The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/1363-951X.htm
PIJPSM
34,3
454
Received 8 March 2010
Revised 6 December 2010
Accepted 9 December 2010
Policing: An International Journal of
Police Strategies & Management
Vol. 34 No. 3, 2011
pp. 454-478
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
1363-951X
DOI 10.1108/13639511111157519
Police deviance and community
relations in Trinidad and Tobago
Nathan W. Pino
Department of Sociology, Texas State University, San Marcos,
Texas, USA, and
Lee Michael Johnson
Department of Sociology and Criminology, University of West Georgia,
Carrollton, Georgia, USA
Abstract
Purpose – Corruption and poor relations with citizens are known to be pervasive in the Trinidad and
Tobago Police Service (TTPS). Police deviance permeates all levels of the TTPS and threatens the
sustainability of reforms. The purpose of this study is to explore the nature and consequences of police
deviance in Trinidad and Tobago through the perspectives of community leaders.
Design/methodology/approach – Data were obtained through individual and focus group
interviews with members of local community-based and non-governmental organizations and the
Trinidad and Tobago Police Service in 2009. The data were examined to reveal respondents’
perceptions concerning the nature and consequences of police deviance as well as its solutions.
Findings – The types of police deviance that emerged as major themes were inadequate crime
control and protection of citizens, maltreatment of citizens, capricious response to criminals and bias
toward less serious crimes, and police corruption and collusion with criminals. However, respondents
also offered solutions and expressed optimism about police-community cooperation.
Social implications – Results suggest both the need and potential to improve police-citizen
relations and reduce police deviance. The paper discusses possible solutions, giving special attention
to sustainability and democratic policing reform.
Originality/value – Very little research has been conducted on police deviance in the Caribbean.
The few studies that can be found focus on brutality and rely more on police survey and official data.
Using in-depth interview data, the current study adds to this small body of research by describing the
impact of police deviance on community relations in Trinidad and Tobago.
Keywords Police deviance, Community relations, Trinidad and Tobago, Police misconduct,
Attitudes to the police, Community policing
Paper type Research paper
Focusing on the nation of Trinidad and Tobago (T&T), the current study seeks to add to
the very small body of literature on police deviance in the Caribbean. With a population
of almost 1.25 million, Trinidad and the smaller Tobago are small islands that sit
between the Caribbean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of South America
just northeast of Venezuela (CIA, 2009). Generally, police deviance involves the violation
of established boundaries dictating acceptable police behavior (Ivkovic, 2005). For the
purpose of this analysis, a broad definition of “police deviance” is accepted to include
several possible forms of misconduct. Police misconduct involves not only the violation
of criminal and civil laws but governmental and departmental policies establishing rules,
procedures, and regulations as well (Lynch and Diamond, 1983). Types of behavior
include brutality/excessive force, harassment, minor and serious corruption, violating
constitutional rights, and failure to perform duties (Geller, 1984).
 Police deviance has consequences that reach beyond management problems Police deviance
(including lawsuits) for police departments; it damages the relationship between and community
citizens and the police at the local and societal levels. Social costs include a lack of
public faith in, trust of, and support for law enforcement (Bayley, 2002). Citizens may relations
generalize incidents of police deviance in developing their perceptions of police
organizations or even the entire criminal justice system. The danger lies in that there is
a mutual dependency between citizens and police; citizens need police for public safety 455
and police need the cooperation of the community in order to provide public safety.
Awareness of police deviance undermines the public’s acceptance of police power as
legitimate. Poor perceptions of the police reduce the community’s willingness to assist
police in conducting their activities, for instance in aiding and cooperating in
investigations (Bayley, 2002). In response, officers may form unfavorable views of
citizens. Police deviance, then, fosters a cycle of mutual police-citizen antagonism
dysfunctional to the provision of public safety and administration of justice.
The importance of studying police deviance in T&T is elevated by the country’s
increasing violent crime rates. Police integrity and community cooperation are of
course essential in confronting crime problems. While property crimes declined
somewhat since the mid 1990s, violent crime has increased. Murders for example have
sharply increased since 2000. Yearly averages increased from 160 in 2001 and 2002, to
245 in 2003 and 2004, to 385 in 2005-2007, until there were 550 murders in 2008
(translating into 42.3 per 100,000 people) (Wells and Katz, 2008). This violent crime is
partly explained by the increased drug trade. The Caribbean is a major avenue through
which drugs are trafficked from South America to the USA (Deere et al., 1990). The
drug trade contributes to other social problems including police corruption (Griffith,
2000; Nanton, 2004).
There is reason to believe that T&T citizens lack a certain amount of trust and
confidence in police, which then makes them apprehensive about assisting police in
responding to crime. For example, citizens with knowledge concerning murder
investigations may fear that their lives will be in danger if they go to the police (Parks
and Mastrofski, 2008). It may be no coincidence then that the country’s homicide
clearance rate is only 7-8 percent (Wells and Katz, 2008). Surveys indicate that
approximately 60 percent of residents are highly fearful of crime (Deosaran, 2002).
Despite this fear, residents are afraid to go to the police because of lack of trust and the
suspicion that criminals will retaliate. The common perception in disadvantaged
communities is that officers associate with, or are even related to, criminals and will tip
them off if a citizen reports an offense. Therefore, residents in high crime areas have
much knowledge about crime and criminals in their neighborhoods but tend to keep it
to themselves (Deosaran, 2002).
The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS), then, suffers from a poor
reputation. The legitimacy of the service has been widely questioned, stemming in part
from accusations of drug corruption and favoritism, criminal convictions of police
officials, and the perception that police are indifferent and incompetent (Bennet and
Moribito, 2006). Numerous instances of use of excessive force have been criticized in
the media and by the general public (Deosaran, 2002). Internal investigations of police
misconduct rarely if ever occur on time, and according to a 1999 report, 18 officers were
allowed to continue working for the TTPS after being convicted of serious crimes
PIJPSM (Deosaran, 2002). The police in turn may develop poor impressions of the public.
34,3 Bennet and Moribito (2006, p. 243) state:
The police are demoralized, socially isolated, and antagonistic toward the public, and they
provide little in the way of unsolicited police services.
The reciprocally antagonistic relationship between citizens and police in T&T has
456 evolved into a culture of alienation (Bennet and Moribito, 2006). A survey of a random
sample of 451 households on perceptions of community policing (COP) programs
showed that only 51 percent thought their district was patrolled adequately, 36 percent
knew that there was a COP unit in their district, 25 percent new much or very much
about what COP was, and 9 percent were involved in some sort of COP activity in the
year prior to the survey being administered (Deosaran, 2002).

