G.R. No.

89606 August 30, 1990

AGUSTIN SALGADO, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (Fourteenth Division) and HON. ANTONIO SOLANO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC-Quezon City (Branch 86) and FRANCISCO
LUKBAN, respondents.

Ernesto L. Pineda for petitioner.

Lukban, Vega, Lozada & Associates for private respondent. 

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 15493 entitled, "Agustin Salgado v. Hon. Antonio P. Solano, et al.," which
affirmed the Order dated December 22, 1987 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 86) sustaining its previous order dated November 18, 1987 directing the issuance
of a writ of execution to enforce the civil liability of herein petitioner in Criminal Case No.
0-33798.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner was charged with the crime of serious physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 0-
33798 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Agustin Salgado," before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (Branch 86). After trial, judgment was rendered on October 16, 1986
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive portion
of the decision, states:

WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused AGUSTIN P. SALGADO, JR., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious physical injuries, defined
and penalized under paragraph 3 Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, and
appreciating in his favor the following mitigating circumstances:

1) voluntary surrender; and

2) No intention to commit so grave a wrong hereby sentence ( sic) said

accused to suffer imprisonment for a period of four (4) months and twenty
(20) days, with the accessories provided for by law, and to indemnify the
victim, Francisco Lukban, Jr., in the sum of P126,633.50 as actual or
compensatory damages, and the sum of P50,000.00 as damages for the
incapacity of Francisco Lukban to pursue and engage in his poultry business.

SO ORDERED. (p. 19, Rollo)

On October 17, 1986, petitioner filed an application for probation with the trial court. The
application was granted in an Order dated April 15, 1987. The order contained, among
others, the following condition:

xxx xxx xxx

4. Indemnify the victim FRANCISCO LUKBAN, JR., in a monthly installment of

P2,000.00 (TWO THOUSAND PESOS) every month during the entire period of
his probation. (p. 15, Rollo)

For the months of May, June, July, August, September and October, 1987, petitioner
complied with the above condition by paying in checks the said sum of P2,000.00 monthly,
through the City Probation Officer, Perla Diaz Alonzo. Private respondent Francisco
Lukban, Jr. voluntarily accepted the checks and subsequently encashed them (p. 19, Rollo).
On September 19, 1987, private respondent Francisco Lukban, Jr. filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution for the enforcement of the civil liability adjudged in his favor
in the criminal case. The motion was opposed by the petitioner.

On November 18, 1987, the trial court issued an order granting the motion for issuance of a
writ of execution. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was denied on
December 22, 1987. After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, the petitioner filed
directly with this Court a petition for review of the trial court's order granting the motion
for issuance of a writ of execution. We referred the petition to the Court of Appeals in a
resolution dated April 13, 1988 (p. 18, Rollo).

On March 16, 1989, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the order of
the trial court granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner but respondent Court of Appeals denied the motion
in a resolution dated August 3, 1989 (pp. 9-10, Rollo).

The petitioner went to this Court via a petition for review which was filed on September 26,
1989 and raised the following assignment of errors:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORDER DATED

APRIL 15, 1987 HAS NOT MODIFIED THE DECISION OF OCTOBER 16, 1986
AS FAR AS THE CIVIL ASPECT IS CONCERNED.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONDITION IN

THE PROBATION ORDER MODIFYING OR ALTERING THE CIVIL LIABILITY
OF THE OFFENDER IS UNAUTHORIZED AND NOT SANCTIONED BY LAW. (p.
10, Rollo)

In its decision affirming the order of the trial court granting private respondent's motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution, respondent Court of Appeals advanced three (3)
reasons: 1) that the decision dated October 16, 1986 had become final and executory and
the judge who rendered the decision cannot lawfully alter or modify it; 2) that it is clear
that the probation law provides only for the suspension of sentence imposed on the
accused; that it has absolutely no beating on his civil liability and that none of the
conditions listed under Section 10 of the Probation Law relates to civil liability; and 3) that
private respondent is not estopped because he had nothing to do with the filing and the
granting of the probation.

