Greece: Banks: Recaps Completed, Restructuring Moves Forward ALB Up To Buy

December 7, 2015
Greece: Banks
Equity Research
Recaps completed, restructuring moves forward; ALB up to Buy

Recaps completed, resolutions avoided
Greek banks have successfully completed their latest round of recaps. The CAPITAL ACTION BY GREEK BANKS THAT COVERED
THE SYSTEM-WIDE SHORTFALL OF €14.4 BN
total capital shortfall identified by the ECB (€14.4 bn) was covered with
€5.3 bn raised in the market, €3.7 bn of additional internal measures Other
€ 0.7 bn SCIs
(mainly LMEs) and the €5.4 bn residual shortfall filled by the state (through € 5.3 bn
common shares as well as contingent capital). We update our outlook for
LMEs
the Greek banks taking into account capital hikes and restructuring plans. € 3.0 bn
State aid a key differentiating factor across banks € 14.4 bn

The four Greek banks avoided resolution, with ALB and EURB able to cover (system-wide shortfall)
the entirety of their capital needs privately. The sector’s private ownership
increased to 62%-98% across banks. However, use of new public funds at
PIR and NBG implies increased state involvement (as per the recap law) State
State Shares
and triggers further balance sheet downsizing (in particular foreign units). CoCos € 1.4 bn
€ 4.1 bn
Balance sheet clean-up paves way for earnings recovery Source: Company data, ECB, Goldman Sachs Global
Our central case incorporates a gradual recovery of profitability, with banks Investment Research
breaking even in 2016-17E on the back of front loading the bulk of AQR- RELATED RESEARCH
implied impairments in 2015. We estimate a recovered 9.9% ROTE for the Recapitalization plans outlined, capital hikes to follow
shortly, November 11, 2015
sector (by c.2019E) which is broadly on par with European peers. Notably,
Stress test: Total recap of €14.4bn at mid-point of GSe
we only see modest differences in the underlying profitability across banks (€13.2bn), November 2, 2015
given similarities in business models and exposures. We incorporate Stress test pave way for recaps; we estimate €13bn(mid) -
€20bn(max), October 28, 2015
further downsizing of asset bases constraining nominal earnings potential.
Recaps in focus but framework unclear, trends to worsen,
September 28, 2015
Reinforced capital serves as buffer against risks
Recaps give scope for ELA increase – but banks far from
High headline capitalization should serve as a mitigant against asset normal, July 14, 2015
quality risk and reliance on DTCs in the capital structure, in our view. On ECB to review collateral haircuts; we see a sharp increase as
unlikely, July 1, 2015
our estimates, recaps lift average fully loaded CET1 by c.4.9pp to 15.2% on
European Banks: Scope for Greek contagion – through
a 3Q15 pro-forma basis. Despite balance sheet clean-up, we forecast a ratio banks channel – is low, June 29, 2015
>16% in 2016-18E on the back of further capital actions and deleveraging. How long until deposit outflow necessitates an adjustment?,
June 26, 2015
Valuation at the bottom end of European banks Pressure on banks’ liquidity worsens; ECB keeps the system
afloat, June 22, 2015
Greek banks shares were placed at 0.3-0.4x TBV (3Q pro forma) triggering
83%-99% dilution to former shareholders. Valuation comes within the
bottom 10% of EUR banks under our coverage and >50% discount to
domestic Southern European peers (0.8x). We value the stocks using an
ROE/COE approach. Our 12-month price targets correspond to 0.6x TBV
(16E) and imply 45%-65% upside to SCI price, and we upgrade ALB to Buy.
Share overhang post LMEs and politics could pressure shares near term;
positive catalysts include reduced uncertainty on asset quality and funding.
Pawel Dziedzic Goldman Sachs does and seeks to do business with
+44(20)7774-1279 pawel.dziedzic@gs.com Goldman Sachs International
Markus Pops
companies covered in its research reports. As a result,
+44(20)7774-1771 markus.pops@gs.com Goldman Sachs International investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of
interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors
should consider this report as only a single factor in making
their investment decision. For Reg AC certification and other
important disclosures, see the Disclosure Appendix, or go to
www.gs.com/research/hedge.html. Analysts employed by non-
US affiliates are not registered/qualified as research analysts
with FINRA in the U.S.
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Global Investment Research

December 7, 2015 Greece: Banks
Contents
Story in six charts: Recaps completed, resolutions avoided 3

Recaps completed, state aid a key differentiating factor across banks 4
Recaps completed: €9.0 bn of €14.4 bn shortfall covered privately 5
New shares issued at 0.3x-0.4x TBV, recap triggered 83%-99% dilution to former shareholders 6
Ownership structure: All banks avoid resolutions, two also avoid further state aid 7
Reinforced capital serves as buffer against risks 8
Balance sheet clean-up paves way for earnings recovery 9
Valuation: Greek banks resume trading at a deep discount to European peers 10
Company profiles 17
Alpha Bank (ACBr.AT): Reinforced balance sheet, least state-influence; up to Buy 18
Bank of Piraeus (BOPr.AT): Recapitalization completed, restructuring pending; Neutral 22
Eurobank (EURBr.AT): Stress test confirms momentum on group de-risking; Neutral 26
Appendix 1: ECB Comprehensive Assessment (2015) 31
Appendix 2: Recapitalization Framework 35
Appendix 3: Past Restructuring and Recaps 37
Appendix 4: Asset quality trends 41
Appendix 5: Funding 45
Appendix 6: Capital controls in Cyprus 47
Prices in this report are based on the market close as of December 4, 2015, unless otherwise stated.
Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research 2

Story in six charts: Recaps completed, resolutions avoided

Exhibit 1: All four Greek banks avoid resolution, with Exhibit 2: State aid to become a key differentiating
>60% of €14.4 bn capital shortfall covered privately... factor, with private ownership highest for ALB and EURB
Capital plans delivered by banks post ECB’s stress test Expected ownership structures pre- and post- recap in 2015
Other SCIs State Private

€ 0.7 bn € 5.3 bn 2%
11%
26%
LMEs 35% 38%
€ 3.0 bn 57%
68% 67%
€ 14.4 bn 89%
98%
(system-wide shortfall) 74%
65% 62%
43%
32% 33%
State
State Shares Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
CoCos € 1.4 bn
€ 4.1 bn ALB PIR EURB NBG
Source: Company data, ECB, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Source: Company data; Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
Exhibit 3: Asset quality concerns still meaningful with Exhibit 4: … but reinforced capital serves as buffer
nearly half of loans non-performing or at risk... against risks, in our view
NPE ratio pre- and post-AQR, % CET1 FL, last reported, 2016E and 18E for ALB, PIR and EURB
AQR reclassification Pre AQR
18.1% -2.0% 17.6%

4.9% -0.9% 16.3%
56.8% 15.2%
3.3%
11.8%
46.5% 46.7%
4.0% 41.6% 5.8%

1.2%
ALB PIR EURB NBG CET1 (+) CET1 (–) (–) CET1 FL CET1 FL CET1 FL
(3Q15) Cap hikes (3Q15PF) State Aid Basel III (3Q15PF) (2016E) (2018E)
Source: ECB, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
Exhibit 5: Balance sheet clean-up paves way for earnings Exhibit 6: Greek banks resume trading at distressed
recovery, we eventually see banks generating 10% ROTE levels and a large discount to their European peers
ROTE in 2019; pro-forma for 12% CET 1, ex state-aid costs Overview of P/E, P/TBV and ROTE (%) across European
regions
14.4%
13.4x
1.1x
6.3% 9.9%
(average) (average)
10.0x
10.0x
0.8x
0.8x
9.9%
9.8%
10.4%
8.4%
10.0%
9.4%
7.8%
5.3x
4.9x
0.4x
6.4%
2.2%
4.9%
GRE'19PF
GRE'19PF
GRE'17E
SE'17E
EUR'17E
GRE'16E
SE'16E
EUR'16E
GRE'17E
SE'17E
EUR'17E
EM'17E
EM'16E
EM'17E
ALB PIR EURB ALB PIR EURB

ROTE: '19 ROTE: '19PF
P/E P/TBV ROTE
Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Source: Datastream, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.

December 7, 2015
Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
Recaps completed, state aid a key differentiating factor across banks

Greek banks have successfully completed their latest round of recaps. All four institutions avoided resolution as they
covered at least the baseline capital shortfalls identified by the ECB (€4.4 bn) using private sources; ALB and EURB were
able to cover the entirety of their capital needs privately.
The total capital shortfall identified by the ECB (€14.4 bn) was covered with €5.3 bn raised in the market, €3.7 bn of additional
internal measures (mainly LMEs) and €5.4 bn residual shortfall filled by the state (through common shares as well as contingent
capital). In total >60% or €9.0 bn of a total system-wide capital shortfall was covered through private sources.
Post the recaps, the sector’s private ownership increased to 62%-98% across banks (up across all banks). However, use of new
public funds at PIR and NBG implies increased state involvement (as per the recap law) and triggers further balance sheet
downsizing (in particular foreign units). ALB remains the only systemic Greek bank without any state aid. EURB screens as one with
the lowest level of share ownership; however, it continues to hold €950 mn of state preference shares which need to be repaid.
Exhibit 7: €9.0 bn of €14.4 bn shortfall covered privately Exhibit 8: Latest round of recaps reduce state ownership to 2%-38%; EURB and ALB cover entirety
Announced capital action plans by banks to cover the of their capital needs privately but only ALB remains without any state aid
total shortfall of €14.4 bn Expected ownership structures pre- and post- recap in 2015
State Private
Other 2%
€ 0.7 bn SCIs 11%
€ 5.3 bn 26%
35% 38%
LMEs
€ 3.0 bn 62% 57%
68%
€ 14.4 bn 89%
98%
(system-wide shortfall) 74%
65% 62%
38% 43%
32%
State
Shares
State € 1.4 bn
CoCos Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
€ 4.1 bn
ALB PIR EURB NBG
Source: Company data, ECB, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Source: Company data; Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
Greece: Banks
4
December 7, 2015
Recaps completed: €9.0 bn of €14.4 bn shortfall covered privately
The four systemic Greek banks have covered €9.0 bn (62%) of a total shortfall of €14.4 bn privately. The contribution of the private
sector is split between €5.3 bn covered by share capital increases (SCI), €3.0 bn coming from liability management exercises (LME)
and €0.7 bn from other capital action measures approved by the regulator. The aggregate amount raised through SCIs is between
the amounts of capital raised in the market in the two previous recap rounds (2013: c.€3 bn, 2014: c.€8 bn). In total the Greek banks
have seen a total sector recap of c.€66 bn over the last 3 years.
Private-sector participation reduced the need for public funds to c.€5.4, split broadly equally between NBG (€2.7 bn) and PIR (€2.7
bn). The state support came through a mix of common shares (25%, c.€1.4 bn) and contingent capital notes (75%, c.€4.1 bn). This
amount of state aid injected into the Greek banking sector came below the lower end of the recap line of credit of €10-25 bn agreed
under the third assistance program for Greece.
Exhibit 9: Greek banks succeeded in covering €9.0 bn (62%) of the total system-wide capital shortfall (€14.4 bn) via private sector
sources; only PIR and NBG to take state aid
Structure of the confirmed recapitalization plans announced by the four systemic Greek banks in response to results of a comprehensive
assessment carried out by the ECB
€bn ALB PIR EURB NBG Aggregate
(+) SCI 1.6 1.3 1.6 0.8 5.3

(+) LME 1.0 0.6 0.4 1.0 3.0
(+) Other 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.7
= Private 2.7 2.2 2.1 1.9 9.0

% total 100% 45% 100% 41% 62%
(+) Common Shares (25%) - 0.7 - 0.7 1.4

(+) Contingent Capital (75%) - 2.0 - 2.0 4.1
= State - 2.7 - 2.7 5.4

% total 0% 55% 0% 59% 38%
Total shortfall 2.7 4.9 2.1 4.6 14.4

o/w baseline 0.3 2.2 0.3 1.6 4.4
Private: % baseline 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

Private: % total shortfall 100% 45% 100% 41% 62%
Source: Company data, ECB, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
Greece: Banks
5
December 7, 2015
New shares issued at 0.3x-0.4x TBV, recap triggered 83%-99% dilution to former shareholders
The aggregate TBV of Greek banks stood at €20.5 bn at the end of 3Q15. Based on the capital measures (both dilutive and non-
dilutive), banks’ TBV will increase by c.€11 bn, on our estimates. The announced issue prices implied a valuation in a range of 0.3x-
0.4x TBV on a pro-forma basis (post money). The recap process consequently results in 83%-99% dilution to former shareholders.
Exhibit 10: New shares issued at 0.3x-0.4x TBV post new money on a pro-forma basis
Impact of capital hikes on last reported tangible book value (TBV); pro-forma valuation based on issue price post new money
€bn ALB PIR EURB NBG Aggregate
Pro-Forma: TBV
TBV: 30 September 2015 6.6 6.3 3.5 4.1 20.5
(+) Private: SCI 1.6 1.3 1.6 0.8 5.3

(+) Private: LME 1.0 0.6 0.4 1.0 3.0
(+) State: Common Shares - 0.7 - 0.7 1.4
(+) State: State Prefs (1) - - - 1.4 1.4
= TBV uplift 2.6 2.6 2.0 3.8 11.0
Pro-Forma: TBV 9.1 8.9 5.6 7.9 31.5
Pro-Forma: Market Value
Old shares 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 --