Review of prior research

There is a scarcity of published studies on police deviance in Caribbean countries. The
small body of academic literature available on the subject consists mostly of historical
and philosophical analyses and reports of limited official data. The few empirical
studies that can be found focus on police brutality, much like those on police deviance
in general. Studies in Latin America too are scarce, with the possible exception of
studies of police brutality in Brazil.
Using survey and interview data collected on two samples of constables and
supervisors from urban police stations in Trinidad, one in 1994 and one in 2007, Pfaff
and Bennett (2008) explored determinants of officers’ perceptions of the extent to which
police use excessive force in dealing with suspects. Their model included situational
(extent of crime and citizen respect), individual (length of service, gender, satisfaction
with job, cynicism, and job profile), formal organizational (training, supervision, and
discipline), and informal organizational (tolerance to police deviance and
subculture/reference group) factors. Results showed that officers’ perceived extent of
crime significantly increased from 1994 to 2007 (which did coincide with increases in
official violent crime rates), as did tolerance to police deviance and perceived use of
excessive force. Thus it appears that the officers tended to believe that police deviance
increased. However, the study identified only one consistent determinant – tolerance to
police deviance – and one inconsistent (2007 only) determinant – perceived extent of
crime – of officers’ perceived use of excessive force, and the model did not explain
differences in perceptions over time. Still, Pfaff and Bennett’s (2008) results suggest
that excessive use of force can be partly addressed by reducing tolerance of police
deviance within the policing subculture.
Bennett (1997) studied situational, individual, and organizational determinants of
officers’ perceptions of excessive force earlier using survey, interview, and
observational data collected on constables and supervisors from urban police
stations in T&T, Barbados, and Jamaica. He found that perceived respect from citizens
and sureness and severity of sanctions reduced, while informal organizational culture
variables increased, officers’ estimates of the extent to which police use excessive force.
Since the mean scores of perceived use of excessive force and most of the independent
variables significantly differed between the three nations, the study suggests that
determinants of perceived use of excessive force can differ between developing nations
in the Caribbean. While the means for controlling excessive force in the USA may be
unavailable in Caribbean nations, Bennett’s (1997) results suggest that excessive force Police deviance
can be reduced through changes to leadership and its resulting organizational culture and community
that accepts excessive force, organizational sanctions, and a refusal to give in to
popular demands for repressive responses to rising crime. relations
Focusing on the idea of social capital and the issue of workplace productivity,
Langbein and Jorstad (2004) examined the same data from Bennett’s (1997, p. 68)
analysis to explore predictors of officer perceptions of the extent of use of excessive 457
force, which they termed “collective propensity” as well as time spent on police work.
They found that with controls, face-to-face communication at the individual and
police-station level, norms at the individual and station level, and opportunities for
repeated interaction reduced propensity to use excessive force and increased time spent
on police work, while monitoring by supervisors did not. Langbein and Jorstad (2004)
suggest that fostering pro-social social capital among peers may be a more effective
and less expensive management strategy.
Using data drawn from face-to-face survey interviews with 684 members of the
Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) in the Kingston and St Catherine areas in 1995,
Harriot (2000) examined police perceptions of corruption in the force. Regarding
pervasiveness, Harriot (2000, p. 60) found that “12 percent of the Force felt the majority
of their JCF colleagues and members of their unit were corrupt, 30 percent felt that
most officers, and 32 percent that most senior officers were corrupt.” Regarding
permissiveness, 37 percent of constables, 36 percent of non-commissioned officers, and
17 percent of officers felt that the force was permissive of corruption. Regarding
sources of corruption, anywhere from 43-49 percent reported pressure from
supervisors and peer support to be major sources. A tendency toward justification
and guilt neutralization may have been exhibited in that about 57 percent attributed
police corruption to human nature, 79 percent to poor pay, and 69 percent to the poor
state of society in general. According to Harriot (2000, p. 64):
The JCF, like the society, has become highly tolerant of most forms of corruption.
Also, in an earlier article examining the repressive style of policing used in Jamaica and
the Caribbean, Harriot (1998, p. 68) briefly mentions a survey of jail prisoners that he
conducted in 1995, stating that the survey confirmed that police often use arrest both
as an investigative tool and as a punishment. His analysis of interviews conducted
with a representative sample of 141 prisoners in jails in the city of Kingston identified
harassment, degrading treatment, and excessive use of violence as forms of police
abuses. In some cases, respondents reported being subjected to violent interrogations
and punishment (Harriot, 1998, p. 69).
Using comparable unofficial (complaint records and newspaper reports) and official
sources of data, Chevigny (1990) studied police deadly force in Jamaica, Argentina, and
Brazil, finding patterns suggesting that deadly force is an abusive means of social control
in these countries. Data show that they have proportionately more police homicides than
the USA. It is possible that increased use of police deadly force can be legitimated by
circumstances such as increased violent crime and danger to officers, but the study found
patterns that do not logically support such a conclusion (Chevigny, 1990).
Employing logical assumptions, Chevigny (1990) implicated excessive police use of
deadly force with three “disproportionate violence ratios.” First, if deadly force is not
being abused, the portion of police shootings that lead to death should be minimal; the
PIJPSM number of civilians wounded then should outweigh the number of those killed. Thus, the
34,3 more the number of those killed reaches the number of those wounded, the more that
abuse of deadly force can be suspected. Official reports in Jamaica show a startling ratio
for 1988: 98 civilians were wounded while 188 were killed by police. Second, if increased
police use of deadly force is required by increased danger to police, the increased danger
should be reflected in a relatively high number of officers killed by civilians. Thus, the
458 less the number of officers killed by civilians reaches the number of civilians killed by
police, the more that abuse of deadly force can be suspected. Pointing out that the ratio of
deadly force by vs against the police in the USA could be approximated at 7:1, Chevigny
proposed that a ratio reaching 15:1 would seem to indicate excessive use of deadly force.
In Jamaica this ratio was very close to 15:1 during 1982-1984 but rose to 23.3:1 in 1985.
Further, official data show that of 372 shooting incidents involving police in 1985, 22
officers were wounded in addition to those killed. Third, if increased police use of deadly
force is required by increased violence by civilians, the number of homicides committed
by police will be high but should still constitute the typically very small portion of all
homicides. Thus, the more the number of homicides committed by police reaches the
number of homicides committed by civilians, the more that abuse of deadly force can be
suspected. In Jamaica from 1984-1988, homicides by police averaged 212 per year while
other homicides averaged 445, meaning that the police accounted for nearly one-third of
all homicides.
Chevingy (1990) concluded that the frequent use of police deadly force in Jamaica,
Argentina, and Brazil is better explained by perceived threats by the underclass
combined with public support for the government’s use of extreme social control
measures, and that many homicides by police could be instances of summary
executions. In a later study on police brutality in Brazil, Paes-Machado and Noronha
(2002) explored the nature of this kind of public support for police vigilantism.
Through interviews with local residents and direct observations in a high crime
neighborhood in Salvador, the researchers found that working class residents are
fearful of crime and dissatisfied with police protection, and they demand increased
protection from the police including aggressive control tactics. Unlike wealthier
residents, they lack the financial resources to improve their own security and do not
have the power to apply pressure to the police into providing better security. In the face
of perceived lack of protection, brutality committed in the name of control may be
applauded by local residents (Paes-Machado and Noronha, 2002).
However, Paes-Machado and Noronha (2002) determined that in the neighborhood,
police were popularly viewed as violent, untrustworthy, and ineffective against serious
criminals. The police are known to collude with and extort criminals, making residents
mistrustful and fearful of the police and thus reluctant to cooperate with them, except
through coercion in instances when officers are interested in particular suspects.
Residents face possible mistreatment, including violence, by the police when reporting
crimes not of interest to the police as well as retaliation by criminals. If citizens report
the activities of criminals, the police may leak their names to these criminals, especially
those in collusion with police. The police are also thought to participate in executions,
while on duty and as part of secretive “death squads,” including those of innocent
people. To promote instrumental police terror, acts of violence and even victim’s
corpses can be displayed in public, sending a message to those who would defy the
police. As a result, residents tend to observe a “code of silence” regarding criminal
activities in the neighborhood. The police are seen as a threat to the safety and security Police deviance
of lawful residents to the extent that they too are widely viewed as “criminals.” and community
Further, the police appear to direct their abusive activities more toward poor and
non-white residents. One’s physical appearance may be enough to draw harmful police relations
attention, indicating that officers may subscribe to stereotypes equating the poor and
minorities with criminality (Paes-Machado and Noronha, 2002). This accusation is
consistent with Mitchell and Wood’s (1998) analysis of data from Brazil’s 1988 National 459
Household Survey, which showed that black men were over twice as likely as white
men to be assaulted by a police officer.
Although residents in Paes-Machado and Noronha’s (2002) study greatly
disapprove of their own victimization by police, many approve of police abuse
committed against serious criminals in the neighborhood, whom they call the
“marginals” – a social category to which they do not belong. Facing endemic crime and
a lack or absence of conventional crime reductions resources and strategies, residents
adopt a “get tough on crime” attitude and see police brutality against serious criminals
as a necessary part of a “war on crime.” In this way, police abuse does not stem simply
from police authority alone, but also from a larger belief system shared by citizens in
which brutality is acceptable as long as it is directed against “bad people.” However, it
appears that the increased discretion granted to police combined with the increased
capacity for corruption means that police abuse can be, and is, directed at “the
innocent” as well.
Popular support for police brutality in Brazil makes it an important political issue
(Ahnen, 2007). Contrary to the goals of democracy, (re)democratization appears to have
increased human rights violations in Brazil. Democracy allows citizens with “get tough
on crime” attitudes to elect politicians who institute crime reduction strategies that
facilitate human rights violations. Ahnen (2007) attributes high rates of police violence
in Brazil to social conflict and right-wing political coalitions that block effective
measures to control police use of force and implement pro-force public safety measures,
and posits that the partisanship of government leaders helps explain rates of police use
of deadly force. Recognizing the unreliability of official data, Ahnen (2007) analyzed
newspaper homicide report data on 19 Brazilian states from 1994 to 2001 and indeed
found that states with governors with center or right party affiliations had
significantly higher rates of police killings than states with governors with left
affiliations, controlling for other social maladies including non-police homicide rates.
Reducing police brutality in Brazil then may require wide public support for human
rights of everyone, including “criminals” and other marginalized people, and its
ensuing election of leaders who institute changes to policy and law that protect human
rights (Ahnen, 2007).
While these studies offer useful empirical information that sheds light on police
deviance in the Caribbean and Latin America, they mostly explore one type, brutality,
and are too few to provide more than a glimpse into the nature, extent, causes, and
consequences of police deviance. Clearly, more empirical studies of police deviance in
these regions are needed.