There is no question that the decision of October 16, 1986 in Criminal Case No. Q-33798
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious physical injuries
had become final and executory because the filing by respondent of an application for
probation is deemed a waiver of his right to appeal (See Section 4 of P.D. 968). Likewise,
the judgment finding petitioner liable to private respondent for P126,633.50 as actual
damages and P50,000.00 as consequential damages had also become final because no
appeal was taken therefrom. Hence, it is beyond the power of the trial court to alter or
modify. In the case of Samson v. Hon. Montejo, L-18605, October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 419,
422-423 cited by respondent appellate court, it was held:

. . . , once a decision becomes final, even the court which rendered it cannot
lawfully alter or modify the same (Rili, et al. v. Chunaco, et al., G.R. No. L-
6630, Feb. 29, 1956), especially, considering the fact that, as in the instant
case, the alteration or modification is material and substantial (Ablaza v.
Sycip, et al., L-12125, Nov. 23, 1960). In the case of Behn, Meyer & Co., v. J.
Mcmicking et al., 11 Phil. 276, (cited by respondents), it was held that "where
a final judgment of an executory character had been rendered in a suit  the
mission of the court is limited to the execution and enforcement of the said
final judgment in all of its parts and in accordance with its express
 orders."  The judgment in question is clear, and with the amended writ of
execution, the liability of petitioner is greatly augmented, without the benefit
of proper proceeding. (Emphasis ours)

We do not believe, however, that the order dated April 15, 1987 granting the application
for probation and imposing some conditions therein altered or modified the decision dated
October 16, 1986. The April 15, 1987 Order of the trial court granting the application for
probation and providing as one of the conditions therein that petitioner indemnify private
respondent P2,000.00 monthly during the period of probation did not increase or decrease
the civil liability adjudged against petitioner but merely provided for the manner of
payment by the accused of his civil liability during the period of probation.

It is the submission of private respondent that in the case of Budlong v. Apalisok, No.
60151, June 24, 1983, 122 SCRA 935. We already ruled that "(T)he 'conviction and
sentence' clause of the statutory definition clearly signifies that  probation affects only the
criminal aspect of the case."

The pronouncement in Apalisok that "probation affects only the criminal aspect of the
case" should not be given a literal meaning. Interpreting the phrase within the context of
that case, it means that although the execution of sentence is suspended by the grant of
probation, it does not follow that the civil liability of the offender, if any, is extinguished.
This can be inferred from a reading of the text of the Apalisok case where the issue that was
involved therein was whether a grant of probation carries with it the extinction of the civil
liability of the offender. The reason for ruling that the grant of probation does not
extinguish the civil liability of the offender is clear, "(T)he extinction or survival of civil
liability are governed by Chapter III, Title V, Book I of the Revised Penal Code where under
Article 113 thereof provides that: '. . . , the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy
the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that
he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other lights, or has not
been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence,
or any other reason.'" In the instant case, the issue is not the survival or extinction of the
civil liability of a probationer but, whether or not the trial court may impose as a condition
of probation the manner in which a probationer may settle his civil liability against the
offended party during the period of probation.

Respondent appellate court ruled that Section 10 of the Probation Law enumerates
thirteen (13) conditions of probation not one of which relates to the civil liability of the
offender (p. 22, Rollo).

Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976) provides:

Sec. 4.  Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the

court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant but before
he begins to serve his sentence and upon his application, suspend the
execution of said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best.

In the case of Florentino L. Baclayon v. Hon. Pacito G. Mutia, et al ., G.R. No. 59298, April 30,
1984, 129 SCRA 148, We ruled that the conditions listed under Section 10 of the Probation
Law are not exclusive. Courts are allowed to impose practically any term it chooses, the
only limitation being that it does not jeopardize the constitutional rights of the accused.
Courts may impose conditions with the end that these conditions would help the
probationer develop into a law-abiding individual. Thus,

