Domalagan v Bolifer

Domalagan v Bolifer G.R. No. L-8166 February 8, 1916

Facts: plaintiff alleged that he and the defendant entered into a contract by virtue of the terms of which he was to pay to
the defendant a certain amount upon the marriage of his son with the daughter of the defendant; that he has completed
his obligation under said contract by paying the stipulated amount; that notwithstanding said agreement, the daughter was
joined to a lawful wedlock with another man not his son; that immediately upon learning of the marriage, he demanded the
return of the payment he has made. The trail court rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.

Issue: Whether or not the verbal contract entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant in regard to the delivery of the
money by reason of a prospective marriage is valid and effective.

Held: Plaintiff invokes paragraph 3 of section 335 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Action and, appellant argues that the
verbal contract, not having been reduced to writing, plaintiff cannot recover.
The section relied upon by the does not render oral contracts invalid. If the parties to an action, during the trial of the
cause, make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts like the one in question and permit the
contract to be proved, by evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced
to writing.

Rodriguez vs CA

FACTS:
On December 31, 1958, a document denominated "Kasunduan" written in the vernacular and ratified before Notary
Public was executed between Nieves Cruz and spouses Atanacio Valenzuela, and Maximina Victorio and Liberate Santos
authorizing the latter three (as agents) to sell a certain parcel of land situated in Rizal. The price payable to Cruz for the
land would be P1.60 per sq.meter and any overprice would pertain to the agents; that Nieves Cruz would receive agents
advance payments for the purchase price by whomsoever may buy the land, in a first P10,000 and another P10,000
thereafter. Should the agent find no buyer by the time that Torrens title is issued, Nieves Cruz reserved the right to look
for a buyer herself and all sums already received from the agents would be returned to them without interest. Amounts
received were evidenced by a receipt. Ad thereafter, Cruz and her children collected various sums of money either thru
Victorio or Salud de Leon (daughter of Santos) from 1969 to 1961 as additional payments for the land, all totaling P47,
198. Proceedings to place land under the Torrens System were initiatedand the registration court decreed in 1960 the land
in the name of Cruz and her brother, subject to the rights of Valenzuela, Victorio, and Santos over the ½ share of the land
which they partially paid for, as carried over the annotation in the Certificate of title. Then, on September 15, 1961, Cruz
sold the property in question to Barbara Lombos Rodriguez, her "balae, for P77,216 and a TCT was issued in the name of
Rodriguez which likewise carried over the annotation pertaining to the ½ part. On the next day Cruz, thru counsel, gave
notice to the three agents to rescind their original agreement with a corresponding check in the amount of all their
payments. Agents returned the check, thus Cruz came before the Rizal Court for an action of rescission and cancellation
of annotation. Agents content that the agreement has been novated by a subsequent agreement whereunder they were to
buy the property directly and the annulment of the sale to Rodriguez. Pending the case, Cruz died and substituted by her
children.
Trial Court decision: In favor of Cruz and Rodriguez as against the defendants (agents)
Court of Appeals decision: Reversed decision of Trial Court ordering possession to be restored to the agents and
Rodriguez divested of title over the land.
Two cases over the same land was brought before the Supreme Court, one where Rodriguez and heirs of Cruz filed a joint
petition for certiorari but filed beyond the reglamentary period mentioned in Rule 45 of Civil Procedure*. The action was
denied. Another action (present action) was filed solely by Rodriguez for mandamus and certiorari with new grounds,
such as (1) land has a value in excess of P200,000 thus CA has no jusrisdiction, and (2) grave abuse of discretion by CA
in denying her motion for new trial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Cruz did agree to sell to the agents the land in question.

