GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner, vs.

JUAN RUIZ, respondent
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES; RELIGIOUS FREEDOM. —
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance
from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling
postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage
stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty- third International Eucharistic
Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a
civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of
the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to
the United States the designs of the postage for printing as follows:
"In the center is a chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green, brown,
cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1.094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36, and 50
centavos." the said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this day, remains
unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.
The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the instant case,
although he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions. While, generally, prohibition as an
extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial
functions (50 C. J., 658), its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to
". . . inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, which
are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person . . .." (Secs. 516 and
226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the
statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the
present case, which act because alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiori "without or in excess of . . .
jurisdiction." The statutory rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined
exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from
encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person
whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for
the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or
vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions," (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)
The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing
and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that
this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 13, Article VI, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, which provides as follows:
xxxxx
xxxxx
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is
not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of
morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of
their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody
their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to
themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,"
they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the
destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere.
In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our
Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec.
3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec.
344, par [c], Adm. Code) sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher
or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium (sec. 13,
subsec. 3 Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by
constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Ad. Code).
Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays are made legal holidays (sec.
29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conducive to beneficial moral results. The law
allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are considered
crimes against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code).
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the
provisions of Act. No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. this Act is as follows:
No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE
SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE
APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW
DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in legislature assembled and by the
authority of the same:
xxxxx
"Approved, February 21, 1933."
It will be seen that the Act appropriate the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and printing of postage
stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the
manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government". The printing and issuance of
the postage stamps in question appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the Philippines in a
letter dated September 1, 1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent alleges
that the Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the
revenue to be derived from the sale of the postage stamps in question at P1,618,179.10 and states that there still
remain to be sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to
the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of
the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use,
benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in
question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any
sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for
the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that
church. On the contrary, it appears from the letter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on
page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise
the Philippines and attract more tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an
event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people" (Letter of the
Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications in the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3,
petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2),
instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and
the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital
of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in
question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if
any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the
opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more
or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by
appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental
results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)
We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the
complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional
inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and persecution, care should be taken
that at this stage of our political development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to
the belief that the Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very
serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the
conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar. Act. No. 4052 grants the
Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to
issue postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government. "Even
if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage
stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor
judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the
court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO OSMEÑA, NICETAS DAGAR and JESUS
EDULLANTES, petitioners, vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City Branch V, BARANGAY COUNCIL of Valencia, Ormoc City, Barangay
Captain MANUEL C. VELOSO, Councilmen GAUDENCIO LAVEZARES, TOMAS CABATINGAN and
MAXIMINO NAVARRO, Barangay Secretary CONCHITA MARAYA and Barangay Treasurer LUCENA
BALTAZAR, respondents.
This case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City,
regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his
annual feast day. That issue was spawned by the controversy as to whether the parish priest or a layman
should have the custody of the image. 
On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious
celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia."
That resolution designated the members of nine committees who would take charge of the 1976 festivity. It
provided for (1) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the
barangay's projects. Funds for the two projects would be obtained through the "selling of tickets and cash
donations" (Exh. A or 6).
On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 6 which specified that, in accordance with
the practice in Eastern Leyte, Councilman Tomas Cabatingan, the chairman or hermano mayor of the
fiesta, would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his
residence for one year and until the election of his successor as chairman of the next feast day.
It was further provided in the resolution that the image would be made available to the Catholic parish church
during the celebration of the saint's feast day (Exh. B or 7).
Resolutions Nos. 5 and 6 were submitted to a plebiscite and were duly ratified by the barangay general assembly
on March 26, 1976. Two hundred seventy-two voters ratified the two resolutions (Exh. 2 and 5).
 
Funds were raised by means of solicitations and cash donations of the barangay residents and those of the
neighboring places of Valencia. With those funds, the waiting shed was constructed and the wooden image of San
Vicente Ferrer was acquired in Cebu City by the barangay council for four hundred pesos (Exh. F-1, 3 and 4).
On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic church of Barangay Valencia so
that the devotees could worship the saint during the mass for the fiesta. cdphil
A controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña, refused to return
that image to the barangay council on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church
funds were used for its acquisition.
Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, on the occasion of his sermon during a mass, Father
Osmeña allegedly uttered defamatory remarks against the barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso, apparently
in connection with the disputed image. That incident provoked Veloso to file against Father Osmeña in the
city court of Ormoc City a charge for grave oral defamation.
Father Osmeña retaliated by filing administrative complaints against Veloso with the city mayor's office and
the Department of Local Government and Community Development on the grounds of immorality, grave
abuse of authority, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance of the law.
Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the Catholic church of Valencia. Because Father Osmeña
did not accede to the request of Cabatingan to have custody of the image and "maliciously ignored" the council's
Resolution No. 6, the council enacted on May 12, 1976 Resolution No. 10, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer
to file a replevin case against Father Osmeña for the recovery of the image (Exh. C or 8). On June 14, 1976,
the barangay council passed Resolution No. 12, appointing Veloso as its representative in the replevin case (Exh. D
or 9).
The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City against Father Osmeña and Bishop Cipriano Urgel
(Exh. F). After the barangay council had posted a cash bond of eight hundred pesos, Father Osmeña turned over the
image to the council (p. 10, Rollo). In his answer to the complaint for replevin, he assailed the constitutionality of
the said resolutions (Exh. F-1).
Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, and two Catholic
laymen, Jesus Edullantes and Nicetas Dagar, filed against the barangay council and its members (excluding
two members) a complaint in the Court of First Instance at Ormoc City, praying for the annulment of the said
resolutions (Civil Case No. 1680-0).
The lower court dismissed the complaint. It upheld the validity of the resolutions. The petitioners appealed
under Republic Act No. 5440.
The petitioners contend that the barangay council was not duly constituted because Isidoro M. Mañago, Jr., the
chairman of the kabataang barangay, was not allowed to participate in its sessions. LibLex
Barangays used to be known as citizens assemblies (Presidential Decrees Nos. 86 and 86-A). Presidential Decree
No. 557, which took effect on September 21, 1974, 70 O.G. 8450-L, directed that all barrios should be known as
barangays and adopted the Revised Barrio Charter as the Barangay Charter.
Barrios are units of municipalities or municipal districts in which they are situated. They are quasi-municipal
corporations endowed with such powers" as are provided by law "for the performance of particular government
functions, to be exercised by and through their respective barrio governments in conformity with law" (Sec. 2,
Revised Barrio Charter, R.A. No. 3590).
The barrio assembly consists of all persons who are residents of the barrio for at least six months, eighteen years of
age or over and Filipino citizens duly registered in the list kept by the barrio secretary (Sec. 4, Ibid).
The barrio council, now barangay council, is composed of the barangay captain and six councilmen (Sec. 7, Ibid).
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 684, which took effect on April 15, 1975, provides that "the barangay youth
chairman shall be an ex-officio member of the barangay council", having the same powers and functions as a
barangay councilman.
In this case, Mañago, the barangay youth chairman, was notified of the sessions of the barangay council to be held
on March 23 and 26, 1976 but he was not able to attend those sessions because he was working with a construction
company based at Ipil, Ormoc City (Par. 2[d], Exh. 1).
Mañago's absence from the sessions of the barangay council did not render the said resolutions void. There was a
quorum when the said resolutions were passed.
The other contention of the petitioners is that the resolutions contravene the constitutional provisions that
"no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion" and that "no public money or property shall
ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium"
(Sec. 8, Article IV and sec. 18[2], Article VIII, Constitution). prcd
That contention is glaringly devoid of merit. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly
establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the
benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money.
The construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular matter.
Manifestly puerile and flimsy is petitioners' argument that the barangay council favored the Catholic religion by
using the funds raised by solicitations and donations for the purchase of the patron saint's wooden image and
making the image available to the Catholic church.
The preposterousness of that argument is rendered more evident by the fact that counsel advanced that argument in
behalf of the petitioner, Father Osmeña, the parish priest.
The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint,
San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the
religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image
of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated.
If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio,
then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of
his image) cannot be branded as illegal.
As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in
rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.
The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall any
suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church. A more practical reason for that arrangement would be
that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, could easily be made available to any family desiring to
borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas.
The contradictory positions of the petitioners are shown in their affidavits. Petitioner Garces swore that the said
resolutions favored the Catholic church. On the other hand, petitioners Dagar and Edullantes swore that the
resolutions prejudiced the Catholics because they could see the image in the church only once a year or during the
fiesta (Exh. H and J).
We find that the momentous issues of separation of church and state, freedom of religion and the use of
public money to favor any sect or church are not involved at all in this case even remotely or indirectly. It is
not a microcosmic test case on those issues.
This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint's image. It would never have arisen if the parties had been
more diplomatic and tactful and if Father Osmeña had taken the trouble of causing contributions to be solicited
from his own parishioners for the purchase of another image of San Vicente Ferrer to be installed in his church.
There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmeña's claim
that it belongs to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to
determine who should have custody thereof. cdrep
If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the Catholic church, that action would not
violate the Constitution because the image was acquired with private funds and is its private property.
The council has the right to take measures to recover possession of the image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and
12.
Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint
is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and
banning the use of public money or property.
In Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201, what was involved was Act No. 4052 which appropriated sixty thousand pesos
for the cost of plates and the printing of postage stamps with new designs.
Under that law, the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Department Head and the President of the
Philippines, issued in 1936 postage stamps to commemorate the celebration in Manila of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress sponsored by the Catholic Church.
The purpose of the stamps was to raise revenue and advertise the Philippines. The design of the stamps showed a
map of the Philippines and nothing about the Catholic Church. No religious purpose was intended.
 Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the founder and head of the Philippine Independent Church, sought to enjoin the
sale of those commemorative postage stamps.
It was held that the issuance of the stamps, while linked inseparably with an event of a religious character, was not
designed as a propaganda for the Catholic Church. Aglipay's prohibition suit was dismissed. llcd
The instant case is easily distinguishable from Verzosa vs. Fernandez, 49 Phil. 627 and 55 Phil. 307, where a
religious brotherhood, La Archicofradia del Santisimo Sacramento, organized for the purpose of raising funds to
meet the expenses for the annual fiesta in honor of the Most Holy Sacrament and the Virgin Lady of Guadalupe,
was held accountable for the funds which it held as trustee.
Finding that the petitioners have no cause of action for the annulment of the barangay resolutions, the lower
court's judgment dismissing their amended petition is affirmed. No costs.

AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CITY OF MANILA, defendant-appellee

Xxxxx
Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered and
doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November, 1898,
with its principal office at 636 Isaac Peral in said City. The defendant-appellee is a municipal corporation
with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila.
In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or
gospel portions thereof (except during the Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and translating
the same into several Philippine dialects. On May 29, 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila
informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without
providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No.
3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three
days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th
quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex A).
Plaintiff protested against this requirement, but the City Treasurer demanded that plaintiff deposit and pay
under protest the sum of P5,891.45, if suit was to be taken in court regarding the same (Annex B). To avoid the
closing of its business as well as further fines and penalties in the premises, on October 24, 1953, plaintiff paid to
the defendant under protest the said permit and license fees in the aforementioned amount, giving at the same time
notice to the City Treasurer that suit would be taken in court to question the legality of the ordinances under which
the said fees were being collected (Annex C), which was done on the same date by filing the complaint that gave
rise to this action. In its complaint plaintiff prays that judgment be rendered declaring the said Municipal
Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364 illegal and unconstitutional, and that
the defendant be ordered to refund to the plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 paid under protest, together with legal
interest thereon, and the costs, plaintiff further praying for such other relief and remedy as the court may deem just
and equitable.
Defendant answered the complaint, maintaining in turn that said ordinances were enacted by the Municipal Board
of the City of Manila by virtue of the power granted to it by section 2444, subsection (m-2) of the Revised
Administrative Code, superseded on June 18, 1949, by section 18, subsection (1) of Republic Act No. 409, known
as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, and praying that the complaint be dismissed, with costs against
plaintiff. This answer was replied by the plaintiff reiterating the unconstitutionality of the often- repeated
ordinances.
Before trial the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
"COME NOW the parties in the above-entitled case, thru their undersigned attorneys and respectfully submit the
following stipulation of facts:
1. That the plaintiff sold for the use of the purchasers at its principal office at 636 Isaac Peral, Manila, Bibles, New
Testaments, bible portions and bible concordance in English and other foreign languages imported by it from the
United States as well as Bibles, New Testaments and bible portions in the local dialects imported and/or purchased
locally; that from the fourth quarter of 1945 to the first quarter of 1953 inclusive the sales made by the plaintiff
were as follows:
 Quarter Amount of Sales xxxxx
2. That the parties hereby reserve the right to present evidence of other facts not herein stipulated.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this case be set for hearing so that the parties may present further
evidence on their behalf (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-16)".
When the case was set for hearing, plaintiff proved, among other things, that it has been in existence in the
Philippines since 1899, and that its parent society is in New York, United States of America; that its contiguous
real properties located at Isaac Peral are exempt from real estate taxes; and that it was never required to pay any
municipal license fee or tax before the war, nor does the American Bible Society in the United States pay any
license fee or sales tax for the sale of bible therein. Plaintiff further tried to establish that it never made any profit
from the sale of its bibles, which are disposed of for as low as one third of the cost, and that in order to maintain its
operating cost it obtains substantial remittances from its New York office and voluntary contributions and gifts
from certain churches, both in the United States and in the Philippines, which are interested in its missionary work.
Regarding plaintiff's contention of lack of profit in the sale of bibles, defendant retorts that the admissions of
plaintiff-appellant's lone witness who testified on cross-examination that bibles bearing the price of 70 cents each
from plaintiff-appellant's New York office are sold here by plaintiff- appellant at P1.30 each; those bearing the
price of $4.50 each are sold here at P10 each; those bearing the price of $7 each are sold here at P15 each; and
those bearing the price of $11 each are sold here at P22 each, clearly show that plaintiff's contention that it never
makes any profit from the sale of its bible, is evidently untenable.
After hearing the Court rendered judgment, the last part of which is as follows:
"As may be seen from the repealed section (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code and the repealing portions
(o) of section 18 of Republic Act No. 409, although they seemingly differ in the way the legislative intent is
expressed, yet their meaning is practically the same for the purpose of taxing the merchandise mentioned in said
legal provisions, and that the taxes to be levied by said ordinances is in the nature of percentage graduated taxes
(Sec. 3 of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Sec. 1, Group 2, of Ordinance No. 2529, as amended by
Ordinance No. 3364).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that this case
should be dismissed, as it is hereby dismissed, for lack of merits, with costs against the plaintiff."
Not satisfied with this verdict plaintiff took up the matter to the Court of Appeals which certified the case to Us for
the reason that the errors assigned to the lower Court involved only questions of law.
Appellant contends that the lower Court erred:
1. In holding that Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as respectively amended, are not unconstitutional;
2. In holding that subsection m-2 of Section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code under which Ordinances
Nos. 2529 and 3000 were promulgated, was not repealed by Section 18 of Republic Act No. 409;
3. In not holding that an ordinance providing for percentage taxes based on gross sales or receipts, in order to be
valid under the new Charter of the City of Manila, must first be approved by the President of the Philippines; and
4. In holding that, as the sales made by the plaintiff-appellant have assumed commercial proportions, it cannot
escape from the operation of said municipal ordinances under the cloak of religious privilege.
The issues. — As may be seen from the preceding statement of the case, the issues involved in the present
controversy may be reduced to the following: (1) whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila, Nos. 3000,
as amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364, are constitutional and valid; and (2) whether the provisions of said
ordinances are applicable or not to the case at bar.
Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, provides that:
"(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights."
Predicated on this constitutional mandate, plaintiff-appellant contends that Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as
respectively amended, are unconstitutional and illegal in so far as its society is concerned, because they
provide for religious censorship and restrain the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession, to
wit: the distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature to the people of the Philippines.
Before entering into a discussion of the constitutional aspect of the case, We shall first consider the provisions of
the questioned ordinances in relation to their application to the sale of bibles, etc. by appellant.
The records show that by letter of May 29, 1953 (Annex A), the City Treasurer required plaintiff to secure a
Mayor's permit in connection with the society's alleged business of distributing and selling bibles, etc. and to
pay permit dues in the sum of P35 for the period covered in this litigation, plus the sum of P35 for compromise
on account of plaintiff's failure to secure the permit required by Ordinance No. 3000 of the City of Manila, as
amended. This Ordinance is of general application and not particularly directed against institutions like the
plaintiff, and it does not contain any provisions whatsoever prescribing religious censorship nor restraining the free
exercise and enjoyment of any religious profession. Section 1 of Ordinance No. 3000 reads as follows:
"SEC. 1. PERMITS NECESSARY. — It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to conduct or engage in any of
the businesses, trades, or occupations enumerated in Section 3 of this Ordinance or other businesses, trades, or
occupations for which a permit is required for the proper supervision and enforcement of existing laws and
ordinances governing the sanitation, security, and welfare of the public and the health of the employees engaged in
the business specified in said section 3 hereof, WITHOUT FIRST HAVING OBTAINED A PERMIT THEREFOR
FROM THE MAYOR AND THE NECESSARY LICENSE FROM THE CITY TREASURER."
The business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff involved in this case is not particularly mentioned in
Section 3 of the Ordinance, and the record does not show that a permit is required therefor under existing
laws and ordinances for the proper supervision and enforcement of their provisions governing the
sanitation, security and welfare of the public and the health of the employees engaged in the business of the
plaintiff. However, section 3 of Ordinance 3000 contains item No. 79, which reads as follows:
"79. All other businesses, trades or occupations not mentioned in this Ordinance, except those upon which
the City is not empowered to license or to tax . . . P5.00".
Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the power of the City to license or tax said
business, trade or occupation.
As to the license fees that the Treasurer of the City of Manila required the society to pay from the 4th quarter of
1945 to the 1st quarter of 1953 in the sum of P5,821.45, including the sum of P50 as compromise, Ordinance No.
2529, as amended by Ordinances Nos. 2779, 2821 and 3028 prescribes the following:
"SEC. 1. FEES. — Subject to the provisions of section 578 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila, as
amended, there shall be paid to the City Treasurer for engaging in any of the businesses or occupations below
enumerated, quarterly, license fees based on gross sales or receipts realized during the preceding quarter in
accordance with the rates herein prescribed: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That a person engaged in any business or
occupation for the first time shall pay the initial license fee based on the probable gross sales or receipts for the
first quarter beginning from the date of the opening of the business as indicated herein for the corresponding
business or occupation.
xxx xxx xxx
GROUP 2. — Retail dealers in new (not yet used) merchandise, which dealers are not yet subject to the payment of
any municipal tax, such as (1) retail dealers in general merchandise; (2) retail dealers exclusively engaged in the
sale of . . . books, including stationery.
xxx xxx xxx
As may be seen, the license fees required to be paid quarterly- in Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 2529, as
amended, are not imposed directly upon any religious institution but upon those engaged in any of the
business or occupations therein enumerated, such as retail "dealers in general merchandise" which, it is
alleged, cover the business or occupation of selling bibles, books, etc.
Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code which includes section 2444, subsection (m-2) of said legal body,
as amended by Act No. 3659, approved on December 8, 1929, empowers the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila:
"(M-2) To tax and fix the license fee on (a) dealers in new automobiles or accessories or both, and (b) retail dealers
in new (not yet used) merchandise, which dealers are not yet subject to the payment of any municipal tax.
"For the purpose of taxation, these retail dealers shall be classified as (1) retail dealers in general merchandise, and
(2) retail dealers exclusively engaged in the sale of (a) textiles . . . (e) books, including stationery paper and office
supplies . . . PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That the combined total tax of any debtor or manufacturer, or both,
enumerated under these subsections (m-1) and (m-2), whether dealing in one or all of the articles mentioned herein,
SHALL NOT BE IN EXCESS OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS PER ANNUM."
and appellee's counsel maintains that City Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as amended, were enacted in virtue of
the power that said Act No. 3669 conferred upon the City of Manila. Appellant, however, contends that said
ordinances are no longer in force and effect as the law under which they were promulgated has been expressly
repealed by Section 102 of Republic Act No. 409 passed on June 18, 1949, known as the Revised Manila Charter.
Passing upon this point the lower Court categorically stated that Republic Act No. 409 expressly repealed the
provisions of Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code but in the opinion of the trial Judge, although Section
244 (m-2) of the former Manila Charter and section 18 (o) of the new seemingly differ in the way the legislative
intent was expressed, yet their meaning is practically the same for the purpose of taxing the merchandise
mentioned in both legal provisions and, consequently, Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as amended, are to be
considered as still in full force and effect uninterruptedly up to the present.
"Often the legislature, instead of simply amending the preexisting statute, will repeal the old statute in its entirety
and by the same enactment re-enact all or certain portions of the preexisting law. Of course, the problem created by
this sort of legislative action involves mainly the effect of the repeal upon rights and liabilities which accrued under
the original statute. Are those rights and liabilities destroyed or preserved? The authorities are divided as to the
effect of simultaneous repeals and re- enactments. Some adhere to the view that the rights and liabilities accrued
under the repealed act are destroyed, since the statutes from which they sprang are actually terminated, even
though for only a very short period of time. Others, and they seem to be in the majority, refuse to accept this view
of the situation, and consequently maintain that all rights and liabilities which have accrued under the original
statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the re-enactment neutralizes the repeal, therefore continuing the
law in force without interruption". (Crawford-Statutory Construction, Sec. 322).
 