New shares: Private (SCI + LME) 1.3 6.5 2.0 5.9 --
New: State - 2.3 - 3.6 --
# shares (post cap-hike) 1.5 8.8 2.2 9.8 --
SCI price (post split) 2.00 0.30 1.00 0.30 --
Pro-Forma: Market Value 3.1 2.6 2.2 2.9 10.8
Pro-Forma: P / TBV
Pro-Forma: TBV 9.1 8.9 5.6 7.9 31.5
Pro-Forma: Market Value 3.1 2.6 2.2 2.9 10.8
Pro-forma P/TBV 0.34x 0.30x 0.39x 0.37x 0.34x
Greece: Banks
(1) Capital plans assume treatment of Greek state preference shares depending on when a bank is expected to receive incremental state aid during
the current recap round. Consequently, as per the recap plans, state prefs are carried over at their nominal value (€950mn) at EURB and subject to
haircut and conversion into common shares at NBG. (2) Assumes dilution from LMEs is reduced by the size of potential capital gains.
Source: Company data, ECB, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
6
December 7, 2015
Ownership structure: All banks avoid resolutions, two also avoid further state aid
The sector’s private ownership increased to >80% on average across all banks, comparing to 15% and 43% post capital hikes in 2013
and 2014, accordingly. State ownership is now the lowest for ALB and EURB, the two banks which succeeded in covering the entire
capital shortfall from private sources, falling from 68% and 35% down to 11% and 2%, respectively. ALB remains the only systemic
Greek bank without any state aid, given EURB will continue to hold 950 mn of state preference shares.
PIR and NBG will see their state ownership falling from 67% and 57% down to 26% and 38%, respectively. However, in contrast to
last two recap rounds, use of public funds implies increased state involvement and triggers further balance sheet downsizing at both
institutions. Pursuant to the recapitalization law (see Appendix 2 for more details) HFSF will maintain full voting rights and right to
nominate a board member with additional oversight powers at both PIR and NBG.
Exhibit 11: State ownership of Greek banks falls to 2%-38% post capital hike; ALB remains the only bank without any state aid
Overview of state ownership of Greek banks post capital hikes in 2013, 2014 and 2015
% ALB PIR EURB NBG Average
Ownership: 2013 recaps
Private 18% 19% 5% 16% 15%
State: Shares 82% 81% - 84% 62%
State: Covered by warrants - - 95% - 24%
Private 32% 33% 65% 43% 43%
State: Shares 68% 67% - 57% 48%
State: Covered by warrants - - 35% - 9%
Private 89% 74% 98% 62% 81%
State 11% 26% 2% 38% 19%
Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
Greece: Banks
7
December 7, 2015
Reinforced capital serves as buffer against risks

High headline capitalization of the Greek banks should put the sector in a stronger position for dealing with operational headwinds
and reliance on DTCs in the capital structure, in our view. On our estimates, recaps lift average fully loaded CET1 by c.4.9 pp to
15.2% on a 3Q15 pro-forma basis. Despite balance sheet clean-up, we forecast, CET1 fully loaded to increase to c.16% and c.18% in
2016 and 2018, respectively. We forecast the sector to be loss making in 2015 on the back of higher loan loss provisions, and broadly
breaking even in 2016. The sector only becomes profit making, and hence startd generating book value, from 2017 onwards
according to our estimates. Our analysis assumes full recognition of DTCs and no changes to the current DTC legislation.
Exhibit 12: We estimate the Greek banks to be strongly capitalised post the cap hikes with 17.6% CET1 fully loaded ration in 2018E
Reconciliation of last reported CET1 ratio with CET1 fully loaded ratio in 3Q15 and 2018E for ALB, EURB and PIR
Capital increase No ordinary dividends, includes

(SCI, LME and state) cost of CoCos at select banks |
Cumulative losses
1.4% 18.1% -2.0% 1.6% -0.1% -0.2% 17.6%

4.9% 3.0% -0.1% 16.3%
-0.9%
15.2% -1.8%
|
11.8%
Deleveraging Return to
and sale of foreign profitability
New State Aid
|
units by select banks
(CoCos) State Aid
(CoCos & Prefs)
Headline CET1
(includes DTCs)
CET1 (+) (+) CET1 (–) (–) CET1 FL (±) (±) (±) CET1 FL (±) (±) (±) CET1 FL
(3Q15) Cap Hike CoCos (3Q15PF) State Aid Basel III (3Q15PF) Earnings Δ RWAs Other (2016E) Earnings Δ RWAs Other (2018E)
Greece: Banks
8
December 7, 2015
Balance sheet clean-up paves way for earnings recovery

With recaps completed, our central case incorporates a gradual recovery of profitability towards c.10% (ROTE) on an
underlying basis. The timing and scope of a recovery, however, is still uncertain, with risks both to the upside and downside.
We forecast the sector to break even in 2016, be modestly profit making in 2017 and reach normalized returns on a >3-year
view. Notably, we only see modest differences in the underlying profitability across banks given similarities in their business
models and exposures. On an individual level, we estimate ALB, EURB and PIR to reach c.9%-10% returns by 2019 (excluding
the payment of CoCos on state aid and assuming CET1 at 12% level).
Our forecasts (to 2019E) incorporate pressure on banks’ NII from falling volumes as the sector continues to de-lever (we only
assume c. one third of 2015 Greek deposit outflows to come back to the system), and a further decline in other revenues from
weaker trading as well as asset disposals triggered by new state-aid requirements. On the other hand, we see falling revenues being
partially offset by strict cost control (C/I estimated in the 50%-55% range by 2019) on the back of EU approved restructuring
programs and further cost optimization plans in the banks’ pipelines.
All in all, we expect the Greek banks to face meaningful headwinds in the near term, with asset quality screening as a key overhang.
In the medium-term, we see the sector achieving returns similar to that of the European average, although lagging the returns of
some of the regional EM markets (CEE, Turkey, Russia for example).
Exhibit 13: We estimate the Greek banking sector ROTE to return to c.10% return by 2019 on an underlying (i.e. capital-adjusted) basis by 2015E
Reconciliation of returns on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROTE); left hand side values expressed as % average 2019E assets (banks include ALB, EURB and PIR)
Strong cost
control
C/I ~ low 50s
Adjusted ROTE calculated based
0.8% 3.3% -2.0% on target 12% CT1 ratio
Provisioning run-rate
and excluding cost of CoCos
3.0% -0.3% at circa 50 bps (loans)
-0.1%
Includes
coupon on
CoCos
12x
Revenues 0.3% 1.6% -0.4%
decline...
1.2% 26.0% 8x 9.9%
-0.1% 0.8% 6.3%

.. but so
do assets
Greece: Banks
Revenues Δ NII Δ Non-NII Δ Assets Revenues Costs Δ Costs PPI LLPs PBT Taxes MI & Pref. Net Profit (x) Leverage Leverage = GS ROTE GS ROTE
(3Q15 x 4) (2019E) (3Q15 x 4) (2019E) (2019E) Shares (2019E) (2019E) (Adjusted) (reported) (adjusted)

9
December 7, 2015
Valuation: Greek banks resume trading at a deep discount to European peers

The shares of Greek banks have fallen c.95% on average since the beginning of the year owing to elevated near-term risks as well as
dilution from the recent recap. Based on the announced issue prices of new shares, the Greek banks trade in the range of 0.3x-0.4x
on 3Q15 pro-forma TBV and at c.0.4x TBV in 2016E. This is considerably below that of their South European and EM peers, which
are trading at 0.8x. On a P/E basis, Greek banks trade at 4.9x 2019E earnings (excluding coupon payment) vs. 10.0x for South
European and 5.3x for EM banks on 2017 estimates. The valuation of the Greek banks comes in the context of them delivering
normalized returns of c.10% (ROTE) in 2019E vs. the South European, Pan European and EM averages of 8.4%, 9.8% and 14.4% for
2017E, respectively.
Exhibit 14: Greek banks resume trading at a deep discount to European peers despite c.10% normalized returns in 2019E
Overview of P/E, P/TBV and ROTE (%) across European regions
13.4x
1.1x 14.4%
10.0x 10.0x 0.8x 0.8x

9.9% 9.8%
8.4%
4.9x 5.3x
0.4x
2.2%
Greece Greece SE EUR EM Greece SE EUR EM Greece Greece SE EUR EM

19PF* 17E 17E 17E 17E 16E 16E 16E 16E 19PF* 17E 17E 17E 17E
P/E P/TBV ROTE

Note: EUR (Europe): sample of 47 European banks under GS coverage; SE (South Europe): sample of 12 domestic Spanish, Italian and Portuguese banks; EM (Emerging
Markets): sample of 9 banks from Russia and Turkey; SCI price assumed for Greek banks; P/E for Greece excludes coupon payment on state aid from earnings; ROTE in
2019E for Greece assumes 12% CET1 ratio
Source: DataStream, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
Greece: Banks
10
December 7, 2015
On our estimates, the three Greek banks trade at c.0.4x on a P/TBV basis (2016E) assuming the issue price of new shares. This puts
them in the bottom end of the European banks ranking and compares to the average of c.1.1x TBV (2016E) of select European banks.
Exhibit 15: Greek banks trade at c. 0.4x TBV based on the issue price of new shares…
P/TBV 2016E for European banks; market prices assumed for ALB and EURB; SCI implied market price assumed for PIR with bar and market price with dot
2.0x
2.2x
1.9x
1.8x
1.7x
1.7x
1.6x
1.6x
1.6x
1.5x
1.5x
1.4x
1.4x
1.4x
1.3x
1.3x
1.3x
1.2x
1.2x
1.2x
1.2x
1.2x
1.1x
1.1x
1.1x
1.1x
1.0x
1.0x
1.0x
0.9x
1.0x
1.1x
0.9x
0.8x
0.8x
0.8x
0.8x
0.8x
0.7x
0.7x
0.7x
0.7x
0.7x
0.6x
0.6x
0.6x
0.5x
0.4x
0.4x
0.4x
0.3x
ALB
PIR
EURB
BMPS
CBKG
DBKGn
RBIV
BCP
BBPI
UBI
CRDI
POP
BAPO
BARC
SOGN
RBS
CAGR
BNPP
PMII
CABK
CSGN
HSBA
DNB
MBK
BKIA
PKO
ING
SAN
BBVA
BKIR
ERST
ISP
OTPB
DANSKE
CNAT
LLOY
NDA
BZW
UBSG
EFGN
SEBa
BHW
PEO
KBC
BKT
SHBa
SWEDa
BKOM
VONN
SHAW
Source: Datastream, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
We expect the Greek banks to be only marginally profit making in 2017. However, on a medium-term view, the sector should be in a
position to offer more attractive returns, in our view. We forecast the banks to generate ROTE of c.6%-8% on a reported, and c.9%-
10% on underlying basis in 2019. This is on par with the European banks’ average of 10% on our 2017 estimates.
Exhibit 16: … with returns of c.9%-10% in 2019E on the underlying basis

ROTE 2017E for European banks; for Greek banks in 2019E ROTE assumed on 12% CET1
16%
18%
16%
15%
14%
14%
14%
14%
14%
14%
13%
13%
13%
13%
13%
12%
12%
12%
11%
11%
11%
11%
11%
10%
11%
11%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
9%
9%
10%
9%
9%
9%
9%
8%
8%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
6%
5%
4%
3%
3%
1%
PIR
ALB
EURB
CBKG
BMPS
UBI
BKIA
MBK
BAPO
RBS
PMII
POP
BBPI
CAGR
CRDI
SOGN
BCP
PIR'19PF
PKO
DBKGn
ALB'19PF
BZW
CABK
CNAT
ING
EURB'19PF
DNB
DANSKE
BNPP
BARC
BKIR
PEO
HSBA
RBIV
BHW
ISP
CSGN
LLOY
SEBa
NDA
ERST
BKT
SHBa
SAN
OTPB
UBSG
SWEDa
KBC
BKOM
BBVA
VONN
Greece: Banks
Source: Datastream, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Note: 2019 earnings for Greek banks exclude coupon payments on state aid and are capital adjusted for 12% CET1 ratio.
11
December 7, 2015
Our current forecasts that incorporate a delayed profit recovery for the Greek banking sector correspond to high P/E multiples for
the three banks when benchmarked against European and EM peers on a 2017E basis. By contrast, earnings expectations consistent
with a recovered 9%-10% ROTEs would put Greek banks on a “normalized” multiple of 4x-5x earnings, one of the lowest in Europe.
Exhibit 17: Greek banks trade at 12x-15x on 2017E earnings, but at 4x-5x P/E on normalized earnings in 2019E
P/E 2017E for European banks
15.4x
14.9x
14.6x
14.4x
13.6x
10x
13.3x
13.1x
12.5x
12.1x
12.0x
12.0x
11.9x
11.9x
11.6x
11.5x
11.3x
11.0x
11.0x
10.9x
10.9x
10.6x
10.5x
10.5x
10.4x
10.2x
10.2x
9.9x
9.8x
9.5x
9.0x
8.9x
8.9x
8.8x
8.7x
8.6x
8.4x
8.4x
8.4x
8.3x
8.1x
7.9x
7.6x
7.6x
7.5x
7.4x
7.1x
7.0x
6.9x
6.2x
6.1x
6.0x
5.7x
5.4x
4.8x
4.8x
4.6x
4.5x
4.4x
4.2x
3.9x
4.1x
VAKBN
YKBNK
SBER
EURB'19PF
HALKB
ISCTR
ALB'19PF
RBIV
PIR'19PF
GARAN
AKBNK
DBKGn
BCP
BBVA
BARC
CSGN
CRDI
SAN
BNPP
BBPI
VTBR
OTPB
CAGR
SOGN
ERST
SHAW
HSBA
EFGN
BMPS
DNB
POP
CABK
BAPO
LLOY
UBSG
ING
BKIR
CBKG
KBC
NDA
UBI
RBS
PKO
ISP
CNAT
SEBa
DANSKE
VONN
BKOM
EURB
BKT
SWEDa
PMII
SHBa
BHW
ALB
BZW
PEO
MBK
PIR
BKIA
Source: Datastream, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Note: earnings for Greek banks exclude coupon payments on state aid. SCI implied market price assumed for Piraeus with bar and market price with dot
Greece: Banks
12
December 7, 2015
ROE/COE is our preferred valuation method for European banks