RULING:

A novatory oral contract existed between Cruz the agents. For several times in the past, as affirmed by the son of Cruz,
agents informed Cruz that Salud de Leon (daughter of Santos) is the buyer of the land. Later, de Leon forgoes the
purchase of land in favor of the agents. Another fact of the existence of such novation is the significance of the notation in
the certificate of title in favor of the agents, to which Cruz and her children did not protest for over a year and continue to
receive the 13 installment payments. SC, therefore, conclude that there is substantial evidence in record sustaining that
that parties to the agency agreement subsequently entered into a different contract, one that of sale and the legion of
receipts that come to support it. In the case of Rodriguez, being aware of the annotations in the certificate, she cannot
claim to be an innocent purchaser for value. As to the two grounds she raised before SC, the first ground does not have
any merit because the value of the land, as evidenced by various sale transactions, could not have been beyond 200,000.
She was also estopped from raising jurisdiction against CA when in the first place, she has subjected herself under its
jurisdiction during the various hearings until the decision of the appealed case. An unfavorable judgment and the goal to
secure relief could not afford one to raise the issue of jurisdiction. As to the second ground, certainly, the CA could not
entertain her request for motion for new trail in application of estoppel by laches**. SC declared the estate of Cruz to be
liable to Rodriguez for the sum she paid for the land and affirmed findings of the CA.

Legal Doctrines:
One cannot seek refuge behind the protection afforded by the Land Registration Act to purchasers in good faith and for
value (the CA considered agents to be IPVs). Annotations included in the certificate of title serve as a notice of the
existence of prior rights acquired over a parcel of land, such that, subsequent purchasers of land cannot claim a right better
than that of his grantor.
*Rule 45 of Civil Procedure – Time of filing of petition with Supreme Court from a judgment, final order or resolution of
CA shall be filed within 15 days from notice of such judgment, final order, or resolution appealed from.
**Laches is a failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned or declined to assert it.

CLARIN V. RULONA

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the finding of the trial
court that there was a perfected contract of sale between the petitioner and the respondent with regard to the ten (10)
hectares of land constituting the petitioner’s share of Lot 20 PLD No. 4, Carmen Cadastre in Carmen, Bohol.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary

On May 31, 1959 the petitioner executed two documents, namely, Exhibits "A" and "B" which respectively
provide:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"This is to authorize Mr. Gustavo Decasa, surveyor from Batuan, Bohol to survey on behalf of Mr. & Mrs. Alberto L.
Rulona of Suba, Katipunan, Carmen, Bohol, a portion of the share of the undersigned of Lot 20 PLD No. 4 (Carmen
Cadastre) from the CLARIN HERMANOS of which the undersigned is one of the heirs in a decision rendered in Cad.
Case No. 20, Reg. Rec. No. 200 promulgated by Judge Hipolito Alo of the Court of First Instance of this province dated
January 6, 1956; of the ten hectares (10) awarded to Mr. & Mrs. Alberto L. Rulona which the couple purchased from the
undersigned for TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P2,500.00). The portion of land to be surveyed is situated
where the house and vicinity of Mr. & Mrs. A. Rulona are located in said lot.

(SGD.) OLEGARIO B. CLARIN

(SGD.) ZOILA L. CLARIN

"Received from Mr. Alberto Rulona of Carmen, Bohol, the sum of Eight Hundred (P800.00) Pesos as an initial payment
for the ten hectares of land in Carmen, Bohol which he is going to purchase from the undersigned. The value of the land in
question is P2,500.00."cralaw virtua1aw library

Respondent Rulona filed a complaint for specific performance and recovery of improvements on the ground that the
petitioner and his wife violated the terms of the agreement of sale "by returning by their own volition and without the
consent of plaintiff, the amount of P1,100.00 in six postal money orders, covering the downpayment of P1,000.00 and
first installment of P100.00."cralaw virtua1aw library

In his complaint, the respondent alleged that the petitioner sold ten hectares of his share of the disputed lot to him for
P2,500.00. The conditions of the sale were that a downpayment of P1,000.00 was to be made and then the balance of
P1,500.00 was to be paid in monthly installment of P100.00. As shown by Exhibit B, the respondent delivered to the
petitioner a downpayment of P800.00 and on the first week of June the amount of P200.00 was also delivered thereby
completing the downpayment of P1,000.00. On the first week of August, another delivery was made by the respondent in
the amount of P100.00 as payment for the first installment. Respondent further alleged that despite repeated demands to
let the sale continue and for the petitioner to take back the six postal money orders, the latter refused to comply.cralawnad

