Petronilo Napone, Jr. and Edgar Napone Vs.

People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 193085. November 29, 2017

FACTS:

Junior and Edgar, together with their father, Petronilo Napone, Sr. were charged with the
crime of murder for the death of Salvador Espelita (Salvador).

Three witnesses testified that Salvador and his son, Robert Espelita (Robert) arrived at
Janioso's house calling out for help. When Janioso came out of her house, she saw Salvador
whose forehead was oozing with blood, 6 and Calib Napone (Calib) likewise bloodied on the
face, mud-laden, and trying to extricate himself from Salvador who held him by the back
collar of his shirt. Calib is the son of Senior and the brother of Junior and Edgar.

When Janioso asked what happened, Salvador replied that Calib waylaid him and struck him
with an iron bar while he and Robert were on their way home from their farm. Salvador
turned over to Janioso the iron bar which he allegedly wrested from Calib. Thereafter,
Janioso directed one of her employees to find a vehicle to be used to bring Salvador and
Calib to the hospital. Janioso was Salvador's balae.

After a while, the Napones arrived in a vehicle. To avoid further conflict, Janioso pulled
Salvador inside her house. Unfortunately, Senior followed them and immediately hacked
Salvador from behind using a borak, a big bolo ordinarily used for chopping wood, hitting
Salvador at the back of his head. Salvador, in retaliation, also hacked Senior.

Meanwhile, Edgar and Junior also alighted from the vehicle. Edgar threw a stone the size of
a fist at Salvador.14Junior then shot Salvador three (3) times with a small firearm, hitting the
latter on the chest which caused him to fall. Janioso immediately rushed to Salvador's aid.
While she was trying to lift Salvador, she saw Junior running away with the gun.

The defense witnesses tended to establish that the Napones acted in self-defense and in
defense of a relative claiming that their neighbor Ervin came to their house and told them
that he saw Calib bloodied and dragged by Salvador and Robert to the house of Janioso,
located approximately 100 meters from their house. Upon hearing the news, Junior
hurriedly ran towards Janioso's house, while Edgar and Senior immediately
followed.21 Before running to Calib's aid, Senior got hold of his borak, because he suspected
that the Espelitas had hacked Calib.

Upon arriving at Janioso's place, the Napones saw Calib bloodied and being held by the
Espelitas who, upon seeing them coming, dropped Calib, who was then prostrate and
unconscious. The Espelitas then went inside the fenced premises of Janioso's house. When
Senior attempted to lift Calib from the ground, Salvador rushed towards him and hacked
him with a bolo multiple times. Senior, unable to retaliate because he was lifting Calib,
parried the attacks with his left hand but was unsuccessful. His ring and middle fingers were
severed from his left hand and his forehead was wounded. Thereafter, Senior fell to the
ground and lost consciousness.
Edgar tried to defend his father from Salvador by throwing a stone at the latter. Because of
this, Salvador shifted his attention towards Edgar and chased him with a bolo.

ISSUE:

Whether the Napoles acted in self-defense and defense of relatives

RULING:

No. After a careful examination of the records, the Court finds that the defense failed to
discharge the burden of proving that the petitioners acted in self-defense or defense of
relatives.

It has been held that when the accused invokes the justifying circumstance of self-defense
and, hence, admits to killing the victim, the burden of evidence shifts to him. The rationale
for this shift is that the accused, by his admission, is to be held criminally liable unless he
satisfactorily establishes the fact of self-defense.

To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must satisfactorily prove the concurrence of
all of its elements, which are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. Similarly, for defense of a relative to prosper, the following
requisites must concur, namely: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) in case the
provocation was given by the person attacked, that the person making the defense took no
part in the provocation.

In both self-defense and defense of relatives, whether complete or incomplete, it is

essential that there be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. After all, there would
be nothing to prevent or repel if such unlawful aggression is not present. For unlawful
aggression to be appreciated there must be an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or
imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.
 People of the Philippines Vs. Golem Sota and Amidal Gadjadli
G.R. No. 203121. November 29, 2017

FACTS:

Sota and Gadjadli were charged with murder and arson.

In the evening of November, 1999, the two accused, armed with a handgun and a hunting
knife, shoot and stab Artemio Eba, inflicting upon him multiple gunshot wounds and
multiple stab wounds on the different vital parts of his body, which caused his
instantaneous death.