We use a ROE/COE valuation methodology for most of the European and EM banks in our coverage. Our analysis of expected
returns and valuations across Europe and EM regions reveals a clear correlation between P/TBV multiples and forecast ROTE.
Exhibit 18: Greek banks under our coverage trade at a deep discount to the EUR/EM peers, driven by remaining concerns over
asset quality and subdued profitability in the near term; we estimate they will achieve c.10% returns by 2019E on underlying basis
ROTE (2017E) versus P/TBV (2016E) for banks under GS coverage by region
16.5% (grey data points (grey data points

R² = 91% excluded) CZ
17% excluded)
R² = 51%
CZ
RU
14.5% HU UK (Dom) 15%
TU HU
AT BEN
12.5% NOR 13% AT GEM
ROTE (2017E)
ROTE (2017E)
PL
PL 11%
10.5% GR'19 PF FR IR
GR'19 PF
PO ES 9%
8.5%
IT 7%
6.5% GR'19 GR'19

5%
4.5% 3%
0.4 0.9 1.4 1.9 0.3x 0.8x 1.3x 1.8x 2.3x
P / TBV (2016E) P / TBV (2016E)

Notes: GEM (global emerging markets) banks include HSBC, Standard Chartered, Santander and BBVA.
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Note: Market prices used for ALB and EURB, and SCI implied price used for PIR. 2019 returns (ROTE) uses adjusted capital at
12% CET1 ratio.
Greece: Banks
13
December 7, 2015
Our review of returns and valuations for the Greek banks over the past ten years shows a similar correlation. Notably, the
relationship holds true for 2004-08, when P/BV multiples often exceeded 2.5x, as well as the more recent stressed period, when
multiples were often below 1x.
Exhibit 19: Expected returns and valuations for Greek banks reveal a clear correlation between ROE and P/TB multiples
P/BV vs. 1-year-forward ROE (Reuters consensus) for our Greek banks coverage over past 10 years (monthly)
20%
R² = 78%
18%
16%
14%
ROE (1 yr forward)
12%
10%
2004-2008
8%
6% 2009-14
4%
2%
0%
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
P / TB
Greece: Banks
14
December 7, 2015
Valuation methodology: Our 12-month price targets imply a fair P/TBV multiple of 0.6x
Our 12-month forward price targets for the Greek banks are derived using a ROTE/COE-based valuation methodology. We use a
2019E valuation as our reference point in order to capture recovery of the banks’ earnings and adjust underlying profitability further
to exclude costs of remaining state-aid. Our individual price targets are adjusted to reflect each bank’s capital position (we use a
fully loaded CET1 cut-off of 12% in 2019E) and are discounted back to reflect upside/downside on a 12-month forward basis (in line
with our coverage). Our 12-month price targets for Greek banks imply a fair P/TBV multiple of 0.6x.
Exhibit 20: Our 12-month price targets for Greek banks imply a fair P/TBV multiple of 0.6x
ROTE/COE valuation methodology on 2019E estimates
€bn Formula ALB PIR EURB
TBV (16E) [1] €8.6bn €7.1bn €5.1bn
# shares1 [2] 1.54 8.80 2.19
TBVPS (16E) [3] = [1] ÷ [2] €5.61 €0.80 €2.34
ROTE (normalized1) [4] 10.0% 9.4% 10.4%
Cost of Equity [5] 12.0% 12.0% 12.0%
Growth [6] 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Fair P/TBV (normalized2) [7] = ([4] – [6] ) ÷ ( [5] – [6]) 0.83x 0.78x 0.87x
Discount Factor3 [8] 1.4 1.4 1.4
Fair P/TBV (1-year forward) [9] = [7] ÷ [8] 0.59x 0.56x 0.62x
Value Per Share (Pre-Adjustments) [10] = [3] x [9] €3.30 €0.45 €1.45
4
Adjustments [11] €0.00 €0.00 €0.00
Target Price (Post Share Split) [12] = [10] + [11] €3.30 €0.45 €1.45
Share Price (Post Share Split) €1.93 €0.65 €0.93

Upside / Downside 71% -31% 57%
SCI Issue Price (Post Share Split) €2.00 €0.30 €1.00

Upside / Downside Potential 65% 50% 45%
(1) Number of shares post capital increase and adjusted for announced reverse stock splits; (2) Normalized profitability proxies by GSe for 2019E; (3) Calculated based on
assumed COE, 3 year period to earnings normalization and 12% CET1 threshold; (4) We did not apply any additional adjustments given lack of clarity over potential capital
returns and required capitalization levels; fair P / TBV multiple has been applied to stated TBVPS, with no additional adjustments for capital shortfall / surplus.
Greece: Banks
Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
15
December 7, 2015
We cross check our valuation approach by putting it in a historical context. The market capitalization implied by our 0.6x P/TBV fair
valuation of the Greek banks puts the aggregate market cap at c.€16-17 bn for the sector as a whole. Notably, this comes below a
trough market capitalization of €18 bn reported during 2H13-2014 (and <50% of peak levels reached in mid-2014).
Exhibit 21: Peak and trough of Greek banks’ aggregate market cap stood at €38 and €18 bn respectively between 2H13-2014, and compares to c.€16-17 bn of
implied market cap based on our fair value multiple of 0.6x P/TBV
Aggregate market cap of four systemic Greek banks; € bn
40.0
Peak : €38 bn
35.0
30.0
25.0
20.0
Trough : €18 bn
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
Jan-13
Feb-13
Mar-13
Apr-13
May-13
Jun-13
Jul-13
Aug-13
Sep-13
Oct-13
Nov-13
Dec-13
Jan-14
Feb-14
Mar-14
Apr-14
May-14
Jun-14
Jul-14
Aug-14
Sep-14
Oct-14
Nov-14
Dec-14
Jan-15
Feb-15
Mar-15
Apr-15
May-15
Jun-15
Jul-15
Aug-15
Sep-15
Oct-15
Nov-15
Dec-15
Exhibit 22: Market cap of Alpha Bank Exhibit 23: Market cap of Bank of Piraeus Exhibit 24: Market cap of Eurobank
€ bn € bn € bn
12.0 14.0 8.0
12.0 7.0
10.0
6.0
10.0
8.0
5.0
8.0
6.0 4.0
6.0
4.0
ALB 4.0 PIR 3.0
2.0 EURB
2.0 2.0 1.0
0.0 0.0 0.0

Jan-13
Mar-13
May-13
Jul-13
Sep-13
Nov-13
Jan-14
Mar-14
May-14
Jul-14
Sep-14
Nov-14
Jan-15
Mar-15
May-15
Jul-15
Sep-15
Nov-15
Jan-13
Mar-13
May-13
Jul-13
Sep-13
Nov-13
Jan-14
Mar-14
May-14
Jul-14
Sep-14
Nov-14
Jan-15
Mar-15
May-15
Jul-15
Sep-15
Nov-15
Mar-13
Sep-13
Mar-14
Sep-14
Mar-15
Sep-15
Nov-13
Nov-14
Nov-15
Jan-13
May-13
Jul-13
Jan-14
May-14
Jul-14
Jan-15
May-15
Jul-15
Greece: Banks
Source: Datastream, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Source: Datastream, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Source: Datastream, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
16
Company profiles

December 7, 2015
Alpha Bank (ACBr.AT): Reinforced balance sheet, least state-influence; up to Buy
Investment Profile Source of opportunity

Low High
We upgrade our rating on ALB to Buy from Neutral following completion of the bank’s recapitalization process.
Growth Growth
While we recognize that operating conditions for Greek banks are likely to remain challenging in the near term,
Returns * Returns *
we ultimately expect ALB to be in a position to deliver capital adjusted 10% returns (ROTE) in the medium term,
Multiple Multiple
on par with European peers. Reduced dilution risk in the near term (post cap hikes) and better visibility on macro
Volatility Volatility
Percentile 20th 40th 60th 80th 100th and operating trends should drive de-risking of ALB’s investment case, in our view. We see the current P/TBV
Alpha Bank (ACBr.AT) valuation discount as a reflection of existing uncertainties as well as timing and structure of the recaps.
Europe Banks Peer Group Average
* Returns = Return on Capital For a complete description of the investment
Our relative preference for ALB over its Greek peers reflects the lower risk profile of the group that comes in the
profile measures please refer to the
disclosure section of this document.
context of comparable underlying profitability and similar valuations. ALB has succeeded in covering the entirety
of its capital shortfall identified by the ECB (€2.7 bn) privately and remains the only Greek bank without any form
of state aid. We see this as a factor limiting potential restructuring disruptions and offering increased operating
Key data Current
Price (€) 2.01 flexibility. Furthermore, on our estimates, the recap leaves the group with a relatively high capitalization (17.8%
12 month price target (€) 3.30
Upside/(downside) (%) 64 CET1 in 2016E) compared to peers, despite better-than-average asset quality track record evidenced by ALB’s
Market cap (€ mn) 3,089.1 solid performance in the last three stress tests in Greece.
Tier 1 ratio (%) 14.3
Catalyst
12/14 12/15E 12/16E 12/17E
GS EPS (€) New (3.08) (3.16) 0.04 0.14 The share price is likely to remain sensitive to news around politics, funding and asset quality, with further
EPS (€) Old (153.87) (165.44) 3.74 4.14
DPS (€) New 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
clarity on the key issues supporting de-risking of the bank’s investment case in our view. We see upcoming 4Q15
DPS (€) Old 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 results as an opportunity for ALB to front-load losses ahead of 2016, but also a chance for investors to gain
GS P/E (X) NM NM 52.3 13.9
Dividend yield (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 better insights into the recent operating trends. Share overhang from LME may also impact share performance.
GS ROE (%) (10.3) (15.9) 0.7 2.5
P/BV (X) 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.3
Valuation
ALB’s shares are valued at 0.3x TBV on our 2016 estimates. This is broadly on par with the other Greek banks
under our coverage but at a substantial discount to the European sector (1.1x) as well as other Southern
Price performance chart European peers (0.8x). On a capital adjusted basis, we see ALB in a position to deliver c.10% ROTE in 2019E, on
30 560
par with the European sector average for 2017E.
25 530
20 500
We value the shares using a ROTE/COE methodology to derive a 12-month price target of €3.30. Our price target
corresponds to a multiple of 0.6x TBV (2016E) and implies 64% upside to the SCI issue price (€2.00). We upgrade
15 470
our rating to Buy. We adjust our estimates and valuation to reflect the recent recaps, front loading of the AQR
10 440
implied provision and marginally better operating trends in outer years.
5 410
0 380 Key risks

Dec-14 Mar-15 Jun-15 Sep-15
Alpha Bank (L) FTSE World Europe (EUR) (R)