In his answer, the petitioner alleged that while it is true that he had a projected contract of sale of a portion of land with
the respondent, such was subject to the following conditions: (1) that the contract would be realized only if his co-heirs
would give their consent to the sale of a specific portion of their common inheritance from the late Aniceto Clarin before
partition of the said common property and (2) that should his co-heirs refuse to give their consent, the projected contract
would be discontinued or would not be realized. Petitioner further contended that the respondent knew fully well the
above terms and accepted them as conditions precedent to the perfection or consummation of the contract; that respondent
delivered the amount of P1,000.00 as earnest money, subject to the above conditions and that the amount was returned by
the petitioner upon his learning definitely that his co-heirs and co-owners refused to give their consent to the projected
sale.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent on the ground that the contract of sale, Exhibit A, is a pure
sale of a portion of Lot No. 20, containing an area of ten hectares for the sum of P2,500.00, and that the sale is not subject
to any condition nor is it vitiated by any flaw. Therefore, it declared the same binding upon the parties under Articles 1356
and 1458 of the Civil Code. The trial court also ruled that the fact that petitioner returned the sum of P1,100.00 paid by
the respondent indicated an intention to rescind the contract. The court stated, however, that rescission under Article 1191
of the Civil Code can be authorized by the court only if either party violates his obligation. Since there had been no
violation, the court ruled that the petitioner could not rescind the contract. Lastly, the court held that although as co-owner
the petitioner could not dispose of a specific portion of the land, nevertheless, his share was bound by the effect of the
sale.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the findings of the trial court, stating that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

". . . We believe that the trial court did not incur any error when it arrived at the conclusion that there was a perfected
contract of sale between the plaintiff and the defendant, for indeed the terms of the agreement (Exh. A) were clearly
drafted in an equivocal manner that leaves no room for interpretation other than those terms contained therein, the real
substance of which satisfied all the elements and requisites of a contract. Appellant, however, argues that Exhibit A was a
mere authority to survey. It is not addressed to any definite party, it does not contain the proper heading, there is no
statement of the manner of paying the purchase price, no personal circumstances of the parties, and it is not notarized. All
these grounds relied upon to suit the theory of appellant, anchored as it were on a weak foundation, deserve scant
consideration. Suffice it to state that a contract to be binding upon the contracting parties need not be notarized. Neither
should it specify the manner of payment of the consideration nor should it specify the manner of payment of the
consideration nor should it contain the proper heading." (sic)

It is maintained in this petition that the appellate court erred in holding there was a perfected contract of sale between the
petitioner and the respondent, principally relying on Exhibit A and that even assuming that the latter were a perfected
contract of sale, such was subject to a condition precedent with which there was no compliance. The petitioner alleges that
the two documents introduced in evidence could not effectively convey title to the land because they were not public
documents. Lastly, the petitioner contends that he could not have validly disposed of a definite portion of the community
property and therefore, there arose a legal impossibility for him and the respondent to agree on a definite
object.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

The petitioner’s contentions are without merit.

While it is true that Exhibits A and B are, in themselves, not contracts of sale, they are, however, clear evidence that a
contract of sale was perfected between the petitioner and the respondent and that such contract had already been partially
fulfilled and executed. A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is
the object of the contract and upon the price. (Article 1475, Civil Code; Phil. Virginia Tobacco Administration v. De los
Angeles, 87 SCRA 210). Such contract is binding in whatever form it may have been entered into. (Lopez v. Auditor
General, 20 SCRA 655).

Construing Exhibits A and B together, it can be seen that the petitioner agreed to sell and the respondent agreed to buy a
definite object, that is, ten hectares of land which is part and parcel of Lot 20 PLD No. 4, owned in common by the
petitioner and his sisters although the boundaries of the ten hectares would be delineated at a later date. The parties also
agreed on a definite price which is P2,500.00. Exhibit B further shows that the petitioner has received from the respondent
as initial payment, the amount of P800.00. Hence, it cannot be denied that there was a perfected contract of sale between
the parties and that such contract was already partially executed when the petitioner received the initial payment of
P800.00. The latter’s acceptance of the payment clearly showed his consent to the contract thereby precluding him from
rejecting its binding effect. (See Federation of United Namarco Distributors, Inc. v. National Marketing Corporation, 4
SCRA 884). With the contract being partially executed, the same is no longer covered by the requirements of the Statute
of Frauds in order to be enforceable. (See Khan v. Asuncion, 19 SCRA 996). Therefore, with the contract being valid and
enforceable, the petitioner cannot avoid his obligation by interposing that Exhibit A is not a public document. On the
contrary, under Article 1357 of the Civil Code, the petitioner can even be compelled by the respondent to execute a public
document to embody their valid and enforceable contract.