The conditions which trial courts may impose on a probationer may be

classified into general or mandatory and special or discretionary. The
mandatory conditions, enumerated in Section 10 of the Probation Law,
require that probationer should a) present himself to the probation officer
designated to undertake his supervision at such place as may be specified in
 the order within 72 hours from receipt of said order, and b) report to the
probation officer at least once a month at such time and place as specified by
said officer. Special or discretionary conditions are those additional
conditions, listed in the same Section 10 of the Probation Law, which the
courts may additionally impose on the probationer towards his correction
and rehabilitation outside of prison.  The enumeration, however, is not
inclusive. Probation statutes are liberal in character and enable courts to
designate practically any term it chooses as long as the probationer's
constitutional rights are not jeopardized . There are innumerable conditions
which may be relevant to the rehabilitation of the probationer when viewed
in their specific individual context.  It should, however, be borne in mind that
the special or discretionary conditions of probation should be realistic,
purposive and geared to help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and
self-respecting individual. Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in
their application, and each case should be judged on its own merits — on the
basis of the problems, needs and capacity of the probationer . . . . .

The primary consideration in granting probation is the reformation of the probationer.

That is why, under the law, a post sentence investigation, which is mandatory, has to be
conducted before a person can be granted probation to help the court in determining
whether the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as the defendant will
be served by the granting of the probation (Alvin Lee Koenig, Post Sentence Investigation,
Its Importance and Utility, IBP Journal, Special Issue on Probation, Vol. 5, No. 5, pp. 381-
387). In the case of People v. Lippner, 219 Cal. 395, 26 p. 2d, 457, 458 (1933), among those
which has to be ascertained is the financial condition and capacity of the offender to meet
his obligations:

. . . there can be no real reformation of a wrong-doer unless there is at least a

willingness on his part to right the wrong committed, and the effect of such
an act upon the individual is of inestimable value, and to a large extent,
determines whether there has been any real reformation. To be clearly
consonant with such a purpose, the post sentence investigation must include
a financial examination of the offender's capability in order to work out a
system of payment which can effectively accomplish reimbursement without
interfering with the defendant's family and other financial responsibilities,
according to U.S. Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute . . . . (Sec.
301.1 Comments (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1954; Also 2 U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Attorney General's Survey of Release Procedures 38 (1939) cited in The
Period and Conditions of Probation by Sergio F. Go, IBP Journal Special Issue
on Probation, Vol. 5, No. 5, pp. 406-420). (Emphasis ours)

The trial court is given the discretion to impose conditions in the order granting probation
"as it may deem best." As already stated, it is not only limited to those listed under Section
10 of the Probation Law. Thus, under Section 26, paragraph (d) of the Rules on Probation
Methods and Procedures, among the conditions which may be imposed in the order
granting probation is:

Sec. 26. Other conditions of Probation. The Probation Order may also require
the probationer in appropriate cases, to:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) comply with a program of payment of civil liability to the victim or his
heirs . . . .

However, this is not to say that the manner by which the probationer should satisfy the
payment of his civil liability in a criminal case during the probation period may be
demanded at will by him. It is necessary that the condition which provides for a program of
payment of his civil liability will address the offender's needs and capacity. Such need may
be ascertained from the findings and recommendations in the post-sentence investigation
report submitted by the Probation Officer after investigation of the financial capacity of the
offender and that such condition is to the end that the interest of the state and the
reformation of the probationer is best served.

In the instant case, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, it is presumed that when
the trial court issued the order of April 15, 1987, the condition that the petitioner has to
pay private respondent P2,000.00 a month for the satisfaction of the civil liability adjudged
against him was recommended by the probation officer who prepared the post-sentence
investigation and that such condition is, in the judgment of the trial court, "deemed best"
under the circumstances.

Counting from April 15, 1987, the date of issuance of the order granting probation which
under the law is also the date of its effectivity (Sec. 11, P.D. 968), the probation period must
have lapsed by now. Hence, the order for petitioner to indemnify the private respondent in
the amount of P2,000.00 monthly during the period of probationmust have also lapsed. If
such were the case, there would therefore, be no more obstacle for the private respondent
to enforce the execution of the balance of the civil liability of the petitioner. However, the
records are bereft of allegations to this effect.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated March 16, 1989 of respondent
Court of Appeals affirming the order of the trial court granting the motion for the issuance
of a writ of execution as well as the resolution dated August 3, 1989 of the same court are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

 
G.R. No. 123936 March 4, 1999

RONALD SORIANO, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. RODOLFO V. TOLEDANO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 69, Third Judicial Region, Iba Zambales; THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF, Third
Judicial Region, Iba, Zambales; Ms. NELDA DA MAYCONG, Suprvising Parole and Probation
Officer and Officer-in-Charge, Zambales Parole and Probation Office; and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari  of the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No.
35550, 1 which upheld the trial court's orders holding petitioner in contempt and revoking
his probation.