Appellant's counsel states that section 18 (o) of Republic Act No. 409 introduces a new and wider concept of
taxation and is so different from the provisions of Section 2444(m-2) that the former cannot be considered as a
substantial re-enactment of the provisions of the latter. We have quoted above the provisions of section 2444 (m-2)
of the Revised Administrative Code and We shall now copy hereunder the provisions of Section 18, subdivision (o)
of Republic Act No. 409, which reads as follows:
"(o) To tax and fix the license fee on dealers in general merchandise, including importers and indentors, except
those dealers who may be expressly subject to the payment of some other municipal tax under the provisions of
this section.
Dealers in general merchandise shall be classified as (a) wholesale dealers and (b) retail dealers. For purposes of
the tax on retail dealers, general merchandise shall be classified into four main classes: namely (1) luxury articles,
(2) semi-luxury articles, (3) essential commodities, and (4) miscellaneous articles. A separate license shall be
prescribed for each class but where commodities of different classes are sold in the same establishment, it shall not
be compulsory for the owner to secure more than one license if he pays the higher or highest rate of tax prescribed
by ordinance. Wholesale dealers shall pay the license tax as such, as may be provided by ordinance.
For purposes of this section, the term 'General merchandise' shall include poultry and livestock, agricultural
products, fish and other allied products."
The only essential difference that We find between these two provisions that may have any bearing on the case at
bar, is that while subsection (m-2) prescribes that the combined total tax of any dealer or manufacturer, or both,
enumerated under subsections (m-1) and (m- 2), whether dealing in one or all of the articles mentioned
therein, shall not be in excess of P500 per annum, the corresponding section 18, subsection (o) of Republic Act No.
409, does not contain any limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per
annum. Hence, and in accordance with the weight of the authorities above referred to that maintain that "all rights
and liabilities which have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the
reenactment neutralizes the repeal, therefore continuing the law in force without interruption", We hold that the
questioned ordinances of the City of Manila are still in force and effect.
Plaintiff, however, argues that the questioned ordinances, to be valid, must first be approved by the President of the
Philippines as per section 18, subsection (ii) of Republic Act No. 409, which reads as follows:
"(ii) To tax, license and regulate any business, trade or occupation being conducted within the City of Manila, not
otherwise enumerated in the preceding subsections, including percentage taxes based on gross sales or
receipts, subject to the approval of the PRESIDENT, except amusement taxes."
but this requirement of the President's approval was not contained in section 2444 of the former Charter of the City
of Manila under which Ordinance No. 2529 was promulgated. Anyway, as stated by appellee's counsel, the
business of "retail dealers in general merchandise" is expressly enumerated in subsection (o), section 18
of Republic Act No. 409; hence, an ordinance prescribing a municipal tax on said business does not have to be
approved by the President to be effective, as it is not among those referred to in said subsection (ii). Moreover, the
questioned ordinances are still in force, having been promulgated by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
under the authority granted to it by law.
The question that now remains to be determined is whether said ordinances are inapplicable, invalid or
unconstitutional if applied to the alleged business of distribution and sale of bibles to the people of the
Philippines by a religious corporation like the American Bible Society, plaintiff herein.
With regard to Ordinance No. 2529, as amended by Ordinances Nos. 2779, 2821 and 3028, appellant contends
that it is unconstitutional and illegal because it restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious
profession and worship of appellant.
Article III, section 1, clause (7) of the Constitution of the Philippines aforequoted, guarantees the freedom of
religious profession and worship. "Religion has been spoken of as 'a profession of faith to an active power that
binds and elevates man to its Creator' (Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil., 201). It has reference to one's views of his
relations to His Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence to His being and character, and obedience
to His Will (Davis vs. Beason, 133 U.S., 342). The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such
right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent". (Tañada and Fernando on the
Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 297). In the case at bar the license fee herein involved is imposed
upon appellant for its distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature.
"In the case of Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, it was held that an ordinance requiring that a license be obtained before
a person could canvass or solicit orders for goods, paintings, pictures, wares or merchandise cannot be made to
apply to members of Jehovah's Witnesses who went about from door to door distributing literature and soliciting
people to 'purchase' certain religious books and pamphlets, all published by the Watch Tower Bible & Tract
Society. The 'price' of the books was twenty-five cents each, the 'price' of the pamphlets five cents each. It was
shown that in making the solicitations there was a request for additional 'contribution' of twenty-five cents each for
the books and five cents each for the pamphlets. Lesser sum were accepted, however, and books were even donated
in case interested persons were without funds.
On the above facts the Supreme Court held that it could not be said that petitioners were engaged in commercial
rather than a religious venture. Their activities could not be described as embraced in the occupation of selling
books and pamphlets. Then the Court continued:
'We do not mean to say that religious groups and the press are free from all financial burdens of government. See
Grosjean vs. American Press Co., 297 U.S., 233, 250, 80 L. ed. 660, 668, 56 S. Ct. 444. We have here something
quite different, for example, from a tax on the income of one who engages in religious activities or a tax on
property used or employed in connection with those activities. It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or
property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. The
tax imposed by the City of Jeannette is a flat license tax, payment of which is a condition of the exercise of these
constitutional privileges. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its
enjoyment. . . . Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to
deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form
of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all 'those who do not have a full purse. Spreading religious
beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would thus be denied the needy. . . .
It is contended however that the fact that the license tax can suppress or control this activity is unimportant if it
does not do so. But that is to disregard the nature of this tax. It is a license tax — a flat tax imposed on the exercise
of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights . . . The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms
is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down. . . . It is not a nominal
fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is in no way
apportioned. It is flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is
guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That
is almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax.'
Nor could dissemination of religious information be conditioned upon the approval of an official or manager even
if the town were owned by a corporation as held in the case of Marsh vs. State of Alabama (326 U.S. 501) or by the
United States itself as held in the case of Tucker vs. Texas (326 U.S. 517). In the former case the Supreme Court
expressed the opinion that the right to enjoy freedom of the press and religion occupies a preferred position as
against the constitutional right of property owners.
'When we balance the constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of
press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position. . . . In
our view the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where the deprivation of property here involved,
took place, were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to
govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by
the application of a State statute.'" (Tañada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th ed., p.
304-306).
Section 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 466, otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code, provides:
 