Key downside risks relate to asset quality and top-line trends, progress on the group’s restructuring,
deleveraging as well as funding conditions. Further risks relate to political stability and macro recovery in
Greece.
Share price performance (%) 3 month 6 month 12 month
Greece: Banks
Absolute (63.5) (88.3) (92.8)
Rel. to FTSE World Europe (EUR) (64.4) (87.5) (93.2)
Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Research estimates, FactSet. Price as of 12/03/2015 close.
18
Exhibit 25: Key Financials
December 7, 2015
€ bn, except per share data
Income statement 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 15/14E 16/15E 17/16E 18/17E 19/18E 20/19E
NII 1.78 1.40 1.65 1.94 1.93 1.86 1.72 1.74 1.82 1.91 -1% -3% -8% 1% 4% 5%
Fees 0.29 0.27 0.37 0.34 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.36 -12% -9% 2% 5% 9% 10%
Core Revenues 2.08 1.67 2.02 2.28 2.23 2.13 2.00 2.04 2.14 2.27 -2% -4% -6% 2% 5% 6%
Other 0.21 -0.16 0.33 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 15% -1% 2% 3% 3% 3%
Total income 2.28 1.51 2.35 2.38 2.34 2.24 2.11 2.16 2.26 2.39 -2% -4% -6% 2% 5% 6%
Operating expenses -1.10 -1.18 -1.43 -1.59 -1.17 -1.16 -1.11 -1.11 -1.14 -1.17 -26% -1% -5% 0% 3% 3%
Pre-provision profits 1.19 0.33 0.92 0.79 1.17 1.08 1.00 1.05 1.12 1.22 48% -7% -7% 4% 7% 9%
Impairments & other -5.92 -1.67 0.70 -1.81 -3.40 -1.00 -0.70 -0.34 -0.29 -0.29 88% -71% -30% -52% -15% 2%
Pre-tax profit -4.73 -1.34 1.62 -1.03 -2.24 0.08 0.30 0.71 0.84 0.93 -- -- -- -- -- --
Profit after-tax -3.81 -1.09 2.32 -0.33 -1.31 0.06 0.22 0.52 0.62 0.68 -- -- -- -- -- --
Net attributable income -3.81 -1.09 2.26 -0.33 -1.40 0.06 0.22 0.52 0.62 0.68 -- -- -- -- -- --
Balance sheet 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 15/14E 16/15E 17/16E 18/17E 19/18E 20/19E
Customer loans (net) 44.9 40.5 51.7 49.6 45.5 41.9 38.1 38.8 40.6 43.4 -8% -8% -9% 2% 4% 7%
Customer deposits 29.4 28.5 42.5 42.9 30.7 32.2 34.4 35.7 37.0 38.4 -28% 5% 7% 4% 4% 4%
Total assets 59.1 58.4 73.7 72.9 69.7 65.0 60.4 60.4 61.4 63.6 -4% -7% -7% 0% 2% 4%
Ordinary shareholders' equity 0.5 -0.3 7.4 7.7 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.7 10.3 11.0 16% 1% 2% 6% 6% 7%
Per share data 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 15/14E 16/15E 17/16E 18/17E 19/18E 20/19E
GS EPS -- -- -- -- -3.16 0.04 0.14 0.34 0.40 0.45 -- -- -- -- -- --
DPS -- -- -- -- - - - - - - -- -- -- -- -- --
BVPS -- -- -- -- 5.8 5.8 6.0 6.3 6.7 7.2 -- 1% 2% 6% 6% 7%
TBVPS -- -- -- -- 5.6 5.6 5.8 6.1 6.5 6.9 -- 1% 3% 6% 7% 7%
Ratios 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 15/14E 16/15E 17/16E 18/17E 19/18E 20/19E
NII / AIEA 3.1% 2.7% 2.6% 3.0% 3.1% 3.3% 3.4% 3.6% 3.7% 3.7% 4% 6% 1% 6% 4% 1%
Cost / Income 48% 78% 61% 67% 50% 52% 53% 52% 50% 49% -25% 4% 1% -2% -2% -3%
Credit costs / avg gross loans 225bps 355bps 313bps 297bps 545bps 166bps 123bps 60bps 50bps 50bps 84% -70% -26% -51% -17% 0%
Loans / deposits 153% 142% 122% 116% 148% 130% 111% 109% 110% 113% 29% -12% -15% -2% 1% 3%
GS ROE -- -- -- -9.2% -18.3% 0.7% 2.5% 5.6% 6.2% 6.4% -- -- -- -- -- --
GS ROTE -- -- -- -9.5% -19.2% 0.7% 2.5% 5.8% 6.4% 6.6% -- -- -- -- -- --
ROA -- -- -- -1.1% -1.8% 0.1% 0.4% 0.9% 1.0% 1.1% -- -- -- -- -- --
NPL ratio 12.9% 22.8% 32.6% 33.0% 38.0% 43.3% 43.5% 41.5% 37.5% 31.8% 15% 14% 1% -5% -10% -15%
Coverage ratio 76% 45% 54% 62% 68% 66% 72% 76% 80% 84% 10% -3% 9% 6% 5% 5%
CET 1 % (Fully Loaded) -- -- 9.7% 13.1% 16.4% 17.8% 19.1% 19.1% 18.8% 19.0% -- -- -- -- -- --
Greece: Banks
Dividend payout -- -- -- -- 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -- -- -- -- -- --
Source: Company Data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

19
December 7, 2015
Exhibit 26: We expect ALB to be in a position to generate c.10% ROTE by 2019E (under assumption of normalized capital structure)
Outline of profitability drivers behind our 2019 forecasts (€ bn)
-2% decline in revenues Strong cost
control
C/I ~ low 50s
2.31 -0.13 0.09 2.26 -1.27 Adjusted ROTE calculated based
Provisioning run-rate on target 12% CT1 ratio
at circa 50 bps
No coupon on
state preference
NII under shares
pressure 0.13 1.12 -0.29
on volumes 10.0%
0.84 26%
0.62 6.4%
1 2 3
Revenues Δ NII Δ Other Revenues Costs Δ Costs PPI LLPs PBT Taxes MI & Pref. Net Profit GS ROTE GS ROTE
(3Q15 x 4) (2019E) (3Q15 x 4) (2019E) (2019E) Shares (2019E) (reported) (adjusted)
Exhibit 28: Total revenues Exhibit 29: Total costs Exhibit 30: Credit costs
€ bn € bn bps
545bps
1 2 3
500bps
1.59
2.39
2.38
2.35
2.34
2.31
1.43
2.26
2.24
2.16
2.11
1.27
313bps
297bps
1.17
1.17
1.16
1.14
1.11
1.11
166bps
123bps
60bps
50bps
50bps
13A
14A
3Q15
15E
16E
17E
18E
19E
20E
13A
14A
3Q15
15E
16E
17E
18E
19E
20E
13A
14A
9M15
15E
16E
17E
18E
19E
20E
Actual Estimates (GSe) Actual Estimates (GSe) Actual Estimates (GSe)
Greece: Banks
Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
20
December 7, 2015
Exhibit 31: We estimate ALB to reach 19.1% CET1 fully loaded ratio in 2018E from 17.4% in 3Q15 pro forma
Reconciliation of last reported CET1 ratio with CET1 BIII (fully loaded) in 2016E and 2018E for ALB, EURB and PIR
€2.56bn No dividends and CoCo coupons

capital increase | No State Aid |
Cumulative losses
(SCI & LME) | |
1.6% -0.3% Nil 19.1%
4.9% Nil 17.4% Nil -0.7% 2.1% Nil 17.8%
16.7% -1.0%
12.5%
Deleveraging
Return to
profitability
Exhibit 32: …with tangible book value starting to grow organically from 2017E onwards
Reconciliation of last reported TBV with TBV in 2016E and 2018E
TBV decline s on the back of High headline CET1

balance sheet clean-up (includes DTCs)
1.01 9.13 -2.05 1.78 Nil 9.38 19.1%

1.54 Nil 8.63 -1.04
1.55 Nil
6.57
No State Aid ALB turns

profitable in 2017-18
TBV 3Q15 Shares Shares Shares TBV 3Q15 Earnings Earnings Other TBV Earnings Earnings Other TBV CET1 FL
(reported) SCI State LME (Pro-Forma) LLPs Other (inc. CoCos) (2016E) LLPs Other (inc. CoCos) (2018E) (2018E)
Greece: Banks
21
December 7, 2015
Bank of Piraeus (BOPr.AT): Recapitalization completed, restructuring pending; Neutral
Investment Profile What's changed

Low High
Piraeus has successfully completed its last round of recaps. The total capital shortfall identified by the ECB
Growth Growth
(€4.9 bn) was covered with €1.3 bn raised in the market (SCI), €0.9 bn of additional internal measures (of which
Returns * Returns *
€0.6 bn were LMEs) and €2.7 bn residual shortfall filled by the state (through common shares as well as
Multiple Multiple
contingent capital). State ownership, as a result of the recaps, falls from 67% to 26%.
Percentile 20th 40th 60th 80th 100th
Implications
Bank of Piraeus (BOPr.AT)
We update our outlook for PIR taking into account the capital hike and restructuring plans. Given the use of state
aid as part of the recap process we incorporate further downsizing of the group, including disposals of foreign
units. The balance sheet clean-up and front loading the bulk of AQR implied impairments in 2015 pave the way
for the bank to achieve normalized returns of c.9% in 2019, on our estimates (excluding coupons and on adjusted
capital at 12% CET1 FL ratio). The bank’s high headline capital (16.9% fully loaded CET1 in 2016E) should serve
Key data Current
Price (€) 0.68 as a buffer against asset quality risks and reliance on DTCs in the capital structure, in our view.
Upside/(downside) (%) (34)
Market cap (€ mn) 5,984.7
Valuation
Tier 1 ratio (%) 12.4 Using the SCI issue price, PIR’s shares are valued at 0.4x TBV on our 2016 estimate. This is broadly on par with
the other Greek banks under our coverage but at a substantial discount to the European sector (1.1x) as well as
12/14 12/15E 12/16E 12/17E
GS EPS (€) New (40.43) (2.10) 0.00 0.01 other Southern European peers (0.8x). On a capital adjusted basis, we see PIR in a position to deliver c.9% ROTE
EPS (€) Old (4,043.03) (887.84) (0.58) (3.48)
DPS (€) New 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
in 2019E (ex coupon payments on state aid), marginally below the European sector average for 2017E.
DPS (€) Old 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GS P/E (X) NM NM NM 104.6 We value the shares using a ROTE/COE methodology to derive a 12-month price target of €0.45. Our price target
Dividend yield (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GS ROE (%) (32.4) (33.0) (0.5) 0.8 corresponds to a multiple of 0.6x TBV (2016E) and implies 50% upside to the SCI issue price (€0.30). We have a
P/BV (X) 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Neutral rating on the shares. We adjust our estimates and valuation to reflect the recent recaps, front loading of
the AQR implied provision, further restructuring and marginally better operating trends in outer years
Key risks
Price performance chart
140 520
Key upside and downside risks relate to asset quality and top-line trends, progress on the group’s restructuring
120 500 (including disposals of non-domestic businesses), deleveraging as well as funding conditions. Further risks
100 480 relate to political stability and macro recovery in Greece.
80 460
60 440
40 420
20 400
0 380
Bank of Piraeus (L) FTSE World Europe (EUR) (R)
Greece: Banks
Absolute (92.7) (98.7) (99.5)
22
December 7, 2015
NII 1.17 1.03 1.66 2.00 1.89 1.77 1.48 1.50 1.56 1.64 -5% -6% -16% 1% 4% 5%
Fees 0.20 0.22 0.29 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.26 0.27 0.30 0.33 -8% -6% -10% 5% 8% 10%
Core Revenues 1.37 1.25 1.95 2.33 2.20 2.06 1.74 1.77 1.86 1.96 -6% -6% -16% 2% 5% 6%
Other -0.15 0.97 0.19 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 17% -21% 2% 3% 3% 3%
Total income 1.22 2.22 2.14 2.48 2.38 2.20 1.89 1.92 2.01 2.12 -4% -7% -14% 2% 5% 5%
Operating expenses -0.82 -0.91 -1.64 -1.53 -1.33 -1.29 -1.04 -1.04 -1.07 -1.10 -13% -3% -19% 0% 3% 3%
Pre-provision profits 0.40 1.31 0.50 0.95 1.05 0.91 0.84 0.87 0.94 1.02 10% -13% -8% 4% 8% 9%
Impairments & other -7.91 -2.49 1.25 -4.00 -4.87 -0.80 -0.60 -0.32 -0.27 -0.28 22% -84% -25% -47% -15% 2%
Pre-tax profit -7.52 -1.19 1.75 -3.05 -3.82 0.11 0.24 0.56 0.67 0.75 -- -- -- -- -- --
Profit after-tax -6.62 -0.52 2.52 -1.98 -2.42 0.08 0.18 0.41 0.50 0.55 -- -- -- -- -- --
Net attributable income -6.62 -0.53 2.50 -1.97 -2.43 -0.04 0.06 0.29 0.37 0.43 -- -- -- -- -- --
Customer deposits 22.4 37.0 54.3 54.8 38.4 35.8 38.5 40.0 41.6 43.3 -30% -7% 7% 4% 4% 4%
Total assets 49.4 70.4 92.0 89.1 84.3 70.2 63.2 61.5 61.0 61.7 -5% -17% -10% -3% -1% 1%
Ordinary shareholders' equity -2.8 -3.2 7.7 7.2 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.8 8.1 8.6 3% -1% 1% 4% 5% 5%
GS EPS -- -- -- -- -2.10 -0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 -- -- -- -- -- --
DPS -- -- -- -- - - - - - - -- -- -- -- -- --
BVPS -- -- -- -- 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.88 0.92 0.97 -- -1% 1% 4% 5% 5%
TBVPS -- -- -- -- 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.84 0.89 0.94 -- -1% 1% 4% 5% 6%
NII / AIEA 2.5% 2.2% 2.2% 2.6% 2.6% 2.9% 2.9% 3.2% 3.4% 3.5% 1% 8% 3% 9% 5% 3%
Cost / Income 67% 41% 77% 62% 56% 59% 55% 54% 53% 52% -9% 5% -6% -2% -2% -3%
Loans / deposits 154% 121% 115% 104% 128% 104% 85% 83% 83% 85% 22% -18% -19% -3% 0% 3%
GS ROE -- -- -- -30.4% -35.8% -0.5% 0.8% 3.8% 4.7% 5.2% 18% -99% -245% 393% 24% 10%
GS ROTE -- -- -- -31.6% -37.6% -0.6% 0.8% 4.0% 4.9% 5.4% 19% -99% -245% 393% 24% 9%
ROA -- -- -- -2.7% -2.8% 0.0% 0.1% 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 2% -98% -283% 430% 31% 15%
NPL ratio 13.7% 23.3% 35.7% 37.8% 43.0% 51.5% 52.2% 50.2% 46.2% 40.5% 14% 20% 1% -4% -8% -12%
Coverage ratio 53% 51% 51% 57% 65% 67% 73% 77% 81% 85% 13% 3% 9% 6% 5% 5%
CET 1 % (Fully Loaded) -- -- 8.9% 11.2% 12.9% 16.9% 18.7% 18.5% 17.9% 17.7% 15% 31% 11% -1% -3% -1%
Greece: Banks
Dividend payout -- -- -- -- 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -- -- -- -- -- --