The fact of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Ronald Santiago was convicted of the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to
homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property on December 7, 1993. 2 His
application for probation was granted on March 8, 1994, and among the terms and
conditions imposed by the trial court were the following: 3

xxx xxx xxx

7. He shall meet his family responsibilities.

8. He shall devote himself to a specific employment and shall not change

employment without prior notice to the supervising officer; and/or shall
pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training.

xxx xxx xxx

11. He is to indemnify the heirs of the victim Isidrino Daluyong in the amount
of P98,560.00 as ordered by the Court.

x x x           x x x          x x x

On April 26, 1994, Assistant Prosecutor Benjamin A Fadera filed a motion to cancel
petitioner's probation due to his failure to satisfy his civil liability to the heirs of the victim,
and a supplemental motion alleging petitioner's commission of another crime for which at
that time he was awaiting arraignment. The Zambales Parole and Probation Office filed a
comment recommending that the petitioner be allowed to continue with his probation and
that he be required instead to submit a program of payment of his civil liability.

On June 20, 1994, the trial court denied the prosecutor's motion and directed petitioner to
submit a program of payment of the civil liability imposed upon him.

Thereafter, probation officer Nelda D. Maycong received information that petitioners father
who owned the vehicle involved in the accident which killed Daluyong, received
P16,500.00 as insurance payment. This amount was not turned over to the heirs of
Daluyong and Da Maycong considered this a violation of the terms and conditions of the
probation. She submitted a manifestation to the trial court praying that the petitioner be
made to explain his non-compliance with the court's order of June 20, 1994, or that
be cited for contempt for such non-compliance. Da Maycong also asked that petitioner be
made to submit a program of payment as soon as possible. The trial court granted his
prayers in an order dated August 15, 1994. Petitioner was once again ordered to submits
his program of payment. Petitioner instead filed a motion for reconsideration explaining
that he did not receive a copy of said order on June 23, 1994 but failed to notify petitioner.
Thus, the latter failed to comply with said order.

On October 4, 1994, the trial court issued an order declaring petitioner in contempt of
court for his failure to comply with its orders of June 20, 1994 and August 15, 1994. The
court likewise revoked the grant of probation to petitioner and ordered that he be arrested
to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. According to the trial court, among the
violation committed by petitioner as regards his probation are his failure to (1) meet his
responsibilities to his family, (2) engage in a specific employment, and (3) cooperate with
his program of supervision.

Petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari  with the Court of Appeals. He
claimed that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of,
or in excess of, jurisdiction in holding petitioner in contempt and revoking his probation.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, holding that petitioner's "stubborn
unwillingness" to comply with the orders of the trial court "shows his refusal to reform
himself and to correct a wrong." 4

According to the Court of Appeals:

Where probation was approved and probationer has proven to be

unrepentant and disrespectful and even showed clear defiance to two lawful
court orders, as in the case of herein petitioner, the court is not barred from
revoking the same. 5

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals for
lack of merit.

Hence, this petition for review, in which petitioner makes the following assignment of
errors. 6

1. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in failing to rule that respondent judge

committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was deliberate
refusal on the part of petitioner to comply with his orders dated June 20,
1994 and August 15, 1994 and subsequently declaring petitioner in
contempt.

2. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in failing to rule that respondent judge

committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the probation order he
earlier issued in favor of petitioner on the ground that petitioner failed to
satisfy the award of civil indemnity for the heirs of the accident victim.

3. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in failing to rule that respondent judge

committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the probation order he
earlier issued in favor of petitioner on the ground that the latter violated the
conditions of his probation three times.