"SEC. 27. EXEMPTIONS FROM TAX ON CORPORATIONS. — The following organizations shall not be taxed
under this Title in respect to income received by them as such —
"(e) Corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or educational
purposes, . . Provided however, That the income of whatever kind and character from any of its properties, real or
personal, or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be
liable to the tax imposed under this Code;"
Appellant's counsel claims that the Collector of Internal Revenue has exempted the plaintiff from this tax and says
that such exemption clearly indicates that the act of distributing and selling bibles, etc. is purely religious and does
not fall under the above legal provisions.
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some
instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same, but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the
business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason We believe that the provisions of
City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its
free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of
religious beliefs.
With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the obtention of the Mayor's permit before any
person can engage in any of the businesses, trades or occupations enumerated therein, We do not find that it
imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious
practices. In the case of Coleman vs. City of Griffin, 189 S.E. 427, this point was elucidated as follows:
"An ordinance by the City of Griffin, declaring that the practice of distributing either by hand or otherwise,
circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind, whether said articles are being delivered free, or
whether same are being sold within the city limits of the City of Griffin, without first obtaining written permission
from the city manager of the City of Griffin, shall be deemed a nuisance and punishable as an offense against the
City of Griffin, does not deprive defendant of his constitutional right of the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, even though it prohibits him from introducing and carrying out a scheme or
purpose which he sees fit to claim as a part of his religious system."
It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to
plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-
appellant and defendant-appellee is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society involved herein for,
as stated before, it would impair plaintiff's right to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and
worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, is
also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, We hereby reverse the decision appealed from,
sentencing defendant to return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it. Without pronouncement
as to costs. It is so ordered.

IGLESIA NI CRISTO (INC.), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BOARD OF

REVIEW FOR MOVING PICTURES AND TELEVISION and HONORABLE HENRIETTA S.
MENDEZ, respondents
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; FREEDOM OF RELIGION; ACCORDED A
PREFERRED STATUS. — Freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental laws, past and present. We have affirmed this preferred status well aware that it is "designed to
protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with
the common good.

