Lecture 7. Theories of Reality.

1. Theories of Reality.
2. The Constitution of Matter.
3. Mechanistic world views.
4. Idealism.
5. Pluralism.
1. Theories of Reality.

The question of reality, the ontological problem, is the one which has its objective, the ultimate
nature of the real. Is the whole course of nature in space and time but the appearance or cloak1 of a
more ultimate reality? Is the world as it appears to me real or is it but the manifestation of a hidden
reality which in itself is quite different from its appearance?
It is obvious that if we are to speak of ultimate forms of reality at all, and if we are to believe
that the world may be reduced to certain elementary substances or elementary forms of being, either
there must be one such elementary substance, or two, or more than two. So, we have the three types
of philosophical theories of reality, Monism, Dualism, and Pluralism. The tendency to seek for unity
in plurality, to find the One in the Many, as Plato said, is persistent2 in the human mind, so that
there has always been a strong hope among philosophers of finding some one elementary form of
being – or, at any rate3, two, the various manifestations of which will make up our world of
experience. Consequently, monistic and dualistic systems of philosophy have been very popular.
Just as present there seems to be less interest in trying to find out what the world is made of and
more interest in discovering its meaning and value. Problems of life, problems of evolution,
problems of experience, problems of value, have now somewhat eclipsed4 the older problem of
“ontology.”
Dualism

Of these three theories of reality, perhaps the easiest one to understand is Dualism. Let us therefore
begin with this. Probably the reason that this is most easily understood is because it is the popular belief.
Dualism is the theory that mind and matter are the two fundamental realities in the world and that they cannot
be reduced the one to the other. Among primitive people, as well as among moderns, it seems very natural to
distinguish mind from body in so sharp a manner as to make ultimate realities of each. Primitive man rarely
failed to distinguish soul and body; the soul, though not perhaps immaterial, was a kind of duplicate of the
body, or a shadowy image of it, and could leave it and might haunt5 the grave after death.

Metaphysical Dualism

1
cloak [kləuk] - 1. n. 1) plaş, məc. örtük, üst örtüyü; 2) bəhanə.
2
persistent [pə'sɪstənt] - 1) mətanətli, dəyanətli; 2) möhkəm, davamlı, mətin.
3
at any rate- hər halda, işdir, hər ehtimala qarşı.
4
eclipse [ɪ'klɪps] - kölgədə qoymaq, ötmək.