Petitioner asserts that he had no intention to ignore the orders of the trial court. The
court's order of June 20, 1994 was received by his counsel who, however, did not notify
petitioner. Petitioner says that his "former counsel's irresponsible delay (in informing him
of the order) should not prejudice him." 7

He explains that his non-compliance with the order to submit a program of payment of his
civil liability is, ultimately, due to his poor financial condition. He only relies on his parents
for support. He claims that it is impossible for him to formulate a payment program
because, in the first place, he is in no position to comply with the same.
Petitioner avers that to require him to satisfy his civil liability in order to continue to avail
of the benefits of probation is to violate the constitutional proscription against unequal
protection of the law. He says only moneyed probationers will be able to benefit from
probation if satisfaction of civil liability is made a condition.

Petitioner contends that his enjoyment of probation should not be made to depend on the
satisfaction of his civil liability. He invokes the separate opinion of Justice Isagani A. Cruz
in Salgado v. Court of Appeals, 8 particularly Justice Cruz' reservation about the validity of
imposing satisfaction of civil liability as a condition for probation such an imposition is in
the nature of an amendment of the decision of the trial court in the criminal case against
him, which cannot be allowed since the decision is already final and executory. He further
invokes the majority decision in Salgado and asserts that "any program of payment of civil
liability must take into consideration the needs and capacity of petitioner." 9

Petitioner claims that his failure to meet his responsibilities to his family and to engage in
gainful employment is not deliberate but is due to his poverty. He adds that his being
unskilled, with a criminal record to his name, does not exactly enhance his chances for
employment.

Finally, petitioner cites our decision in Baclayon v. Mutia: 10

. . . Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in their application and

each case should be judged on its own merits — on the basis of the problems,
needs and capacity of the probationer. The very liberality of the probation
should not be made a tool by trial courts to stipulate instead unrealistic
terms. 11

In his comment, the Solicitor General asks for the dismissal of the petition. The only issue to
be resolved according to him is whether or not petitioner has violated the terms and
conditions of his probation warrant its revocation. The Solicitor General argues that
petitioner has committed violations, thus justifying the trial court' s revocation of the grant
of probation. He further points out that our ruling in Salgado  is inapplicable to the case of
petitioner since what was involved in Salgado was a program of payment already imposed
upon petitioner therein. In this case, however, it is petitioner who is being asked to submit
his own program of payment and he had not submitted any such program:

The only issue for us to resolve in this case is whether or not the revocation of petitioner's
probation is lawful and proper.

Petitioner asserts that his non-compliance with the orders of the trial court requiring him
to submit a program of payment was not deliberate. To our mind, his refusal to comply
with said orders cannot be anything but deliberate. He had notice of both orders, although
the notice of the order of June 20, 1994 came belatedly. He has, up to this point, refused to
comply with the trial court's directive, by questioning instead the constitutionality of the
requirement imposed and harping on his alleged poverty as the reason for his failure to
comply.

Contrary to his assertion, this requirement is not violative of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. Note that payment of the civil liability is not made a
condition precedent  to probation. If it were, then perhaps there might be some basis to
petitioner's assertion that only moneyed convicts may avail of the benefits of probation. In
this case, however, petitioner's application for probation had already been granted.
Satisfaction of his civil liability was not made a requirement before he could avail a
probation, but was a condition for his continued enjoyment of the same.

The trial court could not have done away with imposing payment of civil liability as a
condition for probation, as petitioner suggests. This is not an arbitrary imposition but one
required by law. It is a consequence of petitioner's having been convicted of a crime, 12 and
petitioner is bound to satisfy this obligation regardless of whether or not he is placed under
probation.

We fail to see why petitioner cannot comply with a simple order to furnish the trial court
with a program of payment of his civil liability. He may, indeed, be poor, but this is
precisely the reason why the trial court gave him the chance to make his own program of
payment. Knowing his own financial condition, he is in the best position to formulate a
program of payment that fits his needs and capacity.

Petitioner blames his former counsel's "irresponsible delay" in informing him of the trial
court's order to come up with a program of payment for his failure to make such a
program. Petitioner wants to take exception to the rule that notice to counsel is notice to
client.

We find no reason to make an exception in this case. Petitioner's counsel has not been
shown to be grossly irresponsible as to cause prejudice to petitioner's rights. 13 Moreover,
we note that petitioner later on discovered that such a court order was received by his
counsel. He could have endeavored to comply with the order then. In the June 20, 1994
order, he was given 10 days from receipt of the order within which to comply. The same
period was given him in the order of August 15, 1994. Petitioner does not claim that he
failed to receive notice of the latter order. In fact, he submitted a motion for
reconsideration of said order, but still without the required program of payment.

