Tsarist autocracy[a] (Russian: царское самодержавие, transcr.

 tsarskoye samoderzhaviye) is a
form of autocracy (later absolute monarchy) specific to the Grand Duchy of Moscow, which later
became Tsardom of Russia and the Russian Empire.[b] In it, all power and wealth is controlled (and
distributed) by the Tsar. They had more power than constitutional monarchs, who are usually vested
by law and counterbalanced by a legislative authority; and more authority on religious issues
compared to Western monarchs. In Russia, it originated during the time of Ivan III (1462−1505), and
was abolished after the Russian Revolution of 1917.

Contents

 1Alternative names
 2History
 3Features
 4Influences
 5Criticism of the concept
 6See also
 7Notes
 8References
 9Further reading
 10External links

Alternative names[edit]
This system has also been described by the following terms: Imperial autocracy,[c] Russian
autocracy,[d] Muscovite autocracy,[e] tsarist absolutism,[f] imperial absolutism,[g] Russian absolutism,
[h]
 Muscovite absolutism,[i] Muscovite despotism,[j][k] Russian despotism,[l] tsarist despotism[m] or imperial
despotism.[n]

History[edit]
The Tatar Yoke and the Sino-Mongol ideas and administrative system are credited with bringing the
culture exhibiting some characteristics of an oriental despotism to Russia.[1][b] Absolutism in Russia
gradually developed during the 17th century and 18th centuries, replacing the despotism of
the Grand Duchy of Moscow. Ivan III built upon Byzantine traditions and laid foundations for the
tsarist autocracy, a system that with some variations would govern Russia for centuries.[2][3]
After a period of disorder known as a Time of Troubles, the first monarch of the Romanov
dynasty, Michael of Russia, was elected to the throne by a Zemsky Sobor (or "assembly of the
land"). During Michael's reign, when the Romanov dynasty was still weak, such assemblies were
summoned annually. However, the Romanov dynasty consolidated absolute power in Russia during
the reign of Peter the Great, who reduced the power of the nobility and strengthened the central
power of the tsar, establishing a bureaucratic civil service based on the Table of Ranks but
theoretically open to all classes of the society, in place of the nobility-
only mestnichestvo which Feodor III had abolished in 1682 at the request of the highest boyars.[4][5]
[6]
 Peter I also strengthened the state's control over the church (the Orthodox Church).[4] Peter's
reform caused a series of palace coups seeking to restore the power of the nobility.[7] To end
them, Catherine the Great, whose reign is often regarded as the high point of absolutism in Russia,
in 1785 issued the Charter to the Gentry, legally affirming the rights and privileges they had acquired
in preceding years, and the Charter of the Towns, establishing municipal self-government. This
placated the powerful members of society; however, in fact, the real power rested with the state's
bureaucracy.[7] This was built on by later Tsars. Alexander I established the State council as advisory
legislative body. Although Alexander II established a system of elected local self-government
(Zemstvo) and an independent judicial system, Russia did not have a national-level representative
assembly (Duma) or a constitution until the 1905 Revolution.[8] The system was abolished after
the Russian Revolution of 1917.

Features[edit]
The person of the tsar himself, a sovereign with absolute authority, stood at the center of the tsarist
autocracy.[9] The rights of state power in their entire extent belonged to the tsar. The autocrat further
entrusted power to persons and institutions, acting in his name, by his orders, and within the limits
laid down for them by law. The purpose of the system was to supposedly benefit the entire country
of Russia.[9] A metaphor existed likening the tsar to a father, and all of the subjects of the Empire, to
his children; this metaphor even appeared in Orthodox primers.[10] This metaphor is present in the
common Russian expression "царь-батюшка", literally "tsar-dear father".
Furthermore, unlike the future theoretical separation of church and state in West European
monarchies, the Russian Empire combined monarchy with the supreme authority on religious issues
(see Church reform of Peter I and caesaropapism for details).
Another key feature related to patrimonialism. In Russia the tsar owned a much higher proportion of
the state (lands, enterprises, etc.) than did Western monarchs.[11][12][13][14][15][16]
The tsarist autocracy had many supporters within Russia. Major Russian advocates and theorists of
the autocracy included writer Fyodor Dostoyevsky,[3][17] Mikhail Katkov,[18] Konstantin Aksakov,
[19]
 Nikolay Karamzin,[17] Konstantin Pobedonostsev[3][9] and Pyotr Semyonov. They all argued that a
strong and prosperous Russia needed a strong tsar, and that philosophies
of republicanism and liberal democracy did not fit Russia.[3]