Reports on the activities of the TTPS

Five reports identify several problems faced by the TTPS in recent decades, including
police deviance and poor public perceptions of the service. The first three reports were
PIJPSM produced by policing experts from the UK at the request of the T&T government and
34,3 appear to be available to the public only from the special collections at the University
of West Indies library. The last two were accessed online.
A 1984 Report of the Committee on the Restructuring of the Police Service (CRPS,
1984) identified several problems with the TTPS. Within the service there were poor
relations and low morale, extremely weak leadership due to managerial inefficiencies, a
460 lack of communication among senior officers, ineffective disciplinary procedures, high
supervisor turnover, uneven and unclear officer workloads, and a lack of respect for
senior officers among junior officers. Regarding public relations, there were public
perceptions of the police as indifferent, unresponsive, and unsympathetic and “a
repressive force ready to harass people at every opportunity” (CRPS, 1984, p. 138).
Accusations against the police included ignoring urgent calls for assistance (with the
excuse that there were too few vehicles available or officers on duty), treating suspects
in an overly harsh or uncaring manner, engaging in arbitrary search and arrest,
ignoring serious crimes in favor of minor offenses, destroying the homes of squatters,
failing to conduct internal investigations of police misconduct, and failing to conduct
foot patrols (Committee on the Restructuring of the Police Service, 1984).
Seven years later, O’Dowd (1991) published a separate Review of the Trinidad and
Tobago Police Service. He found similar problems within the service such as weak
leadership and a lack of internal investigations of misconduct. Internal disciplinary
procedures took as long as five years although most investigations were on minor
matters such as showing up to work late. It is no surprise then that there was still a
lack of public confidence in the investigation of complaints against the police. Police
were widely accused of impoliteness, discriminatory behavior, and corruption and
citizens complained of slow or even an absence of police response to their calls for
service (O’Dowd, 1991).
In his report on a Scotland Yard investigation into accusations of police corruption,
Seaby (1993) concluded that corruption was endemic and existed at all ranks in the TTPS.
Like earlier inquiries, the report identified problems of weak leadership, management,
discipline, and accountability within the service, as well as a lack of a sense of community
service among officers. Seaby commented that there is lack of identification of how
decisions are made or who made them and that discipline is superficial. More specifically,
the investigation found recurring incidents in which police required citizens to pay for
their services, blackmailed suspects (to promise to hide evidence or not arrest), stole from
each other and the canteen, failed to show up for court, embezzled police service funds,
helped each other in corrupt activities and promoted individuals from within their own
groups, were accused of shootings and rapes, protected drug dealers and their activities,
and sometimes even actively engaged in the drug trade themselves (such as transporting
cocaine, growing marijuana, and selling drugs). Activities such as embezzlement and
drug corruption allowed some senior ranking members to live beyond their own means.
Further, Seaby (1993) determined that officers did not use scientific investigation
techniques and technologies, were unskilled at taking statements from victims and
witnesses, developed fatalistic attitudes and acquiesced to the status quo in order to keep
their jobs, found cozy niches in offices instead of going out on patrol, and used knowledge
of other officers’ corruption as a way to keep their jobs.
The Police Complaints Authority (PCA) was created by Parliament Act 17 of 1993 to
hear, compile, and assess citizen complaints against the police (Police Complaints
Authority of Trinidad and Tobago, 2003). The PCA is not a police authority; it is an Police deviance
independent civilian body accountable to Parliament that mediates between citizen and community
complainants and the Police Service. However, Section 20 of the Act requires that the
Service have a Complaints Division to investigate, resolve, and report on complaints relations
received by the PCA, thereby suggesting an operational relationship between the PCA
and the police (Police Complaints Authority of Trinidad and Tobago, 2003). The PCA
makes annual reports, but to the authors’ best knowledge, the Seventh Report: May 1, 461
2002-September 30, 2003 is the most recently available (online at www.pca.gov.tt).
The 2003 PCA report shows large increases in complaints against the police from
the prior year. For the May 1, 2002 through April 30, 2003 period there were 3,029
formal complaints, a significant increase of 926 from the prior year, received from by
924 persons, a significant increase of 70 from the prior year (Police Complaints
Authority of Trinidad and Tobago, 2003, p. 9). Further, the 2002/2003 period saw
increases in 14 categories of complaints, compared to increases in six categories in the
previous year, including significant increases in accusations of battery: 154 percent,
criminal damage: 325 percent, failure to perform duty: 45.8 percent, harassment: 56.5
percent, impolite behavior: 40.3 percent, and wrongful arrest: 102 percent (Police
Complaints Authority of Trinidad and Tobago, 2003, p. 10). The 2002/2003 year saw
the highest number of complaints since the first reporting year, after some large
year-to-year fluctuations. There were 1,405 complaints in 1996/1997 which then went
up to 1,663 in 1997/1998 (Police Complaints Authority of Trinidad and Tobago, 1998,
Table 2), down to 1,286 in 1998/1999, back up to 1,488 in 1999/2000, up more to 2,703 in
2000/2001, down a little to 2,103 in 2001/2002, and way up to 3,029 in May 2002/April
2003 (Police Complaints Authority of Trinidad and Tobago, 2003, Tables 2 and 5). The
2002/2003 year did not have the highest number of persons making complaints
however. There were 1,213 complainants in 1996/1997 which then went down to 1,019
in 1997/1998, down more to 769 in 1998/1999, held about steady at 786 in 1999/2000,
back up to 1141 in 2000/2001, down again to 854 in 2001/2002, and up some to 924 in
May 2002/April 2003 (Police Complaints Authority of Trinidad and Tobago, 2003, p.
14). Of course, it cannot be known how much these changes reflect changes in the
amount of police deviance or changes in the detection of or desire to report it by
citizens. However, the relatively high number of complaints made during the 2002/2003
reporting period seems to indicate a problem with citizens’ perceptions of the police
with regard to deviance several years after significant attempts to reform policing and
give the public greater control over its relationship with the police.
In 2006 Amnesty International (AI) issued a document on unlawful killings by
police and deaths in police custody in T&T. Of concern was excessive use of force,
including summary executions, deaths of persons in police custody, and the failure of
authorities to properly carry out investigations and sanction officers’ conduct.
Problems in investigations into allegations of police abuse include “serious
shortcomings in the internal and external police complaints mechanism” and
“lengthy delays in judicial inquiries into fatal shootings and other serious human
rights violations” that interfere with victims’ rights and allow “a climate of impunity to
flourish” (Amnesty International, 2006, p. 2). Fatal shootings in 2004 and 2005 were
officially attributed to criminal violence and proper defensive responses by officers; in
some of these cases however, eyewitnesses said that the shootings were unprovoked.
Further, the results or status of publicly announced official investigations into these
PIJPSM cases have apparently not been made publicly available, some of the officers suspected
34,3 of misconduct may have remained on active duty, and some witnesses have reported
police harassment. Accusations against the police include officers’ involvement in the
country’s rising violent crime problem, such as allegations of police involvement in
kidnappings in 2005; two special reserve officers were in fact arrested for suspected
involvement in the abduction of two sons of a prominent businessman. Several fatal
462 shootings and deaths in custody were reported to AI during 2004 and 2005. Of them,
the report identifies and describes eight suspicious fatal shootings and four suspicious
deaths in custody occurring in 2003-2005. AI asked police authorities for information
on the investigations into these cases but had received none at the time of the writing of
the report. AI asserts that complaints of human rights violations by T&T police have
rarely been fully investigated and points out that sometimes, civil awards are given in
cases in which the officers involved were not disciplined or held criminally responsible.
In recent years, AI could identify only two officers convicted of unlawfully killing
civilians while on duty. AI complains of a lack of transparency in police investigations
of abuses and points out that lack of data on police excessive use of force makes it
difficult to monitor police conduct (Amnesty International, 2006).