This is a petition for review of the Decision dated March 24, 1995 of the respondent Court of Appeals
affirming the action of the respondent Board for Motion Pictures and Television which x-rated the TV
Program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo."
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a television program entitled "Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents
and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with
other religions.
Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992, petitioner submitted to the respondent
Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119,
121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend
and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law."
Petitioner pursued two (2) courses of action against the respondent Board. On November 28, 1992, it
appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128. It succeeded in its appeal
for on December 18, 1992, the Office of the President reversed the decision of the respondent Board.
Forthwith, the Board allowed Series No. 128 to be publicly telecast.
On December 14, 1992, petitioner also filed against the respondent Board Civil Case No. Q-92-14280, with
the RTC, NCR, Quezon City. 1 Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-
rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board
invoked its power under PD No. 1986 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code.
On January 4, 1993, the trial court held a hearing on petitioner's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
The parties orally argued and then marked their documentary evidence. Petitioner submitted the following as
its exhibits, viz.:
(1) Exhibit "A," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television showing its September 9, 1992 action on
petitioner's Series No. 115 as follows: 2
REMARKS:
There are some inconsistencies in the particular program as it is very surprising for this program to show
series of Catholic ceremonies and also some religious sects and using it in their discussion about the bible.
There are remarks which are direct criticism which affect other religions.
Need more opinions for this particular program. Please subject to more opinions.
(2) Exhibit "A-1," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television showing its September 11, 1992
subsequent action on petitioner's Series No. 115 as follows: 3
REMARKS:
This program is criticizing different religions, based on their own interpretation of the Bible.
We suggest that the program should delve on explaining their own faith and beliefs and avoid attacks on
other faith.
(3) Exhibit "B," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television showing its October 9, 1992 action on
petitioner's Series No. 119, as follows: 4
REMARKS:
The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of
the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible that we should do so.
This is intolerance and robs off all sects of freedom of choice, worship and decision.
(4) Exhibit "C," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television showing its October 20, 1992 action on
petitioner's Series No. 121 as follows: 5
REMARKS:
I refuse to approve the telecast of this episode for reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically, the
Catholic religion.
I refuse to admit that they can tell, dictate any other religion that they are right and the rest are wrong, which
they clearly present in this episode.
(5) Exhibit "D," respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television showing its November 20, 1992 action on
petitioner's Series No. 128 as follows: 6
REMARKS:
The episode presented criticizes the religious beliefs of the Catholic and Protestant's beliefs.
We suggest a second review.
(6) Exhibits "E," "E-1," petitioner's block time contract with ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation dated
September 1, 1992. 7
(7) Exhibit "F," petitioner's Airtime Contract with Island Broadcasting Corporation. 8
(8) Exhibit "G," letter dated December 18, 1992 of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr.,
addressed to Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board which x-rated the showing
of petitioner's Series No. 129. The letter reads in part:
"xxx xxx xxx
The television episode in question is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression
under Article III, section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
We have viewed a tape of the television episode in question, as well as studied the passages found by
MTRCB to be objectionable and we find no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger
sufficient to limit the said constitutional guarantee."
(9) Exhibits "H," "H-1," letter dated November 26, 1992 of Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr., addressed to President
Fidel V. Ramos appealing the action of the respondent Board x-rating petitioner's Series No. 128.
On its part, respondent Board submitted the following exhibits, viz.:
(1) Exhibit "1," Permit Certificate for Television Exhibition No. 15181 dated December 18, 1992 allowing
the showing of Series No. 128 under parental guidance.
(2) Exhibit "2," which is Exhibit "G" of petitioner.
(3) Exhibit "3," letter dated October 12, 1992 of Henrietta S. Mendez, addressed to the Christian Era
Broadcasting Service which reads in part:
xxx xxx xxx
In the matter of your television show "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" Series No. 119, please be informed that the
Board was constrained to deny your show a permit to exhibit. The material involved constitute an attack
against another religion which is expressly prohibited by law. Please be guided in the submission of future
shows.
After evaluating the evidence of the parties, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on
petitioner's bond of P10,000.00.
The trial court set the pre-trial of the case and the parties submitted their pre-trial briefs. 9 The pre-trial briefs
show that the parties' evidence is basically the evidence they submitted in the hearing of the issue of
preliminary injunction. The trial of the case was set and reset several times as the parties tried to reach an
amicable accord. Their efforts failed and the records show that after submission of memoranda, the trial
court rendered a Judgment, 10 on December 15, 1993, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and
Television (BRMPT) to grant petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo the necessary permit for all the series of 'Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo' program.
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, however, is directed to refrain from offending and attacking other existing
religions in showing 'Ang Iglesia ni Cristo' program.
SO ORDERED."
Petitioner moved for reconsideration 11 praying: (a) for the deletion of the second paragraph of the
dispositive portion of the Decision, and (b) for the Board to be perpetually enjoined from requiring petitioner
to submit for review the tapes of its program. The respondent Board opposed the motion. 12 On March 7,
1993, the trial court granted petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. It ordered: 13
"xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is granted. The second portion of the Court's Order dated
December 15, 1993, directing petitioner to refrain from offending and attacking other existing religions in
showing 'Ang Iglesia ni Cristo' program is hereby deleted and set aside. Respondents are further prohibited
from requiring petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo to submit for review VTR tapes of its religious program 'Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo'."
Respondent Board appealed to the Court of Appeals after its motion for reconsideration was denied. 14
On March 5, 1995, the respondent Court of Appeals 15 reversed the trial court. It ruled that: (1) the
respondent board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and (2) the
respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV
of the three series of "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against
another religion. It also found the series "indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs."
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
'ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO' PROGRAM IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS A FORM
OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AND EXPRESSION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
BEING AN EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THE 'ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO' PROGRAM IS
SUBJECT TO THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE ONLY IN THE EXTREME CASE THAT IT
POSES A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
MTRCB IS VESTED WITH THE POWER TO CENSOR RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
'ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO,' A PURELY RELIGIOUS PROGRAM IS INDECENT AND CONTRARY
TO LAW AND GOOD CUSTOMS.
The basic issues can be reduced into two: (1) first, whether the respondent Board has the power to review
petitioner's TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and (2) second, assuming it has the power, whether it
gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner's religious program, series Nos. 115,
119 and 121, for the reason that they constitute an attack against other religions and that they are indecent,
contrary to law and good customs.
The first issue can be resolved by examining the powers of the Board under PD No. 1986. Its section 3
pertinently provides:
"Sec. 3 Powers and Functions. — The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein defined, television programs, including
publicity materials such as advertisements, trailers and stills, whether such motion pictures and publicity
materials be for theatrical or non-theatrical distribution for television broadcast or for general viewing,
imported or produced in the Philippines and in the latter case, whether they be for local viewing or for
export.
c) To approve, delete objectionable portion from and/or prohibit the importation, exportation, production,
copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures, television
programs and publicity materials, subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the BOARD
applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral, indecent,
contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its
people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime, such
as but not limited to:
i) Those which tend to incite subversion, insurrection, rebellion or sedition against the State, or otherwise
threaten the economic and/or political stability of the State;
ii) Those which tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the people, their government and/or duly
constituted authorities.
iii) Those which glorify criminals or condone crimes;
iv) Those which serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence or pornography;
v) Those which tend to abet the traffic in and use of prohibited drugs;
vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any person, whether living or
dead;
vii) Those which may constitute contempt of court or of any quasi-judicial tribunal, or pertain to matters
which are sub-judice in nature (emphasis ours).
The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all "television programs." By the clear
terms of the law, the Board has the power to "approve, delete . . . and/or prohibit the . . . exhibition and/or
television broadcast of . . . television programs . . ." The law also directs the Board to apply "contemporary
Filipino cultural values as standard" to determine those which are objectionable for being "immoral,
indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines
and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or
crime."
Petitioner contends that the term "television program" should not include religious programs like its program
"Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of
the Constitution which guarantees that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed."
We reject petitioner's submission which need not set us adrift in a constitutional voyage towards an
uncharted sea. Freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental
laws, past and present. We have affirmed this preferred status well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his
beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common
good." 16 We have also laboriously defined in our jurisprudence the intersecting umbras and penumbras of
the right to religious profession and worship. To quote the summation of Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz, our well-
known constitutionalist: 17
Religious Profession and Worship
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to
act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The
second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
(1) Freedom to Believe
The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his
own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject any religion;
acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the
immortality of his soul — in fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However
absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom
to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his
inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. 'Men may believe what they cannot prove.' Every
one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he believes.
(2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs
But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do
so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all
the other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of
others. It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it
impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious
practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious
conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.
Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: 'The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated
disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is
freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious
dogma.
Accordingly, while one has full freedom to believe in Satan, he may not offer the object of his piety a human
sacrifice, as this would be murder. Those who literally interpret the Biblical command to "go forth and
multiply" are nevertheless not allowed to contract plural marriages in violation of the laws against bigamy. A
person cannot refuse to pay taxes on the ground that it would be against his religious tenets to recognize any
authority except that of God alone. An atheist cannot express his disbelief in acts of derision that wound the
feelings of the faithful. The police power can be validly asserted against the Indian practice of
the suttee born of deep religious conviction, that calls on the widow to immolate herself at the funeral pile of
her husband.
We thus reject petitioner's postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent
Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief.
Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the
exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present
danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more
overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of
religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as
religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. Across the sea and in our
shore, the bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by men were caused by irreconcilable religious differences.
Our country is still not safe from the recurrence of this stultifying strife considering our warring religious
beliefs and the fanaticism with which some of us cling and claw to these beliefs. Even now, we have yet to
settle the near century old strife in Mindanao, the roots of which have been nourished by the mistrust and
misunderstanding between our Christian and Muslim brothers and sisters. The bewildering rise of weird
religious cults espousing violence as an article of faith also proves the wisdom of our rule rejecting a strict
let alone policy on the exercise of religion. For sure, we shall continue to subject any act pinching the space
for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the
irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.
It is also petitioner's submission that the respondent appellate court gravely erred when it affirmed the ruling
of the respondent Board x-rating its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. The records show that
the respondent Board disallowed the program series for "attacking" other religions. Thus, Exhibits "A," "A-
1," (respondent Board's Voting Slip for Television) reveal that its reviewing members x-rated Series 115 for
". . . criticizing different religions, based on their own interpretation of the Bible." They suggested that the
program should only explain petitioner's ". . . own faith and beliefs and avoid attacks on other faiths."
Exhibit "B" shows that Series No. 119 was x-rated because "the Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal
translation of the bible and says that our Catholic veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned
because nowhere it is found in the bible that we should do so. This is intolerance . . ." Exhibit "C" shows that
Series No. 121 was x-rated ". . . for reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically, the Catholic religion. . . .
(T)hey can not tell, dictate any other religion that they are right and the rest are wrong . . ." Exhibit "D" also
shows that Series No. 128 was not favorably recommended because it ". . . outrages Catholic and Protestant's
beliefs." On second review, it was x-rated because of its "unbalanced interpretations of some parts of the
bible." 18 In sum, the respondent Board x-rated petitioner's TV program series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128
because of petitioner's controversial biblical interpretations and its "attacks" against contrary religious
beliefs. The respondent appellate court agreed and even held that the said "attacks" are indecent, contrary to
law and good customs.
We reverse the ruling of the appellate court.
First. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on speech,
including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity
and should be greeted with furrowed brows. 19 It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this
presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case
at bar.
Second. The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioner's TV series for "attacking" other
religions, especially the Catholic church. An examination of the evidence, especially Exhibits "A," "A-1,"
"B, "C," and "D" will show that the so-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held
dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were
not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and
good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling
clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. It
misappreciates the essence of freedom to differ as delineated in the benchmark case of Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 20 viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields, the tenets
of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view, the
pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are
prominent in church or state or even to false statements. But the people of this nation have ordained in the
light of history that inspite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view,
essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of democracy.
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no
excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not
the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious
dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the
establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Vis-a-vis
religious differences, the State enjoys no banquet of options. Neutrality alone is its fixed and immovable
stance. In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it
attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a
State where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion,
the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought
and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the
marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite
speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.
Third. The respondents cannot also rely on the ground "attacks against another religion" in x-rating the
religious program of petitioner. Even a side-glance at section 3 of PD No. 1986 will reveal that it is not
among the grounds to justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner's television program. The
ground "attack against another religion" was merely added by the respondent Board in its Rules. 21 This rule
is void for it runs smack against the hoary doctrine that administrative rules and regulations cannot expand
the letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce.
It is opined that the respondent board can still utilize "attack against any religion" as a ground allegedly ". . .
because section 3 (c) of PD No. 1986 prohibits the showing of motion pictures, television programs and
publicity materials which are contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishes
anyone who exhibits "shows which offend any race or religion." We respectfully disagree for it is plain that
the word "attack" is not synonymous with the word "offend." Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the
Revised Penal Code should be invoked to justify the subsequent punishment of a show which offends any
religion. It cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship of speech. It must be emphasized that E.O. 876, the
law prior to PD 1986, included "attack against any religion" as a ground for censorship. The ground was not,
however, carried over by PD 1986. Its deletion is a decree to disuse it. There can be no other intent. Indeed,
even the Executive Department espouses this view. Thus, in an Opinion dated November 28, 1985 then
Minister of Justice, now President of the Senate, Neptali Gonzales explained:
"xxx xxx xxx
"However, the question whether the BRMPT (now MTRCB) may preview and censor the subject television
program of INC should be viewed in the light of the provision of Section 3, paragraph (c) of PD 1986, which
is substantially the same as the provision of Section 3, paragraph (c) of E.O. No. 876-A, which prescribes the
standards of censorship, to wit: 'immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the
prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people or with dangerous tendency to encourage the
commission of violence, or of a wrong' as determined by the Board, 'applying contemporary Filipino cultural
values as standard.' As stated, the intention of the Board to subject the INC's television program to
'previewing and censorship is prompted by the fact that its religious program' makes mention of beliefs and
practices of other religion.' On the face of the law itself, there can conceivably be no basis for censorship of
said program by the Board as much as the alleged reason cited by the Board does not appear to be within the
contemplation of the standards of censorship set by law." (Emphasis supplied)
Fourth. In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present
danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 22 this Court held: "The constitutional guaranty of
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate
religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of
expression on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has
the right to prevent." In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 23 we further ruled that ". . . it is only
where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of
the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest
extent necessary to avoid the danger."
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is
completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute
impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes
will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech,
including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive
and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
It is suggested that we re-examine the application of clear and present danger rule to the case at bar. In the
United States, it is true that the clear and present danger test has undergone permutations. It was Mr. Justice
Holmes who formulated the test in Schenck v. US, 24 as follows: ". . . the question in every case is whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Admittedly, the
test was originally designed to determine the latitude which should be given to speech that espouses anti-
government action. Bannered by Justices Holmes and Brandeis, the test attained its full flowering in the
decade of the forties, when its umbrella was used to protect speech other than subversive speech. 25 Thus,
for instance, the test was applied to annul a total ban on labor picketing. 26 The use of the test took a
downswing in the 1950's when the US Supreme Court decided Dennis v. United States involving communist
conspiracy. 27 In Dennis, the components of the test were altered as the High Court adopted Judge Learned
Hand's formulation that ". . . in each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." The imminence
requirement of the test was thus diminished and to that extent, the protection of the rule was weakened. In
1969, however, the strength of the test was reinstated in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 28 when the High Court
restored in the test the imminence requirement, and even added an intent requirement which according to a
noted commentator ensured that only speech directed at inciting lawlessness could be
punished. 29 Presently in the United States, the clear and present danger test is not applied to protect low
value speeches such as obscene speech, commercial speech and defamation. Be that as it may, the test is still
applied to four types of speech: speech that advocates dangerous ideas, speech that provokes a hostile
audience reaction, out of court contempt and release of information that endangers a fair trial. 30 Hence,
even following the drift of American jurisprudence, there is reason to apply the clear and present danger test
to the case at bar which concerns speech that attacks other religions and could readily provoke hostile
audience reaction. It cannot be doubted that religious truths disturb and disturb terribly.
It is also opined that it is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because
the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the
speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the
evil apprehended cannot be established. The contention overlooks the fact that the case at bar involves
videotapes that are pre-taped and hence, their speech content is known and not an X quantity. Given the
specific content of the speech, it is not unreasonable to assume that the respondent Board, with its expertise,
can determine whether its sulphur will bring about the substantive evil feared by the law.
Finally, it is also opined by Mr. Justice Kapunan that . . . the determination of the question as to whether or
not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected
speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a
Board of Censors." He submits that a "system of prior restraint may only be validly administered
by judges and not left to administrative agencies." The same submission is made by Mr. Justice Mendoza.
This thoughtful thesis is an attempt to transplant another American rule in our jurisdiction. Its seedbed was
laid down by Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in the 1962 case of Manual Enterprise v.
Day. 31 By 1965, the US Supreme Court in Freedman v. Maryland 32 was ready to hold that "the teaching
of cases is that, because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary
sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a
valid final restraint." 33
 While the thesis has a lot to commend itself, we are not ready to hold that it is unconstitutional for Congress
to grant an administrative body quasi-judicial power to preview and classify TV programs and enforce its
decision subject to review by our courts. As far back as 1921, we upheld this set-up in Sotto vs.
Ruiz, 34 viz.:
"The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature of a privilege which can be regulated in order to
avoid its abuse. Persons posses no absolute right to put into the mail anything they please, regardless of its
character.
On the other hand, the exclusion of newspaper and other publications from the mails, in the exercise of
executive power, is extremely delicate in nature and can only be justified where the statute is unequivocably
applicable to the supposed objectionable publication. In excluding any publication for the mails, the object
should be not to interfere with the freedom of the press or with any other fundamental right of the people.
This is the more true with reference to articles supposedly libelous than to other particulars of the law, since
whether an article is or is not libelous, is fundamentally a legal question. In order for there to be due process
of law, the action of the Director of Posts must be subject to revision by the courts in case he had abused his
discretion or exceeded his authority. (Ex parte Jackson [1878], 96 U.S., 727; Public Clearing House vs.
Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; 