Witness for the prosecution was Jocelyn, the daughter of the deceased.

According to her testimony, she woke up and found that her father, Artemio, was no longer
by her side. She peeped through a hole in the wall of their house and saw Sota and Gadjadli
outside with three other persons. The moon was bright, thus, she was able to identify Sota
and Gadjadli, who were close friends of Artemio and whose lands adjoined Artemio's land.
Sota acted as the leader of the group while Gadjadli carried a pistol. The group was
demanding food from Artemio who was willing to comply on condition that he would hand
the food through an opening in the wall, being afraid to open the door because he might be
harmed. The group lighted a torch made up of coconut leaves and started to bum the house
but Artemio was able to put out the fire. Artemio pleaded for them not to bum his house
and repeated his request that he would wrap the food and hand it to them through the
opening in the wall.

The group demanded that Artemio open the door; otherwise, they would bum the house.
When Artemio refused to comply insisting that he would hand them the food through the
opening in the wall, the group fired at the house, with Gadjadli firing the first shot at
Artemio. At that instance, Jocelyn jumped out of the window to escape and then ran away.
When she looked back, she saw their house burning while Artemio, who ran down the
house, was fired at by the group. Jocelyn proceeded to Eusebio's 6 house, which was 15
meters away from theirs, and told Eusebio, her brother, what happened to their father; but
Eusebio did nothing about it because he was shivering in fear.7

Each of the accused interposed alibi of not being at the scene of the crime at that time.

ISSUE:

Whether the testimony of a young daughter of the victim is meritorious.

RULING:

Yes. Time and again, the Court has held that when the issues involve matters of credibility of
witnesses, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies, and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said
findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court
has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position
to discern whether they are telling the truth.  Credible witness and credible testimony are
the two essential elements for determining the weight of a particular testimony. Evidence to
be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be
credible in itself. Although Jocelyn was only twelve years old when the incident happened
and when called to the witness stand, the Court takes note of the truth that she possessed
all the qualification and none of the disqualification to testify.

Jocelyn's young age had no bearing on her qualification to testify on what happened that
night on 19 November 1999. As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a
relevant event or incident, and can communicate such awareness, experience, or
observation to others can be a witness. Significantly, even under the crucible of an intense
cross-examination, Jocelyn never wavered in her narration as to the incidents that led to the
killing of Artemio and the burning of their house, and in the affirmative identification of Sota
and Gadjadli as two of the five persons who were responsible for these crimes.

Jocelyn gave the credible testimony that on the night of 19 November 1999, Sota, Gadjadli,
and three other unidentified persons lit the torch to burn their house but Artemio was able
to put out the fire. Because the moon was bright, she vividly saw that it was Sota who acted
as the leader of the group while Gadjadli carried a pistol. She witnessed that the group
started to shoot at the house when Artemio became adamant not to open the door for fear
he would be killed. It was with this burst of gunshots that made her jump out of the window
and run towards the house of her brother Eusebio. When she looked back, their house was
already burning while the group was shooting at Artemio who ran down the house. Plainly,
these circumstances as testified to by Jocelyn produced a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt that Sota, Gadjadli, and the three unidentified persons were responsible for the killing
of Artemio and the burning of their house.
 People of the Philippines Vs. Jonas Pantoja y Astorga
G.R. No. 223114. November 29, 2017

FACTS:

Accused-appellant was charged with murder for assaulting a 6-year old child with kitchen
knife hitting the latter on the different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon him fatal
injuries which caused his death.

Witness Cederina Pantoja (Cederina), mother of the accused-appellant, testified that

accused-appellant was admitted to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) on 8 July
2010. Prior to that, he had already exhibited signs of mental illness which started
manifesting after he was mauled by several persons in an altercation when he was twenty-
one (21) years old. Because of the incident, he sustained head injuries, which required
stitches. No further physical examination was conducted on him, because they did not have
the funds to pay for additional checkups. Further, Cederina observed that his personality
had changed, and he had a hard time sleeping. There was a time when he did not sleep at all
for one week, prompting Cederina to bring the accused-appellant to the psychiatric
department of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH). There, the attending physician
diagnosed him with schizophrenia.