The current study and methodology

Official reports and a small number of studies give general evidence of widespread
police deviance and its ensuing public dissatisfaction in T&T. However, fewer if any
empirical analyses have attempted to explore the nature and consequences of police
deviance in the country’s communities. It is for this purpose that the following analysis
is conducted. This study is part of a larger effort to study attitudes toward the police
and recent police reform efforts in T&T. The research took place between January and
May of 2009 and was part of the first author’s activities as a Visiting Fulbright Scholar
at the University of the West Indies in St. Augustine, Trinidad.
Qualitative open-ended interviews were conducted with members of the TTPS,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and community based organizations (CBOs).
NGOs represented in this study are nationally based, have received funding from
international organizations such as the UN, and have received legitimacy from the
T&T government. CBOs represented in the study, on the other hand, while having
been active in some cases for many years, have received little if any governmental
legitimacy and operate at a grassroots, neighborhood level. Ten individual interviews
were conducted with one member of the Ministry of National Security, three TTPS
officers (one high ranking leader, one head of a special unit, and one in a special unit
with experience in community policing), three heads of NGOs, and three heads of CBOs
in poor, violent neighborhoods. A focus group interview was also conducted because
five members of a grassroots CBO (not including the three interviewed individually)
who worked in the same area and knew each other for a long time were present on one
occasion.
Like those used in other qualitative interview studies, the sample used in the current
study is small and non-representative of the general population. Because of the work
they do, however, the persons interviewed are in a good position to observe and discuss
the presence of police deviance and community sentiments regarding the police.
Participants from NGOs and CBOs can provide a third party view from which to
observe relations between the police and citizens. Another of the sample’s strengths is
that it contains members of the TTPS who were willing to speak candidly about police Police deviance
deviance in the service. Yet another strength of the sample is that it is includes the kind and community
of persons who are key but under-studied agents of social change. The data used in this
analysis offer an opportunity to acquire information about police activities that is not relations
available from other sources and utilize the knowledge of community leaders to
develop a better understanding of the problem of police deviance and its potential
solutions. While more research using more representative samples is needed, the 463
purpose of this analysis is to provide a fruitful initial empirical inquiry into police
deviance and its consequences in T&T.
Participants were recruited via snowball sampling due to the first author’s initial
lack of familiarity with T&T’s police and civil society communities. Snowball
sampling also had the advantage of revealing linkages between different civil society
groups and the police that indicate the strength of networking and trust (social capital)
among participants. Keron King, a research assistant at the University of the West
Indies, assisted the first author in locating initial research participants, making initial
contacts, and accompanying him to some of the data collection locations. Participants
were not provided payment or other kind of compensation for their participation, and
they were told prior to the beginning of data collection that their answers would remain
confidential, there was no penalty for refusing to answer certain questions, and all
collected data would be destroyed after the completion of the research study and
publication of findings.
Interview questions were open-ended and covered issues including the largest
challenges that T&T faces in general, police-community relations, the content and
efficacy of recent police and other reform efforts, and respondents’ ideas and
recommendations for future policies. The Appendix displays the interview schedules
for NGO/CBO respondents and Police/Ministry of National Security respondents. The
first author recorded handwritten notes from interviews rather than tape-recording.
The first participants interviewed (both NGO and police) were uncomfortable speaking
candidly while a tape recorder was operating, so in order to maintain consistency
handwritten notes were taken during all interviews and the focus group. An accurate
and complete transcript of the interviews and focus group was therefore not possible,
but the first author was able to acquire many direct quotes (some of them quite lengthy
and included in the analysis section below) because the first author is adept at writing
quickly and participants cooperated by speaking slowly and repeating their comments
when asked. Keron King also took notes during interviews and both sets of notes were
compared to ensure that various responses were recorded accurately.
The authors took a grounded theory approach by engaging in open coding of the
data, allowing any potential themes related to police deviance to arise from the text of
the interviews and focus group. Coding involved making analytical comments and
thematic observations in the margins of the text of interview responses, and various
sections were underlined. Through this process the authors identified the following
broad themes relevant to this paper: participants’ perceptions concerning the kinds of
police deviance that occur, public beliefs and attitudes concerning the police, the
impact of police deviance on the community, and what should be done to respond to the
problem of police deviance. The interview notes were then re-read and coded based on
these guiding themes. Because of space constraints, the authors selected the quotes
that best articulated these themes for inclusion in this paper.
PIJPSM Results
34,3 The authors’ analysis of the individual interview and focus group data reveal four
general problems related to the nature of police deviance: inadequate crime control and
protection of citizens, maltreatment of citizens, capricious response to criminals and
bias toward less serious crimes, and police corruption and collusion with criminals.
The consequences of police deviance are another important theme. An analysis of NGO
464 and CBO participant data is presented first followed by that of the TTPS/Ministry of
National Security participants. Throughout the rest of the paper, the terms
“respondent(s)” and “participant(s)” will be used interchangeably.
NGO and CBO respondents indicated that it is commonly believed that the police
service does not provide adequate crime control and protection from victimization.
According to a CBO respondent: “There are many police patrols, but people are
walking around with guns. There are many people carrying guns, including children.
Kids hold guns for the leaders [. . .] The police are not responsive,” and according to an
NGO respondent, “We don’t have confidence in the police and don’t think that there is a
political will in the management in preventing and fighting crime.” Further, a number
of respondents claimed that the police find ways to avoid responding when citizens go
to or call a station to report an incident. For example, another NGO respondent said:
If you call the police, they tell you to go to the next police post, or say they don’t have cars, or
don’t show up, particularly in Laventille [a ward in the hills west of the capital city
characterized by squatter settlements, poverty, and high crime rates] where they tell you to go
down the hill, and they close up at 8 pm.
It appears that accusations of police insensitivity extend beyond mere
unresponsiveness. Another frequently cited problem is the harsh treatment of
citizens who report crimes. Respondents claimed that it is common for those reporting
crimes to feel like they are being accused of the crime during questioning and that the
police lack basic skills in questioning victims and suspects. As a CBO respondent said,
“[. . .] the police use force and interrogate people who complain about crimes as if they
are the criminals.” Another participant said that the police harass people and terrorize
the taxi drivers that illegally ply routes in violent neighborhoods even though
legitimate taxi services will not serve those areas. Yet another CBO respondent
identified the antagonistic relationship between police and citizens:
The police have an attitude when they come to communities like ours. They come to your
door, jump your fence and knock on your door down and do what they want. They are
antagonistic.
It also appears to be a common perception that the police are inconsistent in the
severity of treatment of suspects and often choose to pursue petty offenses and less
influential criminals instead of the more powerful criminals responsible for the
country’s major crime problems. As two respondents said, “the big fish in the drug
trade get away while the small fish go to jail” (CBO member) and “Big shot criminals
are protected and the police go after the little people” (NGO member). Another NGO
respondent claimed:
One day the police are friendly to a boy and then they rub him down the next day but don’t
bother to check the public toilet where they hide the guns.
Some believe that the focus on petty crime is a result of police collusion with criminals, Police deviance
and many respondents presented a view of the police as criminals themselves. and community
According to a two CBO respondents “The government and the police are interwoven
with the criminal element” and “The police are mixed up with the criminals and can tip
relations
off the criminals about something, like if someone complains about them.” An NGO
respondent pointed out that “Accusations of murders and assassinations by the police
and military have happened.” Also, two other CBO respondents explain: 465
The police are involved in crime, too. They are involved in drugs and guns. They are above
the law. We have police killings and we don’t get any justice for that. The police pit criminals
against each other and then the gang members kill each other. There is so much corruption.
The police are involved somehow in the stealing and drugs.

