Rbpublic of the PhiliPPines

DEPARTMENT OF TIIE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Francisco Gold Condominium ll
EDSA Cor. MaPagmahal St., Diliman
Quezon City

OFFICE OF THE UNDERSECRETARY

FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT
DILG Legal Opinion No. L3s.2Ot2

FEB O 9 2|1Z
ATTY. JULY J.M. AGPAOA
8th Floor, AIC Burgundy Tower
ADB Avenue corner Garnet Road
Mandaluyong City

Dear Atty. Agpaoa:

This is in reference to your letter whrch you wrote for and in behalf of AG&P, seeking
an opinion on the following issues:

1. Legality of the act of Barangay San Jose, Bauan Batangas to require Barangay
lOs trom all AG&P employees working in the said company;

2. Sufficiency of Barangay ordinance No. 51 which was the legal basis for the
Punong Barangay to reqi.rire such barangay lDs; and'

3. Authority of the Punong Barangay and his tanods to check all persons entering
the AG&P company premises and to
refuse the entry of employees not
wearing barangaY lDs-

In reply to your request for an oirinion, we shall address the issues collectively.

As alleged, the bone of contention is the enforcement of Barangay ordinance No. 51,
,An Ordinance Requiring Companies Located in and Operating at Barangay San Roqu.e.
Bauan, Batangas to lnctude Barangay clearance As Paft of the Requirements to be
Compieted / Eecured by Apptican{s" .
This was enacted and made effective on 01
March 2000 by the Singguniang Barangay of San Roque, Bauan, Batangas' The
Punong Barangay then was one Domingo M. Salcedo.

You alleged that on 25 January 20'1.2, Punong Barangay of San R-oque' Richard
Ericson d. Talag and his Barangay Tanods posted themselves in front of the main gate
of AG&p compdund and started inspecting all incoming employees of AG&P, checking
them for "Baranqav-issued lDs and those found to have no such lD, including the
visiting Ad&p V'ice president who came from Manila, were refused entry by
Barangay Chairman Talag and his Tanods. lt is further alleged that the Punong
earaniay of San Roque rdlies gn Barangay Ordinance No. 51 as justification to conduct
such acts just outside the premises of AG&P.

However, a plain reading of the said ordinance, a copy of which was attached to your
letter, showed that what was required of all applicants or hirees of companies located
in Barangay San Roque was the issuance of a !g1g.!g4lgieg4"!eg. Ordinance No'.5{
made no mention of any provision requiring a Barangay lD among those reslolng
in or at least sojourned in the barangay.

The punong barangay, as the chief executive of the barangay government shall, among
all other duties and functions set forth in Section 389 of RA 7160 or the Local
,
Government code of 1991 enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable
within the barangay.
Absent anv law or ordinance dulv enacted and oassed for a specific puroose. a Punonq
Baranoav's actions cannot be
not lawfullv sanctioned. Similarly, acts performed
beyond and in excess of what has been provided under a law or ordinance, for that
matter, are deemed ultra vires acfs. (Jltra vires acts or acts which are clearly beyond
the scope of one's authority are null and void antl cannot be given any effect.
(Gancayco vs City Covernment of Quezon City and Metro Mctnila Development Authoriry, C.R. No.
177807. I I October 201 l)

Thus to answer your queries, the two-paged Barangav Ordinance No. 51, which
require the issuance of a barangay clearance to prospective hirees and appljcants of
companies located within Barangay San Roque, cannot be made the legal basis for
implementing the use of a Barangay lD as a requirement for the same employees, and
neither can ihe same ordinance sanction the acts of Funong Barangay Talag and his
Tanods in conducting inspection of AG&P employees and denying them entry in the
company premises. The ordinance in question does not provide for the
implementation of a barangay lD system nor does it provide sanctions for
violations thereol.

Now to resolve the enforcement of the Barangay lD system sans any ordinance at that,
the cases of "Ople vs lorres, G.R. No. 127685, 23 July 1998" and "Klusang Mayo
lJno vs Director Gerleral, ef a/., G,R. No. 167798, 19 April 2006" will elucidate need
for a valid enactment of a law and the parameters required in order to protect the
sanctity of the citizens' right to privacy,,

In Ople vs Torres, the Supreme Court struck down Administrative Order No. 308
bntitled "Adoption of a National Computerized ldentification Reference System" on the
ground that the executive act was a usurpation of the power of the Congress to legislate,
and it permissibly intrudes on the citizenry's protected zone of privacy as there were no
administrative safeguards established in the AO.