23
December 7, 2015
Exhibit 34: We expect PIR to be in a position to generate c.9% ROTE by 2019E (under assumption of normalized capital structure and ex coupon payment)
-23% cumulative decline
(deleveraging and assets sales)
2.60 -0.32 Cost base at ±€1.0bn

results in C/I in low 50s Adjusted ROTE calculated based
-0.27 on target 12% CT1 ratio
and excluding Coco coupons
2.01 -1.31
Normalized impairments
at ~ 50bps level Coupon on
on CoCos
9.4%
0.24 0.94 -0.27
0.67 26%
-0.12 4.9%
0.37
1 2 3
Exhibit 36: Total Revenues Exhibit 37: Total costs Exhibit 38: Credit costs
€bn €bn bps
1 2 3
680bps
1.64
2.60
2.48
506bps
1.53
2.38
2.20
2.14
2.12
1.33
1.31
2.01
400bps
1.29
1.92
1.89
1.10
311bps
1.07
1.04
1.04
124bps
110bps
60bps
50bps
50bps
13A
14A
3Q15
15E
16E
17E
18E
19E
20E
13A
14A
3Q15
15E
16E
17E
18E
19E
20E
13A
14A
9M15
15E
16E
17E
18E
19E
20E
Greece: Banks
24
December 7, 2015
Exhibit 39: We estimate PIR to reach 18.5% CET1 fully loaded ratio in 2018E from 15.0% in 3Q15 pro forma
Reconciliation of last reported CET1 ratio with CET1 BIII (fully loaded) in 2016E and 2018E
€2.0bn Return to profitability

€2.62bn | CoCos | Cumulative losses
capital increase |
(private, LME, state) 3.6% 19.2% -3.6% 0.6% -0.7%
1.6% 18.5%
5.3% -0.3% 16.9%
4.7% -0.5% 15.0% -3.1%
10.9%
Deleveraging & sale

|
of foreign units Includes coupon
on CoCos
Exhibit 40: …with tangible book value starting grow organically from 2017E onwards
Coupon on
TBV decline in 4Q15-2016E
on CoCos
driven by elevated LLPs High headline CET1
(for 2 years)
(includes DTCs)
0.68 8.90 -3.45
0.60
1.34 1.51 -0.24 7.43 18.5%
1.75 -0.12 7.08 -0.92
6.28
State Aid
(25% provided as
common shares)
Includes part of PIR turns
AQR adjustment profitable in 2017-18E
Greece: Banks
25
December 7, 2015
Eurobank (EURBr.AT): Stress test confirms momentum on group de-risking; Neutral
Investment Profile What's changed

Low High
EURB has successfully completed its last round of recaps. The total capital shortfall identified by the ECB (€2.1
Growth Growth
bn) was fully covered with private funds. EURB raised €1.6 bn in the market (SCI), and generated €0.5 bn of
Returns * Returns *
additional internal measures (of which €0.4 bn were LMEs). EURB together with ALB did not receive any new
Multiple Multiple
state aid as part of the recent recap. State ownership, post cap hike, fell from 35% to 2%. We note, however, that
Percentile 20th 40th 60th 80th 100th EURB does have €950 mn of state preference shares on its balance sheet that will need to be repaid.
Eurobank Ergasias SA (EURBr.AT)
Implications
We update our outlook for EURB taking into account the capital hike. Given that the bank did not need state aid
as part of the recent recap process, private shareholders of EURB are likely to maintain stronger control over the
bank and its operation relative to domestic peers that received public money. Our central case incorporates
gradual recovery of profits, with frontloading the bulk of AQR implied costs in 2015E, broadly breaking even in
Key data Current
Price (€) 0.93 2016E and becoming profit making from 2017E. We see the bank reaching a normalized level of ROTE of c.10% in
Upside/(downside) (%) 56 2019E on a capital adjusted basis (12% CET 1 FL ratio), which is broadly on par with the European peers. The
Market cap (€ mn) 2,037.4 bank’s headline capital (13.5% fully loaded CET1 in 2016E) comes below Greek peers on de-recognition of state
Tier 1 ratio (%) 15.2
preference shares and serve as a buffer against asset quality risks and reliance on DTCs in the capital structure,
12/14 12/15E 12/16E 12/17E in our view.
GS EPS (€) New (8.59) (3.63) 0.03 0.08
EPS (€) Old
DPS (€) New
(859.35)
0.00
(342.45)
0.00
(6.68)
0.00
(7.77)
0.00
Valuation
DPS (€) Old 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 EURB’s shares are valued at 0.4x TBV on our 2016E estimate. This is broadly on par with the other Greek banks
GS P/E (X) NM NM 34.4 12.0
Dividend yield (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 under our coverage but at a substantial discount to the European sector (1.1x) as well as other Southern
GS ROE (%) (25.2) (29.0) 1.1 3.2
P/BV (X) 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4
European peers (0.8x). On a capital adjusted basis, we see EURB in a position to deliver c.10% ROTE in 2019E, on
par with the European sector average for 2017E.
We value the shares using a ROTE/COE methodology to derive a 12-month price target of €1.45. Our price target
Price performance chart corresponds to a multiple of 0.6x TBV (2016E) and implies 45% upside to the SCI issue price (€1.00). We have a
30 560
Neutral rating on the shares. We adjust our estimates and valuation to reflect the recent recaps, front loading of
25 530
the AQR implied provision and marginally better operating trends in outer years.
20 500
15 470
Key risks
Key upside and downside risks relate to asset quality and top-line trends, progress on the group’s restructuring,
10 440
deleveraging as well as funding conditions. Further risks relate to political stability and macro recovery in
5 410
Greece.
0 380
Eurobank Ergasias SA (L) FTSE World Europe (EUR) (R)
Greece: Banks
Absolute (76.1) (94.0) (96.5)
26
December 7, 2015

NII 1.98 1.46 1.29 1.51 1.49 1.43 1.32 1.35 1.41 1.48 -2% -4% -7% 2% 5% 5%
Fees 0.28 0.20 0.20 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.31 -9% -8% 3% 6% 9% 10%
Core Revenues 2.26 1.66 1.50 1.80 1.75 1.66 1.57 1.60 1.69 1.79 -3% -5% -6% 2% 5% 6%
Other -0.01 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 16% 25% 2% 3% 3% 3%
Total income 2.25 1.76 1.59 1.89 1.85 1.79 1.70 1.74 1.83 1.93 -2% -3% -5% 2% 5% 6%
Operating expenses -1.14 -1.05 -1.07 -1.05 -1.03 -0.99 -0.94 -0.93 -0.95 -0.96 -2% -4% -4% -1% 1% 2%
Pre-provision profits 1.11 0.70 0.52 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.76 0.81 0.88 0.97 -2% -1% -6% 7% 9% 10%
Impairments & other -8.08 -2.39 -2.44 -2.51 -3.33 -0.70 -0.50 -0.27 -0.23 -0.24 32% -79% -29% -45% -15% 2%
Pre-tax profit -6.97 -1.69 -1.93 -1.68 -2.51 0.11 0.26 0.53 0.65 0.73 -- -- -- -- -- --
Profit after-tax -5.65 -1.35 -1.14 -0.96 -1.40 0.08 0.19 0.39 0.48 0.54 -- -- -- -- -- --
Net attributable income -5.56 -1.49 -1.17 -1.22 -1.51 0.06 0.17 0.37 0.46 0.52 -- -- -- -- -- --
Customer deposits 32.5 30.8 41.5 40.9 30.2 31.6 33.6 34.8 36.1 37.5 -26% 5% 6% 4% 4% 4%
Total assets 76.8 67.7 77.6 75.5 73.1 67.4 62.2 60.9 60.7 61.7 -3% -8% -8% -2% 0% 2%
Ordinary shareholders' equity -1.1 -2.2 3.2 4.6 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.8 6.3 6.8 13% 1% 3% 7% 8% 8%
GS EPS -- -- -- -- -3.63 0.03 0.08 0.17 0.21 0.24 -- -- -- -- -- --
DPS -- -- -- -- - - - - - - -- -- -- -- -- --
BVPS -- -- -- -- 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.1 -- 1% 3% 7% 8% 8%
TBVPS -- -- -- -- 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 -- 1% 3% 7% 8% 9%
NII / AIEA 2.7% 2.3% 2.1% 2.3% 2.3% 2.4% 2.5% 2.6% 2.8% 2.9% 0% 5% 1% 7% 5% 3%
Cost / Income 51% 60% 67% 56% 56% 55% 55% 54% 52% 50% 0% -1% 1% -3% -4% -4%
Loans / deposits 148% 140% 110% 103% 127% 111% 95% 93% 94% 98% 23% -13% -14% -2% 1% 3%
GS ROE -- -- -- -- -35.5% 1.1% 3.2% 6.7% 7.6% 8.0% -- -- -- -- -- --
GS ROTE -- -- -- -- -36.8% 1.2% 3.3% 6.8% 7.8% 8.2% -- -- -- -- -- --
ROA -- -- -- -- -1.9% 0.1% 0.3% 0.6% 0.8% 0.9% -- -- -- -- -- --
NPL ratio 15.3% 22.8% 29.4% 33.3% 36.0% 39.5% 39.5% 37.5% 33.5% 27.7% 8% 10% 0% -5% -11% -17%
Greece: Banks
Coverage ratio 43% 43% 50% 56% 68% 68% 75% 79% 83% 87% 21% 1% 9% 5% 5% 5%
CET 1 % (Fully Loaded) -- -- 0.1% 10.5% 12.1% 13.5% 14.6% 14.7% 15.8% 15.9% -- -- -- -- -- --
Dividend payout -- -- -- -- 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -- -- -- -- -- --
27
Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

December 7, 2015
Exhibit 42: We expect EURB to be in a position to generate c.10% ROTE by 2019E (under assumption of normalized capital structure)
-4% cumulative decline

Strong cost control
C/I ~ mid 50s
1.91 -0.08
-0.00 1.83 -1.16 Adjusted ROTE calculated based
on target 12% CT1 ratio
Impairments
~ 50 bps run-rate
No coupon on
state preference
NII under shares
Weaker
pressure 10.4%
trading 0.22 0.88 -0.23
on volumes
& other
0.65 26% 7.8%
-0.02 0.46
1 2 3
Exhibit 44: Total revenues Exhibit 45: Total costs Exhibit 46: Credit costs
€ bn € bn bps
627bps
1 2 3
606bps
434bps
1.93
1.91
1.89
1.16
1.85
1.83
386bps
1.79
1.74
1.70
1.07
1.05
1.03
1.59
0.99
0.96
0.95
0.94
0.93
142bps
107bps
60bps
50bps
50bps
13A
14A
3Q15
15E
16E
17E
18E
19E
20E
13A
14A
9M15
15E
16E
17E
18E
19E
20E
13A
14A
3Q15
15E
16E
17E
18E
19E
20E
Greece: Banks
28
December 7, 2015
Exhibit 47: We estimate EURB to reach 14.7% CET1 fully loaded ratio in 2018E from 13.4% in 3Q15 pro forma
Reconciliation of last reported CET1 ratio with CET1 BIII (fully loaded) in 2016E and 2018E
€2.0bn €950mn
state prefs No dividends and CoCo coupons
capital increase |
(SCI & LME) | | (legacy)
5.2% Nil 17.3% -2.4% Cumulative losses
-1.5% 1.6% -0.3% 14.7%

13.4% -1.1% 1.3% -0.1% 13.5%
12.1%
No New
Deleveraging Return to
State Aid
profitability
Exhibit 48: …with tangible book value starting to grow organically from 2017E onwards
Lower that peers post repayment

TBV decline s on the back of
of state-prefs (€950mn)
balance sheet clean-up | |
0.43 5.56 -1.58 1.32 Nil 5.66 14.7%
1.61 Nil 1.13 Nil 5.12 -0.77
3.52
State Prefs
No New Repaid, No
State Aid EURB turns CoCos
profitable in
2017-18E
Greece: Banks

29
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Appendix 1: ECB Comprehensive Assessment (2015)

System-wide shortfall: €4.4 bn in base, €14.4 bn in adverse scenario

This section together with exhibits is based on our extensive analysis of the Greek
banks’ capital shortfall as published in our previous report (see Stress test: Total recap
of €14.4bn at mid-point of GSe (€13.2bn), November 2, 2015).
Baseline: €4.4 bn shortfall to 9.5% CET1 (transitional)

ECB’s baseline scenario indicates a €4.4 bn system-wide shortfall that captures €18.1 bn
incremental asset impairments (cum AQR) and €9.0 bn in pre-provision profits over the 2.5-
year period until 2017E. Shortfalls are calculated against 9.5% CET1 (transitional) threshold.
Exhibit 49: ECB’s baseline scenario points to a system-wide capital shortfall of €4.4 bn that captures €18.1 bn incremental
loan losses (including €9.6 bn AQR adjustment) offset with €9.0 bn pre-provision profits; state prefs (€2.3 bn) are included...
Outcome of the ECB’s comprehensive assessment under the baseline scenario for the four systemic Greek banks
9.0 18.1
Shortfall
Base: LLPs
8.5bn
4.4bn
25.8
AQR 4.4 19.5

9.6bn
Base Case
2.7
1.2 15.2
DTCs
14.1bn
2.2
1.6
0.3 0.3
2Q15 + PPP P&L: P&L: CET: Pro-forma Shorfall Threshold ALB PIR EURB NBG
CET1 (FL) buffer Losses Other other CET1 (FL) @ 9.5%
CET1
Source: ECB, Company Data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Note: DTC balance based on preliminary disclosure and GS estimates
Adverse: €14.4 bn shortfall to 8% CET1 (transitional)

