CASE NO. 19. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC/NORWEGIAN CREW MANAGEMENT V. JULIA T.

ALIGWAY

FACTS: On November 25, 2008, the Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTC), for and in behalf of its foreign principal, the Norwegian Crew
Management (NCM), employed Demetrio as chief cook on board the vessel Amasis. Demetrio's employment contract was for nine months with a
monthly salary of US$758.00. Demetrio alleged that prior to his deployment, he underwent pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and was
declared fit to work. Thereafter, while aboard the vessel, he suffered from "vomiting, anorexia, weight loss, and palpitations followed by dizziness
and a feeling of lightheadedness." As a result, on April 22, 2009, he was medically repatriated. Consequently, Demetrio filed a Complaint13 dated
January 22, 2010 for disability benefits, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees against the PTC, the NCM, and their officers. He alleged
that his work as chief cook, which involved food intake, contributed to or aggravated his gastric cancer. He claimed that although the cause of gastric
cancer was unknown, there was speculation that smoked food may be promoting factors. The LA rendered a Decision dismissing the Complaint for
lack of merit. The LA held that the company-designated physician declared that Demetrio's illness was not work-related; and that because of this, the
burden fell on the latter to disprove the finding of the company-designated doctor. The LA ruled that Demetrio failed to discharge this burden
because he adduced no evidence proving that his work increased the risk of contracting stomach cancer. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Decision
of the LA. It gave credence to the medical opinion of the company-designated physician. It opined that aside from bare allegations, Demetrio
adduced no competent evidence to prove that his stomach cancer was caused or aggravated by the working conditions on the vessel. The CA decreed
that the LA and the NLRC improperly relied on the findings of the company-designated physician. It held that said doctor merely referred to medical
literature to explain Demetrio's condition without personally examining him; that Dr. Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig,
Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad,
Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

Salvador did not discuss how Demetrio's work and working environment could have caused or aggravated his illness; that the opinion of Dr. Salvador
lacked accuracy and was hypothetical, if not purely academic; and that Dr. Salvador was not Demetrio's original attending physician. In conclusion,
the CA held that the presumption of compensability prevails and that Demetrio is entitled to full disability benefits pursuant to the CBA. ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in holding that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Demetrio's appeal and in affirming the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of merit.

RULING: The entitlement of seafarers to disability benefits is governed by medical findings, law and contract. Articles 191 to 193 under Chapter VI
(Disability Benefits) of Book IV of the Labor Code set forth the applicable provisions concerning disability benefits. Also, the POEA-SEC and the
CBA bind the seafarer and his employer to each other.

In this case, considering that Demetrio did not suffer from an occupational disease - or such diseases listed under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-
SEC - it stands to reason that to be entitled to disability benefits, he must establish that he suffered from a work-related injury or illness.

Under Section 20(B) of the 2000 POEA SEC, for disability to be compensable, (1) the seafarer's injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the
work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of his employment contract. Hence, the seafarer must not only show that he suffers
from an illness or injury that rendered him permanently or partially disabled, but he must also prove that there is a causal relation between his illness
or injury and the work for which he had been engaged.

This Court has held that a person who claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law must establish his right thereto by substantial evidence or
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 40 This Court cannot grant a claim for disability
benefits without such substantial evidence because to do so would be offensive to due process. Hence, the burden is on the seafarer to prove that he
suffered from a work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract.

In this case, Demetrio failed to discharge this burden. He failed to prove the required causal connection between his stomach cancer and his work as
chief cook aboard the vessel.

CASE NO. 20. DOEHLE-PHILMAN MANNING AGENCY INC., DOHLE LIMITED AND CAPT. MANOLO GACUTE VS. HENRY C
HARO

FACTS:

 On May 30, 2008, Doehle-Philman, in behalf of its foreign principal, Dohle Ltd., hired respondent as oiler a for a period of nine months
with basic monthly salary of US$547.00 and other benefits.
 Before deployment, respondent underwent pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and was declared fit for sea duty
  On June 1, 2008, the respondent boarded the vessel and assumed his duties as oiler; however, in November 2008, he experienced heartache
and loss of energy after hammering and lifting a 120-kilogram machine; thereafter, he was confined where he was informed of having a
hole in his heart.
 After his repatriation on December 6, 2008, respondent reported to Doehle-Philman which in turn referred him to Clinico-Med. Respondent
claimed that he was confined for two days in UST Hospital and that a heart operation was recommended to him. He admitted that he has
not yet undergone any surgery.
 On April 24, 2009, respondent’s personal doctor declared him not fit to work
 Respondent filed a Complaint for disability benefits, reimbursement of medical expenses, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s
fees against petitioners.
 Respondent claimed that since he was declared fit to work before his deployment, this proved that he sustained his illness while in the
performance of his duties aboard the vessel; that he was unable to work for more than 120 days; and that he lost his earning capacity
to engage in a work he was skilled to do. Thus, he insisted he is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits
 Petitioner’s contentions:
 determination of the fitness or unfitness of a medically repatriated seafarer rests with the company-designated physician; and since Dr.
Abesamis declared that respondent’s illness is not work-related, such determination must prevail
 respondent’s illness is not an occupational disease, then he must prove that his work caused his illness; because of his failure to do so,
then he is not entitled to disability benefits
 Ruling of Labor arbiter: the LA dismissed the case for lack of merit. he LA noted that Dr. Abesamis declared that respondent’s illness is
not work-related; therefore, it is incumbent upon respondent to prove otherwise.
 Ruling of NLRC: he NLRC dismissed the appeal. It found no sufficient evidence that respondent’s illness is work-connected and the
NLRC denied respondent’s MR.
 Ruling of CA: the CA granted the Petition and concomitantly reversed and set aside the NLRC Resolutions.

ISSUE: Is the CA correct in setting aside the NLRC Resolutions denying respondent’s claim for permanent and total disability benefits?

RULING: No. The resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels (POEA-SEC), particularly
Section 20(B) thereof, provides that the employer is liable for disability benefits when the seafarer suffers from a work-related injury or illness during
the term of his contract. To emphasize, to be compensable, the injury or illness
1) must be work-related and
2) must have arisen during the term of the employment contract.

In Jebsen Maritime, Inc. v. Ravena, those diseases not listed as occupational diseases may be compensated if it is shown that they have been caused
or aggravated by the seafarer’s working conditions. The Court stressed that while the POEA-SEC provides for a disputable presumption of work-
relatedness as regards those not listed as occupational diseases, this presumption does not necessarily result in an automatic grant of disability
compensation. The claimant still has the burden to present substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion" that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the illness.

Records reveal that respondent was diagnosed of aortic regurgitation, a heart "condition whereby the aortic valve permits blood ejected from the left
ventricle to leak back into the left ventricle." Although this condition manifested while respondent was aboard the vessel, such circumstance is not
sufficient to entitle him to disability benefits as it is of equal importance to also show that respondent’s illness is work-related.

In Ayungo v. Beamko Shipmanagement Corporation, the Court held that for a disability to be compensable, the seafarer must prove a reasonable
link between his work and his illness in order for a rational mind to determine that such work contributed to, or at least aggravated, his illness. It is
not enough that the seafarer’s injury or illness rendered him disabled; it is equally necessary that he establishes a causal connection between his
injury or illness, and the work for which he is engaged.

Here, respondent argues that he was unable to work as a seaman for more than 120 days, and that he contracted his illness while under the employ of
petitioners. However, he did not at all describe his work as an oiler, and neither did he specify the connection of his work and his illness.

In Panganiban v. Tara Trading Shipmanagement, Inc.,the Court denied the claim for disability benefits of a seafarer.The Court held that petitioner
therein failed to elaborate on the nature of his work or to even specify his tasks as oiler which rendered it difficult to determine a link between his
position and his illness.

The Court is confronted with a similar situation in this case. Respondent simply relied on the presumption that his illness is work-related. He did not
adduce substantial evidence that his work conditions caused, or at the least increased the risk of contracting his illness. Like in Panganiban, herein
respondent did not elaborate on the nature of his work and its connection to his illness. Certainly, he is not entitled to any disability compensation.

Moreover, the company-designated doctor determined that respondent’s condition is not work-related.

Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC provides that the company-designated doctor is tasked to determine the fitness or the degree of disability of a
medically repatriated seafarer. In addition, the company-designated doctor was shown to have closely examined and treated respondent from his
repatriation up to four months thereafter. Thus, the LA and the NLRC's reliance on the declaration of the company-designated doctor that
respondent's condition is not work-related is justified.
Lastly, the Court holds that the fact that respondent passed the PEME is of no moment in determining whether he acquired his illness during his
employment. The PEME is not exploratory in nature. It is not intended to be a thorough examination of a person's medical condition, .and is not a
conclusive evidence that one is free from any ailment before deployment. Hence, it does not follow that because respondent was declared fit to work
prior to his deployment, then he necessarily sustained his illness while aboard the vessel.