No justifiable reason has been given by petitioner for ignoring those two orders. The trial
court could not be faulted for citing him in contempt for his failure to comply with its
orders. Nor did it abuse gravely its discretion in issuing said orders. Hence, we are in full
agreement with respondent appellate court's decision as well.

Moreover, petitioner's continued refusal to submit a program of payment, along with his
prayer for the deletion of the requirement of payment of civil liability from his probation
order, creates the impression that he wants to completely avoid paying his civil liability.
This he cannot do. He cannot escape payment of his civil liability, with or without a
program of payment.

Petitioner's reliance on Salgado is misplaced. In that case, the trial court itself formulated
the manner by which Salgado was to satisfy his civil liability. He was able to comply for a
few months. When he started skipping his payments, his victim sought the issuance of a
writ of execution to enforce full payment of the civil liability. The trial court granted this
motion and it was sustained by the Court of Appeals which ruled that the program of
payment amounted to an amendment of the decision of the trial court ordering payment of
civil liability but without a program of payment. Since the trial court's decision had already
become final, it can no longer be amended by imposing a program of payment, in
installments, of the civil liability.

We held in Salgado,  that the program of payment is not an amendment of the decision of
the trial court because it does not increase or decrease the liability and the obligation to
pay is to be fulfilled during the period of probation.

Unlike in Salgado, herein petitioner was being asked to make a program of payment. But he
failed to do so. Hence, in this case, there is yet no program of payment to speak of, because
of petitioner's stubborn refusal and delay as well as failure to abide by the trial court's
orders.

Petitioner's reliance on Baclayon  is likewise misplaced. In that case, what was being
assailed as an unrealistic condition was the trial court's requirement that petitioner
therein, a teacher convicted of Serious Oral Defamation, refrain from exercising her
profession. This condition was deemed unreasonable because teaching was the only
profession she knew and it appeared that she excelled in teaching. No unrealistic condition
similar to the one in Baclayan  has been imposed upon petitioner herein.
As regards the other violations committed by petitioner, the question of whether or not
petitioner has, indeed, violated the terms and conditions of his probation is evidently a
factual one which had already been passed upon by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. Settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that findings of fact of the trial court are
entitled to great weight, more so when they are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 14 as in
this case.

Besides, petitioner himself admits in his petition that he is unemployed and only depends
on his parents for support. He can barely support his family. 15 Petitioner ought to be
reminded of what is incumbent on a probationer, including those requirements that the
trial court may set.

As Section 10 of the Probation Law states:

Sec. 10. Conditions of Probation. — . . .

The court may also require the probationer to:

(a) Cooperate with a program of supervision;

(b) Meet his family responsibilities;

(c) Devote himself to a specific employment and not to change said

employment without the prior written approval of the probation officer

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training;

xxx xxx xxx 16

Clearly, these conditions are not whims of the trial court but are requirements laid down by
statute. They are among the conditions that the trial court is empowered to impose and the
petitioner, as probationer, is required to follow. Only by satisfying these conditions may the
purposes of probation be fulfilled. These include promoting the correction and
rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized treatment, and providing
an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if
he were to serve a prison sentence. 16a Failure to comply will result in the revocation of the
order granting probation, pursuant to the Probation Law:

Sec. 11. Effetivity of Probation Order. — A probation order shall take effect
upon its issuance, at which time the court shall inform the offender of the
consequences thereof and explain that upon his failure to comply with any of
the conditions  prescribed in the said order or his commission of another
offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he
was placed on probation."16b (Emphasis supplied.)

Probation is not an absolute right. It is a mere privilege whose grant rests upon the
discretion of the trial court. 17 Its grant is subject to certain terms and conditions that may
be imposed by the trial court. Having the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial
court also has the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under appropriate
circumstances.

Moreover, having admittedly violated the terms and conditions of his probation, petitioner
cannot now assail the revocation of his probation. Regrettably, he has squandered the
opportunity granted him by the trial court to remain outside prison bars, and must now
suffer the consequences of those aforecited violations.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 35550 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.