Further, we quote the pertinent pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Ople case:

The essence oJ privacy is the "right to be let alone". xtx

Ife also underscore that lhe right to prh,acy does not bar all incursions
into indiridual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientifc and
technological advsncements that enhance public semice and the common
good. It merely requires that the low be narrowly Jocused and a
compelling interest justify such infuusions. Intrusions into tlre rigll!
must be accomoanied bv oroper safesuards and well-defined standards
to Drevent unconstitutional invasions. [4e reiterate thot any lcnv or order
that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict
. scrutiny. The reason fot this stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutttc' to
tril'

The concept of limited governmenl has always included

the idea that governmental powers s:top short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is
indeed one of the basic disctinctions bettteen absolute
and limited government. Utimate and pemasive conttol
of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark
o;f the absolute state. In contrasL a system of limited
government safeguards a private sector, which belongs
to the individual, firmly dis\inguishing it /ron the public
sector, which the state can control. Protection of this
private sector protection, in other words, of the
- of the individual
dignity and integlity
- has become
increasingly important as modern society has dewloped.
 AII forces of a rcchnological age - industrialization,
the
urbanization, and organization operate to n(trrow the
area of prfuacy and facilitate
-
intnnion into it. In modern
terms, the capacity to mdintain and support this enclave
of private life marks the difference between a democratic
and a totalitarian society.

The right to pritacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a
mass society. The threats emanate from various sources * Sovernments,
journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat
comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O No
308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information
about themselves on the pretext that it will .ficilitate delivery of basic
services. xxxx lle close with the statement that the right lo ptivrcy was
not engrnved in our Conslilution for Jlottery".(emphasis supptied)

On the other hand, the latter case ol Kilusang Mayo Uno vs Director General, et al',
Executive Order No. 420 directed the use of a unified multi-purpose identification (lD)
system for government. The Supreme Court ruled:

"EO 420 does not establish fl national ID card system. EO 420 does not
compel all citizens to have an ID card. EO 420 applies only to gorernmenl
entilies that under existing ldws are already collecting data and issuing ID
' cdrds as part of their governmental funclions.

On its face, EO 420 shows no conslitutional inJirmily because it even

naftowl|t limits the data thal can be collecletl, tecorded and sltown
compared to the existing ID systems of governmenl enlities. EO 420
further provides strict safeguards to protect tlxe confdentiality of the data
collecled, in contrast to the pfior ID systems which ore bereft of strict
adminislrat ive safegzards. " (emphasis supplied)

Barangay Ordinance No. 5'l is an existing ordinance which enjoys the presumption of
validity, having been duly enacted and reviewed accordingly in 2000' or some eleven
years back.

AG&P, however, is not without any legal recourse to question its constitutionality,
taking into consideration the tenor of its letter filed before this Office, nor the taking of an
appropriate legal action against public officers said to be committing infractions or
violations of law. The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act which
is otherwise nufl and void or ultra vires. In British A,merican Tobacco vs' Camacho,
G.R. No. 163583, 20 August 2008, the Supreme Court held that:

"Indeed, petitioner cannot be faulted .for initially undertaking to

comply with, and subjecting itselfto the operation ofSection 145(C)' and
only later on fting the subject case prdyi,lg for the decloration of its
unconstitutionality when the circumstances t:hange and the Jaw results in
what it percefues to be unlawful disctimination. The mere fact tlmt a law
hss been relied. apon in lhe ptsl anel all that time hds not been atlucked
&s unconstitutional is not fl ground for consiilering petitioner estopped
 from assailing its validily. Fot courts will pass upon a, constitutional
ouestion only when presented before il in bona Jide
cases for
"iriiir"iiitr", and the Jact that the question has not been raised before
i, ,o,, o ,olid ,"osoi 7o, refisinf n allo'w it to be raised later'"
@mphasis suPPlied)

We hope that we have sufficiently addressed your concerns-

Very truly Yours,

ASBC. ROLANDO M. ACQSTA

OlC, Otfice of the USLG \i
/r'