ECB’s adverse scenario implies a €14.4 bn system-wide shortfall that reflects €26.7 bn
additional (cum AQR) and €3.7 bn in pre-provision profits over the 2.5-year period until
2017E. Shortfalls are calculated against 8.0% CET1 (transitional) threshold.
Exhibit 50: ... under the adverse case scenario, system-wide shortfall increases to €14.4 bn, driven by decline in PPP
buffer (-58%) to €3.7 bn and a sharp increase in loan losses (+49%) to €27 bn (including €9.6 bn AQR adjustment)
Outcome of the ECB’s comprehensive assessment under the adverse scenario for the four systemic Greek banks
Shortfall
3.7 26.7 14.4bn
25.8
Adverse:
LLPs
17.1bn
Adverse Case
DTCs
14.1bn
14.4 14.5 4.9
4.6
2.7
AQR 2.1
9.6bn
1.9
0.7 0.1
2Q15 + PPP P&L: P&L: CET: Pro-forma Shorfall Threshold ALB PIR EURB NBG
CET1 (FL) buffer Losses Other other CET1 (FL) @ 8.0%
CET1
Source: ECB, Company Data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Note: DTC balance based on preliminary disclosure and GS estimates

AQR review accounts for bulk of the CET1 adjustment

We lay out a side-by-side overview of the ECB’s comprehensive assessment for the four
Greek banks below. The bulk of the adjustments have been identified under the AQR.
Exhibit 51: The bulk of the adjustments under the compressive assessment have been identified as a result of AQR. The
point in time review resulted in €8.8 bn aggregate decline in CET1, compared to a further €1.0-16 bn in the stress test
Side-by-side overview of the ECB’s comprehensive assessment of the Greek banks
ALB PIR EURB NBG Aggregate

€bn
Baseline —Adverse Baseline —Adverse Baseline —Adverse Baseline —Adverse Baseline —Adverse
Actual: 30 June 2015
Common Equity Tier 1 (Transitional) 6.8 6.2 5.4 7.4 25.8

o/w state preference shares - - 1.0 1.4 2.3
o/w DTCs 3.1 3.8 3.5 3.7 14.1
Risk Weighted Assets 53.5 57.1 39.2 63.9 213.7
Common Equity Tier 1 (%) 12.7% 10.8% 13.7% 11.6% 12.1%
Step 1: Asset Quality Review (Point in Time)
[1] Credit File Review (0.5) (1.1) (0.4) (0.7) (2.7)

[2] Projections of Finding (0.3) (1.0) (0.3) (0.3) (1.9)
[3] Collective Provisions (0.9) (1.0) (1.2) (1.3) (4.4)
[4] Other (including CVAs) (0.0) (0.1) (0.0) - (0.1)
[−] Cumulative loan book adjustments (1.7) (3.2) (1.9) (2.3) (9.2)
[±] Other (DTA, IRB, etc) 0.0 - (0.3) (0.1) (0.4)
[±] Tax - - - - -
= Δ CET1 (1.7) (3.2) (2.2) (2.5) (9.6)
Δ Risk Weighted Assets (1.2) (2.8) (1.9) (3.0) (8.8)
Adjusted: CET1 5.0 3.0 3.2 5.0 16.2

Adjusted: CET1 % 9.6% 5.5% 8.6% 8.1% 7.9%
Threshold: CET1% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5%

Shortfall 0.07 (2.19) (0.34) (0.83) (3.28)
Step 2: Stress Test (2.5 years, 2H15-2017)
[1] Operating Profits 2.3 — 0.9 2.0 — 0.0 1.6 — 0.8 3.0 — 2.0 9.0 — 3.7
[2] Impairments (2.1) — (4.3) (1.9) — (3.6) (1.5) — (3.1) (3.0) — (6.1) (8.5) — (17.1)
[3] Other (0.2) — 0.0 (0.3) — (0.1) (0.2) — (0.3) (2.0) — (1.6) (2.7) — (1.9)
[±] Retained Earnings (0.0) — (3.3) (0.1) — (3.8) (0.1) — (2.5) (1.9) — (5.7) (2.2) — (15.3)
[±] Other adjustments (including Capital Actions) (0.2) — (0.8) (0.2) — (0.3) 0.1 — (0.3) 1.5 — 0.6 1.2 — (0.7)
= Δ CET1 (0.2) — (4.1) (0.3) — (4.1) (0.1) — (2.8) (0.4) — (5.1) (1.0) — (16.0)
Δ Risk Weighted Assets (2.2) — (5.8) (3.1) — (6.7) (1.1) — (5.8) 1.2 — (4.9) (5.3) — (23.1)
Pro-Forma: CET1 4.8 — 1.0 2.7 — (1.1) 3.1 — 0.4 4.5 — (0.1) 15.2 — 0.1
(1)
Pro-Forma: CET1 % 9.0% — 2.1% 5.2% — (2.4%) 8.6% — 1.3% 6.8% — (0.2%) 7.6% — 0.1%
Threshold: CET1% 9.5% — 8.0% 9.5% — 8.0% 9.5% — 8.0% 9.5% — 8.0% 9.5% — 8.0%
Shortfall (1) (0.26) — (2.74) (2.21) — (4.93) (0.34) — (2.12) (1.58) — (4.60) (4.39) — (14.40)
Note: (1) Capital shortfalls have been determined based on the minimum level of CET1 at any point in 2H15-2017. Under baseline scenario CET1troughs post AQR for
EURB, 2015 for ALB and NBG and 2017 for PIR; under adverse case scenario shortfalls for all banks materialize in 2017. DTC balance based on preliminary disclosure
and GS estimates
Source: ECB, Company Data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

Asset Quality Review: €9.6 bn hit reflecting existing conditions

The AQR identified a €9.6 bn adjustment to banks’ assets including €9.2 bn additional loan
provisions that come on the bank of higher NPEs (+€7 bn) and higher coverage.
Exhibit 52: AQR identified total adjustments of €9.6 bn… Exhibit 53: … with highest restatement for PIR (€3.2 bn)…
AQR impact by component, € bn AQR impact by individual banks, €bn
€9.6bn
(total AQR adjustment)
0.4 9.6
4.4 0.1 9.2
Projection 3.2
of findings: 70% of "other"
€1.9bn 70% attributed
attributed to
to EURB 2.5
EURB
2.2
0.1
4.6
1.7 0.3
Risk based
sample
€2.7bn
Credit File Collective CVA AQR: Loans Other AQR: Total ALB PIR EURB NBG
Review Provisioning
Other Loans
Source: ECB, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Source: ECB, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
Exhibit 54: … and driven by RE and corporate lending Exhibit 55: Review identified €7 bn new NPEs…
AQR adjustment by asset class, € bn Credit File Review reclassification (including projection), € bn
€9.6bn €7.0bn
(total AQR impact by asset class) (additional non-performing exposures identified by AQR)
5.3
75%
5% 66%
5%
3.3
41%
36%
Non-financial 6% 30%
70% 3%
Assets 61%
8%
0.5 35% 33%
0.3 0.2 22%
0.4
Retail Retail Retail Corporates Other Real Large Corps Large SME (non Residential Shipping
SME Real-Estate Other Estate (non real estate) real estate) Real Estate
Other Loans AQR adjustment Pre AQR
Exhibit 56: … with highest adjustment for NBG (5.8 pp) Exhibit 57: AQR resulted in coverage uplift of 7-8 pp
NPE ratio pre- and post-AQR, % Coverage ratio pre- and post-AQR, %
€7.0bn €9.2bn
(additional non-performing exposures identified by AQR) (credit ralated AQR adjustment, including additional porfolio provisions)
56.8%
52.6% 53.9% 53.5%
3.3% 49.7%
8.4% 8.4% 7.1%
7.2%
46.5% 46.7%
4.0% 41.6% 5.8%

1.2% 44.2% 45.5% 46.4%
42.5%
ALB PIR EURB NBG ALB PIR EURB NBG

AQR reclassification Pre AQR Post AQR Pre AQR

Appendix 2: Recapitalization Framework

Framework: Limits dilution, leaves state with more active role

This section together with exhibits is based on our review of the Greek bank
recapitalization bill as published in our previous report (see Stress test: Total recap of
€14.4bn at mid-point of GSe (€13.2bn), November 2, 2015).
The Greek bank recapitalization bill has laid the foundation for capital hikes and ultimately
strengthens the position of HFSF against banks that received state aid. The recapitalization
framework: (1) allowed banks to cover part of the shortfall under the adverse case scenario
with contingent capital subscribed by HFSF, (2) confirmed eligibility of DTCs for capital
purposes and (3) postponed DTC-law implied dilution. On the other hand, (4) it allowed for
a selective bail-in of creditors even in case public funds are injected for precautionary
reasons, (5) left HFSF with full voting rights and right to nominate a board member with
additional oversight powers. We outline the key provisions of the law in the exhibit below.
Exhibit 58: Recapitalization framework provides the foundation for the capital hikes
Key provisions of the Bank Recapitalizations Law approved by the Hellenic Parliament
Private investor to cover at least base case capital needs via ABB structure
● The banks will need to cover at least base case capital shortfalls with private funds in order to avoid
resolution mechanism.
Private
Recaps ● Capital needs related to adverse case (“precautionary recap”) may be covered with public sector
funds (HFSF).
● The capital increase is to be structured as accelerated book build (ABB). Banks will be given 10 days
to approve the share offerings with recaps to be completed by the year end.
State to inject mix of common shares and CoCos

● HFSF stands ready to cover any residual shortfall with a combination of common shares and
convertible capital bonds (CoCos)
State-Aid:
Precautionary ● HFSF will supply 75 % of the capital needed via CoCos and 25 % in exchange for new common
shares the banks will issue.
● The share issue price for HFSF will be the same as for private investors under ABB, subject to
verification by independent valuator.
Bail-in possible even if public funds injected only for precautionary reasons
● Before any HFSF funds are deployed, bank liabilities including hybrids/prefs, sub-debt and senior
unsecured bonds can be bailed-in
State-Aid: ● The law gives the cabinet discretion (subject to BoG proposal, EC approval) to protect selected
Bail-in creditors on the grounds of financial stability, low level of public support (%RWAs) or significant level
of private sector involvement (% shortfall)
● Bailed-in instruments cannot be worse off than it would be the case under the bank
resolution/liquidation (as per BRRD).
HFSF to play more active and influential role going forward

● HFSF will have a full voting rights from the new shares it acquires (as opposed to veto rights on the
shares held by the fund currently)
● HFSF will retain a right to nominate one board representative who can call AGM, veto management’s
Corporate
compensation or other operation putting bank at risk (CFO appointments)
Governance
● HFSF will evaluate current corporate governance standards (including composition of BoD and BoD
committees) and propose relevant changes to the AGM.
● Banks will be obliged to have at least 3 independent board members, with no relation to Greek
banking sector over last 10 years
Eligibility of DTCs maintained, law-implied dilution risk postponed until 2016

Deferred ● DTCs will remain eligible as capital at the level reported as of 30 June 2015
Tax ● Automatic dilution under DTC-law (triggered by losses) is postponed from 2015 to 2016
Credits
● Banks may recognize tax shield on losses reported in 2Q as tax credit, subject to compensation to
the state (based on 100% tax credit balance and average share price)
Source: Hellenic Parliament, Reuters, Bloomberg, company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.

Appendix 3: Past Restructuring and Recaps

December 7, 2015
Exhibit 59: Consolidation of the Greek banking sector has resulted in the Exhibit 60: ... to four; key players control over 90% of the market
number of banks falling from 15... Market share of gross domestic loans in 3Q15 (%)
Loan market share in Greece (%) – pre consolidation (2009)
Millennium Geniki Attica Probank Proton FBBank Other

TT (2%) (2%) (2%) (1%) (1%) (1%) (4%)
(3%)
|
|
|
BoC
(4%) Piraeus
NBG
(20%) (30%)
Marfin
(5%) Eurobank
(21%)
Emporiki EURB
(9%) (16%)
National Bank
| ALB of Greece
(16%) (21%) |
Alpha Bank
ATE
(25%)
(9%)
|
PIR
(11%)
Source: Company data and Eurobank disclosure. Source: Company data, Bank of Greece.
Exhibit 61: The workforce at Greek banks has fallen by >30% since 2008… Exhibit 62: …and the banks have reduced their branch network by c.35%
Number of employees at Greek credit institutions Number of bank branches of Greek credit institutions
Number of branches down by c. 35%

Number of employees down by >30%
4.1k 4.1k
66.2k 65.7k 4.0k
63.4k 3.8k
3.6k
60.0k
57.0k
3.1k
51.2k
2.7k
45.7k
Greece: Banks
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Source: Bank of Greece, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Source: Bank of Greece, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
38
December 7, 2015
Exhibit 63: The four core Greek banks raised €46 bn in the last three rounds of restructuring; total sector recap stands at €66 bn
Details of the concluded restructuring of the Greek banking sector in 2013-2015
2012/13 Recap 2014 Recap 2015 Recap Total
Capital injection Capital Capital injection Capital