The word dualism is ambiguous, being used in two senses. It has sometimes been used to designate the belief in a
good and a bad principle, which lie at the root of all things. For instance, in the religion of Persia, Ahriman and Ahura-
Mazda (Ormazd) stand for two eternal (əbədi) principles of evil and good. In this sense there is a dualism in Plato, for
the taught that Being and Non-Being are two primordial (əzəli) principles, the latter being the source of imperfection
(natamamlıq).
5
haunt [hɔːnt] - tez-tez baş çəkmək, gəlmə.
 The powerful dualistic current6 in modern thought, extending even to our firesides7, took its rise in
the philosophy of Descartes, who is called the founder of modern philosophy and whose Meditations8,
published in French and in Latin at the middle of the XVII century, have exerted 9an untold influence on our
modern ways of thinking. Descartes’ teaching was that there are in the world two wholly different kinds of
reality, or “substances,” as he called them, thought and extension,10 or, as we should say, mind and matter.
The whole physical world, including the bodies of animals and men, is extended substance – matter, as we
call it, or mass, governed absolutely by mechanical laws. Matter in motion11 constitutes the physical world.
The lower animals are just mechanisms. An animal has no soul; he is only a material body. Not so man, for
within his material extended body there is a thinking substance, the immortal soul, whose very being is to
think.
This hard-and-fast metaphysical Dualism, as taught by Descartes, has at the present time few
representatives in philosophy. We are not so fond of using the word “substance” now, either in referring to
material or mental things. In the physical world we speak of energies and in the mental world of processes.
And we are always searching for some principle of unity or of continuity or of evolution, so that the
assumption of two elementary, wholly distinct, and mutually exclusive kinds of reality is less welcome. To
modern philosophy it seems a little too dogmatic to make such wide generalizations, or to parcel out the
Universe in this way into two exclusive regions. We are always trying to overcome this Dualism and find one
rather than two ultimate forms of being; or else as is now still more congenial12, to recognize at once an
ultimate diversity in the world and a plurality of entities. Consequently, although Dualism is not without its
able advocates at the present time, either monistic or pluralistic world views are more common.
Monism
Besides the dualistic theory which asserts that there are ultimately two kinds of reality, there are
theories which insist that the ultimate stuff13 of the world is one. There are three types of monism:
materialism, idealism and neutralism.
Materialism had its advocates among the Greek philosophers and has had many representatives in
modern times. Such men as Democritus and Lucretius were as convinced that the world was reducible to
material elements and their laws as was the XIX-century thinker, Haeckel. The doctrine of materialism
asserts that there is finally one reality, matter. Mind, which Descartes held to be as ultimate14 as matter and
independent of it, for the materialist is at best a function of matter, if indeed 15there is any such things as
mind at all. The world in the final analysis is matter operating under the laws which physical science reveals
16
to us.
Idealism, too, asserts 17that reality is one, that one being mind or spirit. For the idealist matter is at
best a representation or construct of mind. The world of “matter” is but the appearance of mind to itself. The
world which the physical scientist talks about is, as Eddington says, in The Nature of the Physical World, a
‘world of shadows.” What really is, in the final analysis, is of the nature of mind. Thus, the idealist would
deny that the mechanical interpretation of the world is in any way final. The Universe is not a dead
6
current – cərəyan.
7
fireside ['faɪəsaɪd] - yaxın, intim.
8
meditation [ˌmedɪ'teɪʃən] – düşüncə, fikir.
9
exert [ɪg'zəːt] - toplamaq (gücünü), bütün gücünü qoymaq.
10
extension [ɪks'tenʃən] - 1) dartılma, uzanma; 2) genişlənmə; 3) üstünə əlavə etmə, çoxaltma, artırma.
11
motion ['məuʃən] - 1. n. 1) hərəkət, irəliləyiş
12
congenial [kən'dʒiːnjəl] - 1) ruhən yaxın; 2) uyğun, münasib.
13
stuff [stʌf] - maddə, materiya.
14
ultimate ['ʌltɪmɪt] - 1) son, axırıncı, qəti; 2) əsas, başlıca.
15
indeed [ɪn'diːd] - həqiqətən, doğrudan da.
16
reveal [rɪ'viːl] - 1) açmaq, aşkar eləmək, vermək, açıb demək (sirri); 2) ifşa eləmək.
17
assert [ə'səːt] - təsdiq eləmək, müdafiə etmək.
mechanical ruthless18 grinding19 of wheels, wherein20 values, religion and moral aspirations are but stupid
delusions21; it is, rather, a living dynamic reality which guarantees a cosmic worth to human striving22 and
interprets the world in the light of spiritual values.
There is yet a third type of monism, which we have called neutralism, which holds that reality is
neither mind nor matter but a single kind of stuff of which mind and matter are but appearances or aspects.
Spinoza is the best classical representative of this type of monism. For Spinoza, there are one single reality
which he called substance, and the world in its various aspects is but its attributes and modes23. What
Descartes called mind and matter are for Spinoza but two attributes of substance, two ways in which
substance appears. What is called mind from one point of view is matter from another point of view. They are
not really distinct but only apparently24 so.
Pluralism
This third type of metaphysical theory asserts that the world is not so simple. It cannot be reduced to
one nor even two denominators25. The reality of the world is manifold26 and it is a false analysis which
reduces the welter 27of the Universe to two substances or one. This point of view was represented among the
Ancient Greeks as well as among moderns. Empedocles, for example, may be said to have been a pluralist
when he asserted that ultimate reality is resolvable into earth, air, fair and water. Plato, again, was pluralistic
in his point of view. With him many things were real – Ideas, forms, principles, and laws. Even non-being he
considered to be real.
In modern times other forms of pluralism have been offered. William James is probably the most
famous protaqonist for the pluralistic philosophy.

18
ruthless ['ruːθlɪs] - insafsız, daş ürəkli.
19
Grind – cilalamaq.
20
wherein [wɛər'ɪn] - nə, nədə.
21
delusion [dɪ'luːʒən] - yanılma, yanlış fikir, xəyal, xülya.
22
strive [straɪv] - (strove; striven) 1) səy etmək, cəhd etmək, çalışmaq; 2) vuruşmaq, mübarizə aparmaq (for; against;
with).
23
mode [məud] - hərəkət tərzi, tərzi-hərəkət.
24
apparently [ə'pærəntlɪ] - göründüyü kimi, açıq-aşkar.
25
denominator [dɪ'nɔmɪneɪtə] - riyaz. bölən, məxrəc.
26
manifold ['mænɪfəuld] - 1. a. 1) qədərsiz, çox, külli, saysız-hesabsız; 2) cürbəcür, dürlü-dürlü, müxtəlif.
27
welter ['weltə] - 1. v. vurnuxmaq; avaralanmaq; boş-boşuna gəzmək; 2. n. həngamə, mərəkə, qiyamət; qarma-
qarışıqlıq.