The police are in gangs. The police and military sell gangers ammunition. I know this for a
fact because both the gangsters and the military use nine millimeter ammunition [. . .] The
government could root out the drug problem at the source but they don’t [. . .] If the police
want to kill a gangster they get him and another gangster against each other by saying things
to each of them. They also drop gangsters off in rival territory.
The consequences of these forms of police deviance were also discussed by NGO and
CBO participants. There were claims that because of the lack of police response to high
crime rates, citizens feel that the government ignores their problems and they must
fend for themselves. A CBO respondent stated: “The police are ineffective. People live
in fear of their lives and feel abandonment by the government. Nothing is effective.”
Also, an NGO respondent stated:
People have given up. You are on your own. We don’t expect protection from authorities. You
have to do personal methods to protect yourself. . . People move in convoys in cars and all
walk together and have cell phones on when going to fetes [parties] and bars, etc. Homes have
bars and cars have alarms.
Maltreatment of citizens by the police, according to one respondent, made the innocent
bitter and less likely to report crimes to the police. Other respondents indicated that
citizens want more police presence but are hesitant to go to the police for help after
accusations or observations of police brutality occur. One NGO respondent claimed:
Laventile people want more police, including the business, religious, and other leaders and
residents, but the police abuse you, too. So then they don’t call the police [. . .] The traditional
method is to beat a confession out of a suspect instead of investigation. That has now caught
up with us.
The poor general reputation of the police then leads to citizen dislike and lack of
cooperation. A CBO respondent stated:
People don’t talk to the police. They stay inside if they come by. Younger people don’t like the
police.
Another CBO respondent claimed that because of aggressive police tactics such as
knocking down fences and doors:
The people hate the police. The antagonism is mutual.
PIJPSM The common perception that police officers are tied to crime reduces the trust that
34,3 citizens have in the police and subsequently their willingness to work together with
police. As an NGO respondent explained:
People don’t give police information because some police are also criminals, so information
may get back. You don’t know which cop to trust.

466 Further, this distrust may be part of distrust in the entire government. Another NGO
respondent claimed:
They [citizens] don’t see the police as looking out for their interests. Police are to be feared
because they have power to do things. Because they are connected with the state they
[citizens] don’t trust them. There is less trust with government institutions in general [. . .]
Witness protection is weak [. . .] There is a lot of corruption, too, such as paying for service.
The statements made by NGO and CBO respondents are subjective and represent but a
few points of view, but because these respondents have been active in their
communities and working with fellow residents for lengthy periods – some for
multiple decades – one can reasonably assume that their perceptions of community
attitudes have legitimacy, particularly because study participants provided consistent
responses to questions. Still, it is fair for one to wonder if these participants are
accurately portraying police deviance or exaggerating the problem because of unfair
pessimistic attitudes toward the police, although the researcher noted no reason to
believe that these respondents were motivated to give inaccurate portrayals. Rather
than relying on newspaper editorials or rumor, participants spoke of what they have
seen themselves or heard multiple times from residents; and their observations closely
match numerous problems brought up in external investigations of the TTPS cited
earlier. Still, it is important to see what the police service and Ministry of National
Security participants have to say in comparison to the other respondents’ accusations
and perceptions. Interestingly, their views contained both similarities and contrasts to
those expressed by NGO and CBO respondents. It must be noted however that these
respondents cannot be taken as a representative sample of the TTPS and that their
views may be quite different than those of other service members. The snowball
sampling technique used in the study may have created a sampling bias that
influenced the responses received during interviews. Nevertheless, it was informative
to get corroborative evidence of police deviance and its adverse impact upon citizens
from members of the TTPS and the Ministry of National Security themselves.
These interviews revealed the same themes found in NGO and CBO interviews
except for one: the capricious response to criminals and the bias towards less serious
crimes. In terms of inadequate crime control response, more than one TTPS participant
noted that the police were not proactive enough against crime, visible or accessible
enough to the community, and familiar enough with residents. When attempts were
made to change police behavior via various reforms, the police resisted these changes
and police behavior and effectiveness did not significantly change after new policies
were put in place. One participant said that most police still had negative attitudes and
were more concerned with getting paid and going home than working hard to reduce
crime and improve police-community relations.
The Ministry of National Security participant spoke to the theme of maltreatment of
citizens, noting that there were instances of police brutality, and one TTPS respondent
mentioned that citizens perceive that the police brutalize them. In addition, another
TTPS respondent lamented without going into specifics about how corruption was a Police deviance
problem and that citizens assumed that the police were corrupt. and community
In terms of the consequences of these problems, the TTPS respondents often spoke
of a reduction in respect for the police, and the Ministry of National Security relations
respondent framed it as an issue of trust as did the NGO and CBO respondents.
Addressing the issue of reduced respect, one officer stated:
If they [the police] told a child to behave or they will call the cops, the kid would behave, but 467
now that wouldn’t happen. The police have been increasingly put before the court. There
were assumptions of corruption before, but now they have had proof and are prosecuting. So
there is no respect for cops anymore.
Regardless of affiliation, there was consensus among the respondents that a rift exists
between citizens and police in T&T. Because of the lack of adequate crime control, the
Ministry of National Security participant said that people fear their neighbors, fear the
government, and fear the CJ system and the police, though he thought that this was
partly due to rumor and misinformation.