The petitioner’s contention that he was only forced to receive money from the respondent due to the insistence of the
latter merits little consideration. It is highly improbable that the respondent would give different sums on separate dates to
the petitioner with no apparent reason, without a binding assurance from the latter that the disputed lot would be sold to
him. We agree with the trial court and the appellate court that the payments were made in fulfillment of the conditions of
the sale, namely, a downpayment of P1,000.00 and the balance of P1,500.00, to be paid in monthly installments of
P100.00 each.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
We, therefore, find no error in the lower court’s holding that a contract of sale was perfected between the petitioner and
the respondent and that the sale did not depend on a condition that the petitioner’s co-owners would have to agree to the
sale. The latter finding is strengthened by the fact that although the petitioner has been stressing that he made it clear to
the respondent that the consent of his sisters as co-owners was necessary in order for the sale to push through, his letter to
respondent marked Exhibit C stated another reason, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"My dear Mr. Rulona:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Replying to your letter of recent date, I deeply regret to inform you that my daughter, Alice, who is now in Manila, could
not be convinced by me to sell the land in question, that is, the ten (10) hectares of land referred to in our tentative
agreement. It is for this reason that I hereby authorize the bearer, Mr. Paciano Parmisano, to return to you in person the
sum of One Thousand and One Hundred (P1,100.00) Pesos which you have paid in advance for the proposed sale of the
land in question."cralaw virtua1aw library

x x x

The reasons given by the petitioner cannot operate against the validity of the contract in question. A contract is valid even
though one of the parties entered into it against his better judgment. (See Lagunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476;
citing Martinez v. Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, 15 Phil. 252).

Finally, we agree with the lower court’s holding that although as a co-owner, the petitioner cannot dispose of a specific
portion of the land, his share shall be bound by the effect of the sale. This is anchored in Article 493 of the Civil Code
which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be alloted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
BADILLO vs FERRER

FACTS:
1.Macario Badillodied intestateon February 4, 1966, survived by his widow, Clarita Ferrer, and five minor children.

2.He left a parcel of registered land of77 square meters in Lumban, Laguna, with a house erected thereon, valued at
P7,500.00,(the "PROPERTY", for short). Hence, each of the five minor plaintiffs had inherited a 1/12 share of the
P7,500.00,or P625.00 each, which resulted in Clarita Ferrer being automatically the legal guardian. (Art. 320, Civil Code)

3.January 18, 1967,the surviving widow, in her own behalf and as natural guardian of the minor plaintiffs, executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale of the PROPERTY through which the PROPERTY was sold to defendants-
appellants, the spouses GREGORIO SOROMERO AND ELEUTERIA RANA.

4.November 11, 1968, Modesta Badillo, a sister of Macario Badillo, was able to obtain guardianship over the persons and
properties of the minor plaintiffs.

5. July 23, 1970, their guardian caused the minor plaintiffs to file a complaint for the ANNULMENT OF THE SALE OF
THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE PROPERTY to defendants-appellants and, conceding the validity of the sale of the
widow's participation in the PROPERTY, they asked that, as co-owners, they be allowed to exercise the right of legal
redemption.

6.TRIAL: Annuled the sale and allowed redemption Respondents added that if it was annulled, the petitioners should be
ordered to return THE PURCHASE PRICE AS WELL AS THE VALUE OF THE IMPROVEMENTS Petitioners
contend that when a voidalble sale is annulled, the MINORS should only return partially, only to the extent of the benefits
they received by virtue of the questioned contract.

7. CA: Certified the issue to be pure questions of law

ISSUE: WON there should be mutual restitution.

HELD: NO

a. The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale is NOT A VOIDABLE OR AN ANNULLABLE CONTRACT
UNDER ARTICLE 1390 of the New Civil Code. Article 1390 renders a contract voidable if one of the parties is
incapable of giving consent to the contract or if the contracting party's consent is vitiated by mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence or fraud.

In this case, however, the appellee minors are not even parties to the contract involved. Their names were merely
dragged into the contract by their mother who claimed a right to represent them

b. The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale is an unenforceable or, more specifically, an unauthorized contract
under Articles 1403 (1) and 1317 of the New Civil Code. These provisions state that:

ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given NO AUTHORITY
or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers; ...

ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he has
by law a right to represent him.

A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who has
acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on
whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party.

c. The powers given to CLARITA FERRER by the laws as the natural guardian covers ONLY MATTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION and cannot include the power of disposition. She should have first secured the permission
of the court before she alienated that portion of the property in question belonging to her minor children.

d. The contract remained unenforceable or unauthorized NO RESTITUTION MAY BE ORDERED FROM THE
APPELLEE minors either as to that portion of the purchase price which pertains to their share in the property or
at least as to that portion which benefited them BECAUSE THE LAW DOES NOT SANCTION ANY.
G.R. No. L-10100            August 15, 1916

GALO ABRENICA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANUEL GONDA and MARCELO DE GARCIA, defendants-appellees.

Marcelo Caringal for appellants.

Ramon Diokno for appellee.

ARAULLO, J.:

These proceedings were brought by the plaintiff to compel the defendant to return to him the two parcels of land
described in the complaint which he alleges were sold by him under right of repurchase to the defendant on
February 21, 1916, for the sum of P75 and for the period of seven years. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
refused to deliver said property to him when, upon the expiration of the period mentioned, he endeavored to
redeem the same and tendered payment to the defendant of the sum aforesaid.

The first of the defendants, Manuel Gonda (who had already sold said parcels to the other defendant Marcelino
de Gracia, for which reason the latter was also made a party defendant) alleged that about 19 years ago he was
the sole possessor and owner of said parcels, and in the course of the trial endeavored to prove that they had
been sold to him by the plaintiff and his mother.

The issue presented by the pleadings, therefore, is whether said two parcels of land were sold under right of
repurchase by the plaintiff to the defendant for the period of seven years, for the sum of P75, or whether they
were conveyed to the defendant in absolute sale by the plaintiff's parents.

The justice of the peace of the provincial capital, who tried the case by assignment of the judge of the Court of
First Instance of the same province, heard the evidence introduced by the parties and after making a sufficiently
clear summary of and duly considering the same, reached the conclusion that the proofs introduced by the
plaintiff were entitled to the greater credit and, on the grounds that the plaintiff had not yet lost his right to
recover the lands from the defendant Gonda and that the sale made by this defendant to the other defendant De
Gracia, supposing it to be genuine, could have no legal effect as Gonda was not the true owner of the land,
entered judgment in behalf of the plaintiff and against the two defendants whereby he ordered each and both of
them to return and deliver to the plaintiff the parcels of land claimed by him, after payment to Gonda of the sum
of P75 that had been deposited with the clerk of the court, and assessed the costs against the defendants in equal
shares. The court made no finding in regard to the damages demanded by the plaintiff as there was no evidence
to show that any had been caused. The defendants moved for a new trial. Their motion having been overruled,
they excepted to the ruling and, by proper bill of exceptions, appealed to the Supreme Court. In this instance the
appellants allege in the first place that the trial judge erred in holding that he had jurisdiction to try the case, and
in trying the same in spite of the fact that the Act which authorizes justices of the peace to try by assignment
cases filed with the Court of First Instance is unconstitutional.

Before the hearing in first instance, counsel for the defendant did in fact challenge the jurisdiction of the justice
of the peace of the provincial capital to try the case at bar, on the ground that Act No. 2041 of the Philippine
Legislature is unconstitutional. In deciding this question, said justice of the peace held that he did have
jurisdiction and immediately proceeded to enter judgment in the manner aforestated.

This Supreme Court has held on various occasions, among them in the decision rendered on December 24,
1914, in the case of Calampiano vs. Tolentino (29 Phil. Rep., 116) that said Act No. 2041 is valid and does not
conflict with the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902; that a justice of the peace, acting under the
designation under the law just referred to, acts not as a justice of the peace or holds a justice's court, but acts as
a judge of the zone of first instance and holds, in effect, a Court of First Instance; and finally, that for this
reason the objection that this case falls within that of Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. Rep., 44 (which is the one
cited by the appellants in their brief to show that the error aforementioned was incurred), is not well taken. This
assignment of error cannot, therefore, be sustained.

The second error assigned by the appellants to the judgment of the trial court consists, as they maintain, in that
the court founded its judgment on inadmissible and illegal evidence which was rejected by the same court
during the course of the trial.

