the criteria to include countries such as Cape March 2010.
Verde, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Prı́ncipe, Cyprus or 64. A/63/L.41 (24 November 2008) on ‘Co-operation
Greece, which do not have French as a national language. Between the United Nations and the Community of
Moreover, the IOF not only brings together national Portuguese-speaking Countries’, para. 7.
governments but also includes federal entities such as the 65. Interview with Sancho Coutinho, Political-Diplomatic
Canadian provinces of New Brunswick and Quebec and Adviser at the CPLP Secretariat. Lisbon, Portugal, 9
the Belgian French Community. In order to accommo- March 2010.
date both national and sub-national governments, the 66. Final Declaration adopted at the tenth Meeting of
IOF speaks of participating governments (‘gouverne- CPLP Ministers of Defence, 17– 18 May 2008, 6.
ment participant’) rather than member states. 67. A/63/L.41 (24 November 2008) on ‘Co-operation
42. Cited in Majumdar, ‘Exceptionalism and Universalism’, 22. Between the United Nations and the Community of
43. IOD, ‘Léopold Sédar Senghor’, 6. Portuguese-speaking Countries’, Introduction.
44. The official denomination of the Summit (Conférence 68. Interview with Domingos Simões Pereira, Secretary
des Chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement ayant le français Executive of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking
en partage) will only be adopted in 1995 following the Countries (CPLP). Lisbon, Portugal, January 2011.
proposal of Maurice Druon at the Sixth Summit held in 69. Bernardino, Estratégias de Intervenção em África, 267.
Mauritius. 70. Felino exercises are aimed at improving the response
45. Authors’ translation. capacity of a CPLP light military force in the eventuality
46. Majumdar, ‘Exceptionalism and Universalism’, 26. of a crisis or conflict situation in one of the CPLP
47. Authors’ translation. member states. According to CPLP deliberations, a
48. Meyer, ‘Regional Conflict Management’. possible intervention will have to be requested by the
49. Majumdar, ‘Exceptionalism and Universalism’, 24. UN. So far 10 exercises have been held: 2000 (Portugal),
50. Bryant, ‘French Foreign and Defence Policy’. 2001 (Portugal), 2002 (Brazil), 2003 (Mozambique),
51. Hewlett, ‘France and Exceptionalism’; Majumdar, 2004 (Angola), 2005 (Cape Verde), 2006 (Brazil), 2007
‘Exceptionalism and Universalism’. (Sao Tomé and Principe), 2008 (Portugal), 2009
52. ‘Sarkozy Defends “Offensive” Francophony Concept’. (Mozambique), 2010 (Angola) and 2011 (Angola).
EuroActiv, 21 March 2008. 71. Interview with Colonel Mendonça, Military Adviser at
53. Ager, Francophonie in the 1990s, 3. the Portuguese Ministry of Defense (Direcção-Geral de
54. Ibid., 4. Polı́tica de Defesa Nacional). Lisbon, Portugal, 19 May
55. Aldrich and Connel, ‘Francophonie: Language, Culture 2010. Speaking in his personal capacity.
or Politics?’, 191. 72. Armstrong, ‘From International Community to Inter-
56. Cummings, ‘Commonwealth and Francophone Sum- national Organisation?’, 32.
mits’, 205. 73. Interview with Domingos Simões Pereira, Secretary
57. UNGA latest resolutions: A/RES/54/25 (15 November Executive of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking
1999); A/RES/56/45 (7 December 2001); A/RES/57/43 Countries (CPLP). Lisbon, Portugal, January 2011.
(21 November 2002); A/RES/59/22 (8 November 74. Massey, ‘Multi-faceted Mediation’, 18.
75. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Guinea

Bissau, 28.
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Covenant of the League of Nations already acknowledged the validity of regional

consensus at the UN level is that regional organisations offer a competent service in

(attached to governmental departments or to the CPLP and COMSEC) in Lisbon, London

Commonwealth Secretariat (COMSEC)

Legal capacity in peace and security

Operational experience in Africa

International Organisation of La Francophonie (IOF)

Legal capacity in peace and security

The IOF qualifies fully as an international organisation or as an ‘agency’, using the UN

Nonetheless, the organisation cannot be typified as a ‘regional’ organisation, since there is

Operational experience in Africa

Guillaume Soro, which led to the signing of a peace agreement.

public opinion whenever the government is under criticism since anti-Americanism

Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP)

Legal capacity in peace and security

and therefore it should be regarded as a Chapter VIII organisation,65 even if in some

ground as other similar participating organisations—such as the Commonwealth and

Operational experience in Africa

understanding between the UN and international organisations to foster the exchange of

lack human resources and administrative and organisational arrangements to play a

Art. 21. Southern Cameroons.

30. Ross, ‘Commonwealth’. 2004); A/RES/61/7 (20 October 2006); and

75. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Guinea

“Eleições Gerais”’[CPLP Regrets Coup in Guinea Nations University Press, Tokyo.

81. Miyamoto, ‘O Brasil e a Comunidade dos Paı́ses de

89. Griffin, ‘Peacekeeping’, 156. Defense in the Portuguese-Speaking Countries Com-

D’etat Intervenu Au Niger’, 19 February 2010. Politics 11(4), 577 –587.

99. Larby and Hannam, Commonwealth, xxii. thecommonwealth.org/document/181889/34293/35232/

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