Discussion
The results of the current study show that respondents – members of NGOs, CBOs,
and the TTPS – revealed four general complaints concerning police deviance. First,
the police do not do enough to prevent crime and protect citizens from victimization.
Avoidance of duties, unprofessionalism, and lack of skills and training are among the
obstacles in providing adequate services. Second, citizens reporting crimes and
suspects get mistreated by police. Reporting citizens, who may be victims, are treated
insensitively and fear getting accused of crimes themselves. Further, the police are
known to have committed acts of brutality. The result is that citizens are reluctant to
report crimes and cooperate with police, despite their desire to have more police
protection. Third, police tend to be inconsistent in their treatment of criminals and
often respond to less serious crimes harshly and more serious crimes leniently. Fourth,
police engage in corruption and collude with criminals, a reputation that also severely
reduces the public’s trust and faith in the police and in the government in general.
These results are similar to those of the Caribbean and Brazilian studies reviewed
earlier, especially Paes-Machado and Noronha’s (2002) which found that residents of an
urban neighborhood in Brazil perceived their police as being ineffective at controlling
serious crime, abusive to lawful and unlawful citizens, in collusion with criminals,
untrustworthy, and to be feared. Mistreatment by police was reported by jail prisoners
in Harriot’s (1998) study, a group whose perceptions may be met with skepticism given
their illegal activities and conflict with criminal justice authorities. However, lawful
citizens in the current study too allege that police mistreat suspects and offenders. Like
Ahnen (2007), Chevigny (1990), and Paes-Machado and Noronha (2002), the current
study suggests the frequent occurrence of police brutality. Further, like police officers
in the Harriot (2000) and Pfaff and Bennett (2008) studies, the few officers interviewed
in the current study identified problems with police deviance, corroborating citizens’
complaints to some extent.
Police corruption and collusion is also identified in studies conducted in other
former UK colonies, where police corruption and lack of accountability continue to be
major problems. Jain and Kulshrestha (2004) found several reports of monetary gain
PIJPSM corruption in interviews with 80 autorickshaw drivers in India, including soliciting and
34,3 accepting bribes from law-violating drivers, extorting bribes from law-abiding drivers
and accident victims, demanding free rides, failing to protect drivers from corruption
by other officers, and using threats and physical force to coerce bribes. Kashem (2005)
used multiple data sources to examine police corruption in Bangladesh. Interviews
with 21 station commanders and senior officers at a metropolitan police department
468 revealed a system in which the police extract monetary payoffs (“tolls”) from criminals
and businesses, which includes collusion with gang leaders and politicians, while
direct observations of police behavior at local traffic intersections revealed a “token
culture” in which officers solicit bribes from motorists in exchange for avoiding heavy
fines and vehicle searches, sometimes from non-violating motorists. Further, police
records show that constables and junior officers are disciplined more often and harsher
than senior officers and administrators, which could be due to interference by political
leaders Kashem (2005).
Clearly, police corruption often involves cooperation between police and citizens.
Citizens who have broken or wish to circumvent the law for financial reasons, for
example, can benefit from bribing officers (Kashem, 2005). Also keeping in mind that
aggressive police control tactics often have public support, one may suspect that police
corruption does not always harm citizens’ perceptions of the police. Using household
survey data from Accra, Ghana, Tankebe (2010) found that vicarious experiences with
police corruption (witnessing or knowing of instances) decreased and satisfaction with
police anti-corruption measures increased public confidence in police along three
variables – trustworthiness, procedural justice, and effectiveness, but personal
experiences with police corruption showed no effects. Tankebe (2010) speculates that
nonconsensual personal experiences with police corruption, specifically, are more
likely to decrease citizen confidence in police.
The current study, along with a few other published studies and official reports,
indicate a serious problem concerning police-community relations and police deviance
in T&T – a problem that certainly begs for a solution. A solution, of course, must
respond to the complete set of causes of the problem. Care must be taken to avoid
focusing only on individual, local, and cultural level factors. The preceding data and
analysis focus heavily on individuals’ perceptions of activities in their communities,
but they do not implicate the community as the sole or primary source of the problem.
Police deviance in T&T must be understood in part within the context of
colonization and the development of a colonial policing system. One could plausibly
argue that a repressive style of policing, one that fosters deviance, emerged from the
colonial system. Policing in former colonial countries is especially responsive to
political and social power (Harriot, 1998). The grossly uneven distribution of power in
countries containing weak civil society and a small number of powerful elites results in
the unequal treatment of citizens. According to Harriot (1998, pp. 62-3),
“State-protectiveness, disregard for the law and socially discriminating treatment of
suspects and citizens who make claims for police services” are typical features of
policing in former colonies and the watchman mode of policing in the Caribbean is
“characterized by work avoidance, paramilitarism, poor accountability to the citizenry,
and class differential policing.” The repressive styles of policing developed from
colonialism in Caribbean countries, then, enable procedural injustice, officer violence,
and strained police-citizen relations (Harriot, 1998).
 Attempts to improve criminal justice agencies in less developed countries can be Police deviance
influenced by factors at local and national levels: the strength of a country’s democratic and community
institutions; levels of corruption; levels of human, social, financial and cultural capital;
the amount of political stability and institutional legitimacy; levels of social relations
disorganization; civic participation; patriarchy; and ethnic conflict (Pino and
Wiatrowski, 2006a). T&T is lacking in resources needed to develop stronger
institutions that can deliver the amount and type of social controls and supports that 469
maintain ethical police officer behavior and strong police-community relations. Other
changes to policing in T&T may also be standing in the way of reform. Even if reforms
are more properly devised and implemented, larger geopolitical and global economic
forces may prevent their sustainability. As part of the efforts in its wars on drugs and
terrorism, the USA has entered into agreements with T&T that have promoted the
development of paramilitary style policing (McCulloch, 2007). With this style,
distinctions between military and police functions become blurred and the rhetoric of
transnational crime is used to increase the state’s capacity and power to act coercively,
including against its own citizenry. Anti-crime arguments are used to justify the denial of
civil liberties such as punishing individuals before there is evidence that a crime has been
committed (McCulloch, 2007). The costs of these policies can also lead to the erosion of
public enterprises, subsidies, and welfare programs thereby making national security the
primary focus of the state instead of social and economic security (see Wacquant, 2003).
Security issues and the fear associated with them also allow the state to deal harshly
with internal political resistance while avoiding international rebuke (McCulloch, 2007).
It remains questionable then that reforms aimed at reducing community-level police
violations of civil liberties will be effective while national and international militaristic
law enforcement policies in some ways promote such violations. The old colonial
watchman style of policing has evolved into a repressive paramilitaristic style instead of
a service-oriented style sensitive to social justice and human rights (Harriot, 1998).
Although solutions to the problem of police deviance did not constitute a major
theme in data from the current study, some of the respondents recommended some
basic approaches. The need for police to work collaboratively with community groups
is reflected in a CBO respondent statement:
We would like to see the police partner with us but they don’t seem to want to do that.
While discussing police investigation tactics, an NGO respondent stated: “There have
not been any real investigative skills developed,” suggesting that the harsh treatment
of reporting citizens, suspects, and offenders may be due to a lack of training and skills.
A CBO respondent would seem to agree:
They need to learn more human relations skills. Right now the police deal with people
aggressively.
In response to a lack of faith and trust in the government, and NGO respondent
claimed:
We need a modern and just way of self-governance.
In sum, the solutions offered by respondents have to do with partnerships between
police and community groups, better officer training, and more autonomous
citizen-based governance.
PIJPSM TTPS and Ministry of National Security participants also had ideas regarding
34,3 policy. In terms of restoring trust and respect for the police, one officer noted that the
police used to engage in outreach programs such as sports activities for the youth,
and that the police should do that again. The same officer argued that community
input should be sought from the beginning when new policies are being formulated,
and that the leadership should admit up front to community residents that there are
470 problems and to promise that initiatives that are carried out will last and not fade
away. As with the NGO and CBO respondents, TTPS and Ministry of National
Security respondents wanted the police and community to work co-productively to
reduce crime, increase crime reporting, and increase citizen trust in and respect for
the police. One police leader and the Ministry of National Security respondent
specifically called for police to work with NGOs and CBOs. Another respondent
wanted more courses on crime investigation and other skills to be offered by local
universities. These respondents also wanted more competent and ethical people to be
recruited into the police service.
Better officer selection and training is clearly part of the solutions offered by
respondents. While individual change focused strategies alone will not solve police
corruption problems, they can certainly help. For example, in two quasi-experimental
studies of police officers in Nigeria, Aremu et al. (2009a, b) found that compared to
control groups, officers who underwent locus of control or self-efficacy counseling
showed significantly higher pre-test, post-test reductions in corruption-facilitating
attitudes indicated by the Police Ethical Behavior Scale (PEBS). These results suggest
a unique approach to reducing police corruption: incorporating psychological
counseling techniques into police training. Aremu et al. (2009b, p. 104) inferred that:
[. . .] the two counselling methods appealed to the emotions of the participants, which enable
them to make appropriate decisions and change their outlook on their job and their
interactions with citizens.