In effect, the plaintiff ought to have proven that on February 21, 1906, he sold, under right of repurchase for the
period of seven years, the two parcels of land mentioned in the complaint, or, what amounts to the same thing,
that a contract of sale with right of repurchase (or one of pledge or mortgage, as it was improperly called in the
complaint and so termed by the plaintiff) was entered into between this latter and the defendant, on the date
aforementioned, in respect to said parcels of land.

The plaintiff, testifying at the trial in regard to the existence of the contract, stated that it was a verbal one
between himself and said defendant. Assuredly such a contract could not be proven a trial, except by means of
some written instrument in accordance with the provisions of subsections 1 and 5, section 335, of the Code of
Civil Procedure. The plaintiff, however, having been placed on the stand as a witness by his on attorney,
testified at length and answered all the questions asked him with respect to the said contract, the details of the
same, the persons who witnessed it, the place where it was made, and various other circumstances connected
with its execution. These questions and answers cover six pages of the record, and yet the defendants' counsel
raised no objection to the examination, aside from challenging one of the questions as leading and another of
them as irrelevant. It seems that only when the examination was terminated did counsel for defendants move to
strike out all of the testimony given and statements made by plaintiff in regard to the contract, on the ground
that the period for the fulfillment of the contract exceeded one year and that it could not be proven except by
means of a written instrument. The court sustained this motion, to which an exception was entered by the
plaintiff.

Defendants' counsel moved that the case be dismissed on the ground that, as the aforementioned testimony was
stricken out, there was no proof of the contract. This motion being denied by the court, counsel excepted to the
ruling and on cross-examination put several question to the plaintiff relative to the plaintiff's ownership in said
parcels of land and the manner in which he acquired it. Among these questions some were asked which bore
upon the answers given by the plaintiff on direct examination regarding the existence of the contract by which,
according to the plaintiff, the defendant Gonda came to hold said parcels. These questions on cross-examination
and their respective answers are as follows:

CARINGAL: (To the plaintiff). Prior to the day on which the defendant Manuel Gonda went to see you
or to visit you in the house of Domingo Tamayo, you had not spoken to him with regard to the pledge of
some land of yours, had you? —

A.       No, sir.

Q.       Did you then take advantage of that circumstance of his having gone to visit you? —

A.       Yes, sir.

Q.       You knew then that he was married, did you not? —

A.       Yes, sir.

Q.       Did you not think of necessary to speak to Manuel Gonda's wife about the mortgage? —

A.       No, sir, because I considered him as an uncle of mine.

xxx           xxx           xxx

CARINGAL: So that you knew, did you, that it was Manuel Gonda who paid the land tax? —

A.       Yes, sir.

Q.       Who paid the land tax before the lands were pledged? —

A.       I could not declare them before they were pledged. I have not yet paid the land tax, because I
have not been able to declare those lands.

xxx           xxx           xxx

Q.       Tell us where Manuel Gonda was living on the date when, as you said, the pledge was made. —

A.       In the barrio of Moson.

Q.       Of Taal or Bauan? —
 A.       Bauan.

Q.       What is the distance between the then domicile or residence of Manuel Gonda and the house of
Domingo Tamayo in which you were living? —

A.       I think it is the same as between Bauan and Taal.

Q.       And notwithstanding that distance, Manuel Gonda went purposely to take the money to you? —

A.       He took the money to the house of Domingo Tamayo.

Q.       Was there no written contract of that mortgage? —

A.       No, sir.

That is all.

Continuing to present evidence, the plaintiff put three witnesses on the stand and they were examined.

One of them, Juan Carandang, testified in regard to the plaintiff's ownership and possession of the lands. The
court sustained a motion by defendants' counsel to strike out one of the statements made by this witness in
which he stated that he knew by hearsay that said lands had been "pledged" (sic).

Another of these witnesses, Domingo Tamayo, testified that he was present at the time the plaintiff asked the
defendant for the P75 mentioned in the complaint, and when the agreement was made with regard thereto
between the two men in connection with the so-called pledge of the lands in question. He also testified that he
received that sum from the defendant, at the plaintiff's suggestion.