Influences[edit]
Some historians see the traditions of tsarist autocracy as partially responsible for laying groundworks
for the totalitarianism in the Soviet Union.[2][3][20][21] They see the traditions of autocracy and
patrimonialism as dominating Russia's political culture for centuries; for example, Stephen White is
described as "the most consistent" defender of the position that the uniqueness of Russian political
heritage is inseparable from its ethnic identity. In White's opinion, autocracy is the defining factor in
the history of Russian politics.[22] He wrote that Russian political culture is "rooted in the historical
experience of centuries of absolutism."[23] Those views had been challenged by other historians, for
example, Nicolai N. Petro and Martin Malia (as cited by Hoffmann).[20] Richard Pipes is another
influential historian among non-specialists who holds the position about the distinctness of Russian
history and political system, describing the absolutism of the Muscovite political system as
"patrimonial", and saw the stability of the Soviet Union in the fact that Russians accepted the
legitimacy of this patrimonial organization.[22]
Some historians have pointed to a racial element in the concept. For example, American Cold
War analysts, including George Kennan, linked the Soviet government's autocratic rule
to Tatar influences during its history, and biographies of Russian leaders often stressed their
possible Asiatic ancestries. They maintained that Asiatic influences rendered the Russians, along
with the Chinese, untrustworthy.[24][25]

Criticism of the concept[edit]

Historians of different backgrounds have criticised the concept of tsarist autocracy in its various
forms. Their complaints range from the different names of the model being too vague,[26] to its
chronological implications (it is impossible to consider Russia in different centuries the same) as well
as to its content (the question how Russian or "tsarist" autocracy differs from "regular" autocracy or
from European absolutism for that matter).
Regarding the substance of the autocracy model, its equation with despotism, its supposed origins in
Mongol rule, as well as its supposed rise in medieval Muscovy have been heavily debated.[27] For
one, Marxist Soviet scholars were concerned with prerevolutionary absolutism and identified the
boyar elites and the bureaucracy as its pillars. For example, Sergey M. Troitskii claimed that the
Russian monarchs held sway of the nobility which was reduced to state service. According to
Troitskii, absolutism in Russia was the same as everywhere else. This led to a difficult position within
Marxism, because absolutism revolves around institutions and laws, which were fundamentally less
important than the socioeconomic base of society.[28] This raises the question how absolutism could
be the same when socioeconomic circumstances in Russia were not the same as elsewhere.
In order to reconcile the non-socioeconomic nature of absolutism with Marxist theory, Soviet scholar
Alexander N. Chistozvonov proposed to group the Russian monarchy with the Prussian and Austrian
ones, forming a distinct mix of Western European absolutism and "oriental despotism".[29] In the eyes
of Chistozvonov, whatever absolutist or autocratic elements were indeed present in Russia, they
were not unique and do not warrant Russia’s exclusive categorization.
Similarly struggling with Marxist conceptions, Soviet historians Petr A. Zaionchkovskii and his
student Larisa G. Zakharova focused on the importance of political convictions of Russian officials
and bureaucrats to explain nineteenth-century political decision-making. By showing that the state
was not a unified and powerful whole (commanded by the economically dominant class), they
likewise tackled common (Marxist) conceptions of Russian autocracy.[30] While like Troitskii, they
studied the nobility and bureaucracy (in a later period), Zaionchkovskii and Zakharova painted a
different picture of the tsar's position. Coinciding with Western scholars like Robert Crummey, they
lay bare the interdependence of monarch and nobility in the practice of rule.[31]
Outside Russia and the Soviet Union, Hans-Joachim Torke among others tried to counter the notion
of an all-powerful autocratic state by pointing at the mutual dependency of service elites and the
state (coining the term "state-conditioned society").[32] Torke acknowledges that the tsars were not
reined in by any form of constitution, but he emphasizes for example the limitations of Christian
morality and court customs. The so-called "American school" of the 1980s and 1990s argued for the
important role of elite networks and their power at court. Edward Keenan went even further in his
well-known piece on Muscovite political culture, claiming that the tsar was merely a puppet in the
hands of boyars who wielded the actual power behind the scenes.[33]
For others, like David Ransel and Paul Bushkovitch, it goes too far to portray relations between tsar
and nobility like Keenan does, because it does not appreciate their complexity. Bushkovitch argues
that the theoretic lack of limitations on the power of the tsar is irrelevant and instead claims that the
"crucial question" is where real power lay. In his view, this can only be shown by the political
narrative of events.[34] Bushkovitch placed the balance of power between the tsar, the individual
boyars and the tsar’s favourites at the centre of political decision-making. In so doing, Bushkovitch
found that on the one hand, the tsar's relative power fluctuated per monarch, and on the other hand,
that the nobility was all but unified; the balance of power changed with each tsar as well as the rise
of boyars and in the case of Peter I even shifted multiple times.
Charles J. Halperin cautioned against views that too easily claim tsar and state dominance in politics
or society.[35] While acknowledging the institutional differences between Muscovy and Western
European monarchies, Halperin nevertheless stresses that these differences should not be
considered absolute. In his view, the practice of rule, a matter of human interactions, is more
important than theory and abstractions.