In terms of reducing corruption and brutality, a respondent in the police leadership

said:
They [citizens] now think we brutalize them. We want to change it to “police should help my
son get off drugs” instead of “stop brutalizing my son” [. . .] we need to have clean hands. We
have to do a cleanup campaign like the communities do with rubbish. It must be publicized so
that the police are seen as cleaning up. You publicize the results. Police are now in charge.
You publicize success. You get rid of the dirty ones.
While the preceding quote shows a police leader acknowledging the existence of a
police misconduct problem that needs to be addressed, it is interesting to note that the
statement does not portray the problem as a systemic one in need of structural reforms
but more as one resulting from the behavior of bad individual officers – “the dirty
ones” – that can be solved by a relatively small scale “cleanup campaign.” So while
NGO and CBO respondents see these problems as systemic and widespread, the TTPS
respondents generally see it in terms of a few bad apples that can be weeded out of the
system and replaced with more competent and ethical people. Similarly, Benson (2008,
p. 75) found that a sample of police officers and civilian employees from three police
stations in Pretoria in South Africa identified “inadequate salaries, lack of proper
supervision, example set by police management, lack of ethical standards, public tends
to bribe police, pressure exerted by gangs, and no proper training”, mostly Police deviance
individual-level and situational factors, as the causes of police corruption. The and community
differences in opinion between police and community leaders can help hinder
widespread support for various reform initiatives. relations
Still, all respondents expressed some optimism about working toward common
goals. All NGO and CBO respondents indicated that they want to work cooperatively
with the police, while the police service respondents indicated that they want to work 471
with community residents, believing that doing so is essential. One TTPS respondent
mentioned that community meetings associated with recent reforms produced some
agreement between police and residents after initial disagreements. The respondents’
willingness to work collaboratively and cooperatively gives reason to be optimistic
about carrying out the difficult task of building social capital between police and
citizens so that they may engage in sustainable co-productive reform activities.
Changes to the style of policing seem to be an inseparable part of serious police
reform programs in the Caribbean (Harriot, 1998). However, police deviance in T&T is
systemic and small programs that do not respond to larger structural issues will not
solve the problem. Better applicant screening and officer training, for example, are
important and may improve the quality of officers, but they do not improve the local,
national, and international conditions that directly and indirectly act upon officers,
citizens, and political and economic leaders. In mentioning just a few prerequisites,
Deosaran (2002) argues that the successful implementation of community policing
programs will not occur without human resource development of the police force and
the democratization of the command structure away from the old colonial and
paramilitary style. In a democracy it is necessary that government is open and
transparent, including the police. Thus, while professionalization and community
policing are useful reform goals and strategies, a nationwide service-oriented style of
policing must be sustained through democratizing law enforcement and the entire
criminal justice system.
An important question therefore is: What kind of reforms? Underdeveloped
countries like T&T are not the only ones in need of police reforms. Core countries such
as the US also face problems with police deviance and have been looking to develop
better policing models, such as community-oriented policing, with limited success.
Considering that the results of the current study show that police deviance goes
hand-in-hand with strained police-community relations, it may seem intuitive that
T&T could benefit from a move toward community-oriented policing. However, T&T
has already been making significant attempts at reforms, including a move toward
community-oriented policing.
Recent police reform efforts such as community oriented policing (Deosaran, 2002)
and a more comprehensive plan based on Policing for People, model stations, and the
recent relatively successful reforms in Northern Ireland that included enhanced
oversight and more authority in the hands of the police commissioner (Mastrofski and
Lum, 2008; Parks and Mastrofski, 2008) produced mixed results. While the police
leadership was behind the concept of community policing, there remained concerns
about the capacity to carry them out, officers’ conduct, and citizen support (Deosaran,
2002). After the more comprehensive reforms were implemented, officers engaged in
more foot and car patrols, police visibility and activity increased, citizens tended to
think that their areas were safer, and citizens who reported crimes were happier with
PIJPSM the services they received. However, the survey also showed some failures: citizens
34,3 were less likely to believe that police would solve their problems and thought that they
had less respect for citizens, leading to a lack of improvement in overall satisfaction
after the implementation of the program (Parks and Mastrofski, 2008). The two major
political parties in T&T have not been able to reach a consensus on several issues, and
transferring power to the larger government creates concerns regarding legitimacy,
472 accountability and transparency, control over important functions, and internal
governance of the police (Mastrofski and Lum, 2008).
Implementing programs from other countries are often not appropriate to the local
context because each country has its own particular set of complex political, social, and
economic problems (Brogden, 1999; Ellison, 2007; Ellison and O’Reilly, 2008; Miller and
Hendrix, 2007). Civil society groups and NGOs that could have played a key role in
accounting for these problems were not involved enough in the reform process from the
beginning, so recent reforms may have ignored important local knowledge in
understanding, diagnosing, and attempting to solve problems that affect policing
(Pino, 2009). Harriot (1997, p. 10) points out:
In the field of policing there are no successful models which can simply be replicated. The
developments in the advanced countries must be subjected to critical conceptual examination
and innovative adaptations in the light of our own experiences.
To ultimately be effective, plans created for policing reform in countries like T&T
must be focused and based on consensus, and persons representing diverse interests
must cooperatively work toward larger, collectively determined goals (Pino, 2009).
Thus far then, successful police reform has been difficult to achieve in T&T. The
problems that demand reform themselves, such as capacity and corruption, may
hinder attempts at reform (Mastrofski and Lum, 2008). As reported in a previous
article (Pino, 2009), research participants identified flaws in the processes for hiring
foreign consultants and implementing reform plans. In short, while attempts at
policing reform in the Caribbean have employed models intended to increase
professionalism in police services and citizen involvement, they do not respond to
the larger economic, political, and cultural forces that affect police agencies and
their constituents. The limited beneficial changes resulting from the application of
these models are bound to be short-lived. The dose of resources provided by foreign
reformers may provide a temporary boost to police operations and officer and
citizen morale, but when these resources disappear eventually so too will the
improvements. The key to successful reform then is sustainability: any beneficial
changes that occur must become a permanent characteristic of institutional
structures and processes. Therefore, a new model appropriate to the country in need
that responds to larger social forces and holds more promise for sustainability must
be developed.
Both the NGO/CBO participants and the TTPS/Ministry of National Security
participants in the current study wanted more co-productive activities between
community residents and the police and the local development of reforms, perhaps
with some outside facilitation rather than reforms being dictated by foreign experts.
The emerging model of democratic policing has potential to be part of a basis for
reform. In this model, police organizations are reoriented to conform to democratic
values and act to promote human rights in order to complement other democratic
institutions and human, social, and economic development (Pino and Wiatrowski, Police deviance
2006b). Police adhere to the rule of law, are transparent and accountable to the citizenry and community
via numerous forms of oversight, and work directly with citizens and other
stakeholders (government officials, the business community, etc.) from the beginning relations
rather than dictating reforms themselves. The police understand that their authority
derives from the people and their elected representatives, but if police adhere to the
principles of democratic policing, the citizens and their government must ensure that 473
police organizations receive proper education, training, and support (Pino and
Wiatrowski, 2006b).
The sustainability of democratic policing depends on several agendas that
strengthen civil society and democratic institutions, not just the democratization of
police organizations themselves. These agendas might include:
.
Democratic reform of other elements of the criminal justice system and other
governmental institutions.
.
Pursuing state autonomy to achieve objectives in its own interest including
independent socio-economic development. Policies under this agenda might
include enhancement of regional integration through CARICOM (the Caribbean
Community of 15 nation states) organizations, debt cancellation, and the removal
of structural adjustment policies.
.
Building social and human capital via improvements in education and various
policies associated with enhancing formal and informal networks between
citizens and the Caribbean Diaspora, worker protections, democratizing
workplaces, more access to land and credit for women; and improved
governmental services.
.
Equity in democratic participation including equal participation of women
(Deere et al., 1990; Klak and Conway, 1998; Mandle, 1996; Pino and Wiatrowski,
2006b).