Accused-appellant escaped from the hospital on 14 July 2010, at around 7:45 in the evening,
and arrived at their house the day after. When Cederina inquired from accused-appellant
how he was able to find his way home, accused-appellant responded that he roamed
around until he remembered the correct jeepney route to their house. Cederina then
informed the NCMH that the accused-appellant was in her custody, and she was advised to
bring him back to the hospital. However, they were unable to do so at that time because
they could not afford the transportation expenses.

On 22 July 2010, at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning, Cederina noticed that accused-
appellant was gone. She went outside to look for him and noticed that the front door of the
house where six-year-old AAA resided was open. She then saw accused-appellant holding a
knife and the victim sprawled on the floor, bloodied. She took the knife from him and asked
him what happened. He did not respond and appeared dazed. She took him downstairs and
out of the house where she called out for help for the victim. Nobody responded, until she
saw Glenda, who immediately ran to their house when Cederina told her that her son AAA
had been hurt.

ISSUE:

Whether accused-appellant has clearly and convincingly proven his defense of insanity to
exempt him from criminal liability and, in the negative, whether his mental issues constitute
diminished willpower so as to mitigate his liability and to lower the penalty.

RULING:
No. The Court found all the elements constituting murder exist in the case at bar, with
accused-appellant as the perpetrator. The accused-appellant did not present evidence
controverting such findings. However, accused-appellant raises the defense of insanity in
claiming that he should not be found criminally liable.

In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be
exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act,i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a
total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability. Moreover, the evidence of the defense must establish that such insanity
constituting complete deprivation of intelligence existed immediately preceding or
simultaneous to the commission of the crime.

Accused-appellant contends that even assuming his insanity was not sufficiently proven, the
Court should convict him of homicide only because the defense has proven that he has an
illness which diminishes the exercise of his willpower without, however, depriving him of
the consciousness of his acts.

This contention is without merit. At the outset, the presence of mitigating circumstances
does not change the nature of the crime. It can only affect the imposable penalty,
depending on the kind of penalty and the number of attendant mitigating circumstances.

While the evidence of accused-appellant does not show that he was completely deprived of
intelligence or consciousness of his acts when he committed the crime, there is sufficient
indication that he was suffering from some impairment of his mental faculties; thus, he may
be credited with the mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower. However, since
murder is punishable with two indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death, the
accused-applelant is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
 Edwina Rimando y Fernando Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 229701. November 29, 2017

FACTS:

Alex Muñez, Bank Officer I of the Investigation Division, Task Department, Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) conducted an entrapment operation against Romeo Rimando who offered to
sell to him counterfeited dollar notes. The suspect was accompanied by appellant Edwina
Rimando, his wife.

Appellant Edwina Rimando averred that they were set up by the government operatives and
were planted evidence. She Said that on that fateful day, she was invited by a certain Pong
to meet a certain Emily about an old coins transaction. Her husband, Romeo Rimando, was
with her. Emily invited them to eat at a Pizza Hut behind a hotel. Once there, they just sat
on the sofa. Emily left them to smoke and make a call. She followed Emily outside and the
latter told her to look for another restaurant. They walked towards Kalayaan and Burgos.
While waiting for the stop light to change, she and her husband were suddenly
apprehended by the group of Alex Muñez. Pong and Emily suddenly disappeared. They were
forced to ride a silver Toyota Innova. Criminal accusations were then filed against them.

ISSUE:

Whether the appellant is guilty of the crime of illegal possession and use of false treasury
bank notes beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court ruled the validity of the
entrapment operation conducted by the BSP agents and its findings as to the existence of all
the elements of the crime of illegal possession and use of false treasury bank notes as
defined under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. Having charged that petitioner acted in
conspiracy with Romeo, it was, however, incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that
both the accused had come to an agreement concerning the commission of the crime and
decided to execute the agreement.

It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or
indirect contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt act may consist of
active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral
assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by
exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. Hence, the mere presence of an
accused at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active
participation in the same, is not enough for purposes of conviction.
In the instant case, we find petitioner's participation in the crime not adequately proved
with moral certainty. There were no overt acts attributed to her adequate to hold her
equally guilty of the crime proved.

This Court has held that an overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or
preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course,
without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The record is bereft
of any hint that petitioner cooperated in the commission of the crime under Article 168 of
the RPC.