29/2/2020 How Russia Sees the Ukraine Crisis

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How Russia Sees the Ukraine Crisis

October 13, 2014 Topic: Security Region: Ukraine

Can a compromise be found?

by Paul J. Saunders

Though Ukraine’s not-quite cease-fire is far preferable to the summer’s

heavier fighting, it is far from clear that it will lead to a sustainable
settlement between Kiev and eastern Ukrainian separatists, Moscow and
Kiev, or the United States and Russia.  A recent presentation at the Center
for the National Interest by Andranik Migranyan, a well-informed analyst
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and writer who runs the Kremlin-connected Institute for Democracy and
cooperation in New York, provides useful insight into Moscow’s view of
what would be required to get there—and illustrates the wide gap between
prevailing Western and Russian outlooks and expectations.  His
assessment—based on a recent trip to Russia during which he discussed
the crisis with a number of senior officials—offers little basis for
optimism.  (See his 15-minute presentation, plus about an hour of
discussion, on the Center’s YouTube page here.)

Migranyan’s perspective on Ukraine and on U.S.-Russia relations, like

most mainstream Russian perspectives and indeed Russian official
statements, is unpleasant for many Americans and Europeans to hear.  (In
Migranyan’s case, his views were apparently so unpleasant for one
European diplomat present during his remarks that the diplomat decided
to complain loudly and walk out.)  Unfortunately, the fact that something
is unpleasant—or worse—does not make it unimportant.

Ukraine is a case in point.  Russia has annexed Crimea and has encouraged
and supported armed rebellion in eastern Ukraine, both of which go well
beyond unpleasant.  Thankfully, the fighting in Ukraine has subsided for
the time being, though it could return to pre-cease fire levels very quickly
if Moscow and the separatists choose that path.

Why did all of this happen?  Migranyan explained the origins of the
Ukraine crisis in terms radically different from those commonly accepted
in the United States and much of Europe.  For example, he insisted, the
crisis was not “Russia’s initiative,” arguing instead that Moscow was
forced to respond to U.S. conduct.  Specifically, he asserted that Russia
would not have had the idea to “grab Crimea” and would have felt safe and
secure, had the George W. Bush administration not pursued NATO
membership for Ukraine and Georgia, which “started this process.”  In
fact, Migranyan noted, Crimea’s ethnically Russian majority—and its
elected leaders and parliament—have called repeatedly for annexation by
Russia since Russia and Ukraine became independent countries.  He

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correctly added that Moscow previously ignored these requests many

times, in his view because Russia’s leaders saw Ukraine as a “friendly,
non-bloc country,” and argued that Russia chose to take over Crimea
earlier this year only after Viktor Yanukovych’s ouster.

Ukraine was more stable in the past, Migranyan said, because earlier
presidents like Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma understood that their
country was divided and fragile and, as a result, pursued cautious policies
that maintained relations with both Russia and the West.  He explained
Ukraine’s current turmoil by adding that the “radicals in Kiev” have
abandoned this approach and will “destroy” Ukraine if they continue.
 Migranyan singled out Ukraine’s Prime Minister, Arkady Yatseniuk, as a
representative of the faction seeking to end Ukraine’s neutrality by joining
NATO.

Migranyan described Russia’s objectives in Ukraine as ensuring the rights

of Russian-speakers to use the Russian language, establishing a federal
Ukraine with devolution of power to the country’s regions, and ensuring
Ukraine’s continued “non-bloc” status.  When pressed to define what
federalization would mean in practice, he referred to direct election of
regional governors, independent regional budgets, and the ability for
Ukraine’s regions to pursue trade and economic ties with Russia and other
countries.  He added that those who argue that federalization would lead to
Ukraine’s “collapse” actually prove Russian President Vladimir Putin’s
controversial statement that Ukraine is not a “real” country, which
Migranyan interpreted to mean that it is not a unified nation.

The problem, Migranyan said, is that Russia’s leaders and people do not
understand America’s interests and objectives in Ukraine.  The Russian
people do not see why Washington is making “such noise” about Russia’s
annexation of Crimea, which they see as “fair.”  Nor do they understand
why guaranteeing rights for Russian-speakers in Ukraine is an issue when
many European governments provide such rights to much smaller groups
inside their countries.  Russians view the Russia-Ukraine dispute as a

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“family affair” that should not be of particular concern in either the

United States or the European Union, explained.  As a result, Migranyan
continued, they believe that the situation in Ukraine may be an excuse for
Western sanctions but is not the real reason for the sanctions, which must
be “something bigger”—a desire to limit Russia’s geopolitical role.  This
understanding of the sanctions drives both suspicion of the United States
and support for Putin, which Migranyan put at 87% according to Russian
polls.  (He also referred to polls showing 62% of Russians believe that their
country “is on the right track.”)

In this context, Migranyan asserted, Putin’s policies have fallen well short
of what many among the elite advocate.  For example, he said, Putin has
not formally recognized the independence of the Donetsk and Lugansk
republics despite the fact that leaders in almost all of Russia’s
parliamentary political parties have called for this.  Other elite voices are
urging Putin to create a larger independent Novorossiya in eastern and
southern Ukraine or even to occupy all of Ukraine except for Galicia (a
historical kingdom within the Austro-Hungarian Empire that included
portions of modern-day Poland and western Ukraine).  Some of those who
express these perspectives are “true believers”—such as ideologue
Alexander Dugin, who Migranyan argued has little or no political influence
notwithstanding Western media hype—while others are “political
opportunists” who want to be seen taking public postures that they think
the Kremlin wants them to take.  Migranyan acknowledged that these
more ambitious sentiments are politically useful to Putin, providing him
with greater freedom of action domestically while also contributing to
Russia’s “propaganda” internationally.