Given all these, the Court finds that the CA erred in setting aside the NLRC Resolutions.

CASE NO. 21

CARMELITO VALENZONA VS. FAIR SHIPPING CORPORATION

FACTS:

 In May 2001, Carmelito Valenzona was recruited and hired by the Fair Shipping Corporation to work as an engineer for Sejin Lines Company
Limited.
 He was assigned to work aboard the M/V Morelos ship. Before he embarked, he was declared fit to work by the company doctor.
 But in September 2001, Valenzona got sick while aboard the ship. In October 2001, he was confined at a hospital in Mexico. In the same month,
he was repatriated by Sejin to the Philippines. Upon reaching the Philippines, Valenzona was treated by the company doctor (Dr. Nicomedes
Cruz). He was treated continuously for six months until April 2002.
 But in April 2002, Valenzona sought a second opinion from a certain Dr. Magpapala and the latter diagnosed Valenzona with a cardiovascular
disease. Later that same month, Valenzona demanded from Fair Shipping and Sejin that he be paid his sickness allowance and permanent
disability benefits. Instead of paying him, the company did not as in fact, the company made a declaration that after the 6 months testing,
Valenzona was found to be fit to work.
 To prove his claim, Valenzona sought another independent doctor (Dr. Rodrgigo Guanlao). Guanlao concurred with the findings of D.
Magpapala as he determined that Valenzona is unfit to work in any capacity.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to receive permanent disability benefits as well as attorney’s fees.
HELD: Yes. Petitioner is entitled to permanent disability benefits.

a) The certification by the company-designated physician that petitioner is fit to work was issued after 199 days or more than 120 days from the time
he was medically repatriated to the Philippines.

Petitioner’s Employment Contract specifically provides that the same shall be deemed an “integral part of the Standard Terms and Conditions
Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On Board Ocean-Going Vessels” otherwise known as the POEA Standard Employment Contract.
Section 20(B) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract provides:

B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

xxxx

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is
declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this
period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

xxxx

The Labor Code’s provision on permanent total disability applies with equal force to seafarers.55 Article 192 (c) (1) of the Labor Code provides, viz;

Art. 192. Permanent total disability. – x x x

(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120, except as otherwise provided for in the Rules;

A total disability does not require that the employee be absolutely disabled or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that
the employee cannot pursue his usual work and earn therefrom (Austria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146636, Aug. 12, 2002, 387 SCRA 216, 221).
On the other hand, a total disability is considered permanent if it lasts continuously for more than 120 days.

Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was
trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do. It does not mean absolute
helplessness.

b) The company-designated physician’s certification that petitioner is fit to work does not make him ineligible for permanent total disability benefits.

We find no merit in respondents’ contention that the company-designated physician’s assessment that petitioner is fit to work makes him ineligible to
claim permanent disability benefits.66 This issue has already been raised, and rebuffed, in United Philippine Lines, Inc. v. Beseril. Even in the
absence of an official finding by the company-designated physicians that respondent is unfit for sea duty, respondent is deemed to have
suffered permanent disability.

The POEA Standard Employment Contract particularly Section 20(B) (6) thereof provides, to wit:

6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in
accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of this Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or
disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.

In turn, Section 32 provides that for an impediment considered as total and permanent, a disability allowance of US$60,000.00 (US$50,000.00 x
120%) is granted. Therefore, considering our earlier discussion finding petitioner’s disability as permanent and total, he is then entitled to receive
disability benefits of US$60,000.00.

Petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees.

Petitioner alleges that he is entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code because he was forced to litigate to recover his
wages. On the other hand, respondents argue that petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees is without legal and factual basis.

We find for the petitioner. Circumstances show that he demanded from the respondents the payment of his disability benefits but the same went
unheeded. Left with no other recourse, petitioner filed the instant case to recover what is rightfully his under the law. Plainly, he was “compelled to
litigate due to respondent[s’] failure to satisfy his valid claim, [thus, he] is x x x entitled to attorney’s fees of ten percent (10%) of the total award at
its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment.”81