Banks Status
State Private Total Injection State Private(5) Total Injection
Core
NBG Recapitalized 8.7 1.1 9.8 2.5 0.7 1.8 2.5 14.7
EURB Recapitalized 5.8 - 5.8 2.9 - 2.0 2.0 10.7
ALB Recapitalized 4.0 0.6 4.6 1.2 - 2.6 2.6 8.3
PIR(1) Recapitalized 6.4 1.4 7.9 1.8 0.7 1.9 2.6 12.2
Total 25.0 3.1 28.0 8.3 1.4 8.3 9.7 46.0
Non-Core (resolved)
ATE Acquired by PIR 8.0 - 8.0 -- -- -- -- 8.0
FBB Acquired by NBG 0.6 - 0.6 -- -- -- -- 0.6
3 Co-operatives Acquired by NBG 0.3 - 0.3 -- -- -- -- 0.3
Probank(2) Acquired by NBG 0.2 0.2 -- -- -- -- 0.2
T-Bank Acquired by TT 0.7 - 0.7 -- -- -- -- 0.7
Proton(3) Acquired by EURB 2.0 - 2.0 -- -- -- -- 2.0
TT Acquired by EURB 4.2 - 4.2 -- -- -- -- 4.2
Total 16.2 - 16.2 -- -- -- -- 16.2
Other
Geniki Purchased by PIR - 0.3 0.3 -- -- -- -- 0.3
Emporiki(4) Purchased by ALB - 3.0 3.0 -- -- -- -- 3.0
Millennium Purchased by PIR - 0.4 0.4 -- -- -- -- 0.4
Attica Raised private capital. - 0.2 0.2 -- -- -- -- 0.2
Total - 3.9 3.9 -- -- -- -- 3.9
Greek Banks 41.1 7.0 48.1 8.3 1.4 8.3 9.7 66.1
1) Injection by the official sector includes recapitalization of the Cypriot banks (€524 mn), but excludes capital payment for ATE (€570 mn, included in the resolution costs for non-core banks). Injection by the private sector
includes subscription by SocGen and BCP to the share capital increase. (2) Probank resolution includes the sale of selected assets and liabilities to NBG; HFSF is set to cover the initial capital gap (€0.2 bn) and further capital
requirements, determined by the BoG. (3) Includes the injection by HDIGF. (4) includes €0.15 bn subscription by Credit Agricole. (5) Private includes common shares issued to HFSF and excludes CoCos
Source: IMF, HFSF, ECB, company data.
Greece: Banks
39
The ECB stress test in 2015 was a third detailed study into the health and financial state of
the Greek banks since 2013, preceded by a Bank of Greece stress test in 2013 and a
European-wide Comprehensive Assessment carried out by the ECB in 2014. The results of
the 2015 stress test, resulting in a shortfall of €4.4 bn under the base and €14.4 bn under
the adverse case respectively, compare to the €5.8 bn and €8.8 bn shortfalls identified by
the BoG stress test in 2013. Importantly, the ECB Comprehensive Assessment in 2014
resulted in no shortfall for the Greek banks under a dynamic balance sheet assumption.
Exhibit 64: Capital shortfall of €4.4 bn and €14.4 bn identified in the 2015 stress test for base and adverse case
respectively compares to €5.8 bn and €8.8 bn in BoG stress test in 2013 and no shortfall in ECB 2014 stress test
Summary of capital shortfalls under ECB 2015, ECB 2014 and BoG 2013 stress tests
Adverse Base
Base: €5.8bn Base: €4.4bn

Adverse: €8.8bn Adverse: €14.4bn
5.0 4.6 4.9
2.5 No shortfall 2.7

2.1
0.6 0.8
0.3 2.9 2.2 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.3 1.6 2.2
ALB EUR NBG PIR ALB EUR NBG PIR ALB EUR NBG PIR
BoG: 2013 ECB: 2014 (Dynamic) ECB: 2015
Source: EBA, ECB, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
The capital injection into Greek banks after the ECB stress test in 2015 is a third round of
recapitalization since 2013, with the first two rounds totaling €36.3 bn of new capital. In
2013, the banks were injected with €28 bn primarily as a result of losses incurred from PSI,
followed by €8.3 bn of recaps post the BoG stress test.
Exhibit 65: The capital injection into Greek banks after the ECB comprehensive assessment in 2015 is a third round of
recap since 2013, with a total of €36.3 bn raised in the last two rounds
Summary of recaps in 2013, 2014 and 2015
1 4,00 0
€28.0bn Private Public €9.7bn raised post

ECB 2015 stress test
1 2,00 0
9.8
1 0,00 0
7.9
8 ,000
€8.3bn raised post
8.7 BoG 2013 stress test
5.8
6 ,000
4.6
6.4
5.8
4 ,000
2.6 2.5 2.6

4.0 2.0
2 ,000
0
0.7 0.7
ALB EUR NBG PIR ALB EUR NBG PIR ALB EUR NBG PIR
2013 2014 2015
Source: EBA, ECB, Datastream, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Cocos included in public funds for 2015 recap

Appendix 4: Asset quality trends

December 7, 2015
Asset quality trends in Greece
Exhibit 66: Greek NPL ratio continues to increase and had reached 36% at the Exhibit 67: Greece’s NPL ratio remains above that of most of its European
end of Sept 2015 peers with the exception of Cyprus
NPL ratio in Greece (as % of loans) NPL ratios in Europe (as % of loans)
45%
NPLs
35% ~36%
34%
(Sept-15)
30%
25%
19%
17%
17%
17%
20%
16%
11%
15%
8%
8%
6%
5%
5%
5%
4%
4%
10%
4%
3%
3%
1%
1%
5%
0%
SWE
EST
UK
NED
AUT
BEL
DEN
POL
LAT
SLV
CZ
LTU
ESP
POR
HUN
CRO
BUL
ITA
IRE
GRE
CYP
Dec-07
Mar-08
Jun-08
Sep-08
Dec-08
Mar-09
Jun-09
Sep-09
Dec-09
Mar-10
Jun-10
Sep-10
Dec-10
Mar-11
Jun-11
Sep-11
Dec-11
Mar-12
Jun-12
Sep-12
Dec-12
Mar-13
Jun-13
Sep-13
Dec-13
Mar-14
Jun-14
Sep-14
Dec-14
Mar-15
Jun-15
Sep-15
Source: Source: ECB (NPL data), company data, compiled by Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
Source: IMF, Bank of Greece, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
Exhibit 68: The increase in NPLs has been accompanied by a decline in the Exhibit 69: ... despite the fact that collateral values have fallen (c.40%
coverage ratio… reduction in residential real estate values since 3Q08)
Coverage ratio in Greece (balance sheet provisions/NPLs) Greek Residential Real Estate Index (3Q08 = 100)
70%
-41% decline since peak (3Q08)
65%
60%
55%
50%
45%
40%
35%
3Q06
1Q07
3Q07
1Q08
3Q08
1Q09
3Q09
1Q10
3Q10
1Q11
3Q11
1Q12
3Q12
1Q13
3Q13
1Q14
3Q14
1Q15
3Q15
Dec-07
Mar-08
Jun-08
Sep-08
Dec-08
Mar-09
Jun-09
Sep-09
Dec-09
Mar-10
Jun-10
Sep-10
Dec-10
Mar-11
Jun-11
Sep-11
Dec-11
Mar-12
Jun-12
Sep-12
Dec-12
Mar-13
Jun-13
Sep-13
Dec-13
Mar-14
Jun-14
Sep-14
Dec-14
Mar-15
Jun-15
Sep-15
Greece: Banks
Source: Bank of Greece (index values), compiled and rebased by Goldman Sachs Global Investment
Source: Bank of Greece (provisions), IMF (NPLs after Jun-12), company data, compiled by Goldman Sachs Research
Global Investment Research.
42
December 7, 2015
Exhibit 70: Alpha Bank – NPL formation fell in 3Q15 Exhibit 71: Piraeus Bank – new NPLs have fallen by more than half since end
Group NPL formation (€ bn) and NPL ratio (%) 2013
Group NPL formation (€ bn) and NPL ratio (%)
39% 39% 39% 39% 39% 40%

2 100
37%
4 4%
2 100
37% 38% 4 4%
34% 34% 34% 35% 35%

32% 33% 33% 33% 33% 33%
30% 31%
3 4% 3 4%
1 600 1 600
2 4% 2 4%
1 4% 1 4%
€1.3bn €1.3bn
€1.2bn
1 100 1 100
4% 4%
€1.0bn €1.0bn
€0.9bn
€0.8bn
-6% -6%
6 00
€0.8bn 6 00
€0.5bn €0.6bn €0.5bn

-16 % -16 %
€0.5bn
€0.3bn €0.4bn €0.4bn
€0.2bn €0.3bn
-26 % -26 %
€0.0bn
€0.1bn
1 00 1 00
€0.2bn €0.1bn
1Q13 2Q13 3Q13 4Q13 1Q14 2Q14 3Q14 4Q14 1Q15 2Q15 3Q15 1Q13 2Q13 3Q13 4Q13 1Q14 2Q14 3Q14 4Q14 1Q15 2Q15 3Q15
-36 % -36 %
-0.4bn
-40 0 -46 % -40 0 -46 %
Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
Exhibit 72: Eurobank – NPL formation in 3Q15 up vs. 2Q15 Exhibit 73: NBG – NPL ratio of 26% the lowest among its Greek peers
Group NPL formation (€ bn) and NPL ratio (%) Greek NPL formation (€ bn) and NPL ratio (%)
4 4% 44. 0%
2 100 2 100
33% 34% 34% 35% 33.8%

32% 33% 31.6% 31.9% 32.0% 32.1%
29% 31% 30.3% 31.0%
28% 29.0%
26%
3 4%
25.9% 27.1% 34. 0%
25% 24.3%
1 600 1 600
2 4% 24. 0%
1 4% 14. 0%
1 100 1 100
4% 4.0 %
-6% -6.0%
€0.7bn
€0.7bn
6 00 6 00
€0.7bn
€0.6bn €0.5bn
-16 % -16 .0 %
€0.5bn
€0.4bn €0.4bn €0.4bn €0.4bn €0.4bn
€0.3bn €0.3bn €0.3bn
€0.3bn
-26 %
€0.2bn €0.2bn €0.2bn €0.2bn €0.2bn

-26 .0 %
1 00
€0.1bn
1 00
€0.0bn
1Q13 2Q13 3Q13 4Q13 1Q14 2Q14 3Q14 4Q14 1Q15 2Q15 3Q15 1Q13 2Q13 3Q13 4Q13 1Q14 2Q14 3Q14 4Q14 1Q15 2Q15 3Q15
-36 % -36 .0 %
-40 0 -46 % -40 0 -46 .0 %
Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
Greece: Banks
43
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Appendix 5: Funding

Deposit outflow slowdown post capital controls
Exhibit 74: Deposit flows positive for second consecutive Exhibit 75: … while customer deposits are down c.€43 bn
month with c.€0.5 bn of inflows in September … since November, 2014...
Change in customer deposits; € bn Total corporate and retail deposits (€ bn)
Deposit flows turned positive in August & September 250 Deposits down by
8bn ~€43bn since Nov '14
200
4bn Corporate Deposits
150 Retail Deposits
-1bn
100
-5bn
50
-9bn
00
Oct-01
Oct-02
Oct-03
Oct-04
Oct-05
Oct-06
Oct-07
Oct-08
Oct-09
Oct-10
Oct-11
Oct-12
Oct-13
Oct-14
Oct-15
-13bn
Oct-08 Oct-09 Oct-10 Oct-11 Oct-12 Oct-13 Oct-14 Oct-15
Source: Central Bank of Greece, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Source: Central Bank of Greece, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
Exhibit 76: … equal to a decline in deposit balances by Exhibit 77: Commercial gap narrows marginally in
>26% on a yearly basis September, but stays near levels seen in 2011-12
Customer loan and deposit growth in Greece (yoy) Loan-to-deposit ratio (%) and commercial gap (€ bn)
30% 150%
80
20% 140%
60
130%
10%
40 Commercial gap 120%
0% Loan/Deposit ratio
20
110%
-10% 0 100%
Loans growth (yoy)
-20% -20 90%
Deposit growth (yoy)
-30% -40 80%
Oct-02
Oct-03
Oct-04
Oct-05
Oct-06
Oct-07
Oct-08
Oct-09
Oct-10
Oct-11
Oct-12
Oct-13
Oct-14
Oct-15
Oct-03
Oct-04
Oct-05
Oct-06
Oct-07
Oct-08
Oct-09
Oct-10
Oct-11
Oct-12
Oct-13
Oct-14
Oct-15
Note: Provisions for bad loans subtracted from loan balances. Note: Provisions for bad loans subtracted from loan balances.
Source: Central Bank of Greece, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Source: Central Bank of Greece, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
Exhibit 78: ECB funding has started to fall post imposition of capital controls
Balance of Eurosystem funding (including balance of the ECB’s main refinancing operation and Emergency Liquidity Assistance)
200bn
ELA balance
ECB ELA ECB funding >€120bn in September according to press
160bn
85bn
84bn
~83bn
120bn 82bn
80bn
40bn
0bn
Oct-11 Apr-12 Oct-12 Apr-13 Oct-13 Apr-14 Oct-14 Apr-15 Oct-15 Jul-15 Aug-15 Sep-15 Oct-15
Source: Bank of Greece, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.