While “Russia is feeling” U.S. and European sanctions, Migranyan did not
believe that they would force the Kremlin to change its policy because
Putin maintains high levels of elite and public support.  According to
Migranyan, Putin is “sober” and “cautious” and wants to engage with the
United States to settle the Ukraine crisis and move on to other priorities; in
Migranyan’s view, there is an “urgent need” for an Obama-Putin summit.

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 However, he said, Moscow (probably quite accurately) sees little or no

interest in such a meeting—or such an approach—from Washington.  On
the contrary, Migranyan added, Russians see no real U.S. policy agenda
toward Russia beyond insulting Russia and insulting Putin personally.  And
even if an Obama-Putin meeting took place, he said, it would be politically
impossible for Obama to offer anything to Putin, making agreement
unlikely since Putin would not sign something of no benefit to his own
country.

Even Americans who disagree with the rest of Migranyan’s analysis would
likely agree with his assessment of Obama’s ability to reach any deal with
Putin—as opposed to imposing U.S. terms—at this point.  If Obama
wanted to meet Putin to negotiate some kind of settlement, which appears
unlikely in itself, it’s hard to imagine the president having the political
courage to try (particularly before a midterm election).  Or, for that matter,
deciding to spend his limited political capital on Ukraine rather than Iran
(which seems to be a higher foreign policy priority, and a more direct
threat to U.S. national security) or his domestic agenda (which has usually
had precedence over international affairs).  However, if Migranyan is
correct about the impact of the sanctions, which he seems to be,
Washington has not yet done sufficient damage to Russia to allow America
to impose its terms in Ukraine.

Whether the United States and Europe can ultimately succeed in defining
and securing Ukraine’s future over Russia’s strong objections remains to
be seen.  Among other things, it depends on just how hard they are
prepared to press and to what extent Putin and Russia’s elite and citizens
are prepared to resist.  Over the longer term, taking into account that most
in Russia already believe that the United States and the West imposed
terms detrimental to their country after the end of the Cold War and that
this attitude appears to underlie Russia’s policy—and public support for
Putin—it also depends on how long such an outcome could endure before
Moscow challenged it again.

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How should the United States respond?  We have several options.

One is to decide that Ukraine’s territorial integrity is so important that the

United States will do whatever it takes to restore it—including a war with
Russia to defeat the separatists in eastern Ukraine and to liberate Crimea.
 The Obama administration and America’s bipartisan political
establishment have already discarded this, which speaks to their
commitment to Ukraine and their cost-benefit analysis in considering a
military confrontation with Russia.

The alternative that the United States and the European Union are
currently pursuing is essentially to accept the annexation of Crimea as
irreversible for the foreseeable future, to do what they can to protect
eastern Ukraine short of war or even supplying arms, and to try to sanction
Russia into compliance while avoiding substantial escalation.  This may or
may not work, though the odds are not good without much more severe
sanctions that could in turn provoke a severe Russian response.  Neither
Washington nor Brussels looks ready to attempt “crippling” sanctions
and, as The Washington Post’s Jackson Diehl complains, some of the EU’s
more ardently confrontational governments in central Europe have begun
to moderate their approaches after assessing U.S. and EU actions and
resolve relative to Moscow’s.  Of course, even if sanctions do work, the
result that they buy will last only until Putin or his (possibly more
nationalist) successor feels ready to challenge the outcome again either
directly or indirectly.

The other—unpleasant—choice is to decide that whatever one thinks of

Russia’s behavior and motives, America needs to find some way to ensure
that the confrontation over Ukraine does not becoming an enduring reality
of twenty-first century Europe and an organizing principle of U.S. foreign
policy at a time when Washington should be focusing its resources and
attention on East Asia.  That requires an inherently imperfect compromise
with Moscow.

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Such a compromise need not damage any vital American national interests.
 The United States has survived for well over two hundred years without a
military alliance with Ukraine (which we could have had the day after
Ukraine’s independence, without NATO, if we really considered it vital to
U.S. security).  Likewise, whether Ukraine has elected governors and
stronger regional governments, whether Ukraine’s regions can send trade
missions abroad like U.S. states do, or whether Ukraine’s citizens can
speak Russian in government offices, is not of great importance to the
United States.

An imperfect compromise will not solve all or even most of America’s

problems with Russia.  Among other things, Washington and Moscow can’t
and won’t return to the pre-Crimea status quo and Russia’s continuing
possession of Crimea will impose costs on Moscow.  More important,
Russia’s conduct in Ukraine has appropriately changed how Western
governments and publics view the country.  Russia’s domestic evolution
has become increasingly troublesome as well.  The United States can avoid
a new Cold War with Russia, but only with a Cold Peace.

Paul J. Saunders is executive director of The Center for the National Interest
and associate publisher of The National Interest. He served in the U.S. State
Department from 2003 to 2005. Follow him on Twitter: @1796farewell.

Image: U.S. State Department Flickr. 

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