And, finally, the third witness, Pedro Mendoza, also the plaintiff's, testified that he was present when the money
was tendered by the defendant to the plaintiff, and heard the latter tell the witness Domingo Tamayo to receive
it. He stated that Tamayo did in fact take the money.

In the course of the examination of these witnesses, the defendants' counsel moved that their testimony be
stricken out. The court sustained one of these motions, while as to the rest of them be said that counsel's motion
would be taken under consideration; later, when one of these witnesses, replying to a question by the court,
stated that the contract was not executed in writing, the court said that the motion was sustained, but,
notwithstanding this ruling, and immediately after it had been made, the defendants' counsel put the following
question to this witness on cross-examination:

Q.       Do you remember positively that it was on a Sunday the first time, and on a Tuesday or a
Wednesday the second time, that Manuel Gonda went to your house and delivered the money? —

A.       Yes, sir.

The court finally granted the motion of counsel for defendants for strike out the testimony given by this witness.
Counsel for plaintiff excepted to this ruling.

Now then, it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or objection against the
admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, and that if not so made it will be understood to
have been waived. The proper time to make a protest or objection is when, from the question addressed to the
witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the inadmissiblity of the evidence is,
or may be, inferred.

A motion to strike out parol or documentary evidence from the record is useless and ineffective if made without
timely protest, objection, or opposition on the part of the party against whom it was presented.

Objection to the introduction of evidence should be made before the question is answered. When no
such objection is made, a motion to strike out the answer ordinarily comes too late. (De Dios Chua Soco
vs. Veloso, 2 Phil. Rep., 658).
In the case of Conlu vs. Araneta and Guanko (15 Phil. Rep., 387) in which one of the points discussed was the
inadmissibility of parol evidence to prove contracts involving real property, in accordance with the provisions
of section 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure, no objection having been made to such evidence, this court said:

A failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the statute, is a waiver of the
provisions of the law.

An objection to a question put to a witness must be made at the time question is asked. (Kreigh vs.
Sherman, 105 Ill., 49; 46 Am. Dig., Century Ed., 932.)

Objections to evidence and the reason therefor must be stated in apt time." (Kidder vs. McIlhenny, 81 N. C.,
123; 46 Am. Dig., Century Ed., 933.)

It is held in general that by failing to object to the proof of an oral contract a party waives the benefit of
the statute and cannot afterward claim it. (20 Cyc., 320, where several decisions on the subject are
cited.)

Many rulings have been made in regard to this matter by the courts of the United States, and among them we
cite a few found in volume 46 of the American Digest, page 933:

Where plaintiff without objection proved by parol evidence that certain land belonged to him, defendant
cannot afterwards object that the deed should have been produced. (Clay vs. Boyer, 10 Ill. [5 Gilman],
506.)

After a question has been repeatedly asked and answered without objection, it is too late to object to its
repetition on the ground that the answer is in itself inadmissible. (McKee vs. Nelson, 4 Cow., 355; 15
Am. Dec., 384.)

An objection to the admission of evidence on the ground of incompetency, taken after the testimony has
been given, is too late. (In re Morgan, 104 N. Y., 74; 9 N. E., 861.)

Plaintiff having testified to conversation between defendant's son and himself until the direct
examination extended through about 12 folios, defendant could not sit by and then objet to the
"foregoing testimony." (Boehme vs. Michael, 5 N. Y. St. Rep., 492.)

The first witness to testify at the trial was the plaintiff himself. From the first question put to him, it clearly
appeared, as may be seen in folios 5, 6, and 7 of the stenographic notes, that the contract of pledge or mortgage
of the lands, as the plaintiff himself improperly calls it, or the sale of said lands with right of repurchase,
between him and the defendant Gonda, was a verbal one and for the period of seven years, made in the course
of a conversation between the plaintiff and said defendant in the house of Domingo Tamayo. The defendants'
counsel, however, did not endeavor immediately to obtain from the witness a statement as to whether that
contract was set forth in any instrument; he did not object to the witness' continuing to testify in regard to the
contract, nor did he in any way object to the questions they continued to ask the witness concerning the matter,
though he did object to one question as leading and to another one as irrelevant, thus indicating that he had no
other objection to make to those questions. Only after witness, the plaintiff, had finished answering all the
questions put to him on the subject of the contract, did counsel for the defendants move that all of his testimony
and statements be stricken out. It is obvious that the court should not have granted that motion; but we must also
bear in mind that the court did not grant other similar and subsequent motions made during the examination of
the other witnesses; he merely said that he would take them under advisement. The fact that the defendants'
counsel asked various cross-questions, both of the plaintiff and of the other witness, in connection with the
answers given by them in their direct examination, with respect to particulars concerning the contract, implies a
waiver on his part to have the evidence stricken out.