Post Publishing Co. vs. ROEL EBRALINAG, EMILY EBRALINAG, represented by their parents MR. & MRS.
LEONARDO EBRALINAG; JUSTINIANA TANTOG, represented by her father AMOS TANTOG; JEMIL
OYAO & JOEL OYAO, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. ELIEZER OYAO; JANETH DIAMOS &
JEREMIAS DIAMOS, represented by parents MR. & MRS. GODOFREDO DIAMOS; SARA OSTIA &
JONATHAN OSTIA, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. FAUSTO OSTIA; IRVIN SEQUINO & RENAN
SEQUINO, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. LYDIO SEQUINO; NAPTHALE TANACAO, represented
by his parents MR. & MRS. MANUEL TANACAO; PRECILA PINO, represented by her parents MR. & MRS.
FELIPE PINO; MARICRIS ALFAR, RUWINA ALFAR, represented by their parents MR. & MRS.
HERMINIGILDO ALFAR; FREDESMINDA ALFAR & GUMERSINDO ALFAR, represented by their parents
ABDON ALFAR; ALBERTO ALFAR & ARISTIO ALFAR, represented by their parents MR. & MRS.
GENEROSO ALFAR; MARTINO VILLAR, represented by his parents MR. & MRS. GENARO VILLAR;
PERGEBRIEL GUINITA & CHAREN GUINITA, represented by their parents

ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;SOLE JUSTIFICATION FOR PRIOR RESTRAINT OR LIMITATION ON EXERCISE OF

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM; CASE AT BAR. — "The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the
exercise of religious freedom (according to the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting opinion
in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517) is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both
grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the
petitioners from the schools is not justified. . . . After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag
ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life
and form of government, and learn not only the arts, science, Philippine history and culture but also receive
training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation
for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987
Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about
the very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona.Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the
law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or
respect for duly constituted authorities. As Mr. Justice Jackson remarked in West Virginia vs. Barneta, 319 U.S.
624 (1943):"...To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous
instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free
minds. ...When they [diversity] are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with here, the price is not
too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of
freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order."
"Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, ...— assuming that such unity and
loyalty can be attained through coercion — is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of
religious liberty. A desirable and cannot be promoted by prohibited means." (Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
67 L. ed. 1042, 1046)