Appendix 6: Capital controls in Cyprus

Capital controls in Cyprus

The Cypriot authorities implemented capital controls on March 27, 2013 in order to
safeguard the stability of the country’s financial system. The measures were gradually
eased and finally lifted on April 6, 2015, more than two years after they were initially
implemented.
The introduction of capital controls occurred in the context of the rescue package agreed
between Cyprus and the Troika, first announced on March 17, 2013. The programme
included measures necessary to recapitalize the local banking sector.
As part of the programme, Cyprus agreed to introduce a one-off tax on deposits. The initial
proposal suggested a levy of 6.7% on deposit amounts of < €100k and a 9.9% tax on
deposit amounts of >€100k. Given disagreements over losses on small retail deposits, the
scheme was revised. The final agreement applied a 47.5% haircut to all balances >€100k
and incorporated a bail-in of equity holders, bond holders, and large deposits at Laiki Bank.
Exhibit 79: Capital controls were introduced in Cyprus in 2013 as part of a rescue package; these took >2 years to
unwind
Capital controls in Cyprus
2013 2014 2015
27-Mar 02-Aug 22-Nov 24-Feb 31-Mar 31-May 08-Dec 12-Jan 16-Feb 16-Mar 06-Apr
Cash withdrawals
Individual [per day, per person] €300 €300 €300 €300 Free Free Free Free Free Free
Legal entity [per day, per account] €300 €500 €500 €500 Free Free Free Free Free Free
Non cash payments / transfers without documentation
To other institutions in Cyprus
Individual [per month, per account] €5k €15k €15k €20k €50k Free Free Free Free Free
Legal entity [per month] €5k €75k €75k €100k €200k Free Free Free Free Free
FULL ABOLISHMENT OF RESTRICTIVE MEASURES

Regular business
[per transaction] €5k €300k No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit
(w/o approval)
To institutions abroad:
Regular business
[per transaction] €5k €500k €1 mn €1 mn €1 mn €1 mn €2 mn No limit No limit No limit
(w/o approval)
Cash or credit
[per month] €5k No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit
card payments
Export of currency [per person, per trip] €1k €3k €3k €3k €3k €3k €6k €10k €10k €10k
Transfer of deposits and funds
[per month] €5k €5k €5k €5k €5k €5k €10k €20k €50k €1 mn
abroad
Additional restrictions
Opening of new accounts is prohibited unless intended

4 Yes Νο 1 Νο 1 Νο 1 Νο 1 Free Free Free Free Free
to deposit funds from abroad in time accounts
The addition of new beneficiaries to an existing account

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
and cash checks is prohibited
Transactions by international customers of foreign banks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No
are excluded from restrictions (15 banks) (16 banks) (16 banks) (16 banks) (16 banks) (16 banks) (16 banks) (16 banks) (16 banks)
Compulsory extension of time deposits maturing in one

90% 80% 80% None None None None None None None
month (in percentage to the deposit value)
Only to repay loan at the Additional transactions Additional transactions Additional transactions
Termination of time deposits before maturity same bank allowed allowed allowed
Free3 Free3 Free3 Free3 Free3 Free3
Notes: (1) Or subject to previous approval by the committee; (2) However, a credit institution has the right to request supporting documentation; (3) Subject to banks'
consent; (4) Time accounts created with cash for a minimum period of three months or for loans related to facilitate new customers.
Source: Bank of Cyprus, Alpha Bank, compiled by Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
The case of Cyprus suggests that capital controls may create significant asset quality
headwinds in the near term. The imposed restrictions on access to deposits are likely to put
additional pressure on borrowers and may further erode the payment culture. In the case
of Cyprus, the NPL ratio increased from c.15% to 40% within one year of the introduction of
capital controls and peaked at 45% in 2014. This compares with a ratio of around 33%
reported in Greece last year, up from 25% in 1Q13.

Exhibit 80: The introduction of capital controls preceded a sharp increase in the NPL ratio in Cyprus in 2013-14
NPL ratios in Greece and Cyprus; (%)
50%
Cyprus
45% Greece
Imposition of capital controls in Cyprus
40%
35%
30%
25%
20% Recapitalisation of banks in Cyprus

15%
10%
5%
0%
1Q10
2Q10
3Q10
4Q10
1Q11
2Q11
3Q11
4Q11
1Q12
2Q12
3Q12
4Q12
1Q13
2Q13
3Q13
4Q13
1Q14
2Q14
3Q14
4Q14
Source: IMF, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.

Disclosure Appendix
Reg AC
We, Pawel Dziedzic and Markus Pops, hereby certify that all of the views expressed in this report accurately reflect our personal views about the
subject company or companies and its or their securities. We also certify that no part of our compensation was, is or will be, directly or indirectly,
related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this report.
Unless otherwise stated, the individuals listed on the cover page of this report are analysts in Goldman Sachs' Global Investment Research division.
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market. The four key attributes depicted are: growth, returns, multiple and volatility. Growth, returns and multiple are indexed based on composites
of several methodologies to determine the stocks percentile ranking within the region's coverage universe.
The precise calculation of each metric may vary depending on the fiscal year, industry and region but the standard approach is as follows:
Growth is a composite of next year's estimate over current year's estimate, e.g. EPS, EBITDA, Revenue. Return is a year one prospective aggregate
of various return on capital measures, e.g. CROCI, ROACE, and ROE. Multiple is a composite of one-year forward valuation ratios, e.g. P/E, dividend
yield, EV/FCF, EV/EBITDA, EV/DACF, Price/Book. Volatility is measured as trailing twelve-month volatility adjusted for dividends.
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GS SUSTAIN
GS SUSTAIN is a global investment strategy aimed at long-term, long-only performance with a low turnover of ideas. The GS SUSTAIN focus list
includes leaders our analysis shows to be well positioned to deliver long term outperformance through sustained competitive advantage and
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environmental, social and governance issues facing their industry).
Disclosures
Coverage group(s) of stocks by primary analyst(s)
Pawel Dziedzic: Europe-Pan-Euro Banks.
Europe-Pan-Euro Banks: Alpha Bank, Arrow Global Group, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banca Popolare di Milano, Banca Popolare Emilia
Romagna, Banco BPI, Banco Comercial Portugues, Banco Popolare, Banco Popular Espanol, Banco Sabadell, Banco Santander, Bank Handlowy, Bank
of Ireland, Bank of Piraeus, Bank Pekao, Bank Zachodni WBK, Bankia, Bankinter, Barclays Plc, BBVA, BNP Paribas, CaixaBank SA, Commerzbank AG,
Credit Agricole SA, Credit Suisse, Danske Bank, Deutsche Bank, DNB, EFG International, Erste Bank, Eurobank Ergasias SA, HSBC, Idea Bank, ING
Groep NV, Intesa Sanpaolo, Investor AB, Julius Baer Group, KBC Group, Komercni Banka, Lloyds Banking Group, Mbank, National Bank of Greece,
Natixis, Nordea, OTP Bank Plc, PKO BP, Provident Financial, Raiffeisen Bank International, Royal Bank of Scotland, SEB, Shawbrook Group, Societe
Generale, Standard Chartered, Svenska Handelsbanken, Swedbank, UBI Banca, UBS Group AG, UniCredit, Virgin Money Holdings, Vontobel.
Company-specific regulatory disclosures

The following disclosures relate to relationships between The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (with its affiliates, "Goldman Sachs") and companies
covered by the Global Investment Research Division of Goldman Sachs and referred to in this research.
Goldman Sachs has received compensation for investment banking services in the past 12 months: Alpha Bank (€1.86), Bank of Piraeus (€0.66) and
Eurobank Ergasias SA (€0.90)
Goldman Sachs expects to receive or intends to seek compensation for investment banking services in the next 3 months: Alpha Bank (€1.86), Bank
of Piraeus (€0.66) and Eurobank Ergasias SA (€0.90)
Goldman Sachs had an investment banking services client relationship during the past 12 months with: Alpha Bank (€1.86), Bank of Piraeus (€0.66)
and Eurobank Ergasias SA (€0.90)
Goldman Sachs had a non-investment banking securities-related services client relationship during the past 12 months with: Alpha Bank (€1.86),
Bank of Piraeus (€0.66) and Eurobank Ergasias SA (€0.90)
Goldman Sachs had a non-securities services client relationship during the past 12 months with: Alpha Bank (€1.86), Bank of Piraeus (€0.66) and
Eurobank Ergasias SA (€0.90)
Distribution of ratings/investment banking relationships

Goldman Sachs Investment Research global coverage universe
Rating Distribution Investment Banking Relationships
Buy Hold Sell Buy Hold Sell
Global 32% 53% 15% 63% 57% 52%
As of October 1, 2015, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research had investment ratings on 3,221 equity securities. Goldman Sachs assigns stocks
as Buys and Sells on various regional Investment Lists; stocks not so assigned are deemed Neutral. Such assignments equate to Buy, Hold and Sell
for the purposes of the above disclosure required by NASD/NYSE rules. See 'Ratings, Coverage groups and views and related definitions' below.

Price target and rating history chart(s)

Alpha Bank (ACBr.AT) Stock Price Currency : Euro Bank of Piraeus (BOPr.AT) Stock Price Currency : Euro
Goldman Sachs rating and stock price target history Goldman Sachs rating and stock price target history
2.00 550 6.00 550
0.55 1 0.4
1.80 0.13 0.08
0.58 5.00 1.12
1.60 500 500
1.40 0.7
0.8 0.82 4.00 1.75 1.7 1.4
1.20 450 450
1.00 3.00
0.3
0.80 400 400
0.60 2.00
0.40 350 1.00 350
0.20
0.00 300 0.00 300
Dec 23 Jun 6 Feb 5 Dec 23 Jun 6
Stock Price
Index Price
Stock Price
Index Price
RS CS B N RS CS N
N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S
2012 2013 2014 2015 2012 2013 2014 2015
Source: Goldman Sachs Investment Research for ratings and price targets; FactSet closing prices as of 9/30/2015. Source: Goldman Sachs Investment Research for ratings and price targets; FactSet closing prices as of 9/30/2015.
Rating Covered by Paw el Dziedzic, Rating Covered by Paw el Dziedzic,
Price target as of Jun 5, 2014 Price target as of Jun 5, 2014
Price target at removal Not covered by current analyst Price target at removal Not covered by current analyst
FTSE World Europe FTSE World Europe
(EUR) (EUR)
The price targets show n should be considered in the context of all prior published Goldman Sachs research, which may or The price targets show n should be considered in the context of all prior published Goldman Sachs research, which may or
may not have included price targets, as w ell as developments relating to the company, its industry and financial markets. may not have included price targets, as w ell as developments relating to the company, its industry and financial markets.
Eurobank Ergas ias SA (EURBr.AT) Stock Price Currency : Euro

Goldman Sachs rating and stock price target history
550
14.00 0.12
0.24 0.03
12.00 500
0.32
10.00 0.4 0.38 450
8.00
6.00 400
4.00 0.2
350
2.00
0.00 300
Dec 23 Jun 6
Stock Price
Index Price
RS CS N
N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S
2012 2013 2014 2015
Source: Goldman Sachs Investment Research for ratings and price targets; FactSet closing prices as of 9/30/2015.
Rating Covered by Paw el Dziedzic,
Price target as of Jun 5, 2014
Price target at removal Not covered by current analyst

FTSE World Europe
(EUR)
The price targets show n should be considered in the context of all prior published Goldman Sachs research, which may or
may not have included price targets, as w ell as developments relating to the company, its industry and financial markets.
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Greece: Banks: Recaps Completed, Restructuring Moves Forward ALB Up To Buy

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Greece: Banks: Recaps Completed, Restructuring Moves Forward ALB Up To Buy

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December 7, 2015

Recaps completed, restructuring moves forward; ALB up to Buy

State aid a key differentiating factor across banks € 14.4 bn

The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Global Investment Research

Story in six charts: Recaps completed, resolutions avoided 3

Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research 2

Story in six charts: Recaps completed, resolutions avoided

Other SCIs State Private

AQR reclassification Pre AQR

18.1% -2.0% 17.6%

4.0% 41.6% 5.8%

ALB PIR EURB ALB PIR EURB

Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research 3

Recaps completed, state aid a key differentiating factor across banks

€bn ALB PIR EURB NBG Aggregate

(+) SCI 1.6 1.3 1.6 0.8 5.3

= Private 2.7 2.2 2.1 1.9 9.0

(+) Common Shares (25%) - 0.7 - 0.7 1.4

= State - 2.7 - 2.7 5.4

Total shortfall 2.7 4.9 2.1 4.6 14.4

Private: % baseline 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

€bn ALB PIR EURB NBG Aggregate

TBV: 30 September 2015 6.6 6.3 3.5 4.1 20.5

(+) Private: SCI 1.6 1.3 1.6 0.8 5.3

= TBV uplift 2.6 2.6 2.0 3.8 11.0

Pro-Forma: TBV 9.1 8.9 5.6 7.9 31.5

Pro-Forma: Market Value

Old shares 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 --

# shares (post cap-hike) 1.5 8.8 2.2 9.8 --

SCI price (post split) 2.00 0.30 1.00 0.30 --

Pro-Forma: Market Value 3.1 2.6 2.2 2.9 10.8

Pro-Forma: TBV 9.1 8.9 5.6 7.9 31.5

Pro-Forma: Market Value 3.1 2.6 2.2 2.9 10.8

Pro-forma P/TBV 0.34x 0.30x 0.39x 0.37x 0.34x

% ALB PIR EURB NBG Average

Ownership: 2013 recaps

Private 18% 19% 5% 16% 15%

State: Shares 82% 81% - 84% 62%

State: Covered by warrants - - 95% - 24%

Ownership: 2014 recaps

Private 32% 33% 65% 43% 43%

State: Shares 68% 67% - 57% 48%

State: Covered by warrants - - 35% - 9%

Ownership: 2015 recaps

Private 89% 74% 98% 62% 81%

State 11% 26% 2% 38% 19%

Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.

Reinforced capital serves as buffer against risks

Capital increase No ordinary dividends, includes

1.4% 18.1% -2.0% 1.6% -0.1% -0.2% 17.6%

Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.

Balance sheet clean-up paves way for earnings recovery

-0.1% 0.8% 6.3%

Source: Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.

Valuation: Greek banks resume trading at a deep discount to European peers

10.0x 10.0x 0.8x 0.8x

Greece Greece SE EUR EM Greece SE EUR EM Greece Greece SE EUR EM

P/E P/TBV ROTE

Source: DataStream, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

Exhibit 16: … with returns of c.9%-10% in 2019E on the underlying basis

ROE/COE is our preferred valuation method for European banks

16.5% (grey data points (grey data points

6.5% GR'19 GR'19