It is true that, before cross-examining the plaintiff and one of the witnesses, this same counsel requested the
permission of the court, and stipulated that his clients' rights should not be prejudiced by the answers to those
witnesses in view of the motion presented to strike out their testimony; buy this stipulation of the defendants'
counsel has no value or importance whatever, because, if the answers of those witnesses were stricken out, the
cross-examination could have no object whatsoever, and if the questions were put to the witnesses and
answered by them, they could only be taken into account by connecting them with the answers given by those
witnesses on direct examination.
As no timely objection or protest was made to the admission of the testimony of the plaintiff with respect to the
contract; and as the motion to strike out said evidence came to late; and, furthermore, as the defendants
themselves, by the cross-questions put by their counsel for the witnesses in respect to said contract, tacitly
waived their right to have it stricken out, that evidence, therefore, cannot be considered either inadmissible or
illegal, and court, far from having erred in taking it into consideration and basing his judgment thereon,
notwithstanding the fact that it was ordered to be stricken out during the trial, merely corrected the error he
committed in ordering it to be so stricken out and complied with the rules of procedure hereinbefore cited.

The lower court was guided by the evidence in making that finding, for it was proved that the plaintiff sold to
the defendant Gonda for the period of seven years, with right of repurchase, the two aforementioned parcels of
land, on February 21, 1906, for the sum of P75, Philippine currency. The testimony of the plaintiff himself and
of the witnesses Juan Carandang, Domingo Tamayo, and Pedro Mendoza, of which mentioned is made in the
judgment, proves those facts. As against this testimony, the defendants presented that of one of themselves,
Manuel Gonda, who stated that said two parcels of land were sold to him outright by the plaintiff Galo Abrenica
and his mother, Mamerta Bonio, more than 19 years ago, for the sum of P75; but this allegation was in no
matter proven, for, having stated that an instrument of sale was executed but that it had been lost, he furnished
absolutely no proof of the existence of the instrument, nor of any such sale having been made between himself
and the plaintiff. This defendant did, indeed, exhibit a copy of the affidavit filed by him on May 26, 1906, in the
municipality of Taal, for the purpose of the assessment of a piece of land which he says included the two
parcels in question; but the plaintiff has explained why the tax declaration of said parcels was not made by him,
but by the defendant Gonda. It is easily understood that the latter might have made this declaration on May 26,
1906, that is, three months after the land had been sold to him by the plaintiff under right of repurchase,
inasmuch as said defendant had been the owner of said parcels since the month of February of the same year
and, by reason of said sale, was to be their owner for seven years, so long as the plaintiff did not make use of his
right to redeem them. On the other hand, the very fact that the defendant Gonda did not declare these parcels of
land before May 26, 1906, is proof that he did not purchase them outright from the plaintiff and the latter's
mother 19 years ago.

As the plaintiff made use of his right to recover the property within the period stipulated by the contract and
which did not exceed ten years, and as he deposited with the clerk of the court the sum of P75, the price of the
purchase, in due time, the defendant is not entitled to oppose the recovery, and the said parcels of land must be
delivered to the plaintiff, even though they be in the possession of the other defendant, Marcelino de Garcia, to
whom they were sold by his codefendant Gonda, for the latter could not sell them to De Gracia except under the
condition that they could be repurchased by the plaintiff within the said period of seven years. Even still less
right could the defendant De Gracia have to retain possession of these lands, if the contract executed between
the plaintiff and Manuel Gonda had been one of mortgage (as it was styled all along by the plaintiff and the
defendants at the trial and by the lower court himself in the judgment appealed from) for, as the defendant
Gonda was not the owner of the lands, he could not lawfully convey them to his codefendant.

There being no proof that any damages was caused to the plaintiff by the defendants' refusal to return said
parcels of land to him, no finding should be made against the defendants with respect thereto.

We therefore affirm the judgment appealed from, with the costs of this instance against the appellants. So
ordered.