These two special civil actions for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were consolidated because they raise
essentially the same issue: whether school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovah's
Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private),for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs,
to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem,
saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.
In G.R. No. 95770, "Rose Ebralinag, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Manuel F.
Biongcog, Cebu District Supervisor," the petitioners are 43 high school and elementary school students in the
towns of Daan Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Carcar, and Taburan, Cebu province. All minors, they are assisted by
their parents who belong to the religious group known as Jehovah's Witnesses which claims some 100,000
"baptized publishers," in the Philippines.
In G.R. No. 95887, "May Amolo, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Antonio A. Sangutan,"
the petitioners are 25 high school and grade school students enrolled in public schools in Asturias, Cebu, whose
parents are Jehovah's Witnesses. Both petitions were prepared by the same counsel, Attorney Felino M. Ganal.
All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for
refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No.
1265 of July 11, 1955, and by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. Republic Act No.
1265 provides:
"SECTION 1. All educational institutions shall henceforth observe daily flag ceremony,which shall be
simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the Philippine National anthem.
"SECTION 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue or cause to be issued
rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony herein provided.
SECTION 3. Failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremony provided by this Act and in accordance with
rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall subject the
educational institution concerned and its head to public censure as an administrative punishment which shall
be published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation.
"In case of failure to observe for the second time the flag ceremony provided by this Act,the Secretary of
Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall cause the cancellation of the recognition or permit of the
private educational institution responsible for such failure."
The implementing rules and regulations in Department Order No. 8 provide:
"RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR CONDUCTING THE FLAG CEREMONY IN ALL
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
"1. The Filipino Flag shall be displayed by all educational institutions, public VFand private, every school
day throughout the year. It shall be raised at sunrise and lowered at sunset. The flagstaff must be straight,
slightly and gently tapering at the end, and of such height as would give the Flag a commanding position in
front of the building or within the compound."
"2. Every public and private educational institution shall hold a flag-raising ceremony every morning except
when it is raining,in which event the ceremony may be conducted indoors in the best way possible. A retreat
shall be held in the afternoon of the same day. The flag-raising ceremony in the morning shall be conducted
in the following manner:
"a. Pupils and teachers or students and faculty members who are in school and its premises shall assemble in
formation facing the flag.At command, books shall be put away or held in the left hand and everybody shall
come to attention.Those with hats shall uncover. No one shall enter or leave the school grounds during the
ceremony.
"b. The assembly shall sing the Philippine National Anthem accompanied by the school band or without the
accompaniment if it has none; or the anthem may be played by the school band alone. At the first note of the
Anthem, the flag shall be raised briskly. While the flag is being raised, all persons present shall stand at
attention and execute a salute.Boys and men with hats shall salute by placing the hat over the heart. Those
without hat may stand with their arms and hands down and straight at the sides. Those in military or Boy
Scout uniform shall give the salute prescribed by their regulations. The salute shall be started as the Flag
rises, and completed upon last note of the anthem.
"c. Immediately following the singing of the Anthem, the assembly shall recite in unison the following
patriotic pledge (English or vernacular version),which may bring the ceremony to a close. This is required of
all public schools and of private schools which are intended for Filipino students or whose population is
predominantly Filipino.
"English Version"
I love the Philippines.
It is the land of my birth;
It is the home of my people.
It protects me and helps me to be strong, happy and useful.
In return, I will heed the counsel of my parents;
I will obey the rules of my school;
I will perform the duties of a patriotic, law-abiding citizen;
I will serve my country unselfishly and faithfully;
I will be a true Filipino in thought, in word, in deed.
xxx xxx xxx."
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and
recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" (p. 10,
Rollo) which they "cannot conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything except God" (p. 8, Rollo). They
feel bound by the Bible's command to "guard ourselves from idols — 1 John 5:21" (p. 9, Rollo). They
consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State (p. 10, Rollo). They think the action of the local
authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power
and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protects against official control (p.
10, Rollo).
 
This is not the first time that the question, of whether the children of Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled
from school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8, series of 1955, has been raised
before this Court.
The same issue was raised in 1959 in Gerona, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al.,106 Phil. 2 (1959)
and Balbuna, et al. vs. Secretary of Education,110 Phil. 150 (1960).This Court in the Gerona case upheld the
expulsion of the students, thus:
"The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national
sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and
the Constitution guarantee and protect. Under a system of complete separation of church and state in the
government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag does not involve any
religious ceremony. The flag salute is no more a religious ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by a
public official or by a candidate for admission to the bar."
"In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary of Education is not
imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It is merely enforcing a non-
discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian, Moslem, Protestant or Jehovah's
Witness. The State is merely carrying out the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution which charges it with
supervision over and regulation of all educational institutions, to establish and maintain a complete and
adequate system of public education, and see to it that all schools aim to develop, among other things, civic
conscience and teach the duties of citizenship."
"The children of Jehovah's Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony. They
have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirements still disrupt school
discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority."
"The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from
or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by
competent authority." (pp. 2-3.)
Gerona was reiterated in Balbuna,as follows:
"The Secretary of Education was duly authorized by the Legislature thru Republic Act 1265 to promulgate
said Department Order, and its provisions requiring the observance of the flag salute, not being a religious
ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the
flag stands for, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of religion." (Balbuna, et al. vs.
Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150.).
Republic Act No. 1265 and the ruling in Gerona have been incorporated in Section 28, Title VI, Chapter 9 of
the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) which took effect on September 21, 1988 (one
year after its publication in the Official Gazette, Vol. 83, No. 38 of September 21, 1987). Paragraph 5 of
Section 28 gives legislative cachet to the ruling in Gerona,thus:
"5. Any teacher or student or pupil who refuses to join or participate in the flag ceremony may be dismissed
after due investigation."
However, the petitioners herein have not raised in issue the constitutionality of the above provision of the
new Administrative Code of 1987. They have targeted only Republic Act No. 1255 and the implementing
orders of the DECS.
In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the
Jehovah's Witnesses, and enrolled in various public and private schools, who refused to sing the Philippine
national anthem, salute the Philippine flag and recite the patriotic pledge. Division Superintendent of
Schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS, and Dr./Atty. Marcelo M. Bacalso, Assistant
Division Superintendent, recalling this Court's decision in Gerona, issued Division Memorandum No. 108,
dated November 17, 1989 (pp. 147-148, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770) directing District Supervisors, High
School Principals and Heads of Private Educational Institutions as follows:
"1. Reports reaching this Office disclose that there are a number of teachers, pupils, students, and school
employees in public schools who refuse to salute the Philippine flag or participate in the daily flag ceremony
because of some religious belief."
2. Such refusal not only undermines Republic Act No. 1265 and the DECS Department Order No. 8, Series
of 1955 (Implementing Rules and Regulations) but also strikes at the heart of the DECS sustained effort to
inculcate patriotism and nationalism."
3. Let it be stressed that any belief that considers the flag as an image is not in any manner whatever a
justification for not saluting the Philippine flag or not participating in flag ceremony. Thus, the Supreme
Court of the Philippine says:
"'The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national
sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee
and protect.' (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 105 Phil. 11.)
"4. As regards the claim for freedom of belief, which an objectionist may advance, the Supreme Court
asserts:
"'But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If
the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law, then
the former must yield and give way to the latter.' (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al.,106 Phil. 11.).
"5. Accordingly, teachers and school employees who choose not to participate in the daily flag ceremony or
to obey the flag salute regulation spelled out in Department Order No. 8, Series of 1955, shall be considered
removed from the service after due process."
6. In strong language about pupils and students who do the same the Supreme Court has this to say:
"'If they choose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being
maintained at the expense of their fellow Citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they
could take it or leave it! Having elected not to comply with the regulation about the flag salute they forfeited
their right to attend public schools.' (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al.,106 Phil. 15.)
"7. School administrators shall therefore submit to this Office a report on those who choose not to participate
in flag ceremony or salute the Philippine flag." (pp. 147-148, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770; Emphasis supplied.).
Cebu school officials resorted to a number of ways to persuade the children of Jehovah's Witnesses to obey
the memorandum. In the Buenavista Elementary School, the children were asked to sign an Agreement
(Kasabutan) in the Cebuano dialect promising to sing the national anthem, place their right hand on their
breast until the end of the song and recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag (Annex D, p. 46, Rollo of G.R.
No. 95770 and p. 48, Rollo of G.R. No. 95887),but they refused to sign the "Kasabutan" (p. 20, Rollo of
G.R. No. 95770).
In Tubigmanok Elementary School, the Teacher-In-Charge, Antonio A. Sangutan, met with the Jehovah's
Witnesses' parents, as disclosed in his letter of October 17, 1990, excerpts from which reveal the following:
"After two (2) fruitless confrontation meetings with the Jehovah's Witnesses, parents on October 2, 1990 and
yesterday due to their firm stand not to salute the flag of the Republic of the Philippines during Flag
Ceremony and other occasions, as mandated by law specifically Republic Act No. 1265, this Office hereby
orders the dropping from the list in the School Register (BPS Form I) of all teachers, all Jehovah's Witness
pupils from Grade I up to Grade VI effective today.
"xxx xxx xxx.
"This order is in compliance with Division Memorandum No. 108 s. 1989 dated November 17, 1989 by
virtue of Department Order No. 8 s. 1955 dated July 21, 1955 in accordance with Republic Act No. 1265 and
Supreme Court Decision of a case 'Genaro Gerona, et al., Petitioners and Appellants vs. The Honorable
Secretary of Education, et al., Respondents and Appellees' dated August 12, 1959 against their favor." (p.
149, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.)
In the Daan Bantayan District, the District Supervisor, Manuel F. Biongcog, ordered the "dropping from the
rolls" of students who "opted to follow their religious belief which is against the Flag Salute Law" on the
theory that "they forfeited their right to attend public schools." (p. 47, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.).
"1st Indorsement
DAANBANTAYAN DISTRICT II
Daanbantayan, Cebu, July 24, 1990.
"Respectfully returned to Mrs. Alicia A. Diaz, School In Charge [sic],Agujo Elementary School with the
information that this office is sad to order the dropping of Jeremias Diamos and Jeaneth Diamos, Grades III
and IV pupils respectively from the roll since they opted to follow their belief which is against the Flag
Salute Law (R.A. 1265) and DECS Order No. 8, series of 1955, having elected not to comply with the
regulation about the flag salute they forfeited their right to attend public schools (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of
Education, et al., 106 Philippines 15). However, should they change their mind to respect and follow the
Flag Salute Law they may be re-accepted."
"(Sgd.) MANUEL F. BIONGCOG
District Supervisor"
(p. 47, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.)
The expulsion as of October 23, 1990 of the 43 petitioning students of the Daanbantayan National High
School, Agujo Elementary School, Calape Barangay National High School, Pinamungajan Provincial High
School, Tabuelan Central School, Canasojan Elementary School, Liboron Elementary School, Tagaytay
Primary School, San Juan Primary School and Northern Central Elementary School of San Fernando, Cebu,
upon order of then Acting Division Superintendent Marcelo Bacalso, prompted some Jehovah's Witnesses in
Cebu to appeal to the Secretary of Education Isidro Cariño but the latter did not answer their letter. (p. 21,
Rollo.)
 
