Cases in Memorial - (Prosecution)

1.R v Bowyer  [2013] :

The defendant, Barry Bowyer and the victim Gary Suller, were both having a relationship
with Katie Whitbread, a prostitute. Suller was her pimp.  The defendant was not aware she
was a prostitute. They were both aware of the other’s relationship. On the night of the
killing, the defendant went to Suller’s house to burgle him. Suller disturbed the burglary and
a fight developed. Suller then revealed that Katie was a prostitute and taunted him that she
was her best earner. The defendant  lost his control and  beat Suller and tied him up with
an electricity cable. He was alive when he left him but was found dead the following
afternoon. The defendant was addicted to heroin, diagnosed as bipolar and suffered social
phobia, anxiety and depression.

Held:

The defendant had no justifiable sense of being wronged given that he was committing a
burglary at the time of the offence.

Lord CJ:

“The appellant was a self -confessed burglar. He deliberately entered the home of the
deceased in order to steal property, to sell it to feed his drug habit. He deliberately targeted
the house, taking every precaution to avoid detection. At the very best, he suggests that he
just snapped when, following the householder's return, he, the householder, reacted
violently to the presence of the burglar in his home and used deliberately insulting remarks
about the appellant's girlfriend. To that the somewhat colloquial answer is, "So what"? If
either of these men was justified in losing his self control, it was the deceased. The
deceased was entitled to say and do anything reasonable, including the use of force, to
eject the burglar from his home. Even taking the appellant's evidence at face value (and we
bear in mind that the jury must have rejected it) it is absurd to suggest that the entirely
understandable response of the deceased to finding a burglar in his home provided the
appellant with the remotest beginnings of a basis for suggesting that he had any justifiable
sense of being wronged, let alone seriously wronged. On that basis alone, one essential
ingredient of this defence was entirely absent. Furthermore, we can detect no evidence of
loss of control. The tragic events which occurred in the home of the deceased bore all the
hallmarks of appalling violence administered in cold blood.”

2.R v Pagett (1983):

CAUSATION – NOVUS ACTUS INTERVENIENS – SELF DEFENCE

Facts

The appellant shot at a police officer who was trying to arrest him, and subsequently attempted to use a
pregnant teenage girl standing nearby as a human shield to defend himself against retaliation by the
officer. The officer returned fire, killing the girl. At trial the defendant was acquitted of murder but
convicted of manslaughter, which he appealed.
Issue

The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the officer’s action in shooting at the defendant
constituted a novus actus interveniens  such as to break the chain of causation between the defendant’s
actions and the death of the victim.

Held

It was held that a neither a reasonable act taken for the purpose of self-preservation, nor an act done in
the execution of a legal duty, could not constitute a novus actus interveniens  for the purposes of the
causal chain. The Court suggested that in a homicide case it is rarely necessary to give the jury more than
a simple direction on the issue of causation; a direction that the defendant’s act need not be the sole
cause of death is usually sufficient. In this case, the defendant had done two dangerous acts which a sober
and reasonable person would realise were likely to cause harm, firstly by firing at the officer and secondly
by forcing the victim to shield him from return fire. Both of these acts had in fact contributed significantly
to the victim’s death. The conviction of manslaughter was therefore upheld.

3.R v Blaue [1975]:

Chain of Causation – Manslaughter – Novus Actus Interveniens – Victim’s Own Act – Egg shell Skull Rule

Facts

After the victim refused the defendant’s sexual advances the defendant stabbed the victim four times.  Whist the victim was
admitted to hospital she required medical treatment which involved a blood transfusion.  The victim was a Jehovah’s Witness
whose religious views precluded  accepting a blood transfusion.  She was informed that without a blood transfusion she
would die but still refused to countenance treatment as a result of her religious conviction.  The victim subsequently died
and the defendant was charged with manslaughter by way of diminished responsibility.  The defendant appealed.

Issue

Did the victim’s refusal to accept medical treatment ritute a novus actus interveniens  and so break the chain of causation
between the defendant’s act and her death?  Whether the test laid down in R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95 was to be
applied because of an omission on behalf of the victim.

Held

The appeal was dismissed.  The stab wound and not the girl’s refusal to accept medical treatment was the operating cause of
death.  The victim’s rejection of a blood transfusion did not break the chain of causation.  The defendant must take their
victim as they find them and this includes the characteristics and beliefs of the victim and not just their physical condition. 
Unlike in R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95 the victim’s decision was an omission and not a positive act and so the test
was not of whether the omission was reasonably foreseeable.  In the case of omissions by the victim ‘egg-shell skull’ rule was
to be applied.  Even if R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95 is applied the victim’s response was foreseeable taking into
account their particular characteristics.
4. R v Holland (1841):
The defendant was involved in a fight in which he inflicted a deep cut on the victim's
finger. The victim failed to take care of the wound or get medical assistance and the
wound became infected. Eventually gangrene set in and the victim was advised to
have his arm amputated. The victim refused and died.

The defendant was liable for his death despite the victim's actions in contributing to
his own death.

R v Church [1966]:
Various bases of manslaughter and necessary directions to the jury

Facts

Mr Church and the victim were in a van for sexual purposes. The victim started mocking him
and a fight ensued. He knocked the victim semi-conscious. After his attempts to rouse her
proved unsuccessful, he panicked, thought the victim was dead and threw her into the river.
The victim’s gravely injured body was found in the River Ouse; the cause of death was
drowning. Mr Church was convicted of manslaughter. He appealed his conviction.

Issue

Mr Church argued that the basis of his guilty verdict could not be criminal negligence, as the
trial judge had only directed the jury on recklessness, nor provocation, as it was not adequate
based on the facts. Thus, the only possible basis for manslaughter was that an unlawful act
caused the death. He claimed, however, that the jury was misdirected on the relevance of his
mistaken belief in the victim’s death when he threw her into the river, as mens rea is an
essential element of manslaughter.

Held

The nature of directions given on criminal negligence have to be decided based on the
circumstances of each case – in the present case, it was sufficient to direct the jury about utter
recklessness. Secondly, the commission of an unlawful act does not in itself make a
manslaughter conviction inevitable. It is only satisfied if the unlawful act is such that all
reasonable people would realise that the act would subject the victim to the risk of at
least some harm resulting from it. The trial judge had thus misdirected the jury by claiming that
Mr Church’s belief in the victim’s death when he threw her into the river was irrelevant.
However, despite the misdirection, there was no substantial miscarriage of justice on the whole
because, on proper direction, the verdict would necessarily have been that of guilty.
 Statutes
Section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961:
2.Criminal liability for complicity in another’s suicide.

(1)A person (“D”) commits an offence if—

(a)D does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another person, and

(b)D's act was intended to encourage or assist suicide or an attempt at suicide.

(1A)The person referred to in subsection (1)(a) need not be a specific person (or class of persons) known to, or
identified by, D.

(1B)D may commit an offence under this section whether or not a suicide, or an attempt at suicide, occurs.

(1C)An offence under this section is triable on indictment and a person convicted of such an offence is liable to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years.

(2)If on the trial of an indictment for murder or manslaughter  of a person it is proved that the deceased person
committed suicide, and the accused committed an offence under subsection (1) in relation to that suicide, the
jury may find the accused guilty of the offence under subsection (1). 

(3)The enactments mentioned in the first column of the First Schedule to this Act shall have effect subject to
the amendments provided for in the second column (which preserve in relation to offences under this section
the previous operation of those enactments in relation to murder or manslaughter).

(4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . no proceedings shall be instituted for an offence under this section
except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.