Because of the emphasis on macro-social change, non-governmental and

community-based organizations can play a crucial role in democratic policing
reform; acting as liaisons between community residents and the police, they can build
social capital between all parties and may be able to increase the percentage of
residents willing to work with the police (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006b). Through this
kind of dialogic process, citizens, civil society groups, and the police might be able to
come to a consensus on the nature of problems regarding the police and
police-community relations, as well as potential solutions to these collectively
defined problems. Otherwise, citizens and police leaders will likely continue to differ on
the causes of police corruption and therefore potential remedies.
While the current study provides insights into police deviance and community
relations, it is but one, conducted on a small non-representative sample, which needs to
be followed by more research into police deviance in T&T as well as the rest of the
Caribbean. A comprehensive understanding of the problem of course must be
developed through a large body of research. More generally, increasing the empirical
study of policing problems can contribute to the development of an important and
useful Caribbean criminology.
PIJPSM References
34,3 Ahnen, R.E. (2007), “The politics of police violence in democratic Brazil”, Latin American Politics
and Society, Vol. 49 No. 1, pp. 141-64.
Amnesty International (2006), “Trinidad and Tobago: end police immunity for unlawful killings
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Appendix. Interview schedules

NGO/CBO interview schedule
(1) Could you describe the roles, responsibilities, and duties of your current position?
(2) Tell me on what issues does your organization work?
(3) Could you describe some of the most pressing problems you feel Trinidad and/or your
community faces?
.
Does your organization do anything concerning crime, a crime-related problem, or the
police?
(4) How do residents in your area feel about crime in general?
(5) Could you describe how community residents in your area interact with one another?
.
Do the residents get along?
.
Do they feel like they can trust and rely on one another?
.
Are there contentious social issues in the area that need addressing?
(6) What are your general impressions of the police in your area?
(7) Tell me about police responses to crime in the area.
(8) How would you describe the current relationship between the police and area residents?
.
Have you seen changes in community-police relations over time?
.
Are some residents more favorable or unfavorable towards the police than others?
 (9) Are you aware of any foreign police training or assistance in Trinidad? Police deviance
.
If yes, tell me about your experiences or observations of the training or and community
assistance.
relations
.
Could you explain the effects, if any, of the assistance?
.
How do you feel about these effects? (Positive, negative, combination.)
.
Has it changed how the police operate? 477
(10) Could you describe the reactions of citizens to these changes?
.
Examples?
.
Do community residents seem pleased or displeased?
(11) Could you tell me what role, if any, foreign police training will play in Trinidad’s
future?
.
Would you like to see more foreign police assistance? Why or why not?
.
What kinds of assistance do you need in the future?
(12) How would you feel about the police working with the community to help identify and
tackle crime problems?
.
Would officers be willing to work with community residents or NGOs?
.
Would community residents/NGOs be willing to work with the police?
.
On what would you like to see the community and the police work together?

Police/Ministry of National Security Interview Schedule

(1) Could you describe the roles, responsibilities, and duties of your current position?
(2) Could you describe current community-police relations in your area?
(3) Have you seen changes in community-police relations over time?
(4) Tell me about your experience with foreign police training.
.
Who provided the assistance?
.
What kind of assistance was provided?
(5) Tell me about your impressions about the assistance you received.
(6) How do you feel about those that provided the assistance?
.
Were they helpful/respectful, knowledgeable?
(7) What was their attitude? How did they behave toward officers?
(8) How did your officers respond to the assistance?
(9) Could you explain the effects, if any, of the assistance?
.
How do you feel about these effects? (Positive, negative, combination.)
.
Has it changed how your department/unit operates?
(10) Could you describe the reactions of citizens to these changes?
.
Examples?
.
Do community residents seem pleased or displeased?
(11) Could you tell me what role, if any, foreign police training will play in Trinidad’s future?
.
Would you like to see more foreign police assistance? Why or why not?
.
What kinds of assistance do you need in the future?
PIJPSM (12) How would you feel about the police working with the community to help identify and
tackle crime problems?
34,3 .
How about NGOs?
.
Would officers be willing to work with community residents or NGOs?
.
Would community residents/NGOs be willing to work with the police?
.
On what would you like to see the community and the police work together?
478
About the authors
Nathan W. Pino is an Associate Professor of Sociology at Texas State University in San Marcos.
His primary research interests include policing and police reform in an international context,
sexual violence, and the attitudes and behaviors of college students. Dr Pino served as a
Fulbright scholar in Trinidad and Tobago in 2009, and is the author (with Michael
D. Wiatrowski) of Democratic Policing in Transitional and Developing Countries (Ashgate).
Nathan W. Pino is the corresponding author and can be contacted at: np11@txstate.edu
Lee Michael Johnson is an Assistant Professor of Criminology at the University of West
Georgia. His primary research interests include juvenile delinquency, victimization, and criminal
justice policy and practice. He has published on the topics of juvenile delinquency and system
involvement, victim blaming, and criminal victimization and depression.

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