The petition in G.R. No. 95887 was filed by 25 students who were similarly expelled because Dr. Pablo
Antopina, who succeeded Susana Cabahug as Division Superintendent of Schools, would not recall the
expulsion orders of his predecessor. Instead, he verbally caused the expulsion of some more children of
Jehovah's Witnesses.
On October 31, 1990, the students and their parents filed these Special civil actions for Mandamus,
Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction
and with grave abuse of discretion — (1) in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence,
in violation of their right to due process, their right to free public education, and their right to freedom of
speech, religion and worship (p. 23, Rollo).The petitioners pray that:
"c. Judgment be rendered:
"i. declaring null and void the expulsion or dropping from the rolls of herein petitioners from their respective
schools;
"ii. prohibiting and enjoining respondent from further barring the petitioners from their classes or otherwise
implementing the expulsion ordered on petitioners; and
"iii. compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order the re-admission of
petitioners to their respective schools." (p. 41, Rollo.)
and that pending the determination of the merits of these cases, a temporary restraining order be issued
enjoining the respondents from enforcing the expulsion of the petitioners and to re-admit them to their
respective classes.
On November 27, 1990, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction commanding the respondents to immediately readmit the petitioners to their respective classes
until further orders from this Court (p. 57, Rollo).
The Court also ordered the Secretary of Education and Cebu District Supervisor Manuel F. Biongcog to be
impleaded as respondents in these cases.
On May 13, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions (p. 98, Rollo)
defending the expulsion orders issued by the public respondents on the grounds that:
1. Bizarre religious practices of the Jehovah's Witnesses produce rebellious and anti-social school children
and consequently disloyal and mutant Filipino citizens.
2. There are no new and valid grounds to sustain the charges of the Jehovah's Witnesses that the DECS' rules
and regulations on the flag salute ceremonies are violative of their freedom of religion and worship.
3. The flag salute is devoid of any religious significance; instead, it inculcates respect and love of country,
for which the flag stands.
4. The State's compelling interests being pursued by the DECS' lawful regulations in question do not warrant
exemption of the school children of the Jehovah's Witnesses from the flag salute ceremonies on the basis of
their own self-perceived religious convictions.
5. The issue is not freedom of speech but enforcement of law and jurisprudence.
6. State's power to regulate repressive and unlawful religious practices justified, besides having scriptural
basis.
7. The penalty of expulsion is legal and valid, more so with the enactment of Executive Order No. 292 (The
Administrative Code of 1987).
Our task here is extremely difficult, for the 30-year-old decision of this Court in Gerona upholding the flag
salute law and approving the expulsion of students who refuse to obey it, is not lightly to be trifled with.
It is somewhat ironic however, that after the Gerona ruling had received legislative cachet by its
incorporation in the Administrative Code of 1987, the present Court believes that the time has come to
reexamine it. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the
patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled from
school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of
Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech ** and the free exercise of religious profession and
worship (Sec. 5, Article III, 1987 Constitution; Article IV, Section 8, 1973 Constitution; Article III, Section
1[7], 1935 Constitution).
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection
among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator (Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando's separate opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-531).
"The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis.,freedom to believe and freedom to
act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The
second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare"
(J. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed.,pp. 176-177).
Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not
engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their
love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag
ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings
(Annex F, Rollo of G.R. No. 95887, p. 50 and Rollo of G.R. No. 95770, p. 48).Since they do not engage in
disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
"The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom (according to the
late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in German vs. Barangan,135 SCRA 514, 517)
is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to
public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right
(and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools
is not justified.
The situation that the Court directly predicted in Gerona that:
"[T]he flag ceremony will become a thing of the past or perhaps conducted with very few participants, and
the time will come when we would have citizens untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with
reverence for the flag and love of country, admiration for national heroes, and patriotism — a pathetic, even
tragic situation, and all because a small portion of the school population imposed its will, demanded and was
granted an exemption." (Gerona, p. 24.)
has not come to pass. We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the
flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious which admittedly comprises
a "small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation
"untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and
admiration for national heroes" (Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106 Phil. 2, 24). After all, what the petitioners
seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study
the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, science,
Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues
of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship,
and moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or
banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared
in Gerona.Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that
violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted
authorities.
As Mr. Justice Jackson remarked in West Virginia vs. Barneta, 319 U.S. 624 (1943):
"...To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead
of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free
minds. ...When they [diversity] are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with here, the price
is not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere
shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the
existing order."
"Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, ...— assuming that such
unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion — is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the
expense of religious liberty. A desirable and cannot be promoted by prohibited means." (Meyer vs.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 67 L. ed. 1042, 1046.).
Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will
violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the
duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such
education accessible to all" (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54, 72-75, we upheld the exemption of members
of the Iglesia ni Cristo, from the coverage of a closed shop agreement between their employer and a union
because it would violate the teaching of their church not to join any labor group.
"...It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general
laws conflict with scruples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some 'compelling state
interests' intervenes." (Sherbert vs. Berner 374 U.S. Ct. 1790.)
 
We hold that a similar exemptions may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the
observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs
may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a
right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non vs. Dames II,
185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the exercise of their religion,
"this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should
commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other
persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute
the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may
possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public
morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent"
(German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517).
Before we close this decision, it is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944
when every Filipino, regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and
bowed every Japanese soldier. Perhaps, if petitioners had lived through that dark period of our history, they
would not quibble now about saluting the Philippine flag. For when liberation came in 1944 and our own
flag was proudly hoisted aloft again, it was a beautiful sight to behold that made our hearts pound with pride
and joy over the newly-regained freedom and sovereignty of our nation.
Although the Court upholds in this decision the petitioners' right under our Constitution to refuse to salute
the Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs, we hope, nevertheless, that another foreign invasion
of our country will not be necessary in order for our countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Philippine
flag.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The expulsion orders issued by the
public respondents against the petitioners are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary
restraining order which was issued by this